### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Marc h 4, 200 8 S es sio n


### PERRY ANTHONY CR IBBS v. S TATE OF TENNESS EE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr iminal Cou rt f or Shelby Coun ty No. P -20670 Car olyn B lackett, Judge

No. W2006-01381-C CA-R 3-P D - F iled Jul y 1, 2009

Th e pe tit ion e r, P erry An tho ny Cr ibb s, a pp e a ls the She lby

County Cr imi na l Co ur

t’ s d e nia l of

his p e ti ti o nf o r p o s t- c o n v ic ti o nr e li e f

f r o m h is c o n v ic ti o n s f

o r f ir s t d e g r e e f

e lo n y mu r d e r , a tt e mp ted first deg ree murder, a

nd ag g ravated burg lary , and re sulting sentenc es of de ath, forty y ea rs, and ten y ear s, respe ct i v el y

. On appe al, the petitioner pr esents a numbe r of c laims that can be char acte rized in the following c ateg ories: (1) he is actu al l y innocent of murde r; (2) he was de nie d a fa ir po st- c on vic tio n e vid e nti ary he ari ng ; ( 3) the po st- c on vic tio n c ourt ’s fa ilure to conclude that he wa s ment al l y re t arded was c ontrary to the proof pr esente d by the psy cholog ical experts; (4) he wa s denied the e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel at trial and on dir ect a ppeal; and (5) Te nn e sse e ’s de a th p e na lty statut e vio late s th e Un ite d St a te s and T e nn e sse e Con sti tut ion s. Following a thoroug h and exhaustive revie w of the recor d and the a pplicable law , we c onclude that the petitioner re ceived t he inef fec tive assistance of counse l at sentenc ing. T here fore , the petitioner’ s d e a th

s e n te n c e is r e v e r s e d , an d th e c a s e is r e ma

n d e d to th e tr ia l c o u rt f

o r a new
c a pit a l se nte nc inghe ari ng . T he jud g e wh o p re sid e d o ve r t his po st- c on vic tio n p roce e din g is disqualified from a

ny subsequent proc eeding s in this case.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d in

P art, R ever sed in Part , and th e Case is Rem anded.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D. Kelly

Thomas, J r., J., joined. T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., filed a dissentingopinion.

Paul J . Morrow, Jr., and Sara Wil lingham, Nashville, Tennes s ee , for the appellant, Perr y An tho ny Cr ibb s.

Robe rt E

. Co o p e r , Jr

. , A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l & Re p o rte r ; M ic h a e l M o o r e So li c it o r G e n e r a l; Ja me s E. Gay lord, A s s is ta

n t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l; Wi ll ia

m L

. G ib b o n s , D is tr ic t Att o r n e y G e n e r a l; an d

John Campbell, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION-2- I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

A. Proof Unde rlying the Petitioner’s Convictions

I n th e pe tit ion e r’ s d ir e c t a pp e a l, o ur su pr e me c ourt

state d th e fo llo wi ngfa c ts:
The proof

prese nted by

the State at the guilt phase of the trial established that sometime betwe en 1:30 a.m. and 1:45 a .m. on the mor nin g of Janu ary 2, 19 94 , th e vic tim s, Sid ne y Ha rr is, and his wi fe , L ind a

Ha rri s, re tur ne d f ro m a vis it w ithfr ie nd s to the ir ho me locate d at 43 78 Cottonwo od , in Me mph is. As wa s h is h a bit , Sidney Har ri s backe d his car onto the c arpor t, and then opene d the door for his wife to en ter the house . As she ca me throug h the kitchen door, L inda Har

ris wa s attacke d and knocke d to the floor by an unknown a ss ai l ant. Sidney Har ris strug g led with this man, wh o wa s arm e d w itha

pis tol , f or a pp ro xima te ly

fi ft e e n s e c on ds , and h a d w r e s tl e d h im to th e f lo o r w h e na s e c o n d a s s a il an t, armed with a double barr el sawe d-off shotgun, intervene d an d o rder ed Har ris to relea se the fir st man.

Wit h g uns l eveled upon him, the two intruders orde red Harri s to sit i n a cha ir locate d in the den of his home, whic h was just off the kitchen, a

bout five fe et from where his wife wa s located. A t some point, the intruders ask ed Harris, “whe re is the d o p e? ” an d t h ey t o l d Ha rr i s t h ey i n t en d ed t o s h o o t h i m

. T h o u gh the lig h ts w e r e n o t o n in th e h o u s e d u r in g th is ti me , H ar

r is s a id the

car p o rt l ig h t s h o n e thr o u g hth e o p e nk it c h e nd o o r an d p r o v ided sufficie nt illum ination for him to observe the fac ial features of the int ru de rs . H arr is o bs e rved th e as sa ila nts fo r t we nty to t hir ty seconds be fore th e s ec o nd assailant fire d the shotg un, striking Har ris in the left shoulder a

nd hand. Ha

rris l o s t consciousness for a time af ter he was shot. Wh en h e re g ained c onsciousness, the assai l ants wer e g one. Ha rris obser ved his wife’ s body

ly ing in a pool of blood on the floor of the kitchen whe re she had bee n initially assaulted. B ased upon the discovery of wa dding material on th e l eft side of

her ne ck and pow der bur ns on her body , the medical e x aminer te st i fi ed that L inda Har ris had sustained a

c on t a c t s h o t g u n w o u n d t o t h e l e f t s i d e o f h e r h e a d w h i c h w ou ld have r esu l t ed in instantaneous de ath. Har ris made his wa

y to a
n eighbor’s house , wher e he w as able to summon assist ance befor e
a g a in l os ingc on sc iou sn e ss.-3- Whe n th e po lic e arr ive d at th e sc e ne the y fo un d th e ho us e in d isa rr ay . T he int

ru de rs a pp are ntl y had gaine d e ntr

y to t he ho us e throug h an open bedroom window. Toy s belong ing to th e v i cti m’s daug hter we re in that be droom and visib l e o n t h e videotape of the

scene made by

police. The v ideotape a lso showed the body of L inda Har

ris in t h e k i t chen, shotgun shells on the de n floor, and bloodstains on the chair in whic h Sidney Har ri s had bee n sitti ng wh e n h e ha d b e e n s ho t. T he re we re se ve ral bu ll et ho le s in the wa ll to the left of the c hair in the de n.

Of fi c e r D on a ld C ro w, a

Me mphi s poli c e man, ro de wi th Har ris as he w as transpor

ted to t h e hospital shortly afte r the

s h o o t i n g

. O f

f i c e r C r o w t e s t i f

i e d t h a tH ar r i s d e s c r i b e d

t h e fi rs t
as s ai l an ti ns o m e d et ai l , b u t s t a t e d t h at t h e m an h adb ee nwe ar i n g a bla c k s ki m a sk

. W it h r e sp e c t to the se c on d a ssa ila nt, Ha rr is,

acc ording to Offic er C ro w, said only that he wa s tall, thin, and

wore a blac k ski mask

. S erg eant Ronnie McWilliams of the M e mp h i s p o l i c e d i r e c t e d t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o nan d

i n t e r v i e w e d H arr is the da y aft er the sh oo tin g . A t th a t ti me , H arr is s a id t hat he c ou ld not identify

either of

the two suspects be cause th ey had bee n
wea ring black ski masks. About a week later, Ha rris told a police office r that he c ould n o t ge t the complexion of the man with the sh otgun . Se rg e ant McWilliams d e sc ri be d H arr is a s b e inghe a vil y sed ate d o n th e da

y a ft e r t he mur de r a

nd sa id t hat he ha d b e e n in serious co ndition when the sec ond statement had be en take n. Har ris could not reme mber spea king to police o n the nig ht of the murder a nd rec alled beingsedate d when he spoke wi t h p olice the

ne xt day . T he re a ft e r, and a t tr ia l, H arris descr ibe d th e fi rs t assailant as a b lack man, w ear ing a light-c olored shee r stocking

ma sk , a de nim jum ps uit , a nd g lov e s, a pp ro xima te ly

6' 1" i n h e ig ht, 240 pounds in wei gh t , with a moustache , larg e round nose , thick ey eb rows, and ha ir about one inc h in leng th. Harr is said the second a ssailant, who had shot him, also had bee n a blac k man,

wea ring a lig ht-colore d sheer stocking mask, a dirty light g ree n or g old mechanic ’s j u m p s u i t and g loves. Har ris said this man was taller a nd thinner than the f

irst assailant, appr ox imately 6'3 " or 6' 4" in h e ig ht, and

a bo ut 2 20 po un ds in w e ig ht.

At the tim e of

thi s mu rd e r, the de fe nd ant w a s r e sid ingwi th J acque line Cannon, the mother of his daug hter. Cannon state d that on the nig ht of the murder , the def endant, we aring b l u e jea

ns and a blue denim shirt, le ft their residenc e at approximately 9 : 0 0 or 10:00 p.m. W hen he r eturne d so m et i m e around 1:00 a.m., Cannon-4- said he wa s cover ed i n b l o o d from a “hit.” Cribbs told her that he had shot a man a

nd a woman. C ri b bs expl ained that he had bee n hir e d to kil l th e man b y

ano the r m an w ho ha d b e e n havin g an a ff a ir wi th t he fema le vic tim . Cr ibb s sa id t hat he ha d k ill e d b oth

vic tim s
an d c la im e d th a t h e w o u ld

b e p a id f or t he “hit” so o n

. T h e n e xt day , Ca n n o n discovere d at her residenc e a g old-fac ed Micke y Mouse watc h with a leathe r wrist band w ith the words “g enuine leather ” imprinted on the ba ck. W h en s h e asked Cribbs about the watch, he explained that he had ta k en i t fr om the home of the couple he had killed.

Sh o rt l y t h e r e a f

t e r , C an n o n l e ar

n e d f r o m n e w s r e p o rt s t h a t a man and woma

n had bee n shot, as Cri b b s claimed, on the nig ht of J anuar y 2, 1994. The woma

n had bee n k i l l ed but the man survive d the shooting. B eca

use she f ear ed Cribbs, Cannon d i d n o t relay her knowledg e about the mur der t o t h e police at that time. Som e four to s i x weeks later, howe ver, Cribbs bec ame a ng ry with Cannon beca use h e s uspecte d she had told a ne ighbor about his role in the murder. Cribbs a ssault ed and be at Cannon, and she was hospitaliz ed for

three day s, suffer ing, a mong other things, a puncture d lung. F ear ing f or her life, C annon re lated to her brother what Cribbs had told her a bout the murder. H er br other notified Cr i m e S t o ppers, a

nd as a r esult, the police located and inter viewed Cann on . Ca

nn on e ve ntu a lly

re c e ived $ 90 0 f

ro m Cr ime Sto pp e rs , and her brother r ece ived $100.
Upon lear ning of the g old-fac ed Micke y

Mouse watc h from Cannon, police a sked Sidney Har ris if his wi fe ha d owned suc h a watch. H arr is had bee n hospitaliz ed for twenty -two day s following the shooting a

nd had not discover ed the watch missing. When questioned by

police, Ha

rris conf irmed th at his wife ha d owned such a w atch a

nd that it had been am o n g the items missi ng from the house a fter the murder. At t his point, having re ason to believe that the def

endant may

have bee n i n v olved in the murder of L inda Har ris, p o l i ce compiled a photog raphic lineup of eig ht men, including the defe ndant, who matche d the desc ri p t i o n g iven by Har ris. Visibly

shaken an d emotional, Har ris identified the ph oto g ra phof Cr ibb s a s “ the mot

he r -
-- -- that sh ot me!” Ha rr is previously

had viewe d two other photog raphic lineups, but had not identified anyone as the person who shot him and killed his wi fe. At trial, Har

ris also positively

identified Cribbs as t he man who sh ot h im.A t t he pet i t i oner ’ s mo t i on f or n ew t r i al he ar i ng , t he t r i al cour t s et as i de t he convi ct i ons f or f i r s t degr ee premedi t at ed 1

m urd er a nd f

i rst d eg ree m urd er d uring the p erp etrati o n o f ag gra va t ed ro b b ery b ut up he l d t he co nv i cti o n for fi rst deg r ee mu r der du r i n g t h e per pet r at i on of a g g r av at ed bu r g l ar y a n d t h e dea t h s en t en ce

. Se e St at e v

. Cr i bbs , 967 S.W

. 2 d 77 3 , 77 6 (T enn. 19 9 8 ).

-5-

Ba sed upon the proof

summarized above, the jury found the defe ndant g uilty

of pre meditated first degre e [ murder]; first deg ree
mur de r d ur ingthe pe rp e tr a tio n o f a n a g g ra vate d b ur g lary ; and fi rs t d e g r e e m u r d e r

d u r i n g t h e p e r

p e t r a t i o no f

a g g r a v a t e d

r o b b e r y. [1] The de fendan t wa s also found guilty of ag g ravated burg lary

and attempted first de g ree murder.

Th e tr ia l pr oc e e de d to the se nten c ingph a se . T he State relied upon the evidence p re s ented during the g uilt phase of the tr ia l, a nd in a dd iti on , intr od

uc ed pro of to sh owtha

t th e de fe nd ant, twen t y -t hree -y ear s-old at the time of trial, pr eviously had bee n convicted of

two count s o f att empted sec ond deg ree murder a nd one count of

ag g ra v at ed robbe ry

in 1990. Also introduced wa s testimony t h at the def

endant ha d been c onvicted of attempted second de g ree burg lary

in 1989.
Testifying on his own behalf , Cribbs sa id that he h ad b een born in A la

b ama , b u t h a d li v e d in Sh e lb y Co u n ty f o r a b o u t nine y e ars

. Th e de fe nd ant’ s mot he r, g ra nd fa the r, and two bro the rs , twenty -six and seve nteen, r esided in Armory , Mississ ippi at the time of the trial. B eca use of his g randf

ather ’s illness and ob lig a tio ns a t w or

k o r s c ho ol, none of

his fa mil y we re a ble to att en d his trial. Cribbs said that his family had visited him on the Sunday prior to trial, and that visit had bee n the fir s t time he had

seen his mother in f

our y ear s. Cribbs had a c ousin in Memphis and previously

had bee n employ ed b y his uncle’s c onstruction company , but none of hi s family members attended the tria l or testified on his behalf

. Cribbs sa id that he had told his aunt that the trial was a

matter of life or death, but he had not pre ssed his mother to atte nd the t ri al be c a

us e sh e ha d b e e n il l, a

nd he did no t w ant t o worry her. Cribbs s aid that he ha d attended sc hool throug h the seventh g rade but had droppe d out when he was ex p ell ed for truanc y . Of the t welve-y ear sentenc e he r ece ived on the

c o n v i c t i o n s f

o r a t t e mp t e d

s e c o n d d e g r e e m u r d e r

an d r o b b e r y, Cribbs had b ee n i n carce rate d for thre e and one -half year s in prison and had not violated pr i son rules duringthat time. Cribbs said that he had visited with his o n l y ch ild, a daug hter, seve n or eig ht times-6- since be ing a

rre ste d for the murder of

L inda Har

ris. Cribbs denied

c o mm itti n g th e c r im e f

o r w h ic h th e ju

r y h a d c o n v ic te d h im , an d he

s a id th a t h e h a d r e f

u s e d to p le a d g u il ty in e xc h an g e for a life sentenc e b ec ause he had not committed the cr ime. Cribbs explained t h at C an non had fa lsely implicated him in the murder be c a us e sh e wa s ang ry . Cr ibb s sa id t hat he ha d a

rgue d w ith Cannon bec ause “ she sto l e s ome money from me. I

had whoope d her r eal ba d and told her I wasn’t going to come ar ound no more. . . . So she came in and said this on me.” Crib b s d en i ed havingany knowledg e of a

g old-fac ed Mick ey

Mouse watc h. L astly , Cribbs asked the jury

to spare his life, sa

y i ng that he would conduc t himself a s a

d e c e n t i n d iv id

u a l i np r is o nif

g iv e na s e n te n c e o f

life imprisonment without t he possibility of par ole.

Ba sed upon the proof

, the jury fo u n d that the State had proven the exis tence of two ag g ravating c ircumstance s bey ond a

rea sonable doubt: (1) “[t ]he defe ndant was previously convicted of

on e or mor e fe lo nie s, oth e r t ha n th e pr e se nt c ha

rg e , w ho se statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person;” a nd (2) “ [t ]he murder was committed while the def endant wa s eng ag ed in committi ng or wa s attempting to c ommit, a burg lary .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(2) and (7) (1991 Repl.). F inding that the tw o a g g r av a ti n g c ir c u ms ta n c e s o utweig hed mitiga ting circ umstan ce s b ey ond a re asonable doubt, the jury sentenc ed the defe ndant to death by

elec trocution.

State v. Cribbs
, 967 S.W .2d 773, 776-79 (Ten n. 1998) (f ootnotes omitt ed), c ert. de nied
, 52 5 U .S. 932, 119 S. Ct . 343 (1998).

For the attempted f

irst deg ree murder an d aggr avate d burg lary convictions, the trial cour t imposed consec utive, Rang e I Isentences of for ty and ten y ear s, respe ctively . Our supre me cour t aff irmed the p et i t i o n er’ s convictions and sente nces. I d. at 776 n.1. On De cembe r 2, 1998, the petitioner filed a

pro se pe tition for post-conviction relief . On Fe bruary

8, 1999, the trial cour

t appointed the Of

fice of the Post-Conviction Defe nder to re prese nt the petitioner in the proce eding s, and counse l filed an amended pe t i t i o n on April 13, 2000. Evidentiary hear ings on the peti ti o n w e r e c o n d

u c te d o n v ar io u s d a te s in N o v e mb e r 2 0 0 1 , Ap r il 2 0 0 2 , Ju n e 2 0 0 2 , and September 2002.

B. P ro o f a tt h e P o s t -C o n v i ct i o nE v i d en t i ary He ar i n gs

Be tty Thomas-Moore , an assistant public def ender , testified that she be came co-c o u n s el afte r September

16, 19 9 4 , and “w as not a pa rt of any of the motions or the hea ring s” in the ca se. Despite a reque st for discover

y , co-c ounsel deni ed ev er v iewingJ ames Irvin Parker ’s statementB e c a u se the vic tim s h a v e the sa m e su rn a m e a n d so m e o f t h e w itne sse s sh a re the sa m e su rn a m e , w e ha v e c h o se n to 2

u til iz e the ir fi rs t na m e s w h e n ne c e ssa ry fo r c la rity. W e m e a n no d isre sp e c t t o the se ind ivid u a ls.

-7- any time in 1994. I n his Febr uary 1 2 , 1994 statement, Parke r had c laimed that he wa s inca rc er at ed wi th “seve ral pe rsons who bra g g ed to him that they wer e the one s who killed L inda Har ris and s h o t h er husband, Sidney . . . [and] also indicated that they killed her a

nd shot her husband as a

part of a plan with the husband, Sidney Har ris, to kill t he wife , L i n d a Ha rr i s

. ” Cocounsel opined that t h e s t at ement would have bee n materia l to the prepa ration of the pe titioner’s defe nse. She explained that, had she be en in possession of the statement, she would have located P ar k er and investig ated the statement’s validity . Although c o-counse l could not rec all the indictment, she was not surpr ised to learn t h at Parker ’s name w as listed on it. She ex plained that

no rm a l pr oc e dure wou ld hav e be e n to take the wi tne ss n a me s f ro m th e ind ic tme nt a

nd tr y to locate e ach one . Nothing in the a ttorney file indicate d anyone attempted to loca te Parke r.

C o -c o u n s el t es t i fi edt h at S i dn ey Ha rr i s al l ege d l y

wa s i n v o l v e d

i nh i s wi fe ’s s h o o t i n g. She descr ibed the alleg ation as “a rumor that Mr. Ha

rris had put a contrac t out on his wife.” Coco un s e l s a id s h e u n aw ar e o f an y ma r it a l p r o b le ms th e H ar

r is e s w e r e h a v in g , and she wa s
unawa re of any extramarital af

fairs or financ ial problems. C o -counsel stated that no inv e sti g a tio n w a s c on du c te d into S idn e y ’s po ssi ble inv olv e me nt w ithdr ug s. Al tho ug h d e fen se 2

counse l ha d h e ard

se ve ra l a lle g a tio ns re g ard ing Sid ne y ’s inv olv e me nt w ithdr ug s, the ir investigation into t he ca se fa iled to substantiate the alleg ations. The def ense’ s investigator, Ralph Nally , would have be en assig ned to investig ate the a lleg ations.
Reg ardingthe petitioner’s f ormer g irlfriend, Jackie Cannon, c o-coun sel could not

reme mber a

ny i n v estig ation. Cannon told police that the petitioner c ame home the night of the sh oo tin g wi th b loo d o n h im an d that he g a ve he r a Mic ke y Mo us e watc h th a t su

pp os e dly belong ed to one of

the victims. The attorne y file re flec ted that Ralph Na l ly interviewe d Cannon

on Se pte mbe r 8 , 19 94

. Co- c ouns e l c ou ld n ot r e c a ll i nte rv ie wi ngCann on ’s br oth e r, Ge or g e Ros s. She qu a lif

ie d he r s tate me nt b y

e xpla ini ngthat sh e did

no t do muc h inve sti g a tin g on he r o wn in the ca se. Co-counse l also could not ex p l ain why there was no c ross-examination of Cannon at tr ia l in re sp on se to C ann on ’s state me nt t hat sh e and

he r b ro the r r e c e ived mo ne y fr om C ri me Stoppers. Co-counsel did not reme mber whe ther she a nd lead c ounsel had discussed Ca nnon’s

cross-e x amination.

Co-counsel t es t ified that Elizabeth Be nson was supposed to g ather backg round information about clients. This enta iled g ather ing inf ormation about schoolwor k, medical probl em s , m ed i cal hist ory , family history , work history , and any thing e lse related to a client’ s life. Co-counse l relate d that Be nson had reported in her workingdocument that the pe titioner

was in a resour ce class. Co-counsel interpre ted a “re source class” to be a clas s fo r t h o s e p ersons “who we re a

littl e bit slower than e very body else so they

wer e in spec ial ed. cla sses.”

Co-counsel testified that the defe nse did not consider f iling a motion for the trial judg e, J ud ge A xley , to re c us e him se lf ba se d u po n h is “ pe rc e ive d a

tti tud e s to wa

rd s d e a th p e na lty-8-

de fe nd ants .” She sta

te d that she did no t con du c t any mit ig a tio n inve sti g a tio n o n h e r o wn or g o to Alabama wher e member s of the petitioner’ s family lived. She did not remember seeingany

thing in the fil e directing Ralph Nally to g o to Mississ ippi or Alaba ma. Co-counse l stated that she may have ta lked direc tly

with members of the Cribbs family , but she was not ce rtain.

Co-counsel testified that she could not rec all seeing a T en n essee Depa rtment of Correc tion report re g ardingthe petitioner’s pr ior offe nses. Howe ver, upon r eview, she stated that the re po rt wa s in the a tto rn e y fi le

. Th e re po rt c on ta ine d a lis t of fa mil y me mbe rs , s pecific a lly L or e tta Cr ibb s, Mari e Cr ibb s, Ra nd y Cr ibbs, Annie W. Cr ibb s, Vo nze ll Cr ibb s, F re dd ie Cr ibb s, Od ay Cr ibb s, and J acki e Cann on . T he y liv e d in Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , a

nd Am or y , M iss iss ipp i. Co-counsel ne ver c ontacted a ny of the pe titioner’s frie nds or school tea cher s , an d she could not

re me mbe r a

ny thi nga bo ut t he vic tim ’s fa

mil y or th e pe tit ion e r’ s f

a mil y . Sh e a lso c ou ld n ot r e c a ll any thing a bout the petitioner’s pa

rents or his birth re cords, sc h o o l rec ords, juvenile re cords, or Sunday school rec ords.

Co-counsel testified that although a compe t en cy

and sanity

examination was completed on the petitioner at the Midtown Mental Hea lth Center, s h e could not rec all any reque sts for fu rt her ex pert a ssi sta

nc e in t hat are a . Co -c ouns e l a dd e d th a t, i n h e r o pin ion , “ lot s o f s tuf f .

. . is missing fro m t

h e f il e

. ” Sp e c if

ic a ll y , c o
- c o u n s e l s tate d

th a t d o c u me n ts s h e o b ta in e d d u r in g the tr ia l w e re mis sin g . A s f or the the or y of the c a se , c o- c ouns el cou ld no t re me mbe r t he sp e c if ic defe nse theory . She stated t h at the petitioner “ alway s has said that he didn’t know a ny thing about it and d i d n ’t k n o w

. . . Ms. Harr is nor Mr. Har ris.” Co-counse l also could not remembe r the de fe ns e str a te g y

a t se nte nc ing . Ho wev er, sh e re c oll e c te d th a t th e pe tit ion e r w a s th e on ly witness who testified at se ntencing

.
On cr oss-examination, co-counse l reiterated that she be came in v o l ved in the ca se late a nd acte d primarily

as sec ond chair . She testified that at the time of he r appointment, the c ase a lrea dy had bee n prepa

red fo r t ri al

. The c apital def ense te am had a

social worke r, Elizabeth Be nson, who would have compiled a ba ckg round history on the petitioner. Althoug h co-c ounsel did not talk with the petitioner’s fa mily members, a

nother membe r of the defe n s e t ea m may have ta lked with them.
Reg ardingthe trial, co-counsel testified that she “did not do any direc t examination of any witness” and did not cr oss-examine any witnesses. She adde d that she did n o t as sist with any trial prepa

ration with the e x ce p t i o n of her own per sonal prepa

ration, which c onsisted of rea ding the file. Co-c ounsel stated that althoug h her involvemen t wa s limit ed, she ta lked with the petitioner, and she rec alled “the re not be ing some body available to tes t i fy

on his behalf.” She added that “for some re as o n

. . . we couldn’t g et his family to come down f

or the mitigation.” She said that if any

of the pe titioner’s family members ha d wanted to testify , t h e d efense team would have ma de sure they had tra nsportation to and from c ourt.

Co-counsel testified that nothing indi cate d the petitioner did not understa nd the nature of the cha rg es ag ainst h i m , t he leg al proc eeding s, or the law a nd evidenc e ag ainst him. The-9-

petitioner also did not indicate he wa s havingany emotional or mental proble ms at the time. Cocoun s el s t at ed t hat if she ha d noticed any mental problem, she w ould not have ig nored it. Cocounsel c hara cter ized lead counse l as very thoroug h in the handling of ca ses and ve ry intense.

Ronald J ohnson, lead co u n s el at trial, testified that prior to the petitioner’s c ase, he had tried three to four, but no more tha n five, c apital ca ses. He e x plained that lea d co u n s el i n a
c a pi tal case act ua lly

pr e pa re d th e c a se fo r t

ri a l. H e re late d th a t he ini tia lly wa s se c on d c ha ir

in the petit io n e r ’ s c a s e b u t b e c ame le a d c o u n s e l wh e na tt o r

n e y E d T h o mp s o nw a s n o long er involved with the case

.
L e a d c ouns e l st a te d th a t he ha d in fo rm ati on in t he fo rm of a state me nt f

ro m Jam e s Irv in P arke r in di catin g that Park e r h e ard thr e e me n s ay

Sid ne y Ha rr is h ir e d th e m to kil l L ind a Ha rr is. L ead c ounsel cha

rac teriz ed the statement a s exculpatory and said he obtained the state ment prior to trial. He re called a sking the investigator to locate Par ker. H oweve r, t h e i n v es t i g ator wa s unab l e t o fi n d him. L ead c ounsel stated that no one on the defe nse team talked with the law enforce m en t office rs who took Parke r’s stateme nt. L ead c ounsel aff irmed that his standard prac tice wa s to contact e very person identifie d as a w itness on the indictment.

L ead c ounsel testified that Elizabeth Be nson, the mitigation investig ator/social worker, ha d in dic a te d o n h e r i nta

ke fo rm that th e pe tit ion e r h a d s ome ty pe of learni ngdis a

bil ity . D e sp ite the re fer ence , no investigation into t he petitioner’ s I

. Q. occ urre d. I nstead, the inve stigation was limit ed to an e valuation by the Midtown Mental Hea lth C en t er

. L ead counsel re called attorney Ed Thompson discussing, at one time, the question of re taining me ntal health experts for the petitioner. Howe ver, in Thompson’s opinion, they were n o t neede d. L ead c ounsel stated that althoug h no rec ords from the Me mp h i s C i t y Schools were in the attorney file, there was a

n indication such re cords we re r equeste d but never rec eived.

L ea d co u n s e l t e s t i fi edt h at t h e d ef en s e t ea m d i d

n o td i s cu s s fi l i n g a m o t i o nfo r J u d ge Axl ey to rec use himself and that lead counse l did n o t s ee k any assistance from the Southern Center for Human Rights, L eg al Def ense Fund. Howeve r, lead counsel used t h e Tennessee As so c i a t i o no f

C r i m i n a l D e f

e n s e L aw y e r s T o o l s f

o r t h e U l t i m a t e T r i a l , T e n n e s s e e D e a t hP e n a l ty Def ense Ma nual

. L ea d counsel stated that he did not know any of the juror s persona lly

and that he wa s familiar with leg al pre cede nts relatingto questioning a nd challeng ing pote ntial jurors.

