REPORT FROM A ROUNDTABLE HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S POLICY PLANNING STAFF

SELF-DETERMINATION

Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and

the Right to Secession

Patricia Carley

UNITED STATES

INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Summary v

Preface ix

1 Introduction 1

2 A History of the Self-Determination Concept 3

3 The Rise of Contemporary Self-Determination 

Movements 5

4 The Self-Determination Principle: Legal Definitions 

and Obligations 8

5 A Specific Case: The Crisis in Chechnya 11

6 U.S. Interests and Possible Policy Options 13

7 Conclusion 18

About the Author 19

About the Institute 20

CONTENTS
The right to self-determination has become

one of the most complex issues for U.S. foreign policymakers and the international

community at large. Confusion over the issue

stems not so much from whether there exists a

right to self-determination, which is included in

many international human rights documents, but

from the failure of those documents to define exactly who is entitled to claim this right—a group, a

people, or a nation—and what exactly the right confers. At the same time, the international system,

particularly in the post–World War II era, has

steadfastly defended the inviolability of existing

nation-states’ borders, regardless of how and when

they were determined. 

In recent years, many groups that constitute minorities in their states have invoked the “right to

self-determination” in their demands for autonomy—or, in some cases, secession—and have resorted to violence to pursue their aims. These

groups typically justify their demand for self-determination as a way to end years of repression and

human rights violations by the majority ethnic

group or the central government. The absence of a

precise definition of what the right to self-determination entails has left the international community, and the states concerned, without guiding

principles with which to respond. 

Recognizing the challenge to peace posed by demands for self-determination (and governments’

responses to them), the United States Institute of

Peace, working with the Policy Planning Staff of

the U.S. Department of State, assembled a group of

policymakers and scholars to examine the origins,

growth, and strategies of such movements, and to

discuss whether universal principles can be developed to inform international, and particularly U.S.,

responses. This report summarizes the discussions

at that meeting.

Self-determination as a political force in international society is a relatively recent phenomenon,

emerging in the aftermath of World War I and the

breakup of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian

empires as a demand of national groups seeking to

divide territory. President Woodrow Wilson was

the statesman most closely identified with the selfdetermination principle, though ironically the

term does not appear in his “Fourteen Points”

speech. While he referred to minority rights within

a larger state, he rarely mentioned the establishment of new, independent states.

Self-determination became officially sanctioned

after 1945, when it was included in the United Nations Charter, though it applied to existing states,

not to peoples or national groups. However, selfdetermination quickly evolved from a principle to

a right, especially after the 1960 UN Declaration

on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples, when the term came to denote decolonization. Still, self-determination applied to territories

and not to peoples.

Since the 1970s, there has been a move to combine the ideas of minority rights and decolonization, and the result has been a tendency on the

part of some advocates to define self-determination as conferring the right to independent statehood on every distinctive ethnic group.

Many observers of this trend share the concern

that confusion about what the principle of selfdetermination means and what putative rights it

confers is helping to fuel the violence characterizing contemporary independence movements. Yet

the realities of the international system provide a

rationale of sorts for such movements, including

the view that internationally recognized borders

are “artificial, arbitrary, and accidental” and that

they in fact legitimize the combining of different

peoples arbitrarily, and often against their will,

v

SUMMARY
within the same territory. Moreover, the growth of

these movements is not a temporary phenomenon, but the direct result of changes in the world

wrought by the universal application of Western

ideas such as democracy and human rights. Most

of the world’s peoples have little experience with

the West’s long history of sovereignty and statehood and are thus not prepared to adhere to the

Western insistence on the inviolability of existing

borders. Those in the West who are alarmed by the

growth of these nationalist movements should

consider not whether these contemporary manifestations of nationalism are legal or appropriate,

but rather that they are happening—and that they

very likely cannot be stopped. The potential for violence and international instability becomes even

more obvious when one considers that some still

very large empires, such as Russia and China, are

likely to be affected by these movements.

Unfortunately, turning to international legal

standards on the right to self-determination does

not resolve the problem, since the right has never

been explicitly defined. In any case, it is impractical to assume that legal principles alone will resolve what are essentially territorial and political

disputes. Because the right has never been defined,

the notion of self-determination typically embraces

several different meanings, none of which addresses the central issue of how to respond to a national or other identity group’s aspirations for control over the lives of its members. 

Without a doubt, any new definition of selfdetermination must include customary human

rights standards (e.g., respect for individual and

minority rights) and the right of an appropriate

body to enforce those standards. In their later

stages, self-determination movements typically become the target of human rights violations, which

should be addressed before they reach the often intractable phase of organized struggle against the

state. However, the right to self-determination

must be separated from the right to secession and

the establishment of independent statehood, with

the understanding that there are intermediate categories short of statehood that can address a minority group’s interests and aspirations, such as membership in various international forums or regional

organizations. Human rights violations are easy to

condemn; the dilemma is whether they justify the

persecuted group’s secession from the state, a

conclusion the international community is largely

unwilling to draw. Thus the question becomes,

Can a principle be developed that stands somewhere in between recognized human rights standards and the right to self-determination?

Somewhat ironically, the very propagation of

the idea of human rights intensifies demands for

greater recognition among minority groups that invoke claims of human rights violations to support

their demands. However, the idea that human

rights and political stability are bound to clash is

tenuous, since states held together through terror

and repression are rarely stable in most senses of

the word. In the end, though, it may not be possible to compel an oppressive government to end its

unacceptable actions toward a minority group if

outside countries are unwilling to intervene with

military force.

U.S. policy interests in the self-determination

debate beg a preliminary question: What exactly

does the United States care about with regard to

self-determination movements—the outcome of

the struggle (i.e., the shifting of boundaries and the

proliferation of states) or the means used to obtain

it (i.e., the violence that frequently accompanies

such struggles)? Unfortunately, American diplomacy often cannot decide between these two interests, making a response that much more difficult

to formulate. Generally, though, the United States

should be less concerned about outcomes in these

struggles than about the means used; international

political stability is more likely to be maintained by

focusing on the process than by trying to manipulate events to arrange a predetermined outcome.

The options for a minority group waging a

struggle for self-determination do not have to be

viewed in the zero-sum terms of independence or

assimilation, despite the fact that international law

tends to reinforce this approach. The United States

could encourage the practice of granting some intermediate status short of independent statehood

to unrecognized peoples or other distinct economic or political entities. Parallel or multiple representation for substate entities that function autonomously (such as Taiwan’s participation in the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) can provide outlets for what otherwise might be secessionist pressures. Legitimate secessionist aspirations

could be diverted to nonterritorial demands, thus

avoiding a strictly territorial interpretation of 

vi
vii

self-determination. The United States might also

consider advocating a change in the current system that allows the government to conduct its affairs only with other states and not with subunits

within states. However, offering subgroups some

sort of recognition or representation in international forums or organizations may ultimately lead

to greater demands from smaller and smaller identity groups for independence and UN representation.

The United States may have no choice but to

avoid the pronouncement of clear doctrines and

principles regarding self-determination movements and thereby avoid being driven to intervene

in conflicts according to rigid principles that certainly do not apply in every instance. The United

States should, however, make absolutely clear that

secession has not been universally recognized as

an international right. It may choose, on the basis

of other interests, to support the secessionist

claims of a self-determination movement, but not

because the group is exercising its right to secession, since no such right exists in international law.

At the same time, an absolute rejection of secession

in every case is unsound, because the United

States should not be willing to tolerate another

state’s repression or genocide in the name of territorial integrity. Secession can be a legitimate aim of

some self-determination movements, particularly

in response to gross and systematic violations of

human rights and when the entity is potentially

politically and economically viable. 

Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to the

dilemmas presented by self-determination movements in the world today. Clearly, in the face of the

growing number of such movements, establishing

a definition of the right to self-determination is

necessary, though agreement on such a definition

will not be easy—and even then, it will not likely be

conclusive and unequivocal. The desire among national groups to seek self-determination is not a

simple matter with a single cause. Rather, it stems

from multiple sources, including the denial of minority rights, territorial disputes, national aspirations, and the belief in economic and political viability, among others. This desire may develop

gradually until the last resort to violence and secession come into play. Unfortunately, the inattentiveness of the world community often makes what is

in fact a gradual process seem very sudden. 
The thorny topic of self-determination has increasingly demanded the attention of U.S.

policymakers and the international community. Partly because of the postwar communications revolution, peoples around the globe have an

increased awareness of the state system’s seemingly permanent configuration and of their place

in it. Some of these groups, whether in pursuit of

greater international recognition or in response to

repressive government policies, are now seeking to

exercise what they see as their right to self-determination, which they assume includes the right to independent statehood. Do such groups have this

right? Is this an inevitable consequence of the

processes of imperial dissolution, decolonization,

and increased global awareness? How should the

international community, and the United States in

particular, respond?

All too frequently, self-determination movements resort to violence to achieve their aims. The

origins of these movements sometimes remain obscure, however, and the outside world pays little

attention to them until conflict breaks out, leaving

similarly inclined groups with the “lesson” that violence is the only practical course of action. And, of

course, it is that much more difficult to determine

a policy response when conflict has raised both the

stakes and the resolve of the players to pursue

their aims at all costs. 

With its mandate to pursue the study of peaceful resolution to international conflicts, the United

States Institute of Peace convened a meeting on

“Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession” in February

1995. The all-day session, organized in conjunction with the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, allowed government policymakers and outside experts to gather and discuss

freely, practically, and informally the complex issues surrounding self-determination and secessionist movements. The informal nature of the discussions is particularly important, because in the

West the issue of self-determination is often addressed from a formal, legalistic standpoint. While

most of the participants in this session were well

acquainted with the political and legal terminology

used to describe self-determination, what it means

in practical terms is by far the trickier issue. Because self-determination encompasses so many issues—including individual and minority rights, regional autonomy, government repression,

territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and claims to

independence, to name but a few—the most difficult task in planning such a meeting was to determine which aspects of the issue would be addressed. The resulting focus on territorial integrity

and the right to secession should not suggest that

the other aspects are not important; rather, it was

an attempt to set limits on a topic that can easily

become extremely complicated and broad.

The discussion proved to be so valuable that the

Institute decided to make it available to a wider audience. The session’s report, we believe, fills a gap

in the literature available to members of the U.S.

policy community who do not always have the opportunity to read longer, more in-depth, scholarly

treatments of the subject. While the United States

Institute of Peace has published many works examining the causes behind various self-determination movements—books such as Minorities at Risk:

A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts by Ted

Robert Gurr and its Series on Religion, Nationalism, and Intolerance—this is the Institute’s first effort to address the theoretical and practical aspects

of the self-determination problem in such a comprehensive manner. The Institute plans to hold 

ix

PREFACE
follow-up meetings to explore the self-determination issue further, and reports from those sessions

will also be made available.

The meeting was organized by Institute program officer Patricia Carley. The Institute would

like to thank Adam Wasserman of the Department

of State’s Policy Planning Staff for helping to organize the meeting. This report was prepared by Ms.

Carley and edited by Peter Pavilionis.

x
The right to self-determination as declared in

many international documents is fast becoming one of the thorniest issues for the international community and U.S. foreign policymakers in particular. Considerable confusion and

conflict have resulted not so much over the notion

of the right to self-determination, proclaimed in

such documents as the International Covenants

on Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act, but

over the definition of self-determination. What exactly does this right entail—autonomy? statehood?

What other rights come with it? Who is able to exercise it? Who is not, and why?

Since the end of World War I, and especially

since World War II, the world has ordered its affairs with an international system based on the

concept of states whose borders, no matter how

they were originally determined, are considered inviolable. However, few, if any, nation-states have international borders that unambiguously encompass one nation or people, or even several peoples

who voluntarily agreed to become part of one

state. Many peoples, distinct and recognizable by

most criteria, do not have their own nation-states,

and they find themselves a discrete minority

within a state. In some cases, they are divided

among several states.

The United Nations, and other international organizations have steadfastly defended this system

of states. They have also defended the right of peoples to self-determination as outlined in the UN

Charter. However, the self-determination principle

has been interpreted differently at different times

and has been inconsistently applied as a result. In

the wake of rapid political, social, and technological changes in the world, distinct national groups

have pushed demands for their own states to the

top of their political agendas. These national

groups have armed themselves with the claim to

self-determination, in which the right to secession

is seen as an implicit, integral part. Because the issue is so complex and potentially explosive, the response of the international community has frequently been to sidestep it. 

However, this nonresponse is becoming increasingly untenable as the inconsistencies in the

present system become more obvious. As a greater

number of national groups demand some level of

recognition, the international community finds itself without concrete principles with which to respond. The failure to define self-determination explicitly, while perhaps intentional, has left U.S.

policymakers and international organizations ill

equipped to respond to the ever-increasing number of claims from currently unrepresented (at

least in nation-state form) minority and other national groups throughout the world.

In practical terms, the current system provides a

seat at the United Nations for Monaco, but not for

the Kurds. Armenians and Uzbeks are now legally

outside the bounds of Soviet-cum-Russian colonialism, but other non-Russians currently in the

Russian Federation (such as the Chechens) are

not—not least because they were designated with a

different ethno-territorial status in Stalin’s policy of

national delimitation. Certainly the unchecked

proliferation of new states is not a desired outcome, but the reasons frequently cited against secession—the need for stability and the inviolability

of borders—are falling on the increasingly deaf ears

of those who consider them nothing more than a

smoke screen to protect an existing—and, in their

eyes, unjust—system.

As with many human rights matters, the likelihood that an unrepresented national identity

group will move beyond demands for equality to

fight for independence depends to some, perhaps

a large, extent on the nature of the government

that has sovereignty over the group. Peoples who

are denied basic cultural, linguistic, and political

1INTRODUCTION

1
rights by their rulers are more likely to resort to violence than those who have been given a large

measure of local autonomy. 

Encouraging democracy and respect for human

rights and granting local autonomy might be the

answer to the self-determination dilemma, but this

approach does not resolve the matter across the

board, as self-determination struggles leading to

separatist demands exist in developed democracies (e.g., Canada’s Quebecois separatists and the

Scottish National Movement). Some nations or

groups feel so aggrieved, so repressed by their

rulers, that offers of local autonomy that might

have sufficed at one point are no longer adequate.

It is as if a certain line has been crossed, a point of

no return, beyond which full independence becomes the only acceptable goal.

U.S. Interests

For its part, the United States has largely avoided

defining exactly what the right to self-determination includes. It is usually defined by describing

what it does not include—the right to secession, for

example—but that response has not proved to be

adequate, nor has it been found acceptable to

many of the peoples in question.

The question should be asked, Must self-determination be explicitly defined? Why should the

United States want to address this complex and

potentially explosive issue? Perhaps there is no

practical course but to continue to approach the

matter on a case-by-case basis, taking into account

other strategic, political, and economic interests in

each instance. However, this course does have its

drawbacks, as witnessed in the continuing chaos

and the terrorism that often accompany self-determination movements.

The Institute Roundtable

Recognizing the challenge to world peace that demands for self-determination present, the United

States Institute of Peace convened a small study

group in February 1995 to address the issue. The

Institute worked with the Policy Planning Staff of

the U.S. Department of State to bring together

lawyers, political scientists, and regional experts

who have considered this question in the wider

sense, along with relevant policymakers who understand the practical aspects of the problem. The

discussion was chaired by Max Kampelman, vice

chairman of the Institute’s board of directors and

former U.S. ambassador to the Conference on

(now Organization for) Security and Cooperation

in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE). The purpose of the

meeting was to discuss candidly the nature of selfdetermination, its evolution, and the range of recent applications. The primary focus was whether

universal organizing principles can be formulated

to guide U.S. policymakers, and what likely challenges and opportunities will be presented by future appeals to the right to self-determination. 

The discussion raised several questions of key

significance to policymakers. Do international organizations to which the United States belongs—

such as the UN and OSCE—provide adequate guidance on the self-determination issue for policymakers? If not, is it possible to develop a set of general principles to use in responding to self-determination crises? In other words, to what extent is

each situation so specific that general principles

simply cannot be applied? What activities are acceptable for a sovereign state to use to hold itself

together? How can potential problems be identified before they erupt into conflict? More practically, what influence can the United States exert on

the governments and peoples involved in such

conflicts?

2
Hurst Hannum of the Fletcher School of

Law and Diplomacy described three eras

that have shaped the history of the concept of self-determination. The first era began in

the nineteenth century and lasted through the

Wilsonian period, ending in approximately 1945.

Hannum reminded the participants that John Stuart Mill, among others, first suggested the connection between ethnicity, language, and culture on

the one hand, and statehood on the other, a view

that informed many of the nationalist movements

of the nineteenth century. Ironically, Hannum contended, the classic nationalist movements of that

era were not about the breakup of empires, but

about the unification of “nations” such as Germany

and Italy. It was only after the Ottoman and AustroHungarian empires began to disintegrate that selfdetermination became a rallying cry of smaller national groups as a means of dividing, rather than

unifying, territory. 

At this time, Hannum continued, the essential

qualities of the concept of self-determination were,

first, that it was a purely political principle, usually

referring to some sort of autonomy rather than

statehood for ethnic or national groups, and second, that the right was not absolute, but relative:

Certain political and economic requirements, such

as economic viability and geographic size, were

necessary to warrant statehood. Finally, in the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the concept of self-determination was seen almost invariably in terms of another, much more important,

political goal of promoting world peace.

These limitations on self-determination were accepted by President Woodrow Wilson, who was,

according to Hannum, the statesman most closely

identified with the principle. Ironically, however,

the term “self-determination” does not appear in

Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” speech, which primarily addresses autonomy and minority rights. Moreover, Wilson distinguished between “internal” and

“external” interpretations of self-determination; the

former, referring to a people’s right to choose its

own form of government without outside pressure, was of far greater concern to him. Indeed, he

rarely mentioned the external aspect of self-determination, the one associated with the establishment of independent states. Wilson did want an

article on self-determination included in the

Covenant of the League of Nations, but he was

overruled on this point, not least by the European

powers, which were extremely suspicious of the

term. Wilson’s views on self-determination, Hannum stressed, should be understood in the context of his emphasis on a state’s internal politics—

the protection of a minority’s cultural and

linguistic rights. Wilson never considered selfdetermination to be an absolute right.

The establishment of the United Nations in

1945 marked the beginning of the second era of

the self-determination idea. Unlike the League of

Nations Covenant, the UN Charter mentions selfdetermination twice. However, Hannum pointed

out, the term very clearly applies to states and not

to peoples or groups. Yet, once the idea was written into the Charter, it very quickly evolved from a

principle to a right. The UN continued to define

self-determination in broad language but, again, it

was never seen as an absolute or unlimited right.

The most important document in the promotion of the right to self-determination, and one 

that provides a clear indication of its meaning 

during this era, was the 1960 UN Declaration on

the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples. According to Hannum, the criteria underlying the right did not include possession of a distinct ethnicity, language, or culture; rather,

self-determination was simply a more appealing

term for decolonization. In fact, four principles

characterize self-determination during this era.

3

2

A HISTORY OF THE

SELF-DETERMINATION

CONCEPT
First, self-determination referred only to decolonization. Second, it did not apply to peoples but to

territories. Third, self-determination was now considered an absolute right—though, again, for

colonies only; this marked a significant change

from the previous era. Finally, self-determination

did not allow for secession; instead, the territorial

integrity of existing states and most colonial territories was assumed. The essential quality of selfdetermination during this era, Hannum emphasized, was not that all peoples had the right of

self-determination, but that all colonies had the

right to be independent.

The third, and most problematic, era in the development of the concept began with the end of

decolonization in the late 1970s and continues to

the present. This stage is characterized by the attempt in recent decades to fuse the first two eras;

that is, to combine the ethnic and cultural rights of

minorities that Wilson championed with the territorial absolutism of decolonization. The result has

been a tendency to redefine self-determination to

mean that every distinctive ethnic or national

group has a right to independence. But though

self-determination has taken on this new meaning

in a popular sense, it has not been accepted by any

state or by international law. 

4
The combination of self-determination’s original definition and later interpretations has

caused considerable confusion, Hannum

stated. Today, the goal of states should be, first, to

identify and explicitly define self-determination

and the criteria that determine which entities are

entitled to exercise the right. Contemporary political movements that demand the right to secede

have frequently resorted to violence precisely because of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding their proclaimed goal of self-determination,

and both international law and official Western reactions have done little to clarify the situation. Second, the international community should develop

some parameters that determine exactly what the

right to self-determination includes. For example,

according to Hannum, some people or groups may

be entitled to invoke and exercise this right, but it

should be made clear that this does not necessarily

include the right to independent statehood.

Modern Realities: The Impermanence

of Borders and Raised Expectations

Graham Fuller of the RAND Corporation declared

that the United States must be prepared to understand the world “not the way it ought to be, but the

way it is,” since all too often in the case of selfdetermination and other nationalist movements

“the law is running after reality.” In examining the

causes behind the outbreak of self-determination

movements, several realities of today’s world simply cannot be ignored. First, Fuller maintained

that existing borders between internationally recognized nation-states are “artificial, arbitrary, and

accidental.” Furthermore, they are not permanent.

Second, although some states, mostly in the West,

are a reflection of the congruence of ethnic and territorial boundaries, most are not so constituted.

These other states are typically “mini-empires” or

even greater empires of ethnically distinct peoples

who find themselves arbitrarily forced to live

within the same borders. 

Third, the current concern over self-determination is not merely a “post-Soviet blip”; that is, the

dilemma is not just a regional, short-term phase

following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Many

peoples around the globe are going through their

own process of self-discovery. More than ever before, these peoples seek liberation to “get back to

their history.” The origins of this self-discovery

process, Fuller said, are many. There is a growing

international awareness that “things do not have to

be they way they are,” as identity groups discover

that they no longer have to endure intolerable

forms of government. This awareness has been accelerated by the contemporary application of the

Western heritage of democracy and human rights,

and the peculiarly American notion of individual

fulfillment. It is Americans, Fuller maintained, who

are in fact “corrupting the rest of the world” with

these ideas.

