alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
The Attorney General of Texas 

September 1, 1978 

JOHN L. HILL 

Attorney General 

Honorable Thomas H. Haynie, Chairman 

Texas Private Employment Agency 

Regulatory Board 

Sam Houston State Office Building 

Austin, Texas 

Opinion No. H- 1236 

Re: Whether an advance fee 

resume service is a private 

employment agency under article 

5221a-6, V.T.C.S. 

Dear Mr. Haynie: 

You have requested our opinion as to whether an advance fee resume 

service is a private employment agency under article 5221a-6, V.T.C.S. 

You state that a company commonly referred to as an ‘advance fee 

resume service” furnishes to individuals seeking employment “a prepared 

resume and a list or pre-addressed mailing labels of potential employers.” 

The resume service charges a flat fee for its service, payable in advance. 

The names of prospective employers are ordinarily obtained from trade 

journals and governmental sources, and there is no direct contact between the 

resume service and the prospective employer on behalf of a particular 

employee or with respect to a particular job opening. The resume service 

frequently advertises its services through the broadcast and print media, with 

a specific disclaimer that it is a private employment agency. 

A “private employment agency” is defined by statute as 

any person, place or establishment within this state 

who for a fee or without a fee offers or attempts, 

either directly or indirectly, to procure employment 

for employees or procures or attempts to procure 

employees for employers, except as hereinafter 

exempted from the provisions hereof. 

V.T.C.S. art. 5221a-6, S l(e) (emphasis added). On the basis of the description 

you have furnished us, we believe it is clear that an advance fee resume 

service is not within the definition of a “private employment agency,” for the 

reason that it neither “offers . . . to procure employment for employees” nor 

“procures or attempts to procure employees for employers.” See Miller v. 

Eldridge, 286 S.W. 999 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1926, writ dism’d). 

p. 4932 
Honorable Thomas H. Haynie - Page 2 (H-1236) 

In the situation you describe, an advance fee resume service does not contact 

an employer on behalf of a prospective employee. Nor does it locate prospective 

employees for employers, as does a “management search consultant” under section 

l(b) of the statute. See Attorney General Opinion H-699 (1975). We do not believe 

that the regulatory scope of article 5221a-6 may ordinarily be extended to include 

those entities which maintain contact with only the prospective employee. Since 

there is no direct contact between the resume service and the employer or his 

agent, we believe Texas courts would hold that the service is not a “private 

employment agency” for purposes of article 5221a-6. 

SU.MMARY 

Where there is no direct contact between the resume service 

and a prospective employer or his agent, an advance fee 

resume service, as described, is not a “private employment 

agency” for purposes of article 5221a-6, V.T.C.S. 

Very truly yours, 

APPROVED: 

Attorney General of Texas 

Opinion Committee 

p. 4933
### §14094. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 14094 was editorially reclassified as section 12554 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kevin Ford, Appellant.

[715 NYS2d 644]

—Appeal by the defendant from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Demakos, J.), rendered April 23, 1998, convicting him of murder in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and tampering with physical evidence, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence, and (2) an amended sentence of the same court, imposed February 9, 1999, modifying the sentences imposed for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The appeal from the judgment brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress a statement he made to law enforcement officials.

Ordered that the judgment and the amended sentence are affirmed.

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statement to detectives while he was incarcerated on an unrelated charge. The record supports the finding of the Supreme Court that the defendant’s statement was voluntarily made after the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his *Miranda*rights *(see, People v Vasquez,*90 NY2d 972).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Santucci, J. P., Sullivan, Friedmann and Smith, JJ., concur.
#### Frederick Weidner et al., Respondents, v. Florence C. Walsh et al., Appellants, and Walter Bruchhausen, Respondent.

