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INSTITUTE

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EXTERNAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATE PROGRAM

THREAT POSED BY MOUNTING 

VIGILANTISM IN MEXICO

George W. Grayson

September 2011

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ISBN 1-58487-498-8
iii

FOREWORD

Until the 1980s, Mexico enjoyed relative freedom 

from violence. Ruthless drug cartels existed, but they 

usually abided by informal rules of the game hammered out between several capos and representatives 

of the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party 

(PRI), which ruled the country in Tammany Hallfashion from 1929 until the 1990s. Relying on bribes or 

mordidas, the desperados pursued their illicit activities 

with the connivance of authorities, frequently through 

ad hoc pacts that might last days, weeks, or months. 

Criminal organizations sought protection from 

local police, regional or zonal military commanders, 

and sometimes directly from governors or their interlocutors. Just as in other forms of corruption that pervaded the nation authorities allocated plazas—areas 

where the criminals held sway to produce, store, or 

ship narcotics. The inequality of power ensured that 

drug barons also greased the palms of representatives 

of the federal government—with upfront payments of 

$250,000 or more. Emissaries would forward a portion 

of the loot upward through the chain of command. In 

return, drug dealers behaved discretely, shunned hightech weapons, deferred to public figures, spurned kidnapping, and even appeared with governors at their 

children’s weddings.

Unlike their Colombian counterparts, Mexico’s 

barons did not seek elective office. In addition, they 

did not sell drugs within the country, corrupt children, target innocent people, engage in kidnapping, or 

invade the turf or product line (marijuana, heroin, cocaine, etc.) of competitors. Each syndicate had its own 

geographic enclave, and if one lord sought to cross the 
iv

territory of another, he would first ask permission and, 

if granted, pay the appropriate “crossing fee.” Former 

Nuevo León Governor Sócrates Rizzo summed up the 

arrangement: “There was control, there was a strong 

State and a strong President and a strong Attorney 

General and iron control over the Army. More or less, 

the cartels were told: ‘You act here; you, over there; 

but don’t dare touch these places’.”1

Tradition dictated that, should a conflict get out of 

hand in a municipality, the governor would call local 

officials on the carpet and, if needed, request that the 

military, or tough-as-nails agents of the Federal Judicial Police or the Federal Security Directorate repress 

the reprobates. If conditions remained the same or 

worsened, the state executive would receive a phone 

call from the Interior Ministry (Gobernación)—the 

PRI’s muscular political consiglieri—and sometimes 

even directly from within Los Pinos. The message was 

unequivocal: “Restore peace or pack your bags.” 

Three key events in the 1980s and 1990s changed 

the “live and let live” ethos that enveloped illegal activities. Mexico became the new avenue for Andean 

cocaine shipped to the United States after the U.S. 

military and law-enforcement authorities sharply reduced its flow into Florida and other South Atlantic 

states. The North American Free Trade Agreement, 

which took effect on January 1, 1994, greatly increased 

economic activities throughout the continent. Dealers often moved cocaine and other drugs through 

Nuevo Laredo, El Paso, Tijuana, and other portals. 

The change in routes gave rise to Croesus-like profits 

for cocaine traffickers—a phenomenon that coincided 

with an upsurge of electoral victories by the National 

Action Party (PAN). 
v

Leaders of this center-right party believed that 

winning fair elections—especially the presidency in 

2000—invested them with legitimacy and ensured 

support from the citizenry. In their view, the PRI was 

responsible for every evil in the country—corruption, 

poverty, illiteracy, pollution, economic bottlenecks, 

vote-rigging, lawlessness, and drug trafficking. As a 

result, President Vicente Fox Quesada (2000-06) eschewed deal-making with the criminals even as he 

halted the practice of dispatching shadowy police 

forces from Mexico City to confront the ever-more affluent and brazen Mafiosi. He preferred better trained, 

better armed, and better equipped law enforcement 

agencies to combat the underworld groups. They not 

only lacked the muscle displayed by PRI janissaries, 

but they found themselves up against more powerful 

and deadly foes. 

The situation deteriorated, and the worst violence 

since the early 19th-century revolution now afflicts 

Mexico. From December 1, 2006, when Felipe Calderón Hinojosa swore the presidential oath, through 

the first half of 2011, some 45,000 men, women, and 

children lost their lives at the hands of a dozen drugtrafficking syndicates. Extreme brutality has characterized many of the murders, including chopping off 

limbs, castrations, beheadings, and tossing victims 

into vats of acid. 

Largely unexamined amid this narco-mayhem are 

vigilante activities. Rossana Reguillo Cruz, an activist who studies crime and violence at the Jesuit University of Guadalajara, has homed in on “community 

justice.” “This is not something that has always been 

around in Mexico. It is a new phenomenon that has 

been growing since 2000.”2

 In this monograph, George 

W. Grayson, an authority on Mexican affairs, exam-
vi

ines the roots of vigilantism, the circumstances in 

which it occurs, its perpetrators and targets, and its 

linkages, if any, with the Calderón version of the war 

against drugs. His conclusions raise questions about 

whether there is a major upswing in so-called “community justice.”

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

ENDNOTES-FOREWORD

1. “Sócrates Rizzo admite 'Narcopactos' durante gobiernos priístas” (“Socrates Rizzo Admits 'Narcopacts' during PRI Governments”), Milenio, February 24, 2011.

2. Quoted in Ioan Grillo, “Vigilante Justice Spreads Across Mexico,” Globalpost, October 28, 2009, updated March 18, 2010.
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

GEORGE W. GRAYSON, the Class of 1938 Professor of Government at the College of William & 

Mary, has made more than 200 research trips to Latin 

America. He is a senior associate at the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a 

board member of the Center for Immigration Studies, 

and a life member of the National Association for the 

Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Dr. Grayson lectures regularly at the U.S. Department of State, 

at the National Defense University, and at universities 

throughout the United States and Mexico. He served as 

a Democratic member of the Virginia state legislature 

for 27 years. He is a frequent commentator on CNN, 

National Public Radio, and NPR affiliated stations. In 

addition to preparing 24 books and monographs for 

CSIS, Dr. Grayson has written La Familia Michoacana

(Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2010), Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (Transaction Publishers, Fall 2009), Mexico’s Struggle with 

Drugs and Thugs (Foreign Policy Association, 2009), 

Mexican Messiah (Penn State University Press, 2007), 

Mesías Mexicano (Random House-Mondadori, 2006), 

Mexico: the Changing of the Guard (Foreign Policy Association, 2001), Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East

(University Press of America, 1999), and Mexico: From 

Corporatism to Pluralism? (Harcourt Brace, 1998). His 

articles have appeared in the Commonwealth Magazine, 

the Harvard International Review, ForeignPolicy.com, 

Foreign Policy, Orbis, World Affairs, the Atlanta Constitution, the Baltimore Sun, the Christian Science Monitor, 

the Houston Chronicle, the Globe and Mail, the Los Ange-
viii

les Times, Newsday, Reforma (Mexico City), the San Diego Union-Tribune, the Washington Post, the Washington 

Times, and the Wall Street Journal. Dr. Grayson holds 

a Ph.D. from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 

International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University 

and a J.D. from the College of William & Mary. 
ix

SUMMARY

On November 23, 2004, citizens in the impoverished Mexico City neighborhood of Tláhuac attacked 

three men who were ensconced in an unmarked car 

outside of the Popol Vuh primary school. Fearful that 

the strangers were seeking to molest the youngsters, 

a mob that quickly grew to 2,000 people dragged 

them from the vehicle, bound them, and began to beat 

them. Although badly injured, one of the presumed 

predators escaped. The other two were splashed with 

gasoline and set ablaze, killing them. 

It turned out that the victims, who brandished their 

credentials, were federal detectives on the hunt for 

drug dealers attempting to corrupt the students. As 

television cameras and radio journalists disseminated 

the ghastly scene throughout the country, the officers’ 

pathetic cries for assistance went unheeded until riot 

police turned up 3 hours and 35 minutes after the incident erupted. A squad of municipal police located 

less than a kilometer from the site of the vigilantism 

remained in their stationhouse. 

The mayor and other public officials tried to cover 

up the debacle: One excuse was that guerrillas belonging to the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces had 

spearheaded the bloodshed; another explanation was 

that narrow streets and forbidding terrain prevented 

helicopters from landing at ground zero—even though 

choppers belonging to television networks managed 

to set down. Mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador, 

who narrowly lost the 2006 presidential election, alluded to the inevitability of indigenous people, recent 

migrants to the capital, exercising traditional “uses 

and customs” (“usos y costumbres”), that is, taking the 
x

law into their own hands. In one message, he said: “[I]

t’s better not to get involved in the traditions and beliefs of [native] people.”1

 

After the Tláhuac episode, the media began to 

highlight other cases of “lynchings” (“linchamientos”), 

a generic term for crowd violence against individuals 

suspected of committing criminal acts in their communities. “Vigilantes’ Fatal Fury in Mexico,” “Vigilante 

Justice Spreads across Mexico,” and “The More Deadly Side of Growing Vigilantism in Mexico”—these 

were captions of some of the media articles suggesting 

that so-called “rough justice” was surging in the country. The author reached the same conclusion, believing that President Felipe Calderón’s no-holds-barred 

war against cartels had contributed to an atmosphere 

propitious for citizens to take the law into their own 

hands. However, most reports are extrapolated from 

one or two linchamientos to argue that Mexico suffered 

from a tsunami of grassroots assaults on purported 

wrongdoers. 

Little reliable systematic information existed on 

the number and circumstances of attacks, with several 

exceptions—Carlos M. Vilas, an Argentine scholar living in self-exile in Mexico had begun to collect and 

analyze data. Meanwhile, sociologist Raúl Rodríguez 

Guillén, a distinguished professor and researcher at 

Mexico City’s Autonomous University of Azcapotzalco followed in his footsteps. It is fortunate that Professor Rodríguez also edits El Cotidiano, an academic 

journal devoted to social problems. In various issues 

of the publication, Dr. Rodríguez and colleagues have 

explored vigilantism. Not only was he kind enough 

to share a collection of his writings, but he took time 

from an extremely busy schedule to provide invaluable guidance on the topic and to encourage the au-
xi

thor to collect as many cases of so-called “rough justice” as possible.

Meanwhile, Dr. Luis de la Barreda Solórzano, director general of Mexico’s Citizens Institute for the 

Study of Insecurity, provided his astute insights into 

the causes of Tláhuac and other examples of otherwise docile individuals torturing, or even killing, purported criminals. He emphasized that these men (few 

women are involved) are offered no chance to answer 

the charges or appeal the ad hoc verdicts against them.

This monograph contains the author’s preliminary 

findings, some of the most important of which are 

that: (1) evidence fails to support the tsunami theory 

of linchamientos; (2) these actions more often take place 

in or near urban settings than in the countryside; (3) 

uses and customs seldom, if ever, account for attacks 

on perceived miscreants; (4) the conflict between the 

government and drug lords has not increased the 

number of lynchings; (5) in addition to revenge, “community justice” has a cathartic effect on mob members 

who may suffer poverty, joblessness, alcoholism, drug 

addiction, and broken homes; and (6) the anonymity 

of the attackers enables most to act with impunity 

against wrongdoers; the police and authorities may 

turn a blind eye to the attackers or even cooperate 

with them.

By adding to the number of cases identified, it is 

the author’s hope that this monograph will assist others who embark on research on one of the most fascinating subjects, both in Mexico and in scores of other 

countries.
ENDNOTE - SUMMARY

1. Quoted in “Usos y costumbres y Juárez”(“Uses and Customs and Juárez”), México Liberal, May 15, 2006.

xii
1

THREAT POSED BY MOUNTING 

VIGILANTISM IN MEXICO

INTRODUCTION

Areas of Mexico have deteriorated into blooddrenched killing fields as President Felipe Calderón, 

who took office on December 1, 2006, pursues warfare 

against eight or more deadly cartels, along with the 

gangs of young hoodlums who either cooperate with 

these crime syndicates or wreak mayhem on their 

own. Depictions of decapitations, castrations, brutal 

beatings, and other forms of torture garner newspaper headlines and lead stories on radio and television 

news reports. At times, the media appears to glorify 

drug kingpins, disseminating their propaganda and 

revealing information that could endanger anti-crime 

operations. Such publicity prompted the nation’s largest news outlets to adopt reporting guidelines, stating 

that “we in the news media should condemn and reveal the violence arising from organized crime,” while 

ignoring and rejecting “information coming from 

criminal groups with the purpose of propaganda.”1

Tales of violence fill YouTube, Twitter, and electronic 

mails. “Public space has been taken over by criminals, 

and [in the Northeast state of] Tamaulipas, society is 

at their mercy,” Carlos Flores, a visiting professor at 

the University of Connecticut, told the Wall Street Journal.

2

 While not challenging cartels and gangs, average 

citizens seem increasingly ready to take the law into 

their own hands—especially poor denizens of remote 

neighborhoods who feel abandoned by local law enforcement agencies and threatened by common criminals. 
2

“With federal resources aimed at drug traffickers and local police more often a part of the problem 

than a part of the solution, vigilantes are stepping into 

the void. Suspected criminals who run afoul of these 

vigilantes endure the brunt of a skewed version of 

justice that enjoys a groundswell of support.3

 Rossana 

Reguillo Cruz, an activist who studies crime and violence at the Jesuit University of Guadalajara, echoed 

this conclusion. “This is not something that has always been around in Mexico. It is a new phenomenon 

that has been growing since 2000.”4 Meanwhile, in late 

2009 security specialist Sylvia Longmire argued that: 

“Citizens are growing tired of drug-related violence, 

thievery, and other crimes—tired enough to take matters into their own hands.”5

In this monograph, the author does not define vigilantism as acts that evoke images of sinister whitehooded Ku Klux Klansmen clamoring after terrified, 

sweating African-Americans to demonstrate their 

ugly sense of racial superiority. Rather, the Spanish 

term “linchamiento” or “lynching” will be used to describe situations typified when local residents spy a 

perceived wrongdoer committing a crime “in fraganti” 

in their neighborhood. Tolling church bells alert dozens, possibly hundreds, of citizens to the perceived 

danger. Although having no official law enforcement 

responsibility, the assembled group seizes the suspect, beats and tortures him, and may even administer the coup de grâce by burning, hanging, stoning, 

or mutilation in public. The perpetrators, who are so 

numerous and/or so geographically isolated, realize 

that they can administer punishment with impunity—in many instances because the police steer clear of 

acts of “community justice,” lest they become targets 

of the mob’s fury. Although often poor, individuals 
3

in a mob may feel a sense of equality in carrying out 

their dark mission. This behavior, which somewhat 

resembles Vigiles Urbani, the night watchmen of Ancient Rome who fought fires and kept an eye out for 

thieves and runaway slaves, has been highlighted in 

literature by 17th-century Spanish playwright Lope 

de Vega. In this masterpiece, Fuente Ovejuna, the royal 

commander, Fernán Gómez de Guzmán, mistreated 

humble villagers of Fuenteovejuna. As a result, they 

joined together and killed their overlord. When King 

Ferdinand II of Aragon dispatched a magistrate to 

investigate, the townsmen, even when threatened by 

torture, responded only: “Fuenteovejuna did it.” In 

other words, when everyone is responsible, no one is 

responsible.

Such “rough justice” signifies a distressing retreat 

from civility. The apprehended individual cannot defend himself; indeed, he may be innocent, having ventured into the wrong place at the wrong time. Even if 

he has engaged in criminality, the penalty meted out 

is often grossly disproportional to the misdemeanor 

or felony. For instance, Mexican law does not permit 

capital punishment by legal authorities. 

