America–

Still Unprepared,

Still in Danger

Report of an Independent Task Force 

Sponsored by the

Council on Foreign Relations

Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman,

Co-Chairs

Stephen E. Flynn,

Project Director

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The Council on Foreign Relations is dedicated to increasing America’s understanding of

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TASK FORCE MEMBERS

CHARLES G. BOYD

WARREN CHRISTOPHER

WILLIAM J. CROWE

STEPHEN E. FLYNN

STEPHEN FRIEDMAN

GARY HART

JAMES K. KALLSTROM

JOSHUA LEDERBERG

DONALD B. MARRON

PHILIP A. ODEEN

WARREN B. RUDMAN

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER

HAROLD E. VARMUS

JOHN W. VESSEY

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

STEVEN WEINBERG

[iii]

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CONTENTS

Foreword vii

Acknowledgments ix

Executive Summary 1

Task Force Report 6

Introduction 6

Undertaking the Homeland Security Imperative 7

Identifying Homeland Security Imperatives 11

Issues and Recommendations 12

Conclusion 32

Task Force Members 33

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FOREWORD

Attacks against Americans on U.S.soil that may involve weapons

of mass destruction are likely, but the structures and strategies to

respond to this serious threat are fragmented and inadequate. So

warned the U.S. Commission on National Security led by former

senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman in their final report

released on March 15, 2001. Hardly anyone in Washington or the

mainstream media paid any attention. They should not make

the same mistake twice by overlooking the key finding from the

report of this Task Force, again co-chaired by Senators Hart and

Rudman:“A year after September 11, America remains dangerously

unprepared to prevent and respond to a catastrophic terrorist

attack on U.S. soil.”

This chilling conclusion comes on the eve of what now appears

to be a pending war with Iraq to dethrone Saddam Hussein. It was

arrived at by a bipartisan group that includes two former secretaries of state, three Nobel laureates, two former chairmen of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, a former director of the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and

some of the nation’s most distinguished financial, legal, and medical authorities. Of the dozens of Independent Task Forces that

have been assembled during my decade-long tenure as president

of the Council on Foreign Relations, no report has been so 

timely or important.

Around the anniversary of September 11, we were saturated with

one-year retrospectives. If there are Americans on Main Street or

in the halls of government who have concluded that it is now time

to get back to our “normal” lives, this report is mandatory reading. As the Task Force participants conclude, we are entering a time

of especially grave danger. We are preparing to attack a ruthless

adversary who may well have access to weapons of mass destruction. Yet we will not see the full effect of many of the post–

September 11 initiatives undertaken by the president, Congress,

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governors, and mayors for some time. This is no one’s fault. It 

simply reflects the fact that you cannot turn a nation as large and

complex as this one on a dime.

Still, given the stakes—potentially the loss of thousands of innocent American lives and the mass disruption of America’s economy and society—there are things we must be doing on an

emergency basis to reduce our vulnerabilities here at home. Let

me stress that the Task Force report does all this without thinking about or placing political blame for what has not been done

to prepare our nation against terror attacks. The Task Force was

dedicated to creating a necessary sense of urgency and to helping

get the necessary things done.This Task Force lays out a series of

recommendations that should help guide the nation’s efforts in the

weeks and months ahead.

My deepest appreciation and admiration go to Senators Rudman and Hart for agreeing to lead this Task Force. The Council

and the nation owe a debt to them and all the other distinguished

Task Force members who brought their vast and diverse professional expertise to this enterprise. They selflessly agreed to serve

on very short notice to prepare this report with the same sense of

urgency that our current circumstances clearly warrant. On a personal note, having served with the two formidable former senators

on their National Security Commission, I can think of no more qualified people to take on this responsibility. My thanks also go to Council Senior Fellow Stephen E. Flynn, who served as project director,

lending his considerable expertise, draftsmanship, and independence

of thought to crafting and informing what follows. He was very

ably assisted by the Council’s Army military fellow, Colonel (P) Sal

Cambria, and research associates Rob Knake and Uday Ram.

This Task Force has made an outstanding contribution to informing how we should proceed in the post–September 11 security environment. Shame on us if we do not pay heed to both the warning

and the wisdom of what is outlined on the pages that follow.

Leslie H. Gelb

President

Council on Foreign Relations

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

When Les Gelb approached me in late July with the proposal that

I serve as project director for an Independent Task Force on

Homeland Security Imperatives, I voiced some trepidation. His

aim was for the Task Force to operate essentially on a wartime 

footing—something our home front rightfully should be on,

given the likelihood of a second catastrophic terrorist attack more

deadly and disruptive than what we suffered on September 11, 2001.

I wondered aloud if we could assemble a blue-ribbon Task Force

with just a couple of weeks’ notice and demand so much of its members’ time and energy in the following sixty-day period. As soon

as he told me that Senator Warren Rudman and Senator Gary Hart

had agreed to co-chair the Task Force, my doubts evaporated. I

had the privilege to serve with them while they were at the helm

of the now famous Hart-Rudman U.S. Commission on National Security. There could be no better chairs for this initiative, as

events over the ensuing weeks proved. I count it as a highlight of

my professional career to have again been afforded the opportunity to work with them.

I have drawn added inspiration from the generosity of intellect, wisdom, and time of all our distinguished Task Force members.What a special experience it has been to be a part of an enterprise

with these most extraordinary Americans. Secretary George

Shultz, Secretary Warren Christopher, General John Vessey,

Admiral William Crowe, General Charles Boyd, Judge William

Webster, Dr. Joshua Lederberg, Dr. Harold Varmus, Dr. Steven

Weinberg, Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter, Mr. Philip Odeen, Mr.

Donald Marron, Mr. Stephen Friedman, and Mr. James Kallstrom—

thank you for your grace and responsiveness in the face of draconian

deadlines, and a steady stream of late night e-mails, faxes, and phone

calls.

My debt to Les Gelb extends beyond his affording me the opportunity to serve as project director—he also made every possible 

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Council resource available to support me. He was instrumental in

sharpening the focus, structure, and language of the initial concept paper that got us launched. Most important, he assigned my

colleague, Colonel (P) Sal Cambria, to serve as the Task Force coordinator. Colonel (P) Cambria has flawlessly tended to the innumerable details to get the Task Force from its starting point to the

finish line. Finally, I have received extraordinary research support

from two of the Council’s brightest and most energetic research

associates, Rob Knake and Uday Ram. In short, if this Task Force

report misses the mark in contributing substantively to the national conversation on this vital issue, the responsibility lies completely with me, since no project director has been afforded more

ingredients for potential success. And, underpinning all of the above,

I am grateful for the Arthur Ross Foundation’s support of Task

Forces that gave us the ability to move forward as swiftly as the

urgency of the issues demanded.

Stephen E. Flynn

Project Director

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

When you see the multiple attacks that you’ve seen occur around the world,

from Bali to Kuwait, the number of failed attacks that have been attempted, the various messages that have been issued by senior al-Qaeda 

leaders, you must make the assumption that al-Qaeda is in an execution

phase and intends to strike us both here and overseas; that’s unambiguous as far as I am concerned.

—George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence,

Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,

October 17, 2002

A year after September 11, 2001, America remains dangerously 

unprepared to prevent and respond to a catastrophic terrorist

attack on U.S. soil. In all likelihood, the next attack will result in

even greater casualties and widespread disruption to American lives

and the economy. The need for immediate action is made more

urgent by the prospect of the United States’s going to war with

Iraq and the possibility that Saddam Hussein might threaten the

use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in America.

