Uzbekistan

S

ince independence in 1992, Uzbekistan has emerged as a highly authoritarian state in which human rights, 

including freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief, are not 

respected. In addition to a restrictive law 

on religion that severely limits the ability of religious communities to function 

in Uzbekistan, the Uzbek government continues to exercise a high degree of control 

over the manner in which the Islamic faith 

is practiced. Government authorities also 

continue to crack down harshly on Muslim individuals, groups, and mosques that 

do not conform to government-prescribed 

practices or that the government claims 

are associated with extremist political 

programs. This has resulted in the imprisonment of thousands of persons in recent 

years, many of whom are denied the right to 

due process, and there are credible reports 

that many of those arrested continue to be 

tortured or beaten in detention. Though 

security threats do exist in Uzbekistan, 

including from members of Hizb ut-Tahrir 

(Party of Liberation) and other groups that 

claim a religious linkage, these threats do not 

excuse or justify the scope and harshness of 

the government’s ill treatment of religious 

believers. Due to its concerns about the status of freedom and belief in Uzbekistan, the 

United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom issued a report and recommendations on Uzbekistan in May 2002 

and placed Uzbekistan on its Watch List. In 

May 2005, the Commission recommended 

that Uzbekistan be designated a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC, pursuant to 

the International Religious Freedom Act of 

1998 (IRFA).

The Commission visited Uzbekistan in 

October 2004. In the Uzbek capital of Tashkent, a delegation consisting of Commission 

Chair Preeta D. Bansal, Vice Chair Felice D. 

Gaer, and Commissioner Bishop Ricardo 

Ramirez held an intensive series of discussions with senior offi cials of the Foreign, 

Internal Affairs, and Justice Ministries; the 

Presidential Administration; the Committee on Religious Affairs; and the Parliamentary Ombudsman’s offi ce. The delegation 

also met with representatives of the Islamic, 

Jewish, Christian, and other religious communities, Uzbek human rights activists and 

public defenders, victims of repression and 

their families, representatives of Western 

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 

that are active in Uzbekistan, and U.S. 

Embassy personnel, including U.S. Ambassador John Purnell. In addition to Tashkent, 

the Commission visited the cities of Samarkand, Ferghana, Margilon, and Andijon, 

where the delegation met with regional 

offi cials, human rights activists, and local 

religious leaders.

The visit to Uzbekistan took place as 

part of the Commission’s annual review 

process to determine which countries are 

recommended to the Department of State 

for designation as CPCs. IRFA defi nes 

CPCs as countries whose governments 

are responsible for, or have tolerated, systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom. As a result of its 

monitoring activities, the Commission has 

concluded that the government of Uzbekistan is responsible for severe human rights 

violations, including freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief, and recommends that the country be designated a 

CPC. The Commission’s CPC recommendation for Uzbekistan should not in any way 

be construed as a defense of Hizb ut-Tahrir, 

an extremist and highly intolerant organization that promotes hatred against moderate Muslims, the West, Jews, and others.

Severe Violations of Human 

Rights, including the Use of 

Torture, and Violations of Due 

Process Rights

Over the past 10 years, and particularly since 

1999, the Uzbek government has arrested 

and imprisoned, with sentences of up to 20 

years, thousands of Muslims who exercise 

their faith outside the state’s control over 

religious practice or who the government 

claims are associated with extremist groups. 

There are, according to the State Department’s 2004 Country Reports on Human 

Rights Practices, approximately 5,500 such 

prisoners in Uzbekistan. Because the Uzbek 

criminal justice system is neither transparent nor independent, it is impossible to know 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

800 North Capitol Street, NW Suite 790

Washington, DC 20002

SPRING 2005

P O L I C Y 

F O C U S

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2

...the U.S. government 

should try to make 

unequivocally clear 

to the Uzbek government 

that its human rights 

practices are 

unacceptable and violate 

international law.
fully the basis on which these people have 

been detained. Nevertheless, the monitoring activities of the State Department, as well 

as domestic and international human rights 

organizations, conclude that many of these 

prisoners have been convicted on charges 

that relate to their religious beliefs, practices, 

or alleged association, and not on specific evidence of advocacy of, or engagement in, acts 

of violence. In 2004 alone, over 200 Muslims 

were convicted allegedly because of their 

religious beliefs or affiliations or purported 

contact with prohibited organizations that 

claim a religious affiliation. 

Confessions are the main evidence 

used to convict persons accused of membership in suspect organizations. Such confessions are often obtained before the accused 

has gained access to a lawyer or doctor and 

frequently result from ill-treatment or torture. Interlocutors told the Commission 

that prosecutors in Uzbekistan are under 

pressure to obtain convictions. A father of 

a Muslim prisoner told the Commission 

delegation that his son, “covered in blood,” 

had finally confessed to being a member of 

a banned organization. Further, according 

to the father, a prosecutor told him that his 

son’s name had “been on the list” and that 

if he not given the order for his arrest, the 

prosecutor would have lost his job. 

Uzbekistan does face threats to its 

security from certain political groups that 

claim religious affiliations and that have 

used violence against it in the past, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. 

Another group, Hizb ut-Tahrir, which 

has sanctioned violence but purports not 

to engage in violence itself, espouses the 

establishment of a world-wide caliphate 

without any democratic or constitutional 

process, and the imposition of an extremist 

interpretation of Islamic law which would 

condone punishments such as flogging, 

amputation, and stoning to death. Hizb utTahrir, already banned in some countries, 

including Russia and Germany, because of 

its promotion of intolerance, distributes 

literature which, according to the State 

Department, includes “much anti-western, 

anti-Semitic and anti-democratic rhetoric.” 

The Commission’s CPC recommendation 

for Uzbekistan should not be construed as 

a defense of Hizb ut-Tahrir.

 Nevertheless, the government’s arrest 

of so many Muslims, the use of torture, and 

the large proportion of convictions based 

solely on confession, indicate that gravely 

troubling violations of freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief have been 

occurring in that country. The Commission 

repeatedly was told by human rights activists and others that the brutal government 

policies are counterproductive, serving to 

generate support for these extremist, underground groups. The Uzbek government is 

reported to subject suspected Hizb ut-Tahrir members to harsh treatment, including 

prison terms of up to 20 years for thousands 

of alleged members. Yet, those who monitor 

human rights practices in Uzbekistan have 

concluded that the state has not accused 

those arrested of involvement in specific 

violent acts, nor offered material evidence 

that its members have perpetrated any such 

acts. Moreover, many of those arrested are 

not members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, but are 

detained and charged solely on the basis of 

possessing the group’s literature, which, the 

Commission was told during its visit, frequently is planted on them at the time of 

their arrest.

Uzbek human rights activists reported 

to the Commission that a defendant’s lawyer frequently is denied access to his or 

her client until after a confession has been 

obtained, although technically, such access 

should be granted within 24 hours under 

Uzbek law. Others described a widespread 

reliance on “guilt by association,” a tactic 

whereby members of the same family are 

arrested and sentenced for alleged involvement with proscribed religious organizations, beliefs, or practices. Any outward 

display of piety can arouse governmental 

suspicion. According to an Uzbek lawyer 

with whom the Commission spoke, the 

wearing of certain religious garb often 

results in that person and members of his or 

her family being placed on lists of pious—

and therefore suspect—Muslims. 

The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture concluded in his February 2003 report 

on Uzbekistan that “torture or similar 

ill-treatment is systematic” and that the 

“pervasive and persistent nature of torture 

throughout the investigative process cannot be denied.” The report also pointed 

out that “the practice of maintaining families in a state of uncertainty with a view 

to punishing or intimidating them and 

others ...amount[s] to cruel and inhuman 

treatment.” International specialists on torture, Uzbek human rights activists and relatives of prisoners all have noted that they 