L e a d c ouns e l te sti fi e d th a t he di d not t a lk w ithany of the pe tit ion e r’ s f

a mil y me mbe rs , and he did not re call any

member o f t h e d efense team goingto Missi ssippi or Alabama to spea k wi th t he m. H ow e ve r, the de fe ns e te a m in ter view e d f a mil y me mbe rs wh o li ve d in

Me mph is. L ead c o u n s e l r e late d th a t, ju s t p r io r to tr ia l, th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s u n c le , Ch ar li e Cr ib b s , to ld the defe nse team not to call them any more. He add ed that no one on the de fense team conta cted a ny of the pe titioner’s frie nds or teac hers. The petitioner’s mother w as ill at the time of trial, and nothing in the attorney

file re flec ted that the def ense te am obtained the pe titioner’s birth rec ords

.-10-

L ead c ounsel testified that he did not know a ny thing a bout L inda Har

ris’ fami l y , and he did n o t know if any

member of

the def ense te am attempted to intervie w her family . He r eca lled that Sidney

Har ris and per

haps his brother w er e i nterview ed. Sidney ’s brother indicated that Sidney may not have be en complete l y t ru t h fu l

. L ead c ounsel stated that it was c ommon kn ow le dg e Sid

ne y “ ha d a g ir lf ri e nd or tw o. ” He c ou ld n ot recal l if any inv e sti g a tio n in to Sidney ’s extramarital aff airs was attempted, and he was not a war e of any financ ial or drug problems involving the H arr ises.
Reg ardingJ acki e C an n o n , lead c ounsel testified that she ha d a child with the petitioner. The de fense team had a difficult time locatingCannon, and lea d counse l believed she was “possi b l y o n drug s.” He also was a war e that the pe titioner had har med Cannon duringa phy sical alt e r c a ti o n

. L e a d c o u n s e l w a s u n a b le to e xp la in w h y th e d e f e n s e d id n o t c r o s s
- e xamine Cannon about her druguse or the a

mount of money

s h e re ce ived for “ turning in” the petitioner. The petitioner cla imed he wa s not the perpe trator. Ac cording ly , the def en s e t h eo ry was that the petitioner wa s innocent.

On cr oss-examination, lead counsel testified that h e an d the petitioner met on numer ous
occa sions. He thoug ht they had a ve ry

g ood attorney

/client relationshi p

. L ea d counsel thoug ht Sidney Har ris’ identifica t i o n o f the petitioner wa s questionable. He unsucce ssfully attacke d the ide nti fi c a tio n in

the mot ion

to s up pr e ss a

nd a tte mpt e d to dis c re dit

the ide nti fi cat ion

a t tr ia l. Al tho ug h le a d c ouns e l a sk e d th e pe tit ion e r f or name s o f i nd ivi du a ls who c ou ld h e lp w ithhis claim of innoce nce, the petitioner wa s not forthcoming with any names.

L ead c ounsel testified th at Dr. Wy att Nichols from the Midtown Menta l Health Center signe d a letter

stating that “there was no sig n that he was incompetent or the y couldn’t support an insanity defe nse.” L ead c ounsel related that from his discussion with Dr. Nichols, “[t] here was
no indica ti o nth a t .

. . [th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s ] I

. Q

. w a s im p a ir e d

. ” L e a d

c o u n s e l n e v e r

h a d a p r o b lem

car rying on a conversation with the petit ioner, a nd the petitioner unde rstood the leg al proc ess, the cri me h e w a s c h ar g e d

w it h , th e f a c ts a g a in s t h im , an d

th e la w e s ta b li s h in g p u n is h me n t. L e ad counsel stated that the petitioner wa s adama nt about not being g uil t y an d t h at the petitioner understood the c harg es and “ the conse quence s.” L ead c ounsel stat ed t hat if he ha d had any

conce rns about the petitioner’s ability to unde rstand, he would have had furth er ev al u ati ons perf ormed.

L ead c ounsel testified that no information gathere d supported J am es Parker ’s statement t h a tS i dn e y H ar

r i s o r d e r e d

h i s w i f e t o b e k i l l e d

. C o n s i d e r i n g t h e i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d

b y S i dn e y, lead c ounsel thoug ht a def ense str at egy

sug g esting that Sidney

play ed a substantial r ole in the crime w as questionable.

As for mit ig a tio n, le a d c ouns e l te sti fi e d th a t he a sk e d th e pe tit ion e r f or po ssi ble witnesses, to which the pe titioner responde d, “I don’t know anyone. I

have no f

riends.” T he pe tit ion e r of

fe re d no oth e r inf

or matio n a bo ut him se lf that wo uld have he lpe d th e de fe ns e c omp ile mitigation proof. A s for other mitigating fac tors, lead c ounsel conc eded that t h e d ef ense did not-11-

ask for any of the sta t u t o ry

mitigatingcirc umstances. He noted that the petitioner ha d just been rele ased on parole for an attempted murder conviction. L ead counsel stated that th e p et itioner decla red his innoce nce a

nd asked the jury

t o s p are his life. The pe titioner’s family was not helpful in prepa

ring a mitigation defense

.
Mae D onald, L inda Har

ris’ mother, test i fi ed t h at Sidney Har ris informed he r while he was in the hospital that “they won’t neve r ge t t h em two men . . . unless they turn themselves in.” Sidney ex p l ai n ed to her that “ if they walked in my

room rig ht now Icouldn’t identify either one of them.” A s a re sult, Donald questioned Sidney ’s identification of the perpe trator s an d t old law enfor ceme nt office rs she did not believe the petitioner wa s the perpe trator. Donald said L inda had borr owed money

from her . She stated that no member o f the de fense team conta cted he r and that she would have talked with them.

Al e x War

re n, L ind a

Ha rr is ’ br oth e r- in- law, te sti fi e d th a t he sp ok e wi th S idn e y Ha rr is while Sidney

was hospitalized. Sidney told Alex that he wrestled with one of the intruders on the floor. The only

thing take n from the home w as a Micke y Mouse watc h. Alex said he had seen a 16 -g a ug e , sin g le -s ho t sh otgun in a c los e t in the Ha rr ise s’ ho me and that L ind a Harris had told him the gun be longe d to Sidney ’s father.

Sara Warr en, L ind a Ha rr i s’ sister, testified that in 1993, Sidney Har ris was une mploy ed, and L inda was e mploy ed at the V eter ans Administ ra t i o n Hospital. Sara wa s unawa re of any financ ial or marital pr oblems in the Harr ises’ marr iag e. She said th at t h e week befor e L inda’s death, L ind a ch an ged h er insurance . Sara a lso said she rec eived a strang e letter

from her sister about one month prior to her death, and Sara descr ibed the letter

as a “ g ood-by e” le tter. Sara visited Si dney

in the hospital after

the offe nses and t h o u gh t i t wa s odd that he had r ece ived re d

ro se s f ro m w ome n. She a lso state d th a t th e re we re a lot of pe op le jus t si tti ngaro un d in his ro om. The de fense never

contac ted Sara

. Cheryl Ba

nks, L inda Har

ris’ colleg e fr iend, testified that sh e s er v ed as maid of honor at L ind a and Sid ne y Ha rr is’ we dd ing . B ank s sa id t hat du ri ngthe we dd ingc e re mony , S idne y tol d L inda, “I g uess y ou’re satisfied now.” Ba nks knew a

bout Sidney ’s marital infidelity , and L inda fre quently

borrowe d money

from her

.
J ames Parke r testified that in 1994, he lived in Memphis an d talked with Memphis police reg ardingL inda Har

ris’ homicide. Parke r testified that he told the police that
[h e ] w a s o v e r s o me f

r ie n d ’ s h o u s e n a me d Jo h n L e e B r o wnlee and Bo. A nd we wa s over their house drinkin g, sitti ng around a nd stuff. And some peo p l e came in. And they was talkingabout some drug s . . . and some murde r. T h ey t alki ng about . . . they

wa n t eds o m e m u rd er

fo r h i re

. . . . It w a s a l l

. . . ab o u ts o m e d ru gs and stuff.-12-

One of the men said th at he owe d “D.D. some money ” for “some drug s.” Parke r identified the

man a s Sid

ne y Ha rr is. “ D. D. ” wa s id e nti fi e d a s a fem ale dr ugde a le r who c on du c te d b us ine ss mostly on the south side of M em p h i s

. Parker explained that “[t] he contr act wa s set up in J ohn B ro wn le e ho us e .” D. D. ta lke d to the me n ab out mak ing so me mon e y and e xpla ine d th a t it

wo uld be a mur der- for- hire. The first installment was to be $2500. Parker stated that he did not see the

mon e y

. P arke r s a id t

hat “ An g e lo, ” “ L itt le Rob ,” and “ Am os ” late r t a lke d a

bo ut h owthe y

sh ou ld have killed the ma

n instead of just wounding him. P ar k er i d entified Sidney Har ris as the man who aske d D.D. about killing his wife

. Troy J oy ner, Sidney

Har ris’ for mer ne ighbor, testified that in 1994, he visited Sidney at his home on a daily

basis. J oy

ner sa id Sidney

had aske d J oy

ner to purc hase c ocaine for him.
Serg eant Ronnie McWilliam s t es t i fi ed that he w as assig ned to the Memphis Police Depa rtment’s homicide unit in 1994 and w as t h e l ea d detec tive for L inda Har ris’ homicide. He said th at the investig ation did not impl icate Sidney and that the police never investigated Sidney as a suspe ct.
Serg eant Mc Wil liams testified that he never spoke to James Parker

. Howeve r, Parke r had mention e d

th e n ame s o f

“ A mo s , A n g e lo an d

L ittl e Ro b

. ” Se r g e an t M c Wi ll ia ms s tate d th a t t he homicide file c ontained a s t atement from a per son known as L ittle Rob. P arke r g ave a statement
on F e br ua ry 12 , and th e po lice arr e ste d th e pe tit ion e r o n F e br ua ry 14 . Se rg e ant M c Willi a ms d en i edb ei n g aw ar e t h at J ac k i e C an n o nwa s u s i n g cr ac k co ca i n e o r t h at C an n o n ’s b ro t h er , Ge o rge Ross, also was using c rac k coca ine.

On cr oss-examination, S erg eant Mc Wil liams testi fi ed that he f irst became awa

re of the petitioner’s name from a C ri m e S t o ppers tip and that Ge org e Ross called in the tip about January 29. Ser g e an t M c Wi ll ia

ms d id n o t ta lk w it

h Ja c k ie Ca

n n o n u n ti l F e b r

u ar y 8

. H e e xp la ined that Cannon was in the hospi t al , an d t h en she moved. He said Cannon w as ver y scar ed and w as the fi rs t pe rs on

to m e nti on the Mic ke y

Mo us e watc h. Se rg e ant M c Willi a ms a sk e d Si dn e y Ha rr is whether any watche s were missing, and Ha rris said a Mic key

Mouse watc h was missing.

Re g ard ingJame s Pa

rk e r’ s st a te me nt, Se rg e ant M c Willi a ms t e sti fi e d th a t he wa s unab le to g ather any information to corr oborate Parker ’s claim that the murde r wa s committed by Ang elo, Amos, and L ittle Rob. S erg eant Mc Wil l i am s s t at ed that the police conducte d an investig ation reg ardingSidney

Har ris’ invo lvement but that no motive was found. Sidney had bee n wounded in the incident, suffe rin g wo unds to his face and nec k and losing three fing ers. Ser g eant Mc Willi a ms d id n ot b e lie ve Park e r’ s cla im that Sid ne y wa s w ound e d to c ov e r u p h is involvement, and Serg eant Mc Wil liams could not fi n d an y credible evidenc e that someone other than the petitioner killed L inda Har ris.
Stephanie Ke n d ri cks testified that L inda Har ris was he r best fr iend. Kendr icks stated that Sidney Har ris was ne ver f

ait h fu l to his wife and that L inda was a war e of he r husband’ s inf ide lit ie s. Ke nd

ri c ks sa id L ind a ha d a lot of fi na nc ia l pr ob le ms and a lso had mar it al pro ble ms.-13-

Kendr icks rec alled that af ter L inda’s murde r, Sidney ’s sister commente d, “I h o p e S i dney didn’t have a ny thing to do with this.” P ri o r t o h er murder, L inda told Kendric ks that if something happene d to her, he r child would live with Sidney and then g o to L ittle Rock.

B e tty Cr ibb s, the pe tit ion e r’ s a un t, t e sti fi e d th a t th e pe tit ion e r’ s mo the r, M ari e, was a nervous pe rson, swee t in her own wa y , an d go o d

. Marie Cribbs ne ver attended school, wa s
un a ble to r e a d a

nd wr ite , a nd too k c are of

he r f ourt e e n s ibl ing s. Befor e Mari e mov e d to Memphis, she lived in Vernon, Al ab am a. T h e house in Alabama wa s “just a two room – kitchen wi th t wo ro oms and

sh a c k r e a lly

. . . [w ]ithan o uts ide toi le t.” B e tty e sti mate d th a t a

pp ro xima te ly ten people lived in the house

.
B e tty Cr ibb s t est if

ied th a t th e pe tit ion e r w a s b or n in 19 71 and

that sh e ha d k

no wn him since he was nine y ear s old. She said that in 1981, Marie lef t t h e p et i t i o n er i n Alabama with her sis te r and mov e d to Me mph is. Mari e too k tw o of he r c hil dr e n to Me mph is , fi ft een- y e ar- old Randy and five-year -old J oseph. Marie lived w ith Betty for a bout a y ear . Be tty

and her husband, C h ar l i e, ex p re s s edco n ce rn b e c a u s e t h e y f o u n d R an dy an d J o s ep hi nb edwi t hM ar i e e v en t h o u gh t h e y h a d t h e i r o w n b e d s

. M ar i e d i d e v e r yt h i n g f o r t h e b o ys , an d

B e t t y c o u l d

n o tr e c a l l t h e b o ys mis be havin g . Sh e tho ug ht i t w a s pecul iar t hat sh e c ou ld n ot r e c a ll e ve r s e e ingthe pe tit ion e r e a t. Marie told her

that the petitioner did not like food and that “he e at junk.”

Be t t y C ri bbs testified that at some point, she helpe d Marie g et her own apa rtment. She

a lso he lpe d M ari e g e t a ssi sta nc e fr om t

he Ai d to F a mil ie s w ith De pe nd e nt C hildre n ( AF DC ) pr og ra m and fo od sta mps . M ari e c ou ld not do any thi ngfo r h e rs e lf

and wa s d e pe nd e nt f

ina nc ia lly

on B e tty and Cha rl ie Cr ibb s. Whe n th e pe tit ion e r mov e d to Me mph is, he sh ou ld h a ve be e n in the eig hth gr ade, but be cause he wa s so far behind, he was placed in the fifth gra de. She said that “[f]or his age , he should have been be low the fifth g rade

. He should have been up, you know, wh e re an e ig ht ye ar o ld s ho uld be . B ut h e wa s a

bo ut t e n w he n th e y

put hi m ba c k to the 5th g rade . They

said that was a s far

as they could put him back.” B etty C ri b b s s ai d the petitioner’s g randf ather , Dan Cribbs, wa s in a n u rsi ng home in Ba strop, L ouisiana; suffe red f rom Alzheimer’s disease and diabe tes; and had be en diag nosed as pa ranoid schizophrenic

.
B e t t y C r i b b s t e s t i f

i e d t h a ta tt h e t i m e o f

th e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s tr i a l , M ar i e l i v e d i nMis sis sip pi. Be tty stated th a t th e d e f

e n s e n e v e r c o n ta c te d h e r

. H o w e v e r , s h e a ls o s a id s h e r e c e iv e d a telephone c all one morningfrom a w oman who said that “ t h ey neede d the family

down her e beca use he was fix ing to be sentenc ed.” Be tty said she did not g o to c ourt beca us e “ ev er y

thing would have be en over ” by the time she ar

rived. S h e t h en qualified that stateme nt by saying that she wa s not wanted at the trial and that only the petitioner’s unc les wer e aske d to come to cour t.

Cha rl ie Cr ibb s, B e tty

Cr ibbs’ hu sb and and

the pe tit ion e r’ s unc le , te sti fi e d th a t he wa s a
se lf -e mpl oy e d c on tr a c tor . H e wa s b or n in Ve rn on , A la

bama , a nd the peti ti on er’ s mo the r w a s h is sister. Charlie wa s one of f ifteen c hildren and w as the four th o ldest. The petitioner’ s mother

wa s th e f i f t h o l d e s t

. H e d e s c r i b e d t h e i r c h i l dh o o d h o m e a s a “ s h a c k

. . . p l an k h o u se ” a ndsa id-14-

his pa re nts we re sh are c ro pp e rs

. Cha rl ie ’s mot

he r wa s e ith e r sic k or pr e g na nt fo r mos t o f his childhood, and she w as diabe tic. Three of his siblings also had dia betes.

Ch ar l i e C r i b b s t e s t i f

i e d t h a t h i s s i s t e r , M ar i e , w a s a v e r y n e r v o u s p e r s o n , w a s un a ble to
re a d o r wri te , w a s si c k f

or a ve ry lon g t ime, and

a lmo st l os t he r e y e sig ht. Mari e wa s una ble to d i s c i p l i n e h e r

c h i l dr e nan d

c o u l d b ar e l y t a k e c ar e o f h e r s e l f

. C h ar l i e h e l p e d

h i s s i s t e r f i n an c i a l l y.

Charlie Cribbs t estified that he move d from Alaba ma to Memphis, Tennesse e, in 1960. Mari e mov e d to Me mph is i n 19 67 but g ot p re g na nt b y Do c ke ry Mo or e and

mov e d b a c k to Alabama . The pe titioner was born in Al abama but moved to Memphis when he wa s thirteen y e ars old . Ch arl ie sa id t

he pe tit ion e r h a d a dif

fi c ult tim e do ingta sk s a ssi g ne d to him , b ut C ha rl ie did no t attr ibute the dif

fi c ult y to l a zine ss.
Reg ardingthe petitioner’s tria l, C h ar l i e C ribbs testified that the def ense ne ver c ontacted him . H e saw i nf

or matio n a bo ut t he pe tit ion e r’ s c a se on the ne ws

. On on e oc c a sio n, his wi fe tol d him that “his mother had ca lled or something or other,” but he was una ble to g o to court.
Pamela Woods, the petitioner’s aunt, testified that she lived in Amory , Mississ ip pi, and was the young est of her siblings. She was nine y ear s old and lived in her pa rents’ V ernon, Alabama home when the petitioner wa s born. When the petitioner wa s four or f ive months old, Mari e Cr ibb s mov e d to Me mph is, and the ir sis te r, L or e tta , too k c are of the pe tit ioner. P ame la Woods recalled that the petitioner ate “paint and some s p o n ge roller s” whe n he wa s a toddler, and she de scribed his e ating habits as “stra ng e.” She sa id the petitioner wa s not a g ood student.

Pamela Woods testified that Wi ll J ones was t h e p eti tioner’s father a nd that he wa s not
aro un d mu c h w hen th e pet it io ne r w a s a c hil d. Jone s h a d a

wi fe and so me oth e r c hil dr e n. Mari e Cr ibb s w a s si c k d

ur inghe r p re g na

nc y with the pe tit ion e r. Pame la sa id s he ha d h e ard

of so me “sexually inappropriate beha

vior betwe en L oretta [Cribbs] and [the petitioner].”

L oretta Cribb s , t h e p et itioner’s aunt, testified that she lived in Amory , Mississ ippi. She des c r ib e d h e r s e lf a s a “ s e c o n d mo th e r ” to th e p e ti ti o n e r w h e nh e w a s y o u n g

. T h e p e ti ti o n e r ’s mother, Mar ie, was sick dur ing he r pre gn an cy , h av ing thy roid problems. When the petitioner was two y ear s old, he was in a c ar a ccide nt in Sul lige nt, Alabama. L oretta w as d ri v i ng the ca r, Marie wa s i n t h e front passeng er se at, and the pe titioner was sitting on Mar ie’s lap. L oretta’ s head struc k the windshield, Marie ’s hea d went throug h the winds h i el d , and the petitioner was thr ow n out of the c ar. Th e pe tit ion e r wa s hosp ita lize d f or tw e nty -f our h ours , a

nd the do c tor s sa id he suff ere d head injurie s. The petitioner w as in specia l education clas ses from the f irst gr ade throug h the fourth g rade . He ha d chicke n pox , measles, m u m p s , and other normal childhood diseases.

L oretta Cribbs testified that the pe titioner’s fathe r wa s marrie d and dra nk alcohol. The pe tit ion e r k

ne w h is f a the r’ s id e nt it y , bu t his f a the r h a d n o r ole in h is l if e . T he pe tit ion e r w a s a follower, not a

leade r, and w as ea sily

influence d by

others. L oretta de scribe d h i s b i z arr e eating-15-

ha bit s, re c a lli ngan in c ide nt whe n h e g na we d h e r h a ir

ro lle rs

. Whe n th e fa

mil y mov e d to Memphis, they

lived in roug h neighborhoods and public housingwher e the pe titioner witnessed sh oo tin g s. L or e tta

sa id t hat th e de fe ns e ne ve r c on ta c te d h e r b e fo re the tr ial and th at sh e wo uld have te stified if asked.

On cr oss-examination, L oretta Cribbs testified that she took car e of the p et i tioner fr om about birth to ag e nine. She sa id she took car e of him as be st as she could, a nd she denie d that any thing se x ual occ urre d betwee n them. She said she never b ea t or sexually abused the petitioner.
Randy Cribbs, the petitioner’s older brother, te stified that he g rewup in Memphis but spent some time i n Ve rn o n , Al ab ama. He said he droppe d out of school in the ninth gr ade a nd started he lping his unc le in his construction business. At that time, he was living with his mot her and helpingher f

inancially . He de scrib ed his mother’s he alth as “stable ” and “ pretty g ood,”

a lth ou g h s he wa s d ia

be tic . Wh e n the pe tit ion e r wa s nine or te n y e ars old , th e pe tit ion e r m ov e d to Memphis. The family lived in apar

tments in W hitehaven, a nd Randy

descr ibed the neig hborhood as ha

ving “ [a] lot of shoot ings. A l ot of fights.” The petitioner met Jackie Cannon wh en he was about sevente en y ear s old. Cannon smoked cra ck coca ine, and her brot h er , Ge o rge Ros s, wa s a

“ c ra c kh e a d. ” Rand

y saw t he m us e dr

ug s, and dr ug us e was comm on

in t he ir neig hborhood.

Ra n dy Cr ib b s te s ti f

ie d th a t in N o v e mb e r 1 9 9 3 , th e p e ti ti o n e r w a s p ar o le d f r o m pr ison. Jac kie Cann on

tr ie d to bo rr owmon e y

fr om R and

y , b ut h e re fu se d b e c a

use he th ou ght sh e wo uld use it for c rac k coca ine. Cannon used her child with the petitioner as a n alibi, and Randy

thought Ca n n o nw a s w o r

r ie d th e p e ti ti o n e r

w a s g o in g to tr

y to g a in c u s to dy o f th e ir d a u g h te r w h e nh e g ot
ou t of pr iso n. I n 2 00 0, Cann on con tacte d Ra nd y and wa nte d to sp e a k w ithMari e Cr ibb s. Cannon informed the m that her da ug hter ha d been r ape d, and Randy told her to contac t the police. The defe nse neve r conta cted Randy , and he w ould have testified on his brothe r’s be half.

On cr oss-examination, Randy Cribbs testified that he had two br others, including the petitioner. The pe titioner’s other b rother, Joseph, was inca rce rate d, and Randy

was e mploy ed at Kia Super Store in Tupe lo, Missi ssippi.

Dr. Jona t h an Pincus, a profe ssor of neur ology at Geor g etown Univer sity and the Chief of Neur ology

at the Washing ton Veter an’s Administration Medica l Center, testified that h is area of expertise was in adult and c hild ne u ro logy and that he ha d a spec ific intere st in the neurolog y of be havio r, e sp e c ia lly

vio le nt b e havio r a

nd mov e me nt d iso rd e rs . D r. Pin c us me t th e pe tit ion e r i n Dec embe r 2 001. I n prepa ration for

his meeting with the petitioner, Dr. Pincus re viewed

nume ro us do c ume nts , in c lud inga ps y c ho log ic a l a sse ssm e nt c on du c te d b y Dr . T om P e nd e rg ra ss, the pe tit ion e r’ s sc ho ol r e c or ds , th e petitio ne r’ s me nta l he a lthre c or ds fr om t he Me mph is C ity Schools, the petitioner’s juvenile c ourt rec ords, eva luations o f t he petitioner c ompleted by the Midtown Mental Hea lth Center, and a psy chological a ssessment completed by Dr. Ge raldine-16-

Bishop. Dr . Pincus also had acce s s t o a re p ort prepa red by Dr. Pamela

Auble, a neuropsycholog ist.

Dr. Pincus testified that he or deredan MRIfor the pe titioner. From the F ebrua ry 2002 MRI , Dr. Pincus observe d that the bra in was abnor mal, stating that “it was s h ru n k en, atr ophic,

e sp e c ia lly in t he pa ri e ta l r e g ion s. ” Dr . Pi nc us e xpla ine d that th e pari e ta l r e g ion of the br a in cont ro l led the ca

pacity to rea d, write, c alculate , and spea k. He a lso ex plained that slig ht atrophy was to be e x pecte d when a person reac hed their se venties or e ighties. H oweve r, it was ver y abnorma l fo r atrophy

to occur in a y oung er pe rson. Dr. Pincus stated that, although a bnormal, he could not deter

mine from an MRI

when the a

bnormality

occur red. He s aid it could have

occur red in uter o or could h av e re s ulted from a later incide nt. He also opined that it could have resulted f rom a de g ener ative disea se.

Dr. Pincus testified that he w as not ce rt ai n as to what ef fec t this atrophy

would have on a person’ s neurolog ical func tioning. He explained that a deter mination would require “ car eful psy cholog ical testing sometimes, a ca ref ul neurolog ical ex am i n ation in order to de termine what the conc omitance of

t h at are .” Dr . Pincus opined that, in this case, “I think they

underlie the

. . . ne ur op sy c ho log ic a l de fi c its that ha ve be e n f

ound and the ne urol ogica l a

bn or ma lit ie s th a t I fo un d. ” He s t a t e d

t h a tE E G r e s u l t s r e v e a l e d n o t h i n g an d

t h a tanE E G w a s n o ta l w ay s a g o o d t e st beca use people suffe ring from strokes or Alzheimer’s disease could have normal EEG r esults.

Dr . Pi nc us te sti fi e d th a t he con du c te d a n e xami natio n o n th e pe tit ion e r t hat w a s h e a vil y weig hted towar d discovering h o w t he fr ontal lobes of the br ain wer e wor king. I n the examination, Dr. Pincus used motor and sensory testin g. I n an eye movement test, Dr . Pincus de te rm ine d that the pe tit ion e r’ s “ fr on ta l lob e s we re n’ t up to it” ; his e y e s mov e d “ in li tt le s tac cato jerks instead of

. . . as smoot h v i s u al pursuit which would be nor mal.” Dr . Pincus ex plained that

s p e a k i n g r e qu i r e d

a t r e m e n d o u s am o u n to f c o o r d i n a t i o n

. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s h i s t o r y,
so me on e ha d r e po rt e d th a t th e pe tit ion e r h a d p ro ble ms e nunc iatin g p rop erly . D r. Pin c us a lso found “hy perr efle x ia.” Dr . Pincus ex plai n ed that “hy perr efle x ia” mea

nt the petitioner’s re flexes

wer e a little too active, which could have been the result of b ra in damag e or c ould have be en a neurolog ical def

icit. Dr. Pincus d i s cover ed that the pe titioner was unable to relax his legs, whic h

was a bnormal and a

sign of frontal dy sfunction.

Dr. Pincus testified that he adm inistered the L uria two-ste p pattern a

nd three -step patter

n
m o v em en t s t o t h e p et i t i o n er

. T h e t es tre qu i r e d t h e p at i en tt o h av e o n e h an d o p en o nt h e t h i gh and the other

hand held in a f

ist o n t h e thig h. The patient was then a sked to tap to ensure he or sh e c ou ld d o s o. Th e n th e patie nt w a s a sk e d to re ve rs e the sc e na ri o so that the op e n h and

be c a me a fist, and the f

isted hand wa s open. The patient was aske d to tap ag ain. Dr

. P i n cu s s t at ed that the petitioner wa s unable to complete the task b ec au s e h e was una ble to alternate. Dr. Pincus also administered the “hand g rasp test.” For the t est, the patient was asked t o extend his arms. A fing er w as p l ac ed on the palm of one hand, and a nother fing er w as plac ed on the pa lm of the other ha nd. The patient was then a sked to relax , and the ha n d s s h ould have g one loose. The petitioner’s re sponse was nor mal. Howeve r, whe n Dr. Pincus distracte d the pe t itioner by asking-17-

him to spell t he wor d “fist” a nd then to spell i t b ackwards, the pe titioner’s fing ers c urled a nd g ave r esistance . That re sult was abnorma l and exemplified frontal damag e.

Dr. Pincus testified that he a lso considere d historical fa ctors. F o r ex ample, the pe titioner had sca rs on his back an d repor

ted beingbeate n fre quently as a c hild. Dr. Pincus stated that an ab u s e d p e r s o n i s m u ch an gri er t h an a p er s o nwh o wa s n o tb ea t en

. Dr

. P i n cu s s ai d t h at al t h o u gh most abused people ha

ve the c apac ity

to be v i o l en t , t h ey do not give in to that feeling . Howeve r, if the bra in is not functioning proper ly due to mental illness and neur ologic damag e, an a bused person’ s capa city

to inhibit the violent impulse is defec tive.
Dr. Pincus testified that the pe titioner was n o t m aling eringon the tests, and he

summa ri zed his fi nd ing s a s f

oll ow s:

He ha s evidenc e of ne urol og ic dy sfunction. On my examination the fronta l lobes of the bra in were not working proper ly . Ididn’t mention t h at hi s rea ding w as also at a fifth g rade level, so he’ s not [reading ] t err ibly

well. And he’ s also -- i n serial se ven he ma de a mistake in -- in doing that. All of t h at ’s part of the battery . The fac t is his arithmetic probably is not so good. An d -- but the fr on ta l lo be of

the br a in i s n ot w or

kin g pr op e rl y

. And his a ff e c t, his -- his emotionality

when we wer e tog ether

-- se emed ve ry , very fl a t.