The Task Force recognizes that important and generally 

salutary measures have been undertaken since September 11 to respond

to the risk of catastrophic terrorism, including pending legislation

to create the Department of Homeland Security, which should be

enacted on an urgent basis. Yet, there is still cause for concern. After

a year without a new attack, there are already signs that Americans are lapsing back into complacency. Also, a war with Iraq could

consume virtually all the nation’s attention and command the

bulk of the available resources. President George W. Bush has declared

that combating terrorism requires a war on two fronts—at home

and abroad. The Task Force believes the nation should respond

accordingly. It outlines a number of homeland security priorities

that should be pursued with the same sense of urgency and

national purpose as our overseas exertions.

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Among the risks that the United States still confronts are the

following:

• Some 650,000 local and state police officials continue to operate in a virtual intelligence vacuum, without access to terrorist watch lists provided by the U.S. Department of State to

immigration and consular officials.

• While 50,000 federal screeners are being hired at the nation’s

airports to check passengers, only the tiniest percentage of containers, ships, trucks, and trains that enter the United States

each day are subject to examination—and a weapon of mass

destruction could well be hidden among this cargo. Should the

maritime or surface elements of America’s global transportation system be used as a weapon-delivery device, the response

right now would almost certainly be to shut the system down

at an enormous cost to the economies of the United States and

its trade partners.

• First responders—police, fire, and emergency medical personnel—

are not prepared for a chemical or biological attack. Their

radios cannot communicate with one another, and they lack

the training and gear to protect themselves and the public in

an emergency. The consequence of this could be the unnecessary loss of thousands of American lives.

• America’s own ill-prepared response could hurt its people to

a much greater extent than any single attack by a terrorist. America is a powerful and resilient nation, and terrorists are not supermen. But the risk of self-inflicted harm to America’s liberties

and way of life is greatest during and immediately following

a national trauma.

• An adversary intent on disrupting America’s reliance on energy need not target oil fields in the Middle East. The homeland infrastructure for refining and distributing energy to

support the daily lives of Americans remains largely unprotected

from sabotage.

• While the overwhelming majority of the nation’s critical 

infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector,

significant legal barriers remain to forging effective privatepublic partnerships on homeland security issues.These include

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potential antitrust conflicts, concerns about the public release

of sensitive security information by way of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and liability exposure.

• Domestic security measures must be pursued within an international context. The critical infrastructures that support the

daily lives of Americans are linked to global networks. Efforts

to protect these systems will fail unless they are pursued abroad

as well as at home.

• The National Guard is currently equipped and trained primarily

for carrying out its role in supporting conventional combat units

overseas. The homeland security mission can draw on many

of these capabilities but it requires added emphasis on bolstering

the capacity of National Guard units to respond to biological

attacks; acquiring protection, detection, and other equipment

that is tailored for complex urban environments; and special

training to provide civil support in the aftermath of a large-scale

catastrophic attack.

Key Recommendations

• Empower front-line agents to intercept terrorists by establishing

a twenty-four-hour operations center in each state that can provide access to terrorist watch list information via real time 

intergovernmental links between local and federal law 

enforcement agencies.

• Make first responders ready to respond by immediately 

providing federal funds to clear the backlog of requests for 

protective gear, training, and communications equipment.

State and local budgets cannot bankroll these necessities in the

near term.

• Recalibrate the agenda for transportation security;the vulnerabilities

are greater and the stakes are higher in the sea and land modes

than in commercial aviation. Systems such as those used in the

aviation sector, which start from the assumption that every passenger and every bag of luggage poses an equal risk, must

give way to more intelligence-driven and layered security

approaches that emphasize prescreening and monitoring based

on risk criteria.

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• Fund energy distribution vulnerability assessments to be completed in no more than six months, fund a stockpile of modular backup components to quickly restore the operation of the

energy grid should it be targeted, and work with Canada to put

in place adequate security measures for cross-border pipelines.

• Strengthen the capacity of local, state, and federal public heath

and agricultural agencies to detect and conduct disease-outbreak

investigations.The key to mitigating casualties associated with

a biological attack against people or the food supply is to identify the source of infection as early as possible.

• Enact an “Omnibus Anti–Red Tape” law with a two-year

sunset clause for approved private-public homeland security task

forces to include (1) a fast-track security clearance process

that permits the sharing of “secret-level” classified information

with non-federal and industry leaders; (2) an FOIA exemption in instances when leaders in critical infrastructure industries agree to share information about their security vulnerabilities

with federal agencies; (3) an exemption of private participants

in these task forces from antitrust rules; (4) homeland security appropriations to be managed under the more liberal rules

governing research and development programs in the Department of Defense rather than the normal federal acquisition rules;

and (5) liability safeguards and limits.

• Fund, equip, and train National Guard units around the 

country to ensure they can support the new state homeland 

security plans under development by each governor. Also,

triple the number of National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams

from twenty-two to sixty-six.

Quickly mobilizing the nation to prepare for the worst is an act

of prudence, not fatalism. In the twenty-first century, security and

liberty are inseparable. The absence of adequate security elevates

the risk that laws passed immediately in the wake of 

surprise terrorist attacks will be reactive, not deliberative.

Predictably, the consequence will be to compound the initial

harm incurred by a tragic event with measures that overreach in

terms of imposing costly new security mandates and the assumption of new government authorities that may erode our 

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freedoms. Accordingly, aggressively pursuing America’s homeland

security imperatives quickly and immediately may well be the most

important thing we can do to sustain America’s cherished freedoms for future generations.

Preparedness at home plays a critical role in combating terrorism

by reducing its appeal as an effective means of warfare. Acts of 

catastrophic terrorism produce not only deaths and physical

destruction but also societal and economic disruption.Thus, as important as it is to try and attack terrorist organizations overseas and

isolate those who support them, it is equally important to eliminate the incentive for undertaking these acts in the first place. If

the disruptive effects of terrorism can be sharply reduced, if not

eliminated, America’s adversaries may be deterred from taking their

battles to the streets of the American homeland.

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TASK FORCE REPORT

INTRODUCTION

A year after September 11, 2001, America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on

U.S. soil. In all likelihood, the next attack will result in even

greater casualties and widespread disruption to American lives and

the economy.The need for immediate action is made more urgent

by the prospect of the United States’s going to war with Iraq and

the possibility that Saddam Hussein might threaten the use of weapons

of mass destruction (WMD) in America.

This report’s recommendations are intended to focus the nation

on what must be done on an emergency basis to prevent attacks

and to limit the consequences of these attacks should U.S. prevention efforts fail.The Bush administration, Congress, governors,

and mayors around the country have taken important measures

since September 11 to respond to the risk of catastrophic terrorism. Legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security should be enacted on an urgent basis, and initiatives to improve

U.S. intelligence operations must go forward. But the United States

will not see the full effect of these fundamental changes for several years. In the meantime Americans cannot afford to become

complacent. Our enemies are not idle.

The Task Force identified six critical mandates that deserve the

nation’s immediate attention:

• Empower front-line agents to prevent terrorist attacks and make

first responders ready to respond; 650,000 local and state law

enforcement officers are operating in a counterterrorism information vacuum, and first responders are not nearly ready

enough to respond to catastrophic events.

• Make trade security a global priority; the system for moving

goods affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for

exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists.

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• Set critical infrastructure-protection priorities; some potential

targets pose a graver risk for mass disruption than others.

• Enhance America’s public health system so that it is able to

quickly detect and respond to biological attacks.

• Move quickly to clear federal obstacles to forging effective 

private-public security partnerships by addressing industry

concerns with respect to potential antitrust conflicts, public release

of sensitive security information by way of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and liability exposure.

• Fund, train, and equip the National Guard to make homeland

security a primary mission.