According to Fuller, it is perhaps ironic that the

attraction to democratic values encourages ethnic

self-awareness and, in some cases, secessionist

movements. Though it may be a cliché, it is evident

that the revolutionary developments in mass communications are largely responsible for the spread

of these ideas. In many instances, the introduction

of such democratic values as freedom of speech,

assembly, and the press are accelerating the development of minority groups’ self-awareness and, in

some cases, demands for greater autonomy or

even independence. Furthermore, there is a new

kind of globalized elite that is increasingly alienated from the “lumpen” masses. Some of those

who are disadvantaged as a result of rapid global

3THE RISE OF

CONTEMPORARY

SELF-DETERMINATION

MOVEMENTS

5
economic changes are turning to ethnicity and nationalism to address their grievances. The “mass

culture” emanating from the United States reflects

this gross imbalance of economic power and increases resentment among disadvantaged groups

the world over. Nationalism, ethnicity, and religion

are increasingly used as instruments in expressing

such resentment. This is apparent in many Third

World countries that are experiencing rapid economic development and urbanization along with

declining public

services. In these

countries, marginalized groups

search for new

sources of identity

and loyalty other

than those offered

by a state that has

apparently abandoned them. The

adoption of alternate sources of identity, such as ethnicity and religion, and their use as political instruments is becoming increasingly common.

Echoing some of Fuller’s assertions, Kampelman noted that people in some countries are

healthier and living longer than ever before; however, a significant portion of the world has not enjoyed such an improvement in living standards.

Global communications (mainly television and

films) display these higher living standards to the

world’s population, including those who have not

benefited from modernization. Understandably,

they too want to experience the benefits, and tensions arise from the “unstoppable drive” of people

in the Third World wanting what the advanced industrial nations already have. This situation threatens those in the wealthier nations who are concerned that their benefits will decline as more

economic resources are transferred abroad and

those in the Third World who lead more traditional lives and generally do not aspire to what

they perceive to be “crass Western materialism.” 

Unfulfilled Nationalism

Fuller also described a global “cycle of ethnicity”

currently under way that has divided the world’s

peoples into two loose categories. There are those

in the camp of “matured nationalisms”—in western

Europe, for example—whose members are relatively “fulfilled” in terms of identity and are thus

comfortable surrendering varying degrees of sovereignty. Another, much larger, group of peoples

lacks such fulfillment and thus clings tightly to

their ethnic sources of identity. For example, it is

very difficult to tell the Kazakhs to accept a multiethnic state cheerfully when they have just come

out from under Russian domination. For a Kazakh,

accepting a multiethnic state is tantamount to allowing the Russians to

continue their aim

of destroying

Kazakh language

and culture. Thus,

the nation-building

agenda of the

Kazakh people is

markedly different

from a similar Western agenda, which typically emphasizes ethnic and cultural “diversity.” The reality

is that some peoples are moving away from a

nation-state identity and giving up some sovereignty, while other groups—the majority—are demanding the right to establish themselves in a new

nation-state, to build a “national project.” 

According to Fuller, the issue now is not

whether these manifestations of nationalism are legal or appropriate, but simply that they are happening. The question is what the West’s response

will be. This process cannot be stopped, he contended: “There are no rules for saying that the

gates of nationalism are closed because the rules

are being changed all the time.” It is not sufficient

to say “just assimilate,” because most groups are

simply not going to “commit cultural suicide”

through such assimilation. Furthermore, Fuller

said, the world is going to see some very big empires, including China and Russia, affected by

these developments. The continent of Africa is

likely to be a “staggering mess” as the concepts of

ethnicity and borders enter future debates over

identity.

Scott Thompson of the Fletcher School of Law

and Diplomacy, a member of the Institute’s board

of directors, disagreed with this last point, arguing

that in many Third World countries, such as those

in Africa, new loyalties to the state are in fact

6

The continent of Africa is likely to be a

“staggering mess” as the concepts of

ethnicity and borders enter future debates

over identity.
7

emerging. Over a period of forty years, for example, there have been no major challenges to the

colonial borders on the African continent. Indeed,

for many African states, the colonially contrived

borders are the basis for their identity, and a new

generation of elites in these countries owes its allegiance to the state—though this is often the case,

Thompson admitted, for less than admirable reasons.

In response, Fuller maintained that there will

undoubtedly be a period of immense global chaos

in the future. The United States is caught between

what international law prescribes, on the one

hand, and what its commitment to democratic values and human rights implies on the other. Providing these restive groups with financial assistance

may ease the situation, but it will not solve the

problem, since these “urges are not at heart economic.” Rather, they go to the matter of selfidentity and knowing one’s place in the world.

Yugoslavia’s Breakup and the

Demonstration Effect

Outlining some of the reasons that the world is

seeing such an unprecedented growth in secessionist movements, Lori Damrosch of Columbia

University Law School suggested that the current

problem is only partially a reflection of ancient animosities among peoples. The international response to the situation in the former Yugoslavia

has also exacerbated the problem. Other relatively

small ethnic groups in the world, Damrosch explained, have likened themselves to the various

ethnic groups in the Balkan territory and have

come to believe that they too can get a similar response from the international community to their

demands for self-determination. That response, especially from the European Community, suggested

that a “federation” in the process of disintegration

could seek “validation of a secessionist outcome

on the basis of a process that purported to be juridical, but in reality was essentially political,” according to Damrosch. Leaders of other secessionist movements, she maintained, could believe that

they were in the midst of the same process, that

their federations (e.g., the USSR or the Russian

Federation) were in the process of breaking up and

that the same purportedly juridical result—the

emergence of an independent state—could be validated through the supposedly “legal” claim of selfdetermination.

David Scheffer of the Department of State disagreed with Damrosch’s contention that the international reaction to Yugoslavia’s dissolution has

fueled not only the resulting mass violence, but

other peoples’ claims to the right to self-determination as well. According to Scheffer, there is no evidence that if Yugoslavia had stayed together there

would not have been acts of genocide. No one can

now establish for certain that there would not have

been a vicious civil war even in a unified Yugoslavia. In fact, a great deal of the fighting occurred

before the breakup of the country in 1992. Now,

however, it seems like conventional wisdom to assert that if only the Western powers had restrained

their willingness to recognize the independence of

the former Yugoslav republics, none of the fighting

would have occurred. 

Kampelman argued that, regardless of whether

or not hasty Western recognition of the Yugoslav

republics fueled independence movements, many

other peoples demanding self-determination have

now seen in the Yugoslav situation that violence

can work; after all, he said, it is working for the

Serbs. It is difficult to ask other groups to renounce violence when it has gone so completely

unpunished in the former Yugoslavia. Peter

Schoettle of the Department of State pointed out

two other cases that illustrate why current selfdetermination problems have become so acute,

often turning violent. Tamil separatists in Sri

Lanka and the Turkish community in Cyprus have

sought a political solution to their grievances for

decades. It became clear, however, that nonviolent

means were simply not working; consequently, the

two groups resorted to violence. Schoettle suggested that even if there were an international forum that could have heard their grievances, or a

legal mechanism in place to respond to them, the

violent outcome probably would not have been

different.
Ralph Steinhardt of George Washington

University Law School outlined four essential propositions regarding self-determination and international law. The first is that the

law simply will not definitively resolve competing

claims for power or territorial disputes, though it

can provide the requisite mechanism in attempts

to do so. Yet the paradox remains: Self-determination has little legal meaning but is nevertheless a

tremendously powerful political principle. 

The second proposition regarding the legal context of self-determination is that international law

is not “univocal” on the subject. Self-determination

has never been defined; hence, its mere mention

conjures up several different meanings at once. According to one definition, self-determination refers

to the end of colonialism and the creation of new

states. Another says that self-determination is

shorthand for the rights of states; that is, the sovereign prerogative that defines relations among existing states (the right to their own political destiny, the right to equality in relations with other

states, etc.). Yet another meaning of self-determination involves the protection of individual and collective human rights and popular democratic rule. 