. . . . [T] he fr ontal lobe is very important as a controller of e x pression of emotion. Peo p l e wi t h frontal lobe da mag e tend to be f

lat and tend to have a flat af fec t. And it was -- it’s n o t t h e o n l y thing that c an
c a us e a fl a t a ff e c t. It just w a s c on sis te nt w iththe oth e r f ind ing s. And he ha d more than thre e of the se abnor mal finding s, abnormal two an d thr e e
- s te p Lu r ia

a s w e ll , an d

th e h y p e r r e f le xia , dy s arthria. All that goe s along with a picture that is consistent with what the neuropsycholog ist found, consis t ent wit h what the MRI found. And h e’s damag ed. The re’ s no question about it. Not functioning normally

. Dr. Pincus explained that someone wi t h frontal lobe da mag e bec omes frustrated ea sily , has a low “boili n g p o i nt,” and ha s very littl e ca pacity to control their beha

vior when a

ng ry . He char acte rized the condition as similar to being drunk all of the time.

On c ro ss- e xam in ati on , D r. Pin c us wa s a sk e d to ide nti fy the pe tit ion e r’ s me nta l il lne ss. Dr. Pincus testified that he c ould not say with cer tainty , noting that the pe titioner ’s materna l g randf ather had bee n d i ag nosed as sc hizophrenic. He a lso alluded to para noia bec ause the-18-

petitioner did not trust people, ha d n o s u cc esses, and had no intimate relationships. Dr. Pi ncus
conce ded that the pe titioner’s history of inca rce ration could have play ed a r ole in his perce ived para noia.
When que stioned about the fac ts of the petitioner’s crimes, Dr. Pincus te sti fi ed t h at t he crimes involved planning . Howeve r, t h e use of the shotgun may have be en impulsive. Dr. Pincus stated that noth i n g i n d i cated the petitioner’s a ctions on the nig ht of the homicide we re the result of a

delusional ac t, and he c oncede d that incar cer ation wa s t h e b es t place for someone like the pe tit ion e r. Dr . Pi nc us sa id t he pe tit ion e r w a s a

ble to u nd e rs tand the wrongful nes s of h is actions but was una

ble to combat the impulse.

Dr. Pamela

Auble, a ne uropsy cholog ist, test i fi ed that she f irst met the petitioner at Riverbend Ma x imum S ecur ity I nstitut e on Apr il 17 and 25, 2001. Dr. Auble i n terview ed the pe tit ion e r a

nd a dmi nis te re d te sts

. She sp e nt a tot a l of fi ve ho ur s w ithhim , a

nd sh e de sc ri be d h im as coope rative a lthough his spee ch wa s not alway s clea r.

Dr . Aub le te stifi ed th at sh e ha d a c c e ss t o a re po rt fr om D r. Pe nd e rgra ss, a ps y c ho log ist who administered the Wechsler I .Q. test to the petitioner. Dr . Auble also ha d acce s s t o the petitioner’s school r ecor ds, his Me m p h i s C ity School Mental Hea lth Center re cords, his re cords from the Juvenile Court of Memphis/Shelby County , hi s rec ords from the Midtown Menta l He a lthCe nte r, the ps y c ho log ic a l a sse ssm e nt c omp le te d by Dr . G e ra ldi ne B ish op , D r. Pin c us ’ repor t, vari o u s i n t er v iews by

the petitioner’s f

amily members, a

nd a tra nscript of the tria l. From her e valuation, Dr. Auble wrote a psy cholog ical re port, includin g a s o ci al history of the petitioner.

Dr. Auble testified that Marie Cribbs was “a pretty inadequate per son

. ” Marie ha d been throug h a lot in her l i fe an d was not able to be a g ood pare nt to the petitioner. The pe titioner had little to n o s up e rvis io n by his mot he r. Hi s juve nil e re c or ds re fl e c te d th a t hi s mo the r f a ile d to br inghim in f or vis its /me e tin g s, and

he had nume ro us un e xpla ine d s c ho ol a bs e nc e s. Dr . Aub le stated that childre n neede d to have a mother in order

to develo p n o rm al l y an d that poverty made it difficult for e veryone in a f amily . She considere d the history of mental illness in the petitioner’s fa

mily , specific ally

his maternal g randfat h er

. She also consider ed the he ad injury the pe tit ion e r s us ta ine d in

a c ar a c c ide nt. Th e pe tit ion e r’ s r e la tiv e s r e port e d th a t he a c te d s tr ang e ly afte r the a ccide nt. Specifica lly , he had a fea r of c ars a nd beinginside them.

Dr . Aub le te sti fi e d th a t sh e a lso c on sid e re d th e pe tit ion e r’ s h ist or y of e a tin g ine dib le objects as a

child. The pe titioner ate spong es, cotton, pape r, and ha ir. The pe titioner d i d not eat meat until he was twe lve y ear s old, an d t h e fa m i ly repor ted that he ate “lar g ely

junk food.” Dr

. Auble sa id t h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s e a t i n g b e h a v i o r c o u l d h a v e b e e na

s i g no f a m e n t a l d i s o r d e r

. S h e a lso related that eating non- food items often wa s associate d with lead poisoning

.
Dr. Auble testified that she discove red a history of alc oholi s m i n the petitioner’s materna l uncles. The petitioner did not do well in s ch o o l an d was in spec ial education classes throug hout-19-

his schooling. The petitioner’s school r ecor ds ref lected that he was f

un ct i oning one to three y ear s below his g rade level. In 1984 to 1985, when he w as t h i rt ee n y ear s old, the petitioner was tested in the Memphis City School sy stem and wa s fo u n d t o h ave a n I .Q. of 70. The petitioner also was f

ound to have sig nificant de velopmental dela y s in his abili t y t o re ad , write, a nd do

ari thm e tic . T he pe tit ion e r t ra ns fe rr e d s c ho ols fr e qu e ntl y . H e a tte nd e d s e ve n d if feren t sc ho ols in his junior high and hig h school y ear s and transf err ed a total of

thirteen times duringthat period.

Dr . Aub le te sti fi e d th a t th e pe tit ion e r b e g an g e tti ngint o tr ou ble wh e n h e mov e d to Memphis

. He wa s living in an e nvironment with a lot of violence and drug s. Acc ording to Dr. Auble’s r ecor ds, the petitioner beg an using marijuana when he was twe lve or th i rt ee n y ear s old,

an d h e a l s o u s e d

c o c a i n e

. T h e p e t i t i o n e r s u s t a i n e d

t w o g u n s h o tw o u n d s i nt h e l a t e 1 9 8 0 s

. In 1983, the petitioner wa s g iven the Ammons Full Rang e Picture V ocabula ry T es t , wh i ch showe d he had a n I .Q. of 82. H o we v er , Dr

. Au b l e had ne ver he ard of the test previously

and said it was no longe r commonly

used. She also stated that “ver y likely ,” the Ammons t est indicated a n I .Q. highe r t h an h i s ac t u al I .Q. In 1985, the petitioner scor ed 70 on the Wechsle r I .Q. test. He took the Wechsler te st ag ain in 1999, five y ear s after the cr imes, and scor ed 75.

Dr. Auble testified that she a dminist ere d the followingtests to the petitioner: the Halstea d-Reitan batter

y , including a

speec h perc eption test; the seashore rhy thm test; t he tac tual pe rf or manc e te st; tr a il m akin g , f ing e r o sc ill a tio n, a

nd g ri p s tr e ng th; the Wec hs ler Mem ory Sc a le T h re e; t h e Ruff F igur al Flue ncy test; the Wi sconsin Card Sort; the Controlled Oral Word As so c iatio n; t

he B os ton

Na min g Te st; the Gro ov ed P e g bo ard Te st; the Di g ita l V ig ila

nc e Te st;
and the wr itt e n p or

tio n o f the Woo dc oc k- John so n T e st o f A c hie ve me nt R e vis e d. Dr . Aub le a lso used the Te st of Memory Maling eringto determine whether the p et i t i o n er w as putting f orth g ood eff ort.

Dr. Auble testified that the petitioner trie d hard a nd did his b es t o n t h e tests. Her dia g no sis a t th e e nd

of the te sti ngwa s a s f

oll ow s:

That he ha s cog nitive compromise, that h e’s, you know, he’ s . . . g ot evidence of bra in dy sfunction and tha t I t h i n k its, y ou know, from something that happene d to him pretty ear ly on.

D r

. A u b l e f o u n d h er co n cl u s i o n s co n s i s t en twi t ht h o s e r ea ch edb y Dr

. P i n cu s an d

t h e M R I. Additionally , she dete rmined that “a ccor ding to the T ennesse e st atut ory definition of mental reta rdation,” the petitioner had “ signific antly subaver ag e g ener al i n t el l ectua l functioning as evidenc ed by

a func tional intelligenc e quotient of 70 o r b el ow with a re asonable deg ree of

cer tainty .” Dr . Auble conc luded that the petitioner ha d defic its in adaptive behav i o r to a
rea sonable de g ree of psycholog ical ce rtainty an d that the mental re tardation manifested during the deve lopmental period or by ag e eig hteen.

Dr . Aub le te sti fi e d th a t pa ra no id s c hizo ph re nia

wa s d e fi ne d a s “ pa

ra no id delu si ons, hallucinations . . . a subset of sc hizophrenia which ha s both positi ve and ne g ative sides.” She-20-

explained that positi ve sig ns were delusions and hallucinations, while neg ative sig ns included chang es in emotion , v o l i t i o n , and speech. Dr . Auble stated that the aver ag e ag e of onse t for

sc hizo ph re nia

wa s g e ne ra lly

be tw e e n e ig hte en and

thi rt y and that pa ra no id s c hizo ph re nia

c ou ld have a later onse t. She said that about fifty perc ent of pe ople diag nosed with schizophrenia ha d substance a

buse problems a

nd that distinguishing a

person with par anoid schi z o p h re n ia could be difficult bec ause of

the beha vior ca used by the substance abus e. S he explained that “some ty pes of drug s l i k e co ca i n e . . . mi mic some of the pa ranoid sy mptoms of schiz ophrenia , althoug h, the neg ative sy

mptoms are not so mimicked usually by coca ine abuse .”

On cr oss-examinat i o n , Dr. Auble testified that in her r eport, she dia g nosed the pe titioner with borderline intellec tual functioning with an I .Q. betwe en 71 and 84. She stated that in her opinion, however , his functional intellige nce wa s 70 or below. She e x plained that this new

numbe r w a s b a se d o n a dd iti on a l in fo rm a tio n s he ob ta ine d a ft e r s he wr ote he r r e po rt

. Dr. Au ble

conce ded that the pe titioner’s mental di fficulty could have been the result of a brain injury sustained in a ca

r ac cident or e ating paint as a c hild.
When questioned about Dr. N ichols’ 1994 re port, which indicated the petitioner’ s I .Q.

was actua lly highe r than the 73 re ported in 1989, Dr. Auble testified that “that was Dr. N ichol[s’] impression.” D r

. A u

b le a c kn o w le d g e d

th a t s h e u s e d

th e s c o r e s s h e d id

b e c a u s e th a t w a s h er interpre tation of the Tenne ssee statute.

Dr. Ge raldine B ishop, a psy cholog ist, testified that she met the pe titioner at the Riverbe nd Maxi mum Security

Fa cil ity in the spring of 2000 and spe nt five to six hours with him. She descr ibed him as coope rative, a lthough he appea red ve ry ang ry when he was infor

med that she was ther e to deter

mine whether

he wa s mentally

reta rded. D r. Bishop stated that his reac tion was common in people with mild retarda tion, as they

wer e we ll-awa

re the y had def icits.

Dr . B ish op te sti fi e d th a t in e va luatin g the pe tit ion e r, sh e a dmi ni st ered a vari e ty of te sts , including t h e Ad ap tive Be havior Sca le published by the Amer ican Assoc iation of Mental Retardation ( AAMR). Dr. Bishop also met with Cha rlie Cribbs a

nd his w ife, t h e p et i tioner’s

un c le and a un t. S he re vie we d D r. Th oma s Pen de rgra ss’ re po rt , th e pe tit ion e r’ s sc ho ol r e c or ds , the Memphis City

School Health Center

re co rd s, the petitioner’s juvenile c ourt rec ords, the petitioner’s re cords f

rom the Mi d t own Mental He alth Center, Dr . Pamela Auble’ s repor t, Dr. Pincus’ repor

t, and a tra

nscript summary

of the trial. Howev er , she did not consider a ny court testimony

.
Re g ar d in g th e a s s e s s me n t o f a d a p ti v e d e f ic it s r e lati v e to me n ta l r e ta r d a ti o n , D r

. B is h op testified that two sca les wer e used as a screeningdevice , the Vineland Socia l Maturity Scale a nd the sca le publish ed by

the AAMR. She said she use d the AAMR sca le bec ause it wa s more extensive. Dr. Bi shop also took into account the pe titioner’s “historic a daptive func tioning fr om
re c or ds and

int e rv ie ws .” Dr . Aub le state d th a t in a sse ssi nga da

pti ve de fi cits, it

wa s im po rt ant t o have inf ormati o n about any

kind of trauma that would have c aused br ain damag e. Dr . Bishop-21-

state d th a t w he n th e pe tit ion e r w a s in the fi rs t g ra de , h e was pla c e d in a pr og ra m f or e du c a ble mentally reta rded students. He rema ined in those classe s throug hout elementar y school.

Dr. B ishop testified that the petitioner “c onsistently score d one to four year s behind the

aver ag e g rade level of nonspe cial ed stude nts, so he was w o rk i n g at a g reat deficit.” She explained that he did not exhibi t a ny “par ticular behavior problems until .

. . [h] e wa s i n re s ource and not self- contained.” She s t at ed that “ther e’s e very evidenc e that the a

bility to function beca me compromised at that point and acting out beg an.”

As for the petitioner’s medic al history , Dr. B ishop testi fi ed ab o u t a var iety of fa ctors she considere d important. Sh e b ega n wi t h the pre natal per iod. Dr. B ishop noted that the petitioner’s family was ex t re m ely

impoverished and did not alwa y s have e noug h food to eat. Dr. B ishop state d th a t Ma

ri e Cr ibb s w a s in

he r f ir st t ri me ste r duri ngthe wi nte r m on ths and that th e fi rs t tr ime ste r w a s a

c ru c ia l ti me in d e ve lop me nt a nd the tim e wh e n p oo r n

utri ti on had

the mos t devastating e ffe cts. Dr. B ishop also rec ounted what she descr ibed as the “considerable evidenc e” of “pr etty sever e abuse both of mother, M ar i e Cribbs, and of Per ry Cribbs.” She said Dan Cr ibb s, the pe tit ion e r’ g ra nd fathe r, wa s r e sp on sib le f or at le a st p art

of the a bu se . D r. B ish op a lso considered the petitioner’ s childhood automobile acc ident in which he wa s thrown into the dashboar d of th e ca r an d out the window. The pe titioner was re ndere d unconscious, which D r. B i s h o p r e l a t e d t o c l o s e d h e a d t r a u m a

. F i n a l l y , D r

. B i s h o p c o n s i d e r e d t h e r e s u l t s o f

a r e c e n tM R I, sh ow ingthe pr e se nc e of

str uctur al a bn or ma lity in t he br a in. She sa id t

hat e ve n c on sid e ri ngtho se
nume ro us fa c tor s, sh e wa s una ble to de te rm ine e xac tly wh a t c a us e d th e pe tit ion e r’ s “ br a in problem.” H oweve r, she e x plained that what was imp o rt an t wa s the exist ence of his defic its, not their ca use. Dr. B ishop stated that the “possible reas o n s l i sted for the brain dy sfunction”

occur red pr ior to the petitioner’s e ighte enth birthday

.
The AA MR Adaptive Def icit Scale is an a daptive sca le composed of eig hteen diff

ere nt d o m ai n s

. T en d o m a i n s d e al wi t h s k i l l ar ea s , i n cl u d i n g s u ch ar ea s as i n d ep en d en tfu n ct i o n i n g. Part two of the test de als with subscales that a ddress male adaptive be haviors.

Dr. B ishop testified that the petitioner did fair ly well on some of the skills tests. She related that “[h]e had score s that would be consider ed ever y wher e fr om the normal ra ng e all the way on up to the sever ely delay ed ra ng e.” T he re sults indi cate d the petitioner wa s not
m al i n g e r i n g

. Dr

. Bi s h o p re l at edt h at t h e p et i t i o n er ex h i b i t edd ef

i ci t s i nad ap t i v e f

u n ct i o n i n g. She re po rt e d te n d e fi c its on his sc a lin g and

e le ve n o r t

we lve de fi c its on Cha

rl ie and B e tty

Cr ibb s’

sc a lin g . D r. B ish op state d th a t a fi nd ingof

tw o def ic its wa s c on sid e re d a

su ff ic ie nt n umb e r i n order to establish a seve re a daptive beha vior. Dr. B ishop summariz ed th at “[ m] y conclusions ar e t h a tM r

. P e r

r y A n t h o n y C r i b b s h a s s i g n i f i c an td e l ays i n a d ap t i v e b e h a v i o r an d t h a tt h e s e d e l ays
wer e appa

rent duringthe deve lopment period or pr ior to the ag e of 18.”

Dr. B ishop t es t i fi ed that the Vineland A daptive B ehavior Scales wa s administered to the petitioner in 1987 and t h at the Vineland sc ore e quated to an I .Q. score with a standar d deviation-22-

of 15. D r

. B is h o p r e late d th a t th e p e ti ti o n e r s c o r e d 7 0 o n th e te s t. Sh e e xp la in e d that two standard de viations below the norm of 100 w as the standa rd for mental re tardation.

Dr. B ishop t es t i fi ed that the petitioner a lso was g iven the Wechsler I ntellige nce Sca le for Ch il dr e n
- Re v is e d

. A c c o r d in g to th e te s t, th e p e ti ti o n e r h a d an I

. Q

. o f 7 0 , which wa s two standard de viations below the mea n. Dr. B ishop said that all educational tests conducted on the petitioner re veale d he wa s working at one to four y ear s below gra d e l ev el and that the pe titioner

wa s in the bo tt om five pe rc e nt o f t he po pu latio n. B a se d o n th e re su lts of a ll the te sts administered to the pe titioner, Dr

. Bi s h o p conclude d he had se vere defic its in i ntellige nce, educational achieve ment, and mental a daptive beha vior

. S h e ex plained that the r esults indicated mental re tardation because they o cc u rr ed during the deve lopmental period. When the pe titioner was in school , he wa s diag nosed with a “ sever e dela y ” and w as plac ed in spec ial education classes.

Dr. Bishop testified about psy cholog ical testing completed on the petitioner i n 1 9 8 6 by Dr. B attle. Fr om the results o f a P ea body Picture Voc abular

y Test, Dr. B attle estimated the petitioner’s ve rbal intellig ence score was 46, r ef lectinghe wa s in the moderate ly reta rded r ang e. Dr. B attle also estimated f rom the results of the petitioner’s Dr aw- A-Person te st that his I .Q. was 61, which would h av e indi cate d to a profe ssional that more in-depth testingwas ne eded. T he petitioner would have been f ifteen y ear s old in 1986.

Dr. B ishop testified that the Mid t o wn M ental He alth Center ne ver a dminist ere d an I .Q. test to the petitioner; its evaluation was limited to competenc y . She said a p er s o n could be mentally reta rded an d s t i ll be found compe tent. Dr. B ishop said that neither she nor any other mental hea lth professional found an y p s y choti c indicator s in the petitioner and that it was possible for a pe rson to be mentally reta rded but not insane

. Dr

. Bi shop conce ded that her partne r, D r

. Wy a tt

N ic h o ls , w r o te n o te s in d ic a ti n g th e p e ti ti o n e r h a d anI

. Q

. o f

7 3 in 1 9 8 9

. Dr. B i s h o p s t a t e d

t h a t t h e M i d t o w n M e n t a l H e a l t hC e n t e r r e c o r d s f a i l e d t o r e f l e c tan y s o c i a l h i s t o r

y, any inte r v ie w s w it

h r e lati v e s , o r

an y s c h o o l r e c o r d s an d

th a t t h e r e w a s n o in d ic a ti o nin D r. Nichols’ re port that the I .Q. was ba sed on data . A 1990 letter to a M emphi s Gene ral Sessions jud g e and c on ta ine d in

the re c or d s tate d a s f

oll ow s:
Perry Cribbs is functionally il l i t er ate and of low intellectua l fu nc tio ning. Ho we ve r, his int e lle c tua l f un c tio nin g is s uf

fi c ie nt i n
or de r f or him to p ro c e e d w iththe dis po sit ion of the c ha rg e s.

Dr. B ishop sta t ed t h at , had she be en consulted at that time, she would have w anted the pe titioner to rec eive in-de pth testing.

Dr

. Bi shop testified that she re viewed D r. Auble’ s repor t. Dr. B ishop acknowle dg ed that Dr. Auble conducte d the Halstea d-Reitan B attery , which examined t h e n eu ro logic al state of the individual lobe by

lobe base d on perf

ormanc e. Dr . Auble dete rmined that “the re w as sig nificant impairment and that the impairme nt rea ched t h e h ighe st score that is normally g iven.” Dr

.-23-

B ish op sa id D r. Au

ble ’s re su lts were s igni fi cant b e c a us e the y ind ic a te d th a t “ the re is a n o rg anic condition and that org anic c onditions of the brain, par ticularly if they occur d u ri n g the developmenta l period, ar e ve ry m u ch as sociated w ith the condition of mental reta rdation.” D r. Bishop stated that the petitioner h ad particular diff iculty in visual perce ption functioning a nd that “one of the most impo rt ant things that we nee d our visual per ception func tioning for is reading .” Dr . B ish op a lso state d th a t D r. Au ble ha d d e te rm ine d th e pe tit ion e r’ s me mor y and hi s abi li ty

to
c on c e ntr a te we re int a c t. D r. B ish op int e rp re te d th os e fi nd ing s to me an th e pe tit ioner fai led to achie ve bec ause his bra in did not function well, not beca use he w as unable to remembe r thing s.

Dr. Bishop testified that the petitioner had trouble perf orming two-par

t instruc ti o n s

. She state d th a t th e a dd iti on a l in str uc tio ns “ up p[e d] th e le vel of com pl e xity ” and tha t w hil e mos t
m entally reta rded pe rsons could ade quately function with simple tasks, their ability to function with increa sing c omplex ity was c ompromised. Dr. B ishop noted that the p et i t ioner showe d “atr o p h y in th e p ar ie ta l c o rte x. ” Sh e e xp la in e d th a t h e c o u ld p la n an a c ti v it

y f o r something ve ry familiar to him. Howeve r, if som et hing w as unfamiliar, his entire planningsy stem could brea k down.

Dr. B ishop testified that she re viewed D r. Pen d er gra s s ’s WAI S-3 testing, whic h indicated the petitioner ha d an I .Q. of 75. She stated that the rate of err or was slightly over f ive points. Dr. Bishop opined that the pe titioner was at the l o we r en d o f the scor e as oppose d to the highe r end. She based he r conc lusion on the pattern of te st findings related to the petitioner a nd the fa ct that he wa s educated with mentally reta rd ed s t u d ents when he was in school. The fac t that the petitioner wa s place d in classrooms with mentally reta rded students li mited the amount he believed he could ac hieve. Dr . Bishop also re lated that ther e wa s potentially “[c]los ed hea d tr a uma fr om abu se, cer

ta inl y fr om t he a uto a c c ide nt, c hr on ic ma lnutr iti on in t he e arl y y e ars ; th is was proba

bly too during preg nancy .”

Dr

. Bi s h o p t e s t i fi edt h at s h e c o n cl u d edt h e p et i t i o n er h ada “ s i gn i fi ca n t l y

s u b av er age g ener al intellectual f

unctioning a s evidenc ed by a func tional intelligenc e quotient of 70 or below.” She a g ree d that he had de ficits in adaptive be havior a nd that mental re tardation manifested dur ing the developmenta l period o r b y age e ighte en. In her opinion, the pe titioner was menta lly

reta rded in a ccor dance with the Tenne ssee de finition of mental reta rdation.

Dr. B ishop testified that rec ords illustrated Marie Cribbs’ d ef i ci ts as a par ent. She was of te n il l and

wa s n ot e mot io na lly

ava ila ble to h e r c hil dr e n. Mari e wa s il lit e rate and un a ble to assist her childre n with their schoolwork.

On cr oss-examination, Dr. Bishop testified that he r p ra ct i ce was g ear ed towar ds individuals n o t in c ar c e r a te d

. Sh e a c kn o w le d g e d th a t a t th e ti me o f h e r r e p o rt, th e p e ti ti o n e r had been inc arc erated off a

nd on since 1989. She said that state ments from the pe titioner’s aunt and uncle indicated his mother did numerous per sonal tasks for him, such a s bathing , that other y ouths did independentl y

. Ac co rd ing to infor mation contained in a sc hool rec ord, the pe titioner’s mot he r s a id h e wa s h e lpf

ul a ro un d th e ho us e by was hi ng fl oo rs , d oin g la un dr y , ir on ingc lot

he s,-24-

and cooking for himself and his sibling s. Dr. Bishop stated that it wa s a matter of wh o m y ou believed, the petitioner’s mother or his aunt and uncle

.
Dr . B ish op a c kn ow le dg e d th a t in 19 85 , th e sc ho ol t e ste d th e pe tit ion e r a nd c a me up wi th a primar y diag nosis as “unsp ecified mental disorder , specia l education diagnosis, other handica pping c ondition, and then conduct disorde r as a seconda ry d i agnosis undersoc ialized,

no na g g re ssi ve .” She furth e r a c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e sc ho ol d id n ot d ia g no se him a s me nta lly

re tarde d. Dr. Bishop conce ded that the petitioner had been unable to “ g o out a nd g et j o b s an d go to banks and de al with the outside world bec ause he ’s bee n incar cer ated.”

Dr. B ishop ac k nowledg ed that Dr . Nichols conc luded the petitioner ha d an “[i]nt ellectua l level hig her tha

n the assesse d I .Q. of 73 in 1989.” D r. B ishop then was questioned ab o u t the criter ia for a

ntisocial persona lity . The Dia g nostic and Statistical Manual of Me ntal Disorder s ( D S M IV ) p r o v i d e d

t h e f o l l o w i n g c r i t e r i a

f o r an t i s o c i a l p e r s o n a l i t y:

A. Th er e’ s a p erva sive pattern of disreg ard f

or the violation – for and violation of the r i gh t s o f others since ag e 15 as indicated by thr e e or mor e of

the fo llo wi ng : f

a ilure to c on fo rm

to s oc ia l no rm s wi th r espe c t to lawf

ul b e havio rs a s in dic a te d b y re pe a te dly perf orming acts that a

re g rounds for a

rre st. Two, dece itfulness as indicated by

repe ated lying, us e o f aliases or conningothers for persona l profit or p l ea sure. Thr ee, impulsivity or fa ilure to plan ahea d. [si c] Four, i rritability , ag g ressivene ss as indicated by repe ated phy sical fig hts or assaults. Five, rec kless disreg ard f or the safe ty of self or others. Six , consistent irres p o nsibili ty as indicate d by repe ated f

ailure to sustain consistent workbehavior or honor financ ia l o b li g a ti o n s

. Se v e n , la c k o f r e mo r s e a s in d ic a te d

b y b e ing in d if f e r e n t t o o r

r a ti o n a li zi n g h a v in gh u rt, mi s tr e a te d , o r s to le n from anothe r. The individual is at least 18 y ear s of ag e.

C . . . There is evidence of this conduct dis order with onset befor e ag e 15. And, D, The occur renc e of antisocial behavior i s not exclusively

during the cour se of sc hizophrenia or manic e pisode.

Dr. B is h o p a c kn o w le d g e d th a t t h e p e ti ti o n e r

h a d n e v e r b e e nd ia g n o s e d

a s s c h iz o p h r e n ic or mani c

. Sh e a ls o a g r e e d

th a t h e w a s d ia g n o s e d

w it hc o n d u c t d is o r d e r

p r io r to th e a g e o f

f if te en. She conce ded that “[t] he part two would definitely ag ree with the [definiti o n fo r antisocial persona lity

disor d er ].” Notwithstanding, Dr . Bishop adde d that “[a]nti social per sonality disorder d o es not prec lude a diminished intellige nce.” On re direc t examination, Dr. Bishop testified that sh e c ou ld r

ule out th e po ssi bil ity

of anti so c ia l pe rs on a lity

dis or de r d

ue to t he pr e se nc e of

br a in damag e.-25-

Jac kie Ca nn on

wa s r e c a lle d to the sta

nd to t e sti fy . Sh e imm e diate ly inv ok e d th e F if

th Amendment, stating that she had “al re ad y t es t ified and that she was stickingto that.” When

as k ed t o re view a doc ument, Cannon stated that she c ould not read, that she dropped out of school, and that she ma de all F s while in school. She said she wa s not “a bigdru g u s er ” b u t that sh e “ [kne w] a

bo ut d ru g s. ” Cann on

re c e ive d tr e a tme nt at th e Mid town M e nta l H e a lthCe nte r i n J uly 2000.