UNDERTAKING THE HOMELAND SECURITY IMPERATIVE

The nation must accept three facts of life after September 11. First,

America is in a war against terrorists who want to attack its

homeland, and it must act urgently to reduce its most serious vulnerabilities. Second, bolstering America’s emergency preparedness

in the near term is essential to minimizing casualties when an incident occurs on U.S. soil. Third, America’s own ill-prepared

response can do more damage to its citizens than any single

attack by a terrorist. America is a powerful and resilient nation,

and terrorists are not supermen. But the risk of self-inflicted

harm to America’s liberties and way of life is greatest during and

immediately following a national trauma. Accordingly, preparing

for the worst is an essential investment in preserving America at

its best.

On September 11 we witnessed how warfare will likely be

conducted against the United States for the foreseeable future. Prudence requires we assume America’s adversaries, including Saddam Hussein, have learned from the attacks on the World Trade

Center and the Pentagon, as well as the anthrax mailings, the extent

to which the U.S. homeland is unprotected. They will also have

observed that relatively low-cost terrorist operations directed 

at civilian targets can inflict extensive damage and profound disruption. In short, as long as catastrophic attacks are likely to yield

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tangible results in undermining America’s economy and way of life,

undertaking these attacks will be attractive to those who regard

America as their enemy.

The Task Force identified several overarching considerations

that should guide the nation’s approach to homeland security.

Homeland security measures have deterrence value. U.S. counterterrorism initiatives abroad can be reinforced by making the U.S.

homeland a less tempting target. We can transform the calculations of would-be terrorists by elevating the risk that (1) an attack

on the United States will fail, and (2) the disruptive consequences

of a successful attack will be minimal. It is especially critical that

we bolster this deterrent now, since an inevitable consequence of

the U.S. government’s stepped-up military and diplomatic exertions will be to elevate the incentive to strike back before these efforts

have their desired effect.

Federalism is a major asset. Given the size and complexity of the

American society,there are no “one-size-fits-all”approaches to addressing the nation’s most serious homeland vulnerabilities. Private-sector

leaders and local authorities who are most familiar with those vulnerabilities will generally have the best insights on the most effective solutions. National coordination, resource support, and

leadership by the federal government are all essential. But encouraging the capacity for states, localities, and the private sector to

experiment and to be flexible in adapting to local and regional

circumstances will ensure that our nation’s approach to homeland

security will be as dynamic as the threat that confronts us.

Domestic security measures must be pursued within an international context. The critical infrastructures that support the activities of our daily lives are linked to global networks. For example,

the Northeast is dependent on electrical power generated in Quebec, and much of the natural gas used to fuel the power plants on

the West Coast originates in the western provinces of Canada. Computer viruses such as the “Love Bug” know no boundaries as they

cascade around the Internet at the speed of light. Many of the goods

that fill America’s stores originate from far-flung corners of 

the globe and arrive at U.S. borders in massive volumes via an 

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extremely efficient and low-cost land, sea, and air transportation

system. Efforts to protect these systems will fail unless they are pursued abroad as well as at home.The State Department, the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department, and the Office of

the U.S.Trade Representative all have a critical role to play in making sure that our allies and trade partners work with us to ensure

a collective approach to protecting critical infrastructures as we did

with the year 2000 (Y2K) computer challenge.

Proceed with caution when embracing technological security

“fixes.” Technology can often serve as an enabler, but it must

belong to a layered and dynamic system of defense that incorporates the contribution of human intuition and judgment. Any proposed technological “solution” must be evaluated against the costs

and consequences if it should be compromised. In the end, security is not just about protecting American lives. It is also about sustaining systems that support our way of life in the face of designs

to exploit or target those systems.This means that the security protocol must be able to manage any suspected or real terrorist breach

without imposing costs so high as to compromise the very network it is designed to secure. Ultimately, the endgame must be to

continue to live and prosper as an open, globally engaged society,

not to become a nation trapped behind the modern versions of moats

and castles.

Emergency preparedness can save lives—potentially a lot of lives.

During the Cold War, the prevailing view among most Americans was that civil defense measures were futile—even self-defeating. Nuclear war was viewed as Armageddon, and preparations to

survive a nuclear strike were seen as making nuclear war more probable because they eroded the presumed deterrence value of the “balance of terror.”The contemporary security environment mandates

that we put this anti-civil-defense bias behind us. America’s ability to strike back with devastating force will not deter terrorists.

Meanwhile a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon poses a

grave danger not only to those who are immediately exposed, but

also to the entire emergency response and medical care system in

the areas where such a weapon might be used. Heavy losses of 

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seasoned firefighters, emergency technicians, police, and medical

personnel can easily compromise a community’s long-term capacity to provide for public health and safety.

A proactive mindset is key. The federal government is dedicating an extraordinary amount of energy and resources in response

to the specific character of the September 11 attacks. Congress was

quick to rush into law the Aviation and Transportation Security

Act of 2001, which had the result of focusing the senior leadership in the U.S. Department of Transportation almost exclusively on hiring federal aviation passenger screeners and deploying new

X-ray machines to the nation’s airports.This kind of legislative response

is understandable given the collective horror we shared in seeing

hijacked commercial airliners used as missiles. Still, a reactive

mindset is inevitably wasteful in terms of resources and can distract agencies from anticipating more probable future scenarios and

from undertaking protective measures.

Homeland security measures will almost always have derivative benefits for other public and private goods. Terrorists may acquire a

weapon of mass destruction, but they will not have unlimited access

to these weapons. Consequently, they have to be selective about

where, when, and how they will carry out an attack. No mayor or

industry leader will want to be caught unprepared if his or her city

or critical infrastructure is targeted. But making a case for investing in security safeguards for low probability–high consequence

events can be a hard sell to a tax-wary populace or to CEOs under

pressure to guard the bottom line.

Fortunately, many appropriate measures enacted to prevent and

mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack have other benefits. Bolstering the tools to detect and intercept terrorists will enhance

the means authorities have to combat criminal acts such as cargo

theft, violations of export controls, and narcotics and migrant smuggling. The tools used to save lives and property in the wake of a

catastrophic terrorist act are largely the same as those that would

be used in the event of a tragic industrial or transportation accident or natural disaster. As a result, some of the costs may be offset

by reduced losses and lower insurance rates. Public health invest73459Textpages.qxd 12/4/02 12:24 PM Page 10
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ments will inevitably provide the United States with more effective tools to manage the rising incidence of global diseases and pandemics. In short, sustaining support for actions to confront the new

security environment may not be as difficult as it first appears because

many of these measures can tangibly improve the quality of life

in our society as well.

IDENTIFYING HOMELAND SECURITY IMPERATIVES

The Task Force recognizes that many useful initiatives are now underway that will advance homeland security. The case for establishing a new Department of Homeland Security is a compelling one,

and legislation to create this department should be enacted without delay.The National Strategy for Homeland Security released

by the White House on July 16, 2002, makes a salutary effort to

frame this complex mission and to sketch out priorities. Equally

commendable is the extent to which the strategy recognizes the

importance of bolstering intelligence and warning systems, improving border and transportation security, enhancing domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure and key assets,

defending against catastrophic threats, and improving emergency

preparedness and response.

In addition to reviewing the president’s new strategy, the Task

Force reviewed other recent contributions to the homeland security dialogue, most notably the National Academies’ June 30,

2002, report, Making the Nation Safer.

In selecting the imperatives on which to focus, the Task Force

decided to place its emphasis on issues that satisfied the following three criteria:

(1) the potential consequences of neglecting the imperative area

are serious and well documented;

(2) the recommendations for addressing the imperative can be

acted upon quickly; but

(3) these recommendations are not being pursued on an emergency basis.

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The six critical mandates summarized above and detailed in the

following sections represent only a portion of the homeland security agenda for our nation. There are other issues that we examined and judged to be very important, but we decided the measures

to address them were adequate. For example, the president’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board—created in October 2001—

recently released a draft National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

for public comment.This plan—developed by a private-public partnership involving representatives of corporations and nongovernmental organizations—outlines a comprehensive strategy

to protect against the disruption of the complex, interdependent

network of critical-infrastructure information systems that is

essential to America’s national and economic security.

Other issues require much more study before government

actions should be taken on an expedited basis. For instance, preventive vaccinations of the general population against diseases such

as smallpox may be harmful and even fatal for a small percentage

of healthy people and are not presently an option for the millions

of Americans with weakened immune systems. In short, the Task

Force’s list is inevitably an incomplete one. Nonetheless, the Task

Force believes that acting on the critical issues targeted in this report

with the kind of urgency our wartime footing mandates would contribute significantly to U.S. security in the months and years

ahead. The nation’s leaders in Washington, state capitals, counties, city halls, and boardrooms should be working overtime to address

them—right now.

ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. TAP THE EYES AND EARS OF LOCAL AND STATE LAW

ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN PREVENTING ATTACKS; MAKE

FIRST RESPONDERS READY TO RESPOND.

Today, we are fighting a different kind of war—on two fronts. One front

is Afghanistan, where we have the best technology, the best equipment,

the best intelligence being sent right to the front, and no expense is

spared. But for the first time in nearly 200 years, the second front is right

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here at home. And to date, it’s where we’ve seen the greatest loss of life.

Yet we have insufficient equipment, too little training, and a lack of

intelligence sharing with federal authorities.

—Martin O’Malley, Mayor of Baltimore, April 10, 2002

An estimated 8.5 million illegal aliens are living in the United States,

including nearly 300,000 who have opted for life as fugitives

rather than submitting to a final order of deportation. Stowaways arrive in U.S. ports and jump ship almost daily. These

illegal migrants find it easy to blend in among the tens of millions

of foreigners who arrive legally in the United States each year to

travel, study, or work. Compounding the problem is widespread

trafficking in forged or fraudulently obtained passports, licenses,

and other identification documents. Baseline documents such as

Social Security cards, birth certificates, and driver’s licenses are particularly subject to abuse.

With just fifty-six field offices around the nation, the burden

of identifying and intercepting terrorists in our midst is a task well

beyond the scope of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

This burden could and should be shared with America’s 650,000

local, county, and state law enforcement officers, but they clearly cannot lend a hand in a counterterrorism information void.

When it comes to combating terrorism, the police officers on

the beat are effectively operating deaf, dumb, and blind. Terrorist watch lists provided by the U.S. Department of State to immigration and consular officials are still out of bounds for state and

local police. In the interim period, as information-sharing issues

get worked out, known terrorists will be free to move about to plan

and execute their attacks. And if a catastrophic terrorist attack occurred

today, emergency first responders—police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel—in most of the nation’s cities and counties are no better prepared to react now than they were prior to

September 11.The tools of emergency preparedness are in very short

supply. For instance, according to a survey done by the U.S.

Conference of Mayors earlier this year:

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• 79 percent of mayors reported a funding shortfall for necessary

threat detection equipment, 77 percent for emergency response

equipment, and 69 percent for personal protective apparel.

• 86 percent said they did not have adequate personal protective

apparel and only 10 percent were satisfied with the protective

equipment they had in the event of a biological attack.

Communications

In virtually every major city and county in the United States, no

interoperable communications system exists to support police, fire

departments, and county, state, regional, and federal response

personnel during a major emergency. Radio frequencies are not

available to support the post-incident communication demands

that will be placed on them, and most cities have no redundant

systems to use as backups. Portable radios will not work in highrise buildings unless the buildings are equipped with repeater

systems. Most U.S. cities have separate command-and-control functions for their police and fire departments, and little to no coordination exists between the two organizations. Furthermore, with

few exceptions, first-responder commanders do not have access

to secure radios, telephones, or video conferencing capabilities that

can support communications with county, state, and federal emergency preparedness officials or National Guard leaders.

Protective gear

In the event of a chemical attack, a window of a few minutes to

two hours exists to respond to the incident before morbidity and

mortality rates skyrocket. Yet protective gear is often available only

to a few specialized incident-response teams. Most communities

will run short of even the most basic emergency response resources

(e.g., lifesaving equipment, personal protection suits, oxygen, respirators, etc.) in six hours. Federal agency response teams can help

but they will invariably arrive too late (i.e., no earlier than twelve

hours after the attack).

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Detection equipment

Portable and hand-held detection equipment for highly explosive,

chemical, biological, and radiological materials is in short supply

and notoriously unreliable in urban environments. Department of

Defense and Department of Energy sensors deployed to local first

responders have been issued without adequate personnel training

on use and maintenance of the equipment, or guidance on what

to do should the detection equipment register an alarm.

Training

Major field exercises are important tools for testing the adequacy of contingency plans, equipment, command-and-control procedures, and training. In all but America’s largest cities, there is a

paucity of resources and expertise to organize and conduct these

large-scale exercises. For example, from 1996 to 1999, the federal

government was able to provide WMD response training to only

134,000 of the nation’s estimated 9 million first responders. Furthermore, only 2 percent of these 134,000 responders received

hands-on training with live chemical agents. The Center for

Domestic Preparedness in Anniston, Alabama, is the only facility in the nation where first responders can train with and gain firsthand knowledge of chemical agents. At peak capacity, it can train

only 10,000 responders per year.

Recommendations

Our nation would not send its armed forces into harm’s way

without outfitting them with the right tools and skills. Our first

responders and local law enforcement officers deserve the same

investment—their lives and our lives depend on it.Therefore, the

Task Force makes the following recommendations:

• Establish a twenty-four-hour operations center in each state

that can provide a real time intergovernmental link between

local and federal law enforcement. Field-level police would contact this center when they apprehend suspects to receive a red

or green light to hold or release them based on a check of federal and Interpol databases.

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• Step up efforts to rein in identity fraud by strengthening the anticounterfeiting safeguards in state driver’s licenses and passports,

passing state laws criminalizing identity theft, and mobilizing

120-day joint local, state, and federal agency task forces to

investigate and target phony-identification traffickers.

• Provide grants for states and cities to hire retired first responders

on ninety-day renewable contracts to conduct comprehensive assessments on the status of urban emergency preparedness, including the state of protective gear, the adequacy of communications

plans and equipment, and the availability of chemical antidotes.

• Fund the backlog of protective equipment and training requests

by urban fire departments. This is a case where an immediate

infusion of resources can make an immediate difference in reducing the risks to first responders and the morbidity and mortality of incident victims.

• Fund and deploy commercial off-the-shelf technologies that

can integrate multiple radio platforms to support interoperable communications, including the ability to coordinate the flow

of voice, image, and electronic information among responding agencies.

• Provide the national research labs with adequate funding to develop, field test, and widely distribute new portable and handheld

sensor equipment suitable for urban environments.

• Ensure that the distribution of new technologies to first

responders is supported by training and long-term maintenance

contracts.

• Facilitate collaboration among the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Guard, and state and

local officials to deploy threat-based simulation models and training modules to support local emergency-operations-center

training.WMD field exercises should be funded in all the nation’s

major urban areas over the next eighteen months. Senior

police and fire officials from smaller cities and localities should

be included in these exercises.

2. MAKE TRADE SECURITY A GLOBAL PRIORITY.

There is virtually no security for what is the primary system to transport

global trade. The consequence of a terrorist incident using a container would

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be profound. ... If terrorists used a sea container to conceal a weapon of

mass destruction and detonated it on arrival at a port, the impact on

global trade and the global economy could be immediate and devastating—

all nations would be affected. No container ships would be allowed to unload

at U.S. ports after such an event.

—Robert Bonner, Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service,

August 26, 2002

Immediately following the September 11 attacks, federal authorities ordered the closing of U.S. airspace to all flights, both foreign and domestic, shut down the nation’s major seaports, and slowed

truck, automobile, and pedestrian traffic across the land borders

with Canada and Mexico to a trickle. Nineteen men wielding box

cutters forced America to do to itself what no adversary could ever

accomplish: a successful blockade of the United States. If a surprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrow involving the sea,

rail, or truck transportation systems that carry millions of tons of

trade to the United States each day, the response would likely be

the same—a self-imposed global embargo.

Vulnerable seaports

Ninety-five percent of all non–North American U.S. trade

moves by sea and arrives in 361 ports around the nation. Despite

the vital role seaports play in linking America to the world,

both economically and militarily, port vulnerability studies for the

nation’s fifty largest ports are not scheduled to be completed for

five more years. Over the past few decades, container traffic

and energy imports increasingly have been concentrated in just

a handful of ports, making them inviting targets. For instance,

43 percent of all the maritime containers that arrived in the

United States in 2001 came through the ports of Los Angeles and

Long Beach. As the recent West Coast port closures demonstrated,

the cost to the economy of closing these ports totals approximately

$1 billion per day for the first five days, rising exponentially

thereafter. Nearly one-quarter of all of California’s imported

crude oil is offloaded in one geographically confined area. A USS

Cole–style incident involving a ship offloading at that locale could

leave Southern California without refined fuels within just a few

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days. The American Association of Port Authorities estimates

the cost of adequate physical security at the nation’s commercial

seaports to be $2 billion. So far only $92.3 million in federal grants

has been authorized and approved. Even then, the grants has not

been awarded on the basis of a port’s relative importance to the

nation. The ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach requested 

$70 million in post–September 11 grants and were awarded just

$6.175 million. The adequacy of such grant levels needs urgent

reexamination.

Trade Dependence on the Intermodal Container

There are an estimated eleven million containers worldwide that

are loaded and unloaded ten times per year. Ninety percent of the

world’s general cargo moves in these boxes. The architects of the

intermodal revolution in transportation never considered security as a criterion—lower transport costs and improved speed and

efficiency were the driving forces. For example, a new forty-foot

container costs on average $2,500 to build and holds up to thirty

tons of freight. The cost of the ocean voyage for a full container

from Europe or Asia is approximately $1,500. There are no

required security standards governing the loading or transport of

an intermodal container. Most are “sealed” with a numbered lead

tag that costs fifty cents.

If an explosive device were loaded in a container and set off in

a port, it would almost automatically raise concern about the

integrity of the 21,000 containers that arrive in U.S. ports each day

and the many thousands more that arrive by truck and rail across

U.S. land borders. A three-to-four-week closure of U.S. ports would

bring the global container industry to its knees. Megaports such

as Rotterdam and Singapore would have to close their gates to prevent boxes from piling up on their limited pier space.Trucks, trains,

and barges would be stranded outside the terminals with no way

to unload their boxes. Boxes bound for the United States would

have to be unloaded from their outbound ships. Service contracts would need to be renegotiated. As this system became

gridlocked, so would much of global commerce.

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Trade Dependence on a Small Number of Border Crossings

The five major bridges and one tunnel that link Ontario to

Michigan and New York account for 70 percent of all the trade

between the United States and Canada—America’s largest trading partner.The Ambassador Bridge between Detroit, Michigan,

and Windsor, Ontario, alone carries $250 million per day, which

is 27 percent of the total U.S.-Canada daily trade in merchandise.

When these border crossings were effectively closed following the

September 11 attacks, many of the “big three” automakers’ assembly plants went idle within two days (the average assembly plant

produces $1 million worth of automobiles per hour). Manufacturers

and retailers depend on the unimpeded cross-border flow of trade

to respond to “just-in-time” delivery imperatives. Despite this dependence, the U.S. and Canadian governments provide no security

to these structures because they are either privately owned or

controlled by binational bridge authorities. Since border inspections are done after vehicles cross the bridge or emerge from the

tunnel, these inspections provide no protective value for these vital

trade lines.

Recommendations

The Task Force makes the following recommendations:

• Develop a layered security system that focuses on the entire logistics and intermodal transportation network rather than on an

unintegrated series of tactics aimed at addressing vulnerabilities at arrival ports or at already congested land borders.

• Develop standards for security at loading facilities for an intermodal container. Require certification of these standards and

periodic independent audits for compliance as a condition for

gaining access to an international transportation terminal.

• Identify and test commercial off-the-shelf sensors and tracking devices to assure in-transit visibility and accountability of

container movements and conduct demonstration projects

using volunteer commercial shippers to test their technological and commercial viability.

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• Improve the accuracy, timing, and format for transmitting

and sharing data about the contents, location, and chain of custody involving a container shipment.

• Accelerate the timetable for the action plans agreed to in the

U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico “smart-border” accords.

• Work with Canada to implement adequate security measures

for cross-border bridges and the Detroit-Windsor tunnel.

• Task the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of

Commerce, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

with actively promoting rapid adoption of security standards

governing surface and maritime transportation in bilateral

and multilateral arrangements with America’s trading partners.

Work to advance these standards within appropriate international organizations such as the International Standards Organization, the International Maritime Organization, and the World

Customs Organization. Retrofitting security into the global trade

system is not only about mitigating the risk of terrorists’

exploiting these systems to target the United States, but also

about sustaining the system that underpins global commerce.

3. SET CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PRIORITIES.

We are convinced that our vulnerabilities are increasing steadily, that the

means to exploit those weaknesses are readily available and that the costs

associated with an effective attack continue to drop. What is more, the investments required to improve the situation—now still relatively modest—will

rise if we procrastinate.

—Report of the President’s Commission on 

Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997

Our adversaries can attempt to strike anywhere, but their choice

of target will likely not be indiscriminate. There are some targets

in the United States that are of higher value than others in terms

of visibility and disruptive potential. Not all critical infrastructure

is equally critical. Decisions about what warrants the most immediate attention must be made on the basis of relative vulnerability and consequence. Many of the critical infrastructures that

underpin our national economy and support our modern way of

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life remain as vulnerable to attack today as they were a year ago.

In some instances, the U.S. government is just beginning the process

of undertaking an initial inventory of these vulnerabilities. Greater

attention has been paid to physical security—gates, guards, and

guns—but few resources are focused on preparing to respond and

restore critical systems should these protective measures fail.The

Task Force reviewed the June 30, 2002, findings and recommendations contained within the National Academies’ report, Making the Nation Safer. The areas that the Task Force finds most

worrisome include the following:

Vulnerable Energy Distribution Systems

Crude oil must be refined and distributed if it is to be a meaningful source of energy. Power generation plants are worthless if

the electricity cannot be transmitted to the factories, office buildings, and households that need it to power equipment and provide lighting and climate control. An adversary intent on disrupting

America’s reliance on energy need not target oil fields in the

Middle East. The infrastructure for providing energy to end

users is concentrated, sophisticated, and largely unprotected. Furthermore, some infrastructure lies offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, on the continental shelf, and within the territories of our North

American neighbors.

Sixty percent of the Northeast’s refined oil products are piped

from refineries in Texas and Louisiana. A coordinated attack on

several key pumping stations—most of which are in remote areas,

are not staffed, and possess no intrusion-detection devices—

could cause mass disruption to these flows. Nearly 50 percent of

California’s electrical supply comes from natural gas power plants,

and 30 percent of California’s natural gas comes from Canada. Compressor stations to maintain pressure cost up to $40 million each

and are located every sixty miles on a pipeline. If these compressor stations were targeted, the pipeline would be shut down for

an extended period of time. A coordinated attack on a selected

set of key points in the electrical power system could result in multistate blackouts.While power might be restored in parts of the region

within a matter of days or weeks, acute shortages could 

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mandate rolling blackouts for as long as several years. Spare parts

for critical components of the power grid are in short supply; in

many cases they must be shipped from overseas sources.