No fair and reasonable interpretation of the evidence could support a finding that the amount of the corporation’s potential liability for taxes, as set forth in the balance sheet of June 30, 1947, in the sum of $32,836.30, as a reserve for such purpose within the intent of the contract, was other than a liability to be considered in computing the net worth of the corporation, unreduced by the fact that, because of losses during the second- half of the year, the actual tax liability for the year was later determined to be less than $6,000; or a finding that the purchasers, in consummating *769the transaction, waived the claims asserted in the counterclaims or brought about an accord and satisfaction. Accordingly, the court should have dismissed the first, third and fourth defenses set forth in the reply of plaintiffs and the escrow agent, in addition to the second, which pleaded payment and which the court dismissed. Further error was committed in excluding defendants’ evidence as to what the value of the corporation’s inventory was on January 1, 1947, together with accretions and detractions up to the date when the net worth of the corporation was required to be not less than $75,000. We are also of the opinion that the finding, implicit in the verdict, that the three checks in the total amount of $9,429.60, representing alleged accrued earnings of the plaintiffs, which were drawn out of the corporation’s bank account at the time of the consummation of the transaction, were not to be considered as a reduction of the net worth of the corporation, was contrary to the evidence. Johnston, Acting P. J., Sneed and Wenzel, JJ., concur; Adel and MacCrate, JJ., concur in result.
### §16927. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 16927 was editorially reclassified as section 20929 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
Part 540 [Reserved]

Parent topic: General Services Administration Acquisition Manual
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Life USA, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and  Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof  (the  "Report").  Kelly  Kendall,
President, CFO & CEO of the company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 USC Section 1350,
as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, that to
the best of my knowledge and belief.

        (1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
                or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

        (2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
                material respects, the financial condition and results of
                operations of the Company.


                                         /s/ Kelly Kendall
                                         --------------------------------
                                         Kelly Kendall, President, CEO & CFO

Dated:  June 29, 2005
Case 3:08-cv-00778-MHP Document 32 Filed 03/30/10 Page 1 of 2
3/30/2010

U

NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Marilyn H. Patel

Case 3:08-cv-00778-MHP Document 32 Filed 03/30/10 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 10.96



 Exhibit 10.96 
  
 Terms of Transition Services Arrangements with Nathan H. Peck, Jr. 
  
 It may be beneficial for you to serve as a consultant to BearingPoint, Inc. for the three
(3) months immediately following the effective date of your employment termination, in order to assist management in the orderly transition of your duties, and the resolution of certain outstanding matters. In exchange for your reasonable
cooperation and assistance during this fixed three(3) month term, BearingPoint shall continue to make your email “Outlook” account available and active, and you may retain access to, and possession of, your BearingPoint office, your
BearingPoint laptop computer and computer accessories during this transition period. In exchange for your reasonable cooperation and assistance during this fixed three (3) month term, BearingPoint shall also pay you a monthly fee, equivalent to
your current monthly base salary. In the event that you choose not to do so, or you cease to provide reasonable assistance, in BearingPoint’s sole discretion, at any time during this three month term, BearingPoint may immediately cease monthly
payment, and shall be responsible to pay you only through the date of your last contribution on a pro-rated basis. At the conclusion of the transition period, you agree to immediately return the BearingPoint laptop computer and accessories. In such
event, your BearingPoint “Outlook” account will also terminate, as will your access to your BearingPoint office.
KS/MOATT

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KEVIN M. SCHILLING; et al.,

 Plaintiffs - Respondents,

 v.

TRANSCOR AMERICA, LLC; et al.,

 Defendants - Petitioners.

No. 10-80055

D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00941-SI

Northern District of California, 

San Francisco

ORDER

Before: FISHER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

The court, in its discretion, denies the petition for permission to appeal the

district court’s February 16, 2010 order granting class action certification. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f); Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2005)

(per curiam).

FILED

APR 14 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

Case: 10-80055 04/14/2010 Page: 1 of 1 ID: 7300671 DktEntry: 3 Case 3:08-cv-00941-SI Document 120 Filed 04/21/10 Page 1 of 1
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 19, 2016

No. 04-16-00161-CR

The STATE of Texas,

Appellant

v.

Andres GARCIA,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law, Starr County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR-15-322

Honorable Romero Molina, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The State filed its appellant’s brief on May 25, 2016. Therefore, appellee’s brief was due 

June 24, 2016. However, on June 29, 2016, appellee’s appointed attorney, Mr. G. Allen 

Ramirez, informed this court that he would file a response in writing stating appellee does not 

wish to contest the State’s appeal. Mr. Ramirez has filed neither his response, appellee’s brief, 

nor a motion for extension of time.

 

It is therefore, ORDERED that Mr. Ramirez file either a (1) written response stating 

appellee does not contest the State’s request for relief as stated in the State’s appellant’s brief or

(2) appellee’s brief no later than July 22, 2016. If Mr. Ramirez does not respond by July 22, 

2016, this cause will be abated for the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether: (1) 

appellee desires to file a responsive pleading to the State’s brief; (2) appellant is indigent, and if 

so, the trial court shall take such measures as may be necessary to assure the effective assistance 

of counsel, which may include the appointment of new counsel; and (3) counsel has abandoned 

the appeal. Because sanctions may be necessary, the trial court will be asked to address this 

issue even if new counsel is retained or substituted before the date of the hearing. 

The Clerk of this court shall cause a copy of this order to be served on Mr. Ramirez by 

certified mail, return receipt requested, and by United States mail. The Clerk of this court shall 

also fax a copy of this order to the presiding judge of the County Court at Law, Starr County, 

Texas.
_________________________________

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 19th day of July, 2016.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-30615

Summary Calendar

____________

Minh Vo, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Entergy Company; City Sewer, 

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:22-CV-255

______________________________

Before Clement, Elrod, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Minh Vo appeals the district court’s order dismissing his amended 

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, 

we AFFIRM.

Vo and his family live in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Vo’s pro se amended 

complaint alleges that Entergy Company and City Sewer damaged the sewer 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 2, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-30615 Document: 00516954349 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/02/2023
No. 23-30615

2

system in the backyard of his home which caused his toilets to overflow and 

flooded areas of his home. Vo alleges that the flooding led to mold, which, in 

turn, caused heath issues for him and his family.

On the district court’s fillable form for pro se complaints, the first item 

reads: “State the grounds for filing this case in Federal Court (include federal 

statutes and/or U.S. Constitutional provisions, if you know them).” Vo left 

the answer box underneath this item blank. On the line for listing defendants, 

Vo stated that Entergy Company is a business located in Alabama and City 

Sewer is a business located in Louisiana.

The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction. First, the court held that Vo had failed to 

establish federal-question jurisdiction because the amended complaint did 

not identify any federal law that had allegedly been violated nor did the 

factual allegations therein establish a colorable issue of federal law. Second, 

the court held that it lacked diversity jurisdiction because, as pled, the parties 

were not completely diverse—Vo and City Sewer were both citizens of 

Louisiana.

1 We agree with the district court’s reasoning in its entirety. Vo 

remains free to pursue his claims in state court, subject, of course, to any 

applicable statutes of limitation.

AFFIRMED.

_____________________

1 The court also noted that, based on the public records of the Louisiana Secretary 

of State, it appeared that Entergy was a Louisiana citizen as well.

Case: 23-30615 Document: 00516954349 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/02/2023
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-30742

Conference Calendar

 

BLAKE BOURGEOIS; SAMUEL CARCISSE; DATHRONE

CHAPMAN; DARRELL DUNN; HERBERT FRANCOIS; LAWRENCE

GAINES; CARDELL HAYNES; KEITH J. HICKS; GERALD

HILTON; REGGIE HOLLAND; ROBERT MUSE, JR.; ANDREW

NORTH; JOHNEL PETERS; KEVIN PETERSON; JOE 

SPRIGGS; OSCAR VICKNAIR, JR.; DARRYL WEST, JR.; 

MARK W. WHEAT; ALL PLAINTIFFS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

JEFFREY P. WILEY; HAROLD TRIDICO; BOBBY WEBRE;

JOHN KAIGLER; CEDRICK SMITH, also known as Sedrick

Smith; NFN JULES, Sergeant; CHRIS HAGAN, also known

as Christopher Hagan; PAT OURSO, also known as Pat

Ohsso; NFN TOMPLATE; LUICIEN DORTHWAITE, also known

as Officer Lucien; SUE MARTIN, also known as 

Sergeant Sue, also known as Sue Correctional Worker;

NFN ROSEVILLE, Officer; NFN BUGGAGE, Mr., also known 

as W. Buggage; BILLY BIRD, also known as Billy Byrd;

NFN DIXON, Mr., also known as Kennith Dixon, also

known as Kenneth Dixon; ROOSEVELT THOMPSON, also

known as Deputy Roosevelt; NFN COLLINS, Deputy;

ROOSEVELT HAMPTON; ALL DEFENDANTS,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 97-CV-431

- - - - - - - - - -

June 17, 1999

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*
No. 98-30742

-2-

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

On June 11, 1998, the magistrate judge entered an order

granting the motion for summary judgment filed by 13 of the

above-captioned defendants. Several other defendants did not

join the summary-judgment motion.

When an action involves multiple parties or multiple claims,

any decision that adjudicates the liability of fewer than all the

parties or disposes of fewer than all the claims does not

terminate the litigation and is not appealable unless certified

under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). See Thompson v. Betts, 754 F.2d

1243, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985). The magistrate judge has not

certified the June 11, 1998, order in accordance with Rule 54(b). 

Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction. 

APPEAL DISMISSED.
§ 1104.13 Determination of archaeological or commercial value and cost of restoration and repair. ( a ) *Archaeological value.* For purposes of this part, the archaeological value of any archaeological resource involved in a violation of the prohibitions in § 1104.3 of this part or conditions of a permit issued pursuant to this part shall be the value of the information associated with the archaeological resource. This value shall be appraised in terms of the costs of the retrieval of the scientific information which would have been obtainable prior to the violation. These costs may include, but need not be limited to, the cost of preparing a research design, conducting field work, carrying out laboratory analysis, and preparing reports as would be necessary to realize the information potential.
( b ) *Commercial value.* For purposes of this part, the commercial value of any archaeological resource involved in a violation of the prohibitions in § 1104.3 of this part or conditions of a permit issued pursuant to this part shall be its fair market value. Where the violation has resulted in damage to the archaeological resource, the fair market value should be determined using the condition of the archaeological resource prior to the violation, to the extent that its prior condition can be ascertained.
( c ) *Cost of restoration and repair.* For purposes of this part, the cost of restoration and repair of archaeological resources damaged as a result of a violation of prohibitions or conditions pursuant to this part, shall be the sum of the costs already incurred for emergency restoration or repair work, plus those costs projected to be necessary to complete restoration and repair, which may include, but need not be limited to, the costs of the following: ( 1 ) Reconstruction of the archaeological resource;
( 2 ) Stabilization of the archaeological resource;
( 3 ) Ground contour reconstruction and surface stabilization;
( 4 ) Research necessary to carry out reconstruction or stabilization;
( 5 ) Physical barriers or other protective devices, necessitated by the disturbance of the archaeological resource, to protect it from further disturbance;
( 6 ) Examination and analysis of the archaeological resource including recording remaining archaeological information, where necessitated by disturbance, in order to salvage remaining values which cannot be otherwise conserved;
( 7 ) Reinterment of human remains in accordance with religious custom and State, local, or tribal law, where appropriate, as determined by the Commissioner;
( 8 ) Preparation of reports relating to any of the above activities.
§ 1006.505 Who uses the EPLS? ( a ) Federal agency officials use the *EPLS* to determine whether to enter into a transaction with a person, as required under § 1006.430.
( b ) Participants also may, but are not required to, use the *EPLS* to determine if— ( 1 ) Principals of their transactions are excluded or disqualified, as required under § 1006.320; or
( 2 ) Persons with whom they are entering into covered transactions at the next lower tier are excluded or disqualified.
( c ) The *EPLS* is available to the general public.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3854 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3854

    To amend title 23, United States Code, to help leverage private 
   investment for transit oriented development near transit stations.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 31, 2012

  Mr. Peters introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend title 23, United States Code, to help leverage private 
   investment for transit oriented development near transit stations.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Transit Related Investment 
Improvement Act of 2012''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE AND 
              INNOVATION ACT.

    Chapter 6 of title 23, United States Code is amended--
            (1) in section 601(a)(8)--
                    (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph 
                (C);
                    (B) by striking the period at the end of 
                subparagraph (D) and inserting ``; and'';
                    (C) by adding after subparagraph (D) the following 
                new subparagraph:
                    ``(E) a project to improve or construct public 
                infrastructure located within \1/2\ mile of the station 
                area of a fixed guideway transit facility that includes 
                improvements to mobility and parking, rehabilitation or 
                construction of streets, transit stations, structured 
                parking, walkways and bikeways, or other costs eligible 
                under joint development guidelines, as determined by 
                the Administrator of the Federal Transit 
                Administration.''; and
            (2) in section 602(a)(3), by inserting after subparagraph 
        (B) the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(C) Other projects.--In the case of a project 
                eligible under subparagraph 601(a)(8)(E), eligible 
                project costs shall be reasonably anticipated to equal 
                or exceed $10,000,000.''.
                                 <all>
```