alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §274l. Stem cell therapeutic outcomes database

#### (a) Establishment

The Secretary shall by contract establish and maintain a scientific database of information relating to patients who have been recipients of a stem cell therapeutics product (including bone marrow, cord blood, or other such product) from a donor.

#### (b) Information

The outcomes database shall include information in a standardized electronic format with respect to patients described in subsection (a), diagnosis, transplant procedures, results, long-term follow-up, and such other information as the Secretary determines to be appropriate, to conduct an ongoing evaluation of the scientific and clinical status of transplantation involving recipients of a stem cell therapeutics product from a donor.

#### (c) Annual report on patient outcomes

The Secretary shall require the entity awarded a contract under this section to submit to the Secretary an annual report concerning patient outcomes with respect to each transplant center, based on data collected and maintained by the entity pursuant to this section.

#### (d) Publicly available data

The outcomes database shall make relevant scientific information not containing individually identifiable information available to the public in the form of summaries and data sets to encourage medical research and to provide information to transplant programs, physicians, patients, entities awarded a contract under section 274k of this title 1 donor registries, and cord blood banks.

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title III, §379A, as added Pub. L. 105–196, §3, July 16, 1998, 112 Stat. 635; amended Pub. L. 109–129, §3(b), Dec. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 2561.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 274l, act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title III, §379A, as added Pub. L. 101–616, title I, §101(a)(2), Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 3282, related to study by General Accounting Office, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 105–196, §§3, 7, July 16, 1998, 112 Stat. 635, 637, effective Oct. 1, 1998.

#### Amendments

2005—Pub. L. 109–129, amended section generally, substituting provisions relating to the stem cell therapeutic outcomes database for provisions relating to the bone marrow scientific registry.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Oct. 1, 1998, see section 7 of Pub. L. 105–196, set out as an Effective Date of 1998 Amendment note under section 274k of this title.

1 So in original. Probably should be followed by a comma.
§ 1507.3 Definitions. ( a ) *Record* means any document, collection, or grouping of information about an individual maintained by the Foundation, including but not limited to information regarding education, financial transactions, medical history, criminal or employment history, or any other personal information which contains the name or personal identification number, symbol, photograph, or other identifying particular assigned to such individual, such as a finger or voiceprint.
( b ) *System of Records* means a group of any records under the control of the Foundation from which information is retrieved by use of the name of an individual or by some identifying particular assigned to the individual.
( c ) *Routine Use* means, with respect to the disclosure of a record, the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected.
( d ) The term *Foundation* means the African Development Foundation or any component thereof.
( e ) The term *individual* means any citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted to permanent residence.
( f ) The term *maintain* includes the maintenance, collection, use or dissemination of any record.
( g ) The term *Act* means the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) as amended from time to time.
#### § 1509.665 State.

*State* means any of the States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession of the United States.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER REGARDING UNSERVED DEFENDANTS—No. C-08-02658 RMW

CCL

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-FILED on 7/2/10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MANDANA D. FARHANG and M.A.

MOBILE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,

KHARAGPUR; TECHNOLOGY

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TRAINING

SOCIETY; PARTHA P. CHAKRABARTI;

PALLAB DASGUPTA; GURASHISH S.

BRAR; RAKESH GUPTA; PRAVANJAN

CHOUDHURY; SUBRAT PANDA;

ANIMESH NASKAR,

Defendants.

No. C-08-02658 RMW

ORDER REGARDING UNSERVED

DEFENDANTS

On June 2, 2010, the court issued an order to show cause why the unserved defendants in this

case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Farhang has shown sufficient cause to not

have the unserved defendants dismissed at this point, but without prejudice to any newly served

defendants bringing a motion to dismiss. 

DATED: 7/2/10

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-02658-WHO Document 159 Filed 07/02/10 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         0
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  89,825
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (50,000)
<INVENTORY>                                    428,585
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               479,884
<PP&E>                                         601,993
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (267,735)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 838,925
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,032,143
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       5,206
<OTHER-SE>                                     (3,072,498)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   838,925
<SALES>                                        154,022
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               154,022
<CGS>                                          148,597
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  390,830
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             83,066
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (468,471)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (468,471)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (468,471)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.09)
        


</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John Hulsen and James Weber, Appellants.

Appeal by defendants: (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, entered May 25, 1959, after a jury trial' before its Extraordinary Trial and Special Term, convicting and sentencing them for the crimes of conspiracy, attempted extortion and coercion (Penal Law, § 580, § 850, § 530); and (2) from every intermediate order made in the action. Judgment reversed on the law and new trial granted. No separate appeal lies from the intermediate orders which have been reviewed on the appeal from the judgment. In our opinion it was highly prejudicial error to permit the admission into evidence of the 19 supplemental wire-tap records and transcripts of the series of telephone conversations between the defendants, and between -them and others, during the period September 27, 1957 to October 23, 1957 (¡People’s Exhibits 39 to 46A, inclusive). Such conversations occurred after the commission of the crimes charged; the conversations related to collateral matters and to independent transactions and events wholly unconnected with any of the offenses set forth in the indictment; and the conversations had no logical reference to any of such offenses and did not prove or tend to prove defendants’ guilt with respect to any of them. The nature of the contents of said wire-tap records and transcripts was such as to unduly prejudice the defendants in the minds of the jurors by reason of other conduct by defendants which had nothing at all to do with the present case. We deem this error most prejudicial in the light of the prosecutor’s allusions, both in his jury opening and summation, to the nature of these telephone conversations as reflected in said wire-tap records and transcripts. Such error requires a new trial, as a matter of law. We have not considered any of the other grounds of alleged error. Beldock, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
#### Hanna Downey et al., Respondents, v. Manhattan Center, Inc., Appellant.

Order entered on August 4, 1960, denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of prosecution, unanimously reversed, with $20 costs and disbursements to appellant, and defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute granted, with $10 costs. The record fails to establish any reasonable basis for excusing the inordinate and unwarranted delay in the prosecution of the action. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Rabin, Eager and Bastow, JJ.
Exhibit 10.1


 


ROLLINS, INC.


 


FIRST AMENDMENT TO


1994 EMPLOYEE STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN


AND


1998 EMPLOYEE STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN


 


Rollins, Inc.
(the “Company”), a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Delaware, by resolution of its Board of Directors has adopted this First
Amendment to its 1994 Employee Stock Incentive Plan and its 1998 Employee Stock
Incentive Plan (the “Plans”), effective as of July 25, 2006.


 


1.             Each of the
Plans is hereby amended to the extent necessary to provide as follows:


 


If
the outstanding shares of common stock of Rollins, Inc. (the “Company”)
are changed into or exchanged for a different number or kind of shares or other
securities of the Company by reason of any recapitalization, reclassification,
stock split, stock dividend, combination or subdivision of the common stock of
the Company, or similar transaction involving the outstanding equity interests
in the Company (each, a “Change in Capitalization”), then, subject to any
required action by the stockholders of the Company, the number and kind of
shares of Company stock underlying each stock option, restricted stock award,
or other equity award (and, where applicable, the exercise price per share)
shall be proportionately and equitably adjusted for any increase or decrease in
the number of issued shares of the Company resulting from a Change in
Capitalization, such adjustments to be effected in the manner reasonably
determined by the Committee. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no fractional
shares shall be issued in making the foregoing adjustments.  This provision shall be effective immediately
upon adoption by the Board of Directors and apply to all currently outstanding
equity awards under each of the Plans.


 


2.             All provisions
of the Plans remain in effect except to the extent superseded by the foregoing.


 


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Board has caused this Plan to be executed by a duly
authorized officer of the Company as of the date set forth above.


 


	
   

  	
  ROLLINS, INC.

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/Harry
  J. Cynkus
§ 214.33 Notice of meetings. ( a ) Notice of each advisory committee meeting (whether the meeting is open or closed) shall be published in the Federal Register at least fifteen (15) days before the date of the meeting, and should also be provided through other means such as newspaper advertisements, press releases, and direct mail. ( 1 ) Exceptions to the requirement for public notice are granted only for reasons of national security as determined by the Director, OMB and are requested and justified by the Administrator, A.I.D. at least thirty (30) days prior to the meeting.
( 2 ) Exceptions to the fifteen (15) day advance publication requirement are granted in emergency situations as determined by the Administrator, A.I.D. In such situations, the facts on which exception is based are to be included in the Notice of the meeting.
( 3 ) Requests for exceptions under paragraphs (a) (1) and (2) of this section are prepared by the Advisory Committee Representative and are cleared by the Advisory Committee Management Officer and the General Counsel prior to submission to the Administrator.
( b ) Notices include the name of the advisory committee; the time of the meeting; the purposes of the meeting; a statement regarding the extent to which the public will be permitted to attend and, if any portion is closed, why such closure or partial closure is necessary, including citation of the appropriate exemption permitted under subsection (c) of 5 U.S.C. 552b. Thus, A.I.D. Notices of Advisory Committee meetings normally state that the meeting is open to the public and include the place of the meeting; and instructions for gaining access to open meetings which are held in a “secured” building.
( c ) Both formal and informal notices are prepared by the A.I.D. Advisory Committee Representative; formal notices to be published in the Federal Register are cleared with the Advisory Committee Management Officer and are sent to the Office of the General Counsel at least thirty-two (32) days before the scheduled meeting date.
( d ) Copies of all public notices are provided to the Advisory Committee Management Officer.
[40 FR 33205, Aug. 7, 1975, as amended at 40 FR 54778, Nov. 26, 1975; 42 FR 26975, May 26, 1977]
#### Greene Ambulance and Ambulette Service, Inc., Appellant, v New York State Department of Health et al., Respondents.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, *inter alia,*to compel the New York State Emergency Medical Services Council to grant petitioner’s application for a license to operate an ambulance service, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered November 5, 1976, which denied the petition and confirmed the determination denying the application. Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and matter remitted to the Emergency Medical Services Council for a hearing and a new determination, which shall include appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The hearing directed herein will provide the petitioner-appellant with a reasonable opportunity to be heard in accordance with its due process rights and will provide an adequate record if judicial review of the new determination is sought. The hearing should, *inter alia,*cover the issues of whether appellant made substantial investments in ambulances and equipment, and entered into realty leases, before or after April 1, 1975, and the public need for the ambulance service which appellant seeks to provide. We note, but express no opinion concerning, appellant’s allegations that article 30 of the Public Health Law is being construed so as to eliminate competition in this industry which is vital to the public health. Hopkins, J. P., Suozzi, Margett and Hawkins, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Robert White, Appellant, v. Edward M. Fay, as Warden of Green Haven Prison, Respondent.

