This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2018 UT 55

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ENERVEST, LTD.,

Appellant,

v.

UTAH STATE ENGINEER and MICHAEL CARLSON,

Appellee.

No. 20160394

Filed September 27, 2018

On Direct Appeal

Eighth District, Duchesne

The Honorable Samuel P. Chiara

No. 560800056

Attorneys:

John H. Mabey Jr., David C. Wright, Jonathan R. Schutz,

Salt Lake City, for appellant

Justin P. Matkin, Matthew E. Jensen, Salt Lake City,

for appellee Michael Carlson

Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Stanford E. Purser, Dep. Solic. Gen., 

Norman K. Johnson, Benjamin J. Jensen, Sarah M. Shechter, 

Melissa Reynolds, Asst. Att’y Gens., Salt Lake City, for appellee

Utah State Engineer

JUSTICE HIMONAS authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE,

JUSTICE PEARCE, and JUDGE KATE TOOMEY joined.

Due to her retirement, JUSTICE DURHAM did not participate herein;

Court of Appeals JUDGE KATE TOOMEY sat.
ENERVEST v. UTAH STATE ENGINEER

Opinion of the Court

2

JUSTICE PETERSEN became a member of the Court on

November 17, 2017, after oral argument on this matter

and accordingly did not participate.

JUSTICE HIMONAS, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 “Water rights in the State of Utah are of utmost public 

concern. Water, in an arid state like Utah, is its life-blood, 

measured in currency represented by survival itself . . . . This 

court has likened a drop of water [to] a drop of gold.” Longley v. 

Leucadia Fin. Corp., 2000 UT 69, ¶ 15, 9 P.3d 762 (second alteration 

in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Therefore, it is no surprise that, in Utah, water rights have been 

preserved in our state constitution, codified by our legislature, 

and oft-contested in our state and federal courts.

¶2 This appeal stems from just such a contest over the state 

water engineer’s resolution of who owns the water rights to 

Minnie Maud Creek, a tributary of the Green River. EnerVest, Ltd.

(EnerVest)1 asks us to review the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, which upheld the state engineer’s proposed 

determination that The Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation 

Company (Minnie Maud) is the owner of disputed water rights on 

Minnie Maud Creek and rejected the objections to the proposed 

determination made on those grounds. Before reaching this issue, 

however, we must first decide whether we have jurisdiction over 

the case.

¶3 We conclude that we do not. The district court’s 

certification of its summary judgment ruling as final under Utah 

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) was improper and thus we do not 

have a final judgment before us for review. And we do not 

consider whether we should treat the appeal as a petition for

interlocutory appeal under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 

because we conclude that EnerVest was not aggrieved by the 

__________________________________________________________

1 This case stems from a long history of ownership and 

disputes over the water rights at issue. When we reference an 

action taken or not taken by a party to this case, we are including

the party’s predecessors in interest.
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Opinion of the Court

3

district court’s decision and so lacks appellate standing. 

Therefore, we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

I. GENERAL ADJUDICATION PROCESS

¶4 A general understanding of Utah’s process for 

adjudicating water rights in cases like this one is helpful for

grasping the issues in this appeal. When a justified petition of 

“five or more or a majority of water users” for a determination of 

water rights is given to the state engineer, the engineer files an 

action in the district court to determine the water rights (similar to 

a quiet title action). UTAH CODE § 73-4-1 (1953). The district court 

may then order a general adjudication, which will provide it 

guidance in establishing water rights.

¶5 “[T]he purpose of the general adjudication process is to 

prevent piecemeal litigation regarding water rights and to 

provide a permanent record of all such rights by decree.” Jensen v. 

Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 289 (Utah 1992).

When a general adjudication is initiated, the state 

engineer notifies all known water rights holders and 

provides public notice of the adjudication by 

publication. After the state engineer provides notice, 

all individuals and entities are required to submit 

any water rights claims within the area in question 

to the state engineer. Following the submission of 

water rights claims, the state engineer conducts a 

hydrographic survey of the water system and 

evaluates the submitted claims.

In re Gen. Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, 

¶ 6, 110 P.3d 666 (citations omitted). A party who fails to timely 

file a claim “shall be forever barred and estopped from 

subsequently asserting any rights, and shall be held to have 

forfeited all rights to the use of the water theretofore claimed by 

him.” Utah State Eng’r v. Johnson, 2018 UT App 109, ¶ 19 (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶6 “When the survey is complete and all of the submitted 

claims have been evaluated, the state engineer then prepares a 

proposed determination of water rights for the area.” In re Gen. 

Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, ¶ 6. “A 

copy of the proposed determination is mailed to each claimant, 

along with a notice that any claimant dissatisfied with the 
ENERVEST v. UTAH STATE ENGINEER

Opinion of the Court

4

proposal may file a written objection within ninety days.” Johnson, 

2018 UT App 109, ¶ 20. “[A] claimant who . . . fail[s] to timely 

object . . . takes on the role of a defaulting party and is bound by 

its failure . . . unless and until the claimant seeks leave from the 

court overseeing the general adjudication to file an untimely 

objection . . . .” Id. ¶ 21. “If no objection has been filed to a 

proposed determination, or if all objections have been resolved, 

the district court must enter judgment rendering the proposed 

determination the final adjudication of water rights for the given 

area.” In re Gen. Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 2004 UT 

106, ¶ 7.

II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW

¶7 In the early 1900s, several owners of water rights on 

Minnie Maud Creek filed articles of incorporation for Minnie 

Maud and transferred their water rights to the newly formed 

corporation. The relevant parties in this case transferred their 

rights to Minnie Maud in exchange for shares in Minnie Maud.

¶8 In 1956, this general adjudication, which includes Minnie 

Maud Creek, was initiated. The state engineer issued a proposed 

determination in 1964, allocating twelve water rights to Minnie 

Maud. In the following months, four different objections were 

filed, challenging a total of eight of the water rights provided to 

Minnie Maud. Each of the four objections raise several different 

challenges, but all of the objections argue that Minnie Maud could 

not be the owner of the water rights, either because Minnie Maud 

never legally existed or because it was a defunct corporation.

EnerVest did not file an objection, and the water rights it now 

claims are not directly challenged by the objections.2

¶9 In 2012, EnerVest filed a petition under Utah Code 

section 73-4-24(1) to expedite a hearing on the objections. The 

district court granted the petition but limited the scope of the 

__________________________________________________________

2 EnerVest is claiming ownership of water rights 90-24 and 90-

196. These water rights are provided to Minnie Maud in the 

proposed determination and are not at issue in the objections. 

Additionally, it is unclear from the record whether EnerVest 

submitted a claim to the state engineer for these water rights. We 

will assume, for purposes of this appeal, it complied with the 

requirements for filing a claim.
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Opinion of the Court

5

section 24 hearing to whether the proposed determination 

correctly lists Minnie Maud as the owner of the water rights.

¶10 Several parties participated in the section 24 hearing, 

including non-objectors, EnerVest and Michael Carlson, and

objectors, the Willis A. and Wilma Hammerschmid Trust (the 

Hammerschmid Trust) and Gary and Nancy Motte. Eventually 

the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, with 

EnerVest and the Hammerschmid Trust arguing that Minnie 

Maud could not own the water rights and Carlson arguing that 

the state engineer correctly deemed Minnie Maud the owner of 

the water rights. The district court granted Carlson’s motion for 

summary judgment and denied EnerVest’s and the 

Hammerschmid Trust’s motions for summary judgment. At the 

parties’ request, the district court certified its decision as final 

under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). EnerVest and the 

Hammerschmid Trust appealed.

¶11 During the pendency of the appeal, before the briefing 

schedule was even set, the Hammerschmid Trust’s appeal was 

voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. As a result, Carlson 

challenges EnerVest’s standing to appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 “Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of 

law, which we review for correctness. Additionally, [w]hether a 

district court’s judgment is final is a question of law, which we 

can consider for the first time on appeal.” First Nat’l Bank v. 

Palmer, 2018 UT 43, ¶ 5, __ P.3d __ (alteration in original) 

(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶13 “[S]tanding is jurisdictional and [a challenge] may be 

brought at any” time. Brown v. Div. of Water Rights of Dep’t of Nat. 

Res., 2010 UT 14, ¶ 15, 228 P.3d 747. “[T]he question of whether a 

given individual or association has standing to request a 

particular relief is primarily a question of law.” Alpine Homes, Inc. 

v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ¶ 10, 424 P.3d 95 (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶14 On appeal, there are two jurisdictional issues for our 

review. First, the district court certified its grant of summary 

judgment to Carlson and denial of partial summary judgment to 

EnerVest and the Hammerschmid Trust as final under Utah Rule 

of Civil Procedure 54(b). We conclude that the district court’s 
ENERVEST v. UTAH STATE ENGINEER

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6

summary judgment decisions did not meet the criteria for proper 

rule 54(b) certification.

