United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 17-1006 

KEVEN A. MCKENNA, 

Plaintiff, Appellant, 

v. 

DAVID CURTIN; LAURA A. PISATURO; JOHN SHEKARCHI; MARIA BUCCI; 

DAVID CAPRIO; RICHARD S. HUMPHREY; MATTHEW F. CALLAGHAN; FRANK 

CONNOR; ANTHONY F. AMALFETANO; JOHN MORAN; PAUL TAVARES; DANIEL 

EGAN; WILLIAM RAMPONE; PAUL A. SUTTELL; MAUREEN MCKENNA 

GOLDBERG; WILLIAM P. ROBINSON, III; FRANCIS X. FLAHERTY; GILBERT 

V. INDEGLIA; DEBRA SAUNDERS; WILLIAM SMITH; SCOTT R. JENSEN; 

MARC DESISTO, 

Defendants, Appellees, 

HELEN MCDONALD, 

Defendant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND 

[Hon. Landya B. McCafferty,* U.S. District Judge]

Before 

Torruella, Lynch, and Kayatta, 

Circuit Judges. 

Keven A. McKenna on brief pro se. 

Michael W. Field, Assistant Attorney General of Rhode Island, 

 * U.S. District Judge for the District of New Hampshire, 

sitting by designation. 
and Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General of Rhode Island, on brief 

for appellees. 

August 25, 2017 

 
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Keven A. McKenna was suspended 

from practicing law for one year by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 

He subsequently filed this federal suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against twenty-three judicial officers and administrators who had 

participated in his disciplinary proceedings, seeking, inter alia, 

reinstatement of his license and money damages. McKenna alleged 

that by revoking his license, the defendants violated the principle 

of separation of powers under the Rhode Island Constitution, and 

infringed upon his First, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

under the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed all of 

McKenna's claims, primarily on the grounds that the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine bars this suit. We affirm. 

I. 

In February 2015, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 

suspended Keven A. McKenna ("McKenna") from practicing law for one 

year, beginning on March 29, 2015. The suspension arose from 

McKenna's handling of a workers' compensation claim that one of 

his former employees brought against him in 2009.1 At the time, 

McKenna was practicing law under the licensed entity, "Keven A. 

McKenna, P.C." ("PC"). In re McKenna, 110 A.3d 1126, 1131 (R.I. 

2015). McKenna refused to make payments ordered by the Workers' 

 1 Because McKenna does not dispute the events underlying 

his suspension on appeal, we offer only a cursory summary of his 

conduct. For a full chronicle, see the Rhode Island Supreme 

Court's order, In re McKenna, 110 A.3d 1126, 1131-35 (R.I. 2015).
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Compensation Court. Instead, he attempted to -- in his own words 

-- "drag this on forever" by filing multiple motions to dismiss in 

Workers' Compensation Court. Id. at 1131-32. 

When this tactic failed, McKenna filed a Chapter 11 

bankruptcy petition on behalf of the PC and a petition for personal 

bankruptcy. Id. at 1133. During the pendency of the bankruptcy 

litigation, McKenna committed numerous ethical violations 

including (1) continuing to practice law under an unlicensed 

entity, "The Law Offices of Keven A. McKenna, LLC"; (2) making 

false statements in his bankruptcy filings; and (3) refusing to 

comply with a subpoena issued by Assistant Disciplinary Counsel 

Marc DeSisto ("DeSisto"). See id. at 1133-35. 

In July 2011, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had 

appointed DeSisto to investigate McKenna's professional conduct. 

