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UNITED STates institute of peace

© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“The combination of 

improved infrastructure, 

government services in 

marginalized areas inside and 

outside of Port-au-Prince, 

jobs and education for at-risk 

youth, and robust law enforcement can reduce the propensity toward violence in these 

areas, if they are sustained for 

sufficient time and linked to 

longer-term development.”

September 28, 2010 

Crime, Politics and Violence in PostEarthquake Haiti

Summary

•	 Crime and violence are on the rise in Port-au-Prince due to prisoner escapes during the earthquake. Youth gangs and other armed groups are regaining strength in the most vulnerable 

neighborhoods and spreading to other areas of the city. In the tent camps around Port-auPrince, displaced people—especially women—remain vulnerable to crime. These factors have 

contributed to an increasing sense of insecurity.

•	 As political tensions rise in the run-up to elections, armed groups, criminal enterprises and 

vulnerable youth could once again be mobilized by political forces to fuel violence or disrupt 

the political process.

•	 Gangs and their involvement in criminal and political violence are deeply rooted in Haitian 

politics, and fueled by widespread poverty, inadequate police presence, government weakness, and social and economic inequities. Prior to the earthquake, criminal violence had begun 

to decline due to a combination of political reconciliation, law enforcement operations and 

investment in marginalized neighborhoods. 

•	 These fragile gains have been reversed since the earthquake and public confidence in the 

police has been shaken. Directing resources toward mitigating violence while addressing 

the underlying sources of crime and violence should remain a priority in post-earthquake 

reconstruction.

Introduction 

Since the earthquake on January 12, 2010, worldwide attention has focused on rebuilding Haiti’s 

physical infrastructure and governance capacity. This already monumental task is complicated 

by the risk that Haiti’s prior cycles of crime, violence or instability may re-emerge to disrupt the 

reconstruction process. Although violent crime has decreased since its height in 2005, the earthquake has created new vulnerabilities and fueled an increase in crime. If not properly managed, 

these risks could threaten the upcoming elections and reconstruction process. 

Crime and Violence Are on the Increase since the Earthquake

Since the devastating earthquake in January, criminal activity has increased in parts of Port-auPrince, fueling fears of renewed instability and violence throughout the city. The rise in crime is 

driven largely by the escape of thousands of prisoners from the National Penitentiary in Port-auPrince following the earthquake. According to the Haitian National Police (HNP), 5,136 prisoners 

Louis-Alexandre Berg

E-mail: LB262@Georgetown.edu

peaceBrieF58
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Crime, Politics and Violence in Post-Earthquake Haiti

page 2 • PB 58 • September 28, 2010

escaped, including around 700 violent gang members. Some of these escapees have accessed 

hidden caches of weapons. As of mid-July, only 627 had been recaptured, including roughly 100 

gang members, although more were being rounded up daily. 

This massive escape has set off a new wave of crime, especially in the most vulnerable areas. 

Many gang members have sought to return to their former neighborhoods, setting off violent turf 

battles and increased street crime. A new armed group known as the Armee Federale has brought 

together the escaped prisoners from several neighborhoods. They hide out in the hills of the Martissant section of Port-au-Prince and conduct increasingly organized criminal activities throughout 

the city. Cases of kidnapping and assault increased during the first half of 2010 and crime has been 

reported in the previously quiet suburbs above Port-au-Prince. 

This increase in crime has been compounded by damage to an already weak HNP and justice 

system. Faced with 79 deaths and hundreds of injuries among their ranks, police officers were initially 

absorbed with the post-earthquake clean up, leading to an immediate reduction in the effective force 

by around half. The numbers have since risen to the pre-earthquake level of roughly 9,000, yet many 

HNP continue to operate out of tents next to destroyed stations, while over 65 percent of vehicles and 

much of their equipment remains damaged or destroyed. The U.N. mission (MINUSTAH) also sustained 

significant damage that temporarily affected its capacity until its ranks were replenished. 