Mexican citizens have filled the capital’s main arteries to protest the violence besetting their country; 

in some northern towns like Ciudad Mier residents 

have abandoned their homes in search of safety; and 

they have shown their disdain for politicians in public-opinion surveys. All told, at least 120,000 people 

have fled—with the greatest exodus taking place in 

Chihuahua, Durango, Coahuila, and Veracruz.6

 In 

the 1976 U.S. film, The Network, the main character, 

a broadcaster who has had a nervous breakdown, 

urged his audience to throw open their windows and 

scream into the streets: “I’m mad as hell, and I’m not 

going to take this anymore!”—a proposal that sparked 
4

a cacophony of protest from angry viewers from coast 

to coast. Similar pent up frustration in Mexico has incited some men and women to take the law into their 

own hands—to track down delinquents, rough them 

up, inflict torture, and even extinguish their lives. 

This monograph will (1) provide an overview of 

the violence sweeping Mexico; (2) examine the breakdown of traditional “Rules of the Game” that prevailed in government-cartel relations in the last century; (3) explore the inability of citizens to influence 

public officials; (4) describe several vigilante eruptions, including one that occurred in Mexico City’s 

Tláhuac neighborhood; (5) present data on trends in 

linchamientos in Mexico; (6) identify several groups 

that have organized to combat the drug cartels; and 

(7) suggest means to curb citizens’ resort to self-help 

measures.

OVERVIEW OF THE VIOLENCE SWEEPING 

MEXICO 

In recent years, Mexico has suffered a stunning increase in violence, much of which springs from a war 

that President Calderón launched against drug cartels 

in late 2006. As presented in Figure 1, the number of 

deaths arising from this conflict reached 2,275 in 2007 

before soaring to 11,583 in 2010—with 9,024 fatalities 

recorded through September 9, 2011. To raise money 

for their illegal pursuits, these criminal organizations 

have also resorted to kidnappings, which are estimated to have totaled 1,521 in 2009, 1,262 in 2010, and 837 

through May 2011. For each abduction reported, four 

or five are not revealed to officials either because family and friends do not trust authorities or because they 

prefer to negotiate the release of the victim on their 

own.7
5

Year Number of Murders Year-by-year Increase

2011 (through September 9) 9,024

2010 11,583 4,996

2009 6,587 1,380

2008 5,207 2,932

2007 2,275 155

2006 2,120 583

2005 1,537 233

2004 1,304 -61

2003 1,365 135

2002 1,230 150

2001 1,080

Source: Office of the Attorney General, James C. McKinley, 

Jr., “With Beheadings Attacks, Drug Gangs Terrorize Mexico,” 

New York Times, October 26, 2006; the newspaper Reforma, which 

publishes a weekly tally of murders in its “National” section; and 

Angélica Durán Martínez et al., “Mid-year Report on Drug Violence in Mexico,” San Diego, CA: Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, August 2010. 

Figure 1. Drug-Related Deaths, 

2001 through April 1, 2011.

Figure 2 shows the estimated number of kidnappings during the period 2000 to May 2011.
6

Year No. of Kidnappings

2011 (through May) 837 (State attorneys general)

2010 1,262 (State prosecutors)

2009

1,521 (Seguridad en América); 

1,125 + 50 cases in Oaxaca and Chihuahua (El Sistema Nacional 

de Seguiread Pública)

2008 1,028

2007

438 (Attorney General’s Office); 

6,600 (ICESI)

2006 595*

2005 325 (ICESI)

2004 334* **

2003

426* **

362 (Attorney General’s Office)

2002 433* **

2001 521* **

2000 601* **

Sources: Unless otherwise noted a single asterisk (*) indicates 

Instituto por la Seguridad y la Democracia, AC http://www.insyde.

org.mx/; a double asterisk (**) denotes the Instituto Ciudadano de 

Estudios sobre la Inseguridad, AC or ICESI www.icesi.org.mx/icesi/index.asp/; the 2008 figure comes from “Iguala 2008 a 1997 en 

plagios,” Reforma, December 30, 2008; and the source for 2009 is 

Seguridad del secuestro en México, Seguriad en américa, June 30, 

2010. 

Figure 2. Estimated Number of Kidnappings, 

2000-May 2011.

Mexico has achieved the dubious distinction of 

leading Latin America in the number of kidnappings—

a crime second only to drug sales in generating income 

for criminal organizations. Barnard R. Thompson, an 

astute analyst of Latin American affairs, wrote: 
7

No longer a cottage industry targeting the privileged 

few, today nearly everyone, rich to middle class to 

those of lesser means, faces the threat of kidnapping 

by organized gangs or the unorganized. Kidnapping 

for ransom is tailored to the victims, and if family or 

friends lag in paying even small amounts, they may be 

sent crudely amputated body parts as a sign of worse 

to come.8

 Mr. Thompson made this analysis in mid-2004.9

Since then abductions have soared, possibly reaching 

500 cases a month. Victims and their families report 

few of these crimes because of concern that the police 

may be accomplices. This felony falls into several categories: 

• “Revenge” kidnapping—sometimes to gain the 

release of a cartel member seized by a competing criminal organization;

• “Express kidnappings” have also gained notoriety in Mexico’s murky underworld. Although 

the victims generally survive, these acts often 

begin when a passenger climbs into one of the 

tens of thousands of unauthorized or “pirate 

taxis” whose owners bribe officials in Mexico 

City and elsewhere in order to operate illegally. 

The driver, or his accomplice, whips out a knife 

or gun and demands credit cards, cash, jewelry, cellular phones, or immediate withdrawals 

from ATM accounts. Once the loot is obtained, 

they often release the traumatized victim. In 

addition, “[o]ne increasingly disturbing spin is 

that the criminals may contact your family and 

not release you until a hefty ransom is paid”;10

• “Bogus kidnapping” in which a criminal, claiming to have snatched a youngster, calls a parent 

at his office and commands that money be left 
8

promptly at a specified location or the child 

will suffer the consequences;

• “Murder-kidnappings” in which the abductors 

sought to send a message to their foes such as 

in the 1985 abduction and killing of DEA undercover agent Enrique Camarena; and,

• “Money-raising” kidnapping involving the abduction of a member of an affluent family and 

demands of hundreds of thousands, even millions of dollars for his return.

The last type may explain the disappearance of 

former senator and presidential candidate Diego 

“Jefe Diego” Fernández de Cevallos. The immensely 

wealthy political lawyer went missing from his ranch 

in Querétaro, 100 miles north of Mexico City, on May 

14, 2010. His family asked authorities to keep their 

hands off the case, so that they could reach an agreement on the ransom. Abductors posted a picture of 

the feisty 69-year-old former presidential candidate 

on Twitter in which he was seen blindfolded and barechested, holding an issue of Proceso magazine carrying his picture on the cover. The strategy worked 

inasmuch as Jefe Diego rolled up to his Mexico City 

home behind the wheel of his Mercedes Benz S0600 on 

December 21, 2010.11

In a cruel irony, American anti-kidnapping specialist Felix Batista traveled to Torreón and Saltillo in 

Coahuila state on December 6, 2008, to make presentations to the local business community about kidnapping risks and prevention. The 55-year-old CubanAmerican also met with law enforcement officials in 

connection with his efforts to negotiate the freedom 

of kidnap victim José Pilar Valdés, the former head 

of security for Grupo Industrial Saltillo and a contact of Batista’s in Coahuila. While answering a cell 
9

phone call outside the acclaimed El Mesón Principal 

restaurant in Saltillo, six armed men heaved him into 

a white sport-utility vehicle and sped away. He is still 

missing. Batista consulted for the Houston-based ASI 

Global security firm, which “provides a portfolio of 

crisis management, prevention and pre-incident services to private clients and families, financial institutions and major corporations worldwide.” It identifies 

its “K&R”—kidnapping and ransom—consultants as 

having “the very best minds in the business.”12

CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME

Through the mid-1950s, the Mexican government 

boasted superior firepower over criminal organizations, whose operatives depended on handguns. But 

that did not matter. Relying on bribes or mordidas, 

the desperados pursued their illicit activities with the 

connivance of authorities, frequently through ad hoc 

pacts that might last days, weeks, or months. Loyal to 

the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), 

the armed forces bolstered the top-down control exercised by the state. Criminal organizations sought 

protection from local police, regional or zonal military 

commanders, and sometimes directly from governors 

or their representatives. Just as in other forms of corruption, authorities allocated plazas—areas where the 

gangs held sway to produce, store, or ship narcotics. 

Reportedly, they followed a “1-2-3 System”: a pay-off 

to authorities of $1 million for an interior location; $2 

million for a coastal zone; and $3 million for a U.S.-

Mexico border crossing.13

Clashes among families or between traffickers and 

police happened in places such as “Mi Delirio,” “Montecarlo,” and other bars in Tierra Blanca, a rough-andtumble neighborhood of Sinaloa’s sun-baked state 
10

capital, Culiacán, a mecca for narco activities. The 

inequality of power ensured that drug barons also 

forked over danegeld to representatives of the federal 

government—with upfront payments of $250,000 or 

more. Emissaries would forward a portion of the loot 

upward through the chain of command. Drug dealers 

behaved discretely, showed deference to public figures, spurned kidnapping, appeared with governors 

at their children’s weddings, and, although often allergic to politics, helped the hegemonic PRI discredit 

its opponents by linking them to narco-trafficking. 

Unlike Colombians, Mexico’s barons did not seek elective office. In addition, they did not sell drugs within 

the country, target innocent people, engage in decapitations, or invade the turf or product-line (marijuana, 

heroin, cocaine, etc.) of competitors. 

As Professor Leo Zuckerman has emphasized, 

each syndicate had its own geographic enclave, and 

some had their own product lines. If one lord sought 

either to cross the territory of another or market his 

competitor’s substance, he would first ask permission 

and, if granted, pay the appropriate fee, known as the 

right of transit or derecho de piso. They would not attack the families of other cartel chiefs and, when they 

had to settle a score, they executed their enemy in a 

remote location or north of the Rio Grande. The Federal District (DF), Monterrey, and Guadalajara functioned as sanctuary cities where drug lords and their 

families could live free from revenge killings or other 

reprisals against each other. In 2011 only Mérida, on 

the Yucatán Peninsula, Querétaro, 135 miles north of 

the Federal District, and Mexico City had attributes of 

sanctuary cities.

Tradition dictated that should a conflict get out of 

hand in a municipality, the governor would call local officials on the carpet and, if needed, request that 
11

the military or tough-as-nails agents of the Federal Judicial Police (PJF) or the Federal Security Directorate 

(DFS) repress the reprobates. If conditions remained 

the same or worsened, the state executive would receive a phone call from the Interior Ministry (Gobernación)—the revolutionary party’s muscular political 

consiglieri—and sometimes even directly from within 

Los Pinos (the Mexican White House). The message 

was unequivocal: “Restore peace or pack your bags.” 

The “no-reelection” article in the Mexican Constitution brought a new chief executive and his security entourage to power every 6 years. This provision 

sometimes changed the relative ascendancy—or even 

the ability to do business—of the cartels. The situation was sufficiently fluid so that should a local police 

or military unit refuse to cooperate with a cartel, the 

latter would simply transfer its operations to a nearby municipality where they could cinch the desired 

arrangement. Premier analyst Luis Rubio compares 

drug shipments to United Parcel Service delivery; 

namely, the Mexicans would pick up the merchandise 

from the seller and deliver it to the addressee. Above 

all, the nation’s PRI president and his underlings dictated the conduct of drug enterprises. Sócrates Rizzo, 

a former governor of Nuevo León, summed up the 

arrangement: “There was control, there was a strong 

State and a strong President and a strong Attorney 

General and iron control over the Army. More or less, 

the cartels were told: ‘You act here; you, over there; 

but don’t dare touch these places’.”14

The “live and let live” ethos that enveloped these 

activities began to change in the 1980s and 1990s when 

opportunities to make vast fortunes mushroomed because of changing routes for cocaine trafficking—a 

phenomenon that coincided with an upsurge in National Action Party (PAN) electoral victories. Leaders 
12

of this center-right party believed that winning fair 

elections invested them with legitimacy and ensured 

support from the citizenry. In their view, the PRI was 

identified with every evil in the country—corruption, 

poverty, illiteracy, pollution, economic bottlenecks, 

vote-rigging, lawlessness, and drug trafficking.

As a consequence, PAN governors and mayors 

reorganized law enforcement agencies in their jurisdictions with the objective of firing bad cops and 

rendering better vetting, training, and compensation 

of newcomers to their forces. They sought to enable 

hometown officers to act with greater independence 

from the PJF and other federal agencies, longtime 

intermediaries between Mexico City and organized 

crime. “Consequently, local power fell outside the 

corruption network, a situation that facilitated more 

autonomous actions of traffickers, federal agents, local police, and corrupt officials, thereby increasing the 

probability of violent actions to impose new rules of 

the game,” according to Luis Astorga.15

The Church.

Even ranking clergy in the Roman Catholic Church, 

an ally of Calderón’s PAN, have shown sympathy for 

the kingpins. In 1997, Raúl Soto Vázquez, canon of the 

Basilica of Guadalupe, raised eyebrows in a homily 

when he suggested that more Mexicans should follow 

the example of kingpins Rafael Caro Quintero and 

Amado Carrillo Fuentes who had made offerings of 

millions of pesos.16 When politicians alleged that the 

cleric was stamping his approval on drug activities, 

the Church’s first response was that it was the duty 

of authorities, not religious organizations, to investigate the origin of funds placed in its coffers. Father 

Alberto Athié, executive secretary of the Social Pas-
13

toral Committee of the Episcopate, affirmed that the 

hierarchy does not accept donations from the “culture 

of death,” and that the government was free to audit 

its accounts.17

Church-narco ties had previously elicited attention in the 1990s when photographs were published 

of Amado Carrillo Fuentes visiting the Holy Land in 

the company of Father Ernesto Álvarez Valenzuela 

of Culiacán and Father Benjamín Olivas. Álvarez Valenzuela justified his action as a token of appreciation 

for the drug baron’s generosity to the Ciudad de los 

Niños (City of Children), an orphanage in the Sinaloa 

state capital. The bishop of Aguascalientes, Ramón 

Godínez Flores, has developed a latter-day theory of 

medieval alchemy; namely, that ill-gotten funds contributed for the Church’s social mission can magically 

be transmuted into legitimate resources.18

Carlos Aguiar Retes, bishop of Texcoco and president of the Mexican Episcopal Conference, raised 

the possibility that the government recruit as “counterspies” narco-traffickers who confess their sins 

and abandon wayward lives in order to gather intelligence about cartels. “They are very generous with 

the people in their communities, and in general they 

install electricity, telecommunications, highways, and 

roads, paid for by them,” Aguiar Retes affirmed. The 

narcos should be afforded a way of starting a new 

life through a witness protection program similar to 

the one in Colombia, he suggested. He also cited the 

example of Colombia, where guerrillas who had deserted the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

(FARC) assisted in the rescue of former presidential 

candidate Ingrid Betancourt.19

The Church received another black eye when it 

was found that Heriberto Lazcano, the co-leader of 
14

the sadistic Los Zetas crime syndicate, had provided 

manpower and funds to construct the San Juan de 

los Lagos chapel in the El Tezontle neighborhood of 

Pachuca, Hidalgo. It appears that the killer’s mother 

procured the contribution, and a plaque on the small 

building recognizes her son’s generosity.20

In some states, members of the Church hierarchy 

have refused to condemn—and have even justified—

attacks on Protestants. For instance, José Guadalupe 

Barragán Oliva, spokesman for the Archdiocese of 

Oaxaca, defended indigenous Catholics for attacking 

70 evangelicals in the Ixtlán municipality of his state. 

He called the assault “legitimate” in as much as Protestant “sects” fail to practice the majoritarian faith and 

“divide communities.” First, they “enter the community and then they leave crying . . .” he asserted.21 The 

Church’s permissiveness toward cartel leaders and 

Catholic vigilantes makes it even more difficult to establish professional law-enforcement agencies.

The Police.

