Page i GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

2020 CENSUS

Actions Needed to 

Address Key Risks to a 

Successful Enumeration 

Statement of Robert Goldenkoff, Director, 

Strategic Issues

and

Nick Marinos, Director, 

Information Technology and Cybersecurity

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:30 p.m. ET

Tuesday, July 16, 2019

GAO-19-588T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-19-588T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

July 16, 2019

2020 CENSUS

Actions Needed to Address Key Risks to a 

Successful Enumeration

What GAO Found

The 2020 Decennial Census is on GAO’s list of high-risk programs primarily 

because the Department of Commerce’s Census Bureau (Bureau) (1) is using 

innovations that are not expected to be fully tested, (2) continues to face 

challenges in implementing information technology (IT) systems, and (3) faces 

significant cybersecurity risks to its systems and data. Although the Bureau has 

taken initial steps to address risk, additional actions are needed as these risks 

could adversely impact the cost, quality, schedule, and security of the 

enumeration.

• Innovations. The Bureau is planning several innovations for the 2020 

Census, including allowing the public to respond using the internet. These 

innovations show promise for controlling costs, but they also introduce new 

risks, in part, because they have not been used extensively, if at all, in earlier 

enumerations. As a result, testing is essential to ensure that key IT systems 

and operations will function as planned. However, citing budgetary 

uncertainties, the Bureau scaled back operational tests in 2017 and 2018, 

missing an opportunity to fully demonstrate that the innovations and IT 

systems will function as intended during the 2020 Census. To manage risk to 

the census, the Bureau has developed hundreds of mitigation and 

contingency plans. To maximize readiness for the 2020 Census, it will also 

be important for the Bureau to prioritize among its mitigation and contingency 

strategies those that will deliver the most cost-effective outcomes for the 

census.

• Implementing IT systems. The Bureau plans to rely heavily on IT for the 

2020 Census, including a total of 52 new and legacy IT systems and the 

infrastructure supporting them. To help improve its implementation of IT, in 

October 2018, the Bureau revised its systems development and testing 

schedule to reflect, among other things, lessons learned during its 2018 

operational test. However, GAO’s ongoing work has determined that the 

Bureau is at risk of not meeting near-term IT system development and testing 

schedule milestones for five upcoming 2020 Census operational deliveries, 

including self-response (e.g., the ability to respond to the 2020 Census 

through the internet). These schedule management challenges may 

compress the time available for the remaining system development and 

testing, and increase the risk that systems will not function as intended. It will 

be important that the Bureau effectively manages IT implementation risk to 

ensure that it meets near-term milestones for system development and 

testing, and that it is ready for the major operations of the 2020 Census.

• Cybersecurity. The Bureau has established a risk management framework 

that requires it to conduct a full security assessment for nearly all the

systems expected to be used for the 2020 Census and, if deficiencies are 

identified to determine the corrective actions needed to remediate those 

deficiencies. As of the end of May 2019, the Bureau had over 330 corrective 

actions from its security assessments that needed to be addressed, including 

217 that were considered “high-risk” or “very high-risk.” However, of these 

217 corrective actions, the Bureau identified 104 as being delayed. Further,

View GAO-19-588T. For more information, 

contact Robert Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 

or by email at goldenkoffr@gao.gov and Nick 

Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or by email at 

marinosn@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

The Bureau is responsible for 

conducting a complete and accurate 

decennial census of the U.S. 

population. The decennial census is 

mandated by the Constitution and 

provides vital data for the nation. A 

complete count of the nation’s 

population is an enormous undertaking 

as the Bureau seeks to control the cost 

of the census, implement operational 

innovations, and use new and modified 

IT systems. In recent years, GAO has 

identified challenges that raise serious 

concerns about the Bureau’s ability to 

conduct a cost-effective count. For 

these reasons, GAO added the 2020 

Census to its High-Risk list in February 

2017.

GAO was asked to testify about the 

reasons the 2020 Census remains on 

the High-Risk List and the steps the 

Bureau needs to take to mitigate risks 

to a successful census. To do so, GAO 

summarized its prior work regarding 

the Bureau’s planning efforts for the 

2020 Census. GAO also included 

preliminary observations from its 

ongoing work examining the IT 

systems readiness and cybersecurity 

for the 2020 Census. This information 

is related to, among other things, the 

Bureau’s progress in developing and 

testing key systems and the status of 

cybersecurity risks.

What GAO Recommends

Over the past decade, GAO has made 

106 recommendations specific to the 

2020 Census to help address issues 

raised in this and other products. The 

Department of Commerce has 

generally agreed with the 

recommendations. As of June 2019, 31 

of the recommendations had not been 

fully implemented.
Page ii GAO-19-588T Highlights

74 of the 104 were delayed by 60 or more days. According to the Bureau, 

these corrective actions were delayed due to technical challenges or 

resource constraints. GAO recently recommended that the Bureau take steps 

to ensure that identified corrective actions for cybersecurity weaknesses are 

implemented within prescribed time frames. Resolving identified 

vulnerabilities more timely can help reduce the risk that unauthorized 

individuals may exploit weaknesses to gain access to sensitive information 

and systems.

To its credit, the Bureau is also working with the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) to support its 2020 Census cybersecurity efforts. For 

example, DHS is helping the Bureau ensure a scalable and secure network 

connection for the 2020 Census respondents and to strengthen its response 

to potential cyber threats. During the last 2 years, as a result of these 

activities, the Bureau has received 42 recommendations from DHS to 

improve its cybersecurity posture. GAO recently recommended that the 

Bureau implement a formal process for tracking and executing appropriate 

corrective actions to remediate cybersecurity findings identified by DHS. 

Implementing the recommendation would help better ensure that DHS’s 

efforts result in improvements to the Bureau’s cybersecurity posture. 

In addition to addressing risks which could affect innovations and the security of 

the enumeration, the Bureau has the opportunity to improve its cost estimating 

process for the 2020 Census, and ultimately the reliability of the estimate itself, 

by reflecting best practices. In October 2017, the 2020 Census life-cycle cost 

estimate was updated and is now projected to be $15.6 billion, a more than $3 

billion (27 percent) increase over its earlier estimate. GAO reported in August 

2018 that although the Bureau had taken steps to improve its cost estimation 

process for 2020, it needed to implement a system to track and report variances 

between actual and estimated cost elements. According to Bureau officials, they 

planned to release an updated version of the 2020 Census life-cycle estimate in

the spring of 2019; however, they had not done so as of June 28, 2019. To 

ensure that future updates to the life-cycle cost estimate reflect best practices, it 

will be important for the Bureau to implement GAO’s recommendation related to 

the cost estimate.

Over the past decade, GAO has made 106 recommendations specific to the 

2020 Census to help address these risks and other concerns. The Department of 

Commerce has generally agreed with these recommendations and has taken 

action to address many of them. However, as of June 2019, 31 of the 

recommendations had not been fully implemented. While all 31 open 

recommendations are important for a high-quality and cost-effective 

enumeration, 9 are directed at managing the risks introduced by the Bureau’s 

planned innovations for the 2020 Census. To ensure a high-quality and costeffective enumeration, it will be important for the Bureau to address these 

recommendations.
Page 1 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Peters, and Members of the 

Committee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. Census Bureau’s 

(Bureau) progress in preparing for the 2020 Decennial Census. 

Conducting the decennial census of the U.S. population is mandated by 

the Constitution and provides vital data for the nation. The information 

that the census collects is used to apportion the seats of the House of 

Representatives; redraw congressional districts; allocate billions of dollars 

each year in federal financial assistance; and provide a social, 

demographic, and economic profile of the nation’s people to guide policy 

decisions at each level of government. Further, businesses use census 

data to market new services and products and to tailor existing ones to 

demographic changes.

A complete count of the nation’s population is an enormous undertaking. 

The Bureau, a component of the Department of Commerce (Commerce), 

is seeking to control the cost of the 2020 Census while it implements 

several innovations and manages the processes of acquiring and 

developing information technology (IT) systems.

In recent years, we have identified challenges that raise serious concerns 

about the Bureau’s ability to conduct a cost-effective count of the nation, 

including issues with the agency’s research, testing, planning, scheduling, 

cost estimation, systems development, risk management, and 

cybersecurity practices.

Over the past decade, we have made 106 recommendations specific to 

the 2020 Census to help address these and other concerns. Commerce 

has generally agreed with our recommendations and has made progress 

in implementing them. However, 31 of the recommendations had not 

been fully implemented as of June 2019, although the Bureau had taken 

initial steps to address many of them. In addition, one recommendation 

was closed as the Bureau decided to implement a different approach than 

the one about which the recommendation was directed.
Page 2 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

We added the 2020 Decennial Census to our high-risk list in February 

2017, and it remains on our high-risk list today.1 As preparations for the 

next census continue to ramp up, fully implementing our 

recommendations to address the risks jeopardizing the 2020 Census is 

more critical than ever.

At your request, our testimony today will describe (1) why the 2020 

Decennial Census remains a high-risk area and (2) the steps that 

Commerce and the Bureau need to take going forward to mitigate the 

risks jeopardizing a secure and cost-effective census.

The information in this statement is based primarily on our prior work 

regarding the Bureau’s planning efforts for 2020.2 For that body of work, 

we reviewed, among other things, relevant Bureau documentation, 

including the 2020 Census Operational Plan; recent decisions on 

preparations for the 2020 Census; and outcomes of key IT milestone 

reviews.

In the summer of 2018 we visited the Bureau’s 2018 End-to-End test site 

in Providence County, Rhode Island to observe door-to-door field 

enumeration during the non-response follow-up, an operation where 

enumerators personally visit each non-responding household to include 

them in the census. We also discussed the status of our 

recommendations with Commerce and Bureau staff. Other details on the 

scope and methodology for our prior work are provided in each published 

report on which this testimony is based.

 1

GAO, High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater Progress on 

High-Risk Areas, GAO-19-157SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2019) and High-Risk Series: 

Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others, 

GAO-17-317 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2017). GAO maintains a high-risk program to 

focus attention on government operations that it identifies as high-risk due to their greater 

vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation 

to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.

2

For example, GAO, 2020 Census: Additional Actions Needed to Manage Risk, 

GAO-19-399 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2019); 2020 Census: Additional Steps Needed 

to Finalize Readiness for Peak Field Operations, GAO-19-140 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 

10, 2018); 2020 Census: Continued Management Attention Needed to Address 

Challenges and Risks with Developing, Testing, and Securing IT Systems, GAO-18-655 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 30, 2018); 2020 Census: Bureau Has Made Progress with Its 

Scheduling, but Further Improvement Will Help Inform Management Decisions, 

GAO-18-589 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2018); and, 2020 Census: Actions Needed to 

Address Challenges to Enumerating Hard-to-Count Groups, GAO-18-599 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 26, 2018).
Page 3 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

In addition, we included information in this statement from our ongoing 

work on the readiness of the Bureau’s IT systems for the 2020 Census. 

Specifically, we collected and reviewed documentation on the status and 

plans for system development and testing, and for addressing 

cybersecurity risk, for the 2020 Census. This includes the Bureau’s 

integration and implementation plan, memorandums documenting 

outcomes of security assessments, and reports prepared by the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the Bureau on cybersecurity 

risks. We also interviewed relevant agency officials.

We provided a copy of the applicable new information that we are 

reporting in this testimony to the Bureau and DHS for comment on June 

25, 2019. The Bureau provided technical comments, which we addressed 

as appropriate.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives.

As shown in table 1 the cost of counting the nation’s population has been 

escalating with each decade. The 2010 Census was the most expensive 

in U.S. history at about $12.3 billion, and was about 31 percent more 

costly than the $9.4 billion 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars).3 According to 

the Bureau, the total cost of the 2020 Census in October 2015 was 

 3

According to the Bureau, these figures rely on fiscal year 2020 constant dollar factors 

derived from the Chained Price Index from “Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used 

in the Historical Tables: 1940–2020” table from the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget of the United 

States Government.

Background
Page 4 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

estimated at $12.3 billion and in October 2017 that cost estimate grew to 

approximately $15.6 billion, approximately a $3 billion increase.4

Additionally, Bureau officials told us that while the estimated cost of the 

census had increased to $15.6 billion, it was nevertheless managing the 

2020 Census to a lower cost of $14.1 billion. Bureau officials explained 

that the $14.1 billion includes all program costs and contingency funds to 

cover risks and general estimating uncertainty. The remaining $1.5 billion 

estimated cost is additional contingency for “unknown unknowns”—that 

is, low probability events that could cause massive disruptions—and 

several what-if scenarios such as an increase in the wage rate or 

additional supervisors needed to manage field operations.5

Table 1: The Cost of Previous Decennial Censuses and the Estimated Cost of the 

2020 Census

Benchmark Cost Explanation

2000 Census $9.4 billiona Final cost of the 2000 Census

2010 Census $12.3 billiona Final cost of the 2010 Census

2020 Census estimated 

cost in October 2015

$12.3 billiona Initial cost estimate of the 2020 

Census 

2020 Census estimated 

cost in October 2017

$15.6 billionb Revised cost estimate of the 

2020 Census

2020 Census cost estimate 

less a portion of 

contingency funds

$14.1 billionb Cost estimate the Bureau is 

managing operations to for 

the 2020 Census

Source: GAO analysis of Census Bureau data. | GAO-19-588T

Notes: 

a

Constant 2020 dollars.

b

Inflated to the current 2020 Census time frame, fiscal years 2012 to 2023.

 4

The historical life-cycle cost figures for prior decennials as well as the initial estimate for 

2020 provided by Commerce in October 2017 differ slightly from those reported by the 

Bureau previously. According to Commerce documents, the more recently reported 

figures are “inflated to the current 2020 Census time frame (fiscal years 2012 to 2023),”

rather than to 2020 constant dollars as the earlier figures had been. Specifically, since 

October 2017, Commerce and the Bureau have reported the October 2015 estimate for 

the 2020 Census as $12.3 billion; this is slightly different than the $12.5 billion the Bureau 

had initially reported.

5

The $15.6 billion cost estimate for the 2020 Census includes a total of $2.6 billion in 

contingency funds.
Page 5 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

Moreover, as shown in figure 1, the average cost for counting a housing 

unit increased from about $16 in 1970 to around $92 in 2010 (in 2020 

constant dollars). At the same time, the return of census questionnaires 

by mail (the primary mode of data collection) declined over this period 

from 78 percent in 1970 to 63 percent in 2010. Declining mail response 

rates have led to higher costs because the Bureau sends temporary 

workers to each non-responding household to obtain census data.

Achieving a complete and accurate census has become an increasingly 

daunting task, in part, because the population is growing larger, more 

diverse, and more reluctant to participate in the enumeration. In many 

ways, the Bureau has had to invest substantially more resources each 

decade to conduct the enumeration.

Figure 1: The Average Cost of Counting Each Housing Unit (in 2020 Dollars) Has 

Escalated Each Decade, While the Percentage of Mail Response Rates Has Declined

In addition to these external societal challenges that make achieving a 

complete count a daunting task, the Bureau also faces a number of 

internal management challenges that affect its capacity and readiness to 

conduct a cost-effective enumeration. Some of these issues—such as 
Page 6 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

acquiring and developing IT systems and preparing reliable cost 

estimates—are long-standing in nature.

At the same time, as the Bureau looks toward 2020, it has faced 

emerging and evolving uncertainties. For example, on March 26, 2018, 

the Secretary of Commerce announced his decision to add a question to 

the decennial census on citizenship status which resulted in various 

legislative actions6 and legal challenges.7 Ultimately, the case was heard 

by the U.S. Supreme Court, which, in a June 26, 2019, ruling, prevented 

the addition of the question because the Court found that the evidence 

Commerce provided in the case did not match the Secretary’s 

explanation.8 In addition, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded 

other legal challenges to the district court on June 24, 2019, for further 

legal action, which is yet to be resolved.9

According to Bureau officials, on June 28, 2019, Commerce asked the 

Bureau to put its scheduled July 1 start date for printing questionnaires on 

hold while it considered legal implications of the Supreme Court ruling. 

On July 2, 2019, Commerce told the Bureau to proceed with printing 

questionnaires and other materials without the citizenship question on 

them. As of July 5, 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ) indicated that, 

although printing was continuing without the citizenship question, DOJ 

was evaluating legal options to include the question.10

 6

Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2020, H.R. 

3055, § 534, 116th Cong. (passed June 25, 2019). Ensuring Full Participation in the 

Census Act of 2019, H.R. 1734, 116th Cong. (as introduced March 13, 2019); 2020 

Census Accountability Act, H.R. 5292, 115th Cong. (as introduced March 15, 2018). 

7

See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, No. 18-cv-2921, (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 

2019); California v. Ross, No. 18-cv-01865, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019).

8

New York v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. No. 18-966 at *33 (2019). A majority of the 

Court held in favor of the government on whether the question was permitted under the 

Enumeration Clause of the Constitution and the Census Act, but remanded to the 

Southern District Court of New York for additional proceedings on the limited question of 

whether the administrative record demonstrated reasonable decision making.

9

La Union Del Pueblo Entero et al. v. Ross; Kravitz v. Department of Commerce, No. 19-

1382 (4th Cir.). These cases were remanded to the district court for evidence-gathering on 

the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims.

10Id. DOJ, on behalf of Commerce, submitted a filing for this case on July 5, 2019 stating 

its intent to evaluate legal options for including the citizenship question.
Page 7 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

On July 11, 2019, the President announced that instead of collecting this 

information from the census questionnaire, he ordered all federal 

agencies to provide data on citizenship status to Commerce using legally 

available federal records. We have not analyzed this decision or its 

implications, if any, for how the Bureau will tabulate its official counts. We 

will continue to monitor developments for Congress.

The Bureau also faced budgetary uncertainties that, according to the 

Bureau, led to the curtailment of testing in 2017 and 2018. However, the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 appropriated for the Periodic 

Censuses and Programs account $2.544 billion, which more than doubled 

the Bureau’s request in the President’s Fiscal Year 2018 Budget of 

$1.251 billion.11 According to the explanatory statement accompanying 

the act, the appropriation, which is available through fiscal year 2020, was 

provided to ensure the Bureau has the necessary resources to 

immediately address any issues discovered during operational testing, 

and to provide a smoother transition between fiscal year 2018 and fiscal 

year 2019.12

The availability of those resources enabled the Bureau to continue 

preparations for the 2020 Census during the 35 days in December 2018 

to January 2019 when appropriations lapsed for the Bureau and a 

number of other federal agencies. Moreover, the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2019 appropriated for the Periodic Censuses and 

Programs account $3.551 billion.13 According to Bureau officials, this level 

of funding for fiscal year 2019 is sufficient to carry out 2020 Census 

activities as planned.

Importantly, the census is conducted against a backdrop of immutable 

deadlines. In order to meet the statutory deadline for completing the 

 11Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, Division B, Title I (Mar. 23, 

2018). Of the total appropriated for the Periodic Censuses and Programs account, $2.095 

billion was for the 2020 Census and $213.6 million was for the American Community 

Survey.

12Joint explanatory statement of conference, 164 Cong. Rec. H2045, H2084 (daily ed. 

Mar. 22, 2018) (statement of Chairman Frelinghuysen), specifically referenced in section 4 

of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 4 (Mar. 23, 2018).

13Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, Division C, Title I (Feb. 15, 

2019). Of the total appropriated for the Periodic Censuses and Programs account, $3.015 

billion was for the 2020 Census and $211.4 million was for the American Community 

Survey.
Page 8 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

enumeration, census activities need to take place at specific times and in 

the proper sequence.14 Thus, it is absolutely critical for the Bureau to stay 

on schedule. Figure 2 shows some dates for selected decennial events.

 1413 U.S.C. § 141(b).
Page 9 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

Figure 2: Timeline of Selected Decennial Events

a

Indicates dates that are mandated by law.
Page 10 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

The Bureau has begun to open its area census offices (ACO) for the 2020 

Census. It has signed leases for all 248 ACOs, of which 39 of the offices 

will be open for the address canvassing operation set to begin in August 

2019 where staff verifies the location of selected housing units. The 

remaining 209 offices will begin opening this fall. In 2010 the Bureau 

opened 494 census offices. The Bureau has been able to reduce its 

infrastructure because it is relying on automation to assign work and to 

record payroll. Therefore there is less paper—field assignments, maps, 

and daily payroll forms—to manually process.

For the 2020 Census, the Bureau is refining its recruiting and hiring goals, 

but tentatively plans to recruit approximately 2.24 million applicants and to 

hire over 400,000 temporary field staff from that applicant pool for two key 

operations: address canvassing, and nonresponse follow-up, where they 

visit households that do not return census forms to collect data in person. 

In 2010 the Bureau recruited 3.8 million applicants and hired 628,000 

temporary workers to conduct the address canvassing and nonresponse 

follow-up field operations. According to Bureau officials, it has reduced 

the number of temporary staff it needs to hire because automation has 

made field operations more efficient and there is less paper. As of June 

2019, the Bureau reported that for all 2020 Census operations it had 

processed about 430,000 applicants.

In addition, the Bureau was seeking to hire approximately 1,500 

partnership specialists by the end of June 2019 to help increase census 

awareness and participation in minority communities and hard-to-reach 

populations. As of July 9, 2019, the Bureau’s latest biweekly reporting 

indicated that it had hired 813 partnership specialists as of June 22, 2019. 

Moreover, as of July 10, 2019, Bureau officials told us that another 830 

applicants were waiting to have their background checks completed. 

According to Bureau officials, hiring data are based on payroll dates 

generated biweekly, while background check data are tracked internally.

Therefore, according to Bureau officials, more current hiring data were 

not available as of July 10, 2019 to indicate whether the Bureau had met 

its June 30 hiring goal.

Among other things, partnership specialists are expected to either provide 

or identify partners to help provide supplemental language support to 

respondents locally in over 100 different languages. We will continue to 

monitor the Bureau’s progress in meeting its partnership specialist 

staffing goals and addressing any turnover that takes place. Hiring 

partnership specialists in a timely manner and maintaining adequate 

partnership specialist staffing levels are key to the Bureau’s ability to 

The Bureau Has Begun 

Opening Offices and 

Hiring Temporary Staff
Page 11 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

carry out its planned outreach efforts, especially to hard-to-count 

communities.

Moreover, Bureau officials also stated that the current economic 

environment (i.e., the low unemployment rate compared to the economic 

environment of the 2010 Census) has not yet impacted their ability to 

recruit staff. The Bureau will continue to monitor the impact of low 

unemployment on its ability to recruit and hire at the local and regional 

levels.

For the 2020 Census, the Bureau is substantially changing how it intends 

to conduct the census, in part by re-engineering key census-taking 

methods and infrastructure, and making use of new IT applications and 

systems. For example, the Bureau plans to offer an option for households 

to respond to the survey via the internet and enable field-based 

enumerators15 to use applications on mobile devices to collect survey 

data from households. To do this, the Bureau plans to utilize 52 new and 

legacy IT systems, and the infrastructure supporting them, to conduct the 

2020 Census.

A majority of these 52 systems have been tested during operational tests 

in 2017 and 2018. For example, the Bureau conducted its 2018 End-toEnd test, which included 44 of the 52 systems and was intended to test all 

key systems and operations in a census-like environment to ensure 

readiness for the 2020 Census.

Nevertheless, additional IT development and testing work needs to take 

place before the 2020 Census. Specifically, officials from the Bureau’s 

Decennial Directorate said they expect that the systems will need to 

undergo further development and testing due to, among other things, the 

need to add functionality that was not part of the End-to-End test, scale 

system performance to support the number of respondents expected 

during the 2020 Census, and address system defects identified during the 

2018 End-to-End test.

To prepare the systems and technology for the 2020 Census, the Bureau 

is also relying on substantial contractor support. For example, it is relying 

 15Enumerators are Census Bureau employees who travel from door-to-door throughout 

the country to try to obtain census data from individuals who do not respond through other 

means, including the internet, on paper, or by phone.

The Bureau Plans to Rely 

Heavily on IT for the 2020 

Census
Page 12 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

on contractors to develop a number of systems and components of the IT 

infrastructure, including the IT platform that is intended to be used to 

collect data from households responding via the internet and telephone, 

and for non-response follow-up activities. Contractors are also deploying 

the IT and telecommunications hardware in the field offices and providing 

device-as-a-service capabilities by procuring the mobile devices and 

cellular service to be used for non-response follow-up.16

In addition to the development of technology, the Bureau is relying on a 

technical integration contractor to integrate all of the key systems and 

infrastructure. The contractor’s work is expected to include, among other 

things, evaluating the systems and infrastructure and acquiring the 

infrastructure (e.g., cloud or data center) to meet the Bureau’s scalability 

and performance needs; integrating all of the systems; and assisting with 

technical, performance and scalability, and operational testing activities.

In February 2017, we added the 2020 Decennial Census as a high-risk 

area needing attention from Congress and the executive branch.17 This 

was due to significant risks related to, among other things, innovations 

never before used in prior enumerations,18 the acquisition and 

development of IT systems, and expected escalating costs.

Among other things, we reported that the commitment of top leadership 

was needed to ensure the Bureau’s management, culture, and business 

practices align with a cost-effective enumeration. We also stressed that 

the Bureau needed to rigorously test census-taking activities; ensure that 

scheduling adheres to best practices; improve its ability to manage, 

develop, and secure its IT systems; and have better oversight and control 

over its cost estimation process.

 16In non-response follow-up, if a household does not respond to the census by a certain 

date, the Bureau will send out employees to visit the home. The Bureau’s plan is for these 

enumerators to use a census application, on a mobile device provided by the Bureau, to 

capture the information given to them by the in-person interviews.

17GAO-17-317.

18The Bureau has fundamentally re-examined its approach for conducting the 2020 

Census to help reduce costs. To do this, the agency plans to use innovations in four broad 

areas (described later in this statement): re-engineering field operations, using 

administrative records, verifying addresses in-office, and developing an Internet selfresponse option.

2020 Census Identified by 

GAO as a High-Risk Area
Page 13 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

Our experience has shown that agencies are most successful at removal 

from our High-Risk List when leaders give top level attention to the five 

criteria for removal and Congress takes any needed action. The five 

criteria for removal that we identified in November 2000 are as follows:19

• Leadership Commitment. The agency has demonstrated strong 

commitment and top leadership support.

• Capacity. The agency has the capacity (i.e., people and resources) to 

resolve the risk(s).

• Action Plan. A corrective action plan exists that defines the root 

causes and solutions, and that provides for substantially completing 

corrective measures, including steps necessary to implement 

solutions we recommended.

• Monitoring. A program has been instituted to monitor and 

independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of 

corrective measures.

• Demonstrated Progress. The agency has demonstrated progress in 

implementing corrective measures and in resolving the high-risk area.

These five criteria form a road map for efforts to improve, and ultimately 

address, high-risk issues. Addressing some of the criteria leads to 

progress, while satisfying all of the criteria is central to removal from the 

list.

As we reported in the March 2019 high-risk report,20 the Bureau’s efforts 

to address the risks and challenges for the 2020 Census had fully met 

one of the five criteria for removal from the High-Risk List—leadership 

commitment—and partially met the other four, as shown in figure 3. 

Additional details about the status of the Bureau’s efforts to address this 

high-risk area are discussed later in this statement.

 19GAO, Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks, 

GAO-01-159SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 2000).

20GAO-19-157SP.
Page 14 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

Figure 3: Status of High-Risk Area for the 2020 Decennial Census, as of March 2019

Note: Each point of the star represents one of the five criteria for removal from the High-Risk List and 

each ring represents one of the three designations: not met, partially met, or met. An unshaded point 

at the innermost ring means that the criterion has not been met, a partially shaded point at the middle 

ring means that the criterion has been partially met, and a fully shaded point at the outermost ring 

means that the criterion has been met.

The 2020 Census is on our list of high-risk programs because, among 

other things, (1) innovations never before used in prior enumerations are 

not expected to be fully tested, (2) the Bureau continues to face 

challenges in implementing IT systems, (3) the Bureau faces significant 

cybersecurity risks to its systems and data, and (4) the Bureau’s cost 

estimate for the 2020 Census was unreliable.21 If not sufficiently 

addressed, these risks could adversely impact the cost and quality of the 

enumeration. Moreover, the risks are compounded by other factors that 

contribute to the challenge of conducting a successful census, such as 

the nation’s increasingly diverse population and concerns over personal 

privacy.

 21GAO-17-317.

The 2020 Census 

Remains High Risk 

Due to Challenges 

Facing the 

Enumeration
Page 15 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

The basic design of the enumeration—mail out and mail back of the 

census questionnaire with in-person follow-up for non-respondents—has 

been in use since 1970. However, a lesson learned from the 2010 

Census and earlier enumerations is that this traditional design is no 

longer capable of cost-effectively counting the population.

In response to its own assessments, our recommendations, and studies 

by other organizations, the Bureau has fundamentally re-examined its 

approach for conducting the 2020 Census. Specifically, its plan for 2020 

includes four broad innovation areas: re-engineering field operations, 

using administrative records, verifying addresses in-office, and 

developing an internet self-response option (see table 2).

If they function as planned, the Bureau initially estimated that these 

innovations could result in savings of over $5 billion (in 2020 constant 

dollars) when compared to its estimates of the cost for conducting the 

census with traditional methods. However, in June 2016, we reported that 

the Bureau’s initial life-cycle cost estimate developed in October 2015 

was not reliable and did not adequately account for risk.22

As discussed earlier in this statement, the Bureau has updated its 

estimate from $12.3 billion and now estimates a life-cycle cost of $15.6 

billion, which would result in a smaller potential savings from the 

innovative design than the Bureau originally estimated. According to the 

Bureau, the goal of the cost estimate increase was to ensure quality was 

fully addressed.

 22GAO, 2020 Census: Census Bureau Needs to Improve Its Life-Cycle Cost Estimating 

Process, GAO-16-628 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2016).

Key Risk #1: The Bureau 

Redesigned the Census to 

Control Costs, and Will 

Need to Take Several 

Actions to Better Manage 

Risks
Page 16 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

Table 2: The Census Bureau (Bureau) Is Introducing Four Innovation Areas for the 

2020 Census

Innovation area Description

Re-engineered field 

operations

The Bureau intends to automate data collection methods, 

including its case management system.

Administrative records In certain instances, the Bureau plans to reduce enumerator 

collection of data by using administrative records 

(information already provided to federal and state 

governments as they administer other programs such as, 

Medicare and Medicaid).

Verifying addresses

in-office

To ensure the accuracy of its address list, the Bureau 

intends to use “in-office” procedures and on-screen imagery 

to verify addresses and reduce street-by-street field 

canvassing.

Internet self-response 

option

The Bureau plans to offer households the option of 

responding to the survey through the internet. The Bureau 

has not previously offered such an option on a large scale.

Source: GAO analysis of Census Bureau data. | GAO-19-588T

While the planned innovations could help control costs, they also 

introduce new risks, in part, because they include new procedures and 

technology that have not been used extensively in earlier decennials, if at 

all. Our prior work has shown the importance of the Bureau conducting a 

robust testing program, including the 2018 End-to-End test.23 Rigorous 

testing is a critical risk mitigation strategy because it provides information 

on the feasibility and performance of individual census-taking activities, 

their potential for achieving desired results, and the extent to which they 

are able to function together under full operational conditions.

To address some of these challenges we have made numerous 

recommendations aimed at improving reengineered field operations, 

using administrative records, verifying the accuracy of the address list, 

and securing census responses via the internet.

The Bureau has held a series of operational tests since 2012, but 

according to the Bureau, it scaled back its most recent field tests because 

of funding uncertainties. For example, the Bureau canceled the field 

components of the 2017 Census Test including non-response follow-up, a 

 23GAO, 2020 Census: Bureau Needs to Better Leverage Information to Achieve Goals of 

Reengineered Address Canvassing, GAO-17-622 (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2017).
Page 17 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

key census operation.24 In November 2016, we reported that the 

cancelation of the 2017 Census Test was a lost opportunity to test, refine, 

and integrate operations and systems, and that it put more pressure on 

the 2018 End-to-End test to demonstrate that enumeration activities will 

function under census-like conditions as needed for 2020.

However, in May 2017, the Bureau scaled back the operational scope of 

the 2018 End-to-End test and, of the three planned test sites, only the 

Rhode Island site would fully implement the 2018 End-to-End test. The 

Washington and West Virginia sites would test just one field operation. In 

addition, due to budgetary concerns, the Bureau delayed ramp up and 

preparations for its coverage measurement operation (and the technology 

that supports it) from the scope of the test.25 However, removal of the 

coverage measurement operation did not affect testing of the delivery of 

apportionment or redistricting data.

Without sufficient testing, operational problems can go undiscovered and 

the opportunity to improve operations will be lost, in part because the 

2018 End-to-End test was the last opportunity to demonstrate census 

technology and procedures across a range of geographic locations, 

housing types, and demographic groups under decennial-like conditions 

prior to the 2020 Census.

We reported on the 2018 End-to-End test in December 2018 and noted 

that the Bureau had made progress addressing prior test implementation 

issues but still faced challenges.26 As the Bureau studies the results of its 

testing to inform the 2020 Census, it will be important that it addresses 

key program management issues that arose during implementation of the 

test. Namely, by not aligning the skills, responsibilities, and information 

flows for the first-line supervisors during field data collection, the Bureau 

limited its role in support of enumerators within the re-engineered field 

operation.

 24In non-response follow-up, if a household does not respond to the census by a certain 

date, the Bureau will conduct an in-person visit by an enumerator to collect census data 

using a mobile device provided by the Bureau.

25Coverage measurement evaluates the quality of the census data by estimating the 

census coverage based on a post-enumeration survey.

26GAO-19-140. 
Page 18 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

The Bureau also lacked mid-operation training or guidance, which, if 

implemented in a targeted, localized manner, could have further helped 

enumerators navigate procedural modifications and any commonly 

encountered problems when enumerating. It will be important for the 

Bureau to prioritize its mitigation strategies for these implementation 

issues so that it can maximize readiness for the 2020 Census.

To manage risk to the 2020 Census the Bureau has developed hundreds 

of risk mitigation and contingency plans. Mitigation plans detail how an 

agency will reduce the likelihood of a risk event and its impacts, if it 

occurs. Contingency plans identify how an agency will reduce or recover 

from the impact of a risk after it has been realized.

In May 2019, we reported that the Bureau had identified 360 active risks 

to the 2020 census as of December 2018—meaning the risk event could 

still occur and adversely impact the census.27 Of these, 242 met the 

Bureau’s criteria for requiring a mitigation plan and, according to the 

Bureau’s risk registers, 232 had one (see table 3).28 In addition, 146 risks 

met the Bureau’s criteria for requiring a contingency plan and, according 

to the Bureau’s risk registers, 102 had one.

Table 3: 2020 Census Risks with Required Mitigation and Contingency Plans, as of 

December 2018

Plan Risks requiring plan Risks with plan

Mitigation 242 232 (96%)

Contingency 146 102 (70%)

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 2020 Census risk registers. | GAO-19-588T

Bureau guidance states that these plans should be developed as soon as 

possible after a risk is added to the risk register, but it does not establish 

a clear time frame for doing so. Consequently, some risks may go without 

required plans for extended periods. We found that, as of December 

2018, some of the risks without required plans had been added to the 

Bureau’s risk registers in recent months, but others had been added more 

than 3 years earlier.

 27GAO-19-399.

28The Bureau’s risk registers catalogue information regarding all risks to the 2020 Census 

that the Bureau has identified, including risk descriptions, and mitigation and contingency 

plans.

The Bureau Has Developed 

Hundreds of Risk Mitigation 

and Contingency Plans, but 

Those We Reviewed Were 

Missing Key Information 
Page 19 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

We reviewed the mitigation and contingency plans in detail for six risks 

which the Bureau identified as among the major concerns that could 

affect the 2020 Census. These included cybersecurity incidents, late 

operational design changes, and integration of the 52 systems and 35 

operations supporting the 2020 Census.

We found that the plans did not consistently include key information 

needed to manage the risk. For example, the Bureau’s contingency plan 

for late operational design changes did not include activities specific to 

the three most likely late operational design changes—including removal 

of the citizenship question as a result of litigation or congressional 

action—that the Bureau could carry out to lessen their adverse impact on 

the enumeration, should they occur.

We found that gaps stemmed from either requirements missing from the 

Bureau’s decennial risk management plan, or that risk owners—the 

individuals assigned to manage each risk—were not fulfilling all of their 

risk management responsibilities. Bureau officials said that risk owners 

are aware of these responsibilities but do not always fulfill them given 

competing demands.

Bureau officials also said that they are managing risks to the census, 

even if not always reflected in their mitigation and contingency plans. 

However, if such actions are reflected in disparate documents or are not 

documented at all, then decision makers are left without an integrated 

and comprehensive picture of how the Bureau is managing risks to the 

census.

We made seven recommendations to improve the Bureau’s management 

of risks to the 2020 Census, including that the Bureau develop mitigation 

and contingency plans for all risks that require them, establish a clear 

time frame for plan development, and ensure that the plans have the 

information needed to manage the risk. Commerce agreed with our 

recommendations and said it would develop an action plan to address 

them.
Page 20 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

We have previously reported that the Bureau faces challenges in 

managing and overseeing IT programs, systems, and contractors 

supporting the 2020 Census.29 Specifically, we have noted challenges in 

the Bureau’s efforts to manage, among other things, the schedules and 

contracts for its systems. As a result of these challenges, the Bureau is at 

risk of being unable to fully implement the systems necessary to support 

the 2020 Census and conduct a cost-effective enumeration.

To help improve its implementation of IT for the 2020 Census, the Bureau 

revised its systems development and testing schedule. Specifically, in 

October 2018, the Bureau organized the development and testing 

schedule for its 52 systems into 16 operational deliveries.30 Each of the 

16 operational deliveries has milestone dates for, among other things, 

development, performance and scalability testing, and system 

deployment. According to Bureau officials in the Decennial Directorate, 

the schedule was revised, in part, due to schedule management 

challenges experienced, and lessons learned, while completing 

development and testing during the 2018 End-to-End test.

The Bureau has made initial progress in executing work against its 

revised schedule. For example, the Bureau completed development of 

the systems in the first operational delivery—for 2020 Census early 

operations preparations—in July 2018, and deployed these systems into 

production in October 2018.

However, our current work has determined that the Bureau is at risk of 

not meeting several near-term systems testing milestones. As of June 

2019, 11 systems that are expected to be used in a total of five 

operational deliveries were at risk of not meeting key milestones for 

completing system development, performance and scalability testing, 

 29GAO, 2020 Census: Further Actions Needed to Reduce Key Risks to a Successful 

Enumeration, GAO-19-431T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2019) and GAO-18-655. 

30The 52 systems being used in the 2020 Census are to be deployed multiple times in a 

series of operational deliveries (which include operations such as address canvassing or 

self-response). That is, a system may be deployed for one operation in the 2020 Census 

(such as address canvassing), and be deployed again for a subsequent operation in the 

test (such as self-response). As such, additional development and testing may occur each 

time a system is deployed.

Key Risk #2: The Bureau 

Faces Challenges in 

Implementing IT Systems

The Bureau Has Made Initial 

Progress against Its Revised 

Development and Testing 

Schedule, but Risks Missing 

Near-term Milestones
Page 21 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

and/or integration testing.31 These 11 systems are needed for, among 

other things, data collection for operations, business and support 

automation, and customer support during self-response. Figure 4 

presents an overview of the status for all 16 operational deliveries, as of 

June 2019.

 31As of June 2019, the 11 systems were 2020 Website; Enterprise Census and Survey 

Enabling Platform-Operational Control System; Census Questionnaire Assistance; 

Automated Tracking and Control; Enterprise Census and Survey Enabling Platform–

Internet Self-Response; Census Data Lake; Master Address File/Topologically Integrated 

Geographic Encoding and Referencing Database; MOJO Field Processing; Production 

Environment for Administrative Records Staging, Integration, and Storage; Self-Response 

Quality Assurance; and Unified Tracking System.
Page 22 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

Figure 4: Status of 16 Operational Deliveries for the 2020 Census, as of June 2019

Note: The 52 systems being used in the 2020 Census are to be deployed multiple times in a series of 

operational deliveries (which include operations such as address canvassing or self-response). That 

is, a system may be deployed for one operation in the 2020 Census (such as address canvassing), 

and be deployed again for a subsequent operation in the test (such as self-response). As such, 

additional development and testing may occur each time a system is deployed.
Page 23 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

The at-risk systems previously discussed add uncertainty to a highly 

compressed time frame over the next 6 months. Importantly, between 

July and December 2019, the Bureau is expected to be in the process of 

integration testing the systems in 12 operational deliveries. Officials from 

the Bureau’s integration contractor noted concern that the current 

schedule leaves little room for any delays in completing the remaining 

development and testing activities.

In addition to managing the compressed testing time frames, the Bureau 

also has to quickly finalize plans related to its IT infrastructure. For 

example, as of June 2019, the Bureau stated that it was still awaiting final 

approval for its Trusted Internet Connection.32 Given that these plans may 

impact systems being tested this summer or deployed into production for 

the address canvassing operation in August 2019, it is important that the 

Bureau quickly addresses this matter.

Our past reporting noted that the Bureau faced significant challenges in 

managing its schedule for system development and testing that occurred 

in 2017 and 2018.33 We reported that, while the Bureau had continued to 

make progress in developing and testing IT systems for the 2020 Census, 

it had experienced delays in developing systems to support the 2018 

End-to-End test. These delays compressed the time available for system 

and integration testing and for security assessments.

In addition, several systems experienced problems during the test. We 

noted then, and reaffirm now, that continued schedule management 

challenges may compress the time available for the remaining system 

and integration testing and increase the risk that systems may not 

function or be as secure as intended.

The Bureau has acknowledged that it faces risks to the implementation of 

its systems and technology. As of May 2019, the Bureau had identified 17

high risks related to IT implementation that may have substantial 

technical and schedule impacts if realized. Taken together, these risks 

represent a cross-section of issues, such as schedule delays for a fraud-

 32External network traffic (traffic that is routed through agency’s external connections) 

must be routed through a Trusted Internet Connection. External connections include those 

connections between an agency’s information system or network and the globallyaddressable internet or a remote information system or network and networks located on 

foreign territory.

33GAO-18-655.

The Bureau Faces Additional 

Risks Due to Compressed IT 

Development and Testing Time 

Frames
Page 24 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

detection system, the effects of late changes to technical requirements, 

the need to ensure adequate time for system development and 

performance and scalability testing, contracting issues, privacy risks, and 

skilled staffing shortages. Going forward, it will be important that the 

Bureau effectively manages these risks to better ensure that it meets 

near-term milestones for system development and testing, and is ready 

for the major operations of the 2020 Census.

The risks to IT systems supporting the federal government and its 

functions, including conducting the 2020 Census, are increasing as 

security threats continue to evolve and become more sophisticated. 

These risks include insider threats from witting or unwitting employees, 

escalating and emerging threats from around the globe, and the 

emergence of new and more destructive attacks. Underscoring the 

importance of this issue, we have designated information security as a 

government-wide high-risk area since 1997 and, in our most recent 

biennial report to Congress, ensuring the cybersecurity of the nation was 

one of nine high-risk areas that we reported needing especially focused 

executive and congressional attention.34

Our prior and ongoing work has identified significant challenges that the 

Bureau faces in securing systems and data for the 2020 Census.35

Specifically, the Bureau has faced challenges related to completing 

security assessments, addressing security weaknesses, resolving 

cybersecurity recommendations from DHS, and addressing numerous 

other cybersecurity concerns (such as phishing).36

Federal law specifies requirements for protecting federal information and 

information systems, such as those systems to be used in the 2020 

Census. Specifically, the Federal Information Security Management Act of 

2002 and the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 

(FISMA) require executive branch agencies to develop, document, and 

implement an agency-wide program to provide security for the information 

 34GAO-19-157SP. 

35GAO-19-431T and GAO-18-655.

36Phishing is a digital form of social engineering that uses authentic-looking, but fake 

emails to request information from users or direct them to a fake website that requests 

information.

Key Risk #3: The Bureau 

Faces Significant 

Cybersecurity Risks to Its 

Systems and Data

The Bureau Has Made 

Progress in Completing 

Security Assessments, but 

Critical Work Remains
Page 25 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

and information systems that support operations and assets of the 

agency.37

In accordance with FISMA, National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) guidance, and Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) guidance, the Bureau’s Office of the Chief Information Officer 

(CIO) established a risk management framework. This framework 

requires system developers to ensure that each of the Bureau’s systems 

undergoes a full security assessment, and that system developers 

remediate critical deficiencies.

According to the Bureau’s risk management framework, the systems 

expected to be used to conduct the 2020 Census will need to have 

complete security documentation (such as system security plans) and an 

approved authorization to operate prior to their use. As of June 2019, 

according to the Bureau’s Office of the CIO:

• Thirty-seven of the 52 systems have authorization to operate, and will 

not need to be reauthorized before they are used in the 2020 

Census38

• Nine of the 52 systems have authorization to operate, and will need to 

be reauthorized before they are used in the 2020 Census

• Five of the 52 systems do not have authorization to operate, and will 

need to be authorized before they are used in the 2020 Census

• One of the 52 systems does not need an authorization to operate.39

 37The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128 

Stat. 3073 (Dec. 18, 2014) largely superseded the Federal Information Security 

Management Act of 2002, enacted as Title III, E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 

107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 2946 (Dec. 17, 2002).

38According to the Bureau’s risk management framework, once a system obtains an 

authorization, it is transitioned to the continuous monitoring process where the authorizing 

official can provide ongoing authorization for system operation as long as the risk level 

remains acceptable. Further, according to the framework, authorized systems do not need 

a formal reauthorization unless the system’s authorizing official determines that the risk 

posture of the system needs to change. This could occur, for example, if the system 

undergoes significant new development.

39According to a June 2019 Bureau memorandum, one system—OneForm Designer 

Plus—is expected to primarily be used during the 2020 Census as a desktop tool for 

generating fillable forms. The memorandum further states that, because this system is 

considered a desktop tool, the Bureau’s information security policy does not require it to 

obtain an authorization to operate.
Page 26 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

Figure 5 summarizes the authorization to operate status for the systems 

being used in the 2020 Census, as reported by the Bureau in June 2019.

Figure 5: Authorization to Operate Status for the 52 Systems Being Used by the 

Census Bureau in the 2020 Census, as Reported by the Bureau in June 2019

a

According to the Bureau, one system is expected to primarily be used during the 2020 Census as a 

desktop tool for generating fillable forms and the Bureau’s information security policy does not require 

desktop tools to obtain an authorization to operate.

As we have previously reported, while large-scale technological changes 

(such as internet self-response) increase the likelihood of efficiency and 

effectiveness gains, they also introduce many cybersecurity challenges. 

The 2020 Census also involves collecting personally identifiable 

information (PII) on over a hundred million households across the 

country, which further increases the need to properly secure these 

systems. Thus, it will be important that the Bureau provides adequate 

time to perform these security assessments, completes them in a timely

manner, and ensures that risks are at an acceptable level before the 

systems are deployed. We have ongoing work examining how the Bureau 

plans to address both internal and external cyber threats, including its 
Page 27 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

efforts to complete system security assessments and resolve identified 

weaknesses.

FISMA requires that agency-wide information security programs include a 

process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting 

remedial actions (i.e., corrective actions) to address any deficiencies in 

the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the 

agency.40 Additionally, the Bureau’s framework requires it to track security 

assessment findings that need to be remediated as a plan of action and 

milestones (POA&M). These POA&Ms are expected to provide a 

description of the vulnerabilities identified during the security assessment 

that resulted from a control weakness.

As of the end of May 2019, the Bureau had over 330 open POA&Ms to 

remediate for issues identified during security assessment activities, 

including ongoing continuous monitoring. Of these open POA&Ms, 217 

(or about 65 percent) were considered “high-risk” or “very high-risk.”

While the Bureau established POA&Ms for addressing these identified 

security control weaknesses, it did not always complete remedial actions 

in accordance with its established deadlines. For example, of the 217 

open “high-risk” or “very high-risk” POA&Ms we reviewed, the Bureau 

identified 104 as being delayed. Further, 74 of the 104 had missed their 

scheduled completion dates by 60 or more days. According to the 

Bureau’s Office of Information Security, these POA&Ms were identified as 

delayed due to technical challenges or resource constraints to remediate 

and close them.

We previously recommended that the Bureau take steps to ensure that 

identified corrective actions for cybersecurity weaknesses are 

implemented within prescribed time frames.41 As of late May 2019, the 

Bureau was working to address our recommendation. Until the Bureau 

resolves identified vulnerabilities in a timely manner, it faces an increased 

risk, as continuing opportunities exist for unauthorized individuals to 

exploit these weaknesses and gain access to sensitive information and 

systems.

 40The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128 

Stat. 3073 (Dec. 18, 2014).

41GAO-19-431T. 

The Bureau Has Identified a 

Significant Number of 

Corrective Actions to Address 

Security Weaknesses, but Has 

Not Always Been Timely in 

Completing Them
Page 28 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

The Bureau is working with federal and industry partners, including DHS, 

to support the 2020 Census cybersecurity efforts. Specifically, the Bureau 

is working with DHS to ensure a scalable and secure network connection 

for the 2020 Census respondents (e.g., virtual Trusted Internet 

Connection with the cloud), improve its cybersecurity posture (e.g., risk 

management processes and procedures), and strengthen its response to 

potential cyber threats (e.g., federal cyber incident coordination).

Federal law describes practices for strengthening cybersecurity by 

documenting or tracking corrective actions. As previously mentioned, 

FISMA requires executive branch agencies to establish a process for 

planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to 

address any deficiencies in their information security policies, procedures, 

and practices. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government

calls for agencies to establish effective internal control monitoring that 

includes a process to promptly resolve the findings of audits and other 

reviews.42 Specifically, agencies should document and complete 

corrective actions to remediate identified deficiencies on a timely basis. 

This would include correcting identified deficiencies or demonstrating that 

the findings and recommendations do not warrant agency action.

Since January 2017, DHS has been providing cybersecurity assistance 

(including issuing recommendations) to the Bureau in preparation for the 

2020 Census. Specifically, DHS has been providing cybersecurity 

assistance to the Bureau in five areas:

• management coordination and executive support, including a 

CyberStat Review;43

• cybersecurity threat intelligence and information sharing enhancement 

through, among other things, a DHS cyber threat briefing to the 

Bureau’s leadership;

• network and infrastructure security and resilience, including National 

Cybersecurity Protection System (also called EINSTEIN) support;44

 42GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2014).

43According to OMB, CyberStat Reviews are face-to-face, evidence-based meetings 

intended to ensure agencies are accountable for their cybersecurity posture. OMB, DHS, 

and Commerce participated in the Fiscal Year 2017 CyberStat Review related to the 

Bureau.

The Bureau Is Working 

with DHS to Improve Its 

2020 Census 

Cybersecurity Efforts, but 

Lacks a Formal Process to 

Address DHS’s 

Recommendations
Page 29 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

• incident response and management readiness through a Federal 

Incident Response Evaluation assessment;45 and

• risk management and vulnerability assessments for specific high 

value assets provided by the Bureau.46

In the last 2 years, DHS has provided 42 recommendations to assist the 

Bureau in strengthening its cybersecurity efforts.47 Among other things, 

the recommendations pertained to strengthening cyber incident 

management capabilities, penetration testing48 and web application 

assessments of select systems, and phishing assessments to gain 

access to sensitive PII. Of the 42 recommendations, 10 recommendations 

resulted from DHS’s mandatory services for the Bureau (e.g., risk 

management and vulnerability assessments for specific high value 

assets). The remaining 32 recommendations resulted from DHS’s 

voluntary services for the Bureau (e.g., Federal Incident Response 

Evaluation assessment). Due to the sensitive nature of the 

recommendations, we are not identifying the specific recommendations or 

specific findings associated with them in this statement.

In April 2019, we reported that the Bureau had not established a formal 

process for documenting, tracking, and completing corrective actions for 

 44The National Cybersecurity Protection System, operationally known as the EINSTEIN 

program, is an integrated system-of-systems that is intended to deliver a range of 

capabilities, including intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, analytics, and information 

sharing. This program was developed to be one of the tools to aid federal agencies in 

mitigating information security threats.

45As part of the CyberStat Review, DHS conducted a Federal Incident Response 

Evaluation assessment in October 2017. The purpose of the assessment was, in part, to 

review the Bureau’s incident management practices and provide recommendations that, if 

addressed, would strengthen the Bureau’s cybersecurity efforts.

46According to OMB, high value assets are those assets (such as federal information 

systems, information, and data) for which an unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 

disruption, modification, or destruction could cause a significant impact.

47Although all of the recommendations from DHS are intended to assist the Bureau to 

improve its overall cybersecurity efforts, a recommendation may not explicitly indicate that 

there is a specific vulnerability. However, a recommendation may identify an area where 

the Bureau’s cybersecurity capabilities could be strengthened.

48The National Institute of Standards and Technology defined penetration testing as 

security testing in which the evaluators mimic real-world attacks in an attempt to identify 

ways to circumvent the security features of an application, system, or network. Penetration 

testing often involves issuing real attacks on real systems and data, using the same tools 

and techniques used by actual attackers.
Page 30 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

all of the recommendations provided by DHS.49 Accordingly, we 

recommended that the Bureau implement a formal process for tracking 

and executing appropriate corrective actions to remediate cybersecurity 

findings identified by DHS. As of late May 2019, the Bureau was working 

to address our recommendation.

Until the Bureau implements our recommendation, it faces an increased 

likelihood that findings identified by DHS will go uncorrected and may be 

exploited to cause harm to agency’s 2020 Census IT systems and gain 

access to sensitive respondent data. Implementing a formal process 

would also help to ensure that DHS’s efforts result in improvements to the 

Bureau’s cybersecurity posture.

The Bureau faces other substantial cybersecurity challenges in addition to 

those previously discussed. More specifically, we previously reported that 

the extensive use of IT systems to support the 2020 Census redesign 

may help increase efficiency, but that this redesign introduces critical 

cybersecurity challenges.50 These challenges include those related to the 

following:

• Phishing. We have previously reported that advanced persistent 

threats may be targeted against social media web sites used by the 

federal government. In addition, attackers may use social media to 

collect information and launch attacks against federal information 

systems through social engineering, such as phishing.51 Phishing 

attacks could target respondents, as well as Bureau employees and 

contractors. The 2020 Census will be the first one in which 

respondents will be heavily encouraged to respond via the internet. 

This will likely increase the risk that cyber criminals will use phishing 

in an attempt to steal personal information. According to the Bureau, it 

plans to inform the public of the risks associated with phishing through 

its education and communication campaigns.

 49GAO-19-431T.

50GAO, Information Technology: Better Management of Interdependencies between 

Programs Supporting 2020 Census Is Needed, GAO-16-623 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 9, 

2016) and Information Technology: Uncertainty Remains about the Bureau’s Readiness 

for a Key Decennial Census Test, GAO-17-221T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2016).

51GAO, Social Media: Federal Agencies Need Policies and Procedures for Managing and 

Protecting Information They Access and Disseminate, GAO-11-605 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 28, 2011).

The Bureau Faces Several 

Other Cybersecurity 

Challenges in Implementing 

the 2020 Census
Page 31 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

• Disinformation from social media. We previously reported that one 

of the Bureau’s key innovations for the 2020 Census is the large-scale 

implementation of an internet self-response option. The Bureau is 

encouraging the public to use the internet self-response option 

through expanded use of social media. However, the public 

perception of the Bureau’s ability to adequately safeguard the privacy 

and confidentiality of the 2020 Census internet self-responses could 

be influenced by disinformation spread through social media. 

According to the Bureau, if a substantial segment of the public is not 

convinced that the Bureau can safeguard public response data 

against data breaches and unauthorized use, then response rates 

may be lower than projected, leading to an increase in cases for 

follow-up and subsequent cost increases. To help address this 

challenge, the Bureau stated that it plans to inform the public of the 

risks associated with disinformation from social media through its 

education and communication campaigns.

• Ensuring that individuals gain only limited and appropriate 

access to 2020 Census data. The Bureau plans to enable a publicfacing website and Bureau-issued mobile devices to collect PII (e.g., 

name, address, and date of birth) from the nation’s entire population—

estimated to be over 300 million. In addition, the Bureau is planning to 

obtain and store administrative records containing PII from other 

government agencies to help augment information that enumerators 

did not collect.

The number of reported security incidents involving PII at federal 

agencies has increased dramatically in recent years. Because of 

these challenges, we have recommended, among other things, that 

federal agencies improve their response to information security 

incidents and data breaches involving PII, and consistently develop 

and implement privacy policies and procedures. Accordingly, it will be 

important for the Bureau to ensure that only respondents and Bureau 

officials are able to gain access to this information, and enumerators 

and other employees only have access to the information needed to 

perform their jobs.

• Ensuring adequate control in a cloud environment. The Bureau 

has decided to use cloud solutions as a key component of the 2020 

Census IT infrastructure. We have previously reported that cloud 

computing has both positive and negative information security 

implications and, thus, federal agencies should develop service-level 

agreements with cloud providers. 
Page 32 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

These agreements should specify, among other things, the security 

performance requirements—including data reliability, preservation, 

privacy, and access rights—that the service provider is to meet.52

Without these safeguards, computer systems and networks, as well 

as the critical operations and key infrastructures they support, may be 

lost; information—including sensitive personal information—may be 

compromised; and the agency’s operations could be disrupted.

Commerce’s Office of the Inspector General recently identified several 

challenges the Bureau may face using cloud-based systems to 

support the 2020 Census.53 Specifically, in June 2019, the Office of 

the Inspector General identified, among other things, unimplemented 

security system features that left critical 2020 Census systems 

vulnerable during the 2018 End-to-End Test and a lack of fully 

implemented security practices to protect certain data hosted in the 

2020 Census cloud environment. Officials from the Bureau agreed 

with all eight of the Office of Inspector General’s recommendations 

regarding 2020 Census cloud-based systems and identified actions 

taken to address them.

• Ensuring contingency and incident response plans are in place 

to encompass all of the IT systems to be used to support the 

2020 Census. Because of the brief time frame for collecting data 

during the 2020 Census, it is especially important that systems are 

available for respondents to ensure a high response rate. 

Contingency planning and incident response help ensure that, if 

normal operations are interrupted, network managers will be able to 

detect, mitigate, and recover from a service disruption while 

preserving access to vital information. 

Implementing important security controls, including policies, 

procedures, and techniques for contingency planning and incident 

response, helps to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 

of information and systems, even during disruptions of service.

Without contingency and incident response plans, system availability 

might be impacted and result in a lower response rate.

 52GAO, Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Cyber Incident Response 

Practices, GAO-14-354 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2014).

53U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Inspector General, The Census Bureau Must 

Correct Fundamental Cloud Security Deficiencies in Order to Better Safeguard the 2020 

Decennial Census, OIG-19-015-A (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2019).
Page 33 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

The Bureau’s CIO has acknowledged these cybersecurity challenges and 

is working to address them, according to Bureau documentation. In 

addition, we have ongoing work looking at many of these challenges, 

including the Bureau’s plans to protect PII, use a cloud-based 

infrastructure, and recover from security incidents and other disasters.

Since 2015, the Bureau has made progress in improving its ability to 

develop a reliable cost estimate. We have reported on the reliability of the 

$12.3 billion life-cycle cost estimate released in October 2015 and the 

$15.6 billion revised cost estimate released in October 2017.54 In 2016 we 

reported that the October 2015 version of the Bureau’s life-cycle cost 

estimate for the 2020 Census was not reliable. Specifically, we found that 

the 2020 Census life-cycle cost estimate partially met two of the 

characteristics of a reliable cost estimate (comprehensive and accurate) 

and minimally met the other two (well-documented and credible). We 

recommended that the Bureau take specific steps to ensure its cost 

estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality estimate. The Bureau 

agreed and has taken action to improve the reliability of the cost estimate.

In August 2018 we reported that while improvements had been made, the 

Bureau’s October 2017 cost estimate for the 2020 Census did not fully 

reflect all the characteristics of a reliable estimate. (See figure 6.)

 54GAO-16-628 and GAO, 2020 Census: Census Bureau Improved the Quality of Its Cost 

Estimation but Additional Steps Are Needed to Ensure Reliability, GAO-18-635 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 2018).

Key Risk #4: The Bureau 

Will Need to Control Any 

Further Cost Growth and 

Develop Cost Estimates 

That Reflect Best 

Practices
Page 34 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

Figure 6: Overview of the Census Bureau’s 2015 and 2017 Cost Estimates 

Compared to Characteristics of a Reliable Cost Estimate

In order for a cost estimate to be deemed reliable as described in GAO’s 

Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide55 and thus, to effectively inform 

2020 Census annual budgetary figures, the cost estimate must meet or 

substantially meet the following four characteristics:

• Well-Documented. Cost estimates are considered valid if they are 

well-documented to the point they can be easily repeated or updated 

and can be traced to original sources through auditing, according to 

best practices.

• Accurate. Accurate estimates are unbiased and contain few 

mathematical mistakes.

• Credible. Credible cost estimates must clearly identify limitations due 

to uncertainty or bias surrounding the data or assumptions, according 

to best practices.

 55GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs (Supersedes GAO-07-1134SP), GAO-09-3SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009).
Page 35 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

• Comprehensive. To be comprehensive an estimate should have 

enough detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor 

double-counted, and all cost-influencing assumptions are detailed in 

the estimate’s documentation, among other things, according to best 

practices.

The 2017 cost estimate only partially met the characteristic of being welldocumented. In general, some documentation was missing, inconsistent, 

or difficult to understand. Specifically, we found that source data did not 

always support the information described in the basis of estimate 

document or could not be found in the files provided for two of the 

Bureau’s largest field operations: Address Canvassing and NonResponse Follow-Up. We also found that some of the cost elements did 

not trace clearly to supporting spreadsheets and assumption documents.

Failure to document an estimate in enough detail makes it more difficult to 

replicate calculations, or to detect possible errors in the estimate; reduces 

transparency of the estimation process; and can undermine the ability to 

use the information to improve future cost estimates or even to reconcile 

the estimate with another independent cost estimate. The Bureau told us 

it would continue to make improvements to ensure the estimate is welldocumented.

The 2017 life-cycle cost estimate includes much higher costs than those 

included in the 2015 estimate. The largest increases occurred in the 

Response, Managerial Contingency, and Census/Survey Engineering 

categories. For example, increased costs of $1.3 billion in the response 

category (costs related to collecting, maintaining, and processing survey 

response data) were in part due to reduced assumptions for selfresponse rates, leading to increases in the amount of data collected in the 

field, which is more costly to the Bureau.

Contingency allocations increased overall from $1.35 billion in 2015 to 

$2.6 billion in 2017, as the Bureau gained a greater understanding of 

risks facing the 2020 Census. Increases of $838 million in the 

Census/Survey Engineering category were due mainly to the cost of an IT 

contract for integrating decennial survey systems that was not included in 

the 2015 cost estimate. Bureau officials attribute a decrease of $551 

million in estimated costs for Program Management to changes in the 

categorization of costs associated with risks.

Specifically, in the 2017 version of the estimate, estimated costs related 

to program risks were allocated to their corresponding work breakdown 

Increased Costs Are Driven by

an Assumed Decrease in SelfResponse Rates and 

Increases in Contingency 

Funds and IT Cost Categories
Page 36 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

structure (WBS) element. Figure 7 shows the change in cost by WBS 

category for 2015 and 2017.

Figure 7: Change in 2020 Census Cost Estimate by Work Breakdown Structure Category, 2015 vs. 2017a

a

The historical life-cycle cost figures for prior decennials as well as the initial estimate for 2020 

provided by Commerce in October 2017 differ slightly from those reported by the Bureau previously. 

According to Commerce documents, the more recently reported figures are “inflated to the current 

2020 Census time frame (fiscal years 2012 to 2023),” rather than to constant 2020 dollars as the 

earlier figures had been. Specifically, since October 2017, Commerce and the Bureau have reported 

the October 2015 estimate for the 2020 Census as $12.3 billion; this is slightly different from the 

$12.5 billion the Bureau had initially reported.

b

The 2015 cost estimate also included managerial contingency amounts totaling $829 million; 

however, these were not presented as a separate work breakdown structure category.

More generally, factors that contributed to cost fluctuations between the 

2015 and 2017 cost estimates include:

• Changes in assumptions. Among other changes, a decrease in the 

assumed rate for self-response from 63.5 percent in 2015 to 60.5 

percent in 2017 increased the cost of collecting responses from 

nonresponding housing units.
Page 37 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

• Improved ability to anticipate and quantify risk. In general, 

contingency allocations designed to address the effects of potential 

risks increased overall from $1.3 billion in 2015 to $2.6 billion in 2017.

• An overall increase in IT costs. IT cost increases, totaling $1.59 

billion, represented almost 50 percent of the total cost increase from 

2015 to 2017.

• More defined contract requirements. Bureau documents described 

an overall improvement in the Bureau’s ability to define and specify 

contract requirements. This resulted in updated estimates for several 

contracts, including for the Census Questionnaire Assistance 

contract.56

However, while the Bureau has been able to better quantify risk; in 

August 2018 we also reported that the Secretary of Commerce included a 

contingency amount of about $1.2 billion in the 2017 cost estimate to 

account for what the Bureau refers to as “unknown unknowns.” According 

to Bureau documentation these include such risks as natural disasters or 

cyber attacks. The Bureau provides a description of how the risk 

contingency for “unknown unknowns” is calculated; however, this 

description does not clearly link calculated amounts to the risks 

themselves. Thus, only $14.4 billion of the Bureau’s $15.6 billion cost 

estimate has justification.

According to Bureau officials, the cost estimate remains at $15.6 billion; 

however, they stated that they are managing the 2020 Census at a lower 

level of funding—$14.1 billion. In addition, they said that, at this time, they 

do not plan to request funding for the $1.2 billion contingency fund for 

unknown unknowns or $369 million in funding for selected discrete 

program risks for what-if scenarios, such as an increase in the wage rate 

or additional supervisors needed to manage field operations. Instead of 

requesting funding for these contingencies upfront the Bureau plans to 

work with OMB and Commerce to request additional funds, if the need 

arises.

According to Bureau officials they anticipate that the remaining $1.1 

billion in contingency funding included in the $14.1 billion will be sufficient 

 56This contract has two primary functions: to provide (1) questionnaire assistance by 

telephone and email for respondents by answering questions about the census in general 

and regarding specific items on the census form, and (2) an option for respondents to 

complete a census interview over the telephone.
Page 38 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

to carry out the 2020 Census. In June 2016 we recommended the Bureau 

improve control over how risk and uncertainty are accounted for. This 

prior recommendation remains valid given the life-cycle cost estimate still 

includes the $1.2 billion unjustified contingency fund for “unknown 

unknowns”.

Moreover, given the cost growth between 2015 and 2017 it will be 

important for the Bureau to monitor cost in real-time, as well as, 

document, explain and review variances between planned and actual 

cost. In August 2018 we reported that the Bureau had not been tracking 

variances between estimated life-cycle costs and actual expenses. Tools 

to track variance enable management to measure progress against 

planned outcomes and will help inform the 2030 Census cost estimate. 

Bureau officials stated that they already have systems in place that can 

be adapted for tracking estimated and actual costs. We will continue to 

monitor the status of the tracking system.

According to Bureau officials, the Bureau planned to release an updated 

version of the 2020 Census life-cycle estimate in the spring of 2019; 

however, they had not done so as of June 28, 2019. To ensure that future 

updates to the life-cycle cost estimate reflect best practices, it will be 

important for the Bureau to implement our recommendation related to the 

cost estimate.

The difficulties facing the Bureau’s preparation for the decennial census 

in such areas as planning and testing; managing and overseeing IT 

programs, systems, and contractors supporting the enumeration; 

developing reliable cost estimates; prioritizing decisions; managing 

schedules; and other challenges, are symptomatic of deeper 

organizational issues.

Continued 

Management 

Attention Needed to 

Keep Preparations on 

Track and Help 

Ensure a CostEffective Enumeration

2020 Challenges Are 

Symptomatic of Deeper 

Long-Term Organizational 

Issues
Page 39 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

Following the 2010 Census, a key lesson learned for 2020 that we 

identified was ensuring that the Bureau’s organizational culture and 

structure, as well as its approach to strategic planning, human capital 

management, internal collaboration, knowledge sharing, capital decisionmaking, risk and change management, and other internal functions are 

aligned toward delivering more cost-effective outcomes.57

The Bureau has made improvements over the last decade, and continued 

progress will depend in part on sustaining efforts to strengthen risk 

management activities, enhancing systems testing, bringing in 

experienced personnel to key positions, implementing our 

recommendations, and meeting regularly with officials from its parent 

agency, Commerce.

Going forward, we have reported that the key elements needed to make 

progress in high-risk areas are top-level attention by the administration 

and agency officials to (1) leadership commitment, (2) ensuring capacity, 

(3) developing a corrective action plan, (4) regular monitoring, and (5) 

demonstrated progress. Although important steps have been taken in at 

least some of these areas, overall, far more work is needed.58 We discuss 

three of five areas below.

The Secretary of Commerce has successfully demonstrated leadership 

commitment. For example, the Bureau and Commerce have strengthened 

this area with executive-level oversight of the 2020 Census by holding 

regular meetings on the status of IT systems and other risk areas. In 

addition, in 2017 Commerce designated a team to assist senior Bureau 

management with cost estimation challenges. Moreover, on January 2, 

2019, a new Director of the Census Bureau took office, a position that 

had been vacant since June 2017.

With regard to capacity, the Bureau has improved the cost estimation 

process of the decennial when it established guidance including:

• roles and responsibilities for oversight and approval of cost estimation 

processes,

 57GAO, 2010 Census: Preliminary Lessons Learned Highlight the Need for Fundamental 

Reforms, GAO-11-496T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2011).

58GAO-17-317.
Page 40 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

• procedures requiring a detailed description of the steps taken to 

produce a high-quality cost estimate, and

• a process for updating the cost estimate and associated documents 

over the life of a project.

However, the Bureau continues to experience skills gaps in the 

government program management office overseeing the $886 million 

contract for integrating the IT systems needed to conduct the 2020 

Census. Specifically, as of June 2019, 14 of 44 positions in this office 

were vacant.

For the monitoring element, we found to track performance of decennial 

census operations, the Bureau relied on reports to track progress against 

pre-set goals for a test conducted in 2018. According to the Bureau, these 

same reports will be used in 2020 to track progress. However, the 

Bureau’s schedule for developing IT systems during the 2018 End-to-End 

test experienced delays that compressed the time available for system 

testing, integration testing, and security assessments. These schedule 

delays contributed to systems experiencing problems after deployment, 

as well as cybersecurity challenges. In the months ahead, we will 

continue to monitor the Bureau’s progress in addressing each of the five 

elements essential for reducing the risk to a cost-effective enumeration.

Over the past several years we have issued numerous reports that 

underscored the fact that, if the Bureau was to successfully meet its cost 

savings goal for the 2020 Census, the agency needed to take significant 

actions to improve its research, testing, planning, scheduling, cost 

estimation, system development, and IT security practices. As of June 

2019, we have made 106 recommendations related to the 2020 Census. 

The Bureau has implemented 74 of these recommendations, 31 remain 

open, and one recommendation was closed as not implemented.

Of the 31 open recommendations, 9 were directed at improving the 

implementation of the innovations for the 2020 Census. Commerce 

generally agreed with our recommendations and is taking steps to 

implement them. Moreover, in April 2019 we wrote to the Secretary of 

Commerce, providing a list of the 12 open 2020-Census-related 

recommendations that we designated as “priority.”59 Priority 

 59The 12 priority recommendations originated in reports we issued from November 2009 

to December 2018. 

Further Actions Needed on 

Our Recommendations
Page 41 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

recommendations are those recommendations that we believe warrant 

priority attention from heads of key departments and agencies.

We believe that attention to these recommendations is essential for a 

cost-effective enumeration. The recommendations included implementing 

reliable cost estimation and scheduling practices in order to establish 

better control over program costs, as well as taking steps to better 

position the Bureau to develop an internet response option for the 2020 

Census.

In addition to our recommendations, to better position the Bureau for a 

more cost-effective enumeration, on March 18, 2019, we met with OMB, 

Commerce, and Bureau officials to discuss the Bureau’s progress in 

reducing the risks facing the census. We also meet regularly with Bureau 

officials and managers to discuss the progress and status of open 

recommendations related to the 2020 Census, which has resulted in 

Bureau actions in recent months leading to closure of some 

recommendations.

We are encouraged by this commitment by Commerce and the Bureau in 

addressing our recommendations. Implementing our recommendations in 

a complete and timely manner is important because it could improve the 

management of the 2020 Census and help to mitigate continued risks.

In conclusion, while the Bureau has made progress in revamping its 

approach to the census, it faces considerable challenges and 

uncertainties in implementing key cost-saving innovations and ensuring 

they function under operational conditions; managing the development 

and testing of its IT systems; ensuring the cybersecurity of its systems 

and data; and developing a quality cost estimate for the 2020 Census and 

preventing further cost increases. For these reasons, the 2020 Census is 

a GAO high-risk area.

Going forward, continued management attention and oversight will be 

vital for ensuring that risks are managed, preparations stay on track, and 

the Bureau is held accountable for implementing the enumeration, as 

planned. Without timely and appropriate actions, the challenges 

previously discussed could adversely affect the cost, accuracy, schedule, 

and security of the enumeration. We will continue to assess the Bureau’s 

efforts and look forward to keeping Congress informed of the Bureau’s 

progress.
Page 42 GAO-19-588T 2020 Census

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Peters, and Members of the 

Committee, this completes our prepared statement. We would be pleased 

to respond to any questions that you may have.

If you have any questions about this statement, please contact Robert 

Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or by email at goldenkoffr@gao.gov or Nick 

Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or by email at marinosn@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this statement. Other key contributors to this 

testimony include Ty Mitchell (Assistant Director); Lisa Pearson (Assistant 

Director); Jon Ticehurst (Assistant Director); Emmy Rhine Paule (Analyst 

in Charge); Christopher Businsky; Jackie Chapin; Jeff DeMarco; Rebecca 

Eyler; Adella Francis; Scott Pettis; Lindsey Pilver; Kayla Robinson; Robert 

Robinson; Cindy Saunders; Sejal Sheth; Kevin R. Smith; Andrea 

Starosciak; and Umesh Thakkar.

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

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