J. S12043/15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

SANTANDER BANK, N.A., F/K/A/ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

SOVEREIGN BANK, N.A. : PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH M. KAPNER, :

P.C. AND KENNETH KAPNER, :

: No. 1752 EDA 2014

Appellants :

Appeal from the Order April 22, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Civil Division No(s).: January Term, 2014 No. 00672

BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MAY 28, 2015

Appellants, the law offices of Kenneth M. Kapner, P.C., and Kenneth 

Kapner, Esquire, appeal from the order entered in the Philadelphia County 

Court of Common Pleas denying the petition to open or strike a confessed 

judgment against Appellant by Appellee, Santander Bank, N.A., formerly 

known as, Sovereign Bank, N.A. Appellants contend (1) the complaint was 

defective because the modification agreement (“MA”) was not signed by 

both the Kapner Firm and Kapner; (2) the warrant of attorney was nullified 

by the MA; (3) Appellee Santander lacked the capacity to institute suit; (4) 

the confession of judgment in the promissory note and guaranty was not 

conspicuous; and (5) the complaint includes an improper claim for attorney’s 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J. S12043/15

- 2 -

fees rendering it defective on its face. We affirm the confessed judgment in 

all respects other than that pertaining to the confessed judgment of 

attorney’s fees.

The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

[Appellee] Santander Bank (Santander) confessed 

judgment against [Appellants] on a business line of credit 

[“LOC”] of $60,000, plus interest and fees. The Kapner 

Firm executed a Promissory Note [“PN”] for the line of 

credit on October 14, 2010. Kapner executed a 

Commercial Guaranty on the same day. Both the [PN] and 

the Guaranty contain Confession of Judgment provisions. 

Santander is the successor in interest to Sovereign Bank, 

which originated the loan. 

On or about May 13, 2013,[1 Santander offered Kapner 

a written modification [“MA”] of the loan. This offer 

contained the statement: “Please acknowledge your 

acceptance of the Deferred Repayment Option by signing 

below where indicated and returning this letter to me at 

the following address. . . . Failure to do so by 

6/03/2013 will leave us with no alternative but to 

demand payment in full under the note.” (bold in 

original.)

Kapner executed the [MA] on June 13, 2013, ten days 

after the expiration date.

Santander confessed judgment against [Appellants] on 

January 14, 2014. 

[Appellants] filed a Motion to Strike or Open Judgment on 

February 12, 2014. . . . 

 * * *

 

1 We note the MA was dated May 16, 2013.
J. S12043/15

- 3 -

The [c]ourt denied the petition on April 17, 2014, after oral 

argument.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/14/14, at 1-2. On April 22, 2014, the order denying the 

petition was entered and Pa.R.C.P. 236(b) notice was given. This timely 

appeal followed. Appellants were not ordered to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. On June 16, 2014, Appellants 

filed a motion to strike and/or set aside the writ of execution. On July 11, 

2014, the court entered an order which provided that the writ of execution 

was stricken. The trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on August 

14th.

Appellants raise the following issue on appeal: “Did the lower court err 

in denying Appellants’ Petition to Strike or in the alternative Open the 

Judgment of Confession, to Stay all Proceedings,[2]and for Attorney’s 

Fees[?]” Appellants’ Brief at 3. 

Initially, we address Appellants’ claim that Appellee lacks the capacity 

to bring suit. Appellants’ Brief at 17. Appellants aver that as a foreign 

corporation doing business in Pennsylvania, Santander was required to 

register with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of 

 

2 We note the court’s order of July 11, 2014 renders this issue moot. See

Order, 7/11/14.
J. S12043/15

- 4 -

Corporations, in order to bring the instant action, citing 15 Pa.C.S. § 4141.3 

Id. at 22. We disagree.

Pursuant to statute, 

(b) Domestic Federal financial institution exclusion.─ 

Except as permitted by act of Congress, this article shall 

not apply to:

(1) Any of the following institutions or similar federally 

chartered institutions engaged in this Commonwealth in 

activities similar to those conducted by banking 

institutions, saving associations or credit unions: 

(i) National banking associations organized under The 

National Bank Act (13 Stat. 99, 12 U.S.C. § 1 et 

seq.).

15 Pa.C.S. § 4101(b). Pursuant to this provision, Appellee has the capacity 

to bring suit as it is a bank chartered under the National Bank Act.

 

3 Section 4141 provides:

(a) Right to bring actions or proceedings 

suspended.─A nonqualified foreign business corporation 

doing business in this Commonwealth within the meaning 

of Subchapter B (relating to qualification) shall not be 

permitted to maintain any action or proceeding in any 

court of this Commonwealth until the corporation has 

obtained a certificate of authority. Nor, except as provided 

in subsection (b), shall any action or proceeding be 

maintained in any court of this Commonwealth by any 

successor or assignee of the corporation on any right, 

claim or demand arising out of the doing of business by 

the corporation in this Commonwealth until a certificate of 

authority has been obtained by the corporation or by a 

corporation that has acquired all or substantially all of its 

assets.

15 Pa.C.S. § 4141(a). We note this section has been repealed, effective July 

1, 2015. 
J. S12043/15

- 5 -

First, Appellants claim that Appellees’ complaint is defective because 

the MA, relied upon to form the basis to confess judgment, was not signed 

by both Kapner and the Kapner Law Firm. Appellants’ Brief at 12-13. 

Appellants contend that Appellee did not raise the issue that Appellants 

failed to accept the MA until they filed the petition to strike or open the 

confessed judgment. Id. at 13. Appellants aver “[i]f this Court accepts that 

there was no MA then the Complaint is defective on its face because 

[Appellee] in the Complaint aver[s] there was a MA, which gives them the 

right to confess judgment.” Id. at 14. Appellants claim the MA changed the 

terms of the initial agreement and therefore had to be signed by both 

Kapner and the Kapner Law Firm. Id. at 15.

As a prefatory matter, we consider whether Appellants have waived 

this claim. Appellants have presented no legal authority whatsoever in 

support of its argument. Appellants Brief at 12-15. Appellant, for example, 

does not explain why the MA had to be signed by both Kapner and the 

Kapner Law Firm. “It is the appellant who has the burden of establishing his 

entitlement to relief by showing that the ruling of the trial court is erroneous 

under the evidence or the law. Where the appellant has filed to cite any 

authority in support of a contention, the claim is waived.” Bunt v. Pension 

Mort. Assocs., Inc., 666 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citations 

omitted); accord Korn v. Epstein, 727 A.2d 1130, 1135 (Pa. Super. 1999). 

Because Appellants have cited no legal authority, this claim is waived on 
J. S12043/15

- 6 -

appeal. See J.J. Deluca Co. v. Toll Naval Assocs., 56 A.3d 402, 412 (Pa. 

Super. 2012).

Next, Appellants contend the warrant of attorney in the promissory 

note and guaranty were nullified by the MA because it did not “clearly and 

expressly incorporate the Confessions of Judgment contained in the [PN], 

the Guaranty or the separately executed Disclosure.” Appellants’ Brief at 16. 

Appellants argue that the loan terms were changed by the MA, thus the 

Confession of Judgment in the Promissory Note, Guaranty and Disclosure 

were nullified because of the general reference to the warrant of attorney in 

the MA. Id. at 17. Appellants aver this is a fatal defect on the record and 

the confession of judgment should be stricken. Id. We find no relief is due.

Our review is governed by the following principles:

A confessed judgment will be stricken only if a fatal 

defect or irregularity appears on the face of the 

record. Graystone Bank v. Grove Estates, LP, 58 A.3d 

1277 (Pa. Super. 2012). A judgment by confession will be 

opened if the petitioner acts promptly, alleges a 

meritorious defense, and presents sufficient evidence in 

support of the defense to require the submission of the 

issues to a jury. In adjudicating the petition to strike 

and/or open the confessed judgment, the trial court is 

charged with determining whether the petitioner presented 

sufficient evidence of a meritorious defense to require 

submission of that issue to a jury. A meritorious 

defense is one upon which relief could be afforded if 

proven at trial. 

In examining the denial of a petition to strike or open a 

confessed judgment, we review the order for an abuse of 

discretion or error of law. 
J. S12043/15

- 7 -

In considering the merits of a petition to strike, the 

court will be limited to a review of only the record as 

filed by the party in whose favor the warrant is 

given, i.e., the complaint and the documents which 

contain confession of judgment clauses. Matters 

dehors the record filed by the party in whose favor 

the warrant is given will not be considered. If the 

record is self-sustaining, the judgment will not be 

stricken. However, if the truth of the factual 

averments contained in such record are disputed, 

then the remedy is by a proceeding to open the 

judgment and not to strike. An order of the court 

striking a judgment annuls the original judgment and 

the parties are left as if no judgment had been 

entered.

. . . When determining a petition to open a 

judgment, matters dehors the record filed by the 

party in whose favor the warrant is given, i.e., 

testimony, depositions, admissions, and other 

evidence, may be considered by the court. An order 

of the court opening a judgment does not impair the 

lien of the judgment or any execution issued on it.

Hazer v. Zabala, 26 A.3d 1166, 1169 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Ferrick v. Bianchini, 69 A.3d 642, 647-48 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some 

citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphases added).

In Graystone Bank, this Court opined:

To validate a warrant of attorney appearing in a 

promissory note, the signature of the executor must 

“directly relate” to the warrant. How this relationship 

manifests may be understood by a review of precedent:

We have noted the need for strict adherence to rules 

governing confessed judgments.[ ] As a matter of public 

policy, Pennsylvania applies a similar strict standard to 

establish the validity of a cognovit clause. This is so 

because “a warrant of attorney to confess judgment 

confers such plenary power on the donee in respect of the 

adjudication of his own claims that certain specific 
J. S12043/15

- 8 -

formalities are to be observed in order to effectuate the 

granting of such a power.” Frantz Tractor Co. v. 

Wyoming Valley Nursery, [ ] 120 A.2d 303, 305 ([Pa.] 

1956). Accordingly, “[a] Pennsylvania warrant of attorney 

must be signed. And it will be construed strictly against 

the party to be benefited by it, rather than against the 

party having drafted it.” Egyptian Sands Real Estate, 

Inc. v. Polony, [ ] 294 A.2d 799, 803 ([Pa. Super.] 1972) 

(citations omitted). “A warrant of attorney to confess 

judgment must be self-sustaining and to be self-sustaining 

the warrant must be in writing and signed by the person to 

be bound by it. The requisite signature must bear a 

direct relation to the warrant of attorney and may 

not be implied.” L.B. Foster Co. v. Tri–W Const. Co., [ 

] 186 A.2d 18, 20 ([Pa.] 1962) . . . .

A general reference in the body of an executed lease 

to terms and conditions to be found is insufficient to 

bind the lessee to a warrant of attorney not 

contained in the body of the lease unless the 

lessee signs the warrant where it does appear. 

In short, a warrant of attorney to confess judgment 

is not to be foisted upon anyone by implication or by 

general and nonspecific reference.

Frantz Tractor Co., supra at 305 [ ]; accord Egyptian 

Sands Real Estate, Inc., supra at 804 (stating, “a 

warrant of attorney on the second page of a document will 

not be conclusive against the signer of the first page”), 

Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 

1250, 1274-1275 (3d Cir. 1994) (same).

Graystone Bank, 58 A.3d at 1282-83 (emphases added).

The trial court opined: “[T]he lack of a recital of the warrant of 

attorney provisions would not necessarily be a fatal defect. The [MA] 

incorporates all other provisions, including the warrants of attorney for 

confession of judgment.” Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3. We agree.
J. S12043/15

- 9 -

Instantly, Appellant signed the PN and Guaranty. The PN and 

Guaranty each contained a confession of judgment clause. The confession of 

judgment clause in the PN provided as follows.

Confession of Judgment. Borrower hereby irrevocably 

authorizes and empowers any attorney or the Prothonotary 

or clerk of any court in the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania, or elsewhere, to appear at any time for 

borrower after a default under this note and with or 

without complaint filed, confess or enter judgment against 

borrower for the entire principal balance of this note and 

all accrued interest, late charges and any and all amounts 

expended or advanced by lender relating to any collateral 

securing this note, together with costs of suit, and an 

attorney’s commission of ten percent (10%) of the unpaid 

principal balance and accrued interest for collection, but in 

any event not less than five hundred dollars($500) on 

which judgment or judgments one or more executions may 

issue immediately; and for so doing, this note or a copy of 

this note verified by affidavit shall be sufficient warrant. . . 

. Borrower hereby waives any right borrower may have to 

notice or to a hearing in connection with any such 

confession of judgment and states that either a 

representative of lender specifically called the confession of 

judgment provision to borrower’s attention or borrower 

has been represented by independent legal counsel.

Appellants’ Pet. to Strike or in the Alternative Open Confession of J., 

2/12/14, Ex. “A”.4 The Guaranty contained a virtually identical confession of 

judgment clause. See id.5 

 

4 This appeared in the reproduced record at 64a.

5 R.R. at 68a.
J. S12043/15

- 10 -

In addition, the PN contained a Disclosure for Confession of Judgment 

which was signed by Appellant Kapner, President of Law Officers of Kenneth 

M. Kapner, P.C. Id.6 This disclosure provided, inter alia, as follows:

The undersigned is executing on behalf of declarant, this 

14th day of October, 2010, a [PN] for $60,000.00 

obligating the declarant to repay that amount.

A. The undersigned understands that the [PN] contains a 

confession of judgment provision that would permit lender 

to enter judgment against declarant in court, after a 

default on the note, without advance notice to declarant 

and without offering declarant an opportunity to defend 

against the entry of judgment. . . . [T]he undersigned 

expressly agrees and consents to lenders entering 

judgment against declarant by confession as provided for 

in the confession of judgment provision.

B. The undersigned further understand that in addition to 

giving lenders the right to enter judgment against 

declarant without advance notice or a hearing, the 

confession of judgment provision in the [PN] also contains 

language that would permit lender, after entry of 

judgment, again without either advance notice or a 

hearing, to execute on the judgment . . . . The 

undersigned expressly agrees and consents to lenders 

immediately executing on the judgment in any manner 

permitted by applicable state and federal law, without 

giving declarant any advance notice.

C. After having read and determined which of the following 

statements are applicable, by initialing each statement 

that applies, the undersigned represents that:

1. Declarant was represented by declarant’s own 

independent legal counsel in connection with the [PN].

 

6 R.R. 69a.
J. S12043/15

- 11 -

2. A representative of lender specifically called the 

confession of judgment provision in the [PN] to declarant’s 

attention.

Appellants’ Pet. to Strike or in the Alternative Open Confession of J., 

2/12/14, Ex. “A”.7 Appellant Kapner initialed sections A., B., C1 and C2. 

The Guaranty contains a virtually identical Disclosure for Confession of 

Judgment initialed by Appellant Kapner. See id.8

The MA provided, inter alia, as follows:

Re: [PN] . . . dated 10/14/2010, in the principal amount 

of $60,000 (the “Loan”). . . 

Please be advised that effective immediately, the Bank is 

hereby exercising its right to discontinue any further 

borrowing requests made upon the above referenced Loan 

obligation. The Loan is payable on demand and as a 

result, the Bank has the right to require you to 

immediately repay the entire Loan indebtedness, including 

principal, accrued interest and any fees. The Bank will 

offer to you an option of repaying the outstanding Loan 

balance over 60 months beginning 10/14/2013 (the 

“Deferred Repayment Option”) . . . .

Please acknowledge your acceptance of the Deferred 

Repayment Option by signing below where indicated . . . .

Failure to do so by 6/03/2013 will leave us with no 

alternative but to demand payment in full under the [PN].

Please note that all other Loan provisions remain the 

same during the Deferred Repayment Option term, 

including those effecting interest rates and those 

concerning the Bank’s right to require payment in 

 

7 R.R. at 69a.

8 R.R. at 70a.
J. S12043/15

- 12 -

full at any time. If any Deferred Repayment Option 

payment is not paid when due, or if any other default 

occurs as referenced in the original Loan documents, then 

your Deferred Repayment Option will automatically end 

and the Bank will require the immediate Loan repayment 

in full.

Id.9(emphases added).

Appellant Kapner’s signature appeared on the same page as the 

confession of judgment clause in the PN and Guaranty. Appellant’s 

signature bears a direct relation to the warrant of attorney in the confession 

of judgment in the PN and Guaranty. See Graystone Bank, 58 A.3d at 

1282-83. Therefore, the general reference to the terms of the loan and the 

warrant of attorney in the MA is sufficient to bind Appellants. See id. 

Next, we address Appellants claim that the Confessions of Judgment in 

the PN and Guaranty were not conspicuous, pursuant to 13 Pa.C.S. § 1201. 

Appellants’ Brief at 22. Appellants aver “[t]he Confessions of Judgment 

clauses contained in the [PN] and Guaranty are only capitalized and not 

in a different font then the rest of the printed language on the respective 

pages containing said Confessions of Judgment to make them 

distinguishable.” Id. at 23 (emphasis added). Appellants contend “the 

Confessions of Judgment clauses do not contain a cognovits clause in a 

conspicuous manner that the undersigned is knowingly, voluntarily and 

 

9 R.R. at 71a.
J. S12043/15

- 13 -

intelligently waiving the right to notice and opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 

24.

Our review is governed by the following principle: “Statutory 

interpretation presents a question of law and, as such, our standard of 

review is de novo, while our scope of review is plenary.” Stoloff v. Neiman 

Marcus Group, Inc., 24 A.3d 366, 369 (Pa. Super. 2011). Conspicuous is 

statutorily defines as follows:

“Conspicuous.” With reference to a term, means so 

written, displayed or presented that a reasonable person 

against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. 

Whether a term is “conspicuous” or not is a decision for 

the court. Conspicuous terms include the following: 

(i) A heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than 

the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font or

color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size. 

(ii) Language in the body of a record or display in larger 

type than the surrounding text, in contrasting type, font 

or color to the surrounding text of the same size, or set 

off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols 

or other marks that call attention to the language.

13 Pa.C.S. § 1201(1)(i)-(ii) (emphases added). “‘[O]r’ is disjunctive. It 

means one or the other of two or more alternatives.” In re Paulmier, 937 

A.2d 364, 373 (Pa. 2007). 

“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all 

ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under 

the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). 

“Words and phrases shall be construed according to the 

rules of grammar and according to their common and 

approved usage. . . .” Id., § 1903(a). “The object of all 

interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain 

and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 
J. S12043/15

- 14 -

Id., § 1921(a). “When the words of a statute are clear 

and free from all ambiguity, they are presumed to be the 

best indication of legislative intent.”

Stoloff, 24 A.3d at 369 (some citations omitted).

In Graystone Bank, this Court opined:

Here, the warrant of attorney appeared 

conspicuously in all caps on the very bottom of the 

penultimate page of the agreement and immediately 

preceded where the executor (Mr. Pasch) signed at the top 

of the following, final page. Evidence of this location of a 

conspicuous cognovit contained within the body of 

the agreement sufficed to establish that Mr. Pasch 

effectively signed his name to the warrant of attorney.

Graystone Bank, 58 A.3d at 1283 (emphases added).

Instantly, the confession of judgment clauses in both the PN and 

Guaranty are in all capital letters. See id. Additionally, there are separate 

disclosures for confession of judgment for both the PN and Guaranty, in all 

capital letters. We find the confession of judgment clauses to be 

conspicuous. See 13 Pa.C.S. § 1201(1)(i-ii); Graystone Bank, 58 A.3d at 

1283; In re Paulmier, 937 A.2d at 373.

Next, Appellants contend the complaint contains an improper 

attorney’s fees claim thus rendering the complaint defective on its face. 

Appellant’s Brief at 24. Appellants concede “the Confession of Judgment 

clauses contained in the [PN] and Guaranty state in pertinent part: . . . and 

an attorney’s commission in the amount of ten percent (10%) of the 

unpaid principal balance and the accrued interest for collection . . . .” 

Id. at 26 (emphasis in original). Appellants aver the fees claimed in the 
J. S12043/15

- 15 -

Complaint for six thousand fifty two dollars and thirty two cents are 

excessive based upon “[t]he amount of legal work to produce, what is a 

cookie cutter assortment of documents, is not in balance with what actual 

‘reasonable attorney’s fees’ would be to compile and file said Complaint.” 

Id. at 27. Appellants argue that “[a]ny sums owed by the Kapner Firm 

and/or Kapner should be limited to reasonable fees as specifically set forth in 

the [PN] and Guaranty and not as set forth as averred in the Complaint.” 

Id. In the alternative, Appellants aver the judgment should be opened due 

to the unreasonableness of the attorney’s fees. Id. at 28. We address 

these claims together.

In Graystone, the appellants raised a similar argument. This court 

declined to strike the confessed judgment, but remanded for the court to 

address the issue of the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees. This Court 

opined:

Unreasonable attorney’s fees also warranted striking 

the confessed judgment, [the a]ppellants argue. Pursuant 

to the warrant of attorney’s fee-shifting clause, Appellees 

included in their confessed judgment attorney’s fees in the 

amount of 10% of outstanding principal . . . . [The 

a]ppellants argue that this figure, though reflecting the 

percentage stipulated to in the parties’ contract, far 

exceeds a reasonable fee for filing four “boilerplate” 

confessions of judgment upon each of the [a]ppellees. We 

agree that the record fails to demonstrate whether 

the court conducted a reasonableness inquiry into 

the fees that resulted from operation of the 10% 

provision.

Our jurisprudence is clear that even where a contract 

authorizes fee-shifting in a particular amount, that amount 
J. S12043/15

- 16 -

must be reasonable under the circumstances. McMullen 

v. Kutz, [ ] 985 A.2d 769 ([Pa.] 2009) (collecting cases 

from majority of states, including decisions applying to 

loan documents authorizing lender to recover legal 

expenses); Dollar Bank [Fed. Sav. Bank v. Northwood 

Cheese Co., 637 A.2d 309, 314 (Pa. Super. 1994)], 

(holding court will modify judgment and cause proper 

judgment to be entered where confessed judgment was 

entered according to contract but in excessive in amount).

It is unclear, however, whether the lower court 

recognized that the fee-shifting provision within the 

warrant of attorney was subject to a reasonableness 

standard. Indeed, the court states that the provision 

elsewhere in the agreement requiring a reasonable 

attorney fee for collecting on the loan was distinct, and, 

thus, did not “preclude the provision allowing the award of 

10% of the principal in attorney’s fees in the confession of 

judgment and render it obsolete.” 

 * * *

The record gives no indication if the court 

reviewed whether the 10% attorney’s fee provision 

worked a reasonable result under the circumstances.

We therefore must remand this matter for the court to 

conduct such review of the resultant attorney’s fees and, if 

necessary, open and modify the confessed judgment to 

make the fee amount reasonable.

Graystone, 58 A.3d 1283-84 (emphases added).

In the case sub judice, at the hearing on the petition to strike or in the 

alternative open the confessed judgment, counsel for Appellants raised the 

issue of the reasonableness of the attorney’s fee award. See N.T., 3/19/14, 

at 7-8. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court indicated that it 

would take the matter under advisement. Id. at 16. In its opinion the trial 

court states that Appellants argue the judgment should be opened because 
J. S12043/15

- 17 -

“the attorney’s fees claimed are excessive and unreasonable.” Trial Ct. Op. 

at 2. However, the court did not address the merits of the issue in its 

opinion. See id. at 1-4.

We have no indication if the court reviewed whether the 10% 

attorney’s fee resulted in a reasonable result. Therefore, we remand this 

matter for the court to review the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees and, 

“if necessary, open and modify the confessed judgment to make the fee 

amount reasonable.” See Graystone, 58 A.3d 1283-84.

Lastly, Appellants’ claim the trial court erred in denying the petition to 

open the judgment by confession because “Kapner and the Kapner Firm did 

not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently consent to waive of his right to a 

trial by jury and/or hearing before the entry of judgment especially in light 

of the fact that the Kapner Guaranty and the Kapner Firm [PN] and Guaranty 

Confessions of Judgment were nullified by the [MA] as it pertains to the 

Confession of Judgment.”10 Appellants’ Brief at 28. Given our resolution of 

this issue in relation to Appellants’ argument in support of his claim that the 

 

10 This averment and the claim that “[h]ere, the attorney’s fees claimed due 

in the Complaint are excessive and ureasonable and are in contravention to 

applicable law[,]” constitutes Appellants’ one paragraph argument in support 

of its claim of trial court error. See Appellants’ Brief at 28.
J. S12043/15

- 18 -

trial court erred in denying his petition to strike the confessed judgment, we 

need not revisit it.11 See supra.

We affirm order in all respects other than that pertaining to the 

confessed judgment of attorney's fees, which the lower court shall review in 

a manner consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/28/2015

 

11 We note Appellants have not “allege[d] a meritorious defense, and 

present[ed] sufficient evidence in support of the defense to require the 

submission of the issues to a jury,” in support of the claim that the court 

erred in denying the petition to open the confessed judgment. See Ferrick, 

69 A.3d at 647.