© USIP 2015 • All rights reserved.

United States Institute of Peace • www.usip.org • Tel. 202.457.1700 • 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

@usip

“One of the contributing 

factors to Afghanistan’s long 

period of civil conflict has 

been the fluidity within military 

alliances at the sub-national 

level, preventing any given 

coalition from dominating.”

June 2015

Mallory Sutika Sipus Insurgent Alliances in Afghanistan

E-mail: mallory.sutika@gmail.com

PEACEBRIEF186

Introduction

One of the contributing factors to Afghanistan’s long period of civil conflict has been the fluidity 

within military alliances at the sub-national level, preventing any given coalition from dominating. 

The degree to which insurgent commanders in Afghanistan coordinate their activities and submit 

to the overall strategic direction of senior Taliban leadership has been a subject of considerable 

debate over the past decade of conflict. Most insurgent forces are organized into localized fighting 

groups, and the extent to which they coordinate their actions varies. This brief explores findings 

from a Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) study that examines the circumstances of such 

cooperative agreements, based on field research in five Afghan provinces.1

Summary

• The degree to which insurgent commanders in Afghanistan coordinate their activities and 

submit to the overall strategic direction of senior Taliban leadership is a subject of considerable debate. Most insurgent forces are organized into localized fighting groups, and the 

extent to which they coordinate their actions varies. 

• Overall, the decision to forge an alliance with another group is very much context specific. 

Commanders have to weigh a host of factors, including the extent to which they are integrated in a higher command structure and the relative strength of local leadership, the level 

of violence or security in the area, and the specific objectives of the group.

• Although fighting groups sometimes rely on outside stakeholders to bridge trust gaps with 

other commanders, tribal elders rarely play a role in alliance formation. Though limited in 

the formative stages, communities do appear to play a supportive role once alliances are 

established.

• Generally, the working agreements studied were considered mutually beneficial by respondents. Those few groups that did break with alliance partners often attributed their split to 

disagreements over Pakistani intervention in the conflict. 

• The CAPS study reinforces assessments of the importance of local commander-level decision 

making in consolidating what is otherwise an organizationally fragmented insurgency. Buy-in 

from senior leadership will be critical for any future prospective peace agreement to hold 

across antigovernment fighting groups. 
© USIP 2015 • All rights reserved.

Insurgent Alliances in Afghanistan

page 2 • PB 186 • June 2015

Alliance Formation

In forming partnerships with other fighting groups, commanders have to weigh a host of factors, 

including the extent to which potential allies are integrated in a higher command structure, the 

relative strength of local leadership, the level of violence or security, and the specific objectives of 

the group. Due to the localized and closed nature of most fighting groups’ social networks, relationships between groups tend to rely upon outside individuals who share relationships between 

units. These individuals tend to be situated as essential stakeholders—such as a Taliban governor 

or other similar official position—in the local community with a wide range of ties. When the 

individual is not a major stakeholder in the community, he tends to be someone widely respected. 

In Kunduz, for example, most of the commanders interviewed sought assistance and coordination 

from the Taliban shadow district governors and provincial authorities after a series of heavy losses at 

the hands of the Afghan government and, to a lesser extent, coalition forces. Commander respondents told CAPS that they requested assistance from their shadow district governor, who then helped 

make the appropriate arrangements for cooperation with other groups. Nangarhari respondents, 

by contrast, attributed all decisions regarding intergroup working agreements to Taliban provincial 

authorities in a top-down process. Interviews with Herati groups revealed that commanders in 

the province were overall more judicious and reluctant to forge working agreements with groups 

outside the immediate cluster of their social networks. Some Helmand groups adhere very strictly to 

the organization’s chain of command and refuse to step outside of it for fear of harsh repercussions 

from leadership. Factions that may have been more cut off from leadership concentrations in the 

district and provincial centers were able to initiate working agreements with other groups.

