MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2021 ME 12

Docket: Pen-20-18

Argued: February	10,	2021

Decided: March	16,	2021

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

PHILIP	L.	CLARK

JABAR,	J.

[¶1]	 Philip	 L.	 Clark	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 conviction	 for	

intentional	 or	 knowing	 murder,	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 201(1)(A) (2020),	 entered in	

the	 Unified	 Criminal	 Docket (Penobscot	 County,	 Stokes,	 J.)	 following a	 jury	

trial.	 He contends that	the	court	erred	in	refusing	to	instruct	the	jury	on	the	

affirmative	 defense	 of	 adequate	 provocation,	 as	 set	 forth	 in 17-A M.R.S.	

§ 201(3)	(2020). He also	contends that	the	court	erred	in	denying	his	motion	

to	 suppress	 multiple	 confessions	 and	 abused	 its	 discretion	 by	 denying	 his	

motion	to	recuse	the	presiding	Justice.1 We	affirm	the	judgment	and	sentence.

1		He also	contends	the	court	abused	its	discretion	when	setting	his final	sentence	and	violated	

the	constitution	by	not	setting	his	basic	sentence	at	or	near	the	mandatory	minimum	of	twenty-five	

years.		We	do	not	find	these	arguments	persuasive	and	do	not	discuss	them	further.
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I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		Viewing	 the	evidence	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	State,	 the	

jury	 rationally	 could	 have	 found	 the	 following	 facts	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	

doubt.	 	 See	 State	 v.	 Ouellette,	 2019	 ME	 75,	 ¶	 11,	 208	 A.3d	 399.	 On	 July	 11,	

2018,	 Philip	 L.	 Clark	 fired	 several	 shots	 at	 his	 sister-in-law, Renee	 Clark,	

stopped	to	reload,	and	continued	to	 fire	his	gun	until	Renee	stopped	moving.		

Renee,	who	was	forty-nine years	old	at	the	time	of	her	death,	was	involved	in	

a	contentious	divorce	with	her	husband and	Philip’s	brother, Frank	Clark.		

[¶3]	 	The	 shooting took	 place	 in	 a	 former	 convenience	 store	 that	 had	

been	converted	into	adjoining	apartments	on	Kennebec	Road	in	Hampden.		On	

the	first	floor,	Renee	and	Frank	lived	in	one	apartment	and	Philip	lived	in	the	

other	apartment.		

[¶4]	 	 In	 April	 2018,	 as	 the	 marriage	 between	 Frank	 and	 Renee	 was	

coming	 to	 a	 contentious	 end,	 Renee	 moved	 out	 of	 the	 Kennebec	 Road	

apartment	 and	 into	 a	 home	 in	 Etna2 with	 her	 friend,	 a	 priest.	 	 On	 June	 15,	

2018,	 Renee	 obtained a	 temporary	 order	 for	 protection	 from	 abuse	 order	

against	Frank. The	order	required	Frank	 to	move	out	of	 the	Kennebec	Road	

2	 	After	 moving	 into	 the	 home	 in	 Etna,	 Renee	 did	 not	 sleep	 at	 the	 Kennebec	 Road	 apartment	

again	 because	 “the	 fear	 she	 had	 of	 [Frank]	 and	 Phil	 was	 paralyzing,”	 although	 she	 went	 to	 the	

Kennebec	Road	apartment	frequently	to	retrieve	her	property.		
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apartment.	 	 Because the	 order	 did	 not	 apply	 to	 Philip,	 he	 was	 allowed	 to	

remain	in	 his	apartment.	 	On	 the	 same	 day	 the	 protection	 order	was	issued,	

Renee	 and	the	 priest went	 to	 the	 Kennebec	 Road	 property	 to	 retrieve	 what	

Renee	 believed	 to	 be	 marital	 assets	 and	 found	 that	 various	 items,	 including	

her	 computer, were	 missing.	 	 Philip	 later	 entered	 a	 storage	 area	 of	 the	

apartment	and	saw	that	his	work	tools	were	missing.		Philip	called	the	police	

to	report	his	tools	missing, and	when	the	police	arrived, Renee	informed	them	

that	Philip	was	trespassing. The	officer	charged	Philip	with	criminal	trespass	

and	this	upset	Philip.		

[¶5]		Renee	was	 fearful	of	Frank	and	Philip. As	a	 result,	she pushed	a	

rack	in	front	of	a	door	that	led	from	Philip’s	apartment	to	hers and	she	put	up	

no-trespassing	 signs.		On	 the	day	 of	 the	murder, Frank	dropped	Philip	 off	at	

the	Kennebec	Road	property	while	Renee	and	the	priest were	in	their	cars	in	

the	driveway.		Philip	and	the	priest got	into	a	heated	argument, and	a	physical	

fight	ensued	over	Philip’s	missing	work	 tools	and	Renee’s	missing	computer.		

The	 police	 were	 called, with	 each	 party blaming	 the	 other	 for	 starting	 the	

fight.		Because	of	the	conflicting	statements, neither	Philip	nor	the	priest was

charged.		The	priest inflicted	several	injuries	on Philip, including	a	broken	rib,	

a	contusion	near	his	kidney,	and	a	cut	on	his	forehead.		
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[¶6]	 	 Renee	 left	 the	 apartment	 after	 the	 fight	 but	 returned	 later	 that	

night	 to	 remove	 a	 license	 plate	 from	 a	 Jeep	 she	 owned	 with	 Frank.	 	 Renee	

began	 talking	 to	 her	 mother	 on	 the	 telephone in	 her	 apartment.	 	 Philip	

claimed	that	because	of	the	thin	walls	in	the	apartment	building, he	could	hear	

Renee	laughing	about	his fight	with	the	priest during	her	phone	call	and	as	a	

result	he	became	enraged.		Philip	then	went	into	Renee’s	side	of	the	apartment	

building,	carrying	a	gun, and	asked	Renee	if	she	thought	it	was	funny	that	he	

had	been	beaten	up;	she	replied	that	she	thought	it	was	hilarious.		Philip	then	

shot	Renee	multiple	times,	reloaded	his	gun,	and	continued	to	shoot	her until	

she	was	dead.

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[¶7]		The	day	after	her	death, Renee’s	mother	called	the	police	because	

she	 could	 not	 reach	 her	 daughter.	 	 An	 officer	 went	 to the	 Kennebec	 Road	

property	and	knocked	on	 the	doors	with	no	response.		The	police	attempted	

for	 hours	 to	 contact	 anyone	 in	 the	 Kennebec	 Road	 property.	 	 From	

approximately	4:52 p.m. until	Philip	finally	came	out	at	12:45 a.m.,	the	police,	

with	the	assistance	of	the	Maine	State	Police	Major	Crimes	Unit,	attempted to	

contact	Renee	or	Philip	by	knocking on	the	windows	and	doors.		In	the	early	

3	 	 Philip	 cleaned	 up	 the	 crime	 scene,	 wrapped	 her	 body	 and	 bloody	 bed	 sheets	 in	 plastic,	

collected	 the	shell	casings,	and	 then	went	 to	sleep.		The	 following	day,	 July	12,	2018,	Philip	drove	

Renee’s	car	to	the	Airport	Mall	in	Bangor,	left	it	in	the	parking	lot,	threw	her	keys	into	the	river,	and	

took	a	bus	home.		As	he	was	walking	to	the	bus	station	he	thought	about	turning	himself	in	at	the	

jail, but he instead	went	home	to	sleep.		
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morning	of	 July	13,	2018,	at	about	12:45 a.m.,	Philip	answered	 the	door	and	

told	the	local	officer	at	the	door, “You	know	I	killed	her	so	.	.	.	.”		A	State	Police	

detective	heard	him	 say	 that,	approached	him,	and	asked	him	 to	accompany	

him	to	the	Hampden	Police	Department	to	be	interviewed.		

[¶8]		At	the	police	station,	Philip	confessed	to	killing	Renee.		He	said	that	

he	was	in	a	rage	and	that	she	pushed	all	his	buttons.		He	told	the	police	where	

Renee’s	body	was	and	said	that	he	had	put	the	gun	in	a	safe	after	the	shooting.

Officers	 went	 inside	 Renee’s	 apartment	 and	 found	 her	 body	 exactly	 where

Philip	had	described.		Her	body	was	taken	to	the	Medical	Examiner’s	Office	for	

an	 autopsy,	 which	 determined	 that	 the	 cause	 of	 Renee’s	 death	 was	multiple	

gunshot	wounds.	

II.	 PROCEDURAL	HISTORY

[¶9]		On	July	26,	2018,	Philip	was	charged	with	one	count	of	intentional	

or	 knowing	 murder,	 in	 violation	 of	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 201(1)(A).	 	 After	 being	

indicted	by	the	Penobscot	County	Grand Jury, Philip	pleaded	not	guilty	to	the	

charge.		

[¶10]	 	 On	 February	 12,	 2019,	 Philip	 filed	 a	 motion	 to	 suppress	 his	

confession	 to	 law	 enforcement.	 	 Specifically,	 Philip	 sought	 to	 suppress	

statements	 he	 made	 to	 the	 police	 at	 his	 residence	 in	 Hampden,	 during	 the	
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early	 hours	 of	 July	 13,	 2018,	as	well	as	 his	 post-Miranda statements	 that	 he	

made	at	the	station	later	that	day.		A	two-day	testimonial	hearing	was held	on	

the	 motion.	 	 The	 court (Penobscot	 County,	 Anderson,	 J.)	 denied	 the	 motion.		

The	 court	 found	 that	 Philip	 was	 not	 in	 custody	 at	 the	 time	 he	 made	 his	

statements	 to	 police	 upon	 exiting	 the	 home	in	 the	 early	morning	 of	 July	 13,	

2018,	 and	 that	 the	 statements	 were	 voluntary	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt.	

The	 court	 further	 found	 that	 Philip’s	 statements	 and	 confession	 to	 law	

enforcement	at	 the	police	station	on	 July	13,	2018,	were	voluntary	beyond	a	

reasonable	 doubt	 and	 that	 the	 State	 proved	 by	 a	 preponderance	 of	 the	

evidence	that	Philip	knowingly	and	intelligently	waived	his	Miranda rights.		

[¶11]	 	Between	November	 12	 and	 14,	 2019,	the	 court	 (Stokes,	J.) held	

jury	selection for	Philip’s	trial.		On	the	first	day	of	jury	selection, the	trial	judge

informed	 the parties	 that	he	knew	one	of	 the	witnesses,	the	priest.		The	 trial	

judge stated	that	he	was	not	friends	with the	priest but	had	met	him three	to	

four	years	earlier when	the	priest was	a	seminarian	at	an Augusta	church	for	

the summer.		The	trial	judge was	a	lector	in	that	church	at	the	time	and	stated	

that	they	had	conversations	three	times,	ranging	from a	discussion	of	the	trial	

judge’s work	as	mayor	of	Augusta	 to	a	discussion	of	growing	up	in	 the	same	

part	 of	Massachusetts.		Additionally,	the	 trial	judge disclosed	that	during	his	
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prior	prosecutorial	career with	 the	Attorney	General’s	office, he	had	worked	

with	 the	prosecutors	in	 the	case	and	 that	he	had	hired	and	supervised	 them.		

Philip	asked	the	trial	judge to	recuse	himself	because	of	his prior	relationship	

with	 the	 prosecutors	 and	 his prior	 relationship	 with the	 priest,	 whom the	

defense	described as	 “central	 to	and,	simultaneously,	hostile	 to	 the	defense.”		

The	trial	judge denied	the	recusal	request.		

[¶12]	 	 At	 trial,	 Philip	 tried	 to	 establish	 the defense	 of	 adequate	

provocation to	 obtain	 a	 conviction	 for	 manslaughter	 rather	 than murder.

Philip	called	the	priest as	a	witness	in	an	attempt	to	demonstrate that	he had	

been	provoked by	a	pattern	of	conduct	that	the	priest and	Renee	had	engaged	

in	over	the	weeks preceding	the	killing.		Philip	also	called	as	a	witness	a	doctor

who	 opined that,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 shooting, Philip	 was	 in	 a	 state	 of	

hyperarousal	and	 had	a	 concussion	 from	 his	 fight	with	the	priest.	 	Based	 on

this	testimony	and	the	events	leading	up	to	the	murder,	including	the	beating	

that	 Philip	 suffered	 from	 the	 priest,	 Philip	 requested	 a jury	 instruction on	

adequate	 provocation,	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 201(3),	 which	 the	 court	 denied.	 	 The	

court	determined	that	the	evidence	did	not	generate	the	affirmative	defense of	

adequate	provocation.		Following	a	seven-day	jury	trial, the	jury	returned	its	

verdict	finding	Philip	guilty	of	murder.		
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[¶13]		On	January	7,	2020,	the	court imposed	a	forty-three-year	term	of	

imprisonment.		

[¶14]	 	 On	 January	 8,	 2020,	 Philip	 filed	 a	 notice	 of	 appeal	 from	 the	

conviction	pursuant	 to	M.R.	App.	 P.	 2(b)(1) and	15	M.R.S.	 §	 2115	 (2020),	as	

well	 as	 a	 separate	 application	 to	 appeal	 his	 sentence	 pursuant	 to	 M.R.	

App. P. 20 and	 15	 M.R.S.	 § 2151 (2020).	 	 On	 March	 6,	 2020,	 the	 Sentence	

Review	Panel	issued	an	order	granting	the	application	for	leave	to	appeal	the	

sentence. See State	v.	Clark,	No.	SRP	20-19 (Me.	Sent.	Rev.	Panel	Mar. 6,	2020).

III.		DISCUSSION

A. Adequate	Provocation	Jury	Instruction

[¶15] Philip contends that	 the	 court	 erred	 in	 refusing	 to	 instruct	 the	

jury	on	the	affirmative	defense	of	adequate	provocation.	 17-A	M.R.S.	§	201(3).

He	asserts	that	Renee’s	provocation	of	him	was	two-fold:	her	mistreatment	of	

him	and	her	laughing	on	the	phone	just	prior	to	the	shooting.	

[¶16]		“We review	jury	instructions	as	a	whole	for	prejudicial	error,	and	

to	 ensure	 that	 they	 informed	 the	 jury	 correctly	 and	 fairly	 in	 all	 necessary	

respects	of	 the	governing	law.”		State	v.	Tucker,	2015	ME	68,	¶	11,	117	A.3d	

595 (quotation	marks	omitted).		Because the	claimed	error	here	is	the	denial

of	 a	 particular	 instruction on adequate	 provocation,	 we will	 vacate	 the	
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judgment	 only	“if	 the	 appellant	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 requested	instruction	

(1) stated	 the	law	 correctly;	 (2)	was	generated	 by	 the	evidence;	 (3)	was	 not	

misleading	 or	 confusing;	 and	 (4)	 was	 not	 sufficiently	 covered	 in	 the	

instructions	 the	 court	 gave.	 	 In	 addition,	 the	 court’s	 refusal	 to	 give	 the	

requested	 instruction	 must	 have	 been	 prejudicial	 to	 the	 requesting	 party.”		