Vulnerable Food and Water Supplies

The nation’s food and agriculture industry represents a substantial sector of our economy and presents an inviting opportunity

for biological attacks. As the recent foot-and-mouth disease outbreak among livestock in the United Kingdom illustrated, once

a diagnosis of a contagious disease is made, the effect on domestic and export markets can be devastating. Similarly, there are vast

numbers of pathogens that have the potential to wreak havoc on

crops. Public anxieties over food contamination can undermine the

demand for major foodstuffs for years. Yet, there is no equivalent

to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that

could provide a shared communications network among states and

the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Nor is there an effective means to communicate and coordinate internationally. Confusion over reporting obligations, who has jurisdiction, and to what

extent they can provide adequate response to a potential attack promises to seriously compromise America’s ability to contain the consequences of attacks on U.S. crops and livestock. For example, one

recent exercise found that by the time the Agriculture Department’s

foreign-disease laboratory on Plum Island, N.Y., would have

confirmed the first case of foot-and-mouth cross-border contamination, the disease would likely have spread to twenty-eight states.

The system that provides Americans with a basic element of

life—water—remains vulnerable to mass disruption. Water systems are generally owned and maintained by local water companies and authorities that are slow to adopt new technologies and

protocols. America’s water supply is extremely vulnerable to contamination.This problem is compounded by the fact that extremely limited laboratory capacity and legal liability issues have made

the routine monitoring of public water supplies for dangerous contaminants the exception rather than the rule. This lack of testing

and monitoring capability can compound the consequences of 

a localized attack since there is no means to quickly reassure an

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anxious public across America that their drinking water is safe once

a highly publicized incident takes place.

Vulnerable Clearinghouse Infrastructure to Support Financial

Markets

Over the past two decades, the securities and banking industries

have moved toward relying on a small number of core organizations for their post-trade clearing and settlement activities. If

these systems were targeted by terrorists, the concentrated nature

of these essential services could translate into profound disruption

of daily economic life, both inside the United States and abroad.

For example, clearing and settlement activities for the proper

functioning of the government securities markets are essentially

managed by just two banks, JP Morgan Chase and the Bank of

New York.These two banks each extend approximately $1 trillion

in 24-hour credit to their dealer and clearing customers each day.

The sudden loss of these services could create a serious liquidity

problem and likely damage public confidence in America’s financial institutions and the systems upon which they borrow, invest,

spend, and save.

Recommendations

The Task Force makes the following recommendations:

• Set critical infrastructure priorities by moving beyond a ranking of vulnerabilities within each sector. Instead, conduct a crosssector analysis, placing a premium on addressing vulnerabilities

that present the greatest risk of cascading disruption and losses across multiple sectors.

• Fund energy distribution vulnerability assessments to be completed in no more than six months.

• Fund a stockpile of modular backup components to quickly restore

the operation of the energy grid should it be targeted.

• Work with Canada to put in place adequate security measures

for cross-border pipelines.

• Bolster the capacity for the USDA to exercise control over detection and incidence management of plant and animal disease,

drawing upon the best practices developed by the CDC for

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managing human disease. Task the USDA with immediately bringing online a shared communications network to link

it with states and U.S. trade partners.

• Provide adequate funding to significantly enhance the USDA’s

training in identifying foreign diseases and assume global

leadership in devising a robust international system for monitoring the outbreak of animal and plant disease.

• Identify and remove legal liability constraints on routine testing of public water supplies for dangerous contaminants.

Accelerate the development of adequate laboratory testing to

serve local water companies and commissions.

• Create common integrated communication networks and

realtime data and software backup repositories among the

clearing banks, the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, dealers, and other key participants in the government securities market. Routinely test for recovery and resumption

operations.The goal is to ensure that there are sufficient funds

and securities available to market-makers in times of market

stress so as to support the high level of liquidity required for

trading.

4. BOLSTER PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS.

Our concern is that bioterrorism preparedness funding must be adequate,

lasting, and reliable to enable local public health agencies to build and sustain permanent improvements in their ability to protect their communities twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Most communities do not

now have this level of protection.

—Thomas L. Milne, Executive Director,

National Association of County and 

City Health Officials,

April 18, 2002

Agents used in biological attacks often require several days before

victims start exhibiting acute symptoms. Early detection is key to

stemming morbidity and mortality rates.Yet, with the possible exception of New York City, America’s urban areas lack the advanced

public health warning systems or specialized equipment to make

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this determination. There are simply not enough resources available within existing state and local budgets to remedy this situation in a timely way. Most local public health departments are barely

funded and staffed to run during a normal 9 A.M. to 5 P.M. work

week. Medical professionals often lack the training to properly diagnose and treat diseases spawned by biological agents. Many of the

states’ public health reporting systems are antiquated, slow, and outmoded. It can routinely take up to three weeks for a public health

department to register a disease incident report in the national database. And there is no consensus on which language and diagnostic

coding system should be used for a national database or how to

safeguard that information.

Recent efforts in the federal government to respond to the bioterrorism threat may only add to confusion over responsibility and

accountability. Responsibility for direction and coordination of public health efforts should rest with a substantially bolstered CDC

with clear lines of communication to other departments and

agencies such as the National Institutes of Health. Since much of

the nation’s research and most of its treatment capacity lie in the

private sector, outreach is essential.

Chemical Versus Biological Attacks Have Different Imperatives

In chemical terrorism, detecting an attack is generally not a problem. People will show symptoms immediately: vomiting, suffering from seizures, experiencing respiratory distress, etc. The real

challenge is deciphering which antidotes are appropriate and

delivering them to the victims.The window of opportunity to mitigate the consequences of these attacks is very small—between a

few minutes and two hours.

Detecting that there has been a biological attack can be far more

problematic, since symptoms in a person do not show up right away.

The window of opportunity for responding to the biological

agent anthrax ranges from thirty-six to forty-eight hours and, for

smallpox, nine to eleven days. For hemorrhagic fever viruses such

as Ebola, an outbreak can occur from two to twenty-one days after

the attack is launched. The problem of discerning the difference

between flu-like symptoms and the onset of a deadly disease is com73459Textpages.qxd 12/4/02 12:24 PM Page 25
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pounded when physicians are unfamiliar with diagnosing and

treating such diseases and, in any event, lack the medications to

prescribe.

Little To No Capacity to Conduct Outbreak Investigations

Medical care providers who come in contact with victims are the

first line of defense. Few of these professionals have received

training on how to diagnose, treat, and report symptoms that are

associated with a biological attack.

Most city and county public health agencies currently lack

the resources to support emergency hotlines twenty-four hours a

day. The National Association of City and County Health Officials estimates that localities need 10,000 to 15,000 new employees to work in public health preparedness functions. Given these

shortages, few localities have the ability to assemble a team to conduct an outbreak investigation.

Public health laboratories cannot support a surge in the number of tests to verify the existence of a biological agent. Seven months

after the anthrax mailings, there was a backlog of thousands of unexamined specimens suspected of being contaminated with anthrax

powder around the United States.

Recommendations

The Task Force makes the following recommendations:

• Ensure that major cities and counties plan and train for truly

catastrophic attacks. While these scenarios strike many as too

horrific to contemplate, imagining and planning for them can

potentially make the difference between a 20 percent casualty rate and an 80 percent or higher casualty rate.

• Make emergency federal funding available to address the

highest-priority state, county, and city public health needs.

• Develop public health surveillance systems built around monitoring ambulance calls, pharmacies reporting an upsurge in the

purchase of certain over-the-counter drugs, corporations and

schools reporting a surge in worker or student absenteeism, and

doctors and hospitals reporting an increase in walk-in patients.

• Develop and maintain call lists of retired nurses, doctors, and

emergency medical technicians living in the community who

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can be mobilized in an emergency. Provide annual training for

these nonpracticing professionals and create a process for activating a “good Samaritan” clause to override malpractice issues.

• Identify and maintain call lists of knowledgeable experts who

can authoritatively speak to the media about nuclear, chemical, or biological agents, symptoms of exposures, and recommended safeguards. Develop communications strategies and

prepare educational materials and media guides for radio and

TV on survival fundamentals for attacks involving WMD.

• Recruit major corporations and schools to help provide medications during an emergency. While the federal government

will soon have the capability to ship antibiotics and vaccines

from the twelve national pharmaceutical stockpiles to urban

areas within six hours, there are currently no local distribution

plans to get these medicines to the general population.

• Provide funding to hospitals to pre-wire and outfit certain common areas such as lobbies, cafeterias, and hallways to support

a surge in patients. Negotiate arrangements with hotels and conference centers to provide bed space for spillover patients.

5. REMOVE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OBSTACLES TO

PARTNERING.

Obstacles for using our most potent resources for countering catastrophic terrorism must be identified and overcome.

—Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism,

National Research Council, June 30, 2002

The burden of preparing and responding to catastrophic terrorist attacks lies primarily outside the federal government at the local

and state levels and with the private-sector companies that own

and operate much of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Most of

the expertise about both the vulnerabilities and the most practical protective measures to save lives and avert mass societal and

economic disruption rests at this level as well.The federal government

must provide leadership by issuing the call to action, supporting

forums convened to address these issues, and supplying as much

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specific information as possible to key decision-makers on the nature

of the threat.

Engaging the Private Sector

The barriers to greater information-sharing between the public

and private sectors are not simply bureaucratic and cultural. Private-sector leaders have legal concerns with respect to liability.They

also worry about violating antitrust laws and are apprehensive that

sensitive security information may be publicly disclosed by way of

FOIA. For their part, government agencies find it almost impossible to discuss matters that may involve classified security information. Protecting the public’s right to know and ensuring free

and competitive markets are cornerstones of our democracy. Safeguarding classified material is essential to protecting sources and

methods. As a practical matter, however, the current rules confound

the ability of the private sector to share information with public

authorities on vulnerabilities within critical infrastructure, and preclude the ability of federal government officials to share anything but the most generic security and threat information.

The real value of sharing information is that it can encourage

efforts to develop innovative security measures that involve all the

relevant stakeholders. But innovation also generally requires the

infusion of federal resources to support research and development.

Here the sense of urgency required by the homeland security

mission collides with the lethargic and arcane system governing

federal procurement—the federal acquisition rules. These rules,

which run literally into the thousands of pages, may be tolerable

for routine government purchases, but without a more streamlined

process to move federal resources, change will be measured in terms

of years, not in the weeks and months that taking emergency measures to address our most serious vulnerabilities requires. Also, private companies that agree to work with the public sector to assist

in developing and providing security measures will require legal

safeguards that appropriately reduce their liability exposure. Good

faith efforts to advance security should not result in a risk of

bankruptcy or huge litigation costs should these measures ultimately

fail to deter or prevent terrorist attacks.

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Tap International Expertise

While terrorism may be a new and painful experience for most

Americans, regrettably many American allies such as the United

Kingdom, France, Spain, and Israel have been confronted by this

challenge for some time. Countries such as Switzerland provide

a model for how civil defense efforts can be coordinated and

largely resourced at the national level and adapted and managed

at the local level.The United States does not have a monopoly on

insight and ingenuity. It should be keen to learn from others’ experience by sending research teams abroad to identify the best practices that could be implemented quickly here in the United States.

Recommendations

The Task Force makes the following recommendations:

• Draw on private-sector experts who are involved in the design

and operations of critical infrastructures such as the electricpower grid, telecommunications, gas and oil, banking and

finance, transportation, water supply, public health services, and

emergency services. Enlist their participation to conduct government-sponsored vulnerability assessments and to participate in red-team activities.

• Enact an “Omnibus Anti–Red Tape” law with a two-year

sunset clause for approved private-public homeland security

task forces to include (1) a fast-track security clearance process

that permits the sharing of “secret-level” classified information with non-federal and industry leaders; (2) a FOIA exemption in instances when leaders in critical infrastructure industries

agree to share information about their security vulnerabilities

with federal agencies; (3) exemption of private participants in

these task forces from antitrust rules; (4) permitting homeland

security appropriations to be managed under the more liberal rules governing research and development programs in the

Department of Defense rather than according to the customary federal acquisition rules; and (5) liability of safeguards

and limits.

• Fund and deploy survey teams in the United Kingdom,

France, Spain, and Israel to conduct studies on managing urban

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America—Still Unprepared, Still in Danger

[30]

terrorism, evaluating European airline security procedures, and

examining private-public intelligence-sharing arrangements.

6. FUND, TRAIN, AND EQUIP THE NATIONAL GUARD TO MAKE

HOMELAND SECURITY A PRIMARY MISSION.

The National Guard will play a critical role when the next catastrophic terrorist attack happens on American soil, and it must be

well trained and equipped. Governors will expect National Guard

units in their states to help with detecting chemical and biological agents, treating the victims, managing secondary consequences, and maintaining civil order.The National Guard has highly

disciplined personnel spread throughout the nation in 5,475 units.

The men and women who make up its ranks often come from the

local community in which their unit is based. When called up by

governors, the National Guard can be used to enforce civil laws—

unlike regular military forces which are bound by posse comitatus restrictions on performing law enforcement duties. The

National Guard’s medical units, engineer units, military police units,

and ground and air transport units will likely prove indispensable

in helping to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack.

Adapting to the New Homeland and Security Imperative

Governors, charged with developing state homeland security

plans, will look to their National Guard units to fulfill such

needs as

• State-of-the-art communications systems necessary for command-and-control during the chaos of a terrorist attack;

• Personnel in order to evacuate, quarantine, and protect residents

as need be;

• Knowledge of chemical, biological, and radiological attacks and

the capability to respond to them;

• The capacity to provide local medical centers with additional trauma and triage capabilities.

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Task Force Report

[31]

The National Guard is currently equipped and trained primarily

for carrying out its role in supporting conventional combat units

overseas.The homeland security mission can draw on many of these

capabilities but requires added emphasis on

• Responding to a biological attack—the National Guard’s

focus in recent years has been primarily on surviving and

fighting in a battlefield where chemical weapons have been

deployed.

• Acquiring protection, detection, and other equipment that is

tailored for complex urban environments.

• Training to provide civil support in the aftermath of a largescale catastrophic attack.

Recommendations

An aggressive approach to revamping the capabilities of 

National Guard units designated to respond to domestic terrorist attacks can in the short term provide a more robust response

capability while states and localities work to bring their individual response mechanisms up to par. In order for the National Guard

to fulfill this mission, the Task Force recommends the following:

• Congress should authorize and fund additional training for 

National Guard units to work with state civil authorities and

to conduct exercises with local first responders in support of

the new homeland security plans being developed by each 

governor.

• Triple the number of WMD–Civil Support Teams from

twenty-two to sixty-six, develop capabilities so that response

times are reduced to within the narrow window in which their

presence is still valuable, and reevaluate equipment and training programs in order to develop response capabilities for the

full range of WMD threats in urban environments.

• Bolster the National Guard’s “train the trainers” programs to

quickly bring baseline training on recognizing and responding to WMD events to localities around the country.

• Move away from using National Guard resources where their

deployment has a minimal impact. National Guardsmen are

too valuable to be assigned to borders and airports where they

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[32]

are limited in the functions they can perform. Instead, the agencies with the mandate in these areas need to be given the

necessary resources to perform their missions without National Guard help.

• Redress the pay and job-protection discrepancies between

when National Guard units are called up by the president

and when they are called up by a governor. When governors

order an activation, guardsmen receive no protection that

allows them to return to their civilian jobs as provided under

the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act. In addition, when on

state active duty they may be paid as little as $75 a day.

CONCLUSION

Quickly mobilizing the nation to prepare for the worst is an act

of prudence, not fatalism. In the twenty-first century, security and

liberty are inseparable. The absence of adequate security elevates

the risk that laws passed immediately in the wake of surprise terrorist attacks will be reactive, not deliberative. Predictably, the consequence will be to compound the initial harm incurred by a

tragic event with measures that overreach in terms of imposing costly new security mandates and the assumption of new government

authorities that may erode our freedoms. Accordingly, aggressively

pursuing America’s homeland security imperatives immediately

may well be the most important thing we can do to sustain our

cherished freedoms for future generations.

Preparedness at home also plays a critical role in combating 

terrorism by reducing its appeal as an effective means of warfare.

Acts of catastrophic terrorism produce not only deaths and physical destruction but also societal and economic disruption. Thus,

as important as it is to try and attack terrorist organizations overseas and isolate those who support them, it is equally important

to eliminate the incentive for undertaking these acts in the first

place. If the disruptive effects of terrorism can be sharply reduced,

if not eliminated, America’s adversaries may be deterred from taking their battles to the streets of our nation’s homeland.

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[33]

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

CHARLES G. BOYD is Chief Executive Officer and President 

of Business Executives for National Security (BENS). Before

retiring from the U.S. Air Force in August 1995, General

Boyd served as Deputy Commander in Chief for the U.S.

European Command.

WARREN CHRISTOPHER is a Senior Partner at O’Melveny &

Myers. He served as Secretary of State from January 1993 to January 1997 under President Bill Clinton.

WILLIAM J. CROWE is a Senior Adviser at Global Options. Previously, Admiral Crowe served as the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff under Ronald Reagan.

STEPHEN E.FLYNN,who directed the Task Force,is the Jeane J.Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and recently retired as a Commander

in the U.S. Coast Guard. He served in the White House Military Office during the first Bush administration and as a Director for Global Issues on the National Security Council staff during

the Clinton administration.

STEPHEN FRIEDMAN is a Senior Principal at Marsh & McLennan

Capital. He is a retired Chairman of Goldman, Sachs & 

Company.

GARY HART, who co-chaired the Task Force, has been Of Counsel with Coudert Brothers since 1994. As Senator from Colorado

from 1975 to 1987, he served on the Armed Services, Budget, and

Environment Committees and was also a Congressional Adviser to the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

(SALT II) in Geneva.

Note: Institutional affiliations are for identification purposes only.

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America—Still Unprepared, Still in Danger

[34]

JAMES K. KALLSTROM is Senior Executive Vice President at MBNA

America Bank. After September 11, 2001, Mr. Kallstrom took a

leave of absence from MBNA America and served as 

the Director of the Office of Public Security for the State of 

New York.

JOSHUA LEDERBERG is a Nobel laureate and serves as President Emeritus and Sackler Foundation Scholar at Rockefeller University.

DONALD B. MARRON is Chairman of UBS America and Managing General Partner of Lightyear Capital. Previously, he served

for twenty years as Chairman and CEO of Paine Webber

Group, Inc., until its merger with UBS in 2000.

PHILIP A. ODEEN is Chairman of TRW Inc. Before joining TRW

Inc., Mr. Odeen was President of BDM International, Inc.,

and a Vice Chairman at Coopers & Lybrand LLP.

WARREN B. RUDMAN, who co-chaired the Task Force, is currently a Partner in the international law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,

Wharton and Garrison and formerly Chairman of the President’s

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under President Clinton.

He represented New Hampshire in the U.S. Senate from 1980

to 1992.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ is the Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He has served as

Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Labor,

and Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER is Dean of the Woodrow Wilson

School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

Prior to her appointment at Princeton,she was the J.Sinclair Armstrong Professor of International, Foreign, and Comparative

Law at Harvard Law School.

HAROLD E. VARMUS is President and Chief Executive Officer 

of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and a Nobel 

laureate in physiology/medicine. Previously, he served as Director of the National Institutes of Health.

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Task Force Members

[35]

JOHNW. VESSEY is Chairman of the Center for Preventive Action

at the Council on Foreign Relations and previously served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as Vice Chief of Staff

of the U.S. Army.

WILLIAM H.WEBSTER is a Partner at the law firm of Milbank,Tweed,

Hadley & McCloy. He served as Director of Central Intelligence

from 1987 to 1991 and as Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation from 1978 to 1987.

STEVEN WEINBERG is Director of the Theory Group of the University of Texas. He is a Nobel laureate in physics and a recipient of the National Medal of Science.

Note: Institutional affiliations are for identification purposes only.

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OTHER REPORTS OF INDEPENDENT TASK FORCES

SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

* †Threats to Democracy (2002)

Madeleine K. Albright and Bronislaw Geremek, Co-Chairs; Morton H.

Halperin, Project Director; Elizabeth Frawley Bagley, Associate Director

* †Balkans 2010 (2002)

Edward C. Meyer, Chair; William L. Nash, Project Director

* †Terrorist Financing (2002)

Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky,

Project Co-Directors

* †Enhancing U.S. Leadership at the United Nations (2002)

David Dreier and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs; Lee Feinstein and Adrian

Karatnycky, Project Co-Directors; Cosponsored with Freedom House

* †Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy (2001)

Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Co-Chairs; Robert A. Manning,

Project Director

* †The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New 

Administration (2001)

J. Robert Kerrey, Chair; Robert A. Manning, Project Director

* †Strategic Energy Policy: Challenges for the 21st Century (2001)

Edward L. Morse, Chair; Amy Myers Jaffe, Project Director

* †State Department Reform (2001)

Frank C. Carlucci, Chair; Ian J. Brzezinski, Project Coordinator;

Cosponsored with the Center for Strategic and International Studies

* †U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century: A Follow-on Report (2001)

Bernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers, Co-Chairs; Julia Sweig and

Walter Mead, Project Directors

* †A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on U.S. Policy Toward Brazil

(2001)

Stephen Robert, Chair; Kenneth Maxwell, Project Director

* †Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia (2000)

Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, Co-Chairs; Michael Shifter, Project

Director; Cosponsored with the Inter-American Dialogue

†Future Directions for U.S. Economic Policy Toward Japan (2000)

Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Chair; M. Diana Helweg Newton, Project Director

* †Promoting Sustainable Economies in the Balkans (2000)

Steven Rattner, Chair; Michael B.G. Froman, Project Director

* †Nonlethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects (1999)

Richard L. Garwin, Chair; W. Montague Winfield, Project Director

* †U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: Next Steps (1999)

Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Co-Chairs; Michael J. Green,

Project Director

†Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global Financial System: The Future International Financial Architecture (1999)

Carla A. Hills and Peter G. Peterson, Co-Chairs; Morris Goldstein, Project

Director

* Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions (1999)

Michael Rocard, Chair; Henry Siegman, Project Director

* †U.S. Policy Toward Northeastern Europe (1999)

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Chair; F. Stephen Larrabee, Project Director

* †The Future of Transatlantic Relations (1999)

Robert D. Blackwill, Chair and Project Director

* †U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century (1999)

Bernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers, Co-Chairs; Walter Russell

Mead, Project Director

†

Available on the Council on Foreign Relations website at http://www.cfr.org.

*Available from Brookings Institution Press. To order, call 1-800-275-1447.

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