The problem is, Steinhardt continued, that none

of these definitions speaks to the central issue of

how to respond to an identity group’s aspirations

for control over its own future. Even the third 

definition, the “democracy gloss” on self-determination, fails to answer this question, since democracy is essentially majority rule, and in most cases

the majority is more likely to trample on than to

honor the rights of a minority identity group. Furthermore, international law is not univocal on the

value of independent statehood; it is currently softening its “premium” on statehood by allowing nonstate actors to play roles in the articulation and enforcement of international law.

The third basic proposition about the legal context of self-determination is that it is not a “suicide

pact” in that it does not oblige any state to subjugate its own self-interest. Law is basically an expression of self-interest and has evolved accordingly over time. 

The fourth proposition is that law is constantly

changing. After several distinct eras, Steinhardt

maintained, the self-determination norm is at a legislative turning point. There are several new meanings or “clusters of principles” that should be included in the right to self-determination, just as

there are new ways in which the right should be interpreted. 

First of all, the right to self-determination must

be addressed in light of customary human rights

concerns, especially those of interest to identity

groups. Second, it should be understood that identity groups have options short of statehood to air

their demands. Specifically, they have the right to

participate in bodies such as assemblies of national

minority affairs, local autonomous administrations, decentralized and local forms of government, and mixed commissions (either regional or

international) to facilitate a continuing dialogue on

the issue. All of these are possible institutional

arrangements short of statehood that the United

States could encourage. Third, the right to selfdetermination must include the right of enforcement and scrutiny by an appropriate body, meaning the abandonment of the idea that self-determination somehow erects a wall of exclusive domestic jurisdiction for any country.

Kampelman stressed that the right to self-determination must be separated from the right to secession. Many international documents have established self-determination as a right, but it has

never been defined. Thus, many documents contain a contradiction between the right to secession

and the right to territorial integrity, and such documents should seek a balance in separating the

8

4

THE SELFDETERMINATION

PRINCIPLE: LEGAL

DEFINITIONS AND

OBLIGATIONS

8
9

rights to self-determination and secession. The latter is simply not, according to Kampelman, inherent in the legally stated right of self-determination.

Self-determination may be an internationally recognized principle, but secession is a national issue,

one for states themselves to decide. For example, a

government may wish to allow its nation’s constituent parts the right to secession in its own set of

laws, but no international documents compel it to

do so. Self-determination, Kampelman maintained, means inter alia the right to cultural independence, religious freedom, and the use of one’s

own language, but not secession. Unlike secession,

these rights are “manageable,” making it possible

for the United States to both address and influence

them.

Jamison Borek of the Department of State

pointed out that legal principles are not the driving

factor behind either self-determination movements or U.S. policy toward them. After all, the

United States has not

taken a position on the

precise legal definition of

self-determination. Nor

has the scope of the term

“peoples” been determined, and the debate

continues over whether

self-determination includes a right to secede

outside the context of decolonization. In general,

the United States has not recognized the right to

secession for portions of established countries.

Moreover, in keeping with the general U.S. orientation toward individual rights, U.S. policy prefers to

speak to individual human rights (including civil

and political rights) rather than group rights such

as self-determination. It is not productive, Borek

continued, to debate legal principles in the abstract without addressing pragmatic realities. A

fundamental problem is what the United States

and other countries are willing and able to do

about situations in which governments actively oppress minority groups in their countries. While the

response options range from economic sanctions

to the use of force, ultimately it is not possible to

compel an oppressive government to change its

behavior if other countries are not prepared to intervene militarily. 

Self-Determination and Human Rights

Fuller suggested that the very propagation of the

idea of human rights intensifies demands for

greater recognition among the unrecognized peoples of the world. In telling other states to observe

the human rights of their citizens, the United

States is giving these citizens a greater forum to demand more for themselves. Steinhardt concurred

by suggesting that self-determination is a “symptom” of the human rights crisis. In fact, claims to

self-determination usually indicate a human rights

problem in its final stages. This is one of the main

reasons that complaints about human rights violations must be addressed before they reach this

stage.

In this context, Scheffer disagreed with Hannum’s assertion that the concept of self-determination must return to the more static framework of

previous eras. Scheffer

said rather that self-determination “is a reality from which we cannot escape,” since

there are people all

over the world who

are “screaming that

word.” What is

needed, he said, is

greater recognition of

the postcolonial development of human rights law and principles as an

influencing factor on self-determination movements, however they are defined. Moreover, he

continued, democracy is increasingly considered

an “entitlement.” Even the United Nations is embracing this view in its formal documents, and

peoples in the process of asserting their right to

self-determination increasingly look to international language on human rights as a moral pillar

to support their claims. 

Referring to the international community’s desire to maintain world peace, Schoettle noted that

in the past, the goal of world (and regional) peace

has generally ranked higher than the defense of

human rights. Which goal is more important to the

United States today? The policy of holding up regional peace as a more important goal than human

rights risks achieving the opposite. Groups seeking

independence will quickly realize that by creating

Many international documents have established

self-determination as a right, but it

has never been defined.
10

enough violence—significantly disturbing the

peace—their demands will more likely be satisfied,

or at least addressed, eventually in the name of

promoting peace. This will drive such groups to

ever more extreme, peace-threatening actions. The

goal of maintaining regional peace also raises a

moral question: Does the United States, or any

member of the international community, have the

right to tell a minority group that its human rights

must be curtailed in some form to promote world

peace?

The issue of human rights and their violation is

relatively easy to react to, according to Borek, since

acknowledged international standards exist. The

much more difficult question involves the right to

secession and independence: Does a people have a

right to independence? If there is going to be a

principle that recognizes this right, there must be

some consideration of whether that people has the

capability to establish independence and, if not,

whether the United States or any other state is going to help them in the task, even if military force

must be used to do so. On this point, Borek suggested, there must be some realism. After all, the

United States is not in a position to support such

endeavors all over the world. The crucial question

in the interim is, Can the international community

find a guiding principle somewhere between defending human rights and upholding the right to

self-determination?

Fuller reiterated that there need be no clash between American values such as human rights and

the need to promote stability in a particular country,

as neither of these is an absolute. Nations that are

wracked with internal dissent and held together

only through terror and repression are not necessarily useful in the promotion of U.S. national interests. In other words, such states do not merely

pose a choice between human rights and stability

for the United States, since a state that routinely violates its citizens’ human rights is rarely stable.

Kampelman added that the “confrontation” between human rights and self-determination could

be largely avoided if secession were not an inherent part of the discussion.

Gidon Gottlieb of the University of Chicago

Law School pointed out that in many ways the entire discussion about human rights and the right

to self-determination takes place in a Western (and

largely American) context. From the U.S. perspective, concern about human rights is based on

American values and adherence to a particular

view of individual rights. However, in many states

that are on the receiving end of Western criticism

over human rights, such rhetoric is perceived as an

instrument to advance a certain minority group’s

claims to independence. It is impossible for the

United States to ignore the impact of its human

rights arguments at the other end, where they may

be (perhaps deliberately) misinterpreted as support for some group’s claims, while the U.S. objective may be precisely the opposite. The bottom

line, according to Gottlieb, is that the “consumers”

of the human rights discourse in other countries

may understand such claims in a very different

way than they are intended, a reality that cannot

be ignored.
11

Scheffer advised policymakers to use the crisis in Chechnya as the basis for analyzing

similar situations in the future. Events dating back to 1991, when President Dzhokhar Dudayev first declared Chechnya’s independence

from the then Soviet Union, should be analyzed to

determine if there was a basis in our relations with

the Soviet and Russian governments to discuss the

Chechen situation in light of how human rights

and democratic principles were being applied

there, and how, if necessary, those principles could

be further analyzed with regard to particular types

of autonomous relationships. Scheffer suggested

that such an analysis could be useful in maintaining stability in the Russian Federation. Stability is a

concern, he noted, since the consequences of instability, whether in terms of refugee crises or the

need for humanitarian aid, pose a potential threat

to the larger American aid program to Russia. A little preemptive work in this case would have been

extremely useful, Scheffer added. 

