IN T HE SUP ERI OR COURT OF THE STAT E OF DE LAWARE KATHL EEN M. SZC ZER BA, indivi duall y and as Exec utri x of the Es t at e o f J OSEP H L. SZC ZER BA, Deceased, Plain tiffs, ) ) ) ) ) ) v. ) ) C.A. No. N13C- 09-0 80 WCC AMERICAN CIGARET TE OUTLET, INC. , RAJ SINGH, LCM DI ST RIB UT OR S C O., I NC ., AD RE NA LIN RU SH , IN C. d /b/a SMOKECLEAR, GI ULIO BERTOLI and AN TH ON Y C AP AC CIO , De fend ants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
Submitte d: December 2, 2015 Decided: April 1, 2016 Def en dan t Ad re nali n Rus h, In c. ’s Mot i on t o Di smi ss –DE NIE D

MEMORANDUM OPINI ON Francis J. Murphy, Esquire, Kel ley M. Huff, Esquire, Murphy & Landon, 1011 Cen tre R oad , Su ite 21 0, W ilmin gton , DE 198 05. A ttorn eys fo r Pla intiffs

. Michael F. Duggan, Esquire , Marc Sposat o, Esquir e, Marks, O’Neill , O’Brie n, Do herty & K elly, P .C., 3 00 D elaw are A ven ue, S uite 9 00, W ilmin gton , DE 198 01. Attorneys for Defendant Adrenalin Rush, Inc. d/b/ a Smokeclear.

CA RP EN TE R, J .1 Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 24. 2 Id . ¶ 24. 3 Preliminarily, the Court notes that “bath salts,” which ha ve since been banned in Delaware and across the nation, are a ty pe of synthetic drug

comprised of chemicals known to mimic the effects of substances including coca ine, LSD, and methamphetamine
. SeeDel. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4701 (West) (including “designer drug s” in definition of “controlled substances”); Governor Signs into Law Ban on Dangerous “Bath Salts” Drugs , http://new s.delaware.gov/2012/01 /25/gove rnor-sig ns-into-l aw-ban-on-dan

gerous-bath- saltsdrugs/ (last visited March 8, 2016); Jake Schaller, Not for Bathing: Bath Salts and the New Menace of Synthetic Drugs , 16 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 245 (2013). 4 Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24. 5 Id . ¶ 24. 6 Id

. 2 Before t he Court i s Defendant

Adrenali n Rush, Inc. ’s (“ Adrenali n”) Motion t o Di sm i ss Pl ai nt i ff

s’ Ame nd edCompl ai nt . For t he re as on s t

ha t fo l l ow, Ad rena lin’s M otion will b e D EN IED
. FACTS Th e fac ts and circu msta nces und erlyin g this litigatio n are tragic . Ne w C astle County Poli ce Offic er Jose ph L. Szczer ba (“Offi cer Szcz erba”) responded to a 911 callon September 16, 2011. 1 Upon arrivi ng at t he scene , Offic er Szcze rba encountered David A. Salasky (“Mr. Salasky”). 2 At that ti me, Mr. Salasky was experi encing “ hallucinations, delusi ons, and pa ranoia ” att

ribut able t o his i ngesti on of “bath salts” 3 he h ad p urch ased at A mer ican C igare tte O utlet in Ne w C astle County on Septe mber 15, 2011. 4 Mr. Salasky soon turne d viole nt, dr ew a knife on Officer Sz czerba, and pro ceeded to stab him sev eral times. 5 Officer Szczerba died soon after as a result of his injuries. 6 M r. Sa lasky wa s later a rreste d an d ch arge d in7 See State v. Salasky , 2013 WL 5487363, at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 26, 2013). 8 Mr. Singh ’s responsibilities included “the pur chasing , orderi

ng, inve ntory, and sale

of produc

ts sold by Cigare

tte Outlet, including the products sold at the DuPont Highway store” and “the training , supervi sion, and oversig ht of the other emp loyees of the Cigar ette Outl et.” Pls. A

m. Compl. ¶¶ 15-16. 9 Id . ¶ 13. 10 Id.

3 connect ion with Offi cer Szcz erba’ s deat h. 7 He ultim ately p led g uilty b ut m entally ill to First Degree M urder, in addition to a num ber of other o ffenses. On Sep temb er 11 , 201 3, K athlee n M . Szc zerb a filed her in itial Co mp laint, individually and as personal repres entati ve of her husband’s estat e (“Plai ntiffs” ), against American Cigaret te Outlet, Inc. (“Cigar ette Outle t”) and Raj Singh (“Mr. Singh”), an employe e of the corporation. 8 Plainti ffs then fi led an Amended Co mp laint o n M arch 27, 2 015 nam ing a s add itiona l defe nda nts: A dren alin, G iulio Bertol i (“ Mr. Bertol i”), Anthony Capacci o (“Mr. Capac cio”) , LCM D ist ribut ing, LLC (“LCM ”), a

nd Southern Dist

ribut ors Co., Inc. ( “Souther n”). Eac h Defendant is al leged t o have pla

yed some rol e in t

he manufact

ure, di stribution, or sal e of the bath salts M r. Sa lasky pur chas ed at C igare tte O utlet. S pecif ically, A dren alin, a Ne w J ersey -bas ed co rpo ration ope rated by M r. Be rtoli an d M r. Ca pacc io (co ll ective ly , “ Adren al in De fen dant s”) , manufa cture d and sol d bat h sa lt s t o LCM Distributing and/or S outhern D istributors. 9 LC M and So uthe rn th en so ld the bath salts th ey pu rcha sed f

rom Ad rena lin to th e Cig arette O utlet. 10 On Sept embe r 14, 2015, Adren al in mo ved t o di smi ss Pl ai nti ffs ’ c la ims agains t it pursuant to Superi or Court Civi l Rule 12(b)(6). Counts XIII-XVII of t he11 Id . ¶¶ 85-105. Count XVII for loss of consortium is asserted against all Defenda nts. Id . ¶¶ 104- 105. 12 Def. Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 4 (asserting the 2-y ear statute of limitations for survivorship and loss of consortium claims as barring all counts with the exception of that alleging breach of implied warranty ). 13 Id . ¶ 8. 14 Id . ¶¶ 9-10. 15 Judicial Action Form, D.I. 59. 16 SeeSuper. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).

4 Amend ed Complaint address the Adrenali n Defendants and allege negli gence; gross negligence, recklessnes s, and willfuland wanton conduct; breach of implied

warr ant y; ci vilcons pir acy ; and l oss of c onso rt ium. 11 Ad rena lin’s M otion requ ests that the Court dismiss these claims as barred by the statute of limitations. 12 It also contends dismissalof the conspiracy claim is warranted independently of the timebar beca use Plaintif

fs fai led t o all ege Adrenal in act ed unlawful ly i n furthe rance of the conspiracy. 13 Fin ally, A dren alin ar gue s the b reac h of imp lied w arra nty cla im must be dismissed because no warranty e ver existe d between the buyer and sell er in this c ase. 14 The Court heard argument on D ecember 2, 2015 and denied Adren alin’s Motion to D ismiss to the extent it relied on the statute of limitations. 15 This is the Court’ s decisi on with respect to t he civilconspiracy and impli ed

wa rran ty claim s. STANDAR D OF REVIEW Pursuan t to Superior C ourt Civil Rule 12 (b)(6), the Cou rt will dismiss a

com plain t if it “fail[s ] to state a claim upo n w hich relief c an b e gra nted .” 16 Dismissa l is warrante d only when the Court can de termi ne “wit h reas ona ble17 See Furnari v. Wallpang, Inc. , 2014 WL 1678419, a

t *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 16, 201 4) (emphasis added ) (cit ing Clinton v. Enter. Rent–A–Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. 2009)). 18 See Solom on v. Path e Commc’ ns Corp ., 672 A.2d 35, 38-39 (Del. 1996). See also Precision Air v. Stan dard Chlorin e of Del. , 654 A.2d 403, 406 (Del. 1995 ) (provi ding tha t complain

t is “well-p lead” if

it puts oppo sing par

ty on notice o f claim br

ought a gainst i t); In re Benzene Litig. , 2007 WL 625054, at *5 (Del. Super. Feb. 26, 2007) (discussing broad test for sufficiency of complaint). 19 See In re USACafes, L.P. Litig. , 600 A.2d 43, 47 (Del. Ch. 1991) (providing also that the Court is not required to blindly acce pt all allegations or draw all inference s in the plaintiff’s favor). 20 Def. Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 8. 21 See Johnson v. Preferred Prof'l Ins. Co. , 91 A.3d 994, 1014 (Del. Super. 2014) (quoting Nicolet, I nc. v. Nut t, 525 A.2d 146, 149-50 (Del. 1987), appeal refused sub nom , Turner v. Johnson , 89 A.3d 478 (Del. 2014)).

5 certa inty that, unde r any se t of fac ts that c oul d be p rove n to supp ort the cl ai ms
asser ted, th e plain tiff w ould not b e entitle d to r elief.” 17 In dec iding A drena lin’s Motion, t he Court must

assume as true t

he well- pleade d all egati ons of the Am end ed C om plain t, 18 and affo rd P laintiffs “the b enef it of all r easo nab le infer ence s that c an b e dra wn from [their ] plead ing.” 19 DISCUS SION I. Civi l Cons pir acy Ad rena lin ask s the C our t to dis miss Plain tiffs’ civ il con spira cy claim beca use th e A men ded Co mp laint d oes n ot ple ad th at A dren alin ac ted u nlaw fully in furtherance of the alleged co nspiracy. 20 To estab lish a c laim f or civ il con spira cy, a Plaintiff must allege “(1) [a] confederation or co mbination of tw o or mo re persons; (2) [a]n unlawful act

done in furtherance of t he conspiracy; and (3) [a]ct ual dam age.” 2122 See, e.g. , Ramunno v. Cawley , 705 A .2d 10 29, 10 39 (Del . 1998 ) (cit ing Connolly v . Labowitz, 519 A.2d 138, 143 (Del. Super. 1986)). 23 See NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc. , 997 A.2d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“Although the elements of a claim for civil conspiracy are flexible, it is essential that there be an underly ing wrongf ul act , such as a to rt or a statu tory viol ation .” (cit ing Empire Fin. Servs. v. Bank of New York, 900 A.2d 92, 97 (Del. 2006))). See also Anderson v. Airco, Inc. , 2004 WL 2827887, at *3 (Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2004) (“An actionable tort must accompa ny any conspiracy

in order for th er e t o b e a re co ve ry. ” ). 24 See Bell v. Celotex Corp. , 1988 WL 7623, at *4 (Del. Super. Jan. 19, 1988) (quoting 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1233 at 181 (applying fe deral rule identical to Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 8(a) to conspiracy claim)). 25 See id. See also Strong v. Wells Fargo Bank , 2012 WL 3549730, at *3 (Del. Super. July 20, 2012) (“[W]hen a claim is so vague as to deprive an adverse party from a

clear indication of the nature o f the ple ader' s claim, the Court wi ll not engage in a guessin g game to supply

that clai m on Plaintiffs' behalf.”). 26 See Bell

, 1988 WL 7623, at *1 (discussing recurr ing structure of complaints in asbestos litigati on); In re Benzene Litig. , 2007 WL 625054, at *5 (“The Court must view the complaint as

6 Importantly, civilconspiracy i s not an independent cause of a ction under Del awa re l aw. 22 Thus, A drenalin is correct that Plaintiffs are required to premise thei r cla im on some underlying wrong such a s a tor t or ot her st atut ory viol ati on. 23 That said, Delaware courts “ have recognized that the nature of conspi racies oft en makes it impossibl e to provide detai ls at t he pleading sta ge and that the pl eader should be a llowed t o resort to the discove ry proce ss and not be subje cted t o a dism issal... .” 24 Never

the le ss, the Amende d Compl ai nt mu st , at aminimum, suffici ently al low the Court “to deter mine whether or not a valid cl aim for reli ef has been s tat ed and to e nable t he opposing s ide t o prepare an adequat e respons ive plead ing.” 25 As is oft en the c ase i n pleadings premis ed on product s li abil ity , the Am end ed C om plain t here is “stru cture d cu mu latively ,” so th at all alleg ation s in preceding counts a

re inc orporat ed ther ein. 26 Counts XIII through X V assertan integrated document-all of the allegations must be considered when determining whether the

complaint provides fair notice of the claims.”). 27 Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 99-100. 28 Id . ¶ 101. The premise

of Plaintif

fs’ negligenc e claim a

gainst t he Adre nalin Def

endants specifically is that they

knew or should have known that: (1) “bath salts were a da ngerous and defect ive produ ct and co uld not be s old safe ly to

the public ;” (2) “ customers like Salasky would use the bath salts in a manner that would cause ...psy chotic reactions and ... violent [behavior],” thus pres enting “

risk of se rious bodi ly in

jury and dea th to other

persons; ” (3) the

bath salts “lacked adequate warning s and instructions about their use and their effects...and failed to wa rn customers of the da

ngers o f the use

of the pr oducts;” (4) “the bath salt p

roducts d id not fully disclose their ing redients;” and ( 5) “the b ath salts s old to Salasky were inherently dange rous,...Sa lasky would use

the bath s alts, and ...the bath salts woul d make him

a dang er to the public, including persons like Police Officer Szczerba.” See id. ¶ 86.

7 negli gence; gross negl igence , rec kless ness, and will ful and want on conduct; and breach of

impli ed warrant

y cla ims against t

he Adrenalin Defendants . The allega tions with resp ect to th ese cla ims a re thu s inco rpo rated and re-a lleged in Co unt X VI , wh ich se ts for th P laintiffs’ civil c ons pirac y claim

. Ultimat ely, Plaintiffs all ege the Adrenali n Defendants conspir ed among themselves and w ith Cigarette Outlet, Mr. Sing h, LCM , and Sou thern “to suppress and misr epre sent in form ation abo ut the dan gers pos ed b y bath salts to the p ublic

an d t o i nd i vi du al s l i ke ...Off i ce r S zc ze rb a” whe n i t kn ew o r s ho ul d h av e kno wn thei r conduct

creat ed a ri sk of “s erious personalinjur y and deat

h from persons like Sala sky w ho u sed b ath sa lts.” 27 Plaintiffs further allege the Adren alin Defenda nts “aided and abette d the man ufac turer (s), d istribu tors, s ellers, a nd s upp lier(s) of b ath salt s” in c onceal ing the product’ s “t rue danger s” by se lling thei r bath s alt s to t he public without pr oper warnings , ins tructions, or labe ling. 28 Accord ing to Plaintiffs, the Adrenalin Defendants’ act s and omissions in furt herance of this conspiracy29 Id . ¶ 102. 30 Id . ¶ 92. 31 See Anderson , 2004 WL 2827887, at *3-4 (“Delawar e courts have addressed civil conspiracy in a variety of

contexts but no authority exists to support a civil conspiracy claim proceeding on the should

ers of a negligence cl aim.”). It wo uld seem the instant c ivil consp iracy claim als o encompasses allegations which appear to be more along the lines of aiding and abe tting. Indeed, Plaintiff s contend the Adre nalin Def endants “ aided an

d abette d the manufactur

er(s),distributors, sellers, and supplier(s) of bath salts” in concealing the product’s dangerous effe cts by selling their ba th salts to t

he public without pr

oper wa rnings,instructi ons, or la

beling. Pls. Am. Comp l. ¶ 86. I mportantl y, “ [u]nlike civil conspir

acy 's emphasis on explic it agre ement to c ommit a wrong,” aiding-abetting

liability may

expand the scope of the Plaintiffs’ claim. See Anderson , 2004 WL 2827887, a

t *4-5 (di smissing c onspirac y c laim wher

e underl yin g wrong sounded in negligence but allowing a iding and abetting claim to survive). However, since it has not been specifically asserted by Plaintiffs or ar gued by either party

in this Motion, the Court will not address the issue bey

ond the comments above. 32 See Anderson , 2004 WL 2827887, at *4.

8 were kn owing , malicious, willful, and wanton so as to warra nt punitive damag es. 29 Plain tiffs co nten d this char acteriz ation of th e A dren alin D efen dan ts’ con duc t is appropriate beca

use they act ed out of “sheer greed” a nd a desire to maximize Adrenali n’s prof

its despit e the “ known substant ialrisks ” their product posed to t

he public. 30 At the outset, the Court notes that although the Plai ntiffs have incorporated the par agraphs of

the Amended Complai nt ass erting negli gence, such al legations cannot prov ide the requisite foundation for civil conspiracy. 31 “There is no such thing as a conspiracy to co mmit negligence o r, more precisely, to fail to exercise due care .” 32 Plain tiffs, h ow ever , argu e that th ey ha ve ad equ ately alle ged in this33 Pls. Br. in Opp’n to Def. Mot. to Dismiss, at 7. 34 See Nicolet , 525 A.2d at 149-50. See also Duffield A ssocs., I nc. v. Me ridian Arc

hitects & Eng’rs, LLC

, 2010 WL

2802409, a

t *5 (Del. Super. July

12, 2010) ; Bell , 1988 WL 7623, at *4-5. 35 See Nicolet , 525 A.2d at 149-50. 36 Id. at 149. 37 See Zerby v. Allied Signal Inc. , 2001 WL 112052, at *7-8 (Del. Super. Feb. 2, 2001) (“Although it was an asbestos case, Nicol et'sholding applies here.”).
9 count t he underl ying wrong of i ntent ionalmisrepr esent ati on. 33 In Nicolet, Inc. v. Nu tt , the Delaware Supreme Court found allegations of i ntentional misrepresentation or frau dulent concealme nt sufficient to support the plaintiffs’ claim that

a manufacturer parti cipated i n an industry-wide conspirac y to conceal the health hazards of asb estos. 34 A prima faci e case of fraudul ent conc ealment requ ires a s how ing o f: (1) delib erate c onc ealm ent o f a m aterial fact or silenc e in the fa ce of a dut

y to spe ak; (2) scie nter; (3) int ent t o induce r eli ance upon t he concealment; ( 4) causati on; and (5) result ing damage. 35 The C ourt found these element s prese nt in Nicolet , reaso ning : [P]laintiffs c laim ... the con spiracy, w hich alleg edly inclu ded [d efend ant], caused “ to be posi tive ly as sert ed to pl aint iffs in a manner not warrant ed by the in form ation pos sesse d by said d efen dan ts,... that it w as safe... to w ork in close proximit

y to [the] [asbestos] material s” and ... sup pressed “medical and scien tific da ta and othe r kn ow ledg e, cau sing plain tiffs to be an d rem ain ignorant there of.” The c omplaint clea rly a lle ges sci enter

in that the parti cipant s “knowingl y and will full y conspi red” i n the sc heme...[and] alleges an intent... to ind uce... reliance on false or incom plete material facts. In our opini on these all egati ons are s uffic ient to st ate a

tort claim based on a theo ry of frau dule nt co ncea lmen t. 36 The Court see s no reas on why the Supreme Court ’s rationa le i n Nicolet would be inapplicable here

. 37 W hile th e A men ded Co mp laint d oes n ot ex pres sly38 See Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(f) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial

justice.”). Rule 8 d

oes not “ r

equire t he plead er to, na rrate f acts suf ficient t o constitu te a cause of action, nor is he [or she] required to spell out the definite verbiage of the wrongs complained of if the missing elements, or element, follow, or may reasonably

be inferred from the facts that are alleged.” See Zerby , 2001 WL 1120 52, at *9 (qu otin g Costello v. Cording , 91 A.2d 182, 184 (Del. Super. 1952)). 39 See Bell , 1998 WL 7623 , at *5 (citi ng Nicolet , 525 A.2d at 150). See also White v. APP Pharm., LLC

, 2011 WL

2176151 (Del. Supe

r. Apr. 7 , 2011) (f

inding pa tient pled fraud c laim against pharma

ceutica l manufa cturers with suff

icient pa rticular ity t o defea t motion to di smiss with “kne w or shoul d have known” sci enter a nd emphas izing tha

t patient was not alleging f alse representations but rather a failure to disclose da ngerous side effect of hepa rin). 40 Pls. Br. in Opp’n to Def. Mot. to Dismiss, at 7. 41 Def. Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 9-10.

10 include a separate count bea ring t he labe l “intent ionalmisrepr esent ati on” or “fra udulent concealment,” it c ontai ns all egati ons mirroring thos e in Nicolet

. 38 Plainti ffs all ege Adrenalin breached it s duty to warn consumers about the dangers associat ed with its product, knowingly and w ill fully conspi red with other Defendants to conceal t he harmful effect s of bath salt s from the public, and acted to su ppr ess an d m isrep resen t info rma tion a bou t the ris ks as socia ted w ith the ir product in furthera nce of the con spiracy. 39 Plainti ffs additi onally maint ain they “may be ab le to ad duc e fur ther e vide nce o f frau d in d iscov ery.” 40 Th us, at th is early s tage in the litig ation , the C our t find s the A men ded Co mp laint su fficien tly alleges a basis for civil conspiracy. II. Breach of Imp lied Warranties Adrenalin also asks t

he Court to dismiss Plai ntiffs’ breach of implied warranty claim for fai lure t o all ege any warr anty e ver exi sted wit h respec t to t

he bath salts. 4142 6 Del. C. §§ 2-102, 2-105. 43 6 Del. C. § 2-314(1). 44 See id. § 2-314(2)(a)-(f). “Unless excluded or modified ( Section 2-316) other implied warranties may

arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.” Id . § 2-314(3). 45 See id. § 2-315. See also Barba v. Carlson , 2014 WL 1678246, at *5 (Del. Super. Apr. 8, 2014) (“The consumer does not need to provide the seller with actual knowledge of the particular purpose for which the product is intended, if the se ller has reason to perceive the purpose intended or that reliance exists. It is not nece ssary that the plaintiff c laim that there was

11 Plainti ffs’ cl aim that Adrenali n’s sale of bath salt s was subject to t he implied warranties of merchantabi lit y and fitness for a parti cular purpose is governed under Articl e 2 of Delaware ’s Unifor m Commercial Code ( “UCC”) address ing transactions in goods. 42 Under 6 Del. C. § 2- 314 , “a w arra nty th at the g ood s sha ll be merchant able i s impli ed in a c ontrac t for t heir s ale i f the s ell er is a merchant with respect t o goods of that kind.” 43 “Merchantable” requir es at a mini mum that the g ood s: (a) pas s without

objection in t

he tra de under t

he contr act de scription; and (b) in t he case of fungibl e goods , are of f air average qua lit

y withi n the description; and (c) ar e fit for the ordinar

y purposes for which suc h goods are us ed; and (d) run... of even kind, quali ty and qua ntit y ...; and (e) are adequate ly contai ned, packaged, and label ed as the agreement may requir e; and (f) conf orm to thepromises or affirmati ons of fac t made on t he conta iner or label if any. 44 Moreover, purs uant t o 6 Del. C. § 2-315, “ [w]here t he sel ler ... has rea son to know any p articu lar pu rpo se fo r w hich the g ood s are r equ ired a nd th at the b uyer is relyin g on the se ller's sk ill or ju dgm ent to select o r fur nish suitab le go ods , there is

... an im plied wa rran ty that th e go ods shall b e fit fo r suc h pu rpo se.” 45 Both impliedsome u nusua l use f or the produ ct. Th e cruci al ele ment i s that the bu yer relies on th e sell er's superior knowledge and expertise in selecting suitable goods.”). 46 See Barba , 2014 WL 1678246, at *3-4 (citing 6 Del. C. § 2-316(2)). “[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty

of merchantability or

any part of

it the language must mention merchantability and in c ase of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of

fitness the exclusion must be by a writing a nd conspicuous.” § 2-316(2). For examp le, “[l]ang

uage to exclude a

ll implied warrant

ies of fit ness is suf

ficient i f it states...that ‘[t]here are no warranties which extend bey ond the description on the face hereof.’” Id . The Code

further provides , notwithst

anding § 2-316(2 ): (a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, a ll implied warranties are excluded by expressions like “as is”, “with all faults” or other language which in common understa nding c alls the bu

ye r's att ention to the exclusion of war ranties a nd makes p lain that there is no implied warranty ; and (b) when the buy

er before entering into the contra ct has examined the goods or the sample or model as f

ully as he or she desir

ed or has refuse d to examine

the goo ds there

is no implied warranty w

ith regard to defects which an e xamination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him or her ; and (c) an i mplied wa

rranty can also be exclude d or modif

ied by course o f dealin

g or co urse of performance or usage of trade. Id . § 2-316(3)(a)-(c). 47 6 Del. C. § 2-318. See also S& R Assocs., L.P. v. Shell Oil Co. , 725 A.2d 431, 437 (Del. Super. 1998) (“To counter the harsh result of [the privity ] rule, the legislature enacted Section 2-318, abolishing the privity re quirement and granting standing to those likely to be injured by defective products.”). Notably, “[t]his section only operates, however, w hen an express or implied warranty has been made.... The first question to be answered, there fore, is whether any warranties have been made.” See In re Asbestos Litig. (M

ergentha ler) , 542 A.2d 1205, 1213 (Del. Super. 1986). 48 Lecates v

. Hertric h Pontiac Buick Co ., 515 A.2d 163, 166 (Del. Super. 1986).

12 warranti es may be di scla imed if done so conspi cuously

and in ac cordance with the means set forth i n the Code. 46 Importantly, a sel ler' s warrant y to an or igina l purcha ser “ extends to any natura l pers on who may reasonably be expec ted t o use, c onsume or be af fect ed by the g ood s and wh o is in jured by b reac h of

the w arra nty.” 47 In the same vein, “ [a]

sec ondary p urc has er who cl ai ms the pr ote ct ionof awarr ant y i s su bje ct to t he s ame discl aimers , modifi cati ons or remedy limi tat ion cl auses t

hat were t

he basi s of the und erlyin g sale s agr eem ent b etw een th e orig inal p urch aser a nd s eller.” 48 In other49 In re Asbe stos Litig. (

Mergent haler) , 542 A.2d 1205, 1213 (Del. Super. 1986). 50 Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 95. 51 See In re Asbestos Litig. , 542 A.2d at 1213. 52 Def. Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 9.

13 wo rds, 

### “i f no such warranties were extended to t he buyer, no subsequent user can claim their

breach. The firs t question to be answered, there fore, is whethe r any
wa rran ties ha [d] b een m ade.” 49 Here, t he Amended Complaint all eges t he impli ed warrant ies a pplie d to the sale of bat

h salts to Salasky. Plai ntiffs c laim Adrenalin “r easonably suspect ed Salasky and indi vidual s li ke him would use t he bath s alt s,” a

nd that members of the public, like Officer

Szczerba, “would be affect ed ... and injured by the brea ch of th e w arra nties.” 50 How ever, as t he Plainti ffs also ac knowledge, the original pur chas e of A dren alin’s b ath sa lts w as m ade b y D efen dan t distributors , LCM and Southern, not Salasky. Thus, t he question of whether the prote ction of the implied warranties ext ends to Plainti ffs necessar ily depends on whether the warranti es att ached i n the i niti al t

ransac tion be tween Adrenal in and LCM and/or Souther n. 51 Adrenali n does not c ontend t hat i t val idly

discl aimed or l imit ed the

wa rran ties w ith res pect to its sale o f the b ath sa lts. Ra ther, its sole c onte ntion is that P laintiffs failed to ple ad th at any wa rran ty eve r exis ted, so there can lo gically be no breac h. 52 W hile p erha ps tru e, at this stage of th e litigatio n an d in conside rati on of Delaware’ s liberalpleading rules , such l ack of spe cifi cit y is not fatalto Plainti ffs’ warranty c laims at this t ime. Adrenalin, a s an alle ged53 6 Del. C. § 2-314(1).

14

manuf act ure r of bat h sa lt s, qual if

ie s as a mer chant f

or purpos es o f the UCC 53 and gen erally th ere is a reaso nab le infe renc e of m erch antab ility and fitnes s attach ed to the sa le of its pro duc t. W heth er this claim will s urv ive su mm ary ju dgm ent is

unc lear, b ut the Co urt w ill not d ismis s it at this stage and will a llow disco very to deter min e its via bility. Th at said , the C our t wo uld s ugg est tha t cou nsel f or th e Pla intiffs care fully

con sider the m erits o f brin ging a U CC claim befo re a ju ry an d the com plex ity it

wo uld a dd to the litig ation . Ex plain ing a con cept e ven law yers s trug gle to underst and to t

welve la y people would be chal lengi ng at bes t and would per haps suggest an unwise l iti gati on strategy. But it is ul timat ely f

or counselto deci de wh ether the C our t’s con cern wa rran ts a differe nt co urse of ac tion. Finally, having had an opportunity to consi der the parti es’ brie fing and hear argument on multiple occas ions in thi s litigati on, the Court asks that counsel lit igate t his matter

in a purely l egal and professi onal manner. Everyone appreciat es that O fficer Szc zerb a w as an outs tand ing in divid ual an d a v ery g ood polic e off icer. There is no disput e his de ath was a t ragedy f or his f amily and the c ommunity. But the emot ion surr ounding such a n event s hould not be used to give support to a legal ly i nsuffi cient

claim or to sugges t that the Court shoul d accept an argument15

simply because of t

he consequences that f

lowed from his death. Such conduct would not honor t

he sacr ifi ces of t

his off icer or the oath he swore t o uphold. CONCLUS ION As a resul t of t

he above, Defendant Adrena lin’ s Motion to Dis miss i s hereby DE NI ED
. IT IS SO ORDE RED. /s/ W illiam C . Car pen ter, Jr. Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr.