Transatlantic Relations

in the Aftermath of Ko s ovo

B r i e f l y ...

• T he NATO int e r v e nt ion in Kosovo re i n fo rced ongo i ng tre nds in the allia nce such as the

e s t a b l i s h me nt of a European Security and Defense Ide ntity (ESDI) and the gro w i ng

gap in military capabilities between Europe and the United States.

• At the same time, the crisis in Kosovo ma r ked a turning point for Euro p e, whic h

a c k no w l e dged that vio l e nce and conflict were no longer acceptable in the “ne w ”

E u rope—even on its periphe r y.

• While the United States and Europe displayed a re ma r kable level of coopera t ion and

unity du r i ng the crisis, the future of tra ns a t l a nt ic re l a t io ns may be clouded by disa g re e me nt on ESDI, the long-term int e rests of the allia nc e, the role of Russia in the

B a l ka ns, and a strategy for ens u r i ng Balkan stability and int e g ra t ion with the We s t .

• S e r b ia’s de mo c ra t ic tra ns i t ion is critical to Balkan re g io nal stability. Pa r t ic i p a nt s

debated whe t her targeted eng a ge me nt with de mo c ra t ic eleme nts in Serbian socie t y

would help initiate a political tra ns i t ion, or whe t her it would stre ng t hen the Milosev ic re g i me.

• S o me cont e nded that the de mo c ra t i z a t ion of Serbia cannot proceed unless it she d s

its irre de ntist na t u re and accepts the inde p e nde nce of Mo nt e ne g ro and Kosovo in

o rder to focus on its int e r nal de v e l o p me nt. Others argued that Kosovo and Mo nt e neg ro would be weak states, ma k i ng them vulne rable to Serbia and, in the case of Ko s ovo, eager to seek support through the fo r ma t ion of a Greater Albania. Thu s, the

d i s me m b e r me nt of Serbia mig ht lead to greater re g io nal ins t a b i l i t y.

• Pa r t ic i p a nts endorsed a mu l t i faceted strategy for the Balka ns that inc l uded re g io na l

i nt e g ra t ion by me a ns of the South Eastern European Stability Pact and the de v o l u t io n

of power from cent ral autho r i t ies to local ins t i t u t io ns. This process would ens u re the

re g ion’s event ual int e g ra t ion with Euro p e.

A New Sense of Euro p e

Was the int e r v e nt ion in Kosovo a turning point for NATO or did lessons learned simply

re i n fo rce ongo i ng tre nds in the tra ns a t l a nt ic re l a t io nship? Pa r t ic i p a nts at the me e t i ng

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O RT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

The views ex p ressed in this report do not

necessarily reflect those of the United States

Institute of Pe a c e, which does not 

a d vocate specific policies.

CO N T E N T S

A New Sense of Euro p e 1

R u s s ia and the Balka ns 3

T he Future of Serbia 4

T he Sanc t io ns Debate 5

T he Legitimacy of the FRY 5

T he Future of the Balka ns 6

R e c o m me nda t io ns 8

May 15, 2000

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

This report is based on a me e t i ng on tra ns a t l a nt ic

re l a t io ns in the aftermath of the NATO int e r v e nt ion in Kosovo organized by the United States

I nstitute of Peace’s Research and Stud ies Departme nt in coopera t ion with the Institute’s Balka ns

Wo r k i ng Group. The me e t i ng took place on

November 17, 1999 on Capitol Hill. Its purpose

was to exa m i ne whe re the United States and

E u rope stand on issues of de mo c ra t i z i ng Serbia

a nd stabilizing the Balka ns. Pa r t ic i p a nts were

a s ked to cons ider whe t her a Europe “peaceful,

u nd i v ide d, and de mo c ra t ic” is feasible without the

s uccessful int e g ra t ion and stabilization of southeastern Euro p e. For the me e t i ng, the U.S. Ins t itute of Peace invited experts from U.S.

go v e r n me nt age nc ie s, Cong re s s, no n - go v e r n me nt a l

o rg a n i z a t io ns, and think tanks. Also inc l uded were

p ro m i ne nt experts from European capitals. 

Written by pro g ram of f icer Lauren Van Me t re, this

report is a summary of the pre s e nt a t io ns and disc u s s ion at the November 17 me e t i ng. Specia l

reports on earlier Institute me e t i ngs on Euro p e

a nd the Balka ns are also available on our web site

( w w w. u s i p . o rg) or by calling (202) 429-3832.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E
t ho u g ht that both observatio ns were valid. Kosovo for the first time congealed in Euro p e

t he idea that the Balka ns were no longer of ma rg i nal concern. The credibility of the European Un ion (EU) would be at risk if the war in Kosovo were to persist. Committed to the

e n l a rge me nt of de mo c ra t ic values thro u g hout the cont i ne nt and the int e g ra t ion and

security of count r ies of Cent ral Euro p e, members of the European Un ion recognized that

a fa i l u re to int e r v e ne would call into question its support for enlarge me nt and the EU’s

de f i n i ng premise as an ins t i t u t ion supporting de mo c racy and hu man rig hts in Euro p e.

Kosovo re i n fo rced a new sense of the idea of Euro p e — o ne in which war, ge no c ide, and

w ide-scale ethnic vio l e nce are not tolera t e d. Europe int e r v e ned in the Balka ns and in

Kosovo not me rely for realpolitik objectives, but to protect the goals of a new politic a l ,

e c o no m ic, and social commu n i t y. This is why, partic i p a nts no t e d, the Red-Green coalit ion in Germa ny could stro ngly support the Kosovo int e r v e nt ion. 

No t w i t hs t a nd i ng the ma i nt e na nce of allia nce unity for the du ra t ion of the NATO air

w a r, partic i p a nts questio ned whe t her the United States and the European Un ion would

s t a nd toge t her as well in future crises. Kosovo de mo ns t rated yet again the U.S.-European military technology gap and re i n fo rced at least one ongo i ng tre nd in the tra ns a tl a nt ic re l a t io ns h i p — t he move by Europe toward a common ESDI. Several conc rete steps

have alre a dy been take n :

• T he Ams t e rdam Treaty ma kes it easier and mo re obligatory for Euro p e a ns to fo r m

c o a l i t io ns of the willing .

• T he appoint me nt of Ja v ier Solana to be the EU’s fo re ign policy chief in charge of the

new effort to form a common fo re ign and security policy symbolizes a re - c o m m i t me nt

by Euro p e a ns to ESDI.

• T he Chirac-Blair (Saint - Malo) agre e me nt to establish a ra p id re a c t ion fo rce and cons ide ra t ion of the cons o l ida t ion of European de f e nse indu s t r ies ind icates a re a s s e s sme nt of European military capabilitie s.

A me r ic a ns are ge ne rally re l a xed about the establishme nt of a separate Euro p e a n

de f e nse pillar, but partic i p a nts warned against a sho r t - s ig ht e d, re f l exive U.S. assumptio n

that ESDI could unde r m i ne or bypass NATO. New stra i ns of Euro s ke p t icism are appare nt

in the curre nt adm i n i s t ra t ion in Wa s h i ngton. Stateme nts by U.S. polic y ma kers re v e a l

c o nc e r ns for: (1) competition between the United States and Euro p e, (2) the lack of

E u ropean commitme nt to enhanc i ng de f e nse capabilitie s, and (3) a U.S.-Europe de c o up l i ng as Europe adjusts the curre nt security arc h i t e c t u re to carve out a mo re inde p e nde nt ro l e, yet does not acquire the necessary de f e nse capabilities to support such a

p o s i t io n .

Pa r t ic i p a nts noted that it is legitimate for the United States to question Euro p e a n

c o m m i t me nt to mo re advanced military systems. But they simu l t a neously supported a

g reater European role in polic y ma k i ng for the fo l l o w i ng re a s o ns: (1) the re is a historic a l

l o g ic dr i v i ng European int e g ra t ion, de mo ns t rated re c e ntly by the establishme nt of the

e u ro—a mo me ntum that also drives Europe toward a common ESDI; and (2) the U.S.

p u b l ic will not tolerate U.S. do m i na nce in the Balka ns nor in Euro p e — t he European ro l e

a nd its share of the security burden need to be ex p a nded for U.S. do me s t ic purposes.

Po l ic y ma kers in Wa s h i ngton should not attempt to change Europe’s support for ESDI, but

s hould channel it in ways that re i n fo rce U.S. (and European) int e re s t s. With a suc c e s sful upgra d i ng of Europe’s role in security, the United States will have a mo re inde p e nde nt, “qua r re l s o me” partne r, but Europe will re main a partner and not eme rge as a

c o m p e t i t o r. 

What does the opera t ion in Kosovo mean specifically for NATO? Pa r t ic i p a nts ex p ressed concern that NATO was inc re a s i ngly perceived as the pre f e r red ins t i t u t ion for Western polic ies in

E u rope (giving a new militaristic twist to European policy), and that the re had been a

“ N ATO i z a t ion” of peaceke e p i ng missio ns. Whe t her these perc e p t io ns are valid re ma i ns to be

seen. Certainly accelera t i ng the European Un ion as the stabilizing factor in Europe would mitigate this perc e p t ion, although such a policy has its associated pro b l e ms :

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an

i nde p e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t io n

c reated by Cong ress to pro mote re s e a rc h ,

e duc a t ion, and tra i n i ng on the pre v e nt io n ,

ma na ge me nt, and re s o l u t ion of int e r na t io na l

c o n f l ic t s. Established in 1984, the Ins t i t u t e

meets its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an

a r ray of pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s,

f e l l o w s h i p s, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng pro g ra ms,

c o n f e re nces and worksho p s, library servic e s,

p u b l ic a t io ns, and other educ a t io nal activitie s.

T he Institute’s Board of Directors is appoint e d

by the Pre s ide nt of the United States and

c o n f i r med by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ke r ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • Max M. Ka m p e l m a n , E s q .

( V ice Chairman), Frie d, Frank, Ha r r i s, Shriver and Ja c o bson, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • Dennis L. Bark, S e n ior Fellow,

Hoover Ins t i t u t ion on Wa r, Revolution and Pe a c e, Stanfo rd University • Stephen J. Hadley, Esq., Shea and

G a rd ne r, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • T h e o d o re M. Hesbu rg h ,

P re s ide nt Eme r i t u s, University of No t re Dame • Za l m a y

K h a l i l z a d , RAND Corpora t ion, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • S eymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y,

G e o rge Mason University • W. Scott Thompson, P rof e ssor of Int e r na t io nal Po l i t ic s, Fletcher School of Law and

D i p l o ma c y, Tufts University • Allen Weinstein, P re s ide nt, Center for Demo c ra c y, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • H a r r i e t

Z i m m e r m a n , V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is rael Public

A f fairs Committee, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R S E X O F F I C I O

J. Stapleton Roy, As s i s t a nt Secretary of State for Int e ll ige nce and Research • Daniel H. Simpson, V ice Pre s ide nt, Na t io nal Defense University • Walter B.

S l o c o m b e, Under Secretary of Defense for Po l icy •

R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States Ins t i t u t e

of Peace (no n v o t i ng )
• T he mo re the European Un ion is used as a ma g net for attra c t i ng newly de mo c ra t i zi ng states, the less it is a stro ng, decisive actor. Too ma ny members mig ht dilute the

EU’s ability to reach cons e nsus even on critical issues.

• Also, if the European Un ion cont i nues to ex p a nd eastward, how will its area of int e rest be

de f i ned? As one speaker aske d, ”After the Balka ns, do we head to the Cauc a s u s ? ”

F u r t he r mo re, fo c u s i ng on the European Un ion as ano t her mechanism for pro v id i ng

security to Europe should not de t ract from efforts to ens u re NATO’s effic a c y. Pa r t ic i p a nt s

noted that the re is no long-term cons ide ra t ion of allia nce int e rests by member states;

N ATO appears to be event — ra t her than int e re s t — driven. The re are effo r t s, such as tho s e

by Britian’s prime minister, To ny Blair, to focus on future military re q u i re me nts based on

a l l ia nce int e re s t s. Ho w e v e r, for the most part, NATO members are ig no r i ng curre nt and

p o t e nt ial int e re s t s, leaving the allia nce vulne rable to deep-seated differe nces when it

can least affo rd to be—at the onset of a crisis.

F i na l l y, while the allia nce ma na ged a unity of int e rest and action du r i ng the Ko s o v o

c r i s i s, coopera t ion on Balkan issues is not likely to cont i nu e. Alre a dy, the re are sig ns of

U . S . - E u ropean diverge nce on the issue of sanc t io ns against Serbia. The European Un io n

is beginning to think that the lifting of sanc t io ns, that is, end i ng Serbia’s curre nt isol a t ion, mig ht stimulate positive changes in the Fede ral Republic of Yu go s l a v ia (FRY). In

a dd i t ion, the re has been little allied coord i na t ion and planning with respect to Mo nt e ne g ro. As Pre s ide nt Djuka no v ic moves his country toward inde p e nde nce from the FRY,

will the United States and Europe protect Mo nt e ne g ro from Serbian aggre s s ion, sho u l d

it occur? How would the allia nce legitimate its actio ns in Mo nt e ne g ro? Would it take the

a p p roach it took in Kosovo? 

Russia and the Balka n s

R u s s ia re ma i ns a major factor in tra ns a t l a nt ic dialogue and polic ies on the Balka ns; it

c o nt i nues to deserve careful cons ide ra t ion by Western leaders seeking effective solutio ns

to curre nt and ongo i ng crises in southeastern Euro p e. Stateme nts by Russian of f ic ia l s

du r i ng the Kosovo crisis reflected concern for the growth of U.S. influence in the re g io n .

Moscow’s eng a ge me nt in the Kosovo crisis was primarily to count e r b a l a nce NATO, whic h

a p p e a red to be enc ro a c h i ng into a Russian sphe re of influence (through the air camp a ign on Serbia) and thre a t e n i ng Russian sovere ig nty (by setting a pre c e de nt in Ko s ovo for int e r v e nt ion on behalf of the Che c he ns in Russia). For Mo s c o w, the Ko s o v o

o p e ra t ion was an enlarge me nt of NATO by other me a ns — na me l y, through ex p a nd i ng terr i t o r ial int e re s t s. Stateme nts of concern by Moscow for Serbia’s position were ge ne ra l l y

re g a rded as no n - ide o l o g ical by Western ana l y s t s. That is, loyalty to the Slavic “bro t he rhood” or the ex - c o m munist “fraternity” of na t io ns were not perceived to be the basis of

R u s s ia’s actio ns. For the most part, Russia’s int e nt io ns were seen to be: (1) to diminish

t he influence of NATO and the West, and (2) to ens u re a pro m i ne nt role for Russia in the

re g ion, re f l e c t i ng its ge o p o l i t ical and stra t e g ic int e re s t s. Because Russia’s int e rests in

t he Balka ns were based on ge o p o l i t ical and not ide o l o g ical cons ide ra t io ns, partic i p a nt s

at the me e t i ng agreed that its efforts to count e r b a l a nce NATO would cont i nue re g a rdless of Russia’s ma r ket re fo r ms and de mo c ra t i z a t ion pro c e s s. 

With NATO in comma nd of the peace opera t io ns in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the mu lt i l a t e ral EU, OSCE (Org a n i z a t ion for Security and Coopera t ion in Europe), and UN effo r t s

in place to re c o ns t r uct the Balka ns politically and econo m ic a l l y, how much of a role will

R u s s ia have in the Balka ns in the future? The lack of a re s o l u t ion for Kosovo’s status,

t he potent ial for change in the do me s t ic scene in Serbia, and the possible pursuit of a

” G reater Albania” by Albania ns in Albania, Kosovo, and Ma c e do n ia would be divisive fo r

R u s s ia ns and the tra ns a t l a nt ic partne r s. Russia believes it has influence in the Balka ns

a nd would no doubt assert that influence to protect it. In the Kosovo crisis, the Milos e v ic re g i me sought Russia’s involveme nt primarily for its status as a perma ne nt me m3

F u r t h e r m o re, focusing on the

E u ropean Union as another

mechanism for providing security to Europe should not detra c t

f rom efforts to ensure NATO ’ s

e f f i c a cy.

Because Russia’s interests in

the Balkans we re based on

geopolitical and not ideological

c o n s i d e ra t i o n s, participants at

the meeting agreed that its

e f forts to counterbalance NATO

would continue re g a rdless of

Russia’s market re forms and

d e m o c ratization pro c e s s. 
ber of the UN Security Council. Ac c o rd i ng to one speake r, Serbian ultra na t io nalist Vo j i s l a v

Seselj and the Yu goslav military still lobby for Moscow’s cont i nued int e rest in Ko s o v o ’ s

s t a t u s. In fact, based on the events surro u nd i ng the Kosovo crisis, some tho u g ht that

Moscow’s actio ns in any future crisis would be critical to influenc i ng the re g i me in Belg ra de: Milosevic pulled the Yu goslav security fo rces out of Kosovo when Russia withdre w

its support du r i ng critical post-Rambouillet ne go t ia t io ns. 

Is l a nds of no n - a g re e me nt amo ng the United States, Euro p e, and Russia re g a rd i ng the

Kosovo conflict will cont i nue to invite Russian attent ion. Europe’s ability to take the lead

in stability and re c o ns t r uc t ion matters to Moscow: It is mo re palatable to Russian leaders for the United States to take a back seat to European efforts to cons t r uct a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (curre ntly being organized by the European Un ion). The

issue of int e r v e nt ion in int e r nal crises will also cont i nue to plague Russia’s re l a t io ns with

t he West. Russia supports int e r v e nt ion only with the autho r i z a t ion of a UN Security

C o u ncil re s o l u t ion—an issue of mo re than acade m ic importance for Mo s c o w. One speaker re ma r ked that Russia and the West will have to come to terms with the issue of state

s o v e re ig nt y, perhaps by artic u l a t i ng clear rules for int e r v e nt ion. Othe r w i s e, Moscow will

c o nt i nue to view Western hu ma n i t a r ian int e r v e nt io ns as “assaults” on the principle of

s o v e re ig nt y.

T he na t u re of Moscow’s involveme nt in the Balka ns will also be shaped by int e r na l

p o l i t ical dy na m ics in Russia, that is, by which political fa c t ion is most influent ial within Kremlin circ l e s. Pa r t ic i p a nts at the me e t i ng ide nt i f ied three influent ial gro u p s :

• Hawkish groups within the military. This particular segme nt of Russian political society de s i res confro nt a t ion with the West in order to inc rease military spend i ng and

diminish the influence of its competitors, the liberal de mo c ra t s. For the military, Serb ia, Kosovo, and the Balka ns are opportunities for confro nt a t ion with the We s t .

• T he Fore ign Office and the Council for Fore ign and Defense Po l ic y. This group, fo rmerly re p re s e nted by Ye v geni Prima ko v, is mo re mo de rate in its go a l s. While not wanti ng direct confro nt a t ion with the West, it would like to see divisio ns between Euro p e

a nd the United States over funda me ntal fo re ign policy int e re s t s. Pre v ious and future

c o n f l icts in the Balka ns are perceived by this fa c t ion as opportunities to emphasize

d i f f e re nces between the United States and Europe to Russia’s advant a ge.

• R u s s ia’s business commu n i t y. Most clearly ide nt i f ied with fo r mer prime minister and

G a z p rom of f ic ial Victor Che r no my rdin, this group seeks coopera t ion with the West and is

most int e rested in find i ng mu t ually agreeable polic ies in the Balka ns and in other are a s.

Pa r t ic i p a nts agreed at the November 17 me e t i ng that the do m i na nt fa c t ion would be

“ h a nd pic ked” by then prime minister (now pre s ide nt) Vladimir Putin, but that his pre fe re nces would be difficult to pre d ict. Pa r t ic i p a nts noted that little was known of Putin’s

fo re ign policy positio ns, as he had been most actively involved with do me s t ic issues suc h

as the conflict in Che c h nya. 

The Future of Serbia

Pa r t ic i p a nts at the November 17 me e t i ng agreed that the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y ’ s

s t rategy for Serbia must be based on polic ies that aim for Belgra de’s peaceful tra ns i t io n

to a stable, de mo c ra t ic state. Most were divide d, ho w e v e r, re g a rd i ng the me t hods fo r

a c h ie v i ng a positive change in the re g i me. The debate cent e red primarily aro u nd two

issues: (1) whe t her sanc t io ns imposed by the int e r na t io nal community would pre c i p i t a t e

t he re moval of Milosevic from power, and (2) how the int e r na t io nal community’s support

for the legitimacy of the FRY enables the curre nt re g i me to retain power. 

The nature of Moscow ’ s

i n vo l vement in the Balkans

will also be shaped by internal

political dynamics in Russia,

that is, by which political

faction is most influential

within Kremlin circ l e s.

4
The Sanctions Debate

Ma ny partic i p a nts opposed the curre nt sanc t io ns re g i me and fa v o red its partial lifting in

o rder to better and mo re actively eng a ge Serbian socie t y, while ma i nt a i n i ng strict limit a t io ns on members of the ruling class. Societal eng a ge me nt, they arg u e d, should inc l ude

a id for re c o ns t r uc t ion at the local level in coopera t ion with local commu n i t ies (by circ u m v e nt i ng Belgra de) and ind ige nous no n - go v e r n me ntal org a n i z a t io ns (to bolster Serb ian civil society). This assistance should be carefully targeted and cond i t io nal upon

re c i p ie nts’ support for de mo c ra t ic principles and pro c e s s e s. For Serbia to attain econo m ic

a nd political stability it must rebuild its econo m ic infra s t r uc t u re, which has suffered fro m

years of misma na ge me nt by the socialist and Milosevic re g i me s, and most re c e ntly fro m

t he NATO bombing campaign. Ta rgeted support from the int e r na t io nal community fo r

i n f ra s t r uc t u re re b u i l d i ng and de v e l o p me nt would:

• help soothe ant i - Western sent i me nt amo ng the Serb populatio n

• support Serbia’s struggling civil society by pro v id i ng solidly de mo c ra t ic no n - go v e r nme ntal org a n i z a t io ns with econo m ic assets

• help ne ig h b o r i ng count r ie s, which have suffered econo m ically from the sanc t io ns

re g i me imposed on Belgra de and the NATO int e r v e nt ion in the FRY, and re b u i l d

re g io nal tra de re l a t io ns

Pa r t ic i p a nts argued that a successful tra nsfer of political power from the Milosevic

re g i me to a de mo c ra t ic successor would contribute only partially to stability in Serbia .

S e r b ian society must also ex p e r ie nce an econo m ic and political re newal. Since Serbia is

c e nt ral to stability for the ent i re Balka ns re g ion, why not, they aske d, ens u re now that

it has the basic capacity in place to recover quickly and stro ngly from the de p r i v a t io ns

of the curre nt re g i me ?

O t hers ex p ressed concern that int e r na t io nal involveme nt with Serbia mig ht stre ng t hen Milosevic—a process that would likely result in an int e r nal cra c kdown against the

de mo c ra t ic opposition. Furthe r mo re, even a limited re l a t io nship with the Milosevic

re g i me would weaken alre a dy tenuous ties between the int e r na t io nal community and

o p p o s i t ion leade r s. Yet ano t her “a b a ndo n me nt” by the int e r na t io nal community would

leave the opposition even mo re vulne rable and fo rce it to bargain with Milosevic. 

F i na l l y, some observers felt that the long - held belief in the int e r na t io nal commu n ity’s ability to “ma na ge” Milosevic’s Serbia (through eng a ge me nt) was hubris that would

lead to add i t io nal impotent polic ies and further alie na t ion of Serbian society and the

de mo c ra t ic opposition. For these re a s o ns, and because past efforts to lift sanc t io ns

a g a i nst Serbia have failed to achieve the de s i red policy objectives, the curre nt sanc t io ns

re g i me should re main in place.

T h e L e g i t i m a cy of the FRY

Ac c o rd i ng to some partic i p a nt s, the de mo c ra t i z a t ion of Serbia cannot proceed unless and

u ntil both Kosovo and Mo nt e ne g ro are allowed to go their own way. Only a Serbia fre e

of the need to do m i nate others will be able to conc e nt rate on its own int e r nal de v e l o pme nt. The legal basis for Kosovar and Mo nt e negrin inde p e nde nce has alre a dy been establ i s hed; these ent i t ies should be affo rded the same cho ice given other members of the

fo r mer Yu goslav Fede ra t ion. The 1974 Cons t i t u t ion that established the Yu goslav state

has alre a dy been ma de obsolete by the establishme nt of new states in Slovenia, Cro a tia, Bosnia, and Ma c e do n ia, and by vio l a t io ns by the Milosevic re g i me. (One partic i p a nt

even suggested that the int e r na t io nal community should have used the 1974 Cons t i t ut ion as the basis for overseeing Yu go s l a v ia’s “velvet divorc e,” the reby pre e m p t i ng its viol e nt break-up.) 

F u r t he r mo re, the re is a historical (pre-1974) basis for their inde p e nde nc e. Mo nt e neg ro was an inde p e nde nt state prior to becoming part of Yu go s l a v ia after World War II,

Ac c o rding to some participants,

the democratization of

Serbia cannot proceed unless

and until both Ko s ovo and

M o n t e n e g ro are allowed to go

their own wa y.

5

Participants argued that a

successful transfer of political

p ower from the Milosevic re g i m e

to a democratic successor wo u l d

contribute only partially to

s tability in Serbia.
a nd Kosovo did not acquire its curre nt territoria l - p o l i t ical phy s io g no my until after Wo r l d

War II. Supporters of the FRY’s disme m b e r me nt argued that it is not a legal state, and

that the “myth” of the FRY allows Milosevic to keep areas under Serbian rule, claim a

G reater Serbia, and resist de mo c ra t i z a t ion. In view of the re c e nt eme rge nce of a nu m b e r

of new states in Euro p e, the establishme nt of Kosovo and Mo nt e ne g ro as inde p e nde nt

states sets no da nge rous pre c e de nt in the areas of int e r na t io nal law and self-de t e r m ina t io n .

T hose opposed to the disme m b e r me nt of the FRY questio ned its possible effect on

na t io nal, re g io nal, and global stability. In terms of Serbian int e r nal de v e l o p me nt, some

t ho u g ht that the disme m b e r me nt of the FRY would weaken the Serbian de mo c ra t ic oppos i t ion, which mig ht be blamed for Serbia’s loss of territory. Regio nal disequilibrium mig ht

also result as attempts to form new states mig ht lead to the establishme nt of a Gre a t e r

A l b a n ia and the bre a kdown of the Ma c e do n ian state. Furthe r mo re, a small state in Mo nt e ne g ro would not necessarily be viable; it would still be vulne rable to Serbian aggre ss ion. In fact, Mo nt e negrin self-de t e r m i na t ion would likely pro v o ke an aggressive mo v e

by Belgra de and result in a civil war in Mo nt e ne g ro. Mo nt e ne g ro can best ens u re its

f u t u re security by re ma i n i ng a cons t i t u e nt member of the FRY and injecting de mo c ra t ic

no r ms and processes into fede ral ins t i t u t io ns. This opinion was count e red by others at

t he me e t i ng who argued that Mo nt e ne g ro is most vulne rable in its pre s e nt political conf ig u ra t ion, which legalizes Belgra de’s int e r v e nt ion and the cont i nued pre s e nce of “ho stile” ins t r u me nts of the state on Mo nt e negrin territory. As for an inde p e nde nt Ko s o v o ,

s o me tho u g ht that the curre nt actio ns by Albania ns against the Serbs vitiated Albania n

dre a ms of inde p e nde nc e. The int e r na t io nal community would be hard pressed to support

a state that had been ma de ethnically pure through vio l e nce and int i m ida t ion. 

Ma ny felt that the debate over the legitimacy of the FRY would have a sig n i f ic a nt

impact on int e r na t io nal laws go v e r n i ng state sovere ig nt y. If the FRY does not exist as a

l e g i t i mate state, what does this mean for count r ies such as Russia and Ind ia? Are

C he c he ns, Ta t a r s, and citizens of Punjab also de s e r v i ng of inde p e nde nce? The sanctity of

state sovere ig nty must be preserved in int e r na t io nal law. If legality no longer de t e r m i ne s

s o v e re ig nt y, then raw political power will be the only de c id i ng fa c t o r. Large r, mo re powerful states (and those with nuclear weapons) will always assert their authority over ent it ies seeking self-de t e r m i na t ion, while smaller states will break apart. 

O t hers argued that ins t i l l i ng de mo c racy (and not establishing mo re small mo no - e t h n ic

states) was mo re likely to pro v ide stability to re g io ns such as the Balka ns. Small states re ma i n

v u l ne rable to ne ighbors that have not yet resolved their hostility toward differe nt ethnic

g ro u p s. Ho w e v e r, states based on the principles of compromise and ethnic tolera nce pose little threat to their ne ig h b o r s. They are, in fact, mo re likely to foster re g io nal stability as the y

seek re l a t io ns with like ethnic groups across na t io nal borde r s.

The Future of the Balka n s

A cons e nsus eme rged from the me e t i ng’s final panel re g a rd i ng a s t rategy for the Balka ns

re g ion—a mu l t i faceted strategy that addresses local, na t io nal, and re g io nal conc e r ns.

Pa r t ic i p a nts based their strategy on the pre s e r v a t ion of what re ma i ns of mu l t i - e t h n ic

s t a t e s. For the most part, they rejected partition as a solution to ethnic conflict, as part i t ion often begets vio l e nce du r i ng the exc h a nge of populatio ns. The key to stable and

v iable states in the Balka ns, most agre e d, was stro ng local go v e r na nce and support fo r

re g io nal org a n i z a t io ns. Overly cent ralized polic ies and struc t u res are not effic ie nt and are

i nc re a s i ngly obsolete in the new Euro p e. Just as Western European count r ies are shifti ng go v e r n me nt power upward from capitals to supra - na t io nal European struc t u res and

do w nw a rd to re g io nal parlia me nt s, the Balkan states should follow the same pattern. The

s t rategy fa v o red by Western European leaders for the Balka ns involves re g io nal int e g rat ion, de mo c ra t i z a t ion, and effic ie nt go v e r n me nts at the na t io nal and local levels.

Those opposed to the

dismemberment of the FRY

questioned its possible effect

on national, re g i o n a l ,

and global sta b i l i t y. 

6

A consensus emerged from the

meeting’s final panel re g a rd i n g

a strategy for the Balkans

region—a multifaceted stra t e g y

that addresses local, national,

and regional concerns. 

Participants based their

s t rategy on the pre s e r va t i o n

of what remains of

multi-ethnic sta t e s. 
T h rough re g io nal int e g ra t ion the Balka ns have a road map for joining the West. The

mechanism for achie v i ng greater re g io nal coopera t ion is the South Eastern Euro p e a n

Stability Pact, curre ntly being organized by the European Un ion. 

Ma ny partic i p a nts no t e d, ho w e v e r, that while the curre nt strategy for Balkan stability is lauda b l e, support for the pro g ram in Europe and the United States is lacking. The

Stability Pact should ens u re that Balkan states have access to EU ma r kets for comme rc e

a nd receive support for infra s t r uc t u re de v e l o p me nt. The Stability Pact is not working as

it sho u l d, although re c e nt do nor country me e t i ngs are cause for optimism. Furthe r mo re,

i nt e g ra t ion with the European Un ion will be a difficult process even for the mo re ma t u re

de mo c ra c ies of Cent ral and Eastern Euro p e. For the Balka ns to achieve such levels of

de v e l o p me nt will re q u i re massive infusio ns of de v e l o p me nt aid beyond basic mo neys fo r

re c o ns t r uc t ion, support for de mo c ra t ic and civil society de v e l o p me nt, and the politic a l

will to re form accord i ng to European standa rds even in the face of econo m ic hard s h i p .

P ro g ress has been ma de in Bulgaria and Ma c e do n ia whe re free and fair electio ns have

been conduc t e d. Ho w e v e r, partic i p a nts noted that much work needs to be do ne, espec ially in the count r ies of the fo r mer Yu go s l a v ia, to achieve viable states and re g io na l

e c o no m ic int e g ra t ion. They suggested a count r y - b y - c o u ntry course of action, altho u g h

t hey noted above all that each and every state re q u i res int e r na t io nal investme nt. Econo m ic growth and jobs are the key to solving re g io nal pro b l e ms.

Pa r t ic i p a nts also noted that the Dayton accords were de s ig ned to stop the fig ht i ng

in Bosnia by establishing a go v e r n me nt that inc l uded all ethnic partie s. Large parts of

t he Dayton agre e me nt have not been impleme nt e d, ho w e v e r, and Bosnia and He r z ego v i na re ma i ns divided into three mo no - e t h n ic ent i t ie s. (The Ja nuary 2000 electio ns in

C ro a t ia, which rejected the Cro a t ian na t io nalist party of Franjo Tud j man, the HDZ, in

favor of a coalition of centrist partie s, occurred shortly after the November 17 me e t i ng .

C ro a t ian pre s ide nt Me s ic, upon his accession to power, rejected the polic ies of the HDZ

that fa v o red go v e r n me nt and econo m ic support for He r z e g - B o s n ia, the pre do m i na nt l y

C ro a t ian re g ion of Bosnia and He r z e go v i na. It appears that the change in Cro a t ia is

a c c e l e ra t i ng change within the HDZ in He r z e g - B o s n ia.) The state re ma i ns do nor de p e nde nt and its int e r na t io nal re l a t io ns are tainted by bribery and corruption. Some partici p a nts pre d icted that do nor aid to Bosnia and He r z e go v i na will be cut by 40 perc e nt in

t he near future, causing worker unrest and severe econo m ic stre s s. Five optio ns fo r

B o s n ia were ide nt i f ied at the me e t i ng: (1) give up due to do nor fa t igue; (2) cont i nue worki ng with local go v e r n me nts and ex i s t i ng polic ies; (3) rewrite portio ns of the Dayton accord s,

a process that will likely re - i n v igo rate na t io nalist competition; (4) enfo rce Dayton mo re

robustly; and (5) establish Bosnia and He r z e go v i na as an int e r na t io nal pro t e c t o ra t e. 

Ac c o rd i ng to ma ny partic i p a nt s, the int e r v e nt ion in Kosovo is curre ntly on track to

repeat ma ny of the same mistakes ma de by the int e r na t io nal community in Bosnia and

He r z e go v i na. The lack of an effective go v e r n i ng authority and political instability de t e r

private econo m ic investme nt in Kosovo, which is ra p idly becoming de p e nde nt on int e rna t io nal aid. Cont i nued ethnic conflict and high levels of vio l e nce and crime not only

t h reaten the eme rge nce of a stable Kosovo, but may spill over to ne ig h b o r i ng states.

Kosovo de s p e rately needs a criminal justice system, inc l ud i ng a penal code, a tra i ne d

p o l ice fo rc e, and a working court system. 

T he curre nt state of play in Mo nt e ne g ro int ro duces ano t her potent ial area of re g io nal ins t a b i l i t y. Demo c racy in Mo nt e ne g ro is thre a t e ne d. As a result of the NATO air camp a ign against the FRY, 90,000 re f u gees ent e red Mo nt e ne g ro—a large number for a

c o u ntry of only 600,000 citizens. Milosevic cont i nues his attempts to destabilize the

D j u ka no v ic go v e r n me nt through the Yu goslav army (which re t a i ns a pre s e nce in Mo nt e ne g ro), int e r nal econo m ic sanc t io ns, and a fie rce pro p a g a nda war. 

At risk is the fall of a de mo c ra t ic go v e r n me nt in the Balka ns — o ne that could contribute sig n i f ic a ntly to re g io nal int e g ra t ion and stability. Mo nt e ne g ro will need support

f rom the int e r na t io nal community for its re form pro g ram, which inc l udes pro g ra ms fo r

s o c ial stability, pro t e c t ion, and welfa re; a stable mo netary system (with the int ro duct ion of the deutsch mark as a parallel curre ncy); confide nce in the banking and fina n7

L a rge parts of the

D a y ton agreement have not

been implemented, howeve r,

and Bosnia and Herzegov i n a

remains divided into thre e

mono-ethnic entities.

Ac c o rding to many

p a r t i c i p a n t s, the interve n t i o n

in Ko s ovo is currently on tra c k

to repeat many of the same

m i s takes made by the

international community

in Bosnia and Herzegov i n a .
c ial systems; and a secure enviro n me nt to attract fo re ign investme nt. Yet, this is the

m i n i mum re q u i red from the int e r na t io nal community to ens u re Mo nt e ne g ro’s secure tra ns i t ion. If Milosevic escalates the curre nt conflict, the Djuka no v ic go v e r n me nt may well

re q u i re military int e r v e nt ion to ens u re its survival and the ex i s t e nce of the Mo nt e ne g r i n

s t a t e. Do the United States and Europe have the resolve to invest tro o p s ?

As for Serbia, building a united opposition is a priority but faces such obstacles as:

• a way of life that lends itself to corruption; people have learned to do what it take s

to get by

• s e v e re brain dra i n — t he emig ra t ion of several hu ndred tho u s a nd people who opted to

leave ra t her than oppose the re g i me

A l t hough a Serbia without irre de ntist hopes may soon eme rge, its int e r nal pro b l e ms are of

s uch ma g n i t ude that it would be impossible to establish stability in the re g ion without re s o l vi ng them first. The re is a U.S. and European willing ness to rebuild Serbia, which can become

an important member of the re g io nal group of states. Ho w e v e r, partic i p a nts at the me e t i ng

w a r ned against sing l i ng Serbia out from the others as a key re g io nal partne r. The history of

Yu go s l a v ia shows very clearly that the area, even when politically united (let alone when politically divided), does not tolerate he ge mo n ic states. 

In the end, partic i p a nts agreed that the states of the Balka ns must have equal access

to European ins t i t u t io ns based on adhe re nce to the criteria laid out to them. Count r ie s

must know that they are on track for EU membership (even if membership is years in

c o m i ng) and greater int e g ra t ion into Euro p e. A clear vision of event ual EU me m b e r s h i p

can induce states to solve ethnic tens io ns, given that the most unlikely EU members are

t hose count r ies whe re ethnic pro b l e ms are greatest. 

R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s

• Work to create an ESDI that pro motes U.S.-European coopera t ion, re c o g n i z i ng that

ESDI is part of an affirmative process of greater European int e g ra t ion and that a

s t ro ng Europe de c reases the U.S. burden in Europe and globally—a de v e l o p me nt supported by the Ame r ican public.

• Emphasize the importance of enhanc i ng European de f e nse capabilities to avoid a ho llow ESDI and a de c o u p l i ng of U.S.-European security re l a t io ns.

• R e c o g n i z i ng the endu r i ng na t u re of Russia’s ge o p o l i t ical int e rests in the Balka ns, and

t he inc re a s i ng clarity of the Russian political situa t ion, find positive ways to eng a ge

Moscow on Kosovo, ma k i ng it part of the solution to Balkan pro b l e ms.

• C o ns t a ntly re v iew the FRY sanc t io ns re g i me, which should be mo d i f ied when ne c e ssary to stre ng t hen de mo c ra t ic org a n i z a t io ns and tende nc ies in Serbia while dire c t l y

w e a ke n i ng Milosevic and his supporters (as was do ne by the int e r na t io nal commu n ity in Ja nuary 2000 when it cons ide red lifting the re s t r ic t ion on flig hts from the FRY

to Europe in favor of tig hter fina nc ial and econo m ic sanc t io ns and an inc rease in the

number of people on the visa ban list).

• Work toward diversific a t ion of go v e r n me nt authority in the Balka ns and away fro m

s t ro ng, cent ralized do me s t ic and re g io nal ins t i t u t io ns (which unde r m i ne the de v e lo p me nt of civil society). Enc o u ra ge effic ie nt local, na t io nal, and re g io nal ins t i t u t io ns

to further de mo c ra t i z a t ion, re g io nal coopera t ion, and int e g ra t ion with Euro p e.

• P ress do nor count r ies to step up cont r i b u t io ns to Kosovo’s criminal justice system

( p o l ic e, special polic e, and courts), re c o g n i z i ng that crime, ana rc hy, and persistent

localized attacks on mino r i t ies are the primary threats to stability in Ko s o v o .

• S t udy carefully the impact of a dra w down in int e r na t io nal aid to Bosnia and He r z ego v i na and take steps imme d iately to pre v e nt instability by int ro duc i ng viable econo m ic projects and stre ng t he ned security to the most vulne rable commu n i t ie s.

8

For mo re info r ma t ion, see our web site (www. u s i p . o rg ) ,

w h ich has an online edition of this report cont a i n i ng

links to related web sites, as well as add i t io nal 

i n fo r ma t ion on the Balka ns.

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 5 9

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Wa s h i ngton, DC 20036

In the end, participants agre e d

that the states of the Balkans

must have equal access to

E u ropean institutions based on

a d h e rence to the criteria laid

out to them.