The proliferation of displaced people in tent camps around the city has created an additional burden for the security forces and an opportunity for criminals. Humanitarian agencies have succeeded in 

averting widespread epidemics and famine among the estimated 1.9 million people displaced by the 

earthquake, by distributing tents, food, water and medical care. Yet, the tent camps set up in hundreds 

of places around the city are vulnerable not only to disease and the elements, but also to violence. The 

U.N. has identified numerous cases of thefts, rapes and domestic violence within camps and camp 

residents continue to report a high level of insecurity. Residents also report that escaped prisoners 

have been using the camps as safe havens, and the police hesitate to enter the camps in pursuit of 

criminals for fear of civilian casualties. Many camps have set up “security committees,” but these groups 

lack training or clear channels of communication with either camp residents or the police. 

Political Conflict during Elections Could Fuel Further Violence 

With elections approaching, increased gang activity may be linked to political struggles. Although 

reduced political tensions in the early days of the Préval government weakened the link between 

crime and politics, political conflict is now on the rise. The government is planning to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in November 2010 to meet the constitutional timeframe for 

the new government to take office. Opposition leaders, however, have accused the government 

of stacking the elections against them. Several parties are calling for mass mobilization in an effort 

to force Préval to step down and change the composition of the Provisional Election Commission. 

Attendance at demonstrations has been limited so far, but even minor incidents of violence could 

easily disrupt the elections process. In this climate, unemployed youth and reinvigorated gangs 

seeking to re-establish their turf may be a tempting target for political leaders seeking to mobilize 

demonstrators, disrupt the elections or undermine the government after the elections.

Port-au-Prince Gangs Arose from Divisive Politics and Weak 

Governance

The link between neighborhood youth groups, armed gangs and political conflict is rooted in 

Haiti’s winner-take-all politics, in which the use of informal armed groups has been a long-favored 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Crime, Politics and Violence in Post-Earthquake Haiti

page 3 • PB 58 • September 28, 2010

political strategy, fueled by widespread poverty, weak government services and deep social 

and economic inequities. Youth gangs are based in the poorest and most marginalized urban 

neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince and in other urban areas around the country. The growing youth 

population in these areas was vulnerable to the tumultuous social and political forces around 

them. In the early 1990s, these neighborhoods became politically active, largely in support of 

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who promised to focus on their plight after decades of neglect. 

Both Aristide and his political rivals sought to build upon this support, distributing weapons to 

groups of youth and mobilizing them to protect their political and economic interests. These 

groups assumed responsibility for security in their neighborhoods, often extorting market sellers 

and other businesses in exchange for protection, and sometimes becoming involved in drug 

smuggling and other illicit activities. 

Violent turf battles intensified after Aristide’s departure as armed groups competed for control 

of neighborhoods and money-making opportunities. In the run-up to the 2006 elections, political parties and private sector actors exploited these divisions, distributing cash and weapons to 

armed groups in exchange for their assistance in mobilizing people to demonstrate and vote 

for them, to disrupt the elections, or to protect their businesses. Some groups linked up with 

organized criminal enterprises -- involving kidnapping, arms trading and drug smuggling—to 

bring in revenue and to raise their profile politically in bids for external support. Other groups 

remained localized, driven by violent rivalries specific to each neighborhood. As kidnapping and 

murders spread throughout Port-au-Prince, nowhere did people suffer more than within the 

underprivileged neighborhoods where the armed groups were based. Children were recruited to 

carry weapons and drugs, women were raped and kidnapped as sex slaves, and innocent civilians 

were caught in the crossfire of gang wars and turf battles.

Fragile Steps toward Stability before the Earthquake

The level of crime declined significantly after 2006 due to an evolving political context, robust 

operations by MINUSTAH and the HNP, and increased investment in marginalized neighborhoods. 

After his election in 2006, President Rene Préval calmed tensions by reaching out to many of the 

country’s political factions and bringing them into his coalition, thereby reducing incentives for 

political violence. He established relationships with gang leaders, reportedly promising them jobs 

and resources in exchange for ending their criminal activities. In 2007, the failure of these negotiations amidst continuing crime led Préval to support a series of combined MINUSTAH and HNP 

operations in Cite Soleil that captured or forced into exile many of the top gang leaders. 

