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“Efforts to prevent political 

violence in Bangladesh must 

target its weak democratic institutions, which foster exclusion, 

radicalization, and extremism.”

January 2016

Preventing Violent Extremism through 

Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh

Geoffrey Macdonald

Email: GPMacdonald@gmail.com

PEACEBRIEF200

Introduction

Bangladesh, a country previously known for its strongly secular and syncretic culture, is an emerging breeding ground for violent extremism. Over the past year, at least five prominent bloggers 

have been gruesomely murdered. Each man was hacked to death by machete-wielding extremists 

for the secular critiques of religious fanaticism they posted online. These murders accompanied the 

startling news of ISIS recruiters arrested in Dhaka.1

In Bangladesh, radicalization and institutional dysfunction are closely connected. The increasingly authoritarian secular state provides radical Islamists a compelling grievance around which to 

recruit and mobilize. Political and social alienation have combined with government repression to 

push marginalized groups to violence. Therefore, efforts to prevent political violence in Bangladesh 

must target its weak democratic institutions, which foster exclusion, radicalization, and extremism. 

This approach to opposing Islamist violence would dovetail with a nascent shift in the field from 

traditional counterterrorism to preventive approaches—which moves emphasis from the reactive 

use of force, law enforcement, intelligence collection, and counter messaging to strengthening 

political and social institutions.2

Violent extremism first captured attention in Bangladesh with a string of increasingly spectacular 

attacks throughout the early and mid-2000s. In 2001 and 2002, bomb blasts ripped through a 

Bengali new year’s celebration, a communist party gathering, and four movie theaters. In 2004, terrorists hurled thirteen grenades into a crowded campaign event in a failed attempt to kill then former 

Summary

• The role of Islam in Bangladeshi politics is highly contested and presents a focal point of past and 

current violence. 

• The polarized political climate and institutionalized repression of Islamic parties appear to 

enhance radicalization dynamics.

• The current environment in Bangladesh presents an opportunity to prevent violent extremism 

before it fully manifests itself.

• Measures to improve democratic governance and inclusive politics could help mitigate the risk 

of violent extremism in Bangladesh, while also reducing political violence levels.
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Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh

Page 2 • PB 200 • January 2016

prime minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed. In August of 2005, nearly 500 homemade bombs exploded 

within a 30-minute period in 63 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts. The attacks were carried out by Jamaatul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), an indigenous extremist organization dedicated to creating a 

fundamentalist Islamist state in the country. 

Though the synchronized explosions killed only two people, JMB’s dramatic display of religious 

militancy quickly captured global attention. After a double suicide bombing three months later, the 

government banned JMB, Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami, and other extremist organizations. It also began 

aggressive counterterrorism activities that splintered and marginalized the major violent extremist 

groups. Despite this effort, the political ideology of Islamism has remained powerful.

Islam and the State in Bangladesh

Despite the ostensibly recent rise of religious extremism in Bangladesh, the violent contest over 

the Islamic character of the state is grounded in a long history. As part of Pakistan (1947–71), 

many ethnic Bengalis chafed under the control of a Punjabi-dominated, Urdu-speaking elite 

in the western half of the country. Bengalis constituted over half of Pakistan’s population and 

produced most of its economic output but were treated as culturally and politically inferior. This 

festering resentment grew into a declaration of independence in 1971. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his political party, the Awami League, led Bangladesh’s nationalist movement against 

Pakistan’s army, which had invaded to put down the insurrection. Over the course of nine months, 

Pakistan’s soldiers killed—according to the highest estimate—three million Bengalis, including 

the indiscriminate massacre of students and intellectuals. A mass rape campaign also brutalized 

approximately two hundred thousand women. The war came to a quick and decisive end two 

months after the intervention of India, which presided over Pakistan’s surrender to the newly 

formed nation of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh’s independence war is the genesis of the secular-Islamic divide that still shapes the 

country’s politics. The Awami League’s secular nationalist movement was opposed by Jamaate-Islami, a religious political movement that favored a unified, Islamic Pakistan. Jamaat activists 

collaborated with the Pakistani army, forming paramilitary forces that were implicated in some of 

the worst atrocities in the war. After independence, Mujib, Bangladesh’s first president, banned 

Jamaat, whose leadership had fled to Pakistan. Jamaat, however, would not last long in exile; Mujib 

was assassinated in 1975. 

Mujib’s successor Zia Rahman unbanned Jamaat and integrated its leadership into a political 

alliance led by his party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Mujib personifies the political 

division in Bangladesh today. The independence movement and his assassination are the two 

events that define the antagonism between the country’s two main political parties. Currently, the 

Awami League is led by Mujib’s daughter, Sheikh Hasina, and the BNP is headed by Zia’s widow, 

Khaleda Zia. Political competition between these two women and their parties is quite literally a 

blood feud, which is destructively mapped onto the country’s religious schism. 

The Politics of Violent Extremism

The renewal of extremism represented by the bloggers’ killings is tied to the creeping secular 

authoritarianism of the Awami League. The BNP and Jamaat boycotted the most recent election 

in January 2014, which gave the Awami League an illegitimate victory amid widespread violence. 

The election typified the Awami League’s rule since its election in 2008, which has been marked by 

controversial decisions that have stoked secular-Islamic tension and bred radicalization.
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Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh

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The end of the caretaker system. In order to ensure fair elections, Bangladesh adopted a 

“caretaker government” in 1996 through which the chief justice of the high court assumed the 

head of government and conducted the election free of partisan manipulation. But a decade 

later Bangladesh’s entrenched partisanship corrupted the caretaker system. The parties disagreed 

on who should administer the caretaker government for the 2007 election. After not getting its 

choice, the opposition Awami League initiated street protests and declared its intent to boycott 

the election. In January 2007, the military intervened to break the political stalemate, declaring a 

state of emergency. The two-year, military-backed caretaker government attempted to clean up 

Bangladeshi politics. Much to the dismay of party officials, it pursued corruption charges against 

Awami League head Sheikh Hasina and the sons of BNP chairwoman Khaleda Zia. After the 2008 

elections, the triumphant Awami League ended the caretaker government system that had 

targeted its leader. The decision prompted the opposition BNP to declare a boycott of any election 

not held under a neutral authority.

The war crimes tribunal. Since the war of independence, many Bangladeshis have called for a 

war crimes tribunal to investigate the atrocities committed by West Pakistan sympathizers, primarily the current leaders of Jamaat. In 2009, the Awami League fulfilled its campaign pledge to begin 

organizing tribunals, which disproportionately targeted Jamaat leaders. Despite initial international support for the trials, a leaked U.S. State Department cable noted, “There is little doubt that 

hard-line elements within the ruling party [Awami League] believe that the time is right to crush 

Jamaat and other Islamic parties.” Indeed, several prominent Jamaat leaders have been convicted 

and executed during the tribunal, prompting large protests by its supporters.

These two decisions—the elimination of the caretaker government and the implementation of 

the war crimes tribunal—are closely connected to the recent rise of violent extremism. The men 

arrested for blogger Niloy Chatterjee’s August 2015 murder were leaders of the Jamaat’s student 

wing, Chhatra Shibir.3 Chatterjee was a vocal proponent of the death penalty for Jamaat leaders 

convicted in the war crimes trial. Other blogger attacks have been linked to a new extremist group 

called Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT). According to Bangladeshi police, ABT is an al-Qaeda inspired 

offshoot with connections to Chhatra Shibir.4

Chhatra Shibir is a key source of Jamaat’s political power. Though Jamaat has at times partnered 

with the Awami League in the past, its historical and current political alliance is with the BNP. 

During national elections, Jamaat receives little support, but its loyal and disciplined youth cadres 

in Chhatra Shibir vote, protest, harass, and organize at the behest of their senior political partners 

in the BNP. In return, Jamaat, which advocates Sharia law, has important influence with one of 

Bangladesh’s two major political parties. When the Awami League ended the caretaker government and established the war crimes tribunal, the Islamic parties saw a secular party centralizing 

political power and attacking their interests. Jamaat’s English-language website argues, “After 

failing to establish any link between Jamaat and corruption or terrorism, allegations of war crimes 

are now unfairly being made against it.” 5

The perception of partisanship directed against the chief Islamic party and its current political 

sponsor creates a dangerous environment for radicalization. In 2011 the Bangladesh Enterprise 

Institute conducted a nationwide survey examining various dimensions of terrorism in Bangladesh.6

The survey asked participants to explain the reasons a Bangladeshi might join a terrorist organization: 

Around 40 percent identified the use of Islam “to gain political ends;” another 20 percent said “lack of 

democracy.” With the Awami League consolidating control through institutional manipulation, the 

Islamic parties play the role of aggrieved outsider. Under these conditions, Islamic appeals have featured prominently in Jamaat’s rhetoric. The party’s website declares that its work for “the country and 

Islam” has provoked “political harassment, attack...[and] oppression and torture.” 7 Although Jamaat’s 
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Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh

Page 4 • PB 200 • January 2016

connection to the bloggers’ deaths and other acts of extremism is indirect, its political exclusion and 

oppression creates anger that ripples beyond its active membership to Islamist allies and sympathizers, 

such as ABT.

Addressing Violent Radicalization through Inclusive Politics

Bangladesh’s flawed democratic process feeds frustration and drives radicalization. Though radicalization and extremism have many causes—and traditional counterterrorism approaches have an 

important role to play—strengthening Bangladesh’s election institutions would enhance political 

inclusion and undermine the grievance-complex that bolsters radical recruitment. A recent evaluation of election-violence prevention tools conducted by the U.S. Institute of Peace has identified 

a set of weaknesses in Bangladesh’s electoral process that could be addressed as a way to prevent 

violent extremism and related conflict dynamics. 

• Security Sector Reform: Elements of the country’s police and army operate as political militias 

rather than provide nonpartisan security. Allegations of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, 

and opposition harassment damage the legitimacy of the democratic process. Efforts should 

be made to ensure a nonpartisan security sector.

• Election Management Reform: Bangladesh’s election commission is deeply partisan and ineffectual. This gives opposition parties little reason to trust the process or outcome of elections. 

The election commission needs to be given independent power and the necessary resources 

and be sheltered from partisan manipulation.

• Enhancing Democratic Norms: The peacebuilding community engages actively through violence prevention programs worldwide; however, these practices are almost entirely absent in 

Bangladesh. Civic education and youth-targeted trainings in particular could weaken support 

for extremism. Offering technical support to political parties and their student wings may 

also help create a more professional and inclusive political party system. Though institutional 

reforms are likely more pressing, peacebuilding programs can alter the attitudinal disposition 

toward violence over time.

Bangladesh has a long history of political and electoral violence that has shaped its political 

culture. Protests, boycotts, and intense oppositional politics are defining features of Bangladesh’s 

authoritarian and democratic eras. However, the increasingly radical character of the country’s 

politics adds a newfound urgency to strengthen its democratic institutions. The ruling party’s politics 

of exclusion and violence against an opposition strongly associated with Islamic politics make 

extremist outbidding a potent election strategy: If the political system does not allow Islamic voices, 

then oppose the system. This problem is best addressed through institutional reforms that enhance 

the democratic character of Bangladesh.

Notes

1. Shiv Malik, Aisha Gani, and Saad Hammadi, “Briton Arrested in Bangladesh ‘Confessed to Recruiting’ for Isis,” The Guardian, September 29, 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/

briton-arrested-bangladesh-recruiting-islamic-state.

2. John Hudson, “Inside the Fight Over Obama’s Terror Summit,” Foreign Policy, Februrary 17, 2015, 

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/17/inside-the-fight-over-obamas-terror-summit/.

3. Tom Porter, “Bangladesh: Three Arrested Following Murder of Blogger Niloy,” International Business

Times, November 19, 2015, www.ibtimes.co.uk/bangladesh-three-arrested-following-murderblogger-niloy-1529522.
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4. “Blogger Rajib’s ‘Killers’ Linked to al-Qaeda: DB,” The Daily Star (Dhaka), March 15, 2013, http://

archive.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/blogger-rajibs-killers-linked-to-al-qaeda-db/.

5. Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, “Allegations of War Crimes against the Leaders of Jamaat,” March 

10, 2012, www.jamaat-e-islami.org/en/details.php?artid=MTgw.

6. Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, “The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh, 2010–2011” (BEI: 

Dhaka, Bangladesh, September 2011).

7. Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, “Introduction,” March 1, 2012, www.jamaat-e-islami.org/en/details.php?artid=MTQ4.

About This Bri

This Peace Brief examines the 

relationship between radicalization 

and institutional dysfunctions in 

Bangladesh and addresses how 

strengthening political and social 

institutions, and making them more 

inclusive, can help prevent violent 

extremism and related conflict 

dynamics. Geoffrey Macdonald, 

PhD is a consultant at the United 

States Institute of Peace.