Mexican rulers have never created honest, effective 

police forces. Porfirio Díaz, the dictator who ran the 

country from 1876 to the outbreak of a bloody revolution in 1910, used a Praetorian Guard—the deadly Rurales—to maintain order and attack his foes. The PRI, 

whose forerunner sprang to life in 1929, fashioned 

scores of law enforcement agencies distinguished by 

their corruption, brutality, and service to the self-described “revolutionary party.” 

Upon assuming office in 2006, President Calderón 

found that the several federal police forces proved ineffective against narcotics syndicates. In some instances, they were on the payroll of narco-traffickers, many 

of whom had previously worked in law enforcement. 
15

In other situations, they were outgunned by elements 

of the underworld, which had access to better training 

and superior weapons. In most cases, their reputation 

for venality, wrongdoing, and a lack of professionalism made the police anathema to average citizens. 

Their public approval, which was traditionally low, 

has declined even more during the drug war. The 

government’s efforts to create a modern, competent, 

national police agency—similar to the Carabineros in 

Chile or the National Guard in Spain—slammed into 

an unyielding wall of opposition from members of 

Congress, most state governors, the military, and other important actors. 

On a daily basis, newspapers and the electronic 

media expose wrongdoing by police. On June 25, 

2007, a few months after assuming his position, Genaro García Luna, head of the Ministry of Public Security (SSP), purged 284 commanders from the top 

ranks of Mexico’s federal police forces. The nation’s 

top cop announced the demotion and retraining of 

chiefs in all 32 states; an unspecified number of these 

senior officers allegedly had taken bribes. He replaced 

the commanders with officers from an elite corps who 

had undergone careful vetting, drug tests, lie-detector examinations, and special training. “We know 

Mexicans demand an honest, clean, and trustworthy 

police,” García Luna emphasized. “It’s obvious there 

are mafias that are acting to keep the situation from 

changing, to continue enriching themselves though 

corruption and crime.”22

A Calderón initiative included the opening of a 

modern police academy in the city of San Luis Potosí 

on October 15, 2007, with generous assistance from 

the U.S. Government. The President inaugurated 

the facility, which features a rigorous curriculum in 

“vanguard” crime-fighting technology and leader-
16

ship skills—with emphasis on human rights and civic 

responsibility. Here, instructors teach state-of-the-art 

law enforcement methods to carefully selected men 

and women. Although its graduates receive attractive 

compensation, the sordid and worsening reputation 

of law enforcement personnel poses a major obstacle 

to attracting young, middle class applicants. After outlining the advantages of a career in law-enforcement 

to preparatory school students, no one came forward 

to apply. “They look upon policemen not as professionals but as strange creatures, as Martians,” lamented García Luna.23 As revealed in Figure 3, the public’s 

“average confidence” in the police has deteriorated 

during the Calderón administration—from 6.3 (on a 

scale of 10) in February 2007 to 5.9 in January 2010. 
17

Source: Consulta Mitofsky, “Confianza en las Instituciones: 

Evaluación Nacional,” January 2010; Consulta Mitofsky, “Confianza en las Instituciones: Encuesta Nacional en Viviendas,” February 2007. 

Figure 3. Index of Confidence in Mexican 

Institutions.

Other specialized courses take place in Mexico 

City. No matter how well intended, professional training runs afoul of bureaucratic obstacles. On January 

31, 2009, some 350 cadets who completed 12 months 

of training by the Federal Police found themselves 

with neither an assignment nor a salary. Of the program, designed to prepare elements to restore public 

 Percent High Confidence Average Degree of Confidence

Rank Institution

Jan. 

2009

Jan. 

2010 

Variation 

Feb.

2007

Jan. 

2009

Jan. 

2010

Variation—

2009-10

1 Church 42.0 41.2 -0.8 8.2 7.8 7.7 -0.1

2 Universities 34.9 31.8 -3.1 8.2 7.9 7.7 -0.2

3 Army 41.0 34.4 -6.6 8.0 7.9 7.6 -0.3

4 Mass Media 26.6 25.2 -1.4 7.3 7.6 7.5 -0.1

5 Federal Electoral

Institute (IFE)

22.2 19.6 -2.6 7.1 7.2 6.9 -0.3

6 National Supreme Court 

of Justice (SCJN)

19.0 18.6 -0.4 6.7 7.0 6.9 -0.3

7 Business Community 12.1 14.8 2.7 6.0 6.8 6.8 0.0

8 President 18.0 16.3 -1.7 6.8 7.1 6.7 -0.4

9 Banks 12.6 14.1 1.5 6.9 6.7 6.7 0.0

10 Senators 6.2 7.6 1.4 5.6 6.1 6.0 -0.1

11 Labor Unions 5.5 6.9 1.4 6.2 5.8 5.9 0.1

12 Police 7.8 8.6 0.8 6.3 5.9 5.9 0.0

13 Deputies 5.9 6.2 0.3 5.4 5.8 5.7 -0.1

14 Political Parties 5.1 5.6 0.5 5.6 5.7 5.7 0.0
18

order when mob violence occurred, a participant said: 

“It was a waste of time. We never had the basic law 

enforcement training necessary. . . . We showed up 

and listened to speeches from people who supposedly 

were qualified, but who were not accredited.”24

What have been the over-all results of this modernization effort? Scarcely 3 years later, the Mexican 

government fired an additional 3,200 federal police, 

almost a tenth of the 34,500-man force, for substandard performance. Of these officers, 1,020 failed the 

vetting procedure, including suspected ties to organized crime and medical problems. Of the 465 arrested police personnel, four were commanders dismissed on August 7, 2010, in Ciudad Juárez after 250 

of their subordinates described them as corrupt. “The 

problem is considered worse at the local level, where 

fear or low wages prompt many officers to help drug 

gangs. State and local forces account for the vast majority of Mexico’s 427,000 police officers.”25 Yet, some 

417 municipalities (out of 2,441 municipalities nationwide) lack any type of security force—with 63.5 percent (362 communities) located in Oaxaca.26 In early 

2011, then-Attorney General Francisco Blake Mora 

reported that only 8.9 percent of municipal and state 

police had been certified as professionals.27 In addition, men and women who forfeit their badges seldom 

show evidence of reformation. Instead, they may seek 

employment by a cartel or use their knowledge of the 

underworld to become freelance criminals.

Citizens of the poor neighborhood of Las Palomas, 

located in Tlalnepantla in Mexico State, recently expressed the frustration that boils over into lynchings. 

Anger at the sharp rise in car thefts—from 9.6 cases 

reported for every 100,000 residents to 27.4 cases during the first 6 months of 2010—spurred an outcry by 
19

local residents, who believe law-enforcement officers 

collude with criminals. “We want police who will protect us, not rob us,” was their cri de coeur.

28

The Armed Forces.

The obstacles to creating reliable civilian agencies 

spurred the chief executive to rely heavily on the armed 

forces to fight the Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, the 

Juárez Cartel, the Beltrán Leyva brothers, La Familia 

Michoacana, the Arellano Félix Organization, Los 

Zetas, and other deadly organizations. After all, the 

cartels had exerted dominance over major enclaves of 

the country: the “Golden Triangle” where Chihuahua, 

Durango, and Sinaloa intersect; the “Tierra Caliente,” 

composed of parts of Mexico State, Guerrero, Michoacán, and Colima; the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Oaxaca; areas of Baja California Sur; and zones of major 

cities lying along the border with the U.S. Southwest.

The President ordered the dispatch of contingents 

of thousands of troops to Michoacán, Guerrero, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and other hot spots. Military personnel are trained to pursue, capture, and kill. They 

managed to decimate the Tijuana-based Arellano Félix Organization and capture or kill such notable capos

as Osiel “The Friend Killer” Cárdenas Guillén (Gulf 

Cartel), Arturo Beltrán Leyva (Beltrán Leyva brothers), Édgar “La Barbie” Valdéz Villarrreal (Independent Cartel), and Nazario “The Most Crazy” Moreno 

González (La Familia Michoacana). Such successes 

aside, charges of killings, rapes, disappearances, and 

torture inflicted on civilians abound. Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) has published detailed reports of 65 cases involving Army 

abuses since 2007, and received complaints of more 
20

than 1,100 additional human rights violations in the 

first 6 months of 2010. The armed forces insist on trying suspects in closed military tribunals, and only one 

officer has been sentenced for human rights offenses 

committed during the Calderón administration.29

The armed forces also face a high rate of desertion. 

Between 2001 and 2008, 150,000 officers and soldiers 

went missing, including 18,128 in 2008. From 2000 

to 2010, 1,680 members of Special Forces and Special 

Amphibious Groups (GANFES) went absent without 

leave (AWOL) despite a 115 percent salary increase 

since 2006.30

As discussed in the next section, not only do military tribunals appear to treat offenders with kid gloves, 

but the civilian judicial system teems with corrupt, 

unprofessional prosecutors and judges; Kafkaesque 

artifices such as the “amparo,” a multipurpose injunction; and a flagrant lack of transparency—whether it is 

handling cases of an alleged drug Mafiosi or common 

criminals.

INABILITY OF CITIZENS TO INFLUENCE 

ELECTED OFFICIALS 

Why can’t voters apply pressure on elected officials to combat crime? Calderón bristles at the “failed 

state” characterization, and the Obama administration has turned summersaults to refute that appellation. Freedom House and other think-tanks that assess 

“freedom,” “democracy,” and “failed states” have 

given Mexico reasonably high marks in recent years; 

however, in 2009 Freedom House chided “the government’s inability to implement an effective response 

to the power of organized criminal groups that have 

spread violence and terror through significant parts 
21

of the country.”31 Still, this distinguished organization 

focuses on processes rather than practices—namely 

the presence of a competitive multiparty political system, universal adult suffrage, regular transparent and 

fair elections, access of major political parties through 

the media, and open campaigning. The Fund for Peace 

and Foreign Policy Magazine, which ranks Mexico 96 

out of 177 (a 1 implies a Somalia-like collapse) on its 

2010 “Failed States Index,” concentrates on ethnic conflicts, separatist movements, disputes with neighboring countries, risks of military coups, guerrilla activities, terrorist organization, and control of territory.32

Although helpful, such criteria overlook the chasm 

between the political elite and grassroots constituents, 

breeding in the latter a sense of political helplessness. This situation arises from several factors. These 

include a constitutional ban on reelecting chief executives and the absence of a run-off if no contender 

garners a majority of the votes. President Calderón 

entered Los Pinos with 33.9 percent of the ballots cast, 

just a .6 percent lead over Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a messianic populist backed by a leftist coalition. A second round of voting to achieve a 51 percent 

mandate could have forced parties to negotiate, bargain, and compromise in pursuit of a successful mandate. The crystallization of a winning coalition might 

have contributed to collaboration in Congress, where 

intolerance between and among parties thrives and 

continually leads to deadlock and drift. 

Other constitutional and electoral law elements 

that divorce the establishment from the masses are: 

(1) prohibiting independent candidacies, (2) forbidding civic groups from airing media ads during campaigns, (3) continuing the dominance of party chiefs 

in selecting nominees and ranking them on propor-
22

tional representation lists used to select one-fourth of 

the 128-member Senate and two-fifths of the 500-seat 

Chamber of Deputies, (4) disallowing deputies, senators, governors, state legislators, and mayors to serve 

consecutive terms in their offices, and (5) failing to 

forge a coherent, responsible left. 

With respect to the last point, López Obrador began his political career as a PRI mover-and-shaker. In 

1989 he embraced the newly minted Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) to advance his career. Twenty 

years later, he broke with the PRD to accept the backing of two small, opportunistic organizations: the 

Workers’ Party (PT) and the Convergence Party (Convergencia). The self-named “Legitimate President” and 

his followers have opposed Calderón initiatives even 

as they cross swords with a moderate New Left current (los Chuchos),33 which now controls PRD’s national 

executive committee and state structure. Should one 

of these groups support a presidential bill on a subject other than social spending or monopoly-busting, 

the other accuses it of selling out to the running dogs 

of neoliberalism, and increasingly more common—to 

“neo-fascism.” 

These considerations, combined with the fact that 

so many lawmakers lack defined constituencies, militate against advancing the interest of average men 

and women. All the while, elected officials line their 

pockets with generous salaries, hefty fringe benefits, 

Christmas bonuses, travel funds, free medical care, 

office expense accounts, pensions, “leaving office” stipends, and many other ways to live the good life. At 

the same time, the Federal Electoral Institute—which 

registers voters, supervises elections, and reports preliminary vote tallies—lavishes monies on political 
23

parties, to the tune of 3.6 billion pesos in 2009. No 

wonder that the late, inordinately powerful politician 

and PRI dinosaur Carlos Hank Gonzalez, uttered the 

phrase: “Show me a politician who is poor, and I will 

show you a poor politician.”34

Former Sinaloa Governor Juan S. Millán Lizárraga 

recounts the story of a newly-elected deputy who 

visited an impoverished flyspecked village in the far 

reaches of his territory in Veracruz. He told the subsistence-level and dirt-scratching peasants who shuffled 

into the town square to hear him: “Take a good, long 

look at my face . . . because this is the last time you 

are going to see it in this shit-kicking pueblo.” And he 

kept his word.35

 The 31 state governors and Mexico City mayor, 

whom PRI chief executives kept on a short leash 15 or 

20 years ago, gained emancipation from central dominance when the opposition swept to power in 2000. 

The national media shed some light on irresponsible 

federal officials, but governors tend to rule the roost 

as caciques in their states. 

These executives reign over fiefdoms thanks to a 

compliant press (whose owners fear losing state advertising), close economic bonds to the businessmen 

(who salivate for government contracts), blatant manipulation of state legislatures (whose members receive extravagant salaries and benefits in return for 

rubber-stamping executive initiatives), and control 

of local electoral institutes (whose officials are well 

remunerated) and state human rights commissions 

(whose commissioners enjoy prestige and attractive 

compensation). The spouses of governors traditionally head the states’ Integral Family development program (DIF), which fosters adoptions and child care, 

for which they may receive a stipend of $100,000 or 
24

more. Except when they descend on Mexico City during the preparation of the national budget, state executives can thumb their noses at Los Pinos. The federal 

government supplies 97 percent of state budgets. 

The Judicial System.

High ranking jurists, tough military officers, business executives, and movie-makers have decried the 

venality of the judicial system. In a presentation to 

the Mexican Senate, Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo, 

the newest member of Mexico’s Supreme Court, recognized the discontent with the imparting of justice 

in México. “[We] perceive that society is not satisfied 

with judicial decisions,” he said in an understatement 

worthy of the Guinness Book of Records.36

Retired General Sergio Aponte Polito, who fought 

drug traffickers hammer-and-tongs in Baja California, 

has publicly lambasted the local police, prosecutors, 

judges, representatives of the Attorney General’s Office (PGR), immigration agents, and customs officials 

for their ties to organized crime. “Corruption is the 

evil of all evils in our country . . . along with the lack 

of justice, impunity [for law breakers], irresponsibility, ineptitude, and demagogy...,” he told a reporter.37

In the same vein, entrepreneur Alejandro Martí, 

who suffered the kidnapping and murder of his 

14-year-old son in 2008, implored Mexico’s chief justice to “impose exemplary punishments on corrupt 

judges and magistrates,” adding that “an enormous 

lack of prestige characterizes our judicial authorities, 

our judges.”38 Martí highlighted Magistrate Jesús Guadalupe Luna’s release of a former PGR official, who 

had been sentenced to a 19-year term for kidnapping. 

This same judge also freed Iván Archivaldo Guzmán, 
25

the son of Sinaloa Cartel boss Joaquín “El Chapo” 

Guzmán Loera. 

Between 1995 and 2007, the Federal Judiciary 

Council (Consejo de la Judicatura Federal, or CJF) 

removed 22 judges and magistrates for irregularities; 

however, 41 percent of these men and women were 

reinstated. The most notable case involved Guadalajara magistrate Fernando López Murillo, who rendered 

five decisions favorable to “El Chapo” Guzmán and 

his ally, Héctor “El Guero” Palma, in 2003. Like Mexico’s other 960 judges and magistrates, he had the right 

to challenge his removal. Not only did the CJF return 

him to the bench, but López Murillo sought 14 million 

pesos (just over a million dollars) in compensation.39

An analysis by the Monterrey Institute of Technology found that, of the 7.48 million crimes committed 

in 2010, only 1 percent of offenders were convicted. 

The study indicated that citizens reported only 64,000 

crimes, about 15 percent of which were investigated. 

However, the length of investigations has fallen from 

269 days in 2006 to 130 days. In the same vein, CNDH 

President Raúl Plascencia Villanueva claimed that 

wrongdoers enjoy impunity in nearly 98 percent of the 

crimes carried out. Statistics for the past 10 years indicate, he said, that citizens report only 1.5 million of 

the 13 to 15 million offenses that take place annually. 

Of these reported infractions of the law, courts hand 

down just 150,000 sentences. These alarming statistics 

explain why residents sometimes take the law into 

their own hands. 

In March 2008, Mexico’s Congress approved a constitutional amendment to replace secretive proceedings and shadowy techniques with a U.S.-style adversarial approach in judicial proceedings. The change 

includes open trials, the admission of recorded phone 
26

calls into evidence if one of the participants agrees, a 

presumption of innocence, the right of the defendant 

to face his accuser, and evidence-based proceedings—

with a greater emphasis on forensics and meticulous 

fact-gathering. “In what experts say is nothing short 

of a revolution, Mexico is gradually abandoning its 

centuries-old Napoleonic structure of closed-door, 

written inquisitions—largely a legacy of Spanish colonial rule—that had long been criticized as rife with 

corruption, opaque decisions, abuse of defendants, 

and red tape that bogged down cases for years.”40

In early 2009, legal specialists, with the help of U.S. 

attorneys, were attempting to iron out the protocols of 

this legislation, which will not be implemented in the 

31 states and the Federal District before 2016. Meanwhile, “we work with the same system that was used 

during the Spanish Inquisition,” avers Alberto Barbaz, 

then Mexico State’s Attorney General.41 For example, 

information derived from electric shocks and other 

coercive interrogation techniques constitutes credible evidence. “In America, prosecutors investigate, 

but the judge and jury decide the facts,” said human 

rights lawyer Santiago Aguirre Espinoza. “Here statements made to prosecutors are facts. There is no crossexamination or right to confront accusers. If a person 

in Mexico confesses to a prosecutor, it is considered 

sufficient evidence for a detention—so there is an inherent incentive to obtain confessions.”42

Two Good Samaritans hefting a video camera revealed Mexico’s Byzantine criminal justice system. 

Roberto Hernández, a graduate student in public policy at the University of California, and his wife Layda 

Negrete, a lawyer conversant in Mexico’s dysfunctional legal system, made the award-winning documentary, Presumed Guilty, portraying how, in 2005, 
27

police picked up a 26-year-old street vendor, Antonio Zúñiga, threw him behind bars, and slapped him 

with a murder charge. Even the absence of physical 

evidence and the presence of multiple witnesses who 

said the young man was elsewhere at the time of the 

crime did not deter the judge from sentencing him to 

20 years in prison. Only a technical error—the defendant’s first lawyer had a fake license—opened the way 

for a second trial and Zúñiga’s gaining his freedom.43

Figure 4 depicts the confidence the local populace has 

in its judges and magistrates.

Date

Much or Some 

Confidence in Judges 

and Magistrates

Little or no 

Confidence in Judges 

and Magistrates

Variation

July 2006 35% 55% -20%

May 2006 34 58 -24

June 2005 34 62 -28

May 2004 22 65 -43

August 2003 26 68 -42

May 2003 30 64 -34

June 2002 24 64 -40

Source: Parametría: “Encuesta Nacional en Vivienda,” 

available from www.parametria.com.mx/. 

Figure 4. Confidence in Judges and Magistrates.

Penitentiaries. 

If justice does happen to prevail in the unreliable 

system, and the culprit receives a deserved prison 

sentence, he will enter a penal system that is run, in 

general, by poorly trained men and women who rely 

on low-paid guards to maintain order. Authorities 

nominally control Mexico’s penitentiaries, especially 
28

the nine high-security federal facilities. In reality, payoffs to prison officials and guards, combined with a 

proliferation of organized gangs behind bars, give 

well-heeled convicts unparalleled influence. Inmates 

sometimes settle scores with adversaries when incarcerated—exemplified by the 2004 murder of El Chapo’s brother, Arturo Guzmán, inside La Palma prison 

in Mexico State. Thanks to widespread access to cell 

phones, prisoners find it easy to engage in extortion. 

A committee of the Chamber of Deputies estimated that convicts had extorted 186,620 million pesos in 

the 2001-07 time frame. Just as in the United States, 

drugs and alcohol flow freely inside prison walls. 

Of the 37,000 inmates in Mexico City’s penal institutions, an estimated 25,900 are addicts. Authorities 

admit that the availability of these substances, which 

may generate 15.5 million pesos a month, represents 

a convenient way to minimize melees and curb other 

violent outburst. As a prison official told a city councilman: “Sir, if I cut off the flow of drugs, there will 

be a mutiny the next day.”44 Overcrowding accentuates turmoil.45 Of the nation’s 439 federal, state, and 

local penal institutions, 228 groan with an excessive 

number of inmates. In Mexico City’s Reclusorio Oriente, 70 prisoners occupy one six-by-five square meter 

cell. This means that they must sleep standing up, lie 

in hallways, compete for open spaces to stretch out, 

or pay for access to a bunk. Wealthy “deluxe prisoners” grease the palms of guards, who—for the right 

price—will permit them to exit the facility for a few 

hours to conduct business, engage in a tryst, or commit a crime.46
29

VIGILANTE ERUPTIONS

The Case of Tláhuac.

One of the most sensational cases in recent years 

took place on November 23, 2004. San Juan Ixtayopan 

is a quaint community of 35,000 residents tucked in the 

pine-covered hills in Tláhuac.47 People in this borough 

on the eastern fringe of Mexico City were enraged 

that only a dozen police officers—one for about every 

3,000 men, women, and children—sought to preserve 

order in their largely rural community. They were 

particularly upset at criminals believed to be stalking 

children, with a view to kidnapping and molesting 

them. One of three men in a grey sedan began filming 

the premises of the Popol Vuh primary school where 

380 youngsters were getting ready to leave classes for 

the day. Fearing that the outsiders were predators, 

residents activated dozens of crude, rooftop bullhorns 

that serve as alarm devices in some poor areas. Approximately 2,000 people quickly assembled, surrounded the unknown vehicle, overturned it, tied up 

and beat the occupants with metal pipes, and splashed 

two men with gasoline and set them on fire. Although 

mauled, a third man escaped and was given care, including dialysis, at the Central Military Hospital.

It turned out that the car’s occupants, Víctor Mireles Barrera, Édgar Moreno Nolasco, and Cristóbal 

Bonilla Collín, were plainclothes detectives with the 

Federal Preventative Police on the prowl for smalltime drug dealers under orders from their superiors. 

Although they showed their credentials, two of the 

officers (Mireles and Moreno) were seized, tied up, 

bathed in gasoline, set afire and burned to death. In a 

black comedy of errors, it took riot police 3 hours and 
30

35 minutes to reach the horrifying scene, while television cameras and radio journalists were disseminating 

the incredible episode throughout the country. 

Upon witnessing the event on television, Mayor 

López Obrador immediately contacted Marcelo Ebrard Casaubon, the city’s chief of public security. A 

man known for his rigid, authoritarian personality, 

Ebrard was ensconced in his hideaway office on Liverpool Street involved in a television interview with 

reporters from Proceso magazine. He ordered his staff 

not to disturb him under any circumstances. As a result, his subordinates feared taking the initiative without a green light from their chief to the point of not 

even passing him a note. 

Subsequently, President Vicente Fox fired Ebrard 

and his second in command for their errant behavior. 

Still, López Obrador, who opposed the chief executive on every front, as well as various municipal authorities, trotted out excuse after excuse for failing to 

accomplish a rescue even as they deplored the chief 

executive’s “premature” ousting of the security chief. 

Ebrard responded that: “The president . . . is afraid 

of what I could say about the happenings at Tláhuac 

and thus decided on my arbitrary dismissal.”48 Public justifications for the tragedy included: The terrain 

in Tláhuac was inhospitable for helicopters; people 

jammed the narrow streets where the violence took 

place; and cell phones were not picking up signals 

in the area. Inside the halls of government, officials 

claimed that guerrillas belonging to the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARP) orchestrated the macabre episode.49 At no point did senior decisionmakers 

point out that a contingent of DF preventative police 

was barely a kilometer away from ground zero, that 

the trucks carrying journalists had no trouble reaching 
31

the scene, and that, even if helicopters could not have 

landed, their crews could have broken up the rabble 

with water cannons, gunshots, and tear-gas canisters.

López Obrador, an enemy of Fox, did not want a 

blemish on his mayoral record as he was preparing 

to run for president. He not only downplayed the affair, but also sought to exonerate Ebrard, a presidential aspirant in 2012, by keeping him in his cabinet as 

secretary of social development. At the same time, 

the mayor alluded to the inevitability of poor people 

from indigenous background resorting to traditional 

“usos y costumbres” (“uses and customs”) of their native communities. In a message that seemed to invite 

vigilantism, the mayor claimed “[I]t’s better not to get 

involved in the traditions and beliefs of [indigenous] 

people.”50 In response to this theory, then-Senator 

Diego Fernández de Cevallos stated: “There are still 

imbeciles in power that speak of usos y costumbres and 

that justify displays of mob violence . . . arguing that 

mob violence is never wrong . . . [such statements are] 

disgusting.”51

“It [police indifference] happens to us all the time. 

. . . Sometimes it takes days for them to respond to an 

emergency call, if they respond at all. Many people 

don’t even bother to call them. Law enforcement is a 

joke,” stated Daniel Flores, a 21-year-old engineering 

student who said he had stumbled into a major gang 

fight in his neighborhood a few months earlier but 

could not get the police to break it up.52

Anger at past neglect and distrust of police played 

a role in the vigilante act. However, there is evidence 

that it was not a spontaneous eruption by a mob that 

had run amuck. For instance, at the request of the reporters from TV and radio networks, the executioners 

pushed the bleeding, puffy-faced victims in front of 
32

TV cameras and radio microphones so they could be 

interviewed. Videos of the crowd did show anger on 

the faces of some observers; others appeared serene, as 

if pent-up frustrations of daily lives—poverty, homelessness, disease, joblessness, divorce—were released 

through the executions. One expert spoke in terms of 

a catharsis of the “darker elements” of the viewers’ beings.53 “Onlookers cheered and shouted obscenities as 

the agents were splattered with blood.” Other average 

people casually milled around the charred bodies left 

bleeding in the street.54

Authorities normally would have dismissed the 

Tláhuac incident as López Obrador did; namely, an 

example of the poor carrying out traditional justice. 

However, the involvement of Federal police in the 

incident and the world-wide media attention that it 

garnered excited an investigation of the episode. In 

mid-2009 nine suspects received sentences of 46 years 

and 6 months for the horrendous crime.55 Additional 

individuals were subsequently convicted.

Little Rats of Tepic.

YouTube videos captured another especially grisly 

episode; these films featured five scruffy teenagers wearing blue-jeans and tee-shirts and slouched 

against a dark wall. Suddenly, a fist slammed into 

one boy’s jaw. Next, the barrel of an automatic rifle 

pierced the frame, exciting unvarnished terror on the 

minors’ faces.

“Why are you here?” demanded a sinister off-screen 

voice. 

“For robbing” sobbed the baby-faced captive named 

Édgar Eduardo.
33

“You see. You were little rats and now look at you,” 

snarled the questioner.

This episode took place in the fly-specked city of 

Tepic, capital of Nayarit state, 1,300 miles south of 

San Diego, in October 2009. The boys allegedly had 

robbed the luxury apartment of a shadowy figure. 

The dwelling’s owner did not bother to call the police. 

Rather, he and his cronies solved the problem themselves. They collared the presumed thieves, took them 

to an abandoned house, shaved their heads, beat them 

with fists and gun butts, and forced them to French 

kiss each other. In the background, the vigilantes are 

heard vowing to cut off their hands and sodomize the 

captives if they refused to engage in this humiliating 

gesture. To add to insult to injury, the adolescents 

were dumped naked on the street. 

The event depicted in “Little Rats of Tepic,” a video 

that was quickly withdrawn from circulation, excited 

mixed responses among tepicanos, especially because 

one of the boys claimed that they had been arrested by 

the state police and turned over to their four purported torturers, who were subsequently arrested. Huicot 

Rivas Álvarez, president of Nayarit’s Human Rights 

Commission, deplored the act: “Opening the door to 

justice by your own hand is an enormous step back to 

a state of barbarism and lack of culture,” he asserted, 

adding that: “In a democratic state crime can never be 

used to combat crime.”56

Others disagreed. “In Mexico, we need death 

squads to hunt and exterminate rats and kidnappers 

without further expense to society and without . . . [do 

gooders] getting in the way,” wrote a contributor on 

the website of the Mexico City newspaper El Univer-
34

sal.

57 “I recognize that this is not the correct way to 

administer justice, but I can’t deny that it makes me 

happy that this type of thing happens,” stated another 

reader.58 As with a growing number of citizens, he had 

no difficulty ignoring Article 17 of the Mexican Constitution, which states that “No person can mete out 

justice on his own nor engage in violence to take the 

law in his own hands.” 

TRENDS IN VIGILANTISM 

The practice of linchamientos or vigilantism raises 

many questions. How many such acts have occurred in 

recent years? How many of those attacked die? What 

are the circumstances surrounding vigilante acts? 

What perceived crimes precipitated these eruptions? 

Where do most of these acts take place? Do “usos y costumbres” contribute to Mexico’s rough justice? What is 

the relationship between community justice and the 

drug war?

Number of Acts.

The data shown in Figure 5 are approximate. 

First, officials often announce a number of vigilante 

acts without specifying the cases. Mexico City police 

claimed that eight attempted linchamientos occurred 

during the first 10 months of 2010; yet, only seven 

could be documented. Meanwhile, their Mexico State 

counterparts claimed 15 vigilante acts in this period—

with only eight verified in the media. For their part, 

law enforcement agencies in Oaxaca stated that 20 

cases of popular justice had taken place in their state, 

while an intensive Internet search turned up only 

three. Hence, these are approximations at best, but are 

nonetheless disturbing.
35

Year Number of Vigilante Actions

2011 (through June 17) 8

2010 23 

2009 17

2008 11

2007 n.a.

2006 n.a.

2005 4

2004 8

2003 20

2002 5

2001 16 (11)*

2000 41

1999 29

1998 15

1997 38

1996 47 (deep economic recession)

1995 40 (deep economic recession)

1994 25

1993 18

1992 n.a.

1991 6

1990 n.a.

1989 4

1988 3

1987 3

1986 n.a.

1985 5

TOTAL 379

*Professor Raúl Rodríguez Guillén provided this number (11). 

Source: Antonio Fuentes, “El Estado y la furia,” El cotidiano, No. 

131; Vol. 20, May-June 2005; Professor Raúl Rodríguez Guillén, 

electronic mail to author, March 31, 2011.

Figure 5. Number of Vigilante Actions.
36

Second, authorities may not intervene in, much less 

file official reports of rough justice when it happens 

in poor indigenous communities. There is a tendency 

to write off such behavior as traditional practices in 

these areas. Moreover, their involvement may place 

the lives of police at stake. Third, the circumstances 

in which most vigilante attacks occur—at night, in remote venues—means that there may be few journalists and police on duty to record the event. In addition, 

editors and commanders may have assigned their 

personnel to activities involving the drug war. On the 

basis of available data, the number of lynchings, while 

fluctuating, is not increasing. Figure 6 shows the acts 

committed that prompted citizens to take justice into 

their own hands during the period 2008 through April 

1, 2001.

Acts that Sparked Citizen Justice, 2008-April 2011 No. of Incidents

Robbery 33

Kidnapping 7

Abuse of Authority 4

Sexual Assault 5

Murder 2

Vehicle Accident 3

Religious Dispute 1

Miscellaneous 1

TOTAL 55

Source: Compiled by Author.

Figure 6. Types of Citizen Justice, 

2008-April 1, 2011.
37

Based on data compiled by Mexican scholars, just 

over 42 percent of vigilante acts analyzed between 

1988 and 2005 ended in the deaths of the suspects. 

Such executions are most likely to take place in remote 

areas of Oaxaca, Guerrero, Morelos, and Chaipas.59

Circumstances Surrounding Vigilante Acts.

Figure 7 illuminates the outcomes of vigilante acts. 

In general, the targets are young males with some 

education who are more likely to be seized in the 

evening, at night, or in early-morning hours. A disproportionate number of linchamientos occur around 

Christmas when people have aguinaldos (bonuses), 

free time, and may drink more than usual. Most of the 

cases take place in rural enclaves near Mexico City or 

other urban areas, and the local residents—men and 

women—frequently assemble when church bells are 

tolled. Seldom do the perpetuators use firearms; they 

are more likely to pick up objects at hand—stones, 

bottles, knives, sticks—with which to attack the presumed wrongdoer. Figure 8 depicts the circumstances 

of the vigilantism.
38

Location Subject Killed Vigilante Acts Thwarted Total

Mexico City 11 29 40

Mexico State 5 26 31

Morelos 14 13 27

Oaxaca 16 2 18

Guerrero 8 10 18

Chiapas 8 4 12

TOTAL 62 84 146

Source: Raúl Rodríguez Guillén, “Violencia y delincuencia: 

los linchamientos en México,” José Luis Cisneros and Everardo 

Carballo Crua, eds., Pensar el future de México, Mexico City, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 2011, p. 181.

Figure 7. Outcome of Linchamientos:

1988 to Early 2005.
39

Element Characteristics Comments

Gender of Target Male; a woman was involved in the 

abduction of a child in Tepexpan, 

Acolman, Mexico State, on March 10, 

2011; two-thirds of accused are single 

individuals.

Age 18 to 30 years old.

Education Some; at least primary school. Some youngsters apprehended 

have gone beyond primary 

school.

Time of Day Evening; night; early morning.

Time of Year The several months before and after 

Christmas. 

People have additional funds 

because of distribution of 

aguinaldos or Christmas 

bonuses, free time, and 

increased alcohol consumption.

Location Poor, relatively un-policed communities 

in or near urban areas where insecurity, 

impunity, abuse, and violence are 

integral to everyday life. As in the title 

of a sonnet written by José Alfredo 

Jiménez, linchamientos take place 

where “La vida no vale nada” (“Life is 

Worthless.”)

Means to Summon 

Mob

Tolling of church bells; activation of 

sirens in some areas of Mexico City.

Composition of Mob Neighbors, friends, relatives of the 

“victimized” individuals. 

Males are more likely to inflict 

punishment, while women 

denounce the act, encourage the 

men to respond, and take part 

in discussions of what course to 

take with the suspect.

Weapons Bottles, stones, machetes, clubs, ropes, 

and fire (Vilas found the use of firearms 

in only 13% of cases.)

Rituals His captors may force the subject, his 

hands bound, to walk a gauntlet during 

which he is insulted, spat upon, and hit.

Vilas reports that such conduct 

preceded the burning of alleged 

rapist and murder, Rodolfo 

Soler Hernández, a captive 

in Tathuicapa, Playa Vicente, 

Veracruz, in August 31, 1996. 

Source: Interview with Raúl Rodríguez Guillén, professor of 

Anthropology, Universidad Autónima de Azcapotzalco, March 

11, 2011, Mexico City; Carlos M. Vilas, By their Own Hands; Mass 

Lynchings in Contemporary Mexico, Monografías.com, available from 

www.monografias.com/trabajos39/lynching-in-mexico/lynching-inMexico2.shtml?monosearch. 

Figure 8. Circumstances of Vigilantism.
40

ORGANIZED VIGILANTE GROUPS

In the absence of trustworthy police and judges, 

some citizens have taken the law into their own hands. 

They have organized against the violence waged 

against themselves, their families, their neighbors, and 

their municipalities. On December 3, 2008, six masked 

men stopped the car of Jorge and César Muñoz Reyes 

who were carrying cattle from their ranch outside Parral, a small city in Chihuahua state, where assassins 

killed Pancho Villa in 1923.

The culprits ordered the men out of their vehicle, 

shot César, and kidnapped Jorge. Their father had to 

mortgage his property to pay a 5 million peso ransom 

($385,000) to obtain Jorge’s freedom. Five days later, 

local cattlemen began to meet with other business community members to discuss creating a self-protection 

force. The leader of the group spoke cautiously only 

about the “possibility” of such a vigilante movement.

Members of the self-styled Citizen Command for 

Juarez (CCJ) have been more outspoken. This group 

sprang to life in the violence-plagued Ciudad Juárez, 

which lies across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas. 

In an e-mail to the media, this shadowy organization 

claimed to be funded by local entrepreneurs outraged 

by kidnappings, murders, and extortion in the sprawling metropolis of 1.4 million people. The CCJ may 

have killed and piled up the corpses of six men in their 

20s and 30s in October 2008, leaving behind a sign: 

“Message for all the rats: This will continue.” Early 

this year, a body was found in the city along with the 

warning: “This is for those who continue extorting.”

The respected El Universal newspaper reported 

that on January 15, 2009, the CCJ sent a communica-
41

tion to the media, warning that it would kill one criminal every 24 hours. “The time has come to put an end 

to this disorder . . . if criminals are identified, information can be sent electronically about the ‘bad person’ 

who deserves to die.” It was signed, “El Coma” [“The 

Coma”].”60

Reuters news service reported that another group—

”Businessmen United, The Death Squad”—aired on 

YouTube, threatening to hunt down mafiosi in Ciudad 

Juárez.61 At least two other vigilante-style bands have 

dispatched statements to the media: one in the northern state of Sonora, which borders Arizona; the other 

in the Pacific state of Guerrero, home to the resort city 

of Acapulco—now referred to as “Narcopulco” because of ubiquitous drug activities.62

The execution of Benjamín Le Baron, an anti-cartel 

activist in Galeana, Chihuahua, prompted his lawabiding Mormon community to consider forming its 

own self-defense contingent. In May 2009, hitmen kidnapped Le Baron’s brother, prompting the 2,000 local 

citizens to stage demonstrations in the state capital of 

Chihuahua. They refused to pay a $1 million ransom. 

Even after the youth was released, residents—many 

of whom are dual U.S. citizens—held protests to plead 

for police protection in the remote desert lands of Chihuahua State.

On July 7, gunmen broke into Le Baron’s home and 

tortured him in front of his family before absconding 

with him and his brother-in-law, executing them, and 

dumping their corpses in the nearby countryside. At 

first, Chihuahua’s PRI Governor, José Reyes Baeza, 

agreed to provide training and weapons for a security 

squad in Galeana. This proposal met criticism from 

the president of the CNDH, who insisted that arming 

citizens would indicate a “failure” of the political regime to protect the public.
42

Taxi operators in Mexico City’s Magdalena Contreras borough did take the law into their own hands. 

They suffered multiple assaults and robberies by 

thugs, who were believed to be protected by the police. When local authorities failed to nab the culprits 

after three complaints, the drivers acted. They seized 

the presumed leader of the assailants, “El Perro” (“The 

Dog”), and bludgeoned him to death. Their goals 

were to send a message to the gangsters, to obtain the 

names of other members of the criminal band, and 

to “accomplish justice” on their own. On August 14, 

2009, Ismael Quintero Oliver and Marcos Érik Pérez 

Mora, leaders of the informal “pacto de los choferes” 

(“drivers’ pact”) were arrested, with El Perro’s cadaver in the backseat of their Ford Aerostar. The case has 

yet to be resolved.

The groups cited in Figure 9 (below) have little in 

common with mobs that carry out vigilante acts. To 

begin with, they have an organization and structure. 

In addition, they often enjoy funding from the private 

sector and politicians. Above all, they sprang to life 

to ward off attacks by the extremely well-armed drug 

cartels. Indeed, the success of the narco-syndicates has 

diminished whatever influence these groups wielded. 
43

Source: Julian Cardona, “Shadow of Vigilantes Appears in Mexico 

Drug War,” Reuters, January 19, 2009; Ana Ávila, “Grupos se arman contra el crimen” (“Groups Arm Themselves against Crime”), El Universal, 

January 29, 2009; Carlos Villalobos Lozano, “Fue venganza asesinato de 

Benjamín LeBarón” (“Benjamín LeBarón was Assassinated for Revenge”), 

El Ágora, July 8, 2009; “Mormones crearán policía comunitaria con ayuda 

de las autoridades” (“Mormons Will Create a Community Police Force 

with the Help of Authorities”), Univision.com, July 10, 2009; “Narco controla 5 municipios de Chihuahua: Tío LeBarón” (“Uncle LeBarón Reports 

that Narco Traffickers Control 5 Municipalities in Chihuahua”), El Universal, July 17, 2009; Evangelina Hernández, “Mexico-Ciudad Juárez: Autodefensa, arma de juarenses” (“Mexico-Ciudad Juárez: Local Citizens 

Defend Themselvers”), Offnews.info, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 23, 

2009; Yara Silva, “Pobladores casi linchan a dos asaltantes de un microbus” (“Citizens Nearly Lynch Two Assailants of a Microbus”), El Universal.com, December 15, 2009; and “Rescatan de linchamiento a cinco en 

Edomex” (“Five Rescued from Lynching in Mexico State”), El Universal.

com, August 13, 2010.

Figure 9. Vigilante Organizations.

Citizens 

Protection Group

Date/Location of 

Organization Leadership Objectives Results 

Popular AntiDrug ArmyNov. 2008; various 

cities in Guerrero, 

Sonora Morelos, 

and Mexico State

Obscure Combat cartels

Juárez Residents 

for Peace 

(Juarenses por 

La Paz)

Cd. Juárez, Chih. Members of 

the private 

sector.

Combat cartels

Businessmen 

United, The 

Death Squad

June 2008; Cd. 

Juárez, Chih.

Members of 

the private 

sector

Posted a video 

on YouTube

threatening to go 

after the city’s 

kidnappers and 

criminals.

Local residents 

mobilized to fight 

organized crime

Spring 2009; 

Galeana, Chih.

Benjamín 

LeBarón, leader 

of a small 

community 

of apostate 

Mormons, 

led the battle 

against 

organized 

crime, in 

response to 

the kidnapping 

of LeBarón’s 

nephew. 

.

Combat extortion 

and kidnappings 

carried out by 

drug cartels; 

criticized 

the failure of 

authorities to 

protect their 

community of 

5,000 residents, 

located 125 miles 

south of Cd. 

Juárez.

Following the July 7 killing of LeBarón and his 

brother-in-law, Gov. José Reyes Baeza pledged to 

arm and train 77 young men as policemen in the 

municipality; in the face of political pressure, he 

reneged on this promise, but dispatched additional 

state police to the area; LeBaron’s brother said that 

local residents would support “SOS Chihuahua,” 

an offshoot of the national “SOS” organization 

founded by prominent businessman Alejandro Martí 

whose son was abducted and slain; meanwhile, 

Benjamín’s uncle, Adrián LeBaron, avowed that 

“absolutely no legal authority” existed in five 

Chihuahua municipalities which was not enthralled 

with organized crime: Nicolás Bravo, Gómez Farías, 

Zaragoza, Buenaventura, and Casas Grandes.
44

ADDRESSING “COMMUNITY JUSTICE”

 First, it is important to recognize that vigilantism 

appears unrelated to President Calderón’s war on 

drugs. Areas where community justice takes place 

are seldom those where the government is battling 

cartels. In fact, the very presence of these syndicates 

and their pursuit by the federal police and the armed 

forces may militate against spontaneous acts against 

perceived criminals.

Second, it is ironic that vigilante acts do not appear to be increasing amid the atmosphere of violence 

afflicting Mexico. Vigilantism may send a message to 

authorities that they should be more attentive to conditions in hot spots, lest outbreaks of grassroots mayhem endanger their professional and political careers. 

Of course, there is the possibility that police, who may 

publicly blame other perpetrators, are involved in the 

lynchings.

Third, the federal police should train officers in 

skills related to negotiating the release of prisoners. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which provides 

instruction to Mexican authorities combating crime, 

might extend this program to a cadre of police in Mexico City, Mexico State, Oaxaca, and other entities that 

abound with vigilantism. 

Fourth, like the highly-respected Alianza Cívica, 

professional associations, and other nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) could spur accountability by 

forming independent grassroots committees to keep 

tabs on on law-enforcement in linchamiento-prone 

venues. One precedent might be the National Solidarity Program, launched by President Carlos Salinas in 
45

1990. Some 100,000 local bodies—composed largely 

of women—emerged to prevent waste, fraud, and corruption in the venture's anti-poverty projects.

Fifth, such oversight committees could help establish neighborhood watches, with citizens encouraged 

to contact other community members when suspicious 

individuals enter their streets, parks, school zones, 

and commercial areas. The local observers could alert 

neighbors via ringing church bells, bull horns, the Internet, Facebook, and Twitter. Video cameras, monitored 

by watch groups, would enhance the success of this 

enterprise. The alarms in high-crime areas of Mexico 

City should be installed in other metropolitan areas. 

Sixth, if successful, oversight committees in one 

town could assist one or more neighboring towns to 

form similar entities—with the goal of configuring a 

network of organizations linked together. Mayors in 

the Los Rosales zone, which lies on the border of Mexico State and Mexico City, have signed accords to collaborate in behalf of their citizens. Regrettably, highly 

publicized pacts in Mexico often are a dime a dozen. 

In any case, citizen-led groups could complement or 

supplant such initiatives.

Seventh, international lending institutions should 

condition financial assistance on Mexico’s committing 

itself to registering vehicles and vetting taxi owners. 

Pirate taxis facilitate the nightmarish contagion of 

“express kidnappings,” extortion, robbery, and other 

crimes in major cities, along with attendant vigilantism in response. Of the 110,000-unit taxi fleet in Mexico City, an estimated 30,000 illegal cabs roam its 16 

boroughs. Attacks on drivers contribute to their banding together to maul or kill their attackers. 

Eighth, the Roman Catholic Church must take an 

unequivocal stance against linchamientos. For clergymen in Oaxaca to excuse such behavior towards 
46

Protestant fundamentalists mocks Christian tenets, 

exhibits blatant intolerance, and encourages acts of 

savagery.

Finally, only when Mexico—with assistance from 

other nations—establishes competent, modern, honest 

police forces and judiciaries will people forgo rough 

justice and submit themselves to the rule of law.

ENDNOTES

1. Mark Stevenson, “Mexican Media Sets Drug War Coverage 

Guidelines,” Associated Press, March 24, 2011.

2. Quoted in Nicolas Casey and José de Cordoba, “Northern 

Mexico’s State of Anarchy,” Wall Street Journal, November 20-21, 

2010.

3. Quoted in Sean Goforth, “Vigilante Justice,” Foreign Policy 

Blogs, October 29, 2009. 

4. Quoted in Ioan Grillo, “Vigilante Justice Spreads Across 

Mexico,” Globalpost, October 28, 2009; updated March 18, 2010. 

5. Sylvia Longmire, “The More Deadly Side of Growing Vigilantism in Mexico,” Mexidata.info, November 2, 2009.

6. Verónica Sánchez, “Destierra violencia a 120 mil” (“Violence Has Uprooted 120,000”), Reforma.com, March 25, 2011.

7. “Radiografía del secuestro en Mexico” (“X-Ray of Kidnapping in Mexico”), Seguridad en América, March 23, 2011, available 

from seguridadenamerica.com.mx/2010/06/radiografia-del-secuestroen-mexico/. 

8. Quoted in “Kidnappings in Mexico,” Solutions Abroad, 2007, 

available from www.solutionsabroad.com/en./security. 

9. Barnard R. Thompson, “Kidnappings Are Out of Control in 

Mexico,” Mexidata.info, June 14, 2004. 
47

10.“Kidnapping in Mexico,” SolutionAbroad, 2007.

11. Abel Barajas and Karla Portugal, “Pide Diego resolver casos de violencia,” (“Diego Asks to Resolve Cases of Violence”), 

Reforma.com, December 21, 2010.

12. William Booth, “Kidnap Consultant Taken in Mexico,” 

Washington Post, December 16, 2008. 

13. Luis Astorga, “Drug Trafficking in Mexico,” available 

from www.india-seminar.com/2001/504/505%20luis%20astorga. 

14. “Enderez Rizzo dichos sobre narco” (“Rizzo Corrects 

Statements About Nacrotrafficking”), Reforma.com, February 25, 

2011.

15. Astorga. 

16. Alonso Garza Treviño, bishop of Piedras Negras, stated 

that drug baron Osiel Cárden Guillén contributed tons of food for 

the victims of floods that afflicted Coahuila in 2006. See Leopoldo 

Ramos, “Rechazan que el narco financie a la iglesia” (“Reject that 

Narcos Finance the Church”), El Siglo de Torreón, October 21, 2006. 

In 1997, Raúl Soto, the canon on the Basilica of Guadalupe, suggested in a homily that more Mexicans should follow the examples of capos Rafael Caro Quintero and Amado Carrillo Fuentes, 

who had given millions of pesos to the church. See Carlos Fazio, 

“Polémica con la Iglesia en México por pesos a la iglesia” (“Polemic with the Mexican Church over Narco-Offerings”), Clarín.

com (Buenos Aires, Argentina), September 25, 1997. 

17. Fazio.

18. “Monseñor de oro” (“Monsignor of Gold”), Milenio.com, 

December 19, 2008; Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa, “Plaza Pública: Bendito lavado De dinero” (“Public Plaza: Laundered Money 

is Blessed”), El Diario, April 7, 2008. 

19. “Pide Iglesia reclutar narcos arrepentidos” (“Church 

Asked to Recruit Narcos Who Have Repented”), El Siglo de Torreón, December 22, 2008. 
48

20. Marcos Muedano, “Festejan 2 años de templo construido 

por ‘El Lazca’” (“Celebrated 2 Years the Chapel Constructed by 

‘El Lazca’”), El Universal.com.mx, February 3, 2011. 

21. “Arquidiósis de Oaxaca legitima la persecución a ‘sectarios evangélicos’” (“Oaxacan Archdiocese Legitimates Persecution 

of Evangelical Sects”), La Mujer de Púrpua, January 29, 2011. 

22. Quoted in James C. McKinley, Jr., “Mexico Ousts Hundreds of Police Commanders,” New York Times News Service, June 

26, 2007. 

23. Quoted from a lecture at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, January 31, 2008.

24. Quoted in “‘Arrumba’ PFP a 350 cadetes” (“350 PFP Cadets in Limbo”), El Mañana, March 2, 2009.

25. Quoted in Ken Ellingwood, “Mexico Fires 3,200 Federal 

Police Officers,” Los Angeles Times, August 31, 2008. 

26. Other states with municipalities that lack police forces are 

Chiapas (9 of 118), Veracruz (6 of 124), Jalisco (6 of 126), Guerrero 

(4 of 81), Puebla (4 of 217), and Sonora (4 of 72). See Jorge Ramos 

and Gerardo Mejía, “SSP: Sin policía, 17% de municipios” (Ministry of Public Security Reports that 17% of Municipalities Have No 

Police”), El Universal.com.mx, June 3, 2010.

27. Ignacio Alzaga, “Certificadas, solo 8.8% de las policías: 

Blake” (“Only 8.8% of Police Certified, according to Government 

Secretary Blake”), Milenio, January 8, 2011.

28. “Queremos que la policía nos cuide, no que nos robe” 

(“We Want the Police to Protect Us, Not Rob Us”), El Universal, 

Mexico State, February 9, 2011. 

29. “World Report 2011: Mexico,” Human Rights Watch, 29 

from www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011/mexico.

30. “Desertaron en 10 años 1,680 soldados de élite” (“In 10 

Years, 1,680 Elite Soldiers Have Deserted”), Milenio.com, March 

7, 2011. 
49

31. Arch Puddington, “Freedom in the World 2009: Setbacks 

and Resilience,” Freedom House, available from www.freedomhouse.org

32. Foreign Policy and The Fund for Peace, “The Failed 

State Index 2010,” available from www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings. The United States is ranked 156 on this index. 

33. “Chucho” is the sobriquet for Jesús, the first name of the 

New Left’s top leaders, Jesús Zambrano Grijah and Jesús Ortega 

Martínez.

34. Quoted in George W. Grayson, “Mexican Officials Feather Their Nests While Decrying U.S. Immigration Policy,” Backgrounder, Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies, April 

2006.

35. Juan S. Millán Lizárraga, interview with author, July 8, 

2004, Mexico City, Mexico.

36. Quoted in Ricardo Gómez and Elena Michel, “Rebolledo 

reconoce fallas en sistema de justicia” (“Rebolledo Recognizes 

Weaknesses in Judicial System”), El Universal.com.mx, February 

10, 2011. 

37. Quoted in “General: policías y jueces, corruptos” (“General: Police and Judges Are Corrupt”), El Universal.com, September 

14, 2010.

38. Carlos Avilés, “Martí pide castigo para jueces corruptos” 

(“Martí Demands Punishment for Corrupt Judges”), El Universal, 

October 15, 2008; and Iván González, “Liberan a secuestrador de 

Carlos Antonio Pilgram” (“Kidnapper of Carlos Antonio Pilgram 

is Freed”), Noticieros Televisa, August 26, 2008.

39. Claudia Bensassini Félix and Arturo Caro Islas, “Anula la 

Corte Castigo de Jueces” (“Court Annuls Punishments of Judges”), Medios Mexicos, Konrad Adenaur Stiftung, December 2008. 
50

40. Quoted in Randal C. Archibold, “Mexican Prosecutors 

Train in U.S. for Changes in the Legal System,” New York Times, 

April 24, 2010.

41. Quoted in Archibold.

42. Quoted in Guy Lawson, “The Making of a Narco State,” 

Rolling Stone, March 11, 2009. 

43. “’Presumed Guilty’ Sheds Light on Failures of Mexico’s 

Justice System,” Los Angeles Times, August 19, 2010.

44. Quoted in Henia Prado, “Toleran autoridades drogas en 

penales” (“Authorities Tolerate Drugs in Prisons”), Reforma, November 16, 2008. 

45. Ibid.

46. Liliana Alcántara, “Llevan cartels a penales Guerra por 

territorios” (“Cartels Engage in Warfare in Prisons”), El Universal, October 19, 2008; and Claudia Bolaños, “Cárceles, infierno de 

poblres” (“Jails: the Hell of the Poor”), El Universal, May 16, 2009. 

47. This paragraph benefits from Traci Carl, “Mexican Agents 

Search for Leaders of Mob that Burned Two Officers Alive,” Associated Press, November 25, 2004.

48. Quoted in “Remueve Fox a Ebrard y Figueroa” (“Fox Removes Ebrard and Figueroa”), El Siglo de Torreón, December 6, 

2004. 

49. “En Ixtayopan los policías investigaban ligas de las FARP” 

(“Police in Ixtayopan Are Investigating Links with the FARP”), La 

Jornada, November 27, 2004.

50. Quoted in La Jornada, July 28, 2001. 

51. Quoted in Francisco Barradas, “Explota ‘Jefe Diego’ vs, 

usos y costumbres” [“‘Jefe Diego’ Deplores Exploitation of Uses 

and Customs”), EsMas, November 25, 2004. 
51

52. Quoted in Richard Boudreaux, “Vigilantes’ Fatal Fury in 

Mexico/Angry Mob Burns 2 Officers to Death,” SFGate.com, November 25, 2004. 

53. Dr. Luis de la Barreda Solórzano, Director, Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad, AC; interview with author, March 9, 2011, Mexico City, Mexico. 

54. Quoted in Carl.

55. Mario López, “Sentencian a nueve por linchamiento en 

Tláhuac” (“Nine Sentenced for Lynching in Tláhuac”), Noticieros 

Televisa, May 13, 2009. 

56. Ioan Grillo, “Vigilante Justice Spreads in Mexico,” GlobalPost, October 28, 2009, updated March 18, 2010.

57. Mae López, “Conmociona a Nayarit tortura a 5 adolescentes,” (“Nayarit Upset by Torture of 5 Adolescents”), El Universal,

October 24, 2009.

58. Ibid.

59. Rodríguez Guillén, Interview with author, March 11, 2011.

60. Luis Carlos Cano C., “Investian a Comando Ciudadano 

por Juárez,” (“Citizen Command for Juárez under Investigation”),

El Universal.com.mx, January 21, 2010. 

61. Julian Cardona,“Shadow of Vigilantes Apprears in Mexico,” Reuters, January 19, 2009.

62. William Booth, “Gun Battle in Acapulco Leaves 18 Dead,” 

Washington Post, June 8, 2009.

53

APPENDIX 1

SPONTANEOUS VIGILANTE ACTIVITIES

1 

Place Date/ Time Target(s) Act(s) of 

Vigilantism 

Site of Act Result 

Tepexpan, 

Acolman, 

Mexico State

March 10, 2011

(afternoon) 

Three men and a woman 

allegedly attempted to 

kidnap two children from a 

primary school.

Some 100 residents 

answered the children’s cry 

for help and the rolling of 

church bells to beat the 

abductress even as two of 

her partners tried to flee.

Poor 

community 

outside of 

the DF. 

The State Security Agency (ASE) used tear 

gas shots in the air to rescue the three 

captives whose automobile was set on fire.

Ixtapaluca, 

Mexico State

March 9, 2011 Bus driver hit two 

pedestrians.

Local residents sought to 

lynch the driver.

Poor 

community 

outside the 

DF.

Miguel de la 

Madrid colonia, 

Durango, Dgo.

March 1, 2011

(evening) 

Romualdo Ramírez Montiel 

allegedly attempted an 

armed robbery of a store 

owned by Eleuterio 

Quiñones Nevares.

“Don Eleuterio” shot the 

intruder. 

Poor rural 

community 

Local residents threatened to block the 

streets unless the shopkeeper was absolved 

of any crime. 

San Martín 

Mexicapam, 

Oaxaca

Feb. 17, 2011 Two men believed to be 

attacking taxi drivers. 

Dozens of drivers beat and 

mauled the subjects.

Poor rural 

community 

The taxi drivers fled when the municipal

police arrived.

Altepexi, Puebla Feb. 16, 2011

(evening)

Two men presumed to be 

pulling off a robbery.

100 citizens, who believed 

the culprits had committed 

previous thefts, seized and 

beat them.

Local police saved the men from being 

lynched.

Santa Maria 

Coatlán, 

Teotihuacán, 

Mexico State

Feb. 9, 2011

(evening)

A man who attempted to 

kidnap two residents after 

he had killed another

member of the community. 

A crowd seized the assailant 

and tried to burn him to 

death.

The State Security Agency (ASE) saved the 

culprit even as the policemen used tear gas

to fend off citizens, who pelted them with 

stones and bottles; in retaliation for the lack 

of security in their neighborhood, 400 

people blocked a federal highway.

San Dionisio Jan. 19, 2011

(evening)

Three armed men—

Lorenzo Sernas, Carlos 

Vásquez and Robert 

Fernández—attempted to 

kidnap the local mayor.

A crowd surprised the 

culprits whom they tied up 

and sought to execute. 

Poor 

indigenous 

community 

Elements of the Army negotiated the release 

of the captives.

 

San Martín 

Cuautlapan, 

Chalco, Mexico 

State

Oct. 20, 2010 A car in which two men 

were riding crashed into 

another automobile, killing 

the driver.

Local residents sought to 

lynch the two men in the 

vehicle that hit the second 

car. 

Poor 

community 

near DF.

Police prevented the execution.

Ex Hacienda

de Enmedio,

Tlalnepantla, 

Mexico State

Oct. 20,

2010 

Three armed men 

reportedly tried to rob a 

house of money and 

jewelry.

Some 50 local residents 

answered an alarm and 

caught Jesús Sánchez Rubio, 

28, and Ismael Moreno Pérez 

and threatened to lynch them 

(Their accomplice escaped).

Poor rural 

community 

Police arrived in time to prevent the 

execution.

Small town of 

Tetela del 

Volcán, Morelos 

Oct. 17, 2010 Five presumed 

kidnappers—four men and 

one woman—who sought 

to abduct a gasoline station 

owner.

The citizens seized the 

culprits from the police, 

denuded and beat them, and 

began to burn them along 

with their clothing.

Poor 

community. 

The five individuals confessed to planning

the kidnapping and were charged by 

authorities after being taken to the hospital to 

treat burns that covered 5% of their bodies.

Villas de San 

Martín, Chalco,

Mexico State

Oct. 14, 2010 Six Gypsies, including four 

children, were accused of 

robbing children, invading 

empty homes and engaging 

in witchcraft.

500 local residents 

attempted to kill the 

outsiders before being driven 

off by an ASE swat team; 

citizens hurled rocks and 

bottles at the police.

Ciudad Juárez Oct. 7, 2010 Three men sought to rob a 

local BBQ stand.

Customers and local 

residents killed one of the 

assailants with blows and 

knives, while the other two 

fled.

Small town of

Ascención

(known as “La 

Chona”) 

Chihuahua. 

Sept. 21, 2010 Five young men suspected 

of abducting a 17-year-old 

female employed in a local 

seafood restaurant.

The crowd beat two of the 

alleged kidnappers to death; 

armed with picks, shovels, 

and machetes, the 

townspeople tried to block 

the entry of police and 

soldiers whom they berated 

as “corrupt.”

The abducted woman was freed; one 

suspect escaped; two were apprehended; 

and two were killed; the event almost 

coincided with Sept. 23, the 45th 

anniversary of the attack on the nearby 

Madera Army barracks, led by school 

teacher Arturo Gámiz and Dr. Pablo Gómez, 

who inspired a generation of guerrillas.

La Candelaria

neighborhood of 

the DF’s 

Coyoacán 

borough 

Sept. 4, 2010 Two men caught breaking 

into a home.

Shot to death by an armed 

man inside the residence.

One of the burglars escaped; the other died; 

authorities detained the shooter. 

San Agustín

Tlaxiaca, Hidalgo

Sept. 2, 2010 Agustín Camacho Muñoz, 

21, accused of raping and 

killing a 13-year-old girl.

Led by mothers

accompanied by children and 

old people whom police tried 

to deter with tear gas, the 

The accused was captured and, if convicted, 

faces a 24- to 40-year prison term. Despite 

this prospect, 700 citizens descended on the 

office of the PRI mayor to protest the

1 

Place Date/ Time Target(s) Act(s) of 

Vigilantism 

Site of Act Result 

Tepexpan, 

Acolman, 

Mexico State

March 10, 2011

(afternoon) 

Three men and a woman 

allegedly attempted to 

kidnap two children from a 

primary school.

Some 100 residents 

answered the children’s cry 

for help and the rolling of 

church bells to beat the 

abductress even as two of 

her partners tried to flee.

Poor 

community 

outside of 

the DF. 

The State Security Agency (ASE) used tear 

gas shots in the air to rescue the three 

captives whose automobile was set on fire.

Ixtapaluca, 

Mexico State

March 9, 2011 Bus driver hit two 

pedestrians.

Local residents sought to 

lynch the driver.

Poor 

community 

outside the 

DF.

Miguel de la 

Madrid colonia, 

Durango, Dgo.

March 1, 2011

(evening) 

Romualdo Ramírez Montiel 

allegedly attempted an 

armed robbery of a store 

owned by Eleuterio 

Quiñones Nevares.

“Don Eleuterio” shot the 

intruder. 

Poor rural 

community 

Local residents threatened to block the 

streets unless the shopkeeper was absolved 

of any crime. 

San Martín 

Mexicapam, 

Oaxaca

Feb. 17, 2011 Two men believed to be 

attacking taxi drivers. 

Dozens of drivers beat and 

mauled the subjects.

Poor rural 

community 

The taxi drivers fled when the municipal

police arrived.

Altepexi, Puebla Feb. 16, 2011

(evening)

Two men presumed to be 

pulling off a robbery.

100 citizens, who believed 

the culprits had committed 

previous thefts, seized and 

beat them.

Local police saved the men from being 

lynched.

Santa Maria 

Coatlán, 

Teotihuacán, 

Mexico State

Feb. 9, 2011

(evening)

A man who attempted to 

kidnap two residents after 

he had killed another

member of the community. 

A crowd seized the assailant 

and tried to burn him to 

death.

The State Security Agency (ASE) saved the 

culprit even as the policemen used tear gas

to fend off citizens, who pelted them with 

stones and bottles; in retaliation for the lack 

of security in their neighborhood, 400 

people blocked a federal highway.

San Dionisio Jan. 19, 2011

(evening)

Three armed men—

Lorenzo Sernas, Carlos 

Vásquez and Robert 

Fernández—attempted to 

kidnap the local mayor.

A crowd surprised the 

culprits whom they tied up 

and sought to execute. 

Poor 

indigenous 

community 

Elements of the Army negotiated the release 

of the captives.

 

San Martín 

Cuautlapan, 

Chalco, Mexico 

State

Oct. 20, 2010 A car in which two men 

were riding crashed into 

another automobile, killing 

the driver.

Local residents sought to 

lynch the two men in the 

vehicle that hit the second 

car. 

Poor 

community 

near DF.

Police prevented the execution.

Ex Hacienda

de Enmedio,

Tlalnepantla, 

Mexico State

Oct. 20,

2010 

Three armed men 

reportedly tried to rob a 

house of money and 

jewelry.

Some 50 local residents 

answered an alarm and 

caught Jesús Sánchez Rubio, 

28, and Ismael Moreno Pérez 

and threatened to lynch them 

(Their accomplice escaped).

Poor rural 

community 

Police arrived in time to prevent the 

execution.

Small town of 

Tetela del 

Volcán, Morelos 

Oct. 17, 2010 Five presumed 

kidnappers—four men and 

one woman—who sought 

to abduct a gasoline station 

owner.

The citizens seized the 

culprits from the police, 

denuded and beat them, and 

began to burn them along 

with their clothing.

Poor 

community. 

The five individuals confessed to planning

the kidnapping and were charged by 

authorities after being taken to the hospital to 

treat burns that covered 5% of their bodies.

Villas de San 

Martín, Chalco,

Mexico State

Oct. 14, 2010 Six Gypsies, including four 

children, were accused of 

robbing children, invading 

empty homes and engaging 

in witchcraft.

500 local residents 

attempted to kill the 

outsiders before being driven 

off by an ASE swat team; 

citizens hurled rocks and 

bottles at the police.

Ciudad Juárez Oct. 7, 2010 Three men sought to rob a 

local BBQ stand.

Customers and local 

residents killed one of the 

assailants with blows and 

knives, while the other two 

fled.

Small town of

Ascención

(known as “La 

Chona”) 

Chihuahua. 

Sept. 21, 2010 Five young men suspected 

of abducting a 17-year-old 

female employed in a local 

seafood restaurant.

The crowd beat two of the 

alleged kidnappers to death; 

armed with picks, shovels, 

and machetes, the 

townspeople tried to block 

the entry of police and 

soldiers whom they berated 

as “corrupt.”

The abducted woman was freed; one 

suspect escaped; two were apprehended; 

and two were killed; the event almost 

coincided with Sept. 23, the 45th 

anniversary of the attack on the nearby 

Madera Army barracks, led by school 

teacher Arturo Gámiz and Dr. Pablo Gómez, 

who inspired a generation of guerrillas.

La Candelaria

neighborhood of 

the DF’s 

Coyoacán 

borough 

Sept. 4, 2010 Two men caught breaking 

into a home.

Shot to death by an armed 

man inside the residence.

One of the burglars escaped; the other died; 

authorities detained the shooter. 

San Agustín

Tlaxiaca, Hidalgo

Sept. 2, 2010 Agustín Camacho Muñoz, 

21, accused of raping and 

killing a 13-year-old girl.

Led by mothers

accompanied by children and 

old people whom police tried 

to deter with tear gas, the 

The accused was captured and, if convicted, 

faces a 24- to 40-year prison term. Despite 

this prospect, 700 citizens descended on the 

office of the PRI mayor to protest the

2010
54 2 

outraged citizens attacked 

the suspect’s home, breaking

windows, smashing doors, 

and setting fire to the 

premises—with a view to

hanging the young man and

his family.

insecurity afflicting their neighborhood.

San Gregorio 

Cuautzingo, 

Chalco, Mexico 

State 

Aug. 24, 2010 Five men attempted to rob 

an Internet café.

Some 400 residents, who 

answered the tolling church 

bells, captured three of the 

five suspects whom they beat 

and tried to lynch.

A state police swat team rescued the three 

criminals. Meanwhile, 80 members of the 

community blocked access to their 

community to protest the lack of protection 

from authorities.

Jalatiaco, 

Oaxaca City

Aug. 16, 2010 Ismael López Hernández, 

16, and an accomplice 

attempted to steal a cell 

phone from a woman.

Neighbors seized the young 

man, tied him up by his feet, 

held him for two hours, and 

threatened to hang him.

Poor 

community. 

State and municipal police negotiated the 

culprit’s release. 

Santa Cruz 

Tagolaba, 

Oaxaca

Early August 20 Two men—Ubaldo Sánchez

and José Manuel Baeza 

Quezada—accused of 

robbing a house.

Held the men captive and

threatened to hang them and

to burn the circus for which 

they worked.

Navy and state police used tear gas to free

the prisoners, who were briefly imprisoned 

when the circus agreed to recover the items 

that had been stolen.

Tlachaloya, 

Toluca, Mexico 

State

Aug. 12? 2010 Five men, ranging in age 

from 17 to 40, accused of 

robbing a building materials 

store.

Some 400 local residents

were planning to hang them.

ASE state police and Toluca’s municipal 

police arrived in time to negotiate the 

subjects’ release; for two hours, local 

residents refused to allow a police 

helicopter to land. 

San Antonio 

Oztotepec, DF 

borough of 

Milpa Alta

Aug. 6, 2010 Two presumed criminals, 

ages 19 and 34, sought to 

rob a milk delivery truck.

More than 300 citizens 

responded to the ringing of 

church bells; they captured 

the men and threatened to 

kill them; after 2 hours of 

negotiations, which included 

the city’s attorney general 

and security secretary, the 

culprits were released. 

The city government pledged to provide 

more police protection to the community, 

including twice-a-week helicopter patrols.

San Antonio 

Tecomitl, DF 

borough of 

Milpa Alta 

July 17, 2010

(shortly before 

Midnight) 

Two 18-year olds, David 

Pérez Guzmán and Daniel 

Aldrete Martínez, seized as 

criminals by local residents.

Citizens, including taxi 

drivers, held the young men 

for several hours, requesting 

that the media and 

authorities disseminate their 

pictures.

Rural 

community 

in the DF. 

The police gained Custody of Pérez Guzmán 

and Aldrete Martínez after negotiations that

lasted until 5 a.m. on Sunday. 

San Mateo 

Tlaltenango, DF 

borough of 

Cuajimalpa

June 17, 2010 Two allegedly drunk Federal 

Police agents, dressed in 

civilian clothing, attempted 

to apprehend two young 

men as they left the local 

church. 

The ringing of the church 

bells brought 200 local 

residents who beat and 

threatened to burn their 

captives; 100 militarized 

police (granaderos) rescued 

their colleagues. 

The Federal Policemen, who suffered minor 

injuries, were exonerated of wrongdoing by 

the local prosecutor. 

San Juan de 

Aragón, DF 

borough of 

Gustavo A. 

Madero

May 17, 2010 Édgar Contreras Carrillo, 

22, armed with a pistol, 

sought to steal the 

belongings of 25 children 

aboard a school bus.

The bus driver foiled the 

attempted robbery.

Municipal police took the culprit into 

custody; parents demanded greater security 

for their neighborhood.

San Pedro 

Xalostoc, 

Ecatepec, 

Mexico State

May 17, 2010 An individual attempted to 

rob a bus. 

Some 500 local residents 

captured the suspect, who 

died when residents blocked 

the ambulance attempting to 

take him to the hospital.

A 250-member swat team used tear gas to 

try to open a route for the emergency 

vehicle.

El Rosario, DF’s 

Iztapalapa 

borough 

May 14, 2010 David Villegas Torres, 35, 

and an accomplice stole 

15,000 pesos and the car of 

an off-duty policeman.

Local citizens responded to 

his call for help; they caught 

and beat to death one of the 

alleged thieves who shot a 

policeman during the chase; 

the other assailant escaped. 

No one admitted to being involved in the 

fracas, and no charges were brought. 

Coatepec, 

Ixtapaluca, 

Mexico State

March 21, 2010 Two drunken young men 

allegedly crashed into a 

bicyclist.

Some 180 local residents 

grabbed the car occupants, 

whom they beat and planned 

to execute.

Poor 

community 

outside DF.

The local mayor negotiated with the crowd, 

which eventually released the suspect to 

authorities.

San Pedro 

Atocpan in DF’s 

Milpa Alta 

borough 

Feb. 22, 2010 Police arrested two local 

residents, Flores Becerril 

and Olivo Torres.

Members of the community 

believed that their neighbors 

were being falsely taken into 

custody and used stones, 

sticks, and homemade 

rockets to take captive the 

three arresting officers.

Authorities, including 1,500 riot police, used 

tear gas to free their colleagues.

Salinas del 

Marqués, 

Salinas Cruz, 

Oaxaca 

Feb. 18, 2010

(4 a.m.)

Five suspects boarded a 

taxi and threatened the 

driver with a knife.

Some 200 fellow drivers 

prevented the theft, seized 

Jordi Alberto Gómez Ortega, 

splashed him with gasoline, 

and burned him to death.

Morelia, Mich. Mid-Jan. 2010 Five men accused of being 

“rats” or thieves.

Unknown parties strangled 

or suffocated four of their 

targets with packing tape; the

fifth died from a gunshot. 

Police attribute the deaths to vigilantes in 

light of a hand-written note beside the 

corpses: “This is what is going to happen to 

all the rats who rob houses, cars and 

pedestrians.” 

 
55 3 

San Pedro 

Zicatepc, Tenango

del Valle, Mexico 

State 

Adrian Martínez Bolaños, 

20, and Sergio Martínez 

Bolaños, 22, allegedly stole 

a taxi and auto parts.

More than 150 local 

residents captured the young 

men whom they beat and 

stoned. 

Rural, poor 

community 

Elements of the ASE prevented the killing of 

the culprits. 

San Martín de 

las Rajas, 

Mexico State

Dec. 29, 2009 Bus passengers accused 

five armed subjects of 

robbing them in Lerma.

They apprehended the 

supposed thieves, beat them 

badly, and tied them to a 

tree.

Poor 

community 

near DF.

The ASE arrived in time to save the lives of 

the culprits.

San Pedro 

Chiautzingo, 

Tepetlaoxtoc, 

Mexico State

Dec. 27, 2009

(night) 

Five men appeared to be 

inserting cables to steal 

electricity in an area where 

such thefts abounded.

300 people gathered, caught 

two of the suspects, and 

began to beat them.

Poor 

community 

near DF.

240 ASE elements, who thwarted their 

execution, took them to the sub-procuraría 

in Texcoco.

San Miguel 

Ajusto, Tlalpan, 

D.F.

Dec. 14, 2009 Microbus passengers 

defended themselves 

against criminals.

Passengers banded together 

against four robbers, who 

sought to steal their 

belongings; two of the 

culprits escaped even as the 

enraged citizens beat and 

prepared to hang the other 

two near a local church. 

An Emergency Rescue Squad (ERUM) 

rescued the two robbers before they were 

executed. 

San Francisco 

Chimalpa, 

located on 

highway 

between 

Naucalpan and 

Toluca in Mexico 

State.

Dec. 11, 2009 Julio César Luna Robles, 

22, accused of raping a 13-

year-old. 

Local residents heard 

screams and seized the 

presumed culprit whom they 

sought to execute.

Poor area in 

urban 

Mexico 

State.

Police arrived in time to save the life

of the alleged culprit.

Santiago 

Otolman, 

Otoumba, 

Mexico State 

Dec. 8, 2009

(3:30 to 5:00 

p.m.)

Neighbors captured two 

“suspicious” individuals 

parked outside a school.

The pair turned out to be 

police agents, Roberto Carlos 

Ordóñez Figueroa and Martín 

Suárez Martínez, who 

claimed to be seeking to 

arrest a child-molesting 

teacher. A crowd of 500 

threatened, which blocked a 

nearby roadway, threatened 

to burn buses and execute 

the men (believed to be 

kidnappers) because they 

were “tired” of crime in their 

area.

Rural 

community 

outside the 

DF.

Some 200 specialized

ASE elements used 

tear gas to rescue

the officers.

Ecatzingo, 

Mexico State

November 28, 

2009 

Authorities held subjects 

believed to have kidnapped 

a resident of Morelos. 

Crowd gathered outside the 

Subprocura-duría de Justicia 

de Amecameca to demand 

the release of the alleged 

abductors. 

San Matías 

Cuijingo, 

Juchitepec, 

Toluca, Mexico 

State 

Nov. 10, 2009 Some 1,000 local residents 

believed that six men were 

responsible for kidnapping 

businessman José 

Trinidad Sánchez Rosas.

The citizens seized the 

presumed culprits, including 

two policemen, José Ricardo 

Velázquez Escárrcega and 

Juan Carlos Ortega Vaca, 

doused them with gasoline 

with a view to burning them 

alive.

Poor 

community 

outside 

Toluca 

The ASE intervened to prevent the 

linchamiento. 

La Palma, Ixtlán 

de Juárez, 

Oaxaca

Sept. 3, 2009 Incited by local authorities, 

Catholics sought to execute 

70 evangelical Christians, 

including 25 children.

This threat followed multiple 

acts against the Protestants, 

including the burning of a 

church on Aug. 31.

. 

Santa Cruz 

Otlatla, Santa 

Rita, Tlahuapan, 

Puebla 

Aug. 17, 2009

(6 to 7 p.m.)

Police arrested two 

community members for 

being drunk: Agustín de 

Jesús Mónico, 20, and 

Pedro Nájera Contrera, 34.

Enraged at the arrests, local 

residents attacked 

authorities, injuring three 

policemen and breaking the 

windshield on the mayor’s 

car.

Poor 

community. 

Authorities began negotiations with local 

residents.

“Taxi Drivers 

Pact” in the DF’s 

Magdalena

Contreras

borough 

Aug. 14, 2009 

(Night) 

“El Perro,” a criminal 

allegedly

headed a band that 

assaulted and robbed taxi 

drivers.

El Perro’s body was found in 

the trunk of a vehicle occupied by Ismael

Quintero Oliver, 32, and 

Marcos Érik Pérez Mora, 21, 

who belonged to a”Drivers’ 

Pact” committed to curbing 

crime against their

colleagues.

Poor area of 

Mexico City.

Authorities took Quintero Oliver and Pérez 

Mora into custody.

Jan. 7, 2010

2009
56

4 

Miguel Alemán,

Oaxaca 

Aug. 14, 2009 

(5 a.m.)

Two men —Daniel Martínez 

Martínez,19 and Dante Antonio 

Martínez Díaz—allegedly sexually 

abused a woman and her daughter. 

Enraged taxi drivers beat up 

the suspects. 

Poor 

neighborhood near 

Oaxaca city.

Municipal police intervened to save the 

suspects.

Galeana, 

Chihuahua 

Spring 2009. Benjamín LeBarón, leader 

of a small Mormon 

community, led the battle 

against organized crime, 

which included the 

kidnapping of LeBarón’s

nephew. 

LeBaron was seeking to 

combat extortion and 

kidnappings carried out by 

drug cartels; he criticized the 

failure of authorities to 

protect their community of 

5,000 residents, located 125 

miles south of Cd. Juárez. He 

was kidnapped and 

murdered. 

Following the July 7 killing of LeBarón and 

his brother-in-law, Gov. José Reyes Baeza 

pledged to arm and train 77 young men as 

policemen in the municipality; in the face of 

political pressure, he reneged on this 

promise, but dispatched additional state 

police to the area; LeBaron’s brother said

that local residents would support “SOS 

Chihuahua,” an off-shoot of the national 

“SOS” organization founded by prominent 

businessman Alejandro Martí whose son 

was abducted and slain; meanwhile, 

Benjamín’s uncle Adrián LeBarón avowed 

that absolutely no legal authority” existed in 

five Chihuahua municipalities which were in 

enthralled with organized crime: Nicolás Bravo, 

Gómez Farías, Zaragoza, Buenaventura, and 

Casas Grandes.

Jardines de 

Morelos and 

Rinconadas de 

Aragón, 

Ecatepec, 

Mexico State

Nov. 15, 2008 Three violent individuals 

suspected of robbing cars 

and houses.

Local residents seized two of 

the suspects whom they 

threatened to execute.

Neighborhood near 

DF.

Police arrested the suspects.

Santa María 

Huexoculco, 

Chalco, Mexico 

State

Nov. 15, 2008 Residents caught three 

thieves and four police 

officers allegedly robbing 

electricity in their 

community. 

The presumed culprits were 

taken to the center of the 

municipality and beaten.

Approximately 100 local and state police took 

the culprits into custody.

Tehuacán, 

Puebla 

Nov. 14, 2008. Isaías Castro, 40, believed 

to have molested a 4-yearold. 

A mob seized and beat the 

alleged pederast who died of 

cranial wounds on Nov. 14. 

DF borough of 

Benito Juárez

Nov. 14, 2008 Three assailants tried to 

steal a car from a female 

driver who screamed for 

help. 

Two men in a BMW came to 

her help; others joined in 

capturing one of the 

suspects who was badly 

beaten. 

Populated 

area near 

center of 

DF.

Police arrived to take the suspect into 

custody.

San Miguel 

Tejalpan, 

Xochistahuac, 

Costa Chica, 

Guerrero 

Nov. 14, 2008 An intoxicated individual 

allegedly killed a man and 

his son. 

Local residents pursued the 

suspect, doused his home 

with gasoline, and burned it, 

injuring his wife and 

daughter; next they lynched 

the presumed murderer.

Yolotepec, 

Santiago de 

Anaya, Valle del 

Mezquital,

Hidalgo 

Nov. 14, 2008

(late night/early 

morning) 

Approximately 10 drunk 

teenagers on a bus trip 

were surprised when 

breaking into stores that 

sold groceries and artisan 

goods; they also beat a 

shop owner and his wife 

and son.

Some 200 residents led by 

the municipal delegate 

Nicasio López Hernández 

threatened to stone the 

suspects and their 

companions; the bus driver 

suffered wounds.

Police rescued the captives after they

reimbursed the shop owners 18,000 pesos 

for goods taken.

Pueblo 

Tejomulco el

Bajo 

neighborhood of 

the DF’s 

Xochimilco 

borough. 

Oct. 25, 2008 A 70-year-old homeowner 

caught Víctor Gallego 

Licona, 50, attempting to 

rob his home. 

The victim of the crime and 

his neighbors tied the robber 

to a post and prepared to 

lynch him.

Poor 

community 

on DF’s 

outskirts.

Elements of the DF’s Ministry of Public 

Security arrived in time to prevent the 

execution.

Coatepec,

Ixtapaluca, 

Mexico State

Oct. 1, 2008. Six presumed criminals, 

two of whom were minors, 

tried to rob video games in 

a store.

More than 100 people beat 

the suspects and prepared to 

lynch them.

Sixty members of the ASE required to free 

the culprits.

San Juan 

Yautepec, 

Huixquilucan,

Mexico State

Sept. 4, 2008 Samuel Mejía Montoya, 18, 

was surprised inside a 

cyber-café where he 

allegedly was robbing 

computers.

Some 100 neighbors 

assembled in response to the 

pealing of local church bells 

and began to beat the 

teenager—with a view to 

lynching him; Feliberto 

López, a local resident, 

exclaimed: “we are tired of 

robberies and criminals who 

go free.” 

Poor 

community 

on DF

outskirts. 

Some 30 ASE elements were 

required to prevent an execution.

Portes Gil, Santa 

Clara Ocuyucan

June 23, 2008 A violent dispute erupted 

over the judicial resolution 

of a land dispute in which 

the judge returned to the 

presumed owner 25 

hectares occupied by 100 

families. 

Those living on the land 

spearheaded a protest, which 

involved the seizure of 89 

people.

Poor, rural 

community 

Municipal, metropolitan, and judicial police 

intervened to free the captives.

Querétaro May 21, 2008 José Ruiz Zaragoza allegedly

killed his wife in public. 

A crowd caught and beat 

him.

The police arrived in time to take the

suspect into custody.

2009
57

5 

Ecatepec, 

Mexico State 

April 10, 2008 A man attempted to assault 

bus riders.

500 citizens attempted to 

execute the subject.

Suburb of 

Mexico City 

100 local police saved the man from 

popular justice.

Metro Pantitlá, 

DF.

March 21, 2008 Two young men—Iván 

Rojas Ramírez, 20, and Luis 

Buendía Martínez, 22,

suspected of robbing 

microbus passengers.

The passengers began to 

beat the culprits with a view 

to executing them.

Mexico City Judicial police arrived in time to

protect the suspects. 

San Juan 

Ixtayopan in 

DF’s Tláhuac 

borough 

Nov. 23, 2004 Crowd became convinced 

that three men in an 

unmarked car outside a 

public school were preying 

on their children. 

The men turned out to be 

detectives; even so, two were 

burned to death and the third 

badly beaten before a squad 

of riot police belatedly 

arrived on the scene.

Approximately 30 local residents, some 

captured on video cameras splashing 

gasoline on the two men, were arrested.

DF borough of 

Venustiano 

Carranza

April 23, 2002 Residents sought to lynch a 

17-year-old surprised while 

attempting to rob a senior

citizen’s vehicle. 

Police rescued him before he 

could be executed. 

San Pedro 

Mártir, Baja 

California

Jan. 19, 2002 Local citizens at-tempted to 

punish a 

young man accused of 

trying to rob a home. 

Apparently he escaped from 

his captors.

DF borough of

Iztapalapa

Jan. 6, 2002 Local citizens tried to beat 

to death the 25-year-old 

driver of a vehicle who ran 

over two adolescents. 

Apparently, he survived the 

attack.

Pueblo de San 

Nicolás Tetelco, 

Oaxaca

Oct. 25, 2001 Residents almost lynched a 

man attempting to rob a 

house. 

Preventive police rescued 

him.

DF’s Centro 

neighborhood 

Oct. 15, 2001 Residents almost lynched a 

30-year-old man who had 

wounded two senior 

citizens.

Apparently rescued by the 

police.

Reforma 

community in 

Oaxaca city 

Oct. 2, 2001 300 citizens sought to hang 

two judicial police for 

allegedly kidnapping a 

minor. 

80 municipal, state, and 

judicial police saved the 

officers.

DF’s Centro 

neighborhood 

Sept. 1, 2001 A thief tried to steal a Bible 

used for Mass at the La 

Santísima Church. 

Police rescued the suspect 

as local people were beating 

him. 

San Miguel 

Topilejo in DF’s 

Tlapan’s 

borough 

Aug. 13, 2001 Man surprised while 

robbing images from a 

chapel.

Police saved culprit from 

being lynched by local 

citizens.

Basilica of the 

Virgin of 

Guadalupe 

Aug. 4, 2001 Man attacked and robbed 

worshippers praying in the 

Basilica.

Judicial police saved him 

from worshippers who were 

beating him.

No arrests.

Magdalena

Petlacalco in DF 

borough of 

Tlalpan

July 25, 2001 Subject caught stealing 

objects from local Santa 

María Magdalena 

church. 

Beaten so severely by local 

citizens that he died. 

No arrests.

Sources: Emilio Fernández, “Supuesto plagiarios salvan 

linchmiento en Tepexpan” (“Supposed Abuctors Saved from 

Lynching in Tepexpan”), El Universal.com.mx, March 11, 2011; 

“Salvan a 3 de linchamiento”(3 Saved from Lynching”), Excelsior, March 11, 2011; “Eleuterio Quiñones Nevares y justicia por cuenta propia” (“Eleuterio Quiñones Nevares and Taking Justice in His Own Hands”), Durango el día, March 2, 2011; 

“Dos presuntos asaltantes a punto de ser linchados por taxistas 

(23:54 h)” (“Two presumed assailants on the Verge of Being 

Lynched by Taxi Cab Drivers [23:54 h]”), Agencia Digital de Noticias Sureste, February 17, 2011; Jonathan López, “Frustran linchamiento de dos en Puebla,” (“Lynching of Two Frustrated in 

Puebla”), Reforma.com, Feburary 16, 2011; Emilio Fernández, 

2004 and Earlier
58

“Turba intent linchar a secuestrador en Edomex” (“Mob Tries 

to Lynch a Kidnapper in Mexico State”), El Universal.com.mx, 

February 9, 2011; Héctor Raúl González, “Rescatan a 5 de linchamiento en Morelos” (“Five Rescued from Lynching in Morelos”), Reforma, October 20, 2010; Justino Miranda, “Secuestradores 

que libraron linchamiento aceptan delitos” (“Freed Kidnappers 

Admit to Crimes”), El Universal, October 20, 2010; “Intentan en 

Coatepec linchar a presentos delicuentes” (“An Attempt in Coatepec to Lynch Presumed Criminals”); “Linchan a presunto ladrón 

en Juárez,” (“Presumed Robber Lynched in Juárez”), La Jornada,

October 8, 2010; Emilio Fernández Román, El Universal, October 

2, 2008; Ramón Rentería: Vigilantism Takes Hold: Mexican Town 

Fights Back,” El Paso Times, September 26, 2010; “Is the Fuse Lit? 

Uprising/Lynching in Chihuahua,” Chihuahua News, September 

22, 2010; Antonio Nieto, “Matan a ladrón en Casa de Coyoacán” 

(“Thief Killed in House in Coyoacán”), Reforma, September 5, 

2010; Verónica Jiménez, “Toman Alcaldía por muerte de menor” 

(“Mayor Seized for Death of a Minor”), Reforma, September 

3, 2010; René Ramón, “Multitud intent linchar a tres presuntos 

ladrones en Chalco,” (“Mass of People Try to Lynch Three Presumed Thieves in Chalco”), La Jornada, August 25, 2010; “Rescatan 

de linchamiento a cinco en Edomex” (“Five Saved from Lynching 

in Mexico State”), El Universal.com, August 13, 2010; Martha Izquierdo, “Intentan linchar a dos por robo en el Istmo” (“Attempt 

to Lynch Two for Robbery in Isthmus”), Reforma, August 9, 2010; 

Martha Izquierdo, “Amagan con linchar a 2 por robo en Istmo” 

(“Embittered with Lynching Two for Robbery in Isthmus”), 

Reforma, August 8, 2010; “Evitan robo en Milpa Alta; vecinos intentan linchar a los ladrones” (“Robbery Prevented in Milpa Alta; 

Neighbors Try to Lynch Thieves”), La Jornada, August 7, 2010; 

Rodolfo Dorantes, “Pobladores de San Antonio Tecomitl retienen 

más de cuatro horas a dos asaltantes, hasta que llegaron a un 

acuerdo con la policía para que no hay impunidad” (“Residents 

of San Antonio Tecomitl hold two assailants for more than four 

hours until the police agree that they will not enjoy impunity”), 

Policiaco Veraz, July 18, 2010; Alejandro Cruz Flores, “Rescatan a 

policías federales que fueron retenidos por habitants de Cuajimalpa,” (“Federal Police Rescued after Being Held by Inhabitants 

of Cuajimalpa”), La Jornada, June 19, 2010; Alejandro Cruz Flores, 

“Linchan vecinos de El Rosario, Iztapalapa, a presunto ladrón” 

(“El Rosario, Iztapalapa Neighbors Killed Presumed Robber”), La 

Jornada, May 16, 2010; Johana Robles, “Intentaron lichar a fede-
59

rales; los salvan,” (“Two Federal Policemen Saved from Lynching”), El Universal, February 23, 2010; “Taxistas de Oaxaca queman vivo a un asaltante en la region del Istmo,” (“Oaxacan Taxi 

Drivers Burn Assailant Alive in Isthmus”), CNN México, February 18, 2010; “Vigilante Warnings Attached to 5 Bodies Found 

in Mexico,” PressTV, January 18, 2010; Rodrigo Miranda Torres, 

“Nuevo intent de linchamiento, ahora en Tenango del Valle” 

(“New Lynching Attempt, Now in Tenango del Valle”), El Sol de 

Cuautla, January 8, 2010; Yara Silva, “Pobladores casi linchan a 

dos asaltantes de un microbus” (“Neighbors Almost Lynch two 

Assailants of Microbus”), El Universal.com, December 15, 2009; 

Javier Salinas Cesáreo, “Otumba: salvan de linchamiento a dos 

presuntos judiciales” (“Otumba: two judicial police saved from 

lynching”), La Jornada, December 8, 2009; Antonio Nieto, “Ejecutan a ladrón Taxistas de la Ciudad” (“Taxi Drivers Execute a 

Thief in the City”), Reforma, August 17, 2009; “Por poco linchan 

a abusador sexual (17:21 h)” (“Sexual Abuser Almost Executed 

[17:21 h]”), ADN, August 14, 2009; “A Punto de ser linchados dos 

por robo de automóviles” (“Two Almost Lynched for Robbing 

Automobiles”), Milenio, November 25, 2008; “Casi linchan a visitants borrachos y abusivos,” (“Drunk and Abusive Visitors Almost Lynched”), Milenio, November 15, 2008; “Linchamiento de 

la Del Valle” (“Lynching in la Del Valle”), Milenio, November 15, 

2008; “Rescatan a ladrones y policías de ser linchados en Chalco” 

(“Thieves and Police Rescued from Being Lynched in Chalco”), 

Milenio, November 15, 2008; “Linchan a homicida en la Costa Chica de Guerrero” (“Killer Lynched in Costa Chica of Guerrero”), 

Milenio, November 15, 2008; “Intentan linchar a presunto ladrón 

en Xochimilco” (“Attempt to Execute a Presumed Thief in Xochimilco”), El Universal, October 26, 2008; Rebecca Jiménez, “Frustran 

linchamiento en Huixquilucan “ (“Lynching Frustrated in Huixquilucan”), El Universal, September 4, 2008; “Deja enfrentamiento 

en Ocoyucan 18 heridos y casi 100 detenidos” (“Confrontation in 

Ocoyucan left 18 wounded and almost 100 arrested”), E-consulta, 

June 23, 2008; “Ocurren más de un centenary de linchamientos 

en dos décadas” (“More Than One Hundred Lynchings in Two 

Decades”), El Universal.com, January 8, 2008; “Vigilante Justice,” 

Newsweek, December 20, 2004; and Richard Boudreaux, “Vigilantes’ Fatal Fury in Mexico/Angry Mob Burns 2 Officers to Death,” 

SFGate.com, November 25, 2004.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. George W. Grayson

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil