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UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

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“Success will require 

luck given the possibilities

of natural disasters, and will 

require determination to 

resolve political differences 

and maintain security. Despite

the considerable challenges,

Haiti, with the international 

community’s support, is in 

a position to build back a 

country better than before.

”

June 22, 2010 

Haiti: A Forward Look

Summary

t Five months after Haiti’sJanuary 12th earthquake, the situation on the ground remains critical. 

With the arrival of hurricane season, the failure to provide adequate shelter and instill hope for

a better future threatensstability.

t Donor pledges of more than $5 billion for assistance have not translated into visible progress, 

fueling discontent and raising growing concern among Haitians about their government’s 

e!ectiveness.

t Haiti’s government hastried to exert leadership in recovery operations despite the destruction 

of government buildings, the death of nearly 25 percent of the civilservice personnel and the 

massive dislocations caused by the earthquake.

t The Haitian government has also begun preparationsfor presidential and parliamentary electionsin November 2010. The combination of faltering recovery at a time of national elections

could provoke unrest. 

Five months after Haiti’sJanuary 12th earthquake, the situation on the ground remains critical. 

Most of the 1.2 million displaced personsremain in camps, unable to move to permanent homes.

Many of the displaced live in makeshift dwellings, with a lack ofsanitation facilities, food, and

physicalsecurity in face of widespread sexual violence against women and children. The international attention and outpouring of donationsthat followed the earthquake created high expectations amongst Haitiansthat their desperate needs would be met and that life in the camps would 

be temporary. As aid distributions dribble in and the campstake on a more permanent character, 

these expectations are turning to anger and despair. Aid distribution has become the most pressing political issue asthe Haitian government is blamed for the slow pace of aid deliveries. With the 

arrival of the hurricane season, the Haitian government’sfailure to provide adequate shelter and 

instill hope for a better future could provoke instability.

Post-Earthquake Aid Distribution

At the March 31st United Nations Donors’Conference, the international community pledged

$5.3 billion over the next two yearsto "nance the Haitian government’s“Action Plan for National 

Recovery and Development of Haiti.” The reconstruction plan callsfor a Haitian-led reconstruction 

based on principles of the deconcentration of population and resources; inclusivity of assistance 

programs; and transparency and accountability for aid delivery. Two new mechanismsfor implementing the reconstruction plan came out of the conference. The "rst is a joint Interim Haitian 

Reconstruction Commission co-chaired by U.N. Special Envoy President Bill Clinton and Haitian

ROBERT M. PERITO

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Haiti: A Forward Look

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Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive. The commission was endorsed by Haiti’s parliament and has an 

18-month tenure that began in June 2010. The commission’s membership includesrepresentatives

from various branches of the Haitian government, Haitian unions, the private sector, and donors 

who have given at least $100 million or committed to $200 million in debt relief. Non-voting 

members of the Haitian diaspora and civilsociety are also represented. The commission is charged 

with approving development projects, and coordinating, monitoring, and continually re"ning the 

international community’s e!ortsto implement reconstruction programs. 

Projects approved by the commission will be funded by a World Bank-administered Multi-Donor 

Trust Fund. The fund is modeled after the successful fund established in the aftermath of the 2004

Asian tsunami. Thisfund willsupport projects approved by the commission and is designed to 

ensure donor coordination by consolidating the pledges, processes, and funding procedures. Thus 

far, the World Bank and Brazil are the fund’s only contributors, together depositing a total of $155 

million. The commission and the fund’s operating procedures are not yet public and it remainsto 

be seen how e!ectively the commission, which includes an anti-corruption o#ce (though it cannot mandate donor compliance), will be able to coordinate the activities of the donor community, 

international nongovernmental organizations(NGOs), the private sector, and Haitian government. 

Despite the overwhelming rhetoricalsupport for donor coordination at the U.N. conference, 

it is already apparent that only a fraction of the billions of dollars pledged by the international 

community will be managed by the commission and processed through the fund. Donor countries 

and U.N. agencies will use their traditional channelsfor distributing bilateral aid; individual NGOs 

like the Red Cross, which received millions of dollarsin direct contributionsfor Haiti, will make their 

own decisions. With the commission and the fund playing a limited role, the Haitian government 

will have to ensure the necessary level coordination, transparency, and accountability— if Haiti is 

to bene"t from a truly e!ective international response. 

The Absorptive Capacity of the Haitian Government

Unfortunately, the earthquake reduced Haiti’slimited absorptive capacity to receive and distribute 

foreign assistance. The destruction of all but one government ministry in Port-au-Prince and 

the death of nearly 25 percent of civilservice personnel exacerbated the chronic problems of

adequate human resources and widespread corruption. Historically, donors avoided the government and channeled their funding through NGOs. As a result, Haiti was called the“Republic of

NGOs,”a place where largely foreign, private agencies provided healthcare, education, and other 

basic servicesthat normally come from the public sector. Donors now face the di#cult choice of 

channeling fundsthrough NGOs with the experience and capacity to provide services quickly and 

with limited corruption -- or through an ine#cient and sometimes corrupt Haitian government 

that needs extensive investment in infrastructure and capacity building to reach even itslimited 

pre-earthquake level of capacity.

Beyond chronic problems and quake-related destruction, the Haitian government’s capacity to 

coordinate and utilize assistance isfurther hampered by a shortfall in government revenue and the

need for international direct budgetsupport. Prior to the earthquake, the Haitian government’s 

revenues were around 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) compared to between 20–30 

percent of GDP in most developed countries. Post-earthquake revenue collection will probably 

only reach 7–8 percent of GDP while government expendituresfor reconstruction and meeting 

displaced people’s basic needs will be around 27 percent of GDP. This gap will need to be "lled 

by direct contributionsto the government from the international community. Attracting such 

support will be di#cult, as donors are leery of the government’sreputation for corruption and 
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Haiti: A Forward Look

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ineptitude. Donors have committed publicly to channeling funding through the Haitian government, but capacity-building is a lengthy process and there are enormousimmediate needsto be

met. Creating a balance between utilizing NGOsto provide immediate and necessary aid while 

working to develop the Haitian government’s capacity will be one of the international community’s major challenges.

The international community is poised to provide massive "nancial assistance to Haiti, but experience showsthat not all aid is bene"cial and too much money can be counterproductive. Donors 

will need to avoid aid’s pitfalls and be diligent about putting aid to productive use. The distorting 

economic impact of foreign assistance should be tempered by the macroeconomic stability the 

Haitian government restored after the earthquake. With the exception of the budgetary shortfall 

for current expenses, Haiti remains "scally stable. The Haitian government and the World Bank are 

working to avoid in$ation or the“Dutch Disease”as a result of the in$ux of aid. The private sector 

will need assistance in mobilizing revenues and credit in support of productive and sustainable 

economic activity. Increased accessto credit, especially in the housing sector and micro"nance, 

should be key economic policy priorities. Haiti’s major donors embrace the Paris Principles on 

Aid Accountability, however, mechanismsto ensure accountability and transparency are not yet

developed. If aid is not managed e!ectively to address poverty and inequality, the tension within 

Haiti islikely to increase and threaten stability.

Challenges to Stability and Security

Haiti is extremely vulnerable to hurricanes. In 2008, hurricanes killed almost 800 people, destroyed 

nearly 60 percent of the country’s harvest, and caused nearly a billion dollarsin damage. At the 

onset of what isforecast asthe worst hurricane season in decades, Haiti’s massive population 

of displaced personsis at extreme risk, while e!ortsto create permanent housing and relocate 

people to safe areas are moving at a glacial pace. Port-au-Prince remains clogged with rubble. Even 

where houses have been judged by government engineersto be structurally sound, people have 

refused to return home for fear of future shocks, inadequate security and accessin the campsto 

food, water and healthcare. Haiti has no indigenous capacity for emergency response to natural 

disasters. Should a hurricane strike Haiti, it will fall to the underequipped U.N. peacekeeping force 

and U.S. military forcesin the region to provide rescue and reliefservices. Louisiana National Guard 

members are currently working in Haiti to increase hurricane preparednessin vulnerable areas

outside of Port-au-Prince hosting displaced persons.

Upcoming elections and the Haitian presidential transition also present challengesto security 

and stability. Parliamentary electionsscheduled for February 2010 were postponed because of the 

earthquake. Parliament’s constitutional mandate expired in May and Haiti will operate without a 

national legislature until presidential and parliamentary elections are held in November 2010. The

Organization of American States and U.N. believe that November elections are technically feasible 

and have pledged to provide a range ofsupport. However, a number of di#cult issues need to be 

resolved: (1) recreation of voter registration liststhat were lost in the earthquake; (2) new identi-

"cation cardsfor the hundreds of thousands who lost their identi"cation in the earthquake and 

the new voters who have come of age since the last election; (3) determining where and how the 

displaced will vote; (4) registering political parties; and a host of other election related questions.

The challenge of holding elections and the di#cult and politically-charged decisions about how 

to proceed in the face of daunting obstacles may threaten stability. Holding free and fair elections 

in the context of heightened frustration with the current government will require deft leadership.

Haiti’s history of political disruptions and violence remains a concern along with the opportunity
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that political unrest provides criminal elementsto organize and become a serioussecurity threat.

In light of these concerns, the U.N. increased the authorized strength of the U.N. police force 

in Haiti to 3,771. The additional U.N. police will be working with the Haitian National Police in a 

capacity-building role and will be providing additionalsecurity in the camps. The security situation 

that hasremained stable since the earthquake will be tested and the Haitian government and 

international community must take proactive and preventive action to ensure that the situation 

remains under control. 

Conclusion

The international community and Haitian government have taken the "rststepstowardsthe

long-term goal of a strong and capable Haitian state. The international community appears committed to learning from the past and working with the Haitian government as a partner. Economic 

recovery will depend on e!ective use of aid, careful avoidance of the hazards associated with

large aid in$uxes, and an emphasis on private sector growth. Success will require luck given the 

possibilities of natural disasters, and will require determination to resolve political di!erences and

maintain security. Despite the considerable challenges, Haiti, with the international community’s 

support, isin a position to build back a country better than before.

Haiti: A Forward Look

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