IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 17, 2024

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. NOAH RASHAD LYLES

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Maury County

No. CR-29743 Russell Parkes, Judge

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No. M2023-01063-CCA-R3-CD

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The defendant, Noah Rashad Lyles, pleaded guilty to theft of property between $1,000 and 

$2,500, and the trial court imposed a sentence of three years’ incarceration in the Tennessee 

Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying 

his request for alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and considering the 

applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY,

JR., and JILL BARTEE AYERS, JJ., joined.

Raven Prean-Morris, Assistant Public Defender, Tennessee District Public Defenders 

Conference (on appeal) and Travis Jones, District Public Defender, and Colby Block, 

Assistant Public Defender (at guilty plea and sentencing hearings), for the appellant, Noah 

Rashad Lyles.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; William Lundy, Assistant Attorney 

General; Brent Cooper, District Attorney General; and Pamela Anderson, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

I. Guilty Plea

07/24/2024
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On April 4, 2023, the defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property between $1,000 

and $2,500.1 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant agreed to a three-year sentence 

as a Range II offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The 

facts underlying the plea, as explained by the State, were as follows:

[O]n September 27th of 2019 and going through November the 4th of 

2019 the defendant obtained an account number and routing number to a 

checking account belonging to his sister-in-law of his first wife. There was 

a total of eight transactions that he conducted using the victim’s bank 

account. Some of the transactions were used to attempt to pay bills for his 

second wife, and some of the transactions were used to pay bills for his first 

wife.

The defendant did not have the consent of the victim to use her 

account. The victim is disabled with cerebral palsy, and her mother has 

control of the victim’s bank accounts. The total amount of all eight 

transactions was $1,028. This all occurred here in Maury County.

II. Sentencing Hearing

During the sentencing hearing, the State introduced a copy of the defendant’s 

presentence report. The defendant objected to several statements contained within the 

report, including the statements of law enforcement officers regarding charges that were 

dismissed as part of the plea agreement as well as the victim impact statement of Miaya 

Frierson, the defendant’s ex-wife. The trial court denied the defendant’s objection, finding

the law enforcement statements were reliable hearsay that could be used to prove criminal 

history. However, the trial court noted that it would “give it no weight unless there’s proof 

of that history today at this hearing.” Regarding Ms. Frierson’s victim impact statement, 

the trial court found that the statement could be considered as part of the defendant’s 

criminal history and noted that Ms. Frierson was at the sentencing hearing and could testify 

as to the contents of her statement.

Miaya Frierson testified that she was previously married to the defendant and had a 

child with him before discovering that he was also married to other women in Tennessee. 

Ms. Frierson stated that Kristen Frierson, her sister and the victim in this case, had cerebral 

palsy and required twenty-four-hour care. Because the victim also had mental disabilities, 

Ms. Frierson’s mother controlled the victim’s bank account. After discovering money was 

missing from her sister’s account, Ms. Frierson learned that the defendant had stolen the 

 

1 The defendant was also charged with forgery and bigamy, but those counts were dismissed as part 

of the plea agreement.
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money to pay for his other wife’s bills. Ms. Frierson testified that the victim was unable 

to purchase a new wheelchair after the money was stolen. According to Ms. Frierson, she 

was unaware of the defendant’s prior criminal history at the time of their marriage and was 

devastated because “the person who [she] thought he was is someone [she] no longer 

knew.” On cross-examination, Ms. Frierson agreed that the defendant used some of the 

money he stole from the victim’s account to pay bills for her household and some of it to 

pay bills for the defendant’s other wife.

The defendant also provided a statement of allocution, apologizing for his actions 

and stating that he had set aside funds to reimburse the victim. The defendant testified that 

he currently lived in Illinois with his wife and newborn child and worked two jobs, 

including one for the City of Collinsville. He stated that although his criminal history was 

“bad,” it “[did] not speak to [his] character.” The defendant requested that he be placed on 

probation so that he could continue to work and provide for his family.

In denying probation, the trial court articulated its reasoning, as follows:

The defendant’s criminal history is horrible.

As I’ve already articulated or attempted to articulate, this man has 

never lived by the laws of this society. This [c]ourt has no hopes if released 

on probation that he will ever live by the laws of society.

. . . .

I find that the defendant while released on parole at least three

different times has had his parole revoked prior to now. After his release on 

his 10-year sentence, he attended International Christian College, securing a 

degree and 36 credits, having reported a degree in special education.

I have no idea whether to believe that or not. Frankly, I don’t believe 

anything he says. I know why I get these pre-sentence reports now.

Mr. Lyles or whatever name you choose to go by today, you’re an 

endearing, charming, articulate man, but you’re still a thief, a liar. You are 

a fraud, have been, continue to be. How you secured a job with this criminal 

history is beyond me. You’re saying that you have, quote, set aside funds to 

pay back the money that you stole from this disabled young lady.
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However, there is zero proof that you have made a payment, none. 

Those words strike very much at the heart of your desire to truly make 

amends for the crime you have committed. I find those words are hollow.

They have no meaning to you; they have no meaning to me. I give 

you not one minute of stock. I put not one second of stock in whatever you 

say today. 

As it relates to probation considerations, I’ve considered the presentence report, your mental and physical condition and social history –

which would border on being a sociopath – the facts and circumstances

surrounding the offense – which I find reprehensible – and the nature of the 

criminal conduct which is terrible. His criminal history is more than 

offensive. The previous actions and/or character is, again, terrible.

I find that there is – it does not reasonably appear that he will abide 

by the terms of probation. I find that in the interest of society being protected 

from possible future criminal conduct – that there have been measures less 

restrictive than confinement have been applied and unsuccessful, and I find 

that full probation would greatly unduly depreciate the seriousness of this 

offense.

Analysis

On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying probation. 

Specifically, the defendant argues the trial court relied on irrelevant statements made by 

law enforcement and Ms. Frierson in the presentence report and “gave weight to an 

extrajudicial observation not supported by the record.” The State contends the trial court 

acted within its discretion when it sentenced the defendant to confinement. Following our 

review, we agree with the State.

A trial court’s decision to grant or deny probation is reviewed under an abuse of 

discretion standard with a presumption of reasonableness when the sentence reflects the 

purposes and principles of sentencing. State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 

2012). “[A] trial court’s decision to grant or deny probation will not be invalidated unless 

the trial court wholly departed from the relevant statutory considerations in reaching its 

determination.” State v. Sihapanya, 516 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tenn. 2014) (order) (per 

curiam). The burden of establishing suitability for probation rests with a defendant, who 

must demonstrate that probation will “‘subserve the ends of justice and the best interest of 

both the public and the defendant.’” State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 2002) (quoting State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
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1990)); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(b); State v. Russell, 773 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tenn. 

1989); State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 347 (Tenn. 2008).

Generally, probation is available to a defendant sentenced to ten years or less. Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a). A defendant who is convicted as an especially mitigated or 

standard offender of a Class C, D, or E felony is considered a favorable candidate for 

probation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(A). In determining whether incarceration is 

appropriate, the trial court should consider whether:

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant 

who has a long history of criminal conduct; 

(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the 

offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective 

deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently 

been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C). Additionally, “[t]he sentence imposed should be 

the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is 

imposed,” and “[t]he potential or lack of potential for the rehabilitation or treatment of the 

defendant should be considered in determining the sentence alternative or length of a term 

to be imposed.” Id. § 40-35-103(4), (5). 

Following the defendant’s statement of allocution, the trial court noted that it had 

considered the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, the principles of sentencing, 

arguments as to sentencing alternatives, the nature and characteristics of the criminal 

conduct to which the defendant pleaded guilty, the statistical information and risk and 

needs assessment, and the potential for rehabilitation and treatment.

The trial court examined the defendant’s extensive criminal history, which included 

fourteen felonies and ten misdemeanors, and found it was “horrible” and “more than 

offensive.” The trial court also noted that the defendant had been granted parole on prior 

occasions and had his parole revoked “at least three different times.” The trial court noted 

that the defendant claimed to have set asides the funds to reimburse the victim; however, 

the trial court found there was “zero proof that [the defendant] had made a payment” and 

stated it did not “put . . . one second of stock” in the defendant’s allocution statement. 

