alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1103.160 Communications. ( a ) The agency shall take appropriate steps to ensure effective communication with applicants, participants, personnel of other Federal entities, and members of the public. ( 1 ) The agency shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids where necessary to afford a handicapped person an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a program or activity conducted by the agency. ( i ) In determining what type of auxiliary aid is necessary, the agency shall give primary consideration to the requests of the handicapped person.
( ii ) The agency need not provide individually prescribed devices, readers for personal use or study, or other devices of a personal nature.
( 2 ) Where the agency communicates with applicants and beneficiaries by telephone, telecommunication devices for deaf persons (TDD's) or equally effective telecommunication systems shall be used.
( b ) The agency shall ensure that interested persons, including persons with impaired vision or hearing, can obtain information as to the existence and location of accessible services, activities, and facilities.
( c ) The agency shall provide signage at a primary entrance to each of its inaccessible facilities, directing users to a location at which they can obtain information about accessible facilities. The international symbol for accessibility shall be used at each primary entrance of an accessible facility.
( d ) This section does not require the agency to take any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a program or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens. In those circumstances where agency personnel believe that the proposed action would fundamentally alter the program or activity or would result in undue financial and administrative burdens, the agency has the burden of proving that compliance with § 1103.160 would result in such alteration or burdens. The decision that compliance would result in such alteration or burdens must be made by the agency head or his or her designee after considering all agency resources available for use in the funding and operation of the conducted program or activity, and must be accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for reaching that conclusion. If an action required to comply with this section would result in such an alteration or such burdens, the agency shall take any other action that would not result in such an alteration or such burdens but would nevertheless ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, handicapped persons receive the benefits and services of the program or activity.
Case 3:08-cv-01750-CRB Document 12 Filed 03/03/10 Page 1 of 2Case 3:08-cv-01750-CRB Document 12 Filed 03/03/10 Page 2 of 2
### §§283h, 283i. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 283h, act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title IV, §404F, as added Pub. L. 107–280, §3, Nov. 6, 2002, 116 Stat. 1989; amended Pub. L. 109–482, title I, §§103(b)(5), 104(b)(1)(B), Jan. 15, 2007, 120 Stat. 3687, 3693, which related to the Office of Rare Diseases, was renumbered section 481 of act July 1, 1944, by Pub. L. 112–74, div. F, title II, §221(c)(2)(A)(i), Dec. 23, 2011, 125 Stat. 1089, and transferred to section 287a–1 of this title.

Section 283i, act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title IV, §404G, as added Pub. L. 107–280, §4, Nov. 6, 2002, 116 Stat. 1990; amended Pub. L. 109–482, title I, §103(b)(6), Jan. 15, 2007, 120 Stat. 3687, which related to rare disease regional centers of excellence, was renumbered section 481A of act July 1, 1944, by Pub. L. 112–74, div. F, title II, §221(c)(3), Dec. 23, 2011, 125 Stat. 1089, and transferred to section 287a–2 of this title.
§ 1006.630 May the Inter-American Foundation impute conduct of one person to another? For purposes of actions taken under this rule, we may impute conduct as follows: ( a ) *Conduct imputed from an individual to an organization.* We may impute the fraudulent, criminal, or other improper conduct of any officer, director, shareholder, partner, employee, or other individual associated with an organization, to that organization when the improper conduct occurred in connection with the individual's performance of duties for or on behalf of that organization, or with the organization's knowledge, approval or acquiescence. The organization's acceptance of the benefits derived from the conduct is evidence of knowledge, approval or acquiescence.
( b ) *Conduct imputed from an organization to an individual, or between individuals.* We may impute the fraudulent, criminal, or other improper conduct of any organization to an individual, or from one individual to another individual, if the individual to whom the improper conduct is imputed either participated in, had knowledge of, or reason to know of the improper conduct.
( c ) *Conduct imputed from one organization to another organization.* We may impute the fraudulent, criminal, or other improper conduct of one organization to another organization when the improper conduct occurred in connection with a partnership, joint venture, joint application, association or similar arrangement, or when the organization to whom the improper conduct is imputed has the power to direct, manage, control or influence the activities of the organization responsible for the improper conduct. Acceptance of the benefits derived from the conduct is evidence of knowledge, approval or acquiescence.
#### Alexander Brown, appellee, v. Fernandes Grain Company, appellant*.*

Assumpsit for a balance due on wheat shipped to defendant. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. Prank W. Burton, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1921.

Reversed and remanded.

Opinion filed July 10, 1922.

Harlington Wood and Sampson & Giffin, for appellant. Roger E. Chapin, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Heard

delivered the opinion of the court.
### §§2717 to 2729. Repealed. Pub. L. 93–203, title VI, §614, Dec. 28, 1973, 87 Stat. 883

Section 2717, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §107, Aug. 20, 1964, 78 Stat. 511; Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §101, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 675, provided for establishment of Job Corps centers.

Section 2718, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §108, Aug. 20, 1964, 78 Stat. 511; Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §101, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 676, covered Job Corps program activities.

Section 2719, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §109, Aug. 20, 1964, 78 Stat. 511; Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §101, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 676, covered allowances and support for Job Corps enrollees.

Section 2720, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §110, Aug. 20, 1964, 78 Stat. 511; Pub. L. 89–253, §7, Oct. 9, 1965, 79 Stat. 974; Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §101, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 677, set out standards of conduct and discipline for Job Corps enrollees.

Section 2721, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §111, as added Pub. L. 89–794, title I, §110, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1453; amended Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §101, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 677, covered community participation in Job Corps activities.

Section 2722, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §111–1, as added Pub. L. 89–794, title I, §111, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1454, provided for experimental and demonstration projects and directed Director to report to Congress no later than Mar. 1, 1968.

Section 2723, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §112, as added Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §101, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 678, provided for counseling and job placement.

Section 2724, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §113, as added Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §101, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 679; amended Pub. L. 92–424, §27(b)(1), Sept. 19, 1972, 86 Stat. 705, covered experimental and development projects.

Section 2725, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §114, as added Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §101, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 680, covered advisory boards and committees.

Section 2726, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §115, as added Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §101, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 680, covered participation of States.

Section 2727, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §116, as added Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §101, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 681; amended Pub. L. 90–623, §5(a), Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1315, covered the application of provisions of Federal law.

Section 2728, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §117, as added Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §101, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 682, set out certain special limitations.

Section 2729, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §118, as added Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §101, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 682, prohibited political discrimination and political activity.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Pub. L. 93–203, title VI, §614, Dec. 28, 1973, 87 Stat. 883, provided that the repeal by that section is effective with respect to fiscal years after June 30, 1974.
### §300b–2. Voluntary participation by individuals

The participation by any individual in any program or portion thereof under this part shall be wholly voluntary and shall not be a prerequisite to eligibility for or receipt of any other service or assistance from, or to participation in, any other program.

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title XI, §1103, as added Pub. L. 94–278, title IV, §403(a), Apr. 22, 1976, 90 Stat. 408.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 300b–2, act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title XI, §1103, as added May 16, 1972, Pub. L. 92–294, §3(c), 86 Stat. 138; amended Aug. 29, 1972, Pub. L. 92–414, §4(3), 86 Stat. 652, was identical to this section, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 94–278, title IV, §403(a), Apr. 22, 1976, 90 Stat. 407.
No. 89-6791.

#### Lopez *v.*United States.

C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### §§ 144.152-144.159 [Reserved]
#### § 18.4 Records.

The roster of all persons prohibited from practice before the Department shall be available to public inspection at the Office of Director General. Other records may be disclosed upon specific request, in accordance with appropriate disclosure regulations of the Department.
#### Robert J. Nicola, Respondent, v Mae E. Nicola, Appellant.

In a matrimonial action in which the plaintiff had previously been granted an uncontested divorce on the ground of abandonment, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated February 6, 1976, which denied her motion to vacate the judgment of divorce. Order affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Plaintiff-respondent obtained a judgment of divorce on the ground of his wife’s abandonment. Although the wife filed a notice of appearance in the action, her answer was untimely and *794was refused by plaintiff. The wife’s motion to compel acceptance of her answer was made almost simultaneously with the notice of inquest by plaintiff, but the motion was returnable on a later date than that set forth in the notice. On the date of the inquest, the Special Term offered an adjournment if the wife would come from Missouri and be available for a trial within a week. The wife’s counsel did not acquiesce in that arrangement. For that reason, and for the reason that the wife was, according to plaintiff’s counsel, seeking delay of the New York action in order that her action for divorce in Missouri, commenced after the plaintiff commenced the New York action, might be determined before the New York action, Special Term proceeded with the inquest. In the light of the liberal policy that exists in New York respecting vacatur of defaults in matrimonial actions (see, e.g., *Rutledge v Rutledge,*60 AD2d 646) we might have been inclined to grant the motion to vacate the judgment. However, defendant-appellant, in her brief, states that: "Each of the parties has remarried since this litigation has begun” and that "[tjhis appeal is directed solely at opening the default judgment as it affects the economic differences of the parties and to permit an Answer to be interposed so that child support and property issues may be litigated.” Under those circumstances, vacatur of the default was properly denied since appellant may apply for child support in the Family Court and may institute a plenary action in connection with any property issues which may be in dispute. Hopkins, J. P., Shapiro, Hawkins and O’Connor, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

            Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002

I, Carmine Stella, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Capital Beverage
Corporation.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
registrant and I have:

         a) designed such internal controls to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant and its subsidiaries (collectively, the "Company") is
made known to me by others within the Company, particularly during the period in
which this quarterly report is being prepared;

         b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's internal controls as
of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this quarterly report (the
"Evaluation Date"); and

         c) presented in this quarterly report my conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on my evaluation
as of the Evaluation Date;

5. I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors:

         a) all significant deficiencies (if any) in the design or operation of
internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

         b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
controls; and

6. I have indicated in this quarterly report whether or not there were
significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could
significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent
evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date:  November 15, 2004              /s/Carmine Stella
                                         --------------------------------------
                                         Carmine Stella
                                         President and Chief Executive Officer
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THOMAS M. HERLIHY (SBN 83615) 

Email: thomas.herlihy(a),wilsonelser.com 

FRANCIS TORRENCE (SBN 154653) 

Email: francis.torrence@wilsonelser.com 

WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER LLP 

525 Market Street, 17th Floor 

San Francisco, California 94105 

Telephone: (415)433-0990 

Facsimile: (415)434-1370 

Attorneys for Defendant 

PROVIDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY 

J. DAVID OSWALT (SBN 073439) 

Email: doswalt@kantor.law.net 

CHRISTINA J. SMITH (SBN 193509 

E-mail: csmithfolkantorlaw.net 

KANTOR & KANTOR 

19839 Nordhoff Street 

Northridge, California 91324 

Telephone: (818)886-2525 

Facsimile: (818)350-6272 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

MARGARET HALL, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

PROVIDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT 

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant 

Case No.: CV08 0114CRJ3 

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE DATES 

FOR EXCHANGE OF EXPERT 

REPORTS AND [PROPOSED] ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by the parties, through their attorneys of 

record, that the date for the exchange of expert witness reports be continued from February 15, 

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE DATES FOR EXCHANGE OF EXPERT REPORTS AND [PROPOSED] ORDER 

USDC NDCA Case No.: CV 08 0114 CRB 

480091.1 

)

Case 3:08-cv-00114-CRB Document 77 Filed 02/16/10 Page 1 of 3
2010 to February 22, 2010 and the date for the exchange of rebuttal expert reports be continued 

from March 1, 2010 to March 8, 2010. 

Dated: February 11,2009 

Dated: February 11,2009 

WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & 

DICKER LLP 

By: /s/ Francis J. Torrence 

Francis J. Torrence 

Lisa S. Passalacqua 

Attorneys for Defendant 

Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company 

KANTOR & ICANTOR LLP 

By: /s/J. David Oswalt 

J. David Oswalt 

Attorneys for Plaintiff Margaret Hall 

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE DATES FOR EXCHHABE OF EXPERT REPORTS AND [PROPOSED] ORDER 

USDC NDCA Case No.: CV 08 0114 CRB 

Case 3:08-cv-00114-CRB Document 77 Filed 02/16/10 Page 2 of 3
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PURSUANT TO STIPULATION, IT IS SO ORDERED. The date for the exchange of 

expert witness reports is continued from February 15, 2010 to February 22, 2010 and the date for 

the exchange of rebuttal expert reports is continued from March 1, 2010 to March 8, 2010. 

Date: ,2010 

United States District Judge 

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE DATES FOR EXCHHABE OF EXPERT REPORTS AND [PROPOSED] ORDER 

USDC NDCA Case No.: CV 08 0114 CRB 

 February 16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Charles R. Breyer

Case 3:08-cv-00114-CRB Document 77 Filed 02/16/10 Page 3 of 3
#### Marion S. Kruger et al., Appellants, v. Vincent Ciadella et al., Doing Business as Sunrise Motel, Respondents.

Motion granted to enlarge time for filing respondents’ brief and postponing argument of appeal to January 1961 Term.
Editorial Note on Part 201
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 201 appear at 62 FR 38027, July 16, 1997.

§ 201.24 Progress and advance payments. ( a ) *Definitions* — ( 1 ) *Progress payments.* Progress payments are payments made prior to shipment under a fixed price procurement contract, which are based on actual costs incurred or on an actual stage or percentage of completion accomplished.
( 2 ) *Advance payments.* Advance payments are payments to a supplier prior to, and in anticipation of, performance under a procurement contract. They are not based on actual performance or actual costs incurred.
( b ) *Progress payments* — ( 1 ) *Conditions for eligibility.* USAID will approve progress payments only if: ( i ) The period between the commencement of work and the first required delivery will exceed four months;
( ii ) There will be substantial predelivery costs that may have a material impact on a suppliers's working capital;
( iii ) The total FAS purchase price will exceed $200,000;
( iv ) The supplier must establish a performance bond or guaranty in favor of the borrower/grantee providing adequate security for the amount of the progress payments; and
( v ) The amount of the progress payments does not exceed 95 percent of the total FAS purchase price.
( 2 ) *Notice.* In order for progress payments to be eligible under a competitive procurement, the solicitation document must state that such payments will be allowed and that a request for progress payments will not be considered an adverse factor in the award of the contract.
( 3 ) *Approval.* All progress payments must be approved in writing by USAID.
( c ) *Advance payments* — ( 1 ) *Conditions for eligibility.* Advance payments may be authorized only if USAID has made a positive determination in writing that: ( i ) USAID will benefit therefrom, in terms of increased competition and/or lower prices, prior to the issuance of the solicitation or prior to award of a noncompetitive contract; and
( ii ) The supplier has a financial management system which is adequate for controlling and accounting for U.S. government funds.
( 2 ) *Amount.* The amount of the advance is based on an analysis of the working capital required under the procurement contract, taking into consideration the availability of the supplier's own working capital and shall be limited to the minimum amount needed for immediate disbursing needs.
( 3 ) *Security.* The supplier must establish an advance payment bond or guaranty in favor of the borrower/grantee providing adequate security for the amount of the advance payment.
( 4 ) *Notice.* In order for advance payments to be eligible under a competitive procurement, the solicitation document must state that such payments will be allowed and that a request for advance payments will not be considered an adverse factor in the award of the contract.
( 5 ) *Approvals.* All advance payments must be approved by USAID in writing.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAVANCE MICKEY WILSON,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

A. PANIZZA; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 11-17045

D.C. No. 3:10-cv-01627-JW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

James Ware, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 13, 2012** 

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

Javance Mickey Wilson, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the

district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that

prison officials violated his First Amendment rights when they confiscated a book

FILED

NOV 20 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 11-17045

from his incoming mail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Wilson failed

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ actions were

not reasonably related to a legitimate correctional goal. See Turner v. Safley, 482

U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987) (setting forth relevant factors in determining whether a

regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528-30

(2006) (courts should accord prison officials deference when analyzing the

constitutional validity of prison regulations).

Wilson’s contention that the district court should have requested a copy of

the confiscated book to review are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.