NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARLON BLACHER ,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. B. DIEBALL, Correctional Sergeant, individually and in his official capacity; ELVIN VALENZUELA, Warden, individually and in his official capacity,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 16

- 56667 D.C. No. 2:14

- cv - 07985

- GW

- AGR

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 23, 2017 ** Before: LEAVY , WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges. Marlon Blacher , a California state prisoner, appeals pr o se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations related to an administrative rule violation . We have jurisdiction under

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

NOV 2 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 56667

28 U.S. C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule o f Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler , 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010)

. We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Enlow v. S alem

- Keizer Yellow Cab
Co. , 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm. The district court properly dismiss ed Blacher’s due process claim against defendant Dieball because Blacher failed to allege facts sufficient to show a protected liberty interest or “atypical and significant hardship

. ” Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472, 483

- 85 (1995) (a prisoner has no protected liberty interest when the sanction imposed neither extends the length of his sentence nor imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”); Serrano v. Francis , 345 F.3d 1071 , 107 7

- 78 (9th Cir. 2003) (due process procedural protections “adhere only when the disciplinary action implicates a protected liberty interest”)

. Dismissal of Blacher’s First Amendment retaliation claim was proper because Blacher failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Dieball’ s actions did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution

. See Watison v. Carter , 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth elements of a First Ame ndment retaliation claim in the prison context).3 16

- 56667

The district court properly dismissed Blacher’s Eighth Amendment claim because Blacher failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Dieball acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of ser ious harm. See Farmer v.
Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 8 3 7 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”). The district court properly dismissed Blacher’s e qual p rotection claim because Blacher failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Dieball discriminated against him based on his race

. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab. , 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013) ( “To prevail on an Equal Protection claim brought under § 1983, [plaintiff] must allege facts plausibly showing that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [ him ] based upon membership in a protected class.” (citations and int ernal quotation marks omitted))

. The district court properly dismissed Blacher’s due process claim against defendant Valenzuela because Blacher failed to allege facts sufficient to show a protected liberty interest. See Ramirez v. Galaza , 334 F.3d 850, 8 60 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”).4 16

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D ismiss al of Blacher’s “ conflict of interest s ” claim was proper because Blacher failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See Hebbe , 627 F.3d at 341

- 42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim)

. The district court properly dismissed Blacher’s claim that the punishm ent constitut ed double jeopardy

. See United States v. Brown , 59 F.3d 102, 104 ( explaining that double jeopardy does not attach to prison disciplinary proceedings)

. The district court properly dismissed Blacher’s claim that the punishment constituted slavery or involuntary servitude. See Draper v. Rhay , 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1963) (“There is no federally protected right of a state prisoner not to work while imprisoned after conviction.”). We reject as mer itless Blacher’s contention s that the district court failed to use Blacher’ s correct legal name, his habeas petition is protected by copyright, and defendants were required to respond to his “Affidavit of Corporate Denial.” We do not consider Blacher ’s c ontentions regarding the district court’s denial of his various motions because they are not supported by argument. See
Acosta

- Huerta v. Estelle , 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993 ).5 16

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We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

a ppeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.