Ultimately, the trial court found confinement would protect “the interest of society . . . from 

future criminal conduct,” “there have been measures less restrictive than confinement . . . 
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applied and unsuccessful,” and “full probation would greatly unduly depreciate the 

seriousness of this offense.”

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of probation. As the trial 

court noted, the defendant had an extensive history of committing similar thefts and had 

previously been granted parole for those offenses, which he violated on several occasions. 

Although the defendant testified that he had put aside the funds to reimburse the victim, 

the trial court noted that the defendant had not made any payments toward restitution. As 

evidenced by the record on appeal, the trial court thoroughly considered all the evidence 

prior to denying probation and ordering restitution, and the trial court stated its reasons for 

doing so. The defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

The defendant specifically takes issue with the trial court’s admittance of statements 

from law enforcement officers and Ms. Frierson in the presentence report. During the 

sentencing hearing, the defendant objected, arguing the statements were irrelevant because 

they discussed charges that were ultimately dismissed. The trial court found that the law 

enforcement statements were reliable hearsay and that any statement related to dismissed 

charges was relevant to the defendant’s criminal history. However, the trial court noted 

that it would “give little, if any, weight to the allegation of crime that was dismissed without 

specific proof from the victim or an agency.” The trial court also overruled the defendant’s 

objection regarding Ms. Frierson’s victim impact statement, finding it would consider her 

description of dismissed charges as part of the defendant’s criminal history and noting that 

Ms. Frierson was present at the sentencing hearing to testify regarding the contents of her

statement.

We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the statements 

from law enforcement officers and Ms. Frierson. It is well-settled in Tennessee that a trial 

court has statutory authority to admit trustworthy and probative evidence, including 

reliable hearsay, for sentencing purposes as long as the defendant is “accorded a fair 

opportunity to rebut any hearsay evidence so admitted.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-209(b); 

see also State v. Flynn, 675 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). Furthermore, the 

trial court may “look behind the plea bargain and consider the true nature of the offenses 

committed.” State v. Hollingsworth, 647 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tenn. 1983) (citing State v. 

Welch, 565 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. 1978)); see also State v. Pierce, 138 S.W.3d 820, 828 

(Tenn. 2004). In other words, “a trial court is not restricted to considering only the crime 

to which the defendant pled guilty, but may consider what the evidence shows actually 

happened.” State v. Hargrove, No. M2005-00300-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1896353, at 

*19 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 7, 2006), no perm. app. filed. Here, Ms. Frierson testified at 

the sentencing hearing, and the defendant cross-examined her regarding her victim impact 

statement. Additionally, the defendant was given notice of law enforcement officers’

agency statements more than one month in advance of the sentencing hearing. The 
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defendant was free to seek a continuance in order to subpoena the officers in question or 

rebut their statements during the defendant’s own testimony, but he declined that 

opportunity. Moreover, the trial court noted that it would give little, if any weight, to 

dismissed charges that were not supported by proof at the sentencing hearing. The 

defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

While the defendant also contends the trial court’s statement that the defendant’s 

“mental and physical condition and social history – which would border on being a 

sociopath” was based on speculation and not supported by the record, when viewed in the 

context of the trial court’s complete oral findings, the brief reference was clearly in relation

to the defendant’s extensive criminal record, which spanned the defendant’s entire adult 

life and included convictions for theft, assault, forgery, burglary, possession of drugs, 

unlawful possession of a weapon, and aggravated perjury, and the defendant’s decision to 

steal money from his mentally and physically disabled sister-in-law in order to pay the bills 

of his other family. The trial court’s comment indicates a concern with the defendant’s 

likelihood to re-offend and potential for rehabilitation. As previously discussed, the trial 

court’s denial of probation and imposition of incarceration is entitled to a presumption of 

correctness absent an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the defendant is not entitled to 

relief on this issue.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

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 J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE