# ORIGINAL 

# itio-ts

No.

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

CLARENCE DANNEL DUNNINGTON APPELLANT

vs.

STATE OF TEXAS 

## RECEIVED IN COURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALS DEC 04 2015 

### Abel Acosta, Clerk



## COURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALS

Abel Acosta, Clerk
PETITION IN CAUSE No. 296-80895-2013 FROM THE 296th DISTRICT COURT OF COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS AND APPEAL No. 05-14-00127-CR FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Clarence Dannel Dunnington #1909127 Robertson Unit 12071 F.M. 3522 Abilene, Texas 79601
PRO SEIDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P 38.1(a), the parties to this suit are as follows: 1. Appellant - Clarence Dannel Dunnington 2. Appellate Attorney for Appellant
Heather J. Barbieri Barbieri Law Firm, P.C. SBOT 24007298 1400 Gables Court Piano, Texas 75075 3. Trial .Attorney for Appellant Richard Franklin SBOT 07378600 Robbie McClung SBOT 00789772 100 Highland Park Village Suite 200 Dallas, Texas 75205
4. Prosecutors By and through Greg Willism Collin County District Attorney John Rolater, Assistant District Attorney Collin County Courthouse 2100 Bloomdale Road, Suite 100 McKinney, Texas 75071 5. Trial Judge Collin County Courthouse 296th 2100 Bloomdale Road McKinney, Texas 75071TABLE OF CONTENTS IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES iii WORD COUNT ,iv STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .... 1 STATEMENT OF CASE 1 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1 GROUND FOR REVIEW . 1 The Court of Appeals erred when it held there was sufficient evidence to prove Appellant was guilty under the Law of Parties when it did not properly consider in its opinion that there was neither direct nor circumstancial evidence to prove that Appellant was acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, and that he solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid another person, to commit the offense. ARGUMENT 2 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 5 APPENDIX . , 5

11CONSTITUTION U.S. Const. Amend. 14th

STATUTES INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979) Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.01(a) (Vernon 2003) Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003) Tex. Penal Code Ann. §19.02(b)(1) (Vernon 2003) Tex. Penal Code Ann. §19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2003) Tex. Penal Code Ann. §36.06(a)(1) (Vernon 2003)

CASES Dewberry-v-State, 4 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) Jackson-v-Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) Matson-v-State, 819 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Crim. App 1991) Moreno-v-State, 775 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Crim. App 1988) Nelson-v-State, 405 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. App - Houston 2013) Perry-v-State, 977 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App - Houston 1998) Temple-v-State, 390 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. Crim. App 2013)

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-'JTO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS: Clarence Dannel Dunnington petitions this Honorable Court to review the judgement affirming his conviction for Capital Murder in Cause No. 296-80895-2013.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT The Appellant, Clarence Dannell Dunnington, requests oral argument before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, because oral argument will assist the Court in determining whether the Court of Appeals erred when it determined that petitioner did not carry his burden to show thattfihe trial courts denial of his sufficiency challenge was clearly erroneous.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Appellant was charged by indictment with the offense of Capital Murder for Retaliation./ A jury convicted him under the Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(9) (C.R. 1-84). Appellant was sentenced to LIFE without Parole in the Texas Department of Corrections and no fine. The Court of Appeals for the 5th Court of Appeals District of Texas affirmed the judgement and sentence on August 31st, 2015 in an opinion not desianated for publication.

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

### A three Justice panel of the Court of Appeals rendered its opinion 

### on August 31st, 2015. Dunnington-v-State, 05-14-00127-CR (Tex. App
- Dallas 

### August 31st, 2015, pet. filed)(mem. op. not designated for publication). Subsequently petitioner filed a motion for an extention of time which the Court of Criminal Appeals extended his time to file a petition for discretio nary review to November 30, 2015. PD-1170-15. He files this petition timely in concurrance with this date.