State	v.	Hanaman,	2012	ME	40, ¶ 16,	38	A.3d	1278	(citation	omitted).		

[¶17]		Title	17-A	M.R.S.	§	201 (2020) provides, in	relevant	part,

3.	 [I]t	 is	 an	 affirmative	 defense	 to	 a	 prosecution	 under	

subsection	 1,	 paragraph	 A	 [i.e.,	 intentional	 or knowing	 murder]	

that	 the	 person causes	 the	 death	 while	 under	 the	 influence	 of	

extreme	 anger	 or	 extreme	 fear	 brought	 about	 by	 adequate	

provocation.	

4.	[F]or	 purposes	 of	 subsection	 3,	 provocation	is	 adequate	

if:	

A. It	is	not	induced	by	the	person; and	

B. It	is	reasonable	for	the	person to	react	to	the	provocation	

with	 extreme	 anger	 or	 extreme	 fear,	 provided	 that	 evidence	

demonstrating	 only	 that	 the	 actor	 has	 a	 tendency	 towards	

extreme	anger	or	extreme	fear	is	not sufficient,	in	and	of	itself,	to	

establish	the	reasonableness	of	the	person’s reaction.	

Because	it	is	an	affirmative	defense,	adequate	provocation	“must	be	proved	by	

the	 defendant	 by	 a	 preponderance	 of	 the	 evidence.”	 	 17-A	 M.R.S	 § 101(2)	

(2020).	
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[¶18]		To	determine	if	the	affirmative	defense	of	adequate	provocation	

is	generated by	the	evidence,	we	have said,

“[I]t	is	 the	 [trial]	court,	in	 the	 first	instance,	 that	must	determine	

whether	the	evidence	is	legally	sufficient	to	generate	the	adequate	

provocation	 manslaughter	 defense.	 	 Viewing the evidence in a

light most favorable to the defendant, the court must determine as

a question of law whether there is any evidence from which the

jury could find provocation and other elements that would reduce

the offense to manslaughter.	 	 The test for measuring the

sufficiency of the evidence is whether a jury could rationally have

found that the defense was established by a preponderance of the

evidence.” A court makes that determination in light of [this

Court’s] observation that “[t]here are few instances when we have

recognized conduct as being sufficient to engender extreme anger

or fear and mitigate the conduct of a defendant.” That	 is	 so,	 in	

part,	because	 the	 victim’s	provocation	must	be	“of	 such	a	nature	

that	 [the	 defendant’s]	 reaction	 to	 it	 with	 extreme	 anger	 or	

extreme	fear	was	objectively	reasonable.”

State	v.	Kimball,	2016	ME	75,	¶	10,	139	A.3d	914	(quoting Hanaman,	2012	ME	

40, ¶¶	18,	20,	23,	38	A.3d	1278).		In	this	case,	Philip states	that	the	moment	of	

provocation	 that	 we should	 focus	 on is	 “when	 Renee	 returned	 to	 her	

apartment	 and	 began	 loudly	 joking	 about	 a	 priest	 assaulting	 Philip.”	 	 Philip

further	contends	that	if	there	“is	any	evidence	by	which	a	jury	could	conclude	

that	 Renee	 herself	 induced	 the	 confrontation,	 then	 the	 defense	 would be	

allowed.”		

[¶19]	 	 Here,	 Philip was	 upset	 with	 Renee	 about	 missing	 tools,	 the	

removal	of	his	brother	from	the	property,	the fight	Philip had	with	the	priest,	
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and	 Renee	 laughing	 on	 the	 phone	 in	 her	 apartment.	 	 Knowing	 that	 he	 was

upset	about	these	issues	with	Renee,	Philip armed himself	and	trespassed into	

Renee’s	apartment.		In	the	apartment, Philip	asked	Renee if	she	thought	it	was	

funny	 that	 he	 had	 been	 beaten	 up,	 inducing	 Renee’s comment,	 “I	 think	 it’s	

hilarious	 [that	 the	 priest	 beat	 you up],”	 which	 caused	 him	 to	 shoot	 Renee,	

reload,	and	shoot	her	until	she	stopped	moving.		

[¶20]		“[I]t	is	well-settled	that	‘mere	words’	will	not	suffice” to	engender	

extreme	 anger	 or	 fear	 and	 mitigate	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	 defendant.	 	 State	 v.	

Cumming,	634	A.2d 953,	957	(Me.	1993)	(quoting	State	v.	Michaud,	611	A.2d	

61,	63 (Me.	1992))	(stating	that	provocation	must	be	so	close	in	time	that	the

heat	 of	 passion	had	 not cooled); see	 also State	 v.	Warmke,	 2005	ME	 99,	 879	

A.2d	30	 (upholding	the	denial	of	an	adequate	provocation	instruction	where	

there	was	evidence	that	the	defendant	went	to	the	property	of	the	victim	and	

shot	 her	 because	 of	 prior	 verbal	 mistreatment	 by	 her	 and	 a	 smirk	 at	 the	

defendant just	prior	to	the	shooting); see	also State	v.	Lockhart,	2003	ME	108,	

¶	 42,	 830	 A.2d	 433	 (explaining	 that evidence	 of a	 heated	 argument	 with	 a	

victim,	 during	 which	 the	 victim	 was	 slapping	 and	 hitting	 defendant,	 was	

insufficient	to	generate	an adequate	provocation	instruction).	
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[¶21]	 	 Philip “had	 the	 burden	 of	 proving	 that	 he	 did	 not	 instigate	 or	

create	the	event	that	ultimately	provoked	him	to	commit	the	crime.”		State	v.	

Pulsifer,	 1999	 ME	 24,	 ¶ 15,	 724	 A.2d	 1234.	 Here,	 the	 trial	 court	 correctly	

determined	 that	 the	 evidence	 did	 not	 generate	 the	 issue	 of adequate	

provocation.		The	court	found	that	Philip induced	the	provocation	that	Philip	

claimed	led to	 the	killing	 “by	going	next	door	 to	confront	her	about	what	he	

believed	was	her	laughing”	at	him	on	the	phone.		

[¶22]		Furthermore,	the	missing	work	tools	and	the fight	with	the	priest	

hours	 before	 the	 shooting	do not	 contribute	 to	 bringing Renee’s laughing	in	

her	 own	 apartment to	 the	 level	 where	 it was “of	 such	 a	 nature	 that	 [the	

defendant’s]	reaction	to	it	with	extreme	anger	or	extreme	fear	was	objectively	

reasonable.”	 Hanaman,	2012	ME	40, ¶	20,	38	A.3d	1278.

[¶23]	 	 The	 trial	 court	 did	 not	 err	 in	 determining	 that,	 based	 on	 the	

evidence	 at	 trial,	 a	 jury	 could	 not	 rationally	 have	 found	 that	 the	 affirmative	

defense	was	established	by	a	preponderance	of	 the	evidence. Therefore,	we	

conclude	 that	the	 court	 was	 correct	 in	 holding	 that the	 jury	 instruction	 for

adequate	provocation	was	not	generated by	the	evidence.
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B. Motion	to	Suppress4

[¶24]	 	 Philip	 contends	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 by	 denying	 his	 motion	 to	

suppress	the statements	that	he	made	to	law	enforcement	at	his	residence on	

the	grounds	that the	statements	were	not	voluntary	and	were	obtained	while	

he	was	in	custody	but	had not	been	read	Miranda rights. He	contends	that	he	

was	in	custody	and	that	the	statements	were	involuntary	due	 to	 the lengthy	

police	 presence	 outside	 his	 home.	 	 Additionally,	 Philip	 contends	 that	 his	

involuntary	 statements	 to	 the	 police	 at	 his	 residence	irreparably	 tainted	 his	

confession	and	that this taint	cannot	be	removed	by	later	Miranda warnings	at	

the	police	station.		

[¶25]	 	 We apply a	 two-tiered standard	 of	 review	 to	 examine	 a	 trial	

court’s	 denial	 of	 a	 motion	 to	 suppress: “the	 court’s	 factual	 findings	 are	

reviewed	 for	 clear	 error	 and	 its	 application	 of	 legal	 principles	 to	 those	

findings	is	reviewed	de	novo.”		State	v.	Bryant,	2014	ME	94,	¶	15,	97	A.3d	595;	

see	also State	v.	Lavoie,	2010	ME	76,	¶	13,	1	A.3d	408	(stating	 that	when the	

4	 	Philip also	 contends	 that	 the	 court	abused	its	 discretion	 by	 denying	 his	motion	in	limine	 to	

exclude,	 as	 unfairly	 prejudicial,	 his	 own	 characterization,	 during	 his	 confession	 to	 police,	 of	 the	

shooting	as	a	“murder.”		We	review	the	trial	court’s	admission of	evidence	over	a	Rule	403	objection	

for	an	abuse	of	discretion.		See	State	v.	Michaud,	2017	ME	170,	¶	8,	168	A.3d	802;	M.R.	Evid.	403.		

Philip’s	statement	to the police	was	strongly	probative	of	his	state	of	mind	as	Philip was	explaining	

that he	did	not	attempt	to	cover	up	the	body	because	right	after	the	shooting	he	knew	he	was	not	

going	 to	 get	 away	 with	murder.	 	We	 conclude	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 did	 not	 abuse	its	 discretion	in	

admitting	Philip’s	characterization	of	his	shooting of Renee	as	murder.
14

court’s	 factual	 findings	 are	 undisputed, a	 challenge	 to	 the	 application	 of	

constitutional	protections	 to	 those facts	is	a	matter	of	law	 that we review	de	

novo). We “will	 uphold	 the	 court’s	 denial	 of	 a	 motion	 to	 suppress	 if	 any	

reasonable	view	of	 the	evidence	supports	 the	 trial	court’s	decision.”		State	v.	

Diana,	2014	ME	45,	¶	11,	89	A.3d	132 (quotation	marks	omitted).	

1. Custody

[¶26]		Philip	first	contends that	the	six	hours	of	intense	police	presence	

outside	 his	 home	 prior	 to	 when	 he	 exited his	 residence	 and	 confessed

rendered	him in	custody.		“The	determination	of	whether	an	individual	was	in	

custody	is	a	mixed	question	of	fact	and	law.” State	v.	Lowe,	2013	ME	92,	¶	13,	

81	 A.3d	 360 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 In	 reviewing	 a	 court’s	 custody	

determination,	we defer	to	the	trial	court’s	factual	determinations	but	review	

de	novo	 the	determination	of	whether	an	individual	was	in	custody.		State v.

Jones, 2012 ME 126, ¶ 21, 55 A.3d 432.

[¶27]		To	determine	if	a	person was	“in	custody” for Miranda purposes,	

“a	 court must	 objectively	 review	 the	 pertinent	 circumstances	 to	 decide	

whether	a	reasonable	person	in	the	defendant’s	position	would	have	felt	free	

to	terminate	the	interaction	with	law	enforcement	or	if	there	was	a	restraint	

on	freedom	of	movement	of	the	degree	associated	with	formal	arrest.”		State	v.	
15

Perry,	 2017	 ME	 74,	 ¶	 15,	 159	 A.3d	 840 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 In	

conducting	this	analysis,	the	court considers a	number	of	factors.5 Id.	

[¶28]		Here,	 the	court (Anderson,	J.)	 found	 that	while	 there	were	a	few	

circumstances	present	that	could	weigh	in	favor	of	custody,	there	were	many

factors	 that suggested	 that	 Philip	 was	 not	 in custody.	 	 The	 factors	 that	 the	

court	 found	 weighed against	 a	 finding	 that	 he	 was	 in	 custody	 included that

(1) Philip made	the	statements	in	a	familiar	location,	on	the	front	steps	of	his	

residence;	(2)	the	officers	never	made	any	indication	 that	 they	had	probable	

cause	 to	 arrest	 Philip, and they	 had	 no	 reason	 to	 know	 that	 they	 would	

ultimately	 obtain	 probable	 cause	 to	 arrest	 him;	 (3)	 there	 was	 no	 physical	

restraint;	(4) it	was	Philip,	upon	his	own	volition, who	exited	the	building;	and	

(5)	 the	 officers	 were	 nonconfrontational,	 compassionate,	 and	 polite	 with	

Philip when	 he	 admitted	 to	 shooting	 Renee.	 	 The	 court	 also	 found that	 the	

police	 presence	 was	 not	 without	 context. Philip	 had	 been	 involved	 in	 a	

5	 	The	 factors	include	 “(1)	 the	locale	where	 the	 defendant	made	 the	 statements;	 (2)	 the	 party	

who	 initiated	 the	 contact;	 (3)	 the	 existence	 or	 non-existence	 of	 probable	 cause	 to	 arrest	 (to	 the	

extent	 communicated	 to	 the	 defendant);	 (4)	 subjective	 views,	 beliefs,	 or	 intent	 that	 the	 police	

manifested	 to	 the	 defendant,	 to	 the	 extent	 they	 would	 affect	 how	 a	 reasonable	 person	 in	 the	

defendant’s	position	would	perceive	his	or	her	freedom	to	leave;	(5)	subjective	views	or	beliefs	that	

the	 defendant	 manifested to	 the	 police,	 to	 the	 extent	 the	 officer’s	 response	 would	 affect	 how	 a	

reasonable	person	in	the	defendant’s	position	would	perceive	his	or	her	 freedom	to	leave;	(6)	the	

focus	 of	 the	investigation	 (as	a	 reasonable	 person	in	 the	 defendant’s	 position	would	 perceive	it);	

(7) whether	 the	 suspect	 was	 questioned	 in	 familiar	 surroundings;	 (8)	 the	 number	 of	 law	

enforcement	 officers	 present;	(9) the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect; and

(10) the duration and character of the interrogation.”		State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d

1222.
16

serious	physical	altercation with	the	priest the	previous	day, and	the	officers	

wanted	 to	make	 sure	that	he	was	 okay.	 	Additionally,	 the	 officers	wanted	 to	

locate	 Renee,	 not	 having	 any reason	 to	 believe	that	 she	 was	 dead,	 let	 alone	

that	Philip	was	responsible	for	her	death.		

[¶29]	 	 The	 mere	 fact	 that	 there	 were	 multiple	 officers	 attempting	 to	

conduct	a	well-being	check	of	Philip	and	Renee	did	not	mean	that	Philip	was	

“in	 custody”	 for	Miranda purposes.	 	See,	 e.g.,	State	 v.	 Leonard,	 2002	ME	 125,	

¶¶ 9, 10,	 802	 A.2d	 991	 (affirming	 the	 finding	 that	 the	 defendant	 was	 not	in

custody	where	the	police	were	looking	for	the	defendant	at	his	home	because	

they	 had	 reason	 to	 believe	 he	 had	 committed	 a	 crime,	 many	 officers	 were	

present,	 and	 an	 armed	 standoff	 occurred);	see also State	 v.	 Powell,	640	 A.2d	

209,	210-211	(Me.	1994)	(affirming	the	finding	that	the	defendant	was	not	in

custody	when	multiple	officers	questioned	defendant	while	executing	a	search	

warrant).		The	court	did	not	err	in	concluding	 that	Philip was	not	in	custody	

when	 he	 confessed	 to	 killing	Renee	 outside	 his	 own	 residence.	 Because	 the	

court	properly	determined	 that	Philip	was	not	in	custody,	 the	determination	

of	 whether	 follow-up	 questions asked	 by	 the	 police	 at	 his	 residence	 after	

Philip	 confessed	 amounted	 to	 interrogation is	 not	 necessary.	 	 State	 v.	

Holloway,	 2000	ME	 172,	 ¶	 13,	 760	A.2d	 223	 (stating	that	Miranda warnings	
17

are	 required	 only	 when	 a	 defendant	 is	 both	 in	 custody	 and	 subject	 to	

interrogation).

2. Voluntariness

[¶30]	 	 Philip	 next	 contends that	 his	 statements	 to	 police	 should	 have	

been	suppressed	because	they	were	not	voluntary.

[¶31]	 	 When	 a confession	 is	 not	 “forced”	 out	 of	 a defendant, the	

confession	will	be	examined	to	determine	whether	the	defendant’s	statements	

“were	 free	 and	 voluntary	 or	 whether,	 considering	 the	 totality	 of	 the	

circumstances	under	which	the	statements	were	made,	their	admission	would	

be	fundamentally	unfair,”	in	violation	of	due	process.	 State	v.	Hunt,	2016	ME	

172,	¶	19,	151	A.3d	911.

[¶32]		We	have determined	that

[t]he	voluntariness	requirement	gives	effect	 to	 three	overlapping	

but	 conceptually	 distinct	 values:	 (1)	it	 discourages	 objectionable	

police	 practices;	 (2)	 it	 protects	 the	 mental	 freedom	 of	 the	

individual;	and	 (3)	it	preserves	a	quality	of	 fundamental	 fairness	

in	the	criminal	justice	system.

Id. ¶	 20.	 	 Courts	 consider	 the	 totality	 of	 the	 circumstances	 in	 making	 a	

voluntariness	determination,	including	the	following	factors:

[t]he	 details	 of	 the	 interrogation;	 duration	 of	 the	 interrogation;	

location	 of	 the	 interrogation;	 whether	 the	 interrogation	 was	

custodial;	 the	 recitation	 of	 Miranda warnings;	 the	 number	 of	

officers	 involved;	 the	 persistence	 of	 the	 officers;	 police	 trickery;	
18

threats,	promises	or	inducements	made	to	the	defendant;	and	the	

defendant’s	 age,	 physical	 and	 mental	 health,	 emotional	 stability,	

and	conduct.

State v.	George,	2012	ME	64,	¶	21,	52	A.3d	903	(quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶33]		Here,	 the	court	concluded beyond	a	reasonable	doubt, based	on

the	 totality	 of	 the	 circumstances, that	Philip’s	 statements	 to	 the	 police	 were	

voluntary.6	 	 The	 court	 found	 that	 although	 Philip’s	 physical	 health	 was	

somewhat	diminished	as	a	result	of	the	 fight	with	the	priest,	the	court	 found	

there	 was	 no	 indication	 that	 his	 mental	 health	 was	 actually	 diminished.		

Additionally,	 the	 court	 found	 that	 the	 actions	 Philip took	 before the	 police	

arrived	demonstrated that his conduct,	including cleaning	up	the	crime	scene

and	 getting	 a	 full	 night’s	 sleep	 before	 driving	 Renee’s	 car	 to	 Bangor,	 was	

deliberate.

[¶34]		We review	the	trial	court’s	 factual	determinations	on	a	question	

of	voluntariness for	clear	error.		Bryant,	2014	ME	94,	¶	15,	97	A.3d	595.		“Clear	

error	exists	if	a	finding	is	unsupported	by	competent	evidence	in	the	record.”		

Boyd	v.	Manter,	2018	ME	25,	¶	9,	179	A.3d	906.		Here,	the	trial	court’s	finding	

6	 	The	 court	 focused	 on	Philip’s interaction	with	 police	 on	 his	 doorstep	 and	 found	 that	it	was	

brief;	it	was	 not	 custodial;	 the	 police	 did	 not	engage	in	any	 trickery;	 the	 police	were	 cordial;	 the	

police	were	 there	 to	check	on	Philip’s	well-being	due	 to	his	altercation	with	 the	priest;	and	Philip

appeared	emotionally	stable	during	his	interaction	with	police.		
19

that	Philip’s	 statements	 were	 voluntary	 is	 supported	 by the	 evidence	 of	 the	

voluntary	nature	of	his	actions	after	the	shooting.

[¶35]		We	conclude that	 the	 trial	court	did	not	err	in	determining	 that	

Philip’s	statements	were	voluntary.

C. Recusal

[¶36]	 	 Philip contends that	 the	 trial	 court	 abused	 its	 discretion	 by	

denying	his	motion	to	recuse	based	on	the	trial	court’s	prior	relationship	with	

the	prosecutors	in	the	case	and with a	witness.	

[¶37]	 	 We review	 the	 decision	 on	 a	 motion	 to	 recuse	 for	 abuse	 of	

discretion,	 because	 “the	 trial	 court’s	 decision	 to	 recuse	 is	 within	 its	 sound	

discretion.”		Yarcheski	v.	P&K	Sand	&	Gravel,	 Inc.,	2015	ME	71,	¶	7,	117	A.3d	

1047 (quotation	marks	omitted).	 “[A] judge	is	as	much	obliged	not	to	recuse	

himself	 when	 it	 is	 not	 called	 for	 as	 he	 is	 obliged	 to	 when	 it	 is.”	 	 State	 v.	

Dechaine,	 2015	 ME	 88,	 ¶	 44,	 121	 A.3d	 76 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).		

Pursuant	 to	 the	Maine	Code	of	 Judicial	Conduct, a	judge	must	recuse	himself	

on	 a	 motion	 made	 by	 any	 party	 if	 his	 “impartiality	 might	 reasonably	 be	

questioned”	 or	if	 he	 has	 a	 “personal	 bias	 or	 prejudice	 concerning	 a	 party	 or	

personal	knowledge	of	disputed	evidentiary	facts	concerning	the	proceeding.”		
20

DeCambra	v.	Carson,	2008	ME	127,	¶	8,	953	A.2d	1163;	see	also	M.	Code	 Jud.	

Conduct	R.	2.11.	

[¶38]	 	 Here,	 before	 jury	 selection	 began,	 the	 trial	 judge promptly	

disclosed	 to	 the	 parties	 all	 facts	 known	 to	 him	 that	 were	 relevant	 to	 the	

question	of	impartiality, stating	that	(1)	he	had	worked	with,	and	had	been	the	

supervisor	 of,	 the	 prosecutors	 in	 the	 case	 prior	 to	 being	 appointed	 to	 the	

bench	in	2014,	and	(2)	he	knew	a	witness because	three	to	four	years	prior	to	

the	 trial,	 the	 witness had	 been a	 seminarian	 intern for	 one	 summer	 at	 the	

church	that	the	trial	judge attended, and	during	that	summer	he had	roughly	

three	 conversations	 with	 him.	 	 The	 judge stated,	 “I	 have	 no	 concerns	

whatsoever	that	that	would	affect	my	ability	to	be	fair,	impartial,	and	objective	

in	this	case.”		

[¶39]	 	 Regarding	 the	 prosecutors,	 the	 trial	 judge stated, “[I]t’s	 not	 a	

problem	 for	me.	 I	don’t	 feel	in	any	way,	shape	or	 form	 that	 [the	prior	work	

relationship]	impacts	my	ability	to	be	fair	and	impartial	in	this	case.”		

[¶40]		As	a	result	of	these	disclosures,	on	the	following	day,	Philip asked	

the	trial	judge to	recuse	himself.		The	court	denied	the	motion	and	confirmed	

that	 none	 of	 the	 standards	 of	 the	Maine	 Code	 of	 Judicial	 Conduct	 Rule	 2.11,	

pertaining	to	recusal, required	his	recusal.		The	court	further	stated, “[I]t’s	an	
21

abuse	of	discretion	for	 the	Court	 to	 recuse	itself	when	 there’s no	basis	 for	it	

. . . . I	just	don’t	see	the	basis	for	it.”		

[¶41]	 	 A	 party’s “mere	 belief”	 that	 a	 judge	 might	 not	 be	 completely	

impartial	is	insufficient	to	warrant	recusal	if	the	judge	believes	that	he	can	act	

with	complete	impartiality.		Johnson	v.	Amica	Mut.	Ins.	Co.,	1999	ME	106,	¶	11	

n.1,	733	A.2d	977.		Looking	at	the	record	as	a	whole,	the	fact	that	the	presiding	

judge had	met	the	witness years	before	on	a	few	Sundays	during	one	summer	

was	insufficient	 to	create	even	an	appearance	 of	 bias.	 	Additionally,	the	 trial	

judge had presided	 over	 several	 homicide	 trials	 involving	 the	 Attorney	

General’s	 office	 prior	 to	 this	 case and	 has not	 worked	 in	 the	 Attorney	

General’s	office	for	over five	years.		

[¶42]	 	We conclude that	 the	 trial	 court	 did	 not abuse	its	 discretion	in	

denying	Philip’s	motion	to	recuse.	

The	entry	is:

Judgment	and	sentence	affirmed.
22

David	W.	Bate,	Esq.,	Bangor,	and	Logan	E.	Perkins,	Esq.	(orally),	Perkins	Law	

Office,	Belfast,	for	appellant	Philip	L.	Clark

Aaron	M.	 Frey,	 Attorney	 General, and	Donald	W.	Macomber,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen.

(orally),	Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Penobscot	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2018-2736

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