Upon the conclusion of DeSisto's investigation in November 2012, 

the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, David Curtin ("Curtin"), filed 

disciplinary charges against McKenna, alleging four counts: 

[1] [T]hat respondent violated Article V, 

Rules 3.3, 7.1, 7.5, and 8.4(c) of the Supreme 

Court Rules of Professional Conduct by 

engaging in the unauthorized practice of law 

as a limited liability entity in violation of 

this Court's order of February 23, 2011; [2] 

that respondent violated Rules 3.3 and 8.4(c) 

by failing to disclose his income to the 

United States Bankruptcy Court for the 

District of Rhode Island (Bankruptcy Court), 

misrepresenting his interest in a receivable 

to that court, and by engaging in conduct that 

amounted to a lack of candor, dishonesty, and 
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misrepresentation to the bankruptcy trustee; 

[3] that respondent violated Article V, Rule 

1.19 of the Supreme Court Rules of 

Professional Conduct by failing to provide 

records requested by Assistant Disciplinary 

Counsel through a subpoena and by failing to 

keep records as mandated by Rule 1.19; and [4] 

that respondent violated Rule 3.3 and Article 

V, Rule 3.5(d) of the Supreme Court Rules of 

Professional Conduct by engaging in conduct 

during proceedings in the Workers' 

Compensation Court and Bankruptcy Court that 

demonstrated a lack of candor, as well as an 

attempt to disrupt those tribunals. 

 

From February through October 2013, a three-member panel 

of the Disciplinary Board held eight hearings where McKenna 

presented witness testimony, his own testimony, and exhibits to 

contest these charges. Throughout the proceedings, McKenna sought 

to avoid the Board's review by alleging multiple constitutional 

violations. The panel dismissed all of McKenna's motions and 

ultimately found that there was clear and convincing evidence that 

McKenna had violated the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of 

Professional Conduct on all four counts. On May 13, 2014, the 

full Disciplinary Board adopted the panel's recommendation to 

suspend McKenna's license for one year and forwarded the matter to 

the Rhode Island Supreme Court, pursuant to Article III, Rule 6(d) 

of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules for Disciplinary Procedure. 

The Rhode Island Supreme Court ordered McKenna to appear 

on June 11, 2014 to show cause as to why his license should not be 

revoked. After listening to presentations by both McKenna and 
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Curtin, as well as reviewing the entire record, the Rhode Island 

Supreme Court issued a twenty-page order adopting the Disciplinary 

Board's recommendation and rejecting McKenna's constitutional 

challenges. See In re McKenna, 110 A.3d 1126. The court further 

directed McKenna to reapply for reinstatement at the conclusion of 

his one-year period of suspension.2 

On March 7, 2016, over a year after the suspension order 

was issued, McKenna brought suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against twenty-three judicial officers and administrators 

of the Rhode Island court system -- in their personal capacities 

-- who had participated in his disciplinary proceedings.3 McKenna 

alleged that the defendants violated provisions of the Rhode Island 

Constitution, as well as his rights under the First, Seventh, and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, by charging him 

with ethical violations and by suspending his license. He sought, 

inter alia, a judgment voiding certain Rhode Island Professional 

 2 McKenna did apply for reinstatement on March 23, 2016 

(after filing this suit). However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 

denied his application on the grounds that he had not fulfilled 

all of the requirements for reinstatement. See In re McKenna, 140 

A.3d 158, 158 (R.I. 2016). 

3 After the defendants filed their motion to dismiss, 

McKenna voluntarily dismissed five counts of his original 

complaint. As a result, only nineteen defendants remain on appeal: 

five Rhode Island Supreme Court justices, twelve Disciplinary 

Board members, Curtin, and DeSisto. 
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Conduct rules, an injunction to reinstate his license, money 

damages, and attorney's fees. 

The district court granted the defendants' motion to 

dismiss all claims, primarily on the grounds that the RookerFeldman doctrine divested the court of subject-matter jurisdiction 

to hear the case. See McKenna v. Curtin, No. 16-cv-108-LM, 2016 

WL 7015699, at *8 (D.R.I. Dec. 1, 2016). In the alternative, the 

district court concluded that res judicata and judicial immunity 

also precluded suit. Id. at *9, *11.

Proceeding pro se, McKenna now contends that the 

district court erred in dismissing his claims. He argues, as he 

did in the district court, that (1) the Rhode Island judiciary 

violated separation of powers under the Rhode Island Constitution, 

and (2) the disciplinary proceedings infringed his federal 

constitutional rights.4 

II. 