¶15 Second, Carlson challenges EnerVest’s standing to pursue 

an appeal of the rejection of other parties’ objections. We agree 

with Carlson and conclude that EnerVest lacks standing to appeal. 

Therefore, we decline to consider whether the defects in the rule 

54(b) certification could otherwise be cured by treating the appeal 

as a petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal under 

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a).

I. FINAL JUDGMENT

¶16 The first jurisdictional issue we must address is whether 

this case presents a final judgment over which we have 

jurisdiction on appeal. Unless one of three exceptions is met, we 

lack appellate jurisdiction over a judgment that does not “end[] 

the controversy between the litigants.” Copper Hills Custom Homes, 

LLC v. Countrywide Bank, FSB, 2018 UT 42, ¶¶ 10, 13–15, __ P.3d __

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Certification 

by a district court as final under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 

54(b) provides one of those exceptions. Id. ¶ 15.3

¶17 In order to be appropriately certified as final under Utah 

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), three requirements must be met: 

(1) “there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to 

the action;” (2) “the judgment appealed from must have been 

entered on an order that would be appealable but for the fact that 

other claims or parties remain in the action;” and (3) “the [district] 

court, in its discretion, must make a[n express] determination that 

there is no just reason for delay.” Id. ¶ 16 (alterations in original) 

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Additionally, the district court must “set forth a clear rationale as 

to why there is no just reason” for delay. Id. ¶ 27.

¶18 The district court’s 54(b) certification suffers from three 

flaws. First, the district court did not offer a rationale for why it 

determined there is no just reason for delay. This omission, in and 

of itself, “functions as a practical bar to our appellate jurisdiction.” 

Id.

__________________________________________________________

3 The other two exceptions are statutorily provided avenues 

and interlocutory appeals under Utah Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 5(a). Copper Hills, 2018 UT 42, ¶¶ 13–14.
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Opinion of the Court

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¶19 Second, the district court’s underlying order granted 

summary judgment to Carlson and denied partial summary 

judgment to EnerVest and the Hammerschmid Trust. And the 

district court’s rule 54(b) certification order attempted to certify its 

ruling on all three motions as final. But the denial of EnerVest’s 

and the Hammerschmid Trust’s motions for partial summary 

judgment is not an “order that would be appealable but for the 

fact that other claims or parties remain in the action” because they 

are not final. Id. ¶ 16 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 P.2d 

1359, 1360 (Utah 1977) (dismissing an appeal “from the denial of 

[a] motion for summary judgment . . . because it is not from a final 

order”).

¶20 Finally, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

Carlson holds “that the State Water Engineer correctly determined 

that the Water Rights were owned by Minnie Maud.” The nature 

of a general adjudication prevents complete finality of any water 

rights until the entire general adjudication has been completed. As 

we have long recognized,

[i]f a court were allowed to enter final judgments of 

individual rights in a suit for general adjudication 

before the state engineer has made his survey, 

report, determinations and recommendations as 

provided for in the statute, the very purpose of the 

statute, which we have shown is to avoid piecemeal 

litigation, would be circumvented. Of course, as a 

practical proposition the court may often be obliged 

to hold hearings as between individual claimants 

and enter interlocutory decrees, but no final judgment 

should be entered until all the rights of all the 

claimants can be adjudicated.

Watson v. Dist. Court of First Judicial Dist. in and for Cache Cty., 163 

P.2d 322, 323 (Utah 1945) (emphasis added).

¶21 Therefore, this appeal is not appropriately before us 

under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). We have the discretion

under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a) to treat an appeal 

from an order certified under rule 54(b) that is not actually final 

“as a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order.” 

Because we conclude that EnerVest lacks standing on appeal, we 

do not exercise this discretion here and therefore lack appellate 

jurisdiction.
ENERVEST v. UTAH STATE ENGINEER

Opinion of the Court

8

II. ENERVEST IS NOT AN AGGRIEVED PARTY

AND LACKS APPELLATE STANDING

¶22 “Merely because a party appears in the district court 

proceedings does not mean that the party automatically has 

standing to appeal the judgment rendered by that court.” 

Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Knox Park Constr., Inc., 488 F.3d 680, 684 (5th 

Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

On appeal, a party whose standing is challenged 

must show that he or she had standing under the 

traditional test in the original proceeding before the 

district court. In addition, an appellant generally 

must show both that he or she was a party or privy 

to the action below and that he or she is aggrieved 

by that court’s judgment.

Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 50, 123 P.3d 416 (citation omitted).

Carlson does not dispute that EnerVest had standing to 

participate in the proceedings below.4 And EnerVest did 

participate in the action below. Therefore, the only disputed 

question of appellate standing is whether EnerVest was aggrieved 

by the district court’s decision.

¶23 An aggrieved party is one “whose personal, pecuniary, or 

property rights have been adversely affected . . . by a court’s 

decree or judgment.” Aggrieved Party, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(10th ed. 2014). “An aggrieved party must have been affected or 

prejudiced by the order . . . .” 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 251 (2018). 

A party may be “aggrieved by a judgment that establishes or 

divests property rights,” but “[a] judgment affecting only 

property does not aggrieve a party who has or claims no title or 

interest in that property.” Id.

__________________________________________________________

4 In order to have standing to bring a section 24 petition, a 

claimant must have a “direct interest” in the objection for which 

the expedited hearing is sought. UTAH CODE § 73-4-24(1). Because 

we conclude that EnerVest lacks standing to appeal, we need not 

decide whether a non-objecting party, whose rights under the 

proposed determination are not at issue in the objection, has a 

“direct interest” in the objection for the purposes of participating 

in a section 24 hearing.
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¶24 Additionally, “[i]t is hornbook law that a party may only 

appeal to protect its own interests, and not those of a coparty.” 

Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. CHG Int’l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1214 

(9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Libby, McNeill, & Libby v. City Nat’l Bank, 592 F.2d 

504, 511 (9th Cir. 1978) (“It is, of course, a familiar principle that 

only a party aggrieved by a final judgment may appeal from it. It 

follows that a party may only appeal to protect its own interests, 

and not those of a coparty.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). “An indirect financial stake in another party’s 

claims is insufficient to create standing on appeal.” MorrisonKnudsen, 811 F.2d at 1214.

¶25 EnerVest fails to address why it would be aggrieved for 

purposes of appellate standing.5 However, the state engineer filed 

a brief arguing that EnerVest was aggrieved for the purposes of 

appellate standing because “it is entitled to less of a proportionate 

interest in the disputed water rights than it would receive if the 

district court had ruled in the Objectors’ and EnerVest’s favor.”

¶26 This may technically be correct—EnerVest may 

ultimately benefit from another water claimant’s objection to the 

proposed determination. But that does not answer the legal 

question of whether EnerVest was aggrieved by the district 

court’s decision and can pursue the denial of other parties’ 

objections to the proposed determination.

__________________________________________________________

5 Instead, EnerVest focuses a majority of its briefing on 

whether it had standing to participate in the section 24 hearing. It 

also appears to argue that some notions of traditional and 

alternative standing apply to appellate standing, but it undertakes 

no analysis on whether or how those notions apply in the context 

of appellate standing. And, while it points to Utah Code section 

73-4-16, which provides that “[t]here shall be a right of appeal 

from a final judgment of the district court to the Supreme Court as 

provided in Section 78A-3-102,” it makes no argument that this 

statute somehow exempts it from the appellate standing 

requirement of being an aggrieved party. “[W]e are not a 

depository in which [a party] may dump the burden of argument 

and research,” and we will not consider these inadequately 

briefed arguments on appeal. Espenschied Transp. Corp. v. Fleetwood 

Servs., Inc., 2018 UT 32, ¶ 19, 422 P.3d 829 (second alteration in 

original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
ENERVEST v. UTAH STATE ENGINEER

Opinion of the Court

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¶27 Despite EnerVest not filing its own objection, it is now 

argued that EnerVest is aggrieved by the district court’s rejection 

of other parties’ objections and determination that the state 

engineer correctly deemed Minnie Maud the owner of the water 

rights in question. This cannot be the case. Concluding that 

EnerVest has a sufficient interest in another party’s objection to be

aggrieved by the rejection of that objection would run against 

EnerVest’s status as a defaulting party, conflict with the 

requirement of filing a timely objection, and undercut one of the 

main purposes of general adjudication lawsuits.

A. EnerVest is a Defaulting Party and Cannot Be Aggrieved

¶28 First, EnerVest cannot be aggrieved by the district court’s 

decision here because it failed to object to the proposed 

determination and its rights under the proposed determination 

have not been altered. Water claimants who are dissatisfied with 

the water rights given to them in the proposed determination are

required to file an objection to the proposed determination with 

the court within ninety days of receiving notice of the proposed 

determination. UTAH CODE § 73-4-11.6 For almost a century we 

have stated that “if [a] claimant makes no objection [to the 

proposed determination], he, by his silence, does in legal effect 

precisely what every other person who is sued and makes default 

does, namely, confesses the statements contained in the engineer’s 

proposed determination of his water rights.” Eden Irrigation Co. v. 

Dist. Court of Weber Cty., 211 P. 957, 960 (Utah 1922); see also Butler, 

Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 2004 

UT 67, ¶ 22, 98 P.3d 1 (“A claimant who fails to file a timely 

objection to the proposed determination demonstrates 

acquiescence to the state engineer’s delineation of water rights.”); 

U.S. Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, 

__________________________________________________________

6 Prior to 2013, Utah Code section 73-4-11 did not explicitly 

provide a requirement to file an objection within ninety days. 2013 

Utah Laws 1149. Instead, the law merely provided that the 

engineer must give each claimant “notice that any claimant 

dissatisfied therewith may within ninety days of [the mailing of the 

proposed determination] file with the clerk of the district court a 

written objection thereto.” Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. 

Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 2004 UT 67, ¶ 22, 98 P.3d 1

(citation omitted). We have long recognized parties as defaulting 

parties under that language. Id.
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Opinion of the Court

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¶ 19, 79 P.3d 945 (“[T]he fate of a water right claimant who fails to 

object to a proposed award [is] similar to that of a defaulting party 

in a lawsuit. [I]f the claimant makes no objection, he, by his 

silence, . . . confesses the statements contained in the engineer’s 

proposed determination of his water rights, and thus a judgment 

may legally be entered in accordance with the proposed 

determination of the engineer.” (third and fourth alterations in 

original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Therefore, a claimant’s “failure to file an objection within the 

statutory period prevents him from . . . contesting the disposition” 

of water rights. Butler, Crockett & Walsh, 2004 UT 67, ¶ 23.

¶29 After its ninety-day period to object expired, EnerVest 

became a defaulting party that “confesse[d] the statements 

contained in the engineer’s proposed determination of [its] water 

rights” and thereby acquiesced to the rights provided it under the 

proposed determination. Id. ¶ 22 (citation omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). That proposed determination remains 

intact after the district court’s ruling; EnerVest’s rights have not 

changed from those to which it acquiesced it was entitled decades 

ago.

¶30 The proposed determination awarded the water rights at 

issue to Minnie Maud. EnerVest failed to file an objection within 

the ninety-day period provided and thereby, in legal effect, 

confessed to Minnie Maud’s ownership of these water rights. 

EnerVest cannot now, on appeal, retract its confession to the 

statements contained in the proposed determination, undo its 

default, and argue that it is entitled to greater water rights than 

provided it under the proposed determination. Its “failure to file 

an objection within the statutory period prevents [it] from now 

contesting the disposition” of the water rights, id. ¶ 23, and makes 

it “incapable of claiming [the water rights]” “as a matter of law,” 

id. ¶ 28.

¶31 Therefore, EnerVest has no interests in the water rights—

at least no interests it can champion as a defaulting party—that 

have been adversely affected by the district court’s decision that 

leaves the proposed determination intact. Additionally, because 

EnerVest is “incapable of claiming [the water rights],” id., it 

cannot be aggrieved by the district court’s judgment, see 4 C.J.S.

Appeal and Error § 251 (2018) (“A judgment affecting only property 

does not aggrieve a party who has or claims no title or interest in 

that property.”).
ENERVEST v. UTAH STATE ENGINEER

Opinion of the Court

12

B. EnerVest Cannot Use an Appeal of Another Party’s

Objection to Circumvent the Requirement to Object

¶32 Second, concluding that EnerVest has a sufficient interest 

in another party’s objection to be aggrieved by the denial of that

objection is contrary to the individual requirement to file an 

objection found in Utah Code section 73-4-11 and the process for 

extending the time to file an objection in Utah Code section 

73-4-10. We have previously noted that “claimants should be 

immediately aware of any possible objection as soon as they see 

the proposed determination” because they are aware of the water 

claims they submitted and can determine if the proposed 

determination “does not match the contours of [their] submitted 

claim[s].” In re Gen. Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 2004 

UT 106, ¶ 27, 110 P.3d 666. Therefore, we find it “difficult to see 

how actions taken by a subsequent claimant could cause a 

previously nonexistent objection to suddenly come into 

existence.” Id.

¶33 A district court has the ability to extend the objection 

period “upon due cause shown.” UTAH CODE § 73-4-10(1). In 

interpreting that section, we said that “the existence of the time 

limitation contained in section 73-4-11, coupled with the laudable 

goal of certainty, reveals that the legislature did not intend section 

73-4-10 to provide an escape hatch for water claimants that simply 

neglect to pursue their claims.” In re Gen. Determination of Rights to 

the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, ¶ 41.

¶34 Allowing EnerVest to pursue another party’s objection on 

appeal, without itself ever filing an objection, would undermine 

both the time limitation in section 73-4-11 and the requirement of 

proving due cause to get an extension for filing an objection set 

forth in section 73-4-10. There is nothing in our case law or the 

statutory text to warrant such a result.

¶35 Hearings on an objection occur in one of two ways. First, 

a water claimant with a “direct interest” in a “valid, timely

objection” may file a petition under section 73-4-24 for an 

expedited hearing on that objection. UTAH CODE § 73-4-24(1) 

(emphasis added). A court should grant that petition if it “will 

facilitate a reasonably prompt resolution of the matters raised in the 

objection.” Id. § 73-4-24(4) (emphasis added). If no section 24 

petition is filed, the court will eventually hear the objection as a 

matter of course as part of the general adjudication. Before a 

hearing on an objection, the court must give all claimants notice of 

when “the matter will be heard.” Id. § 73-4-13 (emphasis added). 
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Opinion of the Court

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This language does not suggest that a water claimant participating 

in a hearing on an objection has the right to make or pursue an 

objection that it did not itself timely lodge. Instead, the hearing is 

on the objection that was filed.

¶36 EnerVest would have known of its potential objection

immediately upon the proposed determination’s release. At that 

time, it had the option of objecting to the proposed determination 

or acquiescing in its allocation. EnerVest chose the latter and has 

not argued that there is due cause to excuse its failure to file an 

objection. The right to participate, if any,7 in a hearing on the 

objection under sections 73-4-13 or 73-4-24 does not serve as an 

“escape hatch for water claimants that simply neglect to pursue 

their claims.” In re Gen. Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 

2004 UT 106, ¶ 41. And the right to be heard is not always 

coterminous with the ability to be aggrieved. See Wash. Cty. Water 

Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ¶ 15, 82 P.3d 1125.

__________________________________________________________

7 In 1935, we interpreted a previous statutory requirement to 

provide notice “to all claimants” regarding when and where the 

objection would be heard. Plain City Irrigation Co. v. Hooper 

Irrigation Co., 51 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1935). We concluded that

the intent of the statute is to require notice to all 

adverse claimants, or all claimants whose rights 

would be affected or drawn in question. It would 

also seem that if a claimant or claimants have 

objections or their rights could be affected adversely, 

such claimant or claimants are entitled to notice as 

required by the statute . . . .

Id. We have not had the opportunity to revisit this holding under 

the current statutory framework or to consider whether a 

claimant’s status as a defaulting party impacts whether they have 

rights that could be adversely affected, and therefore are entitled 

to notice of and to participate in the section 13 hearing. Nor have 

we had the opportunity to consider which parties are entitled to 

petition for or participate in a section 24 hearing. These questions

may rest on a “notion of ‘standing’” that is “not the traditional 

sense of that term.” State v. Brown, 2014 UT 48, ¶ 15 n.2, 342 P.3d 

239. In a sense, they are questions of “party status”: to be “legally 

eligible—or in this sense to have standing—to participate in certain 

proceedings, a person or entity must also qualify as a proper 

party.” Id.
ENERVEST v. UTAH STATE ENGINEER

Opinion of the Court

14

¶37 In this case, the section 24 hearing was held on objections 

other parties had filed challenging Minnie Maud’s existence. 

EnerVest cannot use that hearing as a mechanism to lodge its own 

objection on those grounds. While a non-objecting party’s 

interests may ride an objector’s coattails as far as the objector 

wishes to go, the non-objecting party cannot drag the objector 

across the finish line against the objector’s will. To allow this 

would undermine the individual requirement of filing a timely 

objection, UTAH CODE § 73-4-11, or excusing the failure to timely 

file an objection for due cause, id. § 73-4-10(1). Therefore, EnerVest 

does not have a sufficient interest in another party’s objection to 

be aggrieved by a district court’s denial of that objection.

C. Allowing EnerVest to Pursue Another Party’s Objection

Would Undermine the Goals of General Adjudications

¶38 Third, deeming EnerVest sufficiently interested in 

another party’s objection to be aggrieved by the district court’s 

decision would undermine “[o]ne of the key goals of the general 

adjudication process[:] to remove doubts about the validity of 

water rights.” In re Gen. Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 

2004 UT 106, ¶ 41. Challenges to water rights allocated under a 

proposed determination must initiate within the general 

adjudication. U.S. Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 

2003 UT 49, ¶¶ 18–20, 79 P.3d 945. If no challenge to a water right 

is filed, Utah Code “section 73-4-12 requires the court to enter 

judgment consistent with uncontested elements of a proposed 

determination.” Id. ¶ 12. As a result, a water claimant that receives 

rights under an uncontested portion of a proposed determination 

receives a right to obtain a judgment that provides it the water 

rights allocated to it under the proposed determination. Id. ¶ 20. A 

non-objecting party cannot mount a collateral attack on this right 

outside of the general adjudication proceeding. Id. ¶ 18.8

__________________________________________________________

8 Conversely, “[o]nce an objection to a proposed determination 

of water rights has been properly filed in a general adjudication 

proceeding, the objecting party is at liberty to pursue separate 

adjudication of private claims.” U.S. Fuel, 2003 UT 49, ¶ 18. This 

option for objecting parties also supports the conclusion that 

EnerVest lacks a sufficient interest in the objections to be 

aggrieved by their denial.

(continued ...)
Cite as: 2018 UT 55

Opinion of the Court

15

¶39 If an objection is filed, the district court must hold a 

hearing on the objections and “enter[] judgment on the contested 

claims.” Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 

(Utah 1994) (citations omitted); see also UTAH CODE § 73-4-15. But 

those hearings are limited to the objections that are filed. See supra

¶ 35. By the end of the ninety-day objection period, a water user 

with rights under the proposed determination will know whether 

his or her rights are challenged and, if so, which rights and by 

whom. This allows “subsequent appropriators [to] rely upon 

[these recorded water rights] before making their investments.” In 

re Gen. Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, ¶ 41 

(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶40 Accordingly, the requirement of objecting to a proposed 

determination “furthers the goal of certainty by reassuring water 

claimants that their rights are, in large part, immune from attacks by 

claimants that have allowed their ninety-day objection period to expire.” 

Id. (emphases added).9 But EnerVest is attempting to do just that 

on appeal—attack Minnie Maud’s rights under the proposed 

determination despite allowing its ninety-day objection period to 

expire more than half a century ago.

__________________________________________________________

Both a party receiving water rights under the proposed 

determination and an objecting party have the ability to litigate 

that dispute in a private suit. Id. Therefore, the objecting party 

must, out of necessity, have the ability to control its objection and 

withdraw the objection if that party settles with the party 

receiving water rights. EnerVest wants us to determine that a nonobjecting party’s potential indirect benefit from an objection 

creates an interest in the objection substantial enough to be

aggrieved by, and appeal, its denial without the objecting party’s 

involvement. This would undermine and be contrary to the right 

to litigate the objection outside of the general adjudication 

without the non-objecting party’s involvement.

9 The exception we recognized in that case was the district 

court’s “authority [under Utah Code section 73-4-10] to grant a 

retroactive extension to the objection period . . . when a water 

claimant can show due cause justifying the objection’s 

untimeliness.” In re Gen. Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 

2004 UT 106, ¶ 41.
ENERVEST v. UTAH STATE ENGINEER

Opinion of the Court

16

¶41 It is clear from the record, and EnerVest does not dispute, 

that EnerVest’s predecessor in interest did not file an objection to 

the proposed determination. Therefore, EnerVest is a claimant 

that allowed its time period to lapse. However, EnerVest’s 

position might doubly undermine the goal of certainty. EnerVest 

is only claiming two of the twelve water rights allocated to Minnie 

Maud, water rights 90-24 and 90-196. According to EnerVest, it 

“owns all the lands comprising the authorized places of use for” 

those two water rights. It is unclear whether objections were ever 

filed that directly challenge Minnie Maud’s rights to those two 

water rights,10 especially given that EnerVest’s predecessors in 

interest—the landowners with interests in receiving those two 

water rights associated with their land—never filed an objection. 

If no objections filed actually challenge Minnie Maud’s right to 

water rights 90-24 and 90-196, not only would Minnie Maud be 

subject to attack by a claimant who allowed its objection period to 

expire, but also subject to attack on otherwise uncontested water 

rights.11 Opening up water right owners to these types of attacks 

undercuts the objective of establishing certainty through a general 

adjudication, so we decline to recognize EnerVest as having such 

an interest in another party’s objection. And therefore EnerVest 

cannot be aggrieved for purposes of appeal.

¶42 For these three reasons, EnerVest cannot have a sufficient 

interest in another party’s objection to be aggrieved by the denial 

of that objection for the purposes of appellate standing. While it 

may technically be the case that EnerVest would benefit from the 

district court granting the objections and stripping Minnie Maud 

of its water rights under the proposed determination, EnerVest, as 

a defaulting party, lacks the legal ability to argue that it is entitled 

to more rights than those to which it acquiesced when it failed to 

object to the proposed determination. And, without the 

__________________________________________________________

10 For example, the Hammerschmid objection challenges the 

state engineer’s determination that Minnie Maud was the owner 

of water rights 90-188 and 90-189—rights associated with land

being sold to the Hammerschmids.

11 We have never considered whether an objection can be used, 

either by the objector or by another claimant, to attack otherwise 

uncontested water rights under a proposed determination. While 

we need not decide that issue today, we flag it for future cases.
Cite as: 2018 UT 55

Opinion of the Court

17

participation of the objector, it cannot champion the objection on 

appeal.

¶43 This does not mean, as EnerVest suggests, that a 

non-objecting party could never appeal a district court’s ruling on 

an objection.12 There will often be times that claimants receive 

exactly that which they request and the proposed determination 

directly reflects the entirety of the claim they filed. In that case, 

such claimants will have no reason to object and will become, in a 

sense, defaulting parties. However, if an objection is made on the 

water rights they receive under the proposed determination, and 

the court grants the objection in a way that negatively impacts the 

water rights the defaulting party is to receive under the proposed 

determination, those claimants will be aggrieved by the district 

court’s decision and can appeal. A party would also have 

standing to challenge a district court’s decision deeming it a 

non-objecting (defaulting) party. See VP Props. & Devs., LLP v. 

Seneca Specialty Ins. Co., 645 F. App’x 912, 915 (11th Cir. 2016) 

(noting that a defaulting party has “standing to appeal the default 

judgment against it”).

¶44 Similarly, if a claimant timely objects to a proposed 

determination and the district court does not grant the objection 

__________________________________________________________

12 Specifically, EnerVest notes that, “[a]ccording to [Carlson], 

had the court granted EnerVest’s motion, he—as a claimant and 

not an objector—would have no appellate standing.” EnerVest 

could be right. Carlson has been acting on his own behalf, and not 

derivatively on Minnie Maud’s behalf. See Torian v. Craig, 2012 UT 

63, ¶ 16, 289 P.3d 479 (recognizing that a shareholder can only sue 

individually, rather than derivatively, if it can show “an injury to 

him- or herself that is distinct from that suffered by the 

corporation” (citation omitted)); cf. Richardson v. Ariz. Fuels Corp., 

614 P.2d 636, 638–39 (Utah 1980) (“A class action and a derivative 

action rest upon fundamentally different principles of substantive 

law; to ignore those differences is not a minor procedural 

solecism. . . . Suits which are said to be derivative . . . are those 

which seek to enforce any right which belongs to the corporation 

and is not being enforced . . . .” (citation omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Carlson would have to show that he 

was personally injured by the district court’s modification to the 

rights in the proposed determination in order to have standing to 

appeal.
ENERVEST v. UTAH STATE ENGINEER

Opinion of the Court

18

(and the corresponding water rights) in its entirety, that claimant 

will likewise be aggrieved and able to appeal. But EnerVest does 

not fit into any of these categories and therefore is not aggrieved 

by the district court’s decision.

CONCLUSION

¶45 EnerVest failed to file a timely objection to the proposed 

determination. While EnerVest may technically benefit from other 

parties’ objections, it became a defaulting party that lacks a 

sufficient interest in those objections to be aggrieved by their 

denial for the purpose of appellate standing. It may be that a 

non-objecting party’s interests can piggyback on another party’s 

objection, but only as far as the objecting party is willing to travel. 

Once the objecting party chooses to end its objection’s journey, the 

non-objecting party cannot take over.

¶46 The district court’s rule 54(b) certification was insufficient 

to confer appellate jurisdiction upon this court because the 

requirements for certification were not met, and therefore there is 

no final judgment for our review. Having determined that 

EnerVest lacks appellate standing because it is not an aggrieved 

party, we decline to exercise our discretion to treat this appeal as a 

petition for interlocutory appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal 

for lack of appellate jurisdiction.