Cannon tes t i fi ed t h at s he last saw the petitioner whe n he “g ot the death pe nalty .” She added that “the time bef ore the n was whe n

. . . h e at tempted murder ing me .” Howe ver, no char g es wer e filed ag ainst him at that time. Cannon acknow ledg ed that she was conv i ct ed of theft of pr operty

in J anua ry 1 9 9 1 . She explained that “it’s just a petty char g e. Some people g ot
rec ords long as 20 cr iminal offense s. But I don’t have but three.”

Dana Cook testified that she was e mploy ed with the Post-C onviction Defe nder’ s Offic e
a s an inve sti g a tor

in 1 99 9 a

nd me t w ithJacki e Ca nn on in Ma rc h 1 99 9. Ca

nn on a dmi tte d to Cook that she lied at the petitioner’ s trial in order to g et him o u t o f t he house, a nd Cook obtained

an a ff ida vit sig ne d b y

Cann on . A c c or din g to t

he a ff ida vit , th e Mic ke y

Mo us e watch bel on ged

to
ano the r p e rs on . O n c ro ss-ex amina tio n, Coo k a c kn ow le dg e d th a t sh e did no t kn owCann on

c ou ld not rea d. Sh e a ls o s tate d th a t h e r h an dw r itte nn o te s f

r o m h e r c o n v e r s a ti o nw it

hCa n n o nd id n ot
reve al Cannon wa s ly ing when Canon said the pe titioner g ave he r the Micke y Mouse watc h.

Jana n n M c I n n i s , an i n v e s t i g a t o r an d d o c u m e n t s p e c i a l i s t w i t h t h e O f f i c e o f t he Pos tConvic tio n D e fe nd e r, te sti fi e d th a t sh e me t with Jac kie Cann on on Se pte mbe r 1 3, 20 01 . Sh e sa id that Cannon appe are d to understand the a ffidavit and that Cannon “took it an d l o o ked at it. She

rea d it. She unde rstood what she was rea ding.” When Ca nnon was a sked about the a ffidavit, she responde d “y es.” On cross-e x amination, McInnis testified that she was not pe rsonally involved with interviewingCannon.

The State p resented the testimony of Dr. Wy att Nichols, a psycholog ist in private prac tice and a c onsultant to the Midtown Mental Health Center ’s For ensi c P ro gra m. Dr. Nichols testified th a t in 1 9 9 4 , th e c o u rt d ir e c te d h im to e v a lu a te th e p e ti ti o n e r in r e lati o n to th e ca pital murder char g e. He explained that beca use the State re quired a

phy sician t o b e part of the eva luation team, he a

nd Dr. B aldwin, a psychiatrist, eva luated the pe titioner on J uly 20, 1994.

Dr. Nic hols testified that t h e Mi dtown Mental He alth Center ha d evaluated the petitioner in J uly 1989, J une 1990, and O ctober 1990. Whil e those prior evalua t ions were irrele vant to a d e t e rm i n at i o n o f co mp et en cy , Dr

. Ni ch o l s co n s u l t ed t h e I

. Q. t es t s p re v i o u s l y ad m i n i s t er ed

. In Dr. Nic hols’ opinion, the petitioner was c ompetent to pro ce ed to trial in 1994. The petitioner understood the c harg es ag ainst him, could work with counsel, a nd had an under s t andingof the

ro le of the va ri ou s part icip ants in t

he c ourt ro om. Dr . N ic ho ls f

ur the r c on c lud e d th a t an in sanit y defe nse could not be suppor ted for two r easons. F irst, the peti t i o n er d i d n ot have a history of mental illness or treatment and did not present a ny psy chologi ca l s y

mptoms. S econd, the-26-

pe tit ioner mai nt ain ed th a t he did no t c omm it the c ri me . D r. Ni c ho ls r e a d D r. B a ldw in’ s n ote
re latin g to t

he pe tit ion e r’ s e va luatio n. Th e no te state d a s f oll ow s:

Mr. Cribbs was e valuated toda y pursuant to cour

t order. H e wa s g uarde d, suspicious, evasive, de nied all alleg ations, he’s in the proce ss of hiring a privat e co u nsel. I t is my impression he

un ders tan ds the jud ic ia l pr oc e ss a lth ou g h h e wa s in sp e c ia l e d in school. An I Q has be en found to be in the 70 rang e.

Dr. Nic hols testi fi ed t h at the I .Q. test administered in June 1990 reve aled the pe titioner had a ve rbal I .Q. of 76, a

perf ormanc e I .Q. of 73, a

nd a full sca le I .Q. of 7 3 , wh ich was not in the

m en t al l y re t arded rang e. He stated that in his opinion, the petitioner’s intellectual leve l was

a c tua lly hig he r t ha n th e I .Q . o f 7 3 a

nd wa s “ [m]or e lik e the mid to hig h 80s .” F ur the rm or e , in

his opinion, t h e petitioner suf fer ed fr om antisocial persona lity . The pe titioner’s school re cords sh ow e d h e a lso wa s e xami ne d in No ve mbe r 1 98 4 a

nd F e br ua ry 19 85 . T ho se te sts ind ic a te d a fu ll scale I .Q. of 70, with his verba l I .Q. being75 and his perf ormanc e I .Q. being69. I n 19 8 5 , the petitioner’s diag nosis was “unspec ified mental di s o rd er, othe r handic appingconditions, conduct disorder, soc ialized, nonag g ressive.”

Dr. Nic hols testified that in 1990, the Minnesota M u ltiphasic Personality I nventory (MMPI ) wa s administered to the pe titioner. Dr. Nichols a lso was aware that Dr. Auble sc ored the MMPI . I n Dr. Nic hols’ opinion, it would have been unlikely for a mentally reta rded pe rson to h a ve c omp le te d a

va lid MMP Ipr of

ile . H e e xpla ine d th a t a

pe rs on ne e de d to hav e at lea st a sixthg ra de re a din g le ve l in or de r t o c omp le te the MMP Iwi th a vali d r e su lt. He qu a lif ie d h is state me nt b y

sayingtha

t a pe rs on wh o w a s r e tard e d c ou ld t a ke the MMP Iand produ ce a v a lid profile but that i t was unli kely the MMPIwould be administere d to a mentally reta rded pe rson. Th e fa c t th a t th e pe tit ion e r t oo k a n M MPI th at pro du c e d a

va lid pr of ile ind ic a te d to Dr . N ic ho ls that the petitioner wa s functioning highe r than a mentally reta rded le vel.

On cr oss-examinatio n, Dr. Nic hols was aske d about Dr. Pincus’ c onclusion that the petitioner had f

rontal lobe disorde r. Dr. N ichols stated that “[a] larg e number of people [have] front lobe damag e,” inc luding pe rsons with ADHD. He ex p l ained that he could leave the courtroom, hit his head on a windshield, and have frontal lobe da mag e. He acknow ledg ed that he

e v a l u a t e d t h e p e t i t i o n e r

o n l y t o d e t e r

m i n e c o mp e t e n c y an d

s an i t y.

L opaka T homas, an a cquaintanc e of Jackie Cannon, te stified that in 1992, Cannon was living at L aMoy

ne Ga rdens. Thoma s dated he r for seven or eig ht months, but in 1994 , h e wa s incar cer ated f

or viol at i n g h i s parole . Thomas stated that while he was living with Cannon, he observe d her u s e cr ac kcoca ine on seve ral oc casions and sa w her hallucinate. Ca

nnon also was not taking c are of household nee ds or her children.

Eu g e ne B ow e n te sti fi e d th a t he liv e d in L a Mo y ne Gar de ns in 1 98 0 a

nd kn e w Ja c kie Cannon in 1993 and 1994. B owen kne w Cannon used illicit drug s b ec ause he saw he r buy cra ck-27-

c oc a ine . H e a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he so ld t he c oc a ine to her. Ja c kie Cann on a lso wo uld

jus t
scre am at times. I n 1993 and 1994, a person named J ames Polk, also known as “D u ck He ad,” lived with C an n o n . On cr oss-examination, Bowen te stified that the petitioner lived with Cannon when he was re lease d from prison in the fa ll of 1993.

B ow e n te s t i f

i e d t h a th e kn e w t h e p e t i t i o n e r an d t h a tt h e p e t i t i o n e r

w a s p l ayi n g b a s k e tba ll with him on the ni g ht of L inda Harris’ murder. The petiti oner’ s daug hter wa s with the petitioner. After they finished playing ba ll, Bowe n and the pe tit i o n er wa l k ed to g et a be er. L ater , Bow en saw the pe titioner and “W ham” arguing. He ex plained that “Wham” w as Jackie Cannon. B owen said the petitioner’ s attorney s never contac ted him.
Reg ina Ewingtestified that she a lso lived in L aMoy n e Ga rdens in 1994 and that she helped Jackie Cannon c lean he r house a nd fee d h er ch i l d ren. One day , Cannon came to Ewing ’s home and wa s scre aming that someone wa s in her house. When Ewingwent t o i n vestig ate, no
one wa s there. D uring the incident, C an n o n admitted to Ewing that she wa s “on this stuff.” Ewing s tate d th a t s h e n e v e r s aw Ca n n o n u s e dr

u g s

. E w in g s a id th at, h a d s h e b e e n c o n ta c te d by the petitioner’s attorney s, she would have testified about Cannon’s be havior.

Dar lene Dona ld, L inda Har ri s’ sister, testified that she thoug ht it was odd that Sidney Har ris backe d his car into the dr iveway o n t h e n i gh t L inda was murde red. D onald stated that the re we re fi na

nc ia l pr ob le ms in he r s ist e r’ s ma rr ia g e . Sh e a lso wi tne sse d Si dn e y Ha rr is v e rb a lly abuse L inda and wa s awa re that he had phy sically

abused he r. C. Finding s of the Post-Conviction Court

I n a fifty -five pa g e orde r ente red on Ma y 23, 2 0 0 6 , t h e post -convic tion court denied

re lie f. Th e c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t th e pe tit ion e r h a d f a ile d to d e mon str a te a

ba sis up on

wh ic h p os tconviction re lief could be g rante d. The c ourt’s finding s of fa ct an d co n cl u s i ons of law a re
summa ri zed a s f oll ow s:

Petitioner claims that trial counsel should have reque sted expert assistance in investigating f orensic e vidence ag ainst him and in evaluatinghis mental status

. Petitioner contends expert assistance was ne eded to c halleng e the testimony of the State’s patho log ist

re g ard inginj ur ie s su sta ine d b y the victim an d to pr ov ide pr oo f r e g ard ingthe dis tanc e and angle of L ind a Ha rr is’ fata l gunshot wound. Petitioner f u rt h er argues that evide nce w as available at the time of trial to warra nt counsel’s re quest for funding fo r ex pert a ssistance re g ardingthe issue of Petitioner’s

me nta l st a tus

.
This court fin d s Petitioner’s alleg ations relatingto expert service s are without merit. . . . Si nce the initia l indication from-28- Midtown Me ntal Hea lth wa s that Petitioner was compe tent to stand trial and did not suffe r fr om a psy chiatric disorder, this C ourt finds Petitioner’s relianc e on Ake is mispl ace d.

. . . The Petitioner has f

ailed to show def

icient per formanc e by trial counsel f

or fa iling to see k assistance for e x perts and f urther fails on two levels to show that pre judice re sulte d fr o m t h e fa ilure. First, he ha s made no showingthat the in i t ial threshold of Ake has been m et

. The Petitioner has not shown that ha d an ef fort bee n made to see k expert funding , the trial cour t would have be en
re qu ir e d to g ra

nt t hat r e qu e st. Se c on d, the Pe tit ion e r h a s f a ile d to show to a re asonable probability that had an expert been f unded and used at trial, the resulting testimony woul d h av e had a

ny eff ect on the jury ’s dec ision.

Mo re imp or

tantl y , . . . it

a pp e ars c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to r e qu e st funds fo r ex p ert ser

vices oc curr ed due to [counsel’s] conclusion that such a r equest for fu nds was not nec essar y . Both of Petitioner’s trial counse l testified . . . that, afte r discu ssing a ll of the issues in the ca se and the evidenc e to be pre sented with the Petitioner, they

believed the Petitioner fully co mprehe nded the tria l p ro ce s s , t h e e v i d en ce aga i n s th i man d t h e c h ar ges h e w as fa ci n g. Specifica lly , defe nse counse l . . . testified that had she known there “wa s some sort of mental proble m or any thing like that,” she would have “ not let that just sl ide by .” Howe ver, . . . she “neve r g ot any inkling fr o m M r. C ribbs that . . . he wa s mentally defic ient or that there was a

ny problem.”

Se c on d, it i s unli ke ly

that a re qu e st f or su c h s e rv ic e s w ou ld have be en g rante d.

. . . [A ]c c o r d in g to th e te s ti mo n y a t t h e p o s t- c o n viction hear ing, . . . the re w as no b as is upon which to reque st the service s
o f a m e n t a l h e a l t h p r o f

e s s i o n a l

. T h e i n i t i a l t h r e s h o l d r e qu i re me nt . . . is a showi n g o f n ec es s ity . . . . [I ]t appea rs they would have be en unable to mee t the Ru l e 13 require ments. Thus, the Petitioner has fa ile d to de mon str a te tr ia l c ounsel wa s in e ff e c tiv e in f

a ili ngto make suc h a re quest. Trial counsel stated they wer e unaw are of any mental def

ici en cy o n the par

t of the Petitioner and f urther stated that the Petitioner was evaluated and f ound to be compete nt pr ior to t ri a l. T he re fo re , Pe tit ioner ha s f a ile d to de mon str a te that, even if such a r equest ha d been ma de, h e wo u ld have be en entitled to the reque sted servic es pursua nt to the mandates of Rule 13.-29- Simi la rl y , th is C ourt

fi nd s Pe tit ion e r h as also fa ile d to demonstrate the nece ssity for ex p er t assistance in a ssessing the fo re ns ic e vid e nc e a g a inst him . Pe tit ion e r h a s p re se nte d n o p ro of in

su pp or t of hi s bare a lle g a tio n .

. . no r h a s Pe tit ion e r a c tua lly indicated wh at h e woul d have hope d to have pr oven or e x plained wi t h t h e aid of such an e x pert. The ref ore, it is . . . unclea

r whe ther such serv ic e s w o u ld

h a v e b e e ng r an te d

e v e nif c o u n s e l h a d

ma de the re qu e st.

. . . .
Petitioner con t ends t rial counse l’s failure to make a motion for pr e-tria l dis covery

and produc tion of cer tain exculpatory

e vid e nc e re nd e re d h is a ssi sta nc e ine ff e c tiv e . Pe tit ion e r’ s c laims

are not supported by

the proof pr esente d at the post-convic tion hear ing. A t the hear ing, tr ial counsel testifie d t h at a Mot ion for Discover y was filed, r equestingthe produc tion of “any thing materia l to the prepa

ration of the a ccuse d’s def ense.” I n addition, trial counsel stated another motion for production of ex cu lpatory evidenc e wa s filed alongwith a motion for t h e co urt to order the State to a llo w the de fe ns e to i ns pe c t any state me nts wh ic h e sta

bli sh the inn oc e nc e of

the accus ed.

. . . [T ]ri a l c ouns e l te sti fi e d th a t, pri o r to the trial, the pr osecutor a ffor ded the de fense team “ope n file” discovery

. There fore , this Court finds Petitione r’ s alleg ation of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l on

thi s is su e is w ith out me ri t.

. . . .
Pe tit ion e r a lle g e s tr ia l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e in f

a ili ngto prese nt evidence to support his theory that the victi m’s husband, Sidney Har ris, arr ang ed to have his wife m u rder ed for monetary g ain. . . . Petitioner co n t ends t rial counse l should have interview ed Parker and the man known to Par k er as “L il” Rob, whom Parker claims ac tually

killed L inda Har

ris. Additionally , Petitioner

c on te nd s tr ia l c ouns e l sh ou ld have int e rv ie we d Sid ney Ha rr is’ brother, A l Harr is. He cla ims Al Harris’ stat em en t t o the police qu e s t i o n i n g t h e v e r a c i t y

o f S i dn e y H ar r i s ’ v e r s i o no f

t h e e v e n ts surroundingL inda Har

ris’ murder

was rel ev an t and should have been pr esente d t o t h e jury . Finally , Petitioner contends trial counsel s h o u ld have investig ated e vidence establishing a n alibi defe nse. He claims trial counse l should have pre s ented testim ony fr om E ug e ne B ow e n e sta

bli sh inghis a lib i.-30- . . . Petitioner’s trial counse l te s t i fi ed that he w as aw are of Parker and Ha rris’ state ments and that he attempted to disce rn the

vera city of the stateme nts. Counsel further indicat ed t h at t he de fe ns e te am w a s awa

re that Mr . H arr is w a s inv ol ved in m ult ipl e extramarital re lations and stated that their inve stigat o r prepa red a repor t on Harr i s . The de fense was a lso awar e of a statement made by Al Har ris . . . that impli ed t h at S i d ney may not have disclosed all pertinent infor

mation about his life. . . . [T] he inv es tigators for the defense did a thor oug h background che ck of H arr is and found

no evidenc e to c orrobor ate the Petitioner’s asser tion a bout t he drug s. P et i t i o n er ’s t rial counse l . . . testified that . . . considering the injuries sustai n ed b y

Har ris . . . a def

ense a sserting Har

ris was inv olv e d in

pla nn ingthe mur de r o f hi s wif e wo uld unne c e ssa

ri ly

anta g on ize the jur

y , o utw e ig hin g any

be ne fi t to the de fe nd ant.

. . . . . . . [T] he Petitioner fa iled to offer the testimony

of the man kn ow n as “L il Rob” or Al Ha rr is t o s up po rt

the a lle g a tio ns

. There fore , this Court could not conclude that such a materia l wi tne ss e xiste d o r p rej ud ice d the Pe tit ion e r.

. . . [I ]t is n ot t he ro le of thi s Co ur

t to se c on d g ue ss t

he tr ia l st ra te g y of de fe ns e c ouns e l. Rather, t h i s court will g ive def ere nce to infor

med tactica l decisions of trial counse l. Here , it appear s trial counsel wa s aw ar e of the state me nt m a de by

Park e r, a tte mpt e d to inv e sti gate the state me nt,
and ma de an in fo rm e d d e c isi on no t to pr e se nt c e rt a in e vid e nc e to the jur y

. . . . [T]hi s Co ur

t do e s n ot f

ind c ouns e l w a s in e ff

e cti ve in failing to present suc h evidenc e at tria l. Moreov er , P et itioner has fa ile d to de mon str a te he wa s p re ju dic e d b y

c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to prese nt evidence of Parke r’s a ssertions.
Additionally , this Court finds P etitioner’s c ontention t h at defe n s e c o u n s e l s h o u ld

h a v e inv e s ti g a te d

an d p u r s u e d ana libi defe nse al s o h as n o merit. . . . Eug ene B owen testified that on the night of the murder , Petitioner and his y oung daug hter we re playing ba sketball with him unti l 1:00 a

. m

. E v en if this Court

we re to f ind B ow e n’ s te sti mony

c redi bl e, Pe tit ion e r h a s f a ile d to de mon str a te ho w c ounsel ’s pe rf or manc e wa s d e fi c ie nt.

. . . [T ]his Court does not fi n d Bo wen’s testimony cre dible or per suasive. . . . Pe tit ion e r’ s d e fense cou nsel

. . . te sti fi e d th a t he a sk e d Pe tit ion e r t o pr ov ide him

wi th any

wi tne sse s o r a

ny pe rs on s w ho c ou ld h e lp wi th h is d e fe ns e . T he on ly name g ive n by P e tit ion e r w a s th e name of Jac kie Cann on

. . . . Pe tit ion e r n e ve r m e nti on e d Bowen pri or to-31- or duringthe trial. T here fore , counsel ha d no rea son to interview

or c a ll B ow e n a s a

wi tne ss. Pe tition e r c ann ot n owc la im h is counsel wa s ineffe ct i v e for not presentingcer

tain evidenc e that Petitioner failed to disclose to counse l for pre paration of trial.

. . . .
Petitioner contends trial c ounsel should have r equeste d the trial judg e, Judge F red A x ley , to rec use himself, b ased upon a perc eived bias ag ainst capital defe ndants.

. . . Petitione r c o n t ends tha t s i n c e A l l e y w a s d e c i d e d o n l y a f e w m o n t h s p r i o r t o th i s tr ia l, counsel should have reque sted the trial judg e re cuse himself f rom he ari ngPe tit ion e r’ s tr ia l a s w e ll.

I t seems that re cusal of Judge Ax l ey i n Alley was ba sed solely on the avoidanc e of a

public perc eption of par tiality . The Pe tit ion e r .

. . . offers no s pe c if ic bia s o r a c ts o f p re

jud ic e a g a ins t him by this particular judg e. Unlike the petiti o n er in Alley , who pointed to numerous statements indicating a bias by the tri al j u d ge . . . Petitioner has failed to pre sent such proof . . . . Until the judge had demonstrated a per sonal bias spec ifically direc ted [at] the Petitioner in the instant

c a s e , c o u n s e l h a d n o g r o u n d s u p o n w h ic h to s o li c it th e r e c usal of the judg e. . . . Petitioner fa iled t o prese nt any cre dible evidenc e that su c h a

bia s had manif e ste d it se lf

pr ior to o r d ur ingthe tr ia l. There wer e no spec ific i n ci d ents or stateme nts offer ed by the Petitioner for thi s C o u rt t o revie w. . . . [C] ounsel was not ineffe ctive in fa iling to re q u est the trial judg e re cuse himself f rom the instant case

.

. . . .
Peti ti o n e r c o n te n d s tr ia l c o u n s e l’ s p e r f o r ma n c e d u r in g jury

se le c tio n w a s n ot eff

e c tiv e

. . . . Pe tit ion e r c la ims c ouns e l f a ile d to

re ha bil itate jur or s a s p art

of the With e rs po on pr oc e ss; fa ile d to adequately

explain the meaning of mitigating c ircumstance s and failed to e x clude juror s who would not consider mitig ation; failed t o c h a l l e n g e j u r o r s w h o w e r e “ p r e d i s p o s e d ” t o t h e d e a t hp e n a l t y; faile d to e xc lu d e ju

r o r s w h o w e r e v ic ti ms o f v io le n t c r im e o r who had close family

or fr iends who had be en a vic tim of violent crime; fa ile d to qu e sti on

jur or s a bo ut r a c ia l bi as; and , fa ile d to ob je c t to-32- the State’s improper remova l of jurors base d upon rac e, sex, or ag e.

. . . Petitioner has fa iled to demonstrate that co u n s el’s p e r f o r ma n c e , d u r in g th e s e le c ti o n o f th e ju r y , f e ll below the requisite standa

rds of competence. . . . [M] any of the issues ra ised by the Pe tit ion e r h ave be e n re je c te d b y the Te nn e sse e Ap pe llate Courts. . .

. [ T ] h ere is no indication on the rec ord that trial counse l fa ile d to fo llo w the mand a te s o f Wi thers po on and /or fa ile d to adequately

question jur o rs reg ardingthe ra ng e of punishment and their ability

to consider mitigation evidence

. Ot her a lleg ations . . .

are sim ply wi tho ut m e ri t. I n p art ic ula r, Pe tit ion e r f

a ile d to po int

to any particula r juror that was either

rac ially biased; af

fec ted by pri or violent crime; or imprope rly s t ruck by the prosec ution. Thus, they ha v e f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s hc o u n s e l w a s i n e f

f e c t i v e o nt h e s e m a t t e rs

. Fur thermore, ev en if counsel wer e inef fec tive, Petitioner has fa iled to demo n s t rate how he wa s prejudice d by counsel’s a ction or inaction.

. . . .
Petitioner makes s ever al alleg ations relatingto the testimony of Jackie Cannon. F irs t , Petitioner asserts trial c ounsel’s pre- trial investigation of J ackie Cannon should have include d a

re qu e st f or pr od uc tio n o f C ann on ’s m ent al he a lthand juv e nil e
re c or ds . H e c la ims Cann on ha s a his tor y of me nta l health problems and dr

ug abuse. Thus, Petitioner a lso contends trial counsel should have reque sted a ps y chiatric examination of Cann on pr ior to h e r t e sti fy

inga t tr ia l.

. . . .
. . . Cannon either r efuse d to answer their questions or continued to asser

t that her trial testi mony was truthful. When asked if she had g iven two sepa rate aff idavits contradict ing or

re c anti ngpo rt ions of her tr ia l te sti mony , Ca

nn on sp e c if ic a lly denied having g iven the statements or sig ning the aff idavits. One fac t upon which Cannon vehe mently insisted was that the petitioner “attempted” to “murd er ” h er in order to pre vent her from g oing to the police

.
Withre g ard

to P e tit ion e r’ s a lle g a tio ns that c ouns e l sh ould have obta ined Cannon’s medic al and juv en i l e rec ords, . . . the Petitioner offe red no e vidence to show trial counsel should have-33- been a war e of Cannon’ s problems. In fac t , during the trial, the Petiti o n e r , w h o li v e d

w it hth e w it n e s s at t h e ti me o f

th e mu r d er, pr ov ide d c ouns e l w it h no in fo rm a tio n r e g ard ingany pr e se nt o r p a st mental hea lth or drug problems t he witness may have suf

fer ed from at th e ti me o f

h e r tr ia l t e s ti mo n y

. O th e r

th anCa n n o n , w ho was likely

not forthcomingabout such de tails, the Petiti oner w as the be st s ourc e fo r s uc h in fo rm a tio n. I t w a s u p to the Pe tit ion e r t o aler t counsel t h at t here may

be some menta l health issues relating to Cannon’s testimony

. E v ery witness will not be investigated for mental hea lth issues unless pertinent information is discovere d by counsel whic h related direc tly to the case

.
There fore , P eti tioner ca nnot now claim ineff ective assistance of co u n sel bec ause he chose to re main silent about

c e rt a i n m e n t a l h e a l t h i s s u e s

. . . . [T ]h e P e t i t i o n e r w a s u n a b le to show that, when Ca n non testified at trial, she a ctually suffe red fr om m e nta l il lne ss o r w a s und e r t he inf luence of drug s. Thus , th is Court is not i nclined to find trial counse l was ineffec tive in failing to r e qu e st C ann on ’s me nta l and juv e nil e re c or ds

.

. . . . Petitioner challeng es trial counse l’s perf ormanc e duringthe

cr o s s -e x amination of seve ral of the prosec ution witnesses. . . . Petitioner’s claims ce nter a round the de fense theory th at Sidney Har ris was involved in his wife’ s murder.

. . . Petitioner challeng es trial counsel’s pe rfor

mance with reg ard to his cr oss-examination of Har ris. . . . Petitioner further contends c ounsel’s cr oss-examination of var ious Memphis P olice De p ar t m ent officers . . . wa s inadequate.

. . . .
Wit h re gar d to the cross-e x amination of Ha rris and the Memphis Poli ce O ffice rs, . . . this C o urt finds counsel’ s perf ormanc e not def

ici en t. . . . [ T]rial counsel spec ifically stated tha t he w a s c o n c e r

n e d t h a ta d e f e n s e w h i c ha t t a c k e d

H ar r i s w o u ld

re s u l t i n b a c k l a s h f

r o m t h e j u r

y d i r e c t l y t o t h e P e t i t i o ne r. Th is Co u rt f in d s s u c h d e c is io n s to b e r e a s o n a b le ta c ti c a l m aneuve rs
m a d e b y i n f

o r m e d an d a d e qu a t e l y p r e p ar e d

c o u n s e l

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, as the Supreme Court no t ed on direc t appea l, Harr is testified at t ri al that he wa s injured in the attac k and wa s heavily sedate d when he first spo k e t o police. Thus, althoug h it appear s counsel-34- a tte mpt e d to e xploi t c e rt a in d isc re pa nc ie s, the jur

y a c c e pte d H arr is’ explanation.

Couns e l’ s d e c isi on

to n ot c a ll Ja me s Pa

rk e r a s a wi tne ss, d u r i n g t h e g u i l t p h a s e

. . . , i s e qu a l l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o s t r a t e g y. Aga i n , t h i s C o u rt wi l l n o t s ec o n d gu es s t ri al co u n s el ’ s s t ra t egy unless it falls below the ac cepta ble standar ds. . . . [T ] h i s Court d o e s n o tg i v e g r e a tw e i g h tt o t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f P ar k e r

. E s s e n t i a l l y,
c ouns e l w ou ld h ave be e n p itt ingthe c re dib ili ty of Park e r a g a ins t that of Ha rr is, wh o hims e lf

, ha d be e n injure d in the a tta c k.

. . . Sg t. McWill i am s testified that he f ollowed up on the information provided b y

Parker , but found no link to the murder. . . . McWill iams fu rt her state d that there was no c redible e vidence that

someone e lse was involved in the murde r.