The most commonly cited means through which working agreements were solidified between 

insurgent groups were face-to-face meetings. Though meeting in person carries more risk than 

telecommunications, it lays the groundwork for a genuine relationship and mutual respect. Most 

respondents reportedly met only once, while a few interviewees said the agreement took multiple 

meetings to negotiate. In Kunduz, for example, the Taliban district governors are very active in 

their management of the local groups’ partnerships. The governor’s presence aids in trust building, 

particularly when the prospective partners do not know one another or belong to different tribes. 

This also allows the district governor to monitor an alliance and maintain consolidated control over 

his men. Other respondents reportedly met with their alliance partner without the presence of a 

head commander. This was usually done after the head commander had given orders for the groups 

to work together, or in advance of seeking approval for the agreement from leadership. Occasionally, 

in-person jirga meetings convened on a larger scale involving commanders from all local subgroups. 

It is often assumed that community members and tribal elders play a large role in the activities of 

armed groups operating in their area. However, the sample respondents indicate that tribal elders 

rarely play a role in alliance formation. In the rare cases where nonmembers are included in formation 

meetings, the precise extent of their influence over the outcome remains unclear. Though limited in 

the formative stages, communities do appear to play a supportive role once alliances are established; 

one Helmand commander, for example, reported that sometimes tribal elders did attend meetings 

between the alliance partners and weighed in on issues pertaining to the partnership.

Alliance Maintenance and Duration

Once the working relationship has been solidified between the two groups, respondents indicated 

that most communication took place on an ad hoc basis. This is unsurprising given the elastic 

nature of these alliances, where subgroups come together primarily for joint operations at the 
© USIP 2015 • All rights reserved.

Insurgent Alliances in Afghanistan

page 3 • PB 186 • June 2015

request of a higher commander or district governor. The majority of respondents agreed that all 

maintenance communication took place at the commander level, usually at the request of a higher 

commander, often the district governor. Indeed, most soldiers denied participating in planning or 

preparatory measures prior to a joint operation. And despite the relationship mapping matrices 

suggesting otherwise, most soldiers claimed that they did not regularly speak with the men in the 

other group outside of joint fighting opportunities.

Many of the working agreements between groups were reported to have lasted between two 

and four years. However, approximately 68 percent of the quantifiable working agreements were 

reported to have lasted less than two years. This is somewhat surprising given the relatively strong 

interconnections between groups. Familiar relationships, physical distance, tribe, fighting legacy, 

and religious affiliations were all considered by CAPS as strong social linkages between individual 

members of a given Afghan community. Perhaps there are other indicators that were not collected 

that have a greater impact on relationship strength.

Relationship metrics aside, there are several more possible explanations that may account for 

the short duration of the sample working agreements. Soldiers were unable to reliably speak about 

working agreement durations beyond their own tenure in the organization. External security 

developments may have also impacted the formation of working agreements in that two-year time 

period. It is possible that the sample alliances were formed at a time of heightened pressure during 

the 2010–11 “surge” of U.S. forces and had only aged 1–2 years by the time of study.

Alliance Assessments

Soldier respondents unanimously favored the existence of the alliance to which they were a part. 

This phenomenon was observed in all target provinces and did not appear to correlate to group size 

or alliance duration. It is unclear whether the steadfast support of the alliances were a product of 

genuine, unwavering support or fear of saying something that might be construed as direct criticism 

for the commander or organizational leadership. As seen throughout the interviews, the pressure to 

fully submit to the decisions of the commander is intense. Commander respondents both recognized 

this and prided themselves on their ability to maintain order and authority in their groups.

The vast majority of commanders viewed the alliance experience favorably. Commanders 

typically viewed the strength that comes in numbers as the biggest asset of the working agreement. This notion of strength includes both extra men during coordinated activities as well as the 

idea that the organizations’ morale and overall ideological goals were boosted from unity formed 

through the alliance.

Though many reported that the alliance had only a positive outcome for their group, a few 

respondents were more pragmatic in their assessment. Some recognized the increased financial 

burden that accompanies joint operations. Not all commander complaints were financial: They also 

voiced concerns over their own security and that of their men. By allying his Hizb-e-Islami fighters 

with local Taliban, one local commander feared that his men were at greater risk because “Taliban 

can now come to our area with loaded guns. They could turn their guns on us and attack at any 

time.” Another Helmand commander explained that he felt the joint operations actually made his 

men less safe than working alone.

In those few groups that did report breaking a working agreement, respondents attributed the 

break to disillusionment and frustration with the involvement of Pakistani intelligence apparatuses 

in their operations. This perception of Pakistani intervention was fundamentally at odds with 

the local commanders’ ideas of why they were fighting the war—notions of independence from 
© USIP 2015 • All rights reserved.

USIP provides the analysis, training, and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability, and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

Insurgent Alliances in Afghanistan

page 4 • PB 186 • June 2015

2301 Constitution Ave.

Washington, DC 20037

202.457.1700

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, D.C. 20037

2301 Constitution Ave.

Washington, DC 20037

202.457.1700

foreign intervention and a government that fit their own understanding of Islam. Though only a 

minority of respondents reportedly broke an alliance in this way, these commanders lamented 

what they felt was the loss of a true Islamic jihad.

Conclusions

Although this research was conducted on an exploratory basis, CAPS’ study can provide insight 

for future studies and some potential policy lessons. Upper- and lower-level command was 

supportive of alliance construction, though typically for differing reasons. Lower-level soldiers 

primarily sought strength in alliances, while commanders were more strategic toward deeper 

ambitions. Tribal elders hold almost no influence within alliance formation, yet communities do 

play a supportive role once the alliance is established, if at least to not disrupt the fragile stability 

introduced via the alliance. 

Despite the fragmented nature of the insurgent landscape, responses to this study suggest that 

if commanders and leadership lay down their arms, their soldiers will follow. A political reconciliation between Taliban and Afghan government leadership would probably do the most to encourage soldiers to lay down their arms by officially ending the conflict, but it is also the most difficult. 

While efforts at peace talks should be bolstered, political reconciliation efforts at the provincial, 

district, and community levels must begin immediately and in earnest.

Notes

1. CAPS, in partnership with USIP, conducted mixed-method, field-based research regarding 

alliance formation, structure, maintenance, and resilience among armed groups in five Afghan 

provinces (Kabul, Herat, Helmand, Kunduz, and Nangarhar). The study took place over eleven 

months, from December 1, 2013, to November 30, 2014; in total, CAPS researchers conducted 

145 individual interviews with active, reintegrated, and detained militant commanders, 

soldiers, community elders, and political leaders from approximately forty-two groups in the 

provinces. The majority of the interviewed groups self-identified as active or former Taliban, 

although the Hizb-e Islami of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and other independent armed opposition groups were also studied within the sample. This research primarily focused on mid- and 

sub-level commanders and their subordinate soldiers. Alliances were defined as an agreement between two commanders to work together to further the strategic military or ideological goals of the organization. Most often, these working agreements were made between two 

mid-level commanders; however, agreements between commanders either at the request or 

independent of the higher commander are also present in the sample. 

About This Brief

This brief, prepared by Mallory 

Sutika Sipus, Senior Research Analyst 

at Centre for Conflict and Peace 

Studies, provides a synopsis of key 

takeaways from a larger USIP-supported CAPS study, Understanding 

Alliances in Afghanistan. Additional 

research support for the larger study 

came from CAPS Research Analysts 

Hekmatullah Azamy, Sayed Maqsodi, 

Ehsanullah Kamal, and Dr. Monsoor 

Majaab. Data Visualization Specialist 

Mitchell Sipus also lent his social 

networking expertise. Finally, 

Deputy Head of Research Halim 

Kousary and former CAPS Director 

Mr. Hekmat Karzai contributed key 

substantive and logistical insight.