GROUND FOR REVIEW 

### The Court of Appeals erred when it held there was sufficient 

### evidence to prove Appellant was Guilty under the Law of Parties when it did 

### not properly consider in its opinion that there was neither direct nor circum stantial evidence to prove that Appellant was acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, and that he solicited, encouraged, 

### directed, aided, or attempted to aid another person to commit the offense.

-1-ARGUMENT REASON FOR GRANTING REVIEW: The Court of Appeals affirmed Appellants sufficiency claim holding that "based on the totality of the evidence, a jury could have reasonably concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was guilty as a party to the murder of Velasquez." (CO.A. op. pg 8); In respects to this decision, petitioner argues this finding did not consider lack of evidence relevant to support states claim, that Appellant acted within intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, and that he solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid another person to commit the murder of Velasquez. Under the law of parties, "[a] person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both." Tex, PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(a)(Vernon 2003). A person is "criminally respons ible" for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encou rages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2). A person commits "retaliation" if he intentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm another by an unlawful act in retaliation for, or on account of, the service or status of another as a public servant, witness prospective witness, informant, or person who has reported or who the actor 

### knows intends to report the occurance of a crime. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06(a)(1).Appellants focus is on the Law of Parties, the Court of Appeals completely ignored that not person or gunman identified Appellant as a party to the offense, the Court of Appeals acknowledges the retaliation, (CO.A. op. pg 6) but not the law of parties under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(a) (Vernon 2003). Id. § 7.02(a)(2).

THE SALIENT FACTS This petition conserns a sufficiency claim at petitioners trial. Therefore the statement of facts in this petition will limit itself only to the facts salient to this ground for review. At petitioners trial state argues Appellant acted with intent to promote or assist a third-party gunman

-2-in the intentional murder of Jessica Velasquez. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court considers all evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson-v-Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The petitio ner argues that the State lacked the evidence to present said offense to the jury,: while the State relies on case law cited out of Temple-v-State; when the record supports conflicting inferences, the Court presumes that the jury resolved the conflicts of the verdict and defers to that determination. Temple-v-State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The Petitioner argues that the record lacks support because the alleged gunman was never presented at trial which is not petitioners sole claim pertaining to the sufficiency as stated in Perry-v-State, 977 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Tex. App - Houston 1998, no pet.); but the lack of direct evidence comports to the claim petitio ner brings forth. Respectfully the Court of Appeals claim, "the State is not required to present evidence of the specific acts or statements that constitute participation in an offense." (CO.A. op. pg 6) According to the law of parties TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (Vernon 2003) and according to "retaliation" read in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06(a)(1) a person must have "Intentionally" knowledge, of the cause, he must promote or assist in the commission of the offense. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the Appellate Court's duty is not "to disregard, realign, or weigh evidence. This the fact finder has already done." Moreno-v-State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), The Appellate.Court may reverse the verdict only if that verdict is irrational or unsupported by the evidence. Matson -v-State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex. Crim. App). Also both the State and Court of Appeals cites Nelson-v-State to show petitioners guilt. (CO.A. op. pg 6). In Nelson-v-State 405 S.W.3dll3, 125-126; the defendant "had knowledge about the complainant's death that only someone involved in the murder could have had."

THE COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING The Court of Appeals held that "the State presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to reasonably make this finding", "We conclude based on the totality of the evidence, a jury could have reasonably concluded beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was guilty as a party to the murder of Velasquez."
-3-THE STATE DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW PETITIONER INTENTIONALLY WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAUSE, PROMOTE OR ASSISTED IN COMMISSION OF SAID OFFENSE. The Court of Criminal Appeals has consistently held the Appellates 

### Court duty is not to realign or re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. Dewberry -v-State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Moreno-v-State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). In both these cases the duty was for them to weigh the evidence not be the 13th juror, the State clearly presented evidence with no direct admonishment from the petitioner nor any other witness or co-defendant. The State along with the Court of Appeals used cumulative evidence to bring upon the petitioner none of which shows any intentional actions taken by petitioner to commit said offense. In the instant case the Court of Appeals only answers petitioners 

### claim by piecing it together as a "puzzle" to show petitioners guilty something in which the jury has done. Respectfully the Courts detoured from actually 

### answering his claim, petitioner reinterates the States sole issue is that the petitioner "promoted, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted 

### to aid another person to commit the offense" Id § 7.02(a)(2). All without showing he intentionally aided in committing this act. However, where as in this case, the Court of Appeals reviews a case without considering all the relevant evidence or lack thereof it should remand the cause for a new factual determination which takes into account all such material or lack thereof.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF For the reasons here in alleged, the Court of Appeals erred in 

### overruling appellants sole error in Appeal No. 05-14-00127-CR. Therefore, Appellant prays this Honorable Court grant this petition, order briefing and upon reviewing the judgment entered be loss, reverse the judgment of of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for review consistent with this Court's holding. Respectfully Submitted,

Clarence Dannel Dunnington #1909127 Robertson Unit 12071 FM 3522 Abilene, TX 79601 -4-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, pursuant to Rule 9.5 and 68.11 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing petition for discretionary review has been sent to John Rolater, Coling County D.A Office, 2100 Bloomingdale Road, Suite 100, McKinney, Texas, 75071 and sent to State prosecuting attorney, P.O Box 13046, Austin Texas on this day of 2015.

APPENDIX Clarence Dannel Dunnington Pro Se



### Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Court of Appeals District of Texas, Clarence Dannel Dunnington, No. 05-14-00127-CR (Tex. App
- Dallas August 31st 2015, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

-5-ChiefJustice Carolyn Wright Justices

David L. Bridges Molly Francis Douglas S. Lang Elizabeth Lang-Miers Robert M. Fillmore Lana Myers David Evans David Lewis Ada Brown Craig Stoddart Bill Whitehill David J. Schenck 

### Court ofAppeals 

### jf iftJ) Btstrtct ofdexag at ©alias 600 Commerce Street, Suite 200 Dallas, Texas 75202 (214)712-3400 August 31, 2015 FILE COPY

Lisa Matz Clerk ofthe Court (214)712-3450 theclerk@5th.txcourts.gov Gayle Humpa Business Administrator (214)712-3434 gayle.humpa@5th.txcourts.gov
Facsimile (214)745-1083

Internet www.txcourts.gov/5thcoa.aspx

Heather J. Barbieri Attorney at Law 5600 Tennyson Pkwy Ste 205 Piano, TX 75024-3605 * DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL * RE: CourtofAppeals Number: Trial Court Case Number: Greg Willis Collin County DistrictAttorney 2100 Bloomdale Rd., Ste. 20004 McKinney, TX 75071-8313 * DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL * 05-14-00127-CR 296-80895-2013 

### Style: Clarence Dannel Dunnington

v. The State ofTexas 

### Please find attached the opinion that issued in the above cause today. Respectfully, /s/ Lisa Matz, Clerk ofthe Court 

### cc: The Honorable Mary L. Murphy (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL) Andrea StrohThompson (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL) The Honorable John RoachJr. (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL) 

### Libby Joy Lange (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)AFFIRM; and Opinion FiledAugust31,2015.

In The 

## Court ofAppeals ifitfth. Btstrtct nf Qtexas at Dallas
No. 05-14-00127-CR CLARENCE DANNEL DUNNINGTON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

### OnAppealfrom the 296th Judicial DistrictCourt Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-80895-2013



### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before ChiefJustice Wright, Justice Brown, and Justice Stoddart Opinion by Justice Brown 

### A jury convicted Clarence Dannel Dunnington ofcapital murder. The State's theory of guilt was that appellant, acting as a party, participatedin the victim's murder inretaliationfor her providing information to police that resulted in appellant's arrest. In a single issue, appellant asserts the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. For the following reasons,

we affirm. 

### On December 14, 2011, JessicaVelasquez was shot and killed on aresidential street in an old and close-knit neighborhood in Piano, Texas, known as the "Douglas Community." 

### Velasquez was twenty-three years' old at the time ofher death. She suffered from bi-polar disorder, had drug problems, and sometimes engaged in prostitution for drugs and money. 

### Appellantwas one ofthe dealers who supplied her. He lived in Wylie, Texas, but had close ties to the Douglas Community, where his grandmotherlived, and he was known as "Rabbit."On December 10, 2011, a few days before she was murdered, Velasquez and her 

### boyfriend Paul Lankfort rented a motel room at a Motel 6. Appellant had also rented a room at 

### the motel and supplied Velasquez drugs throughout the night. The following morning, Detective Jake Wicker was conducting surveillance ofthe motel. He observed Velasquez exit her motel 

### room, knock on appellant's door a few rooms down, and enter. She emerged about an hour later and returned to the room she shared with Lankfort. Wicker knocked on Velasquez's door and 

### asked her why she had gone to appellant's room. She appeared "high," but denied doing any 

### drugs. But she also told Wicker she had seen drugs in appellant's room. Wicker thenknocked 

### on appellant's door, told appellant he had information there were drugs in his room and questioned him about the woman who had just left. Wicker also asked forconsent to search. Appellant consented to the search, and policefound crackcocaine, a pistol, a ski-mask, two cell phones and$410in cash. Appellant wasarrested and booked intojail. Two days later, and one day before themurder, appellant wasreleasedfrom jail. He went to the home of Mary Walker who lived in theDouglas Community. Walker testified at trial that 

### appellant was "pissed off," cursed Velasquez, complained that "bitch" got him "arrested," and said when he saw her he was "going to run over her, back up, and run over her again." The next day, Velasquez got into a car with Octavio Reyna-Rivera, a man she did not 

### know. Reyna-Rivera testified at trial that he agreed to help Velasquez find drugs. Velasquez directed him to Walker's house. Walker was angry with Velasquez for snitching on appellant, 

### but she and her boyfriend Marcus Hernandez agreed to make some calls and find drugs for 

### Velasquez. TheyusedReyna-Rivera's phonetodo so. Phonerecords show one ofthe numbers called was to aNokia phone. The State presented comprehensive evidence showing appellant 

### usedthatphonetoconducthis drugbusiness. Forexample, evidence showedthis wasthephone

-2-

### numberVelasquez used to contact appellant during the Motel 6 incident, and it was also the phonenumberHernandeztold policehe used tocontactappellant.' Although they called appellant's cell phone, they also called another drug dealer who agreed to bring Velasquezdrugs. After the drugsarrived, VelasquezandReyna-Riverawent to a parking lot where Velasquez smoked the crack. When she was done, she wantedmore. In an effort to find more cocaine, she began making calls on Reyna-Rivera's phone. Reyna-Rivera 

### testified Velasquez was not dialing, butjusthitting redial, and he could hear only one sideofthe conversation. Reyna-Rivera's cell phone records show Velasquez was also receiving incoming 

### calls. The phone records show one ofthose incoming calls came from the Nokia phone appellant used to conduct his drug business, a number Velasquez had not dialed. After speaking on the phone, Velasquez told Reyna-Rivera that she had found someone who would give her drugs for free. Reyna-Rivera took Velasquez to meet this man. He was the last person Velasquez spoketo on Reyna-Rivera's phone. When they found him, Velasquez did not appear to know the man. Nevertheless, he got 

### into Reyna-Rivera's car. The man told them he did not have the drugs with him, but directed them to where they could get them. When they arrived at the location to get the drugs, the man got outofthe carand immediately shot Velasquez several times at close range. Reyna-Rivera fled into a nearby home. The gunman followed, shooting at Reyna-Rivera and also at the homeowner. After the gunman fled the scene, Reyna-Rivera returned to Velasquez, who was dead. His cell phone was gone.

After Velasquez used the Nokia phone number to contact appellant during the night of the Motel 6 incident, he was arrested with two phones, one a Nokia phone, the other his personal LG phone. When he wasjailed, he asked his girlfriend, Jessica Cook, to pick up the Nokia phone and deliver it to a known drug dealer. Upon his release, appellant immediately called the Nokia phone from his personal cell phone. Cell tracking information showed the two phones soon thereafter started "traveling together."Witnesses saw two cars flee the scene after the shooting. One fit the description of 

### Reyna-Rivera's vehicle and the other was a light-coloredvehicle with a square back which fit the description ofappellant's Ford Fusion. 

### Almost immediately after the shooting, Velasquez's boyfriend Lankfort received a call 

### from "Shay," another local drug dealer who knewVelasquez. Shay toldLankfordVelasquezhad been killed for being a snitch. Shay also told Lankford where he could find Velasquez's body. Lankfortthenwent to the scene, where he told police about Shay's call. 

### Police discovered that Velasquez, just three days prior, had given police information that 

### led to appellant's arrest. Police had also received anonymous phone tips that "Rabbit" and "Cagan" had been involved in a murder. 

### The State also provided evidence, through phone records, that showed appellant was in 

### possession of the Nokia phone used by the gunman shortly before the murder. Specifically, about an hour before the murder, texts were exchanged between the Nokia phone and Susan 

### Mounsey, awoman with whomappellant had a sexual relationship, but wasotherwise without ties to appellant's associates or the Douglas Community. 

### The State also presented "cell phone tracking" evidence, specifically evidence from which the location ofa cell phone could be determined. That evidence showed that both the 

### phone thegunman used andappellant's personal cell phone were in thevicinity of themurder when it occurred and that both phones then "traveled" to Wylie, Texas, immediately after the murder. The State further showed the Nokia phone was later found in a searchofappellant's residence after his arrest for this offense. 

### Afterhearingtheevidence, thejurywas instructed inaccordancewiththelawofparties, 

### andfoundappellantguiltyofcapitalmurder. Inhis soleissue, appellantcontendstheevidenceis legallyinsufficientto showhe wasguiltyas apartytoVelasquez'smurder.

-A-

### When reviewing the sufficiency ofthe evidence, we consider all ofthe evidence in the 

### light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a 

### reasonable doubt. Temple v. State,390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Jacksonv. 

### Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The jury is the sole judge ofthe credibility ofthe witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360. Thejurymay draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

### When analyzing the sufficiency ofthe evidence, we "determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Claytonv. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 

### (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A jury may draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each inference is supported by the evidence (direct or circumstantial) presented at trial. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As applicable to this case, a person commits capital murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death ofan individual and intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit retaliation. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(2) (West 2011). A person commits retaliation ifhe intentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm another by an unlawful act in retaliation for a person providing information to police about an offense. See Tex. Pen. CodeAnn. § 36.06(a)(1) (West2011); see also Morrow
v. State, 862 S.W.2d 612, 614-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 

### A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct ofanother if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission ofthe offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2); see Patterson v. State, 950 S.W.2d 196, 202 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. refd). In reviewing the

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### sufficiency ofevidence under the law ofparties, we consider "eventsoccurring before, during and afterthe commission ofthe offense and may rely on actions ofthe defendant which show an 

### understanding andcommon design to do theprohibited act." Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Each fact need not pointdirectly andindependently to the guilt of 

### the appellant, as long as the cumulative effect of all the incriminating facts are sufficient to supporttheconviction. Id. Circumstantialevidence alonemaybeusedtoprovethat apersonis


### apartyto anoffense. Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Beardsley
v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Wygal v. State, 555 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). 

### According to appellant, the State failed to prove his guiltbecause it did not present evidence showing "what actions" he took thatamounted to "soliciting, encouraging, directing, 

### aiding or attempting to aid the unknown gunman." But the State is notrequired to present evidence of the specific acts or statements thatconstitute participation in anoffense. See, e.g., Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004);Nelson v. State, 405 S.W.3d 113, 

### 125-126 (Tex. App.—Houston 2013, pet.refd). Instead, thequestion iswhetherthe jury could 

### reasonably find, beyond areasonable doubt, based on thecollective force of all of theevidence presented, whetherappellantwas aparticipantin Velasquez'smurderand knew he wasassisting in the offense. Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 50. We conclude the State presented sufficient evidence to allow thejurytoreasonablymake this finding. 

### Velasquez, who was generally known to be a sweet, buttroubled young woman, was 

### murderedjustdays after she gave police informationthat led to appellant's arrest. Motive is a 

## significantcircumstanceindicatingguilt. Guevara, 152S.W.3dat50. Moreover,thedaybefore shewaskilled, appellanthadmadethreatstoharmVelasquez,blamingherforhis arrest. Onthe

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### day she was killed, the gunman, using appellant's phone, lured Velasquez with promises of free drugs and then gunnedher down. 

### Cell phone tracking information showed both the Nokia phone used by the gunman and 

### appellant's personal cell phone were in the area where the murder occurred. The cell phone tracking information also showed that immediately after the murder, the cell phones traveled to Wylie, where appellant resided. Further, a car matching the description ofappellant's was seen fleeing the scene. Finally, the phone used by the gunman was later found in a search of appellant's bedroom. 

### Additionally, when appellant heard he was a suspect in this offense, he contacted police in an effort to exonerate himself. He told them he was in Wylie, Texas, with his girlfriend 

### Jessica Cook at the time ofthe murder. However, cell phone data from his personal phone, an 

### LG phone appellanttold police was always with him, showed appellant was not in Wylie at that time. Cell phone evidence also showed appellantwas calling and texting Cook from his personal cell phone in this sametime period whenhe claimedto be with Cook. Cooktestified at trial, and attempted to provide appellant with an alibi, but she acknowledged that they would not have needed to text or talk on the phone ifshe and appellant had been together. Attempts to conceal incriminating evidence and giving false statements to authorities are also probative ofwrongful conduct and circumstances ofguilt. Id.

## Court ofAppeals 

## Jfffftlj district of Qtexas at Ballas JUDGMENT
CLARENCE DANNEL DUNNINGTON, Appellant
No. 05-14-00127-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

### On Appeal from the 296thJudicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296-80895-2013. Opiniondeliveredby Justice Brown. Chief Justice Wright and Justice Stoddart participating. Based on the Court's opinionofthis date, thejudgmentofthe trial courtisAFFIRMED. 

### Judgmententeredthis 31st day ofAugust, 2015.

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