. . . .
P et i t ioner c ontends trial counse l was ineff ective in f

ailing to adequately

prepa re f or the sente ncingph as e of the trial. . . . The Pe ti ti o n e r , a s th e s o le w it n e s s f o r th e d e f e n s e , te s ti f

ie d b a s e d upon
a the or y of re sid ua l do ub t. T he Pe tit ion e r n owa lle g e s th a t, h a d h is fr ie nd s and

fa mil y be e n c on ta c te d, the y

wo uld have te sti fi e d o n h is be hal f du ri ngthe se nte nc ingph a se

. . . . Pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th is te sti mony re g ard inghis so c ia l ba c kg ro un d a nd me nta l he a lth would have ad d ed co n s i d er ab le mitigation to his case

. Additionally , Petitioner con t ends trial counse l should have ca lled J ames Parke r in support o f t heir theor y that the victim’s husband was involved in her

death.
At the post-conviction hea ring , multipl e me m b er s of the Petitioner’s family

testified that, had t h ey b een c ontacted, the y would have of

fer ed testimony

conce rning the Petitioner’s trouble[d] child h o od, including the fac t that Petiti oner ha d been sh ot a s a te e na g e r, the e ff

e c t of his fathe r’ s a

bs e nc e thr ou g ho ut his life, the hi s tory

of mental illness in his family , the Petitioner’s

aca demic strug g les and odd c hildhood behaviors , and a he ad injury

and oth e r i lln e sse s su ff

e re d b y Pe tit ion e r a s a chi ld. Ho we ve r, it appea rs th e Pe ti ti o n e r

p r o v id e d

tr ia l c o u n s e l w it

hn o n a me s of ind ivi du als that ma

y have be e n h e lpf

ul i n h is d e fe ns e duri ngthi s phase of the trial. In addition, at t h e p ost-conviction hea ring , trial

c ouns e l te sti fi e d th a t t he de fe ns e te a m c on ta c te d s e ve ra l f a mil y members prior to the beg inning of the sentenc ing phase an d we re told not to call back.-35- . . . .
I nitially , this Cou rt fi n d s that, at best, there is conflicting te sti mony re g ard ingwh e the r o r n ot t he Pe tit ion e r’ s f

a mil y wo uld have pa rt ic ipate d in

th e sen ten cingph a se of the tr ia l. .

. . Th is Court acc redits the testimony of trial couns el wh o stated that the defe n se team attempted to contac t the Petitioner’s family members but were told not to call back. Additionally , this Court finds t rial

c ouns e l w e re no t ne g lig e nt i n f a ilingto c a ll Jame s Pa rk e r t o support a t h eo ry

of re sidual doubt and attac k the victim’s husband. Tr ia l c ouns e l te sti fi e d th a t th e y a tte mp ted to a sc e rt a in t

he ve ra c ity of Park e r’ s c la ims , b ut were una ble to d o s o. I n h is s tate me nt t o police and a g ain at the post-c onviction hear ing, Par ker state d that he did not know the ac tual names of the persons he cl aim ed Sidney Har ris hired to kill his wi fe

. He further stated that he ha d no pe rs on a l kn ow le dg e of the e ve nts surr ound ingL ind a Ha rr is murder. . . . [T]he Court finds Parker’ s testimony

. . . woul d have added ve ry

littl e to Petitioner’s mitigation. Thu s, this C ourt finds de fe ns e c o u n s e l ’ s p e r f

o r m an c e w a s n o td e f

i c i e n td u e t o t h e ir failure to be pre sent at the sente ncingphase. A l s o , t he testimony of ea ch of the Petitioner’s family members a

nd testimony

of James Pa r k e r d o e s n o t im

p a c t tr ia l c o u n s e l’ s p e r f o r ma n c e in suc h a

manner that prejudice s the Petitioner and the r esult of the ca se.

More o v e r , e v e nif

th is Co u rt w e r e to f in d c o u n sel’s perf ormanc e at the sen t en cingphase to be defic ient, the Petitioner has fa i l ed t o demonstrate that he was pr ejudiced by trial counsel’ s failure to call ce rtain witnesses on his beha l f. Trial counse l . . . testifie[d] that cer

tain witnesses did not want to testify

.
. . . Trial counse l testified that the def ense te am attempted to contact the w itnesses[;] howeve r, Petitioner’s fa mily rebuf fed their attempts. Moreove r, despite the lack of te stimony . . . , Pe tit ion e r te sti fi e d duri ng the se nte nc ing ph a se of tr ia l; and, t hu s, ha d an o p p o rtu n i t y t o d i s c u s s h i s b a c k g r o u n d i n d e t a i l

. Th us , it was not as if de fense counsel fa iled to p u t on any mitigation proof.

. . . F in a ll y , th e St a te p r e s e n te d in d is p u ta

b le e v id e n c e o f

tw o [enhance ment] factors: (1 ) t h at the murde r wa s committed in the perpe tration of a burg lary ; and (2) that the defe ndant had be en
c on v i c t e d o f o n e o r m o r e p r i o r

v i o l e n tf

e l o n i e s

. T h u s

. . . thi s Court finds tha t , even if

counsel’s pe rfor

mance was de ficient, the Petitioner has fa iled to demonstr at e h e was prejudice d by counsel’s alleg ed inac tion.-36- . . . .
Pe t i t i o n e r c l a i m s t r i a l c o u n s e l w a s d e f i c i e n t i n f

a i l i n g to inv e sti g ate on e of

the pr ior

c on vic tio ns wh ic h th e State us e d to prove a n ag g ravating c ircums t ance. Specific ally , Petitioner

c on te nd s tr ia l c ouns e l sh ou ld h a ve fi le d a mot ion to i nv a lid a te his 1990 g uilty

plea. . . . Petitioner ha s failed t o p re s ent evidenc e that his 1990 conviction is “constitut ionally invalid,” or that trial counsel should have been a war e t hat the convic tion was constitutionally

infirm.

. . . [E] ven if one of the prior violent felony

convictions was excluded, the State .

. . co uld have r elied on other prior convic tions to prove the e x istence of

this particular a g g ravating c ircumstance

.

. . . .
Pe tit ion e r c on te nd s tr ia l c ouns e l sh ou ld have ob je c ted to the prosec utor’s comments re g ardingthe impact of th e cr i m e on the victim’s family

and the possibility

t h at Petitioner might be

e lig ibl e fo r p aro le . Pe tit ion e r also c on te nd s tr ia l c ouns e l sh ou ld have obje cted to th e S t at e’s r efe renc ing a watch the y

claimed wa s stolen from the victim’s re sidence and found in Petitioner’s possession.
Reg ardingt h e S t ate’ s ref ere ncingthe loss to the victim’s f ami ly an d Pe ti ti o n e r ’ s e li g ib il it y f o r p ar o le , th is Co u rt f

in d s that these matter s were fully

and fa irly

litigated o n d irec t appea l. . . . Th e re fo re , it

is i mp roper

fo r P e tit ion e r t o n owa tte mpt to r e -l iti g a te these issues throug h the g uise of an ine ffe ctiv e as s i stance of counsel c laim.

Pe tit ion e r a lso c on te nd s c ouns el shou ld h a ve ob je c te d to the State ’s re fe re nc e s, duri ng c los ingargume nt, to a Mic ke y Mo us e watch the y

argued wa s stolen from the victim duri ng the murder

. Pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t be c a us e the watc h w a s n ot i ntr od uc e d into evidenc e, the State wa s prec luded fr om discussing it in closing arguments. . . . [A] t trial, J ackie Cannon specif ically testified that sh e fo un d th e wat c h amon g the Pe tit ion e r’ s b e lon g ing s and he tol d her it belong ed to the woman he had ki l l ed. . . . Sidney Har ris had identified the watch as one belong ing to his wife , an d s tated the

watc h w a s mi ss in g fr om thei r h ome a ft e r t he mur de r.

. . . T hu s,-37- this Court finds t he State’s a rgument was proper and trial counsel was not ineff

ective in f ailing to objec t.

. . . .
Pe tit ion e r c la ims tr ia l c ounsel wa s in e ff e c tiv e du e to h is f a i l u r e t o o b

j e c tt o t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s i n s t r u c t i o n [ s ] t o t h e j u r

y. Petitioner contends the instructio n s: (1) improper ly shifted the burden to the Petitioner to show the e x istence of mitigating circ umstances; (2) did not adequat ely define mitigation; (3) did not ad eq u ately

explain how the jury

was to consider

and wei gh mitigating evidenc e; (4) improperly limit ed the jury ’s consider ation of mit ig atin g fac tor s; ( 5) dim ini sh e d th e jur y ’s re sp on sib ili ty

in imposing the d ea t h p enalty ; (6) fa iled to narrow the class of persons e ligible f

or the deat h penalty ; (7) included a g g ravating circ ums t an ce s which improper ly duplicated a

n element of

the char g ed offense; a

nd (8) imprope rly

allowed the jur

y to consider the same se t of

fa c ts i n d e te rm ini ngthe a pp lic a bil ity of bo th

a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums tanc e s.

Petitio n er h as failed to demonstrate that the tr ial court rende red a

char g e outside the confines of the l aw a s it ex isted at the tim e of se nte nc ing . T hu s, tr ia l c ouns e l w a s n ot i ne ff e c tiv e in failing to object to the jury char g e at the se ntencingphase of the tr ia l, n or wa s th e de fe ns e te a m in e ff e c tiv e in fai li ngto r e qu e st additional or ame nded instructions.

. . . . Finally , the Appellate Courts have routinely re j ecte d the ty pes of c laims asserted by

Petitioner in this porti on of his petition.

. . . .
P eti ti on e r c la ims tr ia l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e in f

a ili ngto object to the trial judg e’s “bolstering ” of the prosec utor’s qualifications in t he pre sence of the jury . I t appears

. . . that the trial judg e brie fly

commented on the educ ational bac kg round of the prosec utor. No obj ection wa s raised. H oweve r, this Court finds trial co u n s e l w a s n o t i n e f f e c ti v e in f a il in g to o b

je c t t o th e tr ial judge’s c omm e nts . M or e ov e r .

. . Pe tit ion e r h a s f a ile d to demonstrate he was pre

judiced by

the c o m ments in that the jury decision would have been dif fer ent but for the c omments.-38- . . . . Petitioner alleg es trial counsel should have moved to strike the death penalty

as a se ntencingoption b eca use it violates treaties by the United States and e stablished international law

.
Petitioner cites no ca s e that has a pplied international lawas a bar to the implementation of the death penalty in the United S t a t e s an d

t h i s c o u rti s a w a r e o f

n o s u c hr

u l i n g

. T o t h e c o n t r ar

y, the Six th Circuit Court of Appeals, in B uell v. Mitch el l , 2 7 4 F.3d 33 7 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 1) , r e

je c te d s imi lar chall enges to the Oh io d e a th penalty statute. . . . Moreover, the a uthority supporting the proposition that no i nternational law or tre aty prohibits a state fr om imposing the de ath pena lty is well-settled. Ther efor e, this Court finds trial counsel wa s not deficient i n failing to challeng e the death pe nalty

based upon inter

national law.

. . . .
Peti ti o n e r c o n te n d s tr ia l c o u n s e l w a s in e f f e c ti v e in f a iling to raise the issue of

Petitione r’ s mental re tardation during the

se nte nc ingph a se of his tr ia l. I n c on jun c tio n w iththi s a

rgume nt, Peti tione r a lso c on te nd s h e is m e nta l[ly ] re tard e d a nd wa s me nta lly reta rded at the time of the offe nse, and, thus, c annot be ex ecuted under Te nnessee ’s death penalty statute.

. . . . This court notes that the statute precludingthe execution of

me nta lly re tard e d [de fe nd ants ] wa s e nact ed in 19 90 , p ri or

to Petitioner’s trial and a

ppeal. How ever , the Van T ran de cision holding that ex ecutions of suc h individuals viol ates the U nited States and Tenne ssee c onstitu t i o ns was not dec ided until 2001, fo ur y e ars a ft e r the c on c lus ion of pe tit ion e r’ s dir e c t a pp e a l. Th us , Pe tit ion e r’ s c la im that he is m e nt a lly re tard e d h a s n ot p re vio us ly been litig ated e ither at the tria l court level n o r addressed upon d i r e c t ap p e a l

. . . . [ D ] e s p i t e h i s ar g u m e n t s t o t h e c o n t r ar y, Petitioner is not ent i t l ed t o a jury trial on the issue of menta l reta rdation and t h e State does not bea r the burde n of demonstrating Petitioner is not mentally reta rded.

. . . .-39- This court finds t hat Petitioner does not meet the de finition of mental re tardation under Te n n

. C o d e Ann. § 39- 13-203. . . . Petitioner’s g ener al intellectual f unctioning ha s been evaluated on

s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s t h r o u g h o u th i s a d o l e s c e n c e an d a d u l t h o o d

. In 1984, Petitioner was found to have an I .Q. of 70; in 1990 Petit ioner was found to hav e an I

. Q. of 75; and in 1993 Petitioner was f ound to h ave an I .Q . o f 7 3. I n a dd ition , D r. Au ble fo un d Pe tit ion e r t o have a n I .Q. of 73 a

nd Dr. Nic hols reporte d that he believe d petitioner’s I .Q. was likely highe r than the a ssessed scor e of 73. Thus, the only

score ref

lectinga sub ave rag e g ener al intellectual fu nc tio nin g wa s th e 19 84 e va luatio n c on du c te d b y the Me mph is City School sy stem. Howeve r, the school [sy stem’s] diagnosis was unspecifie d mental disorder and conduc t disorder, not mental

re ta rd a t i o n

. T h u s , i tw o u l d a p p e ar th a ta l t h o u g ht h e M e m

p h i s City School sy stem found Petitioner to have a n I .Q. of 7 0 , t hey

did not find that he suff

ere d from def

icits in adaptive beha

vior as spec ified by the sec ond part of the statutory definition.

. . . . . . . [T] his Court finds the more re liable evidenc e re g arding Pe tit ion e r’ s in te lle c tua l funct ion ingto b e the 19 90 and 19 93 te sts , as we ll as the initial evaluation conduc ted by Dr. [Auble]. Both the 1990 and 1993 tests indicated Petitioner ha d a full ra n ge I .Q. of 73

or h ighe r. In addition, Dr. Auble’ s initi al re port stated that petitioner had a

n I .Q. of 73, a

nd Dr. Nic hols’ repor

t stated that he believed the petitioner’s I .Q. was e ven hig her. . . . Thus, g i v en the combined testimony

of all the e x perts, thi s C ourt finds that Petitioner has failed to me et the first prong of the s tatutory definition.

. . . Moreove r, this Co urt reje cts Dr. Auble ’s explanation with reg ard to he r re -scor ing of Dr. Pende rgr as s ’ data. This cour t simply finds that her e x planation for the re- scoringof the data and her inter pretation of the statute is not credible.

Th e re fo re , th is C ourt

fi nd s Pe ti tio ne r h a s f a ile d to demonstrate that he has sig nificant subave rag e g ener al intellectual fu nc tio nin g a s e vid e nc e d b y an I .Q . o f 7 0 or bel ow . T hu s, it i s arg ue d th e Pe ti ti o n e r

c an n o t m e e t t

h e s ta n d ar d s e t f o rth b y T enn. Code Ann. 39-13- 203 as ame nded.-40- . . . [T ]h i s C o u rtf

i n d s t h a tP e t i t i o n e r

h a s f a i l e d to demonstrate that counsel wa s ineffe ctive in fa iling to ra ise the issue of me nta l r e tard a tio n e ith e r p ri or to t ri a l or on a pp e a l.
Counsel stated that they

bel i ev ed Petitioner wa s competent and oper ating wi t h an I .Q. above the level of individuals who are deeme d mentally

reta rded. Mor eover , even if counsel should have

ra ise d th is i ssu e

. . ., in lig ht of the Court ’s fi nd ingthat Pe tit ion e r i s not mentally

reta rded, Petitioner [has] failed to d em o n s t rate he wa s prejudice d by

trial counsel’ s inaction.

This c ourt finds that the alleg ations in se ctions “I I I ” and “I V” of the amende d petition

. . . are without merit. These issues have be en p reviously

addre ssed and r ejec ted by the Tenne ssee Appellate Courts a

nd/or are i nappropr iate cla ims for purposes of post-conviction revie w. Part “I I ” of the petition a ddresse s al leg ed

er ro r by counsel on dire ct appe al. Howe ver, those issues ha ve either , b e e n a d dr e s s e d an d r e je c te d b y th is Co u rt’ s r e v ie w of counsel’s trial perf

ormanc e; or Petitioner failed to pr esent p ro of be y on d th e me re a sse rt ion of e rr or in s up po rt

of his a lle g a tio ns

. (F ootnotes and citations omitted.)

II. Ana lys is

A. Standard of

Review

Post-convict i o n relief

is only war rante d when a

petitioner establishes that his or he r conviction is void or voidable bec ause of an ab ri d g ement of a constitutional right. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. The petition challeng ing the petitioner’s c onvictions is gover ned by the 1995 Post-Convi ction Act, which require s that alleg ations be prove n by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 110(f) . Evidence is clear and convinc i n g wh en t h er e is no serious or substantial doubt about the ac cura cy of the c oncl u s i o n s d ra wn from the evidence . Hicks v. State, 983 S.W .2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.
Once the post-co n v i ct i o n court has ruled upon a pe tition, i ts findings of f act a re
con c lu s iv e o na

p p e a l u n le s s th e e v id e n c e in

th e r e c o r d

p r e p o n d e r a te s a g a in s t t

h e m. Wa ll a c e v. State, 121 S.W .3d 652, 656 (Tenn. 2003) ; State v. Nichols, 90 S.W .3d 576, 586 (Tenn. 2002) (citing State v. Bur

ns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1 9 9 9 ))

. T h i s court may not rewe igh or

ree va luate th e evid e nc e or su bs tit ute its inf

e re nc e fo r t

ho se dr awn

by the po st- c on vic tio n c ourt

. Ni c ho ls, 90 S.W. 3d

a t 58 6. Qu e st io ns con cernin g the c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s and

the we ig ht t o be g iven their testimony are for r esolution by

the post-conviction cour t. I d. (citing He n l ey

v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 5 79 (Tenn. 1997) , petition to rehea r denie d, (1998), c ert. de nied, 525-41-

U.S. 830, 119 S. C t. 82 (1998)). It is, therefor e, the pe titioner’s burden to show that the evidenc e preponde rate d ag ainst those finding s. Clenny v. State, 576 S.W .2d 12, 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
Notwithstanding, de terminations of whe ther c ounsel provided a d efendant constitutionally

defic ient assistance prese nt m i x ed questions of lawand fa ct. Wallace, 121 S.W .3d at 656; Nichols, 90 S.W .3d at 586. As such, the f indings of f

act a re r eviewed under

a de novo stan d ar d , accompanied with a pr esumption that those findings a re c orre ct unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise . See F ields v

. S t at e, 4 0 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001). I n clar ifying the standard, our supreme c ourt explained that the standar d for r eviewingthe fac tual finding s of a tria l court has a lway s been in a ccor dance with the require ment s of the Tenne ssee Rules of A

ppellate Proc edure , specific ally Rule 13(d). I d. at 456.

Th e pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t th is c ourt shou ld n ot p ro vid e a pr e sumpt ion

of c or re c tne ss t o the post-conviction cour

t’s finding s of fa ct re lating to the credibility of Eugene Bow en and James Parker . He a

rgues that the post-c onviction court’s findings ar e conc lusory in nature a

nd are not supported by

the evidenc e. He further complains that the lower court fa iled to ar t i culate a ny valid rea son why

the testimony

of those two witnesses w as not cre dible.
Appellate c ourts in Tennesse e do not re weig h or re ev al u at e the evidenc e. We ca nnot substitut e our infe renc es for those drawn by

the trial judg e. More o v er , questions conce rning the

cre dibilit y

of the witnesse s, the weig ht and value to be g iven their t es t i m o n y , and the f actua l issues raised by

the evidenc e ar e to be r esolved by the trial judg e, not this court. Henle y , 960 S.W. 2d a t 57 9. We w ill no t make c re dib ili ty de te rm inatio ns

.
B . Pe tit ion e r’ s Cl a ims

1. Actual Innocenc e

Th e pe tit ion e r c la ims that he is a c tua lly inn oc e nt o f L in da Harris’ mur de r a nd a sk s th is court to c o n s id e r

h is a c tu a l i n n o c e n c e a s a f r e e s ta n d in g c la im

. H e ar g u e s th a t t h e T e n n e s s ee C o n s t i tu t i o ng r an t s s t r o n g e r p r o t e c t i o no f

i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s t h and o e s t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i tu t i o n

. In thi s r e sp e c t, h e a sse rt s th a t “ Te nn ess ee ca se law g ive s c ourt s th e po we r t o f a sh ion a re me dy to
corr ect a nin ju s ti c e , in c lu d in g th e e xe c u ti o no f aninn o c e n t m an

. ” I nth is r e g ar d , th e p e ti tioner asks this court to hold that “executing an innoce nt person wou l d v i o l ate the Tennesse e Constit ution.” Acc ording to his appellate brie f, “A ctual innoce nce a lone re quires re lief fr om This Court.” The pe titioner states that “[he] has a con s t i t utional rig ht not to be executed for a crime he did not commit, and the Post-Conviction P roce dure A ct g uara ntees re lief whe n ‘a conviction is void or voidable bec ause o f an abridg ement of a ny rig ht gua

rante ed by

the Constit ution of T en n es s ee or the Constituti on of the United States.” Additionally , the petitioner asks this court to adopt the standa rd that newevidenc e nee d on l y furnish a r easona ble basis for concludingthat the re sult of proce eding s “mig ht have” been dif fer ent.-42-

Review of the petitioner’s c laim is guided by our supre me cour

t ’s re cent r

uling in James A. Delling er v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___ , No. E2005-01485-CCA-R3-PD, 2008 Tenn. L EXI S 111 (Knoxvil le, Fe b. 25, 2008). In that case , our supre me cour t gr anted the a

pplication for permission to a p p eal to dete rmine whe ther a fre estandingclaim of a ctual innoce nce w as cog nizable in an initial petiti on for po s t -c o n viction relief unde r the Te nnessee Post-Convi ction Procedur e Ac t. Dellinge r asse rted that he had a r ight unde r the state a nd fede ral c o n stitut ions not to be imprisoned and e x ecute d for a crime he did not commit. The supreme court held t hat as the Ac t it se lf prov ide d a

n ave nu e fo r r e lie f whe n n e w s c ie nti fi c e vid e nc e of a c tua l inno c e nc e be c a me available afte r the limit ations period for filing a post-conviction petition ha d ex p i re d , j u d icial economy and log ic d i ct at ed t h at such e vidence should be permitted at the time the or igina l petition was filed. James A. Delling er, N o. E2005-01485-CCA-R3-PD, 2008 Tenn. L EXI S 111, at *___. Althoug h rec og nizi ng the exist ence of a c laim of ac tual innocenc e b as ed upon new
sc ie n ti f ic e v id e n c e , th e s u

p r e me c o u rt a f

f ir me d th e d e n ia l o f

r e li e f b y c o n c lu d in g th a t D e lling er failed to mee t his burden of proof to support his claim. I d. at *___.

The Te nnessee Supreme Court dec lined the o p p o rt unity to addre ss the broade r question as to whethe r a pe titioner had a c onstitut ional ri gh t n o t t o be executed f or a c rime he did not

c omm it. I d. a t *_

__ . T he c ourt

a c kn ow le dg e d t hat th e Uni ted St a te s Su pr e me Court

ha d y e t to decide the issue of whe ther the e x ecution of a n innocent per son violated the fe dera l con s t i t ution. I d. at *___ n.4 (citing House v. Be ll, 547 U.S. 518, 554-55, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006 ))

. M oreove r, reg ardingclaims of ac tual innocenc e not base d o n s ci en t ific evide nce, our supreme c ourt
rec og nized that such claims m ay b e b ro u g ht in a petition for writ of e rror cora m nobis and in an applicatio nf

o r e xe c u ti v e c le me n c y

. I d

. a t *

_ _ _ n

. 7

. A c c o r d in g ly , o u r

s u p r e me c o u rt c o n c luded that a cla im of actua l innocence not based on scie ntific evidenc e may not be ra ised in a petition for post-c onviction relief.

I n support of his claim of act u al i n nocenc e, the pe titioner contends that no phy sical

e vid e nc e links hi m to Harri s’ mur de r. He a lle g e s th a t he pr e se nte d s ub sta nti a l e vid e nc e of

his innocenc e at the post-c onviction hear in g , including the testimony of alibi witness Eug ene B owen and the testimony

of James Parker, w ho overhe ard Sidney Har ris as k a drugdeale r to arr ang e the murder of his wife. The petition er ’s claim is not based upon ne w scientific e vidence establishing his actual innoce nce. A p o st-conviction proc eedingis not the proper a venue in whic h to seek relief based upon non- scientific e vidence establishing a ctual innoce nce. Notwithstanding, e ven assumi ng that a cla im based on newnon-scientific evidenc e establishing a ctual innoce nce is to be r ecognized in a post-conviction proce eding , the peti t i o ner is not entitl ed to re lief. To esta blish his “actual innoce nce,” a petitioner must establish by clea r and convinc ing e vidence that no jury would have con v icted him in light of the ne w evidenc e.” See Ex parte Eliz o n d o , 947 S.W .2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (superc eded on othe r g rounds by

statute); see also Miller v. Comm’r o f Corr., 700 A.2d. 1108, 1132 ( Conn. 1997) (holding that “in orde r to g rant a pet i t ioner’s r equest for

relief , the habe as cour

t first must be convince d by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that the pe tit i o n er i s ac t ually innocent); State e x rel Amrine v. Roper , 102 S.W .3d 541, 548 (Mo. 2003) (e n b anc) (holding that a petitioner a sserting-43-

a fr eesta nding c laim of ac tual innocenc e is requir ed “to make a cle ar a nd convincingshowing of actua l innocence that undermines c o n fi dence in the corr ectne ss of the judg ment”); Montoy a v. Ul iba r r i , 1 6 3 P

. 3 d 4 7 6 , 4 8 3

- 8 6 ( N

. M

. 2 0 0 7 ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t p e t i t i o n e r a s s e rt i n g f r e e s t an d i n g c la im of innoce nce must convinc e the c ourt by clea r and co n v i n ci n g evidenc e that no re asonable juror would have c onvicted him in l i gh t o f t he new evidenc e). Consideringthe “ne w” e vidence introduced at the post-con v i ct i on evidentiar y hear ing, w e ca

nnot conclude that the petitioner established by

clea r and c onv i n ci n g ev i dence that no jury would have c onvicted him in light of the new e vidence . Thus, even if a fr eesta nding c laim of ac tual innocenc e wa s co gnizable in a pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r eli ef, we c ann ot c on c lud e that th e pe tit ion e r w ou ld b e e nti tle d to relief on this ground.

2. Denied a Fa ir Post-Conviction Evi dentiary Hea ring
The pe titioner contends t h at h e was denied a fa ir post-conviction evide ntiary hear ing beca use the post-c onviction court deni ed h is petition wit hout having the transc ribed testimony of Dar le n e D o n a ld , L in d a H ar r is ’ s is te r

. T h e St a te r e s p o n d s th a t th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s c la im is without

me r it b e c a u s e d u e p r o c e s s r e qu ir e s “ th e o p p o rtu n it y to b e h e ar d

‘ a t a me an in g f

u l time and in a

me an in g f u l m an n e r

. ’ ” M a tt

h e w s v

. E ld

r id g e , 4 24 U.S. 319, 333 , 9 6 S. Ct

. 8 9 3 , 9 9 2 ( 1 9 7 6 )

. We conclude that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.

On No ve mbe r 2 0, 20 06 , d e fe ns e c ouns e l r e c e iv ed a c op y of the tr ans c ri pt o f t

he po stconviction proc eeding s. Upon revie w of the tra nscript, counse l discovere d th at Donald’s testimony had not bee n trans cr i b ed. The testimony was late r dete rmined to be “ truly missing from t h e au d i o tape of

the proc eeding s.” Ultimately , a nar rative of Donald’s testimony

was submitt ed pursua

nt to Rul e 24(c ), Tenne ssee Rules of A ppellate Proc edure . The pe titioner argues that the fa ct that the post-conviction cour t rende red its dec ision knowing a n important piece of testimony

wa s m i s s i n g v i o l ates his rig ht to a full and fa ir hea ring . The pe titioner further

c ite s to the po st- c onvi ction c ourt ’s fa ilure to me nti on Do na ld o r o the r f

a mil y me mbe rs re late d to L inda Har

ris in its order dismissing the petition.
We conclude that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. The post-conviction cour t hear d Donald’s testimony

on November

14, 2001. No due pr ocess r ight ex ists requiring that the trier of fac t later rea d that testimony from a transcr ipt. We a re not pe rsuade d that the po s t -c o n v iction court fa iled to consider the pr oof bef ore r ender ing its dec ision.

3. Mental Retar dation

The petitioner contends that “under any standard of proof, [he] is me ntally reta rded under the pr ov isi on s o f Ten n. Co de Ann. § 3 9- 13 -2 03 .” I n s up po rt of his argume nt, he no te s th a t in 19 83 to 1 98 4, his ful l scal e I .Q. was 70 and tha t hi s sc ho ol r e c or ds and

a dd iti on a l te sts pr ior

to t h e a ge o f e i gh t ee nre fl ec t eds i g n i f i c a n t l y s u b av er age gen er al i n t el l ec tu al fu n ct i o n i n g. Ad dit ion a l l y , h e n o t e s t h a t h i s e xp e rt s an d t h e S t a t e ’ s e xp e rt , D r

. N i c h o l s , a g r e e d t h a t h e m e ta ll three prong s of the Te nnessee statute exemp t i n g t h e mentally reta rded f rom execution. The-44-

petitioner complains t h at the post-conviction cour t ignor ed the e x pert witnesse s’ unanimous op i n i o n s an d t h e w e i g h t o f t h e d o c u m e n t ar y e v i d e n c e an d i n s t e a d r e l i e d u p o n i t s o w n ip se dixit , L atin for “ he himself said i t

. ” I n other wor ds, something that is asse rted but unprove d. See Am e ri c an H e ri tage Dicti on ary 4th e d. (2 00 0) . T he pe tit ion e r m a ke s nume ro us c omp la int s reg ardingthe cour

t’s finding s of fa ct a n d co n cl u s i o n s of law. He also proper ly points out t hat this court’s re view involves an a pplication of the lawto the fac ts and is de novo. In t h i s reg ard, the pe tit ion e r a sse rt s th a t ( 1) the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s w a s n ot a n is su e in t

he se proceed i ng s; (2) the post-c onviction court wa s not choosing be tween two pe rmissible views of the evidenc e bec ause the State failed to pre sent any witnesses or e vidence to the contra ry ; and (3) the j u d ge at t h e ev identiary hear ing w as not the judg e who pr esided ove r the orig inal trial or the ori ginal po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g and , th e re fo re , w a s n ot i n a be tte r p os iti on

tha n th is c ourt

to revie w the tra

nscripts of the pr ior proce eding s. The pe titioner also asser ts that the post-conviction

c ourt imp ro pe rl y

a tte mpt e d to e xer c ise c lin ic a l ju dg me nt i n f ind ingtha

t he did no t ha ve de fi c its in a da pti ve be havio r and

that hi s su

bave ra g e int e lle c tua l f

un c tio nin g did

no t ma nif e st d ur inghis developmenta l period.

I n 1990, Tenne ssee Code An n o t ated section 39-13-203 wa s enac ted prohibiting the execution of mentally

reta rded individuals. See Te nn. Code An n

. § 39-13-203( b); Howe ll v. State, 151 S.W .3d 450, 456 (T enn. 2004); Va n Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001)

. Whil e our supr eme c ourt deter mined that this l eg islation was not to be applied re troac tively , the court he ld that the execution of mentally reta rd ed p er sons violated constitutional prohibiti ons ag ainst crue l and unusual punishment. I d. (citing Van Tr an, 66 S.W.3 d at 798-99); c f. Atkins v. Vi r g i n i a , 5 3 6 U

. S

. 3 0 4 , 3 2 1 , 1 2 2 S

. C t

. 2 2 4 2 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ( e xe c u t i o no f m e n t a l l y r e t ar d e d i n d i v i du a ls violates the United States Constituti on).

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-203(a ) provides the following definition of “mental r etar dation”:

(1) Sig nificantly

sub-ave rag e g ener al intellectual f unctioning a s
e vid e nc e d b y

a fu nc tio na l in te lli g e nc e qu oti e nt ( I .Q.) of se ve nty (70) or below;
(2) De ficits in adaptive be havior; and
(3) The mental retardation must have be en manife sted duringthe developmenta l period or by eig hteen ( 18) y ear s of ag e.

The de marc ation of an I .Q. score of 70 is a brig ht-lin e cu t o ff and mus t be met. Howe ll, 151 S.W .3d at 456, 458-59. The statute should not be interpre ted to make a llowance for a ny standard

err or of mea surement or

other c ircumstance s where by a per son with an I .Q. above 70 could be

c on sid e re d me nta lly

re tard e d. I d. We n ote that a ll thr e e pr ongs mu st be satis fi e d to e sta bli sh mental re tardation.-45-

In p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o np r o c e e d i n g s , a p e t i t i o n e r

m u s te s t a

b l i s hm e n t a l r e t ar d a t i o nb y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Howe ll, 151 S.W

. 3d at 465. A pre pondera nce of the evidenc e
me ans e vid ence whi ch is of g re a te r w e ig ht, or

is m or e c on vin c ing , th an th a t e vid e nc e of fe re d in op po sit ion . 3 2AC.J.S. Ev ide nc e 13 12 (2 00 5) . “[ T] he ter m do e s n ot m e an p re po nd e ra nc e in

a mou nt, b ut im plie s an o ve rb a lanc ingin w e ig ht, and that it me ans , in

the la st a

na ly sis , pr ob a bil ity of the tr uth .” I d. (i nte rn a l f

oo tno te omitte d) . Su sp ic ion s a re ins uf fi c ie nt t o amou

nt t o proof by a p re p o n dera

nce of the evidenc e. I d. The satisfa ction of this preponde ranc e standa rd require s the finder

of fa ct to evaluate the evide nce, d et ermine what evidenc e is reliable , and deter mine what evide nce is probative to demonstrate the tr uth of the asse rted proposition with the requisite deg ree of ce rtainty . I d . I n other wor ds, a pre pondera nce is such pr oof as lea ds the trier of fa ct to find that it is more probable tha n not, o r m o re l i k el y

than not, that a conte sted fac t
e x i s t s

. Id

. A p r e p o n d e r a n c e i s a t t a i n e d w h e r e t h e e v i d e n c e i ni t s qu a l i t y o f c r e d i b i l i t y d e s t r o ys and over balanc es the e quilibrium. I d. M o re o v er , i t is not required that the trier of fac t must be

e nti re ly or tho ro ug hly

satis fi e d o r c on vin c e d, or satis fied w ithc le arn e ss a nd c e rt a int y , o r t hat a fac t in issue shall be proved to full satisfac t i o n o r t o the re asonable satisfac tion of the trier of fac t. I d. “The probabilities must be such that the conc lusion i s ac ce ptable to the judg ment of the court or ju

r y a p p li e d to th e e v id e n c e in th e p arti c u la r c a s e ; me r e p r o o f o f p o s s ib il it y , or possibili ties, or eve n a pre pondera nce o f p ossibili ties or a major ity of cha nces, or a choic e of probabilities, or amongdiffer ent possibilit ies, never can suffice alone to esta blish a proposition of fa ct.” He ck Va

n Tran v. State, N o. W2005-01334- C C A- R3-PD, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 899, at 60-61, at (Jackson, Nov. 9, 2006), pe rm. to appea l denied, (Te nn. 2007). The que s t i on of whe ther a defe ndant is mentally

reta rded a nd, thus, ineligible for

the death pe nalty

is a mix ed question of law and fa ct. I d. at *57. Thus, this court must review the post-conviction cour

t’s finding s of fact de novo, with a pr esumption of corr ectne ss that is to be

overc ome only

when the pr eponder ance of the e vi d en ce i s contra ry to the court’s f

indings. I d.;

see a lso Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 456

. I n re v i ew i n g the application of the law to the fa cts, howeve r, this c ourt conducts a purely de novo revie w. Field, 40 S.W .3d at 457. Thus, no presumption of

corr ectne ss attache s to the post-conviction court’ s conclusions of law. I d. The post-c onviction court de termined that the pe titioner did not meet the definition of mentally reta rded under section 39-13-203, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated. The post-conviction court found that the petitioner’s g ener al i n t el l ec t u al functioning had be en eva luated on seve ral

occa sions th ro u gh o u t his adolesce nce a nd adulthood. Specifica lly , the lower court noted that the petitioner wa s determined to have an I

. Q. o f 7 0 i n 1984, an I .Q. of 75 in 1990, and a n I .Q. of 73 in 1993. The cour

t also noted that the only score ref

lectinga subave ra g e g ener al intellectual functioning was the 1984 e valuation conduc ted by the Memphis City

School sy stem an d t h at t he school sy stem’s diag nosis was an unspec ified m en t al d i s order and conduc t disorder, not mental reta rdatio n

. T h u s , the cour

t concluded that although the Memphis Cit y School sy stem found the petitioner to have an I .Q. of 70, the sc h o o l s y s t em appar ently did not find that he suffe red f rom defic its in adaptive behavior as spec ified by the sec ond part of the statutory definition.

The lowe r cour

t further deter mined that the 1990 and 1993 tests, which i n d i ca t ed the petitioner had a

full rang e I .Q. of 73 or hig her, w ere more re liable. Acc ording ly , the lower courtSp eci f i cal l y , t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n co urt ’ s o rder st at es i n a f o o t no t e as f

o l l o ws: “ T hi s co urt ackno wl ed ges t he 3
t est i m o ny present ed regardi ng pe t i t i o ner' s p o t ent i al de f i ci t s i n ad ap t i ve b ehavi o r and chi l d ho o d i njuri es t o t he b rai n; howev er , s i nce t hi s cour t f i nds pet i t i oner ha s f

ai l ed t o m eet t he f

i r s t prong of

t he s t at ut e, i n t hat he does not ha ve an I.Q . o f sev e n ty o r b e lo w , t h is c o u rt n e e d no t ad d re ss th e se c o n d a n d third p ro n g o f t h e sta tute .”

-46- conclude d that the petitioner fa iled to satisfy the first prongof the statutory def i n i t i o n o f mental reta rdation in that he did not hav e an I Q o f 70 or be low. The c ourt stated that bec ause the petitioner fa iled to establish t h e fi rst prongof the statute, the c ourt did not need to addr ess the second a nd third prong s of the statute. I n our consider ation of th e p o s t -c o n v iction court’s 3 conclusion that the petitioner failed to e stablish he had subaver ag e g ener al i n t el l ec tual functioning as evide nced by a func tional I .Q. of 70 or be low, we wi l l reviewthe proof pr esente d b y t h e p et i t i o n er

att h e e v i d en t i ary

h ea ri n g.

Dr

. Pi n c u s o b s e r

v e d th a t th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s b r a in w a s a b n o r ma l in th a t “ it w a s shrunken, atrophic, e specia lly

in the parie tal reg ions.” Dr. Pincus could not say with cer tain t y as to what eff ect this would have on a per s o n’s neur ologic al func tioning. In a summary of his finding s, Dr. Pincus noted that the petitioner had e vidence of neur ologic dy sfunction and ha d the re ading level of a f ifth g rade r. Dr. Pincus stated, how ever , that the fa cts of the pe ti t i o n er ’s crime involved planning and ther e wa s no indication the petitioner’s a cti ons on the nig ht of the homicide we re the re sult of a delusional ac t.

Dr. Auble testified that the petitioner’ s school rec ords demonstrate d he was func tioning one to two levels be low his gr ad e l ev el

. I n 1983, the petitioner wa s found to have a n I .Q. of 82. She repor ted that in 1984 to 1985, the petitioner wa s tested by the Memp h i s City

Schools and was found t o h ave an I .Q. of 70. Results of anothe r test in 1985 ref lected the petitioner’s I .Q.

wa s 7 0. On c ros s-e xami natio n, Dr . Aub le c on c e de d th a t sh e dia g no se d th e pe tit ion e r w ith border line intellectual func tioning and that his I

. Q. ra ng e wa s betwee n 71 and 84. She qualifie d this assessment, stating that “ his functional intelligen ce i s 7 0 or below.” Her assessment wa s based on he r interpr etation of the Te nnessee statute.

Dr. B ishop interviewed the petitioner in 2000 and c oncluded that his ad apti ve beha vior met the cr iterion for be ing me ntally reta rded. D r. B i s h o p stated that the pe titioner was g iven the Vineland Ada

ptive Be havior Sca les in 1987 and that a V inelan d t es t s co re e quated to an I .Q.

score with a standar d deviation of 15. Two sta ndard de viations below the norm of 1 0 0 was the standard for mental reta

rdation. Dr. B ishop related that the petitioner scor ed a 70 on the test, two standard de viations below the n o rm

. She further stated that the pe titioner score d an I .Q. of 70 on the Wec hs ler I nt e lli g e nc e Sc a le fo r C hil dr e n- Re vis e d. Dr . B ish op re late d th a t D r. Pe nd e rg ra ss had administ er ed t h e W AI S-3 testing, whic h indicated the pe titioner had an I .Q. of 75. She expla in e d th a t th e r a te o f e r r o r w a s a li tt le o v e r f

iv e p o in ts

. I n h e r p r o f

e s s io n a l o p in ion, D r. Bishop concluded that the pe titioner had a “ signific antly subaver ag e g ener al intellectual functioning as evide nced by a func tional intelligenc e quotient of 70 or be low.”-47-

Dr. Nic hols testified that an I .Q. test administered in June 1990 reve aled the pe titioner had a f ull sc al e I .Q. of 73. He stated that in his opinion, the petitioner’s intellectual leve l was actua lly highe r than the I .Q. of 73. Dr . Nichols adde d that t h e p et i t i oner’ s school rec ords indicate d te s ts p e r f

o r me d in N o v e mb e r 1 9 8 4 an d F e b r u ar y 1 9 8 5 s h o w e d a f

u ll s c a le I

. Q . of 70. Howeve r, in 1985, the petit i o n er was diag nosed with “unspec ified mental disorde r, other handica pping c onditions, conduct disorder, soc ialized nonag g ressive.”

I n St a te v. Str od e , 2 32 S.W. 3d 1, 18 (T e nn . 2 00 7) , th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court he ld that the manife statio n o f t he subave rag e g ener al intellectual f unctioning must have been established prior to a g e eig hteen. Subave rag e g ener al intellectu al fu nctioning is ba sed on I ntellige nce Q uotient (“I .Q.”) score s that were obtained throug h the use of sta nd ar d ized int e lli g e nc e te sts . V an T ra n, 66 S.W. 3d

a t 79 5. Th e DSM I V u se d th e fo llo wi ngsc a le s:

I .Q. of 50-55 to a

pproxi mately

70: mild m ental re tardation

I .Q. of 35-40 to 50- 55: moderate mental re tardation

I .Q. of 20-25 to 35- 40: severe mental re tardation [ and]

I .Q. below 20- 25: profound mental r etar dation.

I d. at 795 (c iting the Ame rica n Psy chiatric As sociation, Diag nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorde rs, 39 (4th ed. 1994) ).
Turning to the instant c ase, in 1984, the thirteen-year -old petitioner had a full scale I .Q. of 70 . H o w e v e r , i nJun e 1 9 9 0 , t h r e e an d o n e
- h a l f y e ar s b e f

o r e t h e c r i m e , t h e n i n e t e e n
- y e ar -o ld pe tit ion e r h a d a

fu ll s c a le I .Q . o f 7 3, and in 1 99 9, five y e ars a ft e r t he c ri me , h e ha d a

fu ll s c a le I .Q. of 75. Althoug h, Dr. Auble and Dr . Bishop testified that they believed the petitioner’s I .Q.

was a ctually

70 or below, D r. Auble a cknowledg ed on cr oss-examination that gi v en t h e rate of

e rr or on th e 19 90 I .Q. te st, the pe tit ion e r’ s I .Q . c ou ld h a ve be e n e ve n h ig he r t ha n th e te st indicated. F urthermor e, Dr . Nichols testified for the State that he be lie v ed t h e p eti tioner’s I .Q. was hig her tha

n the 1990 test result of 73. I n light of the evidenc e pre sented, we cannot c onclude t h a t t h e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o nc o u rte r r e d b y f i n d i n g t h a tt h e p e t i t i o n e r f a i l e d t o s h o w b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that he satisfied the first prongof the menta l retar dation definition.
We note, howeve r, that Dr. Auble also t es t ified that all I .Q. tests have a rang e of e rror and, theref

o re , t h at t h e petiti oner’ s I .Q. in 1990 could have been a s low as 67. Additionally , Dr. B ish op te sti fi e d th a t g ive n th e ra te s o f e rr or

a sso c iate d w iththe pe tit io ner’ s I .Q . te sts , h e c ou ld have sc ored 70 or

below on all of the tests and that the five -poin t d i ff er en ce betwee n a 70 and a 75 on an I .Q. test

. Despite this testimony , as an intermediate court, we are boun d b y o ur
su pr e me c ourt ’s c on c lus ion in H ow e ll, ho ldi ngth at th e legi slatur e int e nd e d f or 70 to b e a

br ig htline cutoff that does not take into ac count standar d rate s of er ro r. S ee Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 45 9

. U n f

o rtu n a t e l y , b y r e f

u s i n g t o c o n s i d e r r an g e s o f e r r o r , i t i s o u r v i e w t h a t s o m e me nta lly-48-

re tard e d d e fe nd ants are like ly to b e e xec ute d in

Te nn e sse e , p art ic ula

rl y in a c a se sim ila

r t o th is one whe re the defe ndant’s I .Q. is so close to the brig h-line cutoff of 70.

4. I neff ective A ssistance of Counsel

The Six th Am endment to the United States Constituti on provides, in per tinent part, that “[i] n all criminal prose cutions, the ac cused s h al l enjoy the rig ht . . . to have the Assistanc e of Couns e l f or his de fe nc e .” Th is r ig ht t o c ouns e l is “ so fu nd a ment a l and

e sse nti a l to a

fa ir tr ia l,

and so , to du e pr oc e ss o f l aw, that it is m a de ob lig a tory up on th e State s b y the F ourt e e nth Amendment.” G ideon v. Wainwrig ht, 372 U.S. 335, 350, 83 S

. C t. 792 (1963) (quotingBe tts v. Brady , 31 6 U.S . 455 , 4 65 , 6 2 S. Ct. 12 52 (1 94 2) ). I nh e re nt i n th e ri g ht t o c ouns e l is the ri g ht t o the ef fec tive assi s t an ce o f co unsel. Cuy ler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S. C t. 1708 (1 98 0) ; M c M an n v

. R i c h ar d s o n , 3 9 7 U

. S

. 7 5 9 , 7 7 1 n

. 1 4 , 9 0 S

. C t

. 1 4 4 1 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ; se e a lso Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).

“The benchma

rk for judgingany

claim of ineffec tiveness must be whethe r counse l’s conduct so underm i n ed the prope r func tioning of the adver sarial pr ocess that the tr ial cannot be relied on as h aving produce d a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Co mb s v

. Coy

le , 20 5 F .3 d 26 9, 27 7 (6 th Cir

. 20 00 ). Th e fo llo wi ng tw o- pr on g te st dir e c ts a
c ourt ’s e va luatio n o f a

c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e ne ss:
First, the de fenda

nt must show that counsel’s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt. This requi re s showing that counsel made erro rs s o serious that counse l was

n o t f u n c ti o n in g a s th e “ c o u n s e l” g u a r an te e d the defe ndant by

the Six th Amendment. Second, the defe ndant mus t show that the def icient per formanc e prejudice d the def

ense. Th i s require s showing tha t counsel’s e rror s were so serious as to depr ive the de fe nd ant o f a

fair tr ia l, a

tr ia l w ho se re su lt i s reliable

. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; s ee a lso Combs , 205 F.3d at 277.
The pe rfor

mance prongof the Strickland test re quires that a pe titioner show that

co u n s el ’s re p re s en t at i o nfe l l b el o w a n o b j ec t i v e s t an d ar d

o f r ea s o n ab l en es s , o r “ o u t s i d e t h e r an ge of p r o f e s s i o n a l l y c o mp e t e n ta s s i s t an c e

. ” S t r i c k l an d , 4 6 6 U

. S

. a t6 9 0 , 1 0 4 S

. C t

. a t2 0 6 6 ; s e e a l so Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S

. 3 65, 386, 106 S. Ct . 2574 (1986). “ J udicial scrutiny of perf ormanc e is hig hly

defe rential, a

nd ‘[a] fair assessme n t of attorney perf ormanc e re quires that

ever y eff ort be made to eliminate the distorting e ffe cts of hindsig ht, to reconstruc t the circ umstances of

counsel’s c halleng ed conduc t, and t o evaluate the conduc t from counse l’s perspe ctive at the time.” Combs, 205 F.3d at 278. Upon re vi ew i n g cl aims of ineff ective

a ssi sta nc e of cou ns el, the c ourt “ mus t in du lg e a

str on g pr e sumpt ion

tha t c ouns e l’ s c on du c t f

a lls-49-

wi thi n th e wi de ra

ng e of re a so na ble p ro fe ssi on a l a ssi sta

nc e ; th a t is , th e de fe nd ant m us t ov e rc ome the pre sumption t hat, under the circ umstances, the c halleng ed act i o n s ‘mig ht be consider ed

so un d tr ia l st rat egy .’” Str ic kla nd , 4 66 U. S. at 68 9, 10 4 S. Ct. a t 20 65 . A dd iti on a lly , c ourt s sh ou ld d e fe r t o trial str a te g y or ta c tic a l c ho ic e s if

the y are inf or me d o ne s b a se d u

po n a de qu a te prepa ration. He llard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 19 8 2 ). Fi n al ly , it is acknowledg ed that

c ri min al de fe nd ants are no t e nti tle d to pe rf e c t r e pr e se ntatio n, on ly

c on sti tut ion a lly

a de qu a te
re pr e se nt ation. De nto n v . St a te , 9 45 S.W. 2d 79 3, 79 6 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). I n o the r w or ds , “in consider ing c laims of ineffective assistance of c ounsel, ‘we addre ss not what is prudent or appropr iate, but only

what is constitutionally

compelle d.’” B urg er v. K emp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3126 (1987) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 66 5 , n

. 3 8 (1984)). No tw it hs tand ing , it

is the duty

of thi s Co ur

t to “ se arc h f

or c on sti tut ion a l [de fi c ie nc ie s] w ith painstaking car e” as t h i s re s p o n s i bility is “neve r more e x actingthan it is in a capital ca se.” I d. at 785, 107 S. Ct . at 3121.

I f the petitioner shows that counsel’s repr esentation fell below a r easona ble standar d, then th e p e t i t i o n e r m u s t s a t i s f

y t h e p r e j u d i c e p r o n g o f t h e S t r i c k l an d t e s t b y d e m o n s t r a t i n g “ t h e r e is a

rea sonable proba

bility that, but for counse l’s u n p ro fe s s ional err ors, the re sult of the proce eding

wo uld h a v e b e e n d i f

f e r e n t

. ” S t r i c k l an d , 4 6 6 U

. S

. a t 6 9 4 , 1 0 4 S

. C t

. a t 2 0 6 8

. “ A r e a so nable probability

is a probability

sufficie nt to undermine confide nce in the outcome.” I d. I n evaluating whether a petitioner satisfies the prejudice p ro n g, a court must ask “whethe r counse l’s defic ient perf ormanc e re nders the r esult of the trial un re l i ab l e or the proc eedingfundame ntally unfair.” L ockhar t v. Fr et we l l , 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S. C t. 838 (1993) (c iting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct . at 2064). That is, a petitioner must e stablish that the def iciency of counse l was of such a de g ree that it deprived the pe titioner of a f air trial a nd called into question the reliabilit y of the outcome. Nic hols, 90 S.W .3d at 5 8 7

. Fo r ex ample, the e vidence stemming fr om the failure to pr e pa re a so un d de fe ns e or to pr e se nt wi tne sse s mus t be sig nif ic ant, but it do e s no t n e c e ssa ri ly follow th a t th e tr ia l w o u ld h av e o th e r w is e r e s u lt e d in an a c qu itta l. N e a ly v

. Ca b an a , 764 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (5th Cir. 1985); Code v. Montg omery . 799 F.2d 1481, 1 4 8 3 (1 1 t h Cir. 1986). “A

re a s o n a b le p r o b a b il it y o f b e in g f o u n d g u il ty o f a le s s e r c h ar g e , o r

a s h o rte r s e n te n c e s a ti s f

ie s the second pr ong of Str i ck l an d .” State v. Z immerman, 823 S.W.2d 220, 225 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); see a lso Chambers v. Armontrout, 907 F .2d 82 5 , 8 3 2 (8th Cir. 1990), ce rt. denied, 498 U.S. 950, 111 S. C t. 369 (1990). More over, when cha lleng ing the imposit ion o f a s en t ence of death, the pe titioner m ust show that “there is a rea sonable proba bility that, absent the e rror s of counsel, the se ntence r . . . wo u ld have c oncluded that the ba lance of the a g g ravating a nd mitigating circ umstances did not war rant de ath.” He nley , 960 S

. W

. 2 d at 579-80 (c iting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2069).

a. guilt phase defic iencies

Th e pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t he re c e ive d th e ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ou ns el at the guil t phas e o f h is c a p it a l t r ia l. Sp e c if

ic a ll y , h e c o n te n d s th a t c o u n s e l ( 1 ) f a il e d to lo c a te an d

inte r view critica l witnesses, (2) f

ailed to investig ate a

nd eff ectively cross-e x amine the State’ s witnesses, (3) failed to pre sent a de fense , and (4) failed to re quest a c ontinuance.-50-

1. Tr ia l c ouns e l f

a ile d to inv e sti g a te c ri tic a l w itn e sse s.

The petitioner contends that he rec eived the ineffe ctive assistance of counsel beca us e t rial

co u n s el fa i l ed to locate and intervie w two cr itical witnesses. The two w itnesses wer e Eug ene Bow en, an al i b i wi tness, and James Parker, who implicated other suspe cts. We will address the p e t i t i o n e r ’ s c l a i m s a s t o e a c h w i t n e s s s e p ar a t e l y.
Eug ene B owen lived in the s am e n ei gh b o rhood as Jackie Cannon in 1993 and 1994. H e testified that he use d to sell crac k coca ine to Cannon and that at times, she would “just [scream].” Bow e n a ls o s tate d th a t th e p e ti ti o n e r li v e d w it h Ca nn o n in h e r L a M o y

n e G ar d e n s a

p artment and that he and the petitioner pl ay ed baske tball toge ther on the nig ht of L inda Har ris’ murder . He said that the petitioner ha d his lit tle g irl with him and t h at after they finished “shooting ball,” he and the pe titioner walked to g et a be er. L ate r, h e o bserve d the petitioner a nd “Wham” havingan argument. He explained that “Wham” wa s Cannon. Bow en said the pe titioner’s attorney s never contac ted him.
The post-c onviction court conc luded that couns el was not def icient by failing to locate, interview, a

nd ca l l Eug ene B owen a s an alibi witness bec ause the petitioner fa iled to inform counsel a bout Bowe n. The post-c onviction court fur t her de termined that B owen wa s not
c re dib le . T he pe tit ion e r c onte sts the po st- c on vic tio n c ourt ’s ru lin g , a rguin g , in

pe rt ine nt p art , that tr ia l c ouns e l w a s awa re of B ow e n b ut f

a ile d to inv e sti g a te him

. At the post-conviction hea ring , lead c ounsel was q u est ioned as to whe ther the pe titioner ha d to ld h im a

b o u t a p e r s o n n ame d “ F r o g , ” w h o m th e p e ti ti o n e r w a s w it h o n th e nig ht of the shooting. Counsel re sponded, “A s Ican r eca ll, it doesn’t (indiscernible) in the f ile; and I knew we ha d that in there w ith someone. But I t h i nk that’s the only

name we had I

believe.” Counsel added that no investigation was co n d u ct ed to find t he per son known only to the defe nse as

“ F ro g .” Ho we ve r, c ouns e l a lso sa id t he pet it io ner cou ld n ot r e c a ll a ny pe rs on , o the r t

ha n Jac kie Cannon, who could he lp him with hi s alibi defense . Counsel further s tated that “I just don’t

re c a ll a ny bo dy e lse tha t he sa id t hat he may hav e be e n w ith . It’ s a po ssi bil ity

that he ha d; b ut i f he had, the re w ould have be en an inve stigation done on it.”
The pe titioner also contends t h at trial counse l was ineff ective f or fa iling to locate and interview James Parker . He a dds that counse l co u l d have loc ated Par ker w ith reasona

ble ef fort but failed t o d o s o

. He argues that he w as pre judiced by

counsel’s f

ailure to intervie w Parke r beca use it preve nted him from pre senting other suspec ts to the jury

. At the post-co n v i ct i o n h earing , lead c ounsel stated that prior to tria l, he was in possession of Parke r’s stateme nt, which indicated tha t Parker ha d overhe ard three men discussing the f act that Sid ne y Ha rr is h ir e d th e m to kil l L ind a Ha rr is. Tr ia l c ouns e l a sk e d the i nve sti g a tor to l oc a te Pa r k e r , b u t th e inv e s ti g a to r d id n o t f in d h im

. I n a d d it io n , c o u n s e l w a s c o n c e r n e d th a t in li g ht of Sid ne y Ha rr is’ inj ur ie s, int

ro du c ingPark e r’ s uns up po rt e d a lle g a tio ns int o e vid e nc e mig ht i nf lame-51-

the jur y . Se rg e ant M c Willi ams t e sti fi e d th a t an in ves tig a tio n w a s c on du c te d into S idn e y Ha rr is’ inv o l v em en t in his wife’s murder but that no motive was found. An investig ation into Parker’ s state me nt a lso wa s c on du c te d, and the po lic e did no t un c ov e r any inf or mation t o co rro bo rate Parker ’s statement.

Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt de te rm ine d t hat tr ial co un se l ma de a str a te g ic de c isi on

no t to
c a l l P ar k e r t o t e s t i f y. In a d d i t i o n , t h e c o u r t d i d n o tg i v e g r e a tw e i g h tt o P ar k e r ’ s c r e d i b i l i t y. Specifica lly , the lower

court stated,

Couns e l’ s d e c isi on

to no t c a ll Ja me s Pa

rk e r a s a wi tne ss, during the g uilt phase . . . , is equally attributable to strateg y . Ag ain, thi s Co ur t w ill no t seco nd g ue ss t ri a l c ouns e l’ s st

rate g y un le ss i t falls below the a ccept ab l e standards. . . . [T]his Court does not g ive g re a t w e ig ht t o th e c re dib ili ty of Park e r. Es sen ti ally , c ouns e l w ou ld have be en pit ting the cre dibilit y of Parke r ag ainst that of Har ris, who him se lf , h a d b e e n in

jur e d in the a tta c k.