At the same time, donor-funded programs enhanced the availability of services and infrastructure in these neighborhoods and improved relationships between the population and local 

authorities. For example, the U.S.-sponsored Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI) combined short-term 

jobs, infrastructure, and support to the HNP to create a more conducive atmosphere for development projects and private-sector investment. Other projects supported dialogue and communitybuilding to reduce tensions across rival neighborhoods. 

The security situation throughout Port-au-Prince improved. With their leadership disrupted, 

armed groups decreased in size and could no longer carry out organized operations like kidnapping. Political tensions became less salient, and turf battles decreased in intensity. The HNP 

expanded their presence in some neighborhoods and public confidence in them improved as 

efforts at professionalizing the HNP began to take root. Improvements in infrastructure—most 

notably two new police stations and an expanded main road through Cite Soleil—contributed to 

improved relationships among residents and government authorities. 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

About This Brief

This Peace Brief was prepared by 

Louis-Alexandre Berg, a JenningsRandolph Peace scholar at the U.S. 

Institute of Peace (USIP) and a rule 

of law adviser at the U.S. Agency 

for International Development 

(USAID). It is based on research 

conducted by the author in Haiti 

in July 2010, aimed at assessing 

vulnerabilities to conflict and 

instability in the post-earthquake 

period. 

The views expressed by the author 

are entirely his own and do not 

reflect those of USAID or USIP, 

which does not advocate specific 

policy positions. 

Nonetheless, armed groups continued to operate and prey on the people within their communities, primarily through petty, neighborhood-level crimes. While some neighborhoods benefited 

from donor projects, others were left out, fueling continued tensions. In a mere three years, donor 

attention to these areas did not translate into sufficient new jobs, government services, or sense of 

community, while the sense of exclusion among residents of these neighborhoods remained high.

In the aftermath of the earthquake, these fragile improvements were set back as escaped 

prisoners returned to their neighborhoods, law enforcement capabilities weakened, and the 

intensive focus on marginalized areas waned, allowing violent crime to re-emerge. The HNP and 

MINUSTAH have stepped up their presence in camps and staged high profile operations in search 

of escaped prisoners. As the justice system struggles to function after the destruction to buildings, 

files and personnel, these large-scale operations risk raising the already high number of pre-trial 

detainees. Meanwhile, camp residents continue to report that they rarely see the overstretched 

and under-resourced HNP, residents of slum areas report decreased confidence in the police, and 

security across the city has declined.

Conclusion: Community Development, Services, Jobs and Law 

Enforcement

The increase in insecurity since the earthquake underscores Haiti’s continued vulnerability to 

violent crime and political instability. Overcrowded urban areas plagued by high poverty and 

unemployment combined with weak government institutions will continue to serve as breeding 

grounds for violent crime and armed groups for years to come. As political conflict escalates, these 

groups can be manipulated by political or economic interests to fuel broader instability. 

Efforts that had begun to demonstrate progress in addressing these challenges prior to the 

earthquake should be continued and expanded. The combination of improved infrastructure, government services in marginalized areas inside and outside of Port-au-Prince, jobs and education 

for at-risk youth, and robust law enforcement can reduce the propensity toward violence in these 

areas, if they are sustained for sufficient time and linked to longer-term development. Critical to 

these efforts is a focus on improving social ties within and across communities to reduce tension, 

and building local capacity for managing conflicts. Improvements to the management and leadership of the HNP, implementing stalled reforms in the judiciary, strengthening local government, 

and fostering dialogue and reconciliation among political parties are further necessary to avoid 

recurrent crime and political conflict. As they turn their attention from immediate humanitarian 

aid toward reconstruction, the Haitian government and international community should direct 

resources toward mitigating conflict in the short-term while continuing to address the underlying 

drivers of crime and violence in Haiti. 

Crime, Politics and Violence in Post-Earthquake Haiti

page 4 • PB 58 • September 28, 2010