Adam Wasserman of the Department of State

pointed out that though the self-determination issue is legally unsettled, the United States has made

its position on the issue clear in practical terms. Regarding Chechnya, the United States has consistently affirmed the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, and there has been little ambiguity in this stance. Kampelman contended that

problems arose in U.S. policy toward the Chechen

conflict not because the United States reiterated its

recognition of Russia’s sovereign rights, but because that reiteration implied an approval of Russia’s methods of asserting its sovereignty. It is important to be consistent, Kampelman said. If minority

groups are told that achieving their aims through

violent means is unacceptable, then central governments must be told this as well. The United

States did not make this clear to the Russian government in its initial reaction to the Chechen crisis.

Hannum suggested that in seeking a solution to

the Chechen conflict, greater attention should be

given to the example of Tatarstan, which was willing to accept a “fuzzy, legally imprecise set of documents” in negotiating its status within the Russian

Federation that essentially deferred the most difficult questions indefinitely. This arrangement may

not solve all the problems between the Russian

government and the country’s non-Russians, but it

is an alternative to violent conflict. Patricia Carley

of the United States Institute of Peace pointed out

that the history of the Russians and Tatars is quite

different from that of the Russians and Chechens.

The Tatars have been part of “Russia” since the sixteenth century, even though for some Tatars this

does not justify continued Russian domination.

Not until the nineteenth century did the Russians

conquer and colonize the Chechens in a particularly lengthy and brutal campaign that continued

well into this century and included Stalin’s relocation of the entire Chechen population during

World War II. 

Furthermore, as the Chechens see it, they were

colonized by the Russians only a few decades earlier than the Central Asians, who have become independent from Russia. Carley stressed the importance of understanding situations such as the

conflict in Chechnya from the viewpoint of the

people themselves—in this case, the Chechens. For

the United States to be of any help in diffusing this

situation, it must try to understand Chechen motivations and grievances and the history of their relationship with Russia. Statements about legal principles and territorial integrity mean little to people

who believe they are fighting for their very existence.

Gottlieb maintained that the Chechens have always had the status of a tributary state—they have

never had any other existence. In other words, the

Chechens have always been subject to some 

A S 5PECIFIC CASE: THE

CRISIS IN CHECHNYA
colonial or other major power. Under an earlier international legal system, the Chechens would have

had no basis for advancing the type of claim to independence they are now pursuing, and the current international system, according to Gottlieb, is

at fault for raising their expectations to the point

that they feel justified in making such a claim. Carley pointed out, though, that millions of people

throughout the world used to know only the existence that Gottlieb described, and many of them

now live in independent states; thus, looking to

past experience does not necessarily justify the

perpetuation of a particular current status. In any

case, can it be considered the “fault” of the

Chechens, or any other peoples, that they have had

the misfortune of existing as a tributary state for

much of their history? In other words, must this

status determine their future as well? Can the

United States openly acknowledge that the repressive status the Chechens—or any other similarly

oppressed peoples—have always known is the one

in which they must remain?

12
13

Before turning to how the United States

should address current self-determination

movements, Gottlieb raised the question of

whether or not the United States should care

enough to become a party to these disputes at all.

He contended the United States should perhaps

care more about waves of migration in Europe,

which are pushing the continent’s politics in the

direction of political extremism. However, the

United States should also care about self-determination movements, he said, because several current conflicts have the potential to change the face

of some of the major actors on the world stage, including our immediate neighbors—witness the

Quebec separatists in Canada and the Chiapas

rebels in Mexico. Finally, the United States must

care, because if it does not assert its values in the

international arena, U.S. foreign policymakers will

lose the support of the American public to an even

greater extent than is the case now.

What is the Primary American

Concern?

Crystal Nix of the Department of State proposed a

crucial preliminary question in determining what

the U.S. policy response to self-determination

movements should be: What exactly does the

United States care about regarding struggles for

self-determination—the aim of the struggle or the

means employed? Does the United States object

only to the shifting of borders as a threat to its national interest, or is it more concerned with the

means used to make those changes? If the concern

is with the means, the United States would most

likely not object to groups that seek to change existing borders as long as they refrain from using violence and do not violate international law. Or perhaps the United States would object to redrawing

borders along specifically ethnic and religious

lines, regardless of the means. 

In fact, Nix continued, American diplomacy and

rhetoric are often in conflict over these issues. If

border changes are the primary concern, the range

of that concern will be relatively narrow, since

there are only a certain number of border changes

that the United States would consider threatening

to its national security. If the means of effecting

these changes is the paramount issue, some action

may be required to make groups accountable for

the way they attempt to achieve their goals. However, if the main objection concerns the goal of redrawing borders along religious and ethnic lines,

the United States should be prepared to involve itself more heavily in the matter than in previous,

similar cases. Clearly, Nix concluded, the United

States “needs to be more precise about which of

these three options it is really concerned about.”

Hannum stated that the United States should

generally be less concerned with the outcome of

these situations than with the means used. Order,

stability, and predictability are more likely to be

maintained, he said, by insisting on a peaceful

process of resolving conflicting claims than by trying to manipulate events to arrange a predetermined outcome. 

Promoting Human Rights

Damrosch asserted that the U.S. government

should use all available means of nonforcible leverage to prevail on other governments to respect the

human rights of all minority groups within their

states. In some cases, demands for greater autonomy can be supported, but she was skeptical about

the United States, as a matter of policy, endorsing

demands for self-determination and the creation of

new states. According to Damrosch, the only

6

U.S. INTERESTS AND

POSSIBLE POLICY

OPTIONS
instance in which the United States may decide for

reasons of policy to support the emergence of a

new state is in the “genocide or postgenocide”

phase. In that instance, all “legal inhibitions” could

be “shucked aside.”

According to Hannum, the self-determination

debate would be much clearer if the United States

simply stated that there is no right to secession,

with the possible exception of responding to genocide (though such an exception would put the

United States in the position of arguing that the

Kurds have a right to a separate state). Besides,

U.S. foreign policy already has a method for dealing with minority problems in other countries: human rights. Human and minority rights norms

continue to evolve, and the United States should

declare its position as one of concern for the human rights of every state’s citizens. Beyond that,

the United States should not enter into the debate

on the merits of self-determination claims. In fact,

responding directly to claims for self-determination is probably the worst policy option for the

United States.

Providing Outlets for Minority Groups

“Sovereignty does not have to be a zero-sum

game,” Damrosch said, though international law

unfortunately tends to reinforce the zero-sum approach. For example, when Taiwan lost its seat at

the United Nations to the People’s Republic of

China, there was one big winner and one disappointed loser. Now, however, Taiwan is pursuing a

more pragmatic arrangement of representation for

two governments from one divided state, using the

precedents of Germany and Korea. Unlike the UN,

Damrosch noted, international bodies that govern

such spheres as trade and finance do not use the

zero-sum approach. In these bodies, economic realities frequently take precedence over strictly formal notions of sovereignty. Taiwan retained its

membership in the Asian Development Bank, for

example, after its UN membership was revoked.

Similarly, Hong Kong and Macao enjoyed membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (which has been succeeded by the World

Trade Organization) under provisions allowing

participation by nonstate entities that have functioning autonomy over their international economic relations. Policy options should include

parallel or multiple representation for territorial

units that function autonomously in such areas as

trade and international economic relations, providing outlets for what might otherwise be secessionist pressures.

Damrosch went on to suggest that the U.S. government might consider expanding its range of official contacts in the international community from

strictly interstate relations to contacts among subunits of states; such contacts could be developed

through functional relationships with unofficial

entities. For example, Damrosch noted that the

Russian constitution of 1993 allows some flexibility in the establishment of foreign relations by subunits within the Russian Federation; and Tatarstan,

after negotiating with Moscow, was given a very

functional flexibility in its external relations. Another option for the United States is economic

sanctions, which, Damrosch suggested, could be

used in a differentiated fashion—either to punish

the bad or reward the good territorial unit claiming

the right to self-determination.

Similarly, Steinhardt suggested that the United

States should recognize as legitimate intermediate

types of association to protect vulnerable populations. U.S. policy should not imply that minority

groups’ options are limited to secession or nothing. Scheffer agreed that it is in the U.S. interest to

deal with more than just central governments;

there should be a dialogue with the subnational

groups involved as well. However, the United

States should strive to hold minority groups accountable so that they understand they have certain responsibilities as well, not only under international law but also in their domestic actions.

Damrosch agreed that these groups should be

held accountable, but questioned whether the

United States could hold out as a “carrot” the possibility that, if they are democratic enough, they will

eventually gain international recognition. Scheffer

countered that independence need not, and in

most cases would not, be one of the carrots offered, as many intrastate political arrangements

short of independence are available, all with varying degrees of autonomy.

Gottlieb said that more effort should be made to

offer new outlets for legitimate aspirations of selfdetermination movements in order to divert them

to nonterritorial demands. Simply put, minority

groups need an international forum to express

their desires, and a variety of regional organizations

14
could offer them such an arena. There is a need to

“deconstruct” the self-determination principle,

Gottlieb said, to demonstrate that it has other interpretations than just the territorial and that there

are different ways identity groups can lead and express national life. Not every nation can be given a

territorial state, so there should be other options

under the self-determination rubric and new ways

of relating to national minority groups in the international arena. The State Department could be the

pioneer in such an effort, but the legislative branch

can be in the forefront as well. Nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs) can also play a leading role

in this regard in much the same way as they provide advance warning of potential subnational

conflicts. Congressional hearings already provide

one way for minority groups to express their grievances and speak about their national homelands

as something other than states. In general, Gottlieb

asserted, the international community must

change the perception that self-determination

leads only to the formation of a new state. Rather

than setting the threshold of international recognition at the highest level of the state, organizations

and international conventions should be open to

other political entities as well.

Responding to the notion that aggrieved minority groups should be satisfied with some status

other than statehood, Gottlieb acknowledged that

this suggestion was in no way a universal remedy,

although it might work in the case of the Basques

or the Corsicans. Its purpose is not to provide

maximal solutions for minority groups, but a “release process” for the United States and the groups

themselves. It may be possible to satisfy some national minority groups with something other than

statehood, though such solutions will not always

be acceptable or realistic. Fuller responded that

any attempt to offer minority groups outlets in the

international arena will be extremely menacing to

the many “bad-guy” states that rule over them. 

Carley suggested that the United States and

other Western governments consider giving more

attention to such groups as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), which

met in The Hague in January 1995 to determine

where potential conflicts over self-determination

movements might arise. This group of peoples that

do not have seats at the UN has been in existence

since 1991 and was organized in part to protest the

international community’s unwillingness to

recognize them. Members include the Chechens,

Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Gagauz, and Abkhaz,

all of whom are distinct peoples of the former Soviet Union who live within the territory of a state

dominated by a different ethnic group. Other

members are Tibet, East Turkestan, and Kurdistan.

Many of UNPO’s members, Carley pointed out,

consider themselves colonies, and many are, in

fact, in the generally recognized sense of that term.

Furthermore, they believe that they did not gain independence during the two great periods of decolonization—immediately after World War II and following the breakup of the USSR—simply because

of bad luck or a quirk of fate, but not because they

are any less deserving. Will the international community continue to ignore this group at its peril?

Unlike other participants, Hannum cautioned

against offering subgroups some sort of recognition or representation in regional or trade organizations or providing UNPO with a platform at the

UN, which he said may ultimately lead to greater

assertions from smaller and smaller identity

groups, to the point where each is demanding independence and a seat at the UN. Raising false

hopes, according to Hannum, may be the very

worst step to take. International law and politics—

and U.S. policy—must reflect only the possible. But

which approach is preferred: diffusing statehood

aspirations by offering platforms to nonstate subunits or providing such platforms only sparingly

to avoid raising a minority group’s expectations?

Gottlieb replied that both approaches are necessary. With regard to the UN, providing platforms is

probably a potentially destabilizing policy. However, in the case of technical conventions on such

things as assigning communications frequencies,

maritime rules, or environmental protection, participation need not be limited to states. Gottlieb insisted that the aura surrounding statehood should

be minimized and devalued.

Proclaiming a Clearly Defined Principle

Gottlieb asserted that the United States really has no

choice but to “avoid clear doctrines and clear principles” when it comes to self-determination movements, as it would be “disastrous” for the United

States to be driven to intervene in remote conflicts

by rigid principles that could not possibly apply

across the board. There are simply no appropriate

15
global principles, and no arrangements should be

promoted in terms of global principles. The only

exception is the defense of human rights; for example, the absolute unwillingness to tolerate genocide. Agreeing with Hannum, Gottlieb maintained

that the United States should have a policy of “passivity,” meaning that it should not take sides during a conflict or take a stance on a particular outcome. Instead, the United States should use its

leverage to push toward an accommodation. Furthermore, Gottlieb suggested that more could be

done to make groups understand the costs of

statehood—not only the economic costs, but the

political ones as well. Hannum agreed that policymakers must keep their pronouncements on this

issue ambiguous, as it is impossible to articulate

self-determination explicitly and absolutely. However, principles such as human rights, democracy,

and nonviolence can be articulated, and should be

supported and promoted consistently.

On the other hand, Fuller noted that even expressing ambivalence on the subject of self-determination movements will make the United States

appear as an enemy to much of the Third World by

threatening those states’ national unity. Obviously,

early intervention in such situations is highly desirable, and Fuller suggested an approach along

the lines of marriage counseling. In any conflict between a central government and a secessionist

movement, all options short of “divorce” should be

considered: cultural autonomy, political autonomy, federation, confederation, or international

guarantees, to name a few. 

In any case, the United States should most definitely “put states on notice” that their repressive

policies will likely lead to the emergence of problems with their minority groups. Perhaps such notice could best be handled by NGOs to avoid the

political implications of warning a state that it is

courting instability. Fuller stated that the United

States would do well to make it clear to states that

if they cannot satisfy the cultural aspirations of

their minorities, they are headed for trouble. The

United States should also make it clear that it is not

going to be a guarantor of an unacceptable status

quo. Scheffer agreed that NGOs could publicly

identify these potential hot spots, since governments cannot do so publicly, though they should

privately. He further suggested that places to watch

in the future with regard to self-determination

movements include Kosovo, Taiwan, Hong Kong,

Tibet, Western Sahara, and parts of Kurdistan. 

Generally, Fuller maintained, it is in the interest

of the United States to see the proliferation of democratic states in the world. Undemocratic states

that rely on force and repression to maintain their

existence not only run counter to American principles, they are also unstable—maybe not so much in

the short term, but certainly in the longer term.

Steinhardt contended that the United States

should take a very high-profile position in international institutions, especially those that are regionally based, since these organizations have generally proved to be good forums for articulating the

idea that certain practices and behaviors of states

are required by law—a sort of psychology of compulsion. 

Robert Hansen of the Department of State

pointed out that there is danger in fostering confusion between the standards for self-determination

and state recognition on the one hand, and the

question of what the United States is prepared to

do to effect that policy on the other (i.e., what

Americans are or are not prepared to sacrifice in

terms of money and troops). Though the United

States may decide not to take an active part in supporting a particular self-determination movement,

that decision may not make it any less important

that there be clear, defensible legal standards when

it comes to providing moral support. Perhaps

more effort should be devoted to making a distinction between these two options.

Approaching the Claim to Secession

Secession has not been identified as an international right, and Kampelman declared that this fact

should be made clear to all groups with claims to

self-determination. If a particular group wants independence, he said, it can agitate, propose negotiations, and/or initiate a propaganda campaign to

convince the international community that its status as part of another state is unjust. If major

bloodshed would likely result from such actions,

this would be because of a decision the minority

assumed when it chose to agitate for independence. This is not to say that the United States

should overlook the bloodshed, but that it should

make clear to those seeking independence that

16
they cannot object to the violence waged against

them by claiming they were simply attempting to

exercise their “right” to secession. In the end, it

may be in the U.S. national interest to help this

group, but not because any international rights

have been violated. Kampelman stressed that the

extent to which the United States and other states

make it clear that secession is not an international

right will lessen the likelihood that violence will be

used toward this goal. In these instances, other avenues would likely be pursued.

Secession is, according to Steinhardt, a legitimate exercise of self-determination in some cases,

particularly in response to gross and systematic violations of human rights and when the resulting

entity is economically viable. Thus, a rigid rejection of secession is unsound. Policymakers should

abandon the distinction between self-determination and other categories of human rights. Likewise, Alan Romberg of the Department of State

noted that the right to secession cannot always be

excluded as a matter of principle. The rights to selfdetermination and secession may not be identical,

but they are also not entirely incompatible. Stating

that it is the means and not the aim of self-determination movements that should be of concern to

the United States, Romberg suggested that some

standards of behavior for achieving the goal of independent statehood may be necessary. 

Steinhardt maintained that the United States

should not allow its policy options to become polarized because of an apparent tilt against secession. Kampelman argued in favor of such a bias,

since secession frequently entails mass violence.

Certainly, Steinhardt acknowledged, the United

States should be concerned about the unchecked

proliferation of states, but the question remains:

What is the United States prepared to tolerate in

the name of territorial integrity?

Negotiations

Timothy Sisk of the United States Institute of Peace

suggested that one option for resolving the

dilemma of self-determination versus territorial integrity is the promotion of a negotiated settlement—to the extent that it is possible. The United

States need only make clear that it will abide by

whatever the parties to the negotiations decide.

Though it may be the case that some on either side

will not want to enter negotiations, there are frequently cleavages within groups that leave some

factions willing to negotiate. Furthermore, the

United States should examine cases in which accommodated outcomes have occurred, how and

why they did, and which institutional arrangements were instrumental in resolving the conflict.

Several options are available, such as the formation

of power-sharing or coalition governments and a

proportionality of government appointments, options that typically form a crucial part of a negotiated settlement. The main goal is to de-link ethnicity from the state and from citizenship. It was

pointed out, however, that the cases that are usually the easiest to deal with are those in which the

parties are willing to negotiate. It is possible, for example, to imagine negotiations between Ottawa

and Montreal or London and Edinburgh. All too

often this is not the case, and the fundamental

problem or conflict stems from the inability of the

sides to agree on the terms under which they

might consider even entering into negotiations.

Elections

The participants did not view elections as a satisfactory way to determine the political status of a

particular region because secession is not an issue

that can be voted on. Sisk mentioned the difficulty

of relying on majority rule. Very often the cause of

the problem in the first place is that a minority

group believes it is repressed by the majority. Hannum stated that the problem with elections is that

if, say, Quebec voted to secede, smaller national

groups within Quebec would have to be given the

same right. Carley raised the problem of evaluating

the validity of elections in essentially totalitarian or

post-totalitarian states, reminding participants that

only a few months before the Soviet Union collapsed, its citizens voted en masse to remain part

of the USSR in elections that were very much like

old Soviet-style polls. Kampelman said that, ultimately, it would not be useful for the United States

to set elections as a condition for any kind of policy decision it wants to make.

17
There is no easy solution to the dilemmas

posed by self-determination movements in

the world today. Clearly, in the face of the

growing number of such movements, there is a

need to establish a more concise and workable definition of the right to self-determination, though

such a definition will not be easily arrived at, and

even then it will most likely be inconclusive and

equivocal. In any case, the international community would do well to recognize that the desire

among identity groups to seek self-determination

is not a simple matter with a single cause. The urge

to seek self-determination has multiple origins, including the denial of minority rights and other

forms of government repression, territorial disputes, national aspirations, and perceptions of economic and political viability, among others. It develops gradually until violence and secession

come into play as a last resort. Unfortunately, the

inattentiveness of the world community often

makes what is a gradual process seem all too sudden. Perhaps carefully analyzing the origins of selfdetermination movements, addressing the most

salient factor or factors in a particular identity

group’s claim or struggle, and attending to them

promptly and directly will help the United States

and the international community address these

demands before violence and secession are seen as

the only means of achieving them.

7

18

CONCLUSION
Patricia Carley is program officer for

the former Soviet Union and Turkey at

the United States Institute of Peace,

where she also works on broader issues

such as the OSCE and Western relations

with the Islamic world. She is the author

of several Institute publications, including The War in Tajikistan Three Years

On, Turkey’s Role in the Middle East:

A Conference Report and The Future of the CSCE. She received

her B.A. in Soviet studies from the University of Texas at Austin in

1981 and an M.A. from George Washington University in 1983. Before coming to the Institute, Carley was a staff adviser at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Her other publications include the Central Asia section of Human Rights and

Democratization in the Newly Independent States (1993),

“Turkey and Central Asia: Reality Comes Calling” in Regional

Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and Iran

(M. E. Sharpe, 1995), and “The Legacy of the Soviet Political System and the Prospects for Developing Civil Society in Central Asia”

in Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States

of Eurasia (M. E. Sharpe, 1995).

19

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by

Congress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including

research grants, fellowships, professional training programs, conferences and workshops, library services,

publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. Crocker

Vice Chairman: Max M. Kampelman

President: Richard H. Solomon

Executive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Distinguished Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University

Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C.

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 

Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University

Christopher H. Phillips, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei

Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts 

University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Toby Trister Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

Ervin J. Rokke, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University

Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

20
Peaceworks No. 7. First published March 1996.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author or conference participants alone. 

They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

1550 M Street NW, Suite 700

Washington, DC 20005-1708

Phone: 202-457-1700

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Internet: gopher.usip.org

Other titles in the Peaceworks series:

Turkey’s Role in the Middle East: A Conference Report by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No.

1)

Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity by Nancy Lubin (Peaceworks

No. 2)

From the Managing Chaos conference:

Keynote Addresses by Les Aspin and Ted Koppel (Peaceworks No. 3)

Sources of Conflict: G.M. Tamás and Samuel Huntington on “Identity and Conflict,” 

and Robert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews on “‘The Coming Anarchy’ and 

the Nation-State under Siege” (Peaceworks No. 4)

NGOs and Conflict Management by Pamela R. Aall (Peaceworks No. 5)

Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa by David R. Smock (Peaceworks No. 6)
UNITED STATES

INSTITUTE OF PEACE

1550 M Street NW

Washington, DC 20005 Peaceworks No. 7