We review the dismissal of McKenna's claims de novo and 

may affirm on any independently sufficient ground. See BadilloSantiago v. Naveira-Merly, 378 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004). The 

 4 On appeal, McKenna makes a glancing reference to the 

alleged First, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendment violations, but 

does not develop his arguments, so they are waived. See United 

States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting the 

"settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory 

manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, 

are deemed waived"). 
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district court correctly held that McKenna's suit is barred by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As such, we need not reach the merits of 

McKenna's constitutional claim. 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which is derived from two 

U.S. Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 

413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 

460 U.S. 462 (1983), prevents "lower federal courts . . . from 

exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court 

judgments." Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006); see also 

Badillo-Santiago, 378 F.3d at 6. We have held that the RookerFeldman doctrine only applies "in the 'limited circumstances' 

where 'the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court 

after the state proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused 

by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of 

that judgment.'" Federación de Maestros v. Junta de Relaciones 

del Trabajo, 410 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Exxon 

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)). 

These prerequisites are satisfied here. McKenna is a 

state-court loser who filed suit in federal court one year after 

the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued its suspension order. 

Throughout his complaint, McKenna repeatedly alleges that his 

suspension infringed "[his] liberty interests, his property 

interests, his freedom of speech interests, and his due process 

interests under the U.S. Constitution." And under multiple counts, 
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McKenna demands "a stay of his unlawful suspension," by way of 

relief. Because McKenna (1) complains of a personal injury arising 

from the Rhode Island Supreme Court's suspension order, and (2) 

asks the district court to countermand that order, his suit is 

precisely the "functional equivalent of an appeal" that the RookerFeldman doctrine forbids. Badillo-Santiago, 378 F.3d at 6. 

Although McKenna attempts to clear this jurisdictional 

hurdle by reframing his case as a "public law" challenge, he is 

felled by his own complaint. McKenna's bald assertions that the 

Rules of Professional Conduct are "unconstitutional," and that the 

defendants lacked "authority" to discipline him, are insufficient 

to raise a facial challenge when all of the allegations in his 

complaint concern the constitutionality of the rules as applied to 

him. As such, adjudicating the separation of powers issue McKenna 

raises would necessarily require reviewing the merits of the Rhode 

Island Supreme Court's decision, thus violating the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine. 

McKenna's only rejoinder -- that the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine does not apply here because his suspension hearings did 

not constitute a judicial proceeding -- is plainly contradicted by 

Feldman itself. There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 

proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 

surrounding Feldman's petition to be admitted to the District's 

bar, without sitting for the exam, was judicial in nature. See 
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Feldman, 460 U.S. at 479. Faced with similar facts to this case, 

the Court noted that: 

[The proceedings] required the District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals to determine in 

light of existing law and in light of 

Feldman's qualifications and arguments 

whether Feldman's petition should be granted. 

The court also had before it legal arguments 

against the validity of the rule. When it 

issued a per curiam order denying Feldman's 

petition, it determined as a legal matter, 

that Feldman was not entitled to be admitted 

to the bar without examination or to sit for 

the bar examination. The court had 

adjudicated Feldman's "claim of a present 

right to admission to the bar," and rejected 

it. This is the essence of a judicial 

proceeding. 

Id. at 480-81 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 

The Rhode Island Supreme Court's disciplinary hearings 

contained the same "essence of a judicial proceeding." Id. at 

481. The court had to determine in light of existing law and the 

evidence on the record whether it should adopt the Disciplinary 

Board's recommendation to suspend McKenna for one year. The court 

also had before it McKenna's constitutional challenges to the 

proceedings, as well as his various motions to stay and to recuse 

members of the court. When the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued 

its twenty-page order suspending McKenna, it adjudicated his 

constitutional claims, and "determined as a legal matter" that 

McKenna failed to show cause. Id. at 480. The suspension order 

thus falls squarely within the definition of a final state-court 
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judgment that is insulated from federal district court review by 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is 

particularly appropriate here because McKenna's separation of 

powers claim is based on an interpretation of the Rhode Island 

Constitution. And in this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 

-- the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of that constitution -- 

itself expressly dismissed McKenna's constitutional challenge. 

See In re McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1137-41. 

III. 

The district correctly held that McKenna's suit is 

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, we affirm the 

dismissal of McKenna's claims.