have seen the signs of torture on the bodies 

PREETA D. BANSAL, CHAIR

Of Counsel, Skadden, Arps, Slate, 

Meagher & Flom

FELICE D. GAER, VICE CHAIR

Director, Jacob Blaustein Institute for 

the Advancement of Human Rights, The 

American Jewish Committee 

NINA SHEA, VICE CHAIR

Director of the Center for Religious Freedom, 

Freedom House

KHALED ABOU EL FADL, 

COMMISSIONER

Professor of Law, UCLA

ARCHBISHOP CHARLES J. CHAPUT, 

COMMISSIONER

Archbishop of Denver

MICHAEL CROMARTIE, 

COMMISSIONER 

Vice President, 

Ethics and Public Policy Center

ELIZABETH H. PRODROMOU, 

COMMISSIONER

Associate Director of the Institute on 

Culture, Religion, and World Affairs 

and Assistant Professor of International 

Relations, Boston University 

BISHOP RICARDO RAMIREZ, 

COMMISSIONER

Bishop of the Diocese of Las Cruces, 

New Mexico

MICHAEL K. YOUNG, 

COMMISSIONER

President, The University Of Utah

JOHN V. HANFORD III, 

EX-OFFICIO, 

NON-VOTING COMMISSIONER

Ambassador-at-Large for International 

Religious Freedom, U.S. Department of State

JOSEPH R. CRAPA, 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

P O L I C Y F O C U S

visit our web site at 

www.uscirf.gov

COMMISSIONERS

2

USCIRF

CONTINUED ON PAGE 3
The Commission recognizes that U.S. policy towards Uzbekistan reflects a variety of U.S. 

interests, including security and other concerns; nevertheless, the U.S. government should 

try to make unequivocally clear to the Uzbek government that its human rights practices are unacceptable and violate international law. To this end, the Commission makes the 

following recommendations.

I. The U.S. government should ensure that it speaks in a unified voice in its relations 

with the Uzbek government. 

Recommendation 1. Uzbekistan should be designated a “country of particular concern” under the 

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). 

Recommendation 2. U.S. statements and actions should be coordinated across agencies to ensure 

that U.S. concerns about human rights conditions in Uzbekistan are reflected in all dealings with the 

Uzbek government.

Recommendation 3. U.S. assistance to the Uzbek government, with the exception of assistance to 

improve humanitarian conditions and advance human rights, should be made contingent upon establishing and implementing a specific timetable for the government to take concrete steps to improve 

conditions of freedom of religion or belief and observe international human rights standards. Initial 

steps by the Uzbek government should include:

(a) ending reliance on convictions based solely on confessions, a practice that often is linked to ill treatment of prisoners; implementing the recommendations of the UN Committee against Torture (June 

2002) and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (February 2003);

(b) halting the detention and imprisonment of persons on account of their religious beliefs 

and practices;

(c) establishing a mechanism to review the cases of persons previously detained under suspicion of, 

or charged with, religious, political, or security offenses, including Articles 159 (criminalizing 

“anti-state activity”) and 216 (criminalizing membership in a “ forbidden religious organization”), and releasing any of those who have been imprisoned solely because of their religious 

beliefs or practices as well as any others who have been unjustly detained or sentenced; 

(d) making public a list of specific and detailed information about individuals who are currently 

detained under these articles or imprisoned following conviction;

(e) implementing the recommendations of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE) Panel of Experts on Religion and Belief to revise the 1998 Law on Freedom of Worship and 

Religious Organizations to bring it into accordance with international standards;

(f) registering religious groups that comply with the legal requirements; 

(g) ensuring that every religious prisoner has access to his or her family, adequate medical care, 

and a lawyer, as specified in international human rights instruments, including Article 14 of the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and 

(h) allowing prisoners to practice their religion while in detention, to the fullest extent compatible 

with the specific nature of their detention.

The Commission recognizes the Uzbek government’s duty to protect public safety and order 

by targeting groups that have engaged in violence, but the United States must stand firmly against 

policies and actions that amount to the criminalization of religious belief and practice.

Recommendation 4. U.S. security and other forms of assistance should continue to be scrutinized 

to ensure that this assistance does not go to Uzbek government agencies, such as certain branches of 

the Interior Ministry and the Justice Ministry, which have been found to be responsible for religious 

freedom violations.

Recommendation 5. The U.S. government should reinstate Uzbek-language radio broadcasts at the 

Voice of America (VOA), and should use VOA and other appropriate avenues of public diplomacy to 

explain to the people of Uzbekistan why religious freedom is an important element of U.S. foreign 

policy as well as specific concerns about religious freedom in their country.

Recommendation 6. “American corner” reading rooms should be established in various regions 

of Uzbekistan, including Tashkent. Such reading rooms should include materials on democracy, 

civic education, human rights, the role of religion in society and other relevant topics. 

Commission 

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S 

For U.S. Policy

CONTINUED ON BACK OF FLAP
II. The U.S. government should encourage gr

human rights record.

Recommendation 7. The U.S. government sho

concerns in appropriate international fora such 

it should facilitate the participation of Uzbek h

rights mechanisms.

Recommendation 8. The U.S. government sho

Center in Tashkent, including the collection of m

staff member in the OSCE Center in Tashkent for 

report to the OSCE Tolerance Unit in the Office 

in Warsaw. 

Recommendation 9. The U.S. government should 

Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion or Belie

the full and necessary conditions for such a visit.

III. The U.S. government should support Uz

religious freedom initiatives. 

Recommendation 10. The U.S. government shou

of U.S. NGOs and the numerous new restrictions pl

rescinded, the U.S. government should make clear t

Uzbek bilateral relationship, including a ban on high

Recommendation 11. The U.S. Embassy in Tash

tus of individuals who are arrested for alleged religi

tinue its efforts to improve the situation of Uzbek 

registration of human rights groups and religious c

Recommendation 12. The U.S. government sho

Uzbekistan designed to encourage the creation of in

and promote religious freedom. This assistance cou

and criminal investigation for police and other law en

attempted in the past with little effect, they should b

monitored and conditioned upon fulfillment of, the

12a. Legal assistance programs for Uzbek relatives 

arrestees. Such programs should be continued 

12b. “Train-the-trainer” legal assistance programs 

the registration process should be expanded.

12c. The Democracy and Conflict Mitigation 

Development and the Democracy Commissio

Embassy should specify freedom of religion or 

of activity. 

12d. The U.S. government should encourage the Uz

of national and local public roundtables betwe

society on freedom of religion. 

Recommendation 13. The U.S. government shou

for Uzbek human rights advocates and religious figu

13a. expand exchange programs for Uzbek religious 

communities; US participants should include 

and law; 

13b. follow-up on exchange programs in Uzbekista

NGO development; conflict-resolution and so

13c. expand exchange programs for Uzbek human 

international conferences and opportunities to 

13d. vigorously protest whenever an Uzbek particip

with the Uzbek authorities upon return to Uz

Uzbek authorities that there will be negative c

relations, including a ban on high-level meetin

RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED
U Z B E K I S T A N

USCIRF or corpses of prisoners. Access to the trials 

of the accused is often denied by the Uzbek 

authorities and relatives frequently face difficulties in ascertaining the whereabouts of 

their imprisoned family members. 

Uzbek human rights activists told the 

Commission that even after the publication 

of the report of the UN Special Rapporteur 

on Torture, reliance on the use of torture 

in detention has not decreased. Indeed, 

one Uzbek human rights lawyer said that 

methods of torture have become “more 

advanced.” In his report, the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Torture recommended to the 

Uzbek authorities that they should “review 

cases of convictions based solely on confessions...recognizing that many of these may 

have been based upon evidence obtained 

through torture or ill-treatment, and, as 

appropriate, provide prompt and impartial 

investigations and take appropriate remedial measures.” The Commission was told 

by non-official sources that the practice of 

relying almost exclusively on confessions 

for convictions ensures the continued use of 

torture. Uzbek officials informed the Commission that a law had recently been passed 

against relying solely on confessions for 

convictions, but those officials were unable 

to produce a copy of this law, and no other 

interlocutors with whom the Commission 

spoke were aware of its existence. In March 

2005, the Uzbek government sent a press 

release to the Commission detailing the 

administrative and legal measures that it 

claims to have implemented in response to 

the criticism by the UN Special Rapporteur 

on Torture. The practice of torture, however, has not, by all accounts, ceased.

In recent years, President Karimov 

has instituted regular amnesties of prisoners, often involving tens of thousands of 

persons. The amnesty requirements, however, are usually extremely restrictive and 

human rights groups in Uzbekistan have 

criticized these provisions for making it virtually impossible for religious prisoners to 

be included. For example, amnesty decrees 

state that only those who have taken the 

“path of correction” and have “demonstrated constructive repentance”—which must 

be confirmed by the administration of the 

correctional facility—can be considered for 

pardon. According to Uzbek human rights 

organizations, this provision may be open 

to abuse, as the conditions for establishing 

repentance often depend on the payment of 

bribes to the prison authorities. Moreover, 

many political and religious prisoners did 

not admit at their trials to being guilty, but 

would be forced to admit guilt in order to 

gain release. In addition, amnesties apply 

only to those with prison terms of fewer 

than six years, which rules out most religious prisoners, since they typically have 

received longer terms of imprisonment. 

Finally, the Commission was told that in 

order to qualify for an amnesty, prisoners 

are often forced—sometimes through beatings—to renounce their religious faith.

Strict Government Controls on 

Religious Education and Practice

There are no official statistics on religious 

affiliation in Uzbekistan. It is estimated that 

approximately 90 percent of the population 

is nominally Sunni Muslim, with a small 

Shi’a minority. The remaining 10 percent 

of the country’s population adheres to various other religious denominations, primarily Russian Orthodox; there is also a small 

Jewish community. In recent years, there 

has been a religious resurgence, particularly 

among the rural population. The emigration 

of Slavs and Jews from Uzbekistan has resulted in a decrease in the numbers of Russian 

Orthodox and Jewish adherents.

There essentially are no outlets for 

Muslims to learn about or practice their 

faith other than opportunities those provided by the government, which oversees 

Islamic practice and worship through an 

administrative body known as the Muslim 

Spiritual Board, a relic of the Soviet past. A 

number of interlocutors told the Commission that the government, through the Muslim Spiritual Board, determines the topics 

of the Friday sermons and requires that 

imams adhere to these prescribed subjects. 

Moreover, Uzbek citizens are permitted to 

go on the haj to Mecca only after obtaining permission from the Muslim Spiritual 

Board. The government also strictly monitors the activities of the country’s imams. 

The Commission delegation experienced 

this directly during its visit to Uzbekistan, 

when certain officials from the Uzbek Interior Ministry insisted on being present 

at the Commission’s meetings with local 

imams in Samarkand and in cities in the 

Ferghana Valley.

In addition, in its effort to maintain 

tighter control on Islamic practice, the government has been closing down mosques 

throughout the country in recent years. 

Before 1998, there reportedly were 5,000 

functioning mosques in Uzbekistan; today, 

an Uzbek official told the Commission, the 

country has a total of 2,000 open mosques. 

This strict governmental control over 

the content and character of Islamic teaching, worship, and practice has led some in 

Uzbekistan, particularly among the young, 

to seek alternative voices and sources 

of religious authority. The Commission 

delegation heard from many interlocutors 

3

CONTINUED ON PAGE 4

USCIRF delegation meets with an imam from the Shia Community in Samarkand
that the absence of permitted religious alternatives generates support for underground 

groups, including Hizb ut-Tahrir, many of 

which preach an extremist and intolerant 

understanding of Islam. 

The Uzbek Religion Law

Uzbekistan’s 1998 law on religion continues to be used by government authorities 

to deny registration to numerous religious 

groups in Uzbekistan, particularly minority religious communities, resulting in 

an effective ban on the activities of these 

groups. At present, some 100 unregistered 

religious communities—of all faiths—are 

seeking registration. During its meetings 

with Uzbek officials, the Commission delegation expressed concern over registration 

difficulties encountered by numerous religious communities, including the Urgench 

Baptist church in the city of Urgench; the 

International Church of Tashkent; the Mir 

(Peace) Presbyterian Church in Nukus; the 

United Church of Evangelical Christians/

Baptists in Tashkent; the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Bukhara and in Tashkent; the Full 

Gospel Pentecostal Church in Andijon; the 

Church of Jesus Christ in Gazalkent, and 

the Guliston Baptist Church. None of the 

registration cases raised by the Commission 

during its October 2004 visit are known to 

have been positively resolved, despite the 

pledges of a number of Uzbek officials that 

efforts would be made to that effect.

The Commission delegation learned 

first-hand that the onerous requirements of 

the Uzbek religion law continue to be used 

to prevent many religious groups from registering and thus operating legally. Representatives of various Protestant groups, Jewish 

organizations, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, 

and others recounted to the Commission 

delegation how their registration applications repeatedly are rejected by the authorities, often with the imposition of a new or 

capricious requirement that forces them to 

revise and resubmit their application. As a 

result, numerous groups are caught in what 

appears to be a deliberately contrived Catch 

22: despite good faith efforts, the groups cannot gain registration. As a result, members 

of some of these groups are then routinely 

raided, fined, and often physically harassed 

by the police if they meet privately in homes 

on the charge that their activities are illegal 

because they are unregistered. The Commission delegation met with the Greater Grace 

Church in Samarkand, which has attempted 

to apply for registration three times; the 

church was told that it should remove all 

ethnic Uzbek names from its application for 

registration and that the head of its congregation must be an Uzbek citizen, otherwise, 

the application would never be accepted. The 

Greater Grace Church has been subjected 

to police raids, threatened with arrests, and 

its members have been branded as “terrorists” by local officials, who grouped these 

unregistered communities together with 

others banned for promoting hate or violence. Other unregistered religious groups, 

such as Jewish organizations, have also been 

subjected to police raids, the Commission 

was told.

The Uzbek government invited the 

Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Panel of Experts on 

Religion and Belief to analyze the Uzbek 

religion law to see how it accords with 

international human rights norms. In June 

2003, the OSCE Panel made numerous 

critical observations about the Uzbek religion law, including that: the formulation of 

limitations on freedom of religion does not 

accord with international law; the bans on 

private religious education, on the involvement of minors in religious organizations, 

and on proselytism, breach international 

standards; and the vague formulation that 

religion cannot be used for anti-state and 

anti-constitutional propaganda is problematic and should be replaced. In addition, the 

following provisions of the 1998 law were 

found to fall short of international norms: 

that a religious body only has the status of 

legal person after it is registered with the 

Ministry of Justice; that a court is not given 

the exclusive right to decide whether to halt 

the activity of a religious body; the ban on 

the public wearing of religious attire except 

by religious figures; and the vaguely defined 

powers of the expert body which has been 

granted authority to examine and ban 

imported religious literature. A high-ranking Uzbek official told the Commission delegation that he had “no problems” with “90 

percent” of the OSCE recommendations 

(with the significant exception of the OSCE 

finding on private religious education, 

which Uzbek authorities attempt to justify 

by maintaining that young people should 

obtain “proper”—that is, state-provided—

religious education). He added, however, 

that these reforms could, “at the earliest,” 

be implemented by the end of 2005, because 

they would require parliamentary action. 

Similar promises by Uzbek officials, however, have not led to specific improvements. 

Religion and the Criminal Code

Many of those arrested and accused of 

“extremism” in Uzbekistan are charged 

under certain articles of the criminal code 

that penalize membership in “forbidden 

organizations.” In violation of international 

human rights law, the Uzbek criminal code 

contains three articles that are, in fact, used 

to penalize membership in religious organizations or individual religious or other 

opinions or beliefs. These three articles carry 

maximum prison sentences of 20 years and 

reflect the criminalization of religious activity apparent in the 1998 religion law, since 

they punish unregistered religious activity 

on an equal footing with such offenses as 

corruption or organized crime, even if the 

alleged religious acts do not involve violence 

or the advocacy of violence. 

P O L I C Y F O C U S

4

USCIRF

Founder, Imomi Osim mosque-madrassa 

in Andijon, Ferghana Valley, which was 

closed by the government
USCIRF

5

• Article 216, adopted in 1998, sets a possible five-year prison term for participation in “illegal” religious activities. 

This applies not only to “the organization of forbidden social associations 

and religious organizations,” but also to 

the “inclination to participation” in the 

activities of a forbidden religious organization. A 1999 amendment drew a 

sharper distinction between “illegal”—

those not properly registered—and 

“prohibited” groups, that is, those that 

are banned altogether. Participation in 

“prohibited” groups may result in prison terms of up to 20 years and confiscation of property.

• Article 244-2 states that “setting up, 

leading and participating in religious 

extremist, separatist, fundamentalist 

or other banned organizations are punishable by five to 15 years of imprisonment with confiscation of property.” 

The same actions, if they entail “serious 

consequences,” are punishable by 15 to 

20 years of imprisonment with confiscation of property. 

• Article 159 refers to the general crime 

of anti-state activity and “encroachment upon the constitutional system 

of the Republic of Uzbekistan.” This 

article is so broad in its formulation that 

it is used against those not detained or 

charged under articles 216 or 244. Individuals found guilty under this article 

are eligible for prison terms ranging 

from five to ten years, but alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir deemed to have 

engaged in conspiracy may be imprisoned for up to 20 years. Since there is 

no further delineation of the activities criminalized under Article 159, it 

is often deployed to target anyone who 

opposes government policies, including 

membership in extremist Islamist organizations such as the Islamic Movement 

of Uzbekistan. In fact, Article 159 is also 

deployed against those Muslims who 

choose to practice religion in a place or 

manner not controlled by the state-controlled Muslim Spiritual Board. Many 

of those found guilty under Article 

159 reportedly hold opinions deemed 

unacceptable by the government; however, evidence of violent activity or 

advocacy of violence against the state is 

rarely produced. 

In 1998, the Uzbek criminal code was 

amended to include a provision, Article 

244-1, making possession and distribution 

of literature containing ideas of “religious 

extremism, separatism, and fundamentalism” a serious offense. Under the new 

Article 244-1, producing and storing, with 

the goal of actual distribution, materials 

that contain “ideas of religious extremism, 

separatism and fundamentalism” became 

punishable by up to three years in prison. 

Actual distribution of literature deemed 

to fall into one of these categories carries 

with it a maximum sentence of five years 

in prison. If religious literature is disseminated “under aggravating circumstances,” 

(by which is meant distribution after agreement by a group, the result of official position, or using financial assistance from a 

religious organization, foreign state, group, 

or person), then the alleged offense is 

punishable by up to eight years in prison. 

Nowhere are these terms and phrases further defined. 

The overwhelming majority of the 

estimated 5,500 religious prisoners in 

Uzbekistan today were convicted under the 

criminal code articles delineated above.

Increasing Problems for 

Domestic and International 

Human Rights Groups 

Efforts to improve human rights conditions 

in Uzbekistan are hampered by the state’s 

tight control on information and association. 

Registered domestic groups include the Independent Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, Ezgulik (affiliated with the opposition 

political party Birlik), the Committee for 

Protection of Individual Rights, and the 

Legal Aid Society. Other human rights 

groups, including the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, Mazlum (affiliated with 

the opposition political party Erk), and the 

Mothers Against the Death Penalty and Torture, have not been granted registration but 

are still able to function, although they face 

obstacles in renting offices and cannot open 

bank accounts, making it difficult to receive 

funds from abroad. In February 2004, the 

Ministry of Justice issued an official warning 

to Ezgulik after the group reported on possible government abuse of an Uzbek prisoner 

who died in custody. Also in February 2004, 

a “banking decree” was passed that has been 

enforced selectively to prevent registered and 

unregistered NGOs from receiving funding 

from abroad. 

The few domestic organizations that 

do manage to operate openly in Uzbekistan labor under strict governmentimposed constraints. An example of the 

heavy-handed tactics the government 

employs is the Commission’s experience 

in the city of Ferghana, where Uzbek security agents made overt efforts to disrupt the 

U Z B E K I S T A N

CONTINUED ON PAGE 6

Registan Square in Samarkand
visit our web site at 

www.uscirf.gov

TO CONTACT THE COMMISSION:

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

800 North Capitol St., NW, Suite 790

Washington, DC 20002

Web site: www.uscirf.gov

E-mail: communications@uscirf.gov

Voice: 202-523-3240 

Fax: 202-523-5020

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

6

USCIRF delegation’s meeting with an Uzbek human 

rights activist, former prisoner, and other 

victims of repression.

Since 2003, the Uzbek government 

has adopted new laws and regulations that 

severely curtail the activities of international NGOs operating in Uzbekistan. In 

late 2003, the Uzbek government required a 

number of international NGOs to reregister with the Ministry of Justice, rather than 

with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as had 

previously been the case. The Ministry of 

Justice subsequently introduced complex 

new administrative requirements for the 

visas of representatives of these organizations, along with onerous new financial and 

other reporting requirements that effectively 

hindered these groups’ ability to work effectively, particularly with local partners. In 

December 2003, criminal code articles dealing with treason and espionage were amended to include specific references to “foreign 

organizations or their representatives,” 

expanding the definition of treason and 

espionage potentially to include what would 

otherwise be considered ordinary or necessary activities of Uzbek citizens working for 

western NGOs.

In April 2004, the Ministry of Justice 

refused to reregister the Uzbek branch of 

the New York-based Open Society Institute (OSI), in effect terminating its Uzbek 

operations, alleging that OSI had engaged 

in subversive activities, such as supplying 

teaching materials that discredited government policies. In May, the Ministry of 

Justice publicly criticized the congressionally-funded National Democratic Institute 

(NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) for working with unregistered 

political parties in Uzbekistan; by March 

2005, however, the representatives of both 

organizations had been granted visas by the 

Uzbek authorities. In September, the Ministry of Justice suspended for six months 

Internews Uzbekistan, a local, western 

affiliated, journalism-training NGO, and in 

late 2004, Uzbek authorities froze the bank 

account of Internews’ international branch. 

As of the time this report was published, 

Freedom House and Human Rights Watch 

continue to operate in Uzbekistan. 

U.S.–Uzbek Bilateral Relations

The U.S. government has a multi-faceted 

relationship with the Uzbek government, 

as set forth in the bilateral Declaration on 

the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation 

Framework, signed on April 7, 2002. In 

addition to “combating international terrorism,” the agreement reaffirms a commitment to “the principles of international law 

and human rights set forth in both United 

Nations and Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) documents.” The State Department and the U.S. 

Embassy in Tashkent conduct a wide range 

of programs in Uzbekistan, many reflecting 

human rights and religious freedom issues. 

The Commission is concerned that 

in its dealings with the Uzbek government, 

the U.S. government does not always pursue 

a coordinated policy or send a consistent 

message with regard to Uzbek human rights 

practices. For example, in July 2004, the Secretary of State refused to certify Uzbekistan 

as meeting human rights criteria set forth in 

Section 568 (a) of the FY 04 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and declined to 

make $18 million in FY 04 financial assistance available to the Uzbek government. 

Yet, exactly one month later, General Richard Myers, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, traveled to Uzbekistan, praised the 

Uzbek government for its assistance in “antiterror operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,” 

and announced that the U.S. Department 

of Defense would provide the government 

of Uzbekistan with $21 million in military 

assistance. Referring to Myers’ action during the Commission visit, a high-ranking 

Uzbek official asked the Commission delegation which agency of the U.S. government 

reflected actual American policy towards 

his country. õ

USCIRF delegation with U.S. Ambassador John Purnell (center) and Uzbekistan’s First 

Deputy Foreign Minister (second from right) 

1 With regard to the ban on religious clothing in public, the UN 

Human Rights Committee recently ruled, in a case brought before 

it by an Uzbek citizen, that “the freedom to manifest one’s religion 

encompasses the right to wear clothes or attire in public which is in 

conformity with the individual’s faith or religion.” The Committee 

went on to say that “to prevent a person from wearing religious 

clothing in public or private may constitute a violation of article 

18, paragraph 2, which prohibits any coercion that would impair 

the individual’s freedom to have or adopt a religion.” (CCPR/C/82/

D/931/2000, January 18, 2005.)

For further information on this issue, contact:

CATHERINE COSMAN, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST

202-523-3240, ext. 25 • ccosman@uscirf.gov