Motion by appellant to appeal as a poor person and for assignment of counsel on his appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County; dated November 8,1960, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus. Motion denied with leave to renew on a showing of merit in the appeal. Nolan, P. J., Beldock, Ughetta, Christ and Brennan, JJ., concur.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**

**OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Internet Infinity, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June30, 2013, asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the “Report”), I, George P. Morris,Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:

 

(1)           TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           Informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Date: August 14, 2013

 

 

A signed original of this written statementrequired by Section 906 has been provided to Internet Infinity, Inc. and will be retained by Internet Infinity, Inc. and furnishedto the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
1 The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 99-1960

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Andrew W. Luster, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: July 5, 2000 Filed: July 12, 2000

___________ Before LOKEN, FAGG, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Andrew Luster challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), and witness retaliation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2), for which the district court 1 sentenced him to concurrent terms of ten years imprisonment and three years supervised release.-2-

Upon de novo review, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government

and accepting all reasonable inferences that support the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Luster’s convictions. See United States v. Grimaldo , Nos. 99-1517/2177, 2000 WL 709498, at *6 (8th Cir. June 2, 2000) (standard of review). It is reasonable to infer from the evidence presented that either Jimmy or Jerry Johnson--who knew that Luster’s victim had agreed to testify against Jimmy--conveyed the information to Luster, Jimmy’s close friend. It is also reasonable to infer from the timing of Luster’s attack (the month before Jimmy’s trial) and his repeated statements to the victim (“Why are you snitching on my homey” and “Why are you testifying against my homey, you snitch”) that his purpose was to prevent her from testifying against Jimmy and to retaliate against her for cooperating with law enforcement in Jimmy’s case. See UnitedStates v. Jackson , 204 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 2000) (conviction may rest on indirect or circumstantial evidence, without direct evidence). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### § 1424.5 Selection of the unfair labor practice procedure or the negotiability procedure.

Where a labor organization files an unfair labor practice charge pursuant to part 1423 of this subchapter which involves a negotiability issue, and the labor organization also files pursuant to this part a petition for review of the same negotiability issue, the Board and the General Counsel ordinarily will not process the unfair labor practice charge and the petition for review simultaneously. Under such circumstances, the labor organization must select under which procedure to proceed. Upon selection of one procedure, further action under the other procedure will ordinarily be suspended. Such selection must be made regardless of whether the unfair labor practice charge or the petition for review of a negotiability issue is filed first. Notification of this selection must be made in writing at the time that both procedures have been invoked, and must be served on the Board, the appropriate Regional Director and all parties to both the unfair labor practice case and the negotiability case. Cases which solely involve the Department's allegation that the duty bargain in good faith does not extend to the matter proposed to be bargained and which do not involve actual or contemplated changes in conditions of employment may only be filed under this part.
Exhibit 31.1
                                  CERTIFICATION

     I, Philip M. Cohen, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of PetCARE Television
     Network, Inc.;

2.   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of
     a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
     statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
     were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
     report;

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
     information included in this report, fairly present in all material
     respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
     the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.   The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
     establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
     in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

     a)   Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
          disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
          supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
          registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to
          us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
          which this report is being prepared;

     b)   Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
          and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
          effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
          of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     c)   Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
          control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's
          most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in
          the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
          reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal
          control over financial reporting; and

5.   The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
     our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
     the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board
     of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

     a)   all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
          operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
          reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to
          record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

     b)   any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
          employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
          control over financial reporting.


Date:    November 14, 2003



/s/ Philip M. Cohen
------------------------------
Philip M. Cohen, President and CEO