. . . Sg t. M c Willi a ms testified that he f

o l l o we d up on the information provide d by Parker , but found no link to the m u rd er

. . . . McWill iams further stated that the re wa s n o c re dib le e vidence th a t so me on e e lse wa s invo lve d in the murder

.
We conclude that the petitioner has fa i l ed to demonstrate that c ounsel rende red de ficient pe rf or manc e or that he wa s p re

jud ic e d b y

c ouns e l’ s a c tio ns . T he te sti mony a t th e po stconviction hea

ring reve aled that Par

ker c ould not be located. Fu rt h er more, e ven if Parke r had been foun d , c o u n s e l m a d e th e ta c ti c a l d e c is io nn o t t o p u r s u e Pa r k e r ’ s u n c o r

r o b o r a te d a ll e g a ti o ns
a tt h e g u i l tp h a s e

. F i n a l l y, t h e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o nc o u rtc o n c l u d e d t h a tP ar k e r l a c k e d

c r e d i b i l i t y. There fore , counsel wa s not ineffe ctive f o r fa i ling to investig ate f urther a nd prese nt Parker’ s t e s t i m o n y.

2

. T r i a l c o u n s e l f

a i l e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e an d

c r o s s
- e x a m i n e t h e S t a t e ’ s w i t n e s s e s e f f e c t i v e l y.

Nex t , t h e p et i tioner ar g ues that his defe nse team knew the State wa s g oing to c all two key wi tne sse s, S id ne y

Ha rr is a nd Jac kie Cann on , to te sti fy . H ow e ve r, de fe ns e c ouns e l c omp le te ly f a i l e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e t w o w i t n e s s e s an d f a i l e d t o c r o s s
- e x a m i n e t h e me f f e c t i v e l y.

Re g ar d i n g S i dn e y

H ar r i s , t h e p e t i t i o n e r

c o n t e n d s t h a th i s a t t o r

n e y s f a i l e d t o i n v e s t ig a te S i dn e y a d e qu a t e l y w h e nt h e y h a d i n f o r m a t i o n i mp l i c a t i n g h i mi nh i s w i f e ’ s m u r d e r

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, the petitioner c ites J ames Parke r’s stateme nt. He also c ites to the statem en t Al Ha rr i s, Sidney ’s br oth e r , g a v e t o p o l i c e , s ayi n g h e w a s n o t s u r e S i d n e y w a s t e l l i n g t h e p o l i c e e v e r y t h i n g a b o u this wi fe ’s m u rd er

. T h e p et i t i o n er fu rt h er ci t es t o co u n s el ’s s t at em en t t h at i t wa s co m m o nkn o wl ed ge Sidney eng ag ed in extramarital af fairs.-52-

Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt de te rm ine d a s f

oll ow s:

Pe ti ti o n e r ’ s c la im s c e n te r ar o u n d th e d e f e n s e th e o r

y th a t Sidney Har ris was involved in his wife’ s murder.

. . . Petit i o n er challeng es tr ia l c o u n s e l’ s p e r f

o r ma n c e w it h r e g ar d to h is c r o s s
- e xami n a ti o n of Ha rr is.

. . . . Withre g ard

to t he cross -e xami natio n o f H arr is .

. . , th is Court fi n d s c o u n s e l’ s p e r f o r ma n c e w a s n o t d e f

ic ie n t.

. . . [T ]r ia l

c ou ns e l s p e c i f

i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t h e w a s c o n c e r

n e d t h a ta d e fe ns e which [attacke d] Harris wou l d re sult in backlash from the jur y di re ct l y to the Petitioner. This Court finds such decisions to be

re a so na ble ta c tic a l ma

ne uv e rs ma de by

inf or me d a nd a de qu a te ly prepa red counsel. Additionally , as the Supreme Court noted on direc t appea l, Harr is t estified at tria l that he was injure d in the attack

and wa s h e avil y

se dated when h e fi rs t sp ok e to p oli c e

. . . . Thus , a lth ou g h it a

pp e ars c ouns e l a tte mpt e d to ex pl oi t ce rt a in discrepa ncies, the jury

acc epted Ha

rris’ e x planation. The pe titioner’s claims re g ardingSidney ’s involvement in his wife’s murde r, involvement with illega l drug s, involvement in ex tramar ital affa irs, and finan ci al p ro blems are based on he ars ay state me nts fr om n

ume ro us wi tne sse s. S erge ant M c Willi a ms t e sti fi e d th a t th e Me mph is Police De p ar tment expl ored Sidney ’s possible involvement in the murder but that the investiga tion could not corrobor ate a ny alleg ations. L ead c ounsel stated that Sidney was int e rv ie we d a

nd tha t hi s b ro the r a lso may

have be e n inte rv ie we d. Th e pe tit ion er has fai led to offe r leg itimate evidence to suppor t his claims reg arding Sidney ’s char acte r. The post-c onviction court de termined that in lig ht of Sidney ’s injuries, trial counse l made a sound ta ct i cal decision not to e x p l o re those are as in a hostile cr oss-examination. W e ca nnot disag ree . There fore , the petitioner has f

ailed to establish pre

judice and is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

As to J ackie Cannon, the petitioner c ontends that trial counse l was ineff ective f or fa iling to investigate her . He a sserts that def ense c ounsel knew she was “ possibly on drug s” and that she

rec eived money

in exchang e for

g iving infor

mation to the police. The p etitioner ar g ues that had def en s e co u nsel completed a n adequate investig ation of Cannon, they would have le arne d that she had be en ser iously

addicted to c rack coc aine f or many y ear s and that her

drugabuse ma sked an under ly ing me ntal condit i o n

. The pe titioner asserts that Cannon’ s druguse and bizarr e behavior would have unde rmined the ve rac ity of her statement implicating him as the perpe trator.
At the post-conviction hea ring , lead c ounsel t es t i fied that, in his opinion, Cannon was “p o s s i b l y o ndru gs

. ” H o we v er , h e a l s o wa s aw ar e t h att h e p et i t i o n er h adi n j u re d C an n o n d

u ri n g a phy sical alter cation. Serg eant Mc Wil liams stated that nothing indicated Cannon wa s using c rac k

coca ine and that Cannon w as “ve ry scar ed.”-53-

Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt re a c he d th e fo llo wi ngc on c lus ion s:
First, Petitioner asse rts trial coun sel’s pre -trial investig ation of J ackie Cannon should have include d a re quest for pr odu ct ion of Cannon’s mental he alth and juvenile r ecor ds. He claims Cannon ha s a his tor y of me nta l he a lthpr ob le ms a nd dru g a

bu se . T hu s, Petitioner also contends trial c ouns el s hould have r equeste d a ps y c hiatr ic e xami natio n o f C ann on pr ior to h e r t e sti fy

inga t tr ia l.

. . . .
. . . Cannon either r efuse d to answer their questions or continue d to a s s e rt th a t h e r tr ia l te s ti mo n y w a s tr u th f u l.

. . . When ask ed i f she had g iven two sepa rate aff idavits contradictingor
recan t i n g portions of her tr ial testimony , Cannon specif ically denied having g iven the stateme nts or signingthe af fidavit s . One f

act upon which Cannon ve hemently insisted was that the petitioner

“ a tte mpt e d” to “ mur de r” he r i n o rd e r t o pre ve nt h e r f ro m g oin g to the police.

Withre g ard

to P e tit ion e r’ s a lle g a tio ns tha t c ouns e l sh ou ld h av e o b t ai ned Cannon’s me dical and juve nile rec ords . . . , the Petitioner offe red no e vidence to show trial counse l s hould have been a war e of Cannon’ s problems. In fac t, during the trial, the Petitioner, who lived with the witness at the time of the murde r, provi ded c ouns e l w ithno inf or matio n r e g ard ingany

pr e se nt o r p a st mental h e a lt

h o r dr u g p r o b le ms th e w it

n e s s ma y h a v e s u f f e r e d f rom at the time of he r trial testimony . Other tha n Cannon, who wa s lik e ly no t fo rt

hc omi ng a

bo ut su c h de ta ils , the Pe tit ion e r wa s the best

source for su ch i n formation. I t was up to the Petitioner to aler t
c ouns e l th a t th e re may

be so me me nta l he a lthiss ue s r e lat in g to Cannon’s testimony . Every witness will not be i n v es t iga ted for mental hea lth issues unless pertinent information is discovere d by counsel whic h related direc tly to the case

.
There fore , Petitioner cannot now c laim ineffe ctive assist an ce of counse l b ec au se he c hose to rema in silent about certa in mental health i s s u es

. . . . [T] he Petitioner wa s unable to show that, whe n Cannon testified at trial, she actua lly suffe red f

rom mental illness or

wa s und e r t

he inf lue nc e of dr ug s. Thus , th is C ourt

is n ot i nc lin e d to find trial counse l was in ef fe ctive in fa iling to re quest Cannon’s

me nta l and

juv e nil e re c or ds

.-54-

The pe t i t i o ner ha s failed to convinc e this court that any information was a

vailable to trial counsel whic h would have indica ted Cannon suffe red f

rom a mental d ef

ec t at the time of the trial. Whil e some witnesse s provided insig ht into C annon’s unusual behavior, this alone w as insuff ic ie n t to r e qu ir e d e f

e n s e c o u n s e l to r e qu e s t an y p o s s ib le me n ta l h e a lt h r e c o r d s on the S t at e’ s wi t ness. Additionally , while trial counse l conce ded that he thoug ht Cannon was using illega l drug s, Serg eant Mc Wil liams testified to the contrar y , s t ating that nothing indicated she

wa s using dr

ug s. There is no indication, and it is highly unlikely , that Cannon would have admitted to drug use at the tria l. This court will n o t as sume that Cannon would have admitted druguse on the stand, a s such an a ssumption i s highly improbable. More over, the testimony of the var ious witnesses who stated that Cannon h ad u s ed coca ine most likely would have be en deeme d inadmissible by

the trial court. There fore , we c annot conc lude that the petitioner w as pr e jud ic e d b y

tr ia l c ouns e l’ s d e c isi on

no t to c ro ss- e xami ne Cann on on the se iss ue s.

3. Trial counse l failed to pre sent a de fense

. The pe titioner asserts that trial c ounsel’s fa ilure to investi gat e James Parker’ s statement and fa ilure to invest i gate Sidney Har ris deprive d him from prese nting the de fense that Sidney Ha rr i s wa s involved in his wife’s murder . The pe titioner argues that his alibi witness, the lack of any phy sical evide nce linking him t o t h e cr i m e, the fa ct that the gun was ne ver f ound, and the fac t that a sec ond g unman was ne ver a rre sted would have bolstered his def ense. The petitioner argues that Sidney

Har ris’ identification of hi m wa s u n reliable and that Jackie Cannon’s statement to the police w as both false and unre liable.

Trial counse l unsucce ssfully challeng ed Sidney

Har ris’ identification of the petitioner in a mot ion to supp re ss. Mo re ov e r, c ouns e l atte mpt e d to dis c re dit the ide nti fi c a tio n d

ur ingthe tr ia l. Th e re is n o s uppo rt in the re c or d, be y on d innu e nd o, that Sid ne y Ha rr is w a s r e sp on sib le fo r h is wife’ s murder. Ser g eant Mc Wil liams testified that a p olice investig ation did not result in Si dney Har ris becominga suspec t. Additionally , Edwar d Bow en’s testimony at the post-convic tion hear ing f ell short of establishing an alibi, and the post-c onviction court wa s conce rned a bout Bow en’s c redibility . Trial counse l, consideringthe options av ai l able, determined that a n attack

on an in jur e d v ic timwh o h a d ju st l os t hi s w if e c ou ld b a c kf

ir e if pr e se nte d to a

ju ry

. The po stconviction cour

t properly declined to se cond-guess tri al counse l’s trial strateg y . Acc ording ly , the petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

4. Trial counse l failed to re quest a c ontinuance.

One we ek bef

ore tria l, th e p et i t i o n er learne d that Ed Thompson, lead c ounsel at the time, was ill and, there fore , t h at t h e trial might not beg in as schedule d. Ultimately , Thompson was unable to appea r at trial, and new lea d counsel, who ha d been le ad counse l for only one we ek, proce eded to tria l. The petitioner c o n t en d s t hat this was insufficie nt time for him and lead counsel to deve lop a re lations hip and that counse l should have re quested a continuance in order to establish a re lationship with hi m and investig ate the c ase.-55-

At the post-conviction hea ring , lead c ounsel test i fi ed t h at he initially was a ppointed as

se c on d c ha ir

c ounsel and th at he ha

nd le d mo st o f t

he mot ion

he ari ng s, inc lud ingthe mot ion to suppress and the Morg an hearing. He also stated that he be came lead c ounsel in September 1994

an d that, acc ording to his notes, Ed Thompson had planned to try the petitioner’s c ase a s late as November

7, 1994. The pe titioner’s trial started on N ovember 14, 1994.

Al tho ug h the p eti ti on e r a sse rt s th a t c ouns e l w a s d e fi c ie nt f or fa ili ngto r e qu e st a
c on tin ua nc e fo r t he purp os e of

“ e sta bli sh [ in g] a rela tio ns hip wi th M r. Cr ibb s o r t o inve sti g a te his

case ,” the pr oof shows that lea d counsel wa s involved w i t h t h e ca s e well before November 7, 1994. H e h a d me t w it

h th e p e ti ti o n e r an d w a s f a mi li ar w it

h th e f a c ts o f th e c a s e . Nothing sug g ests that counsel did not h ave a re asonable time to prepar e prior to tria l. Moreover , the petitioner has f

ailed to show how he was pre judiced by co u n s el ’s fa ilure to establish a be tter relationship wit h him. The petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.
b. penalty phase de ficienc ies

Th e pe tit ion e r al so compla ins a bo ut t ri a l c ouns e l’ s p e rf

or manc e duri ngthe pe na lty ph a se
o f his capital trial. Specif ically , he conte nds that counsel (1) failed to investig ate pr operly and prepa re m it ig a ti o ne v id e n c e an d ( 2 ) f a il e d to intr o d u c e an y e v id e n c e o f

r e s id u a l d o u b t o r ar g ue residual doubt duringclosing argument.

1. Trial counse l failed to investig ate a nd prepa re mitig ation evidenc e. The pe t i t i o ner c ontends that trial counse l failed to investig ate a nd prese nt miti g ation evidenc e re g ardinghis family history . Additionally , he conte nds that counsel s hould have discovere d and pre sented e vidence that he wa s intellectually impaired.

I n death penalty case s, the s entenc er may not be precluded from considering any aspec t of

a d e f e n d an t ’ s c h ar a c t e r

o r r e c o r d a s a b a s i s f o r a s e n t e n c e l e s s t h and e a t h

. L o c k e t tv

. O hio
, 438 U. S. 5 86 , 6 04-05, 98 S. Ct . 2 95 4, 29 64 -6 5 ( 19 78 ) (plu ra lity op ini on ); se e a lso J ohnson v. Texas
, 509 U.S. 350, 361, 113 S. C t. 2658, 2666 (1993). The United States Supreme Court has he ld that mitigating evidenc e is rele vant to sentenc ing he aring s and should be hea rd. See California v. Br own , 47 9 U .S. 53 8, 54 1, 10 7 S. Ct. 83 7, 83 9 ( 19 87 ); Ed din g s v . O kla ho ma , 455 U.S. 104, 113- 15, 102 S. Ct . 869, 876-77 (1982) . “‘[E]vidence about the d ef en d ant’s backg round and c hara cter is releva nt beca use of the be lief . . . that def endants w h o co mmit criminal acts that are

a ttr ibuta ble to a dis a dv anta g e d b a c kg ro un d, or to e mot ional a

nd me nta l pr ob le ms m ay

be le ss culpable tha

n defe ndants who have no such excuse.’” Goad v. St at e, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Br own, 479 U.S. at 545, 107 S. Ct. at 841) (O’Connor, J., concurr ing) ).

There is no leg al re quirement a n d no established pra ctice that the acc used must offer evid e n c e a t t

h e p e n a lt y p h a s e o f a c a p it a l t r ia l. St a te v

. M e ls o n , 7 7 2 S. W. 2 d 4 1 7 , 4 2 1 ( T e n n. 1989). In fac t, in many death pe nalt y cases, counsel ha s proper ly decide d not to offer

any evidenc e at the pe nal ty

phase. I d. at 421; see a lso St ate v. Z ag orski
, 701 S.W .2d 808 (Tenn.-56-

1985). Althoug h there is no absolute duty to investigate par t i cu l ar facts or a cer tain line of de fe ns e , c ouns e l do e s h ave a du ty to m a ke re a so na

ble inv e sti g a ti on or

to m a ke a

re a so na ble decision that make s particular investigation unnecessa

ry . St rickland

, 46 6 U .S. a t 69 1, 10 4 S. Ct. at 2052. Counsel’s duty

to invest i gat e derive s from counse l’s basic func tion which is “to make the a dv e rs ari a l te sti ng

pr oc e ss w or

k in the pa rt ic ula r c a se .” Ki mme lma

n v . Mor ri so n, 47 7 U .S. 365, 384, 106 S. Ct . 2574, 2066 (1986). The adver sarial testingproce ss will not fun ct i on pr op e rl y un le ss d e fe ns e c ouns e l ha s d on e so me inv e sti g a tio n into t he pr os e c uti on ’s c a se and int o
va ri ou s d e fe ns e str a te g ie s. I n thi s re g ard , c ou ns e l is un de r a

duty to m a ke re a so na

ble i n v e s t i g a t i o no r

t o m ak e a

r e a s o n a b l e d e c i s i o nt h a tm a k e s p art i c u l ar i n v e s t i g a t i o n s u n n e c e s s ar y. I d. at 384, 106 S. Ct. at 2066.

I n deter mining whether counsel brea ched this duty , counsel’s pe rfor mance is reviewe d for

rea sonablene ss under pre vailing pr ofessional n o rm s, which includes a context-depende nt consideration of the cha lleng ed conduc t as see n fr om counsel’s prospe ctive at the time. Wigg ins v. Smit h, 539 U.S. 523, 123 S. C t. 2536 (2003). Counsel is not re quired to investig ate e very
conce ivable line of mitigating evidenc e no matter how unlikely the eff ort would be to a ss i s t t he defe ndant at sen t encing . I d. at 533, 121 S. Ct. at 2381. Neither is counsel r equire d to interview

ever y conce ivable witness. He ndricks v

. C al d eron, 70 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 1995). In other

wo rd s, c ouns e l’ s d

uty to i nv e sti g a te and

pr e pa re is n ot l imi tle ss. Se e Was hin g ton v. Watkin s, 65 5 F .2 d 1 34 6 ( 5th

Cir . 1 98 1) . Co un se l’ s p e rf or manc e wi ll n ot b e fo un d d e fi c ie nt fo r f a ili ngto unveil al l miti g ation evidenc e, if, a fter a rea sonable investig ation, nothing ha s put counsel on notice of the exis tence of that evide nce. See Ba bbit v. Calderson

, 151 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9 t h Cir. 1998). A ta c ti c a l d e c is io n n o t to p u r s u e o n e c o u r s e o r an o th e r s h o u ld n o t b e c o n f u s e d w it h the d u t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e

. In s u m m ar y, no particula

r set of de tailed rules c an satisf ac torily take a ccount of the var iety

of circ umstances f

ace d by defe nse coun s el . Rather, courts must judge the re as o n ab l eness of counsel’s c onduct on the fac ts of the par t i cu l ar case , viewed a s of the time of c ounsel’s conduct, a

nd judicial scrutiny

of counse l’s perf

ormanc e must be hig hly de fe re nti a l.

Roe v. Flore s-Orte g a, 528 U.S. 470, 477, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1034-35 (2000) (intern al ci t ations and quotations omit ted).

I n a dd re ssi nga tto rn e y

pe rf or manc e , cou rt s mu st b e min df ul n ot “ to ‘ se c on d gue ss’ tactica l and strateg ic choice s per t ai n i n g to defe nse matters or to measure a def

ense attorney ’s repr esentation by

‘20-20 hindsig ht.’” He nley , 960 S.W .2 d at 5 7 9 (quoting Hellar d v. State, 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) ). A c ourt revie wing counsel’s pe rfor mance should “elimina te the distorting ef

fec t s o f h i n d s ight . . . [and] evaluate the conduct f rom counsel’ s perspe ctive at the t i m e. ” S t rickland, 466 U .S. at 689, 104 S. C t. at 2065. “The fac t that a par ticular strateg y

or tactic f ailed or hur

t the defe nse, does not, st andingalone, e stablish unreasona ble re prese ntation.”-57-

Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 3 6 9

. On the other ha nd, “def ere nce to matter s of strategy and tac tical choice s applies only

if the choic es ar e informe d ones base d upon adequate pre paration.” I d.

I n n o w fa m i l iar languag e, the Supre me Court in Strickland linked the defe renc e af forde d counsel’s c hoices a

nd d ec isions to t he re asonable ness of the inve stigation supporting the c hoices

and de c isi on s, statin g a s f

oll ow s:
[S ]t rate g ic choi ce s made a fter thor oug h investigation of law and fa cts rele vant to plausible options are virtua lly unchalleng eable ; and strate g ic choice s made a fter l es s than complete inve stigation

ar e r e a s o n a

b le p r e c is e ly

to th e e xte n t t

h a t r e a s o n a

b le p r o f essional j u d g m e n t s s u

p p o rtt h e l i m i t a t i o n s o ni n v e s t i g a t i o n

. I no t h e r w o rd s,
coun s e l h a s a d

u ty to ma k e r e a s o n a

b le inv e s ti g a ti o n s o r to make a

re a s o n ab le d ecision that make s particularinvestiga tions

u n n e c e s s ar

y.

C a u t h e r n v

. S t a t e , 1 4 5 S

. W

. 3 d 5 7 1 , 6 0 0

- 0 1 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 4 ) ( c i t i n g S t r i c k l an d , 46 6 U .S. at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066).

A re asonable investigation does not require that counsel lea ve no stone unturne d. The

re vie wi ngc ourt

mus t c on sid e r t

he lim ite d ti me and res ourc e s o f c ouns e l. R e a so na ble ne ss s ho uld be g uid e d b y

the c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

he c a se , in c lud inginf

or matio n p ro vid e d b y

the de fe nd ant,
conver sations with the defe ndant, and c onsideration of r eadily available resour ces. A dditionally ,
the re asonable ness of c ounsel’s ac tions may be dete rm i ned or substantially

influence d b y

the def endant’ s own statements or
a c ti o n s

. . . . I n s h o rt, in qu ir y into c o u n s e l’ s c o n v e r s a ti o n s w ith the defe ndant may

be cr i t ical to a pr oper a ssessment of counse l’s investigation decisions, just as it may be cr itical to a prope r
a sse ssm e nt o f c ouns e l’ s o the r l iti g a tio n d e c isi on s.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; s ee a lso Nichols v. St at e, 9 0 S

. W

. 3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002)

.
Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt fo un d a s f

oll ow s:

I niti al l y , t his Court finds that, at best, there is conf licting te sti mony re g ard ingwh e the r o r n ot t he Pe tit ion e r’ s famil y

wo uld have pa rt ic ipated in th e se nte nc ingph a se of the tr ia l. .

. . Th is Court acc redits the testimony o f t ri al counse l who stated that the defe nse team attempted to contac t the Petitioner’s famil y members but were told not to call back. Additio n ally , this Court finds t rial counsel wa s not neg lige nt in failing to c all J ames P arke r to support-58- a theor y of re sidual doubt and attac k the victi m ’s h u s band. Tria l counsel testified that they attempted to asc erta in the vera city of Park e r’ s c la ims , b ut w e re un a ble to d o s o. I n h is stat e me nt t o police and a g ain at the post-c onviction hear ing, Par ker state d that he did not know the ac tual n am es of the pe rsons he c laimed Sidney Har ris hired to kill his wife. He f urther stated that h e h ad no pe rs on a l kn ow le dg e of the e ve nts surr ound ing L ind a Ha rr is’ murder. . . . [T]he Court fi n d s Parker ’s testimony . . . would have added ve ry

littl e to Petitioner’s mitigation. Thus, this Court finds de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s perf

orma nc e wa s n ot d e fi c ie nt d ue to t he ir failure to be pre sent at the sente ncingphase. A lso, the te s t i m o ny of ea ch of the Petiti oner’ s family members a

nd testimony

of James Parker does n o t i mpact trial c ounsel’s per formanc e in such a

manner that prejudice s Petiti oner a nd the re sult of the case

.
Moreove r, ev en i f t his Court were to f ind counsel’s perf ormanc e at the se ntencingp h as e to be deficient, the Petitioner has fa iled to d em o n s t ra te that he wa s prejudice d by trial counsel’ s failure to call ce rt ain wit nesses on his beha lf. Trial c ounsel . . . t e s t i f i e [ d ] t h a tc e rt a i nw i t n e s s e s d i d n o tw an tt o t e s t i f

y.

. . . Trial counse l testified that the def ense te am attempted to cont act the w itnesses[;] howeve r, Petitioner’s fa mily rebuf fed their attempts. Moreo v er , d espi te the lac k of testimony

. . . Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d d

ur ingthe se nt enci ngph a se of tr ia l; a nd , th us , ha d a n o pp or tun ity to d isc us s h is backgrou nd in d e ta il. Thus , it

wa s n o t a s if

d e f e n s e c o u n s e l f

a il e d to p u t o nan y

mi ti g a ti o np r o o f. . . . Finally , the State presented indisputable evide nce of two [enhance ment] factors: (1) that t h e m u rder was c ommitt ed in the perpe tration of a bur g lary ; and (2) that the defe ndant had be en
c on vic te d o f o ne or

more p ri or

vio le nt f e lon ie s. Thus , . . . thi s Court fin d s that, even if c ounsel’s per formanc e wa s deficie nt, the Petitioner has fa iled to demonstrate he was p re j u diced by

counsel’s alleg ed inac tion.

a. fa mily history
The pe tition er cl ai m s that trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive for failing to investigate and pr e se nt m iti g a tio n e vid e nc e a bo ut h is f

a mil y hi stor y . T he re is c on fl ic tin g te sti mony a s to wh et h er the petitioner’s f amily members would have par ticipated in the sente ncingphase. Acc ording to ou r supreme c ourt’s opinion in the petitioner’s dire ct appe al, the petitioner te stified at his sentencinghear ing that “none of his family

wer e ab l e to attend his t rial.” Cribbs, 967 S.W .2d at 778. Fur

thermore , “he ha d told his aunt t h at t he trial wa s a matter of life or de ath, but-59-

he ha d n ot p re sse d h is mo th er to atten d th e tr ia l be c a us e sh e ha d b e e n il l, a

nd he did no t w ant t o
wo rry h er

. ” Id. T h o s e s t at em en t s ar e c o n s i s t en twi t ht es t i m o n y at t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nh ea ri n g. Co- c ouns e l te sti fi e d th a t sh e re c a lle d “ the re no t be ingso meb od y avai labl e to t e sti fy on his behal f ” an d th a t “ f

o r s o me r e a s o n

. . . w e c o u ld n ’ t g e t h is f

a mi ly to c o me d o w n f

o r the mit ig a tio n. ” L e a d c ouns e l te sti fi e d th a t ot he r m e mbe rs of

the de fe ns e te a m inte rv ie we d f a mil y
me mbe rs wh o li ve d in

Me mph is a

nd that ju st p ri or

to t ri a l, t he pe tit ion e r’ s unc le , Ch arl ie Cr ibb s, told the defe nse not to call them any more. The post-conviction co urt ac cre dited the testimony of trial counsel, whic h was c orrobor ated by the petiti o n er ’s trial testimony . Ba sed upon the te sti mony pro vid e d b y

the pe tit ion e r’ s f

a mil y me mbe rs a t th e po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng , w e a lso

are unable to conc lude that the s en t en ce woul d not have be en the same. Henle y , 960 S.W .2d at 579-80. Ther efor e, the pe titioner is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.
b. intellectual impairment

T h e p e ti ti o n e r c o n te n d s th a t c o u n s e l s h o u ld h a v e d is c o v e r e d an d p r e s e n te d e v id e n c e that he wa s intellectually

impaired. In support of his claim, h e n o t es t hat Elizabeth Be nson’s intake fo rm no te d h e ha d b e e n in

re so ur c e c la sse s in

sc ho ol a nd that th e de fe ns e te a m d id no t ob ta in h is

rec ords from the Me mphis Ci ty Schools and Gee ter Hig h School.

Couns e l ha s a

duty to inve sti g a te a ll r e a so na ble lin e s o f d e fe ns e , a

nd thi s d uty is m os t strictl y o b serve d in capital ca ses. For counsel to be ine ffe ctive for failing to investigate an alleg ed mental c ondition, the p et i t i o ner must show fa cts indicating a possible mental condition. Sometimes it will be appar ent from the e vidence surroundingthe circ u m s tance s of the cr ime, fr om c on ve rs a tio ns wi th th e de fe nd ant, or fr om o the r s ourc e s o f i nf or matio n n ot r e qu ir ingfr e sh investigation that the petitioner has some mental or other condition tha t w ill re quir e further inv es t i gati on; then, the fa ilure to investigate will be ineff ective a ssistance. See Antwine v. De lo, 54 F.3d 1357, 1365- 68 (8th Cir. 1995), ce rt

. d enied, 516 U.S. 1067, 116 S . Ct. 753 (1996); Br ewe r v. Aiken, 9 3 5 F. 2 d 850, 857-58 (7th Cir. 1991). In Thompson v. State, 958 S.W .2d 156, 16 4- 65 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ), thi s c ourt e xpla ine d a s f

oll ow s:

“ [T]he re is a ‘gre a te r d

uty of inq uir y int o [a ] cl ie nt’ s me nta l he a lth imposed for [ t h e] penalty phase of [a capital] trial.’” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W .2d 521, 529 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting Be rtolotti v

. Dug g er, 88 3 F .2 d 1 50 3, 15 16 (1 1th Cir . 1 98 9) ) (second and thi rd a lte ra tio ns in orig inal). Even if a psy cholog ically based defe nse could n o t b e s upported at the guilt phase, the evide nce ma y be usef ul i n m i t i g ation at the sentenc ing pha se. I d. Even whe n court-or dere d examinations result in a finding of sanity , defe nse counse l should alway s attempt to determine whether psy cholog ical infirmities may be used a s miti g ating evidenc e. I d.
As stated pre vi o u s l y , Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-203 prohibits the execution of mentally

reta rded individuals. See Te nn. Code An n

. § 3 9-13-203( b); Howe ll, 151 S.W .3d at 456. A per son is “mentally reta rded” when the pe rson (1) ha s an I .Q. of 70 or be low,-60-

(2) ha s deficits in ad ap t i v e b ehavior, and (3) the mental re tardation manifested duringthe pe r s o n ’ s d e v e lo p me n ta l p e r io d o r b y th e ti me th e p e r s o n tu r n e d e igh te e n y e ar s o ld

. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 39-13-203( a). The trial court de term i n es wh ether a def endant wa s mentally

reta rded at t h e t i m e o f

t h e c r i m e , an d

t h e b u r d e ni s o nt h e d e f e n d an tt o p r o v e m e n t a l r e t ar d a t i o nb y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Te nn. C o d e. An n

. § 39-13-203( a); How ell, 151 S.W .3d at 465. I f the de fenda

nt raises t h e i s s u e of mental retar dation at trial but the cour t determines that the defe ndant was not menta lly reta rded, then “the defe ndant shall be e ntitled to offer e vidence to the trier o f fa ct of diminished intellectual ca pacity as a mitig ating circ umstance pur suant to § 39-13-204(

j)(8).” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 39 -1 3 -2 03(e) . For defe ndants convicte d befor e the

e na c tme nt o f t

he statut e , a

c la im o f m e nta l r e tard a tio n sh ou ld be ra ise d in a pe tit ion fo r p os tconviction re lief. Va

n Tran, 66 S.W.3d at 811-12.

I n deter mining whe ther trial c ounsel was inef fec tive for f

ailing to investig ate and pre sent
cer tain mitigatin g ev idence , our supre me cour t has outlined sever al fa ctors to consider in making such an e v al u at i on. First, the r eviewingcourt must analy ze the nature and extent of the mitigating evidenc e that wa s available and not pr esente d. Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 371. Second, the court must deter m i ne whe ther substantially simil ar mitig ating evidenc e wa s prese nted to the jury duri n g either the g uilt or penalty phase of the proc eeding s. I d. Third, the cour t must consider whether there was such strongeviden ce of applica ble ag g ravating f

actor (s) that the mitig ating evidenc e would not have aff ecte d the jury ’s deter

mination. I d.
At the post-conviction hea ring , co-c ou n s el testified that Elizabeth Be nson had re ported the pe tit ion e r w a s in

a re so ur c e c la ss. Co- c ouns e l in te rp re te d a “ re so ur c e c la ss” to m e an a c la ss for those pe rsons “w h o we re a l i ttle bit sl ower than eve ry

body else so they

wer e in spec ial ed. classes.” Co-counsel said that she d i d n o t remembe r re viewingany of the pe titioner’s birth, school, or juvenile r ecor ds and that he ne ver indicated he wa s h av i n g emotional or mental problems. Co-counse l also stated that n o t h ing indicated the petitioner did not under stand the nature of the c harges aga i n s t h i m, the leg al proc eeding s, or the law a nd evidenc e ag ainst him and that if she had notice d any mental problem, she w ould not have ig nored it.

Simi larly , lead c ounsel test ified that he w as aw are the petitioner ha d some ty pe of lear ning disa bility but that the defe nse did not furth er investigate his mental condition. I nstead, the investig ation was limited to an eva luation con d u ct ed by the Midtown Mental Hea lth Center. Al tho ug h th e r e w a s s o m e d i s c u s s i o na s t o w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n s e s h o u l d

r e t a i nm e n t a l h e a lth experts, lead counse l determined the y wer e not nec essar

y . I n ad d i t i o n , lead c ounsel testified that he did not have a

ny difficulty

conver sing w ith th e p et i t i o n er and that the pe titioner understood the leg al proces s , the cr ime he wa s char g ed with, the fa cts ag ainst him, and the law e stablishing punishment. As did co-counse l, lead counse l stated that if he ha d had any conce rns about the petitioner’s a

bility to understand, he would have ha d further evalua t i ons conducte d. Fur thermore , lead co u n s el stated that althoug h the petitioner’s sc hool rec ords wer e re quested, the de fe ns e ne ve r r e c e ive d th e m.-61-

Although the petitioner’s attorney s were awa re that h e h ad s o m e ty pe of me ntal impairment, they

failed to pursue an y fu rt her inve stigation into t he issue. Consideringthe

sever ity of t he charg es and the pos sible punishment in this case and the fac t that trial counsel wa s
awa re the petitio n er wa s m en t all y impaired, c ounsel had a

duty to collect as muc h information as possible about the petitioner’s me ntal history , including h i s s ch ool rec ords. Had c ounsel followed throug h with the i r request for the petitioner’s re cords f rom the Memphis City

School sy stem, t h ey would have disc overe d that the re sults of an I .Q. test the petitioner took whe n he

was thirteen y ear s old show ed his I .Q. was only 70, the threshhold delineating mental re t ardation and inelig ibilit y

for the de ath penalty . The de fense then could have raised the issue reg arding

me nta l r e tard a tio n in

the tr ia l c ourt . M or e ov e r, a lth ou g h th e po st- c on vic tio n cour t st a te d th a t it would not have f

ound the petitioner to be me ntally reta rded, counsel could have argued to the jur y in m iti g a tio n at se nte nc ing that th e pe tit ion e r’ s c a pa c ity to a pp re c iate the wr on g fu lne ss o f h is conduct or

to conform his conduc t “to the re quiremen t s o f t he law w as substantially impaired a s
a re sult of a men t al d i s ea s e or defec t . . . which was insuff icient to establish a def

ense to the crime but whic h substantially aff ecte d the [petiti oner’ s] j udg ment.” Te nn. C o de Ann. § 39

- 1 3

- 2 0 4 (

j) ( 8 )

. I n s te a d , c o u n s e l f a il e d to p r e s e n t an y e v id e n c e a t s e n te n c in g r e g ar d in g the pe tit ion e r’ s me nta l cond it ion. C ouns e l’ s in a de qu a te inv e sti g a tio n r e su lte d in the fa ilure to discover the evidenc e and w as def icient per formanc e.

Fur thermore , by

failing to invest i gat e the petitioner’s mental impairment, def ense c ounsel pr e c luded the j ur

y fr om c on sid e ri ngthe inf

or matio n. Th is e vid e nc e wo uld have be e n e sse nti a l in attempting to show mitig ating circumstances, a nd counsel’s f

ailure to pre sent evidenc e about the pe tit ion e r’ s me nta l de fi c its re nd e re d th e se nte nc ingph a se of the pe ti ti on er’s tr ia l f

un dame nta lly unfair. Th ere fore , we a re una ble to conclude that the petitioner wa s not prejudiced by trial counsel’s fa il u r e to e xp lo r e h is me n ta l i mp a ir me n t. T h e p e ti ti o n e r

h a s s a ti s f

ie d b o th p r o n g s of the Str ic kla

nd te st a nd re c e ive d th e ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l.

2. Tr ia l c ouns e l f

a ile d to int

ro du c e any

e vid e nc e of

re sid ua l do ub t.

The p e ti ti o n e r c o n te n d s th a t tr ia l c o u n s e l f a il e d to p r e s e n t an y e v id e n c e o f r e s idua l doubt during the pena lty

phase. Spec ifically , he ar g ues that trial counse l should have pres ented the te sti mony of J ame s Park e r a

nd the fa mil y and fr ie nd s o f L ind a

Ha rr is t o c a st d ou

bt o n h is guil t and that counse l should have pre sented proof reg ardingSidney

Har ris’ motives to have his wife killed. The petiti o n er al s o faults counse l for fa iling to ar g ue re sidual doubt during c losing argument. He c ontends that, althoug h counsel mentioned r esidual doubt duringthe opening statement, he f

ailed to mention it during c losing a rgument.

Our s u p r e me c o u rt h a s c o n s is te n tl y r u le d th a t p r o o f o f r e s id

u a l d o u b t is r e le vant in a capital se ntencinghear ing a s a “non- statutor y m i t iga ting c ircumstance .” State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W .3d 12, 23 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Sta t e v

. Au s t i n , 87 S.W .3d 447, 459 (Tenn. 2002) ; State v. Ha rtman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 55 (Tenn. 2001)). D uring the pena lty phase, the petitioner testified that he wa s innocent of L inda Har ris’ murd er. H e explained that he a nd J ackie Cannon had a

rug edT he p eti t i o ne r m ere l y ref ers thi s co urt t o t he claim s set f o rth i n his i ssue s num b ere d I t hro ug h V II. T he p eti t i o ne r’ s 4 cl ai ms a t t ach ed t o hi s i s s ues nu mb er ed I I I ( po s t

- convi ct i on cour t cr edi bi l i t y det er mi nat i ons s houl d not be gi ven def er en ce by t h i s c ou r t ) a n d I V ( pos t

- con v i ct i on c ou r t r en der ed dec i s i on w i t h ou t f u l l t r an s cr i pt of

pos t

- con v i ct i on he aring ) ca nn o t l o gica l l y be att ac he d t o an y de f i cien t p erfo rm an ce o n b eh alf o f ap p ell ate c o un sel. O b vio usly , t ho se al l eged err o rs had not even o ccurred at t he t i m e o f t he d i rect ap p eal

. T he p et i t i o ner’ s ass ert i o n t hat al l eged err o rs sh o u ld b e a ttrib u te d to c o u n se l ar e no t we ll ta k e n

. -62- ov e r m on e y , th a t he ha d “ wh oo pe d h er real bad ,” and that Ca nn on ha d f a lse ly imp lic a te d h im beca use she wa s ang ry

.
Th e p eti tioner wa s able to adva nce his theor

y during the pena lty

phase. I f counse l had p r e s e n t e d a d d i t i o n a l t e s t i m o n y, i tw o u l d h a v e b e e nc u m u l a t i v e t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y. F ur the rm or e , th e State c ou ld h ave re butte d Pa rk e r’ s st a te men t w ithSe rg e ant M c Willi a ms’ te sti mony tha t th e po lic e we re un a

ble to c or

ro bo ra te Park e r’ s a lle g a tions . We are un a ble to conclude that the petitioner was prejudice d by counsel’s failure to put additional re s i d u al doubt evidenc e bef

ore the jury

or that wa s he pre

judiced by co u n s el ’s fa ilure to argue re sidual doubt duri ngc los ingargume nt.

c. appe llate def iciencie s The pe titioner raises s everal ar g uments reg ardingappellate counsel’s pe rfor mance on direc t appea l. Although not spec ifically delineate d in his arg ument, he esse n t i al l y ar g ues that he

rec e iv e d th e in e f

f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e o f c o u n s e l b e c a

u s e a p p e ll a te c o u n s e l ( 1 ) f

a il e d to r aise the issue of his actua l i n n o cenc e; (2) f ailed to ra ise the issue of his mental re tardation; and (3) fa iled to raise a ny issue reg ardingtrial counsel’ s deficie nt perfor mance

. T h e S t at e ar g ues that the

4 petitioner has wa ived any ch al l en ge to appe llate counse l’s perf ormanc e bec ause he failed to off er any argument to suppor

t his alleg ations. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R 10( b). I n t h e a l t ernative, the Sta t e as s erts that because the individual claims fail on their mer its, the petitioner cannot establish prejudice

.
To deter m i n e whether appe llate counse l was constitutionally eff ective, w e use the twoprongtest set forth in Strickland, the same tes t ap p l i ed to claims of ineff ective a ssistance of tr ial counsel a sserted unde r the Six th Amendment to the United St at es C o n s t itution. C arpe nter v. St at e, 1 26 S.W .3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004) ; Porterfield v. State, 897 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tenn. 1995); see a lso Sm ith v. Murray , 477 U.S. 52 7 , 535-36, 106 S. Ct. 2661 (1986) (applying Strickland to a cla im of attorney err or o n appea l). As stated pre viously , under Strickland, w e must determine (1) whether counsel’s pe rfor

mance was de ficient a

nd (2 ) whe ther the pe titioner was pre judiced by

the alleg ed defi ci en cy

. 4 6 6 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct . 2052. The pe titioner bear s the burden of est abli sh ingbo th p ro ng s o f t his te st. I d. a t 69 0- 94 , 1 04 S. Ct . 2 05 2. F a ilure to establish either pr ong provides a suf fi cient basis to deny

relief . I d. at 697, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Acc ording ly , a cour

t need not a ddress both pr ong s if the petitioner make s an insufficie nt showing of one c omponent. I d.-63-

We acknowle dg e that appe llate counse l are not co n s t i t utionally require d to raise e very
conce ivable issue on appe al. King v. State, 989 S.W .2d 319, 33 4 (T enn. 1999); Campbell v. S t ate, 904 S.W .2d 594, 596-97 (Te nn. 1995). The de termination of which issues to ra ise on appea l is ge nera l l y wi thin appellate c ounsel’s sound discre tion. J ones v. B arne s, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct . 3308 (1983); Carpe nter, 126 S.W.3d at 886; King, 989 S.W.2d at 3 34. There fore , appellate counsel ’s p ro fessional judgment with reg ard to whic h issues will best serve the appellant on a

ppeal should be g iven consider able de fe re n ce

. See Campbell, 904 S.W.2d at 597;

see a lso St rickland, 466 U .S. at 689, 104 S. C t. 2052. We s h o u l d n o t second- g uess such decision s

. De fe rence to counse l’s tactica l choices, how ever , applies only if such choic es ar e within the rang e of competenc e re quired of attorney s in criminal case s. Carpente r, 126 S.W.3d at 887; Campbell, 904 S.W .2d at 597.

On a pp e a l to thi s c ourt , a

pp e llate c ouns e l r a ise d th e fo llo wi ngiss ue s: (1) whe ther the e y ewitness jury instructions were adequate;
(2 ) whe the r t

he c ri me sc e ne vid e o w a s unf a ir ly pr e jud ic ia l;
(3) whe ther the photog raphic lineup was unduly sug g estive;
(4) whe ther re fer ence s to the Bible, victim impact, paro le elig ibilit y , and mit ig a tio n d

ur ingfi na l argume nt q

ua lif ie d a s p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t;
(5) whe ther the state may use prior c onvictions for attempted se cond degree murder to e stablish the prior violent felonies a g g ravator;
(6 ) whe the r t

he de nia l of

sp e c ia lly re qu e ste d in str

uc tio ns we re e rr on e ou s; (7) whe ther the Te nnessee death pe nalty statute violates the state or fede ral

c on sti tut ion s; (8 ) whe the r the pres entatio n o f e vid e nc e of a no nv iol e nt f

e lony to e sta bli sh the prior violent fe lonies ag g ravator requir es re v ersa l of the death sentence ;

. . . (9) whe ther use of

the und er l y i n g felony

for this felony

murder c ould be used as a n ag g ravating c ircumstance under the state cons t i tutional standard as def ined in State v. Middlebrooks . . . [; and]
[(10 whether the evidenc e wa s sufficient.]
State v. Perry

A. Cribbs, N o

. 0 2 C 0 1 -9507-CR -00211, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 142, at **2-3 (J ackson, Feb. 14, 1997), aff irmed by
, 967 S.W .2d 773 (Tenn. 1998) . The pe titioner failed-64-

to present a

ny proof at the post-conviction heari ng related to his claims that appellate c ounsel

we re de fi c ie nt.

We acknowle dg e t h at appea ls are limited to a re view of e vidence prese nted in the trial

c ourt . N oth ingpe rm its a pp e llate c ounsel ’s in tr od uc tio n o f n e w e vid e nc e a t th e a pp e llate le ve l. I ndeed, a ppellate c ourts are not fac t-finding courts. In this reg ard, the petitioner’s c laim of err or by appellate counsel for

failing to raise a

claim of a ctual innoce nce is unfounde d. T h er e is no

avenue by

which counse l could have introduc ed new evidenc e. Appe llate couns el challenge d the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence but were unsucce ssful. There exis ted no ave nue on dire ct appe al under w hich counse l could have validly raised a claim of a ctual innoce nce. T his reasoning

a pp lie s e qu a lly

to t he pe tit ion e r’ s c la im that a ppell a te c ouns e l f

a ile d to ra ise the iss ue of his

me nta l r e tard a tio n. No thi ngin t he tr ia l r e c or d w a s ava ila ble to a pp e ll ate cou ns el up on

wh ic h to base suc h a cha lleng e.

Fina l l y , this court has re peate dly cautioned that raising an issue of ine ffe ctive assistanc e of counse l on direct a

ppeal is a pr actice to be avoided due to the difficulty in proving an ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel claim without an evide ntiary hear ing a

nd the dan ger that the defe ndant will not only

lose on di re ct ap p ea l , but also be bar red f rom raisingthe issue in a later post-conviction petition. See Kendr i ck s v

. State, 13 S.W .3d 401, 405 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) ; Thompson v. State, 958 S.W .2d 156, 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 9 9 7 ). Ac co rding ly , we c annot conclude that appellate counse l ’s d ec i sion not to challeng e the e ffe ctiveness of trial counsel wa s not a tactica l decision based upon w ell rea soned d ec i sion. Accor dingly , the petitioner ha s failed to establish that appe l l at e counsel we re de ficient in their pe rfor mance and/or that he was prejudice d by

alleged er ro rs co mmitt ed by appellate counsel. The petitioner has f ailed to show that he is e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is c la im.

d. cumulative def

iciencie s The pe titioner contends that counse l’s perf ormanc e wa s constitutionally defi cient base d upon the cumulative e ffe ct of the e rror s. Be cause this c ourt has deter mined that trial counsel wa s ine ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto i nv e sti gate and pr e se nt e vid e nc e of the pe tit ion e r’ s me nta l im pa ir me nts at his capital sente ncing hear ing, w e nee d not addre ss the impact of c umulative defic iencies.

5. Constit utionality

of the De ath Penalty

in Tennesse e The pe titioner raises numer ous challeng es to the constitu t i o n al i t y of the imposition of the death penalty

. I n essenc e, he asser ts that his death sentence must be vac ated be cause the trial and

a pp e llate pr oc e e din g s w e re “ ri fe ” wi th c on sti tut ion a l e rr or . We a g re e wi th t he State that the se claims should have be en ra ised in prior proc ee d i n gs . Acc ording ly , the petitioner’s c laims are

wa ive d. Se e Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 30 -106( g ). Th e pe tit ion e r c on c e de s th a t ma ny of his c la ims

we re ru le d u

po n in the op ini on on

dir e c t a pp e a l but argue s th a t he is c omp e lle d to pr e se rv e a ll issues for late r possi b l e fe dera l review . I n this reg ard, w e note that the f ollowing c laims have-65-

previously

been r eviewe d and re

jected on dir ect a

ppeal a nd ar e n o t appropr iate for this court’s revie w at this stag e:

a . T he pe tit ioner cla ims tha t T e nn e sse e ’s de a th p e na lty statut e s f

a il t o me anin g fu lly

narr ow the cla ss of death-elig ible defe ndants, specif ically beca use Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 39-13- 204(i)(2) , (5), ( 6), and ( 7) ar e over broad, va gu e, an d en compass a ma jority of the ho mi cid es comm itt e d in

Te nn e sse e . T he se argume nts have be e n r e je c te d b y our s up re me c ourt

. See State v. Ke en, 926 S.W.2d 727, 742 (Tenn. 1994).

b. Th e pe tit ion e r c la ims that th e de a th s e nte nc e is i mposed capric iou sly and arb itr ari ly

in that
(1 ) u

nli mit e d d isc re tio n is ve ste d in the pr os e c uto r a s to wh e the r o r n ot t o s e e k th e de a th penalty . This argument has bee n reje cte d

. S ee S t ate v. Hines, 919 S.W .2d 573, 582 (Tenn. 1998).
(2 ) T he de a th p e na lty is i mpo se d in

a dis c ri min a tor

y ma nn e r b a se d u pon e c on omi c s,
rac e, g eog raphy , and g ender . This argument has bee n reje cted. See Hines, 919 S.W.2d at 582; State v. Br imme r, 8 7 6 S

. W

. 2 d 75, 87 (Tenn. 1994) ; State v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 268 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Smit h, 857 S.W .2d 1, 23 (Tenn.) , cer t. denied, 510 U.S. 996, 114 S. Ct . 561 (1993).
(3) The re a

re no unifor

m standards or proce dures for j ury selec tion to ins ure ope n inquiry

conce rning potentially

prejudicia l subject matter. This ar g ument has bee n reje cted. See S tate v. Caug hron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 542 (Tenn.), ce rt. denied, 510 U .S. 979, 114 S. C t. 475 (1993).
(4) The death qua lification proce ss skews the m ak e- u p o f t h e jury and re sults in a relatively prosec u t i o n -prone, g uilt-prone jury . This argument has bee n reje cted. See State v. Har bison, 704 S.W .2d 314, 318 (Tenn. 1986)

. (5) De fenda

nts are pr o hibited from addr essing jurors’ popular misconceptions about matters re levant to sente n ci n g, i

. e., the cost of incar cer ation versus the c ost of execution, det e r r e n c e , me th o d o f e xe c u ti o n

. T h is ar g u me n t h a s b e e n r e je c te d

. Se e B r im me r , 8 7 6 S. W.2d at 86-87; Cazes, 875 S.W .2d at 268; State v. Bla ck, 815 S.W.2d 166, 179 (Tenn. 1991).
(6) The jury

is instructed that it must agr ee unan i m o u s l y i n order to impose a life sentenc e and is prohibited f rom beingtold the effe ct of a non-unanimous v er dict. This argument has bee n re

j ecte d. See B rimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 87; C azes, 875 S.W .2d at 268; Smit h, 857 S.W .2d at 22-23.
(7) Requiring the jury to a g ree unanimously to a life verdic t violate s Mil l s v

. M ary land, 48 6 U .S. 36 7, 10 8 S. Ct. 18 60 (1 98 8), an d M c Ko y v. No rt h Ca ro lin a , 4 94 U. S. 4 33 , 1 10 S. Ct

. 1227 (1990). This ar g ument has bee n reje cted. See Br immer, 8 7 6 S.W .2d at 87; State v.-66-

Thompson, 768 S.W .2d 2 3 9 , 250 (Tenn. 1989) ; State v. King, 718 S.W.2d 241, 249 (Tenn. 1986), super seded by

statute as re cog nized by , State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W .2d 161 (Tenn. 1994)

. (8) The j u ry i s n ot require d to make the ultimate dete rmination that death is the ap p ropriate penalty . This argument has bee n reje cted. See Br immer
, 87 6 S. W.2 d at 87 ; Smi th
, 857 S.W .2d at 22.
(9 ) T he de fe nd ant i s d e nie d f ina l clo si ng argume nt i n th e pe na lty ph a se of the tr ia l. T his argument has bee n reje cted. See Br immer, 876 S.W .2d at 87; Cazes, 875 S. W

. 2 d at 269; Smit h, 857 S.W .2d at 24; Caug hron, 855 S.W.2d at 542.
(10) The petitioner conte nds that the m an d at ory introduction of victim impact evidenc e violates the doctrine of sepa ration of pow ers. He furthe r alleg es that the fa ct that damag ed, depres s ed , and mentally

ill defenda

nts are a llowed to waive pr esentation of available mitigation deprive s the jury

of esse nt i al i nformation in deter mining whe ther someone should live or die. Th e pe tit ion e r’ s c la ims re g ard ing the wa ive r of mit ig a tio n pr oo f is ir re le va nt to hi s cas e bec a

us e the pe tit ion e r p re se nte d mi tig a tin g e vid e nce d uri ng the pe na lty ph a se . M or e ov e r, the se c la ims have pr eviously

been r ejec ted by

the cour ts of this state. S ee S t at e v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 407 (Tenn. 2005) (appe ndix ); State v. Odom, 137 S.W .3d 572, 602 (Tenn. 2004)

.

c . T he pe tit ion e r a

rgue s th a t th e a

pp e lla te re vie w p ro cess in deat h p e na lty c a se s is

c on sti tut ion a lly

ina de qu a te in i ts a

pp lic a tio n. He con tend s th a t th e a pp e llate re vie w p ro c e ss i s not c onstitut ionally meaning ful beca use the appellate courts cannot rew eig h proof d u e t o the absenc e of w ritten finding s conce rning mitigating circ umstances, be cause th e i nformation re lied up on by t h e a

p p e l l a t e c o u rt s f

o r c o mp ar a t i v e r e v i e w i s i n a d e qu a t e an d i n c o mp l e t e , an d

b e c a us e the a pp e llate c ourt s’ meth od ol ogy of re vie w i s f

lawe d. Th is a

rgume nt h a s b e e n s pe c if ic a lly reje cted b y o u r s u p reme court on numer ous occa sions. See Cazes, 875 S.W .2d at 270-71; see also State v. Har

ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 7 7 (Tenn. 1992) ; State v. Ba rber , 753 S.W .2d 659, 664 (Tenn. 1988) . Moreove r, the supre me cour t has rec ently

held that “while importa nt as an
a dd iti on a l sa fe g ua

rd a g a ins t arb itr ary

or c a pr ic iou s se nte nc ing , c omp ara tiv e pr oporti on a lity revie w is not constituti onally require d.” State v. B land, 958 S.W.2d 651, 663 (Tenn. 1997).

d. Th e pe tit ion e r a sse rt s th a t e xec uti on by the means of le tha l in

je c tio n v iol a te s h is r ig hts to be fr e e f

r o m c r u e l a n d u nu s u a l p u n is h me n t. T h e T e n n e s s e e Su p r e me Co u rt h a s c o n sidered thi s c la im a

nd de te rm ine d th a t T e nn e sse e ’s le tha l in je c ti on pr oto c ol i s c on sis te nt w ith contempora

ry standards of d ec ency

and with the over

whelming majority

of lethal injec tion protocols used by

o t h er s t at es and the fede ral g overnme nt. Abdul’ Rahman v. B rede sen, 181 S.W. 3d 29 2, 30 6- 07 (T e nn . 2 00 5) , ce rt . de nie d, 54 7 U .S. 11 47 , 1 26 S. Ct . 2 28 8 ( 20 06 ). On Ap ri l 16 , 2 00 8, the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court

a ff ir me d th e us e of

the three-dru g p rot oc ol u se d in Kentucky ’s lethal injection proc edure

. Ba z e v

. Rees, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). Tenne ssee use s the same pro t o co l as Ke n tucky . I d. (citing Workman v. Br edese n, 486 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir. 2007)). The petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.-67-

e . T he pe t i t i o n e r a s s e rt s t h a t t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e i n f r i n g e s u p o n h i s f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t to life an d is no t ne c e ssa

ry to p ro mot e any

c omp e lli ngstate int e re st. Th is c omp la int is c on tr ary

to settled prec edent a s ref

lected in Cauthe rn, 145 S.W.3 d at 6 2 9 (c iting Nichols, 90 S.W.3d at 604; State v. Mann, 959 S.W .2d 503, 536 (Tenn. 1997) (appe ndix ); State v. Bush, 942 S. W

. 2 d 4 8 9, 523 (Tenn. 1997) ). Ac cording ly , the petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.
f. The pe titioner asserts that Tenne ssee’ s imposit ion of a death pe nalty violates treaties of the United States and, he nce, the fede ral c onstitut ion’s Supremac y Clause. I t appea

rs t h at the petitioner conte nds the Supremac y Clause was violate d when the pe titioner’s rig hts under tre aties and customar

y internation al l aw to which the United States is bound wer e disreg arde d. Arguments that the death penalty is unconstituti onal under int er n at i o n al laws and tre aties have sy st e m a t i c a l l y b e e n r e

j e c t e d b y t h e c o u rt s

. S e e O d o m , 1 3 7 S

. W

. 3 d a t 6 0 0

. W e d i s c e r n n o v iable

reas on to r e so lve thi s is su e in a dif fe re nt m ann e r i n th is c a se . T he pe tit ion e r i s n ot e nti tle d to relief on this iss ue.

III. Conclusi on

After a thoroug h revie w o f t h e re cord, w e conc lude that trial counse l’s failure to conduct adequate investig ation into the petitioner’s mental impai rm en t s and pre sent mitigatingevidenc e at sentenc ing r eg ardingthose impairments suffice s for a showing of def

icient pe rf

ormanc e. Moreove r, counse l’s constitu t i o n ally defic ient perf

ormanc e pre

judiced the pe titioner’s rig ht to a fair pe nalty

proce eding . I n our view, t h ere is a re asonable probability that absent the de fi c ie nc ie s, the ou tc ome of the pen alt y

ph a se of

the tr ia l mi g ht w e ll h a ve be e n d if fe re nt. There fore , the evidenc e pre ponderat es aga i n s t the finding s of the post-convic tion court, and the petitioner’s sente nce of

death is re verse d. Th e ca s e i s re m an ded to the trial c ourt for a new
se nte nc inghe ari ng . H ow e ve r, the jud g e wh o p re sid e d o ve r t his po st-co nv ict io n p ro c e e din g is disqualified from a

ny subsequent proc eeding s in this case. With reg ard to the guilt phase of the trial, the judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, JUD GE