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UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

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“Efforts to contain and 

resolve conflict must employ 

a regional lens and take into 

consideration the role of 

cross-border transactions.

”

June 2016

Peacebuilding in Libya

Cross-Border Transactions 

and the Civil Society Landscape

Sherine N. El Tarabou

Email: s.eltaraboulsi.odi.org.uk

PEACEBRIEF208

Introduction

Despite the United Nations (UN) brokering of the Government of National Accord in Libya, there 

is no political consensus on the ground and militia groups maintain a stronghold.1 While the 

implications of Libya’s unrest in the region have been analyzed, little attention has been given to 

transactions across the Tunisian-Libyan borders beyond arms smuggling. While arms trafficking is 

indeed occurring, other exchanges are helping to shape the political and civic landscape in Libya. 

Organizations in Libya are learning lessons from Tunisia’s experience with civil society engagement 

and political settlements. In fact, a large portion of Libya’s civil society now operates out of Tunis. 

Thus, the structuring of political capital, defined here as investment in a particular political settlement for Libya, is undoubtedly informed both in the short and long terms by cross-border transactions. This means that the regional context is as significant as the local and international contexts 

when designing a peacebuilding intervention. 

Summary

• Cross-border transactions in North Africa support both conflict and peacebuilding. For instance, 

while these transactions include arms smuggling, they also include civil society exchanges that 

are helping to shape both the political and civic landscape in Libya. 

• The emergence of complex networks across North Africa has made it impossible to effectively 

design an intervention without taking them into account. More multilateral and bilateral attention to civic regional transactions would help build a sustainable infrastructure for peace.

• These cross-border networks are rooted in historical and communal ties. Their strength presents 

an opportunity and a challenge to peacebuilding.

• Achieving peace in Libya is partly dependent on the continuity and reworking of these networks 

and how they manifest themselves on both sides of the borders. Regional and international 

actors must participate in efforts to realize a unified local vision. 
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Peacebuilding in Libya

Page 2 • PB 208 • June 2016

This brief draws on qualitative analysis that combines desk research and fieldwork in Tunisia in 

April 2015. As the centrality of regional and international networks unfolded, particularly related to 

activist and Muslim Brotherhood members, follow-up and verification interviews were conducted 

with respondents in the United Kingdom (in person) and in France, Turkey, and Malta (via Skype). 

Twenty semistructured interviews were conducted with Libyan civil society leaders based in 

Tunisia; Tunisian civil society leaders with activities in Libya; and Libyan youth activists in the 

United Kingdom, Tunisia, France, Turkey, and Malta with activities in Tunisia and Libya. 

Networks and Tribal Linkages 

Cross-border exchanges between Libya and Tunisia are rooted in historical and communal ties. 

The Jefara Region has a history of largely informal, cross-border tribal and economic exchanges between Tunisia and Libya. These exchanges flourished in the 1960s following the discovery of oil in 

Libya.2 The Twazin tribe in Tunisia and Nwayel tribe in Libya developed a range of black market services, including exchanging money and smuggling people. The exchanges continued to expand, 

particularly during the UN embargo of Libya and after adoption of the 1989 Treaty Establishing the 

Arab Maghreb Union, which opened the borders between Tunisia and Libya. In 2010, an estimated 

ten thousand Libyans and Tunisians crossed the Ras Jedir border each day.3 However, following the 

2011 revolutions, informal economic exchanges in the Jefara Region collapsed; trafficking across 

Ras Jedir became one way from Libya to Tunisia and demand shifted to mainly staples like food 

and medical supplies.4

Civic Transactions Post-2011 

Between 2011 and 2015, hundreds of civil society organizations (CSOs) and initiatives emerged in 

Libya, but the majority have stopped operating because of the conflict or have shifted their focus 

to humanitarian aid.5 Of the 1,900 CSOs registered in Libya, 90 percent were officially registered 

after the 2011 uprising.6 Interviews conducted in Tunisia show that most CSOs have fled the 

conflict and are operating out of Tunis. For Libyans, starting an organization in Tunisia is difficult, 

but most respondents have been trying to either partner with a Tunisian organization or secure 

funding from international donors. 

In 2015, Libyan civil society activists were facing extreme security threats. One respondent said, 

“Civil society activists are getting jailed, photographers are getting kidnapped, and young people 

are disappearing from Libya.”7 She estimated that “60 percent of civil society leaders and activists 

are operating from abroad and many pass through Tunisia.” Libyan civil society leaders now based 

in Tunis are benefiting from their observations of Tunisian counterparts. An association called 

We Love Sousse, which heads the Anna Lindh Foundation’s national network in Tunisia, has been 

developing linkages between civil society in Libya and Tunisia via roundtable discussions and 

workshops. However, the association has been facing challenges (e.g., getting Libyan workshop 

participants to Tunis because of insecurity in Libya and navigating the Tunisian border control, 

which, at times, does not allow participants in). 

Some institutionalization of the lessons learned has occurred; for example, an association 

for Libyan judges emerged in 2012 as an offshoot of its Tunisian counterpart. According to one 

founder, although the association has no official headquarters in Libya, it is registered and currently focusing on the rights of judges who have become “swayed by the power dominant in the 

place where they operate.”8 For instance, a judge in the eastern part of Libya is likely to submit to 

the forces of the Tobruk-based government. Generally speaking, all respondents decried the lack 

of an independent judiciary in Libya and identified it as a main cause of the civil war. 
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Peacebuilding in Libya

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Tunisia has a largely unified front of human rights defenders, which is lacking in Libya even 

though civil society exchanges are taking place. The effort is immediately inhibited by the fragmented and polarized Libyan setting; while the exchanges between Tunisia and Libya are helping 

sustain the civic consciousness that emerged in 2011, they are also feeding existing divisions. 

Human rights organizations in Libya are as divided as the country’s politics; those in the east are 

documenting violations taking place in the west to gain the favor of the government in the east, 

and those in the west are doing the exact opposite.9

Key Tensions

Cross-border transactions are affected by myriad tensions that manifest themselves differently in 

each country. However, the regional dialectic that occurs as a result provides an opportunity to 

maintain civic capital and ease those tensions.

Civil society and political shifts. While Tunisian civil society is heavily influenced by political 

shifts, it has the capacity to operate in an apolitical manner. There are still cultural and grassroots 

organizations that do not support a particular political effort. For Libyan civil society leaders, this is 

not the reality. One respondent, however, described an organization she cofounded as apolitical; 

and when asked to describe what that meant and what politics was for her, she said that “politics 

for me is governmental politics....We do not side with political parties or do events for them and 

we do not get funding from them.”10 When probed regarding how she manages to engage young 

people from different political leanings, she described how civil society is a means to “give back” to 

Libya and that it can be a mechanism whereby young people from a divided country can be united 

behind one cause. She emphasized that “politics are split but the people are not” and that they 

should be given a chance to exercise unity. Civil society in Libya seems to be defining itself by what 

it is not, rather than taking up a consolidated identity. 

Profit- and mission-driven goals. One respondent related that “it is all about money” and that the 

flood of donor funds in Libya has led to more harm than good.11 Political activists became “hired” and 

thus attached to particular efforts instead of staying autonomous and helping establish a vision for 

their country. Donors, according to most respondents, are selective; certain organizations are focused 

on, but they are not necessarily the ones that will have the most impact on the ground. 

Donor-driven activism was described as a problem. “Star-activism” impedes the coalescing of a 

vision needed for national unity. According to one respondent, “I have seen cases where donors 

would give us a call and say we have $25,000—what projects would you like to launch?”12 Eight to 

nine organizations continue to receive funding in Tripoli; the rest are not funded either because 

of the lack of capacity to develop proposals and applications or lack of related experience. In 

addition, donors are often driven by pressure to “burn” or spend money, without regard to what 

is happening on the ground. For example, donors agreed to fund an initiative to raise awareness 

around elections, but the funds arrived only three weeks before the elections and, thus, the money 

became useless. 

Minority groups and identity politics. Minority groups in Libya have been caught in a precarious situation where they either become allies to one of the two governments or maintain a low 

profile to avoid polarization. Now, with many minority group members located in Tunisia, a country 

with a stronger and more coherent identity, the groups are exploring ways to align their identity 

with Libya’s statebuilding project. Some Amazigh activists expressed their desire to launch a 

separate state, while others have committed to becoming part of a unified Libya.13 Within that 

struggle, a window of opportunity for minority groups to negotiate and assert their identity has 

presented itself via the civic landscape. A founder of a youth organization for Touareg described its 
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Peacebuilding in Libya

Page 4 • PB 208 • June 2016

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effort to “change the perception of Touareg as solely tribal” and learn from Tunisia’s experience to 

develop mechanisms that “cultivate allegiance to a state and not to neighbourhoods or tribes.”14

However, having been internally displaced after 2011 (because of supporting the Gaddafi camp), 

the organization is laying low politically and not openly engaging militarily. The Tebu have also 

embarked on establishing their identity via the creation of associations and coalitions.

Conclusion 

Efforts to contain and resolve conflict must employ a regional lens and take into consideration 

the role of cross-border transactions. Donor money has flooded the civic space both in Libya 

and, subsequently, Tunisia, but resource use has not fully accounted for regional activities or the 

needs on the ground in Libya. Donor spending should be coordinated with various local actors to 

effectively support the peacebuilding process and achieve a unified vision for the country. 

Notes

1. Rana Jawad, “Libya: Can Unity Government Restore Stability?” BBC News, www.bbc.co.uk/

news/world-africa-35959847, accessed April 14, 2016. 

2. Moncef Kartas, On the Edge? Trafficking and Insecurity at the Tunisian-Libyan Border (Geneva: 

Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013).

3. Ibid. 

4. Ibid. 

5. See Sherine N. El Taraboulsi, Mahi Khallaf, Ahmed Salah Eldin, Almongi Zidi, and Naila Taji 

Farouky, Giving in Transition and Transitions in Giving: Philanthropic Practices in Egypt, Libya, 

and Tunisia 2011–2013 (Cairo: John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement, 

American University in Cairo, 2013). 

6. Walid Salhi and Khalil Jibara, Mapping and Participatory Needs Assessment of Civil Society in 

Libya (Tripoli: Foundation for the Future, 2012), www.foundationforfuture.org/en/Portals/0/

Publications/Mapping%20and%20Participatory%20Needs%20Assessment%20of%20

Civil%20Society%20in%20Libya.pdf, accessed April 14, 2016. 

7. Interview, civil society leader, Tunis, April 9, 2015. 

8. Interview, former security officer, Tunis, April 17, 2015. 

9. Interview, former security officer, Tunis, April 17, 2015; interview, civil society leader, April 9, 

2015; and interview, civil society leader (youth), April 12, 2015. 

10. Interview, Tunis, civil society leader, April 9, 2015. 

11. Interview, Tunis, civil society leader, April 9, 2015. 

12. Interview, Tunis, civil society leader (youth), April 12, 2015. 

13. Interview, Naples, Italy, Amazigh activist, December 2014. 

14. Interview, Tunis, civil society leader, April 20, 2015. 

About This Bri

Sherine N. El Taraboulsi is a 

research fellow for the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas 

Development Institute and a 

doctoral candidate in international 

development at Oxford University. This brief is based on desk 

research and fieldwork conducted 

in Tunisia in April 2015 to examine 

the role of cross-border transactions in peacebuilding in Libya.