COMMin tE StNSi liVfc - RUSSIA INVESl IGATION ONLY

CIA reported to the Committee that on the same day, December 20, FBI first

informed die CIA's team that FBI wanted to include material derived from what became kitown

as the "Steele dossier." This iiifonnation was from a former

{officer now operating a private commercial intelligence tirm, who had an

ssr? Tr^in'iTipT "f fho lnr»rviovs'wirh Nafion??! Ao«»n«"v p3n«»? Mav 1R. 2017 pp

tl

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMIT! fcfc StNSm Vt - RUSSIA IN VLS1IGATION ONLY

estabiislied relationship with FBI. This material eventually became Annex A of the ICA, but its

placement in the ICA was not resolved until December 29.

B. (U) Confidence Level Debate Over One Judgment

7 (I ) ssi I 1 1 I I I I ijrt t i [„ |, 1. 1 , . ni l \.lniiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, Director, National Security Agency,

and Commander. U.S. Cvber Command, March 19, 2018, p. S8.

78 (II) Ibid., pp. 62-65.

79 (U) /bid , p. 61.

80 (U) rbid.. p. 60.

32

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMIT!tt SLNSiliVt-RUSSIA INVhSi lGAlION ONLY

C. (U) Discussion of the "Steele Reporting" in the ICA

The CIA team working on the ICA first learned on December 20, 2016, of

infonnation the FBI held and wanted to include in the ICA. Despite the fact that the ICA

explicitly excluded ongoing investigations, FBI sought to introduce a summary of the material

from former||H|||||||^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hofficer Christopher Steele.^^^

(U) The Committee reviewed the debate over whether and where to include the Steele

materials with all participants to the drafting of the ICA. In the first meeting of the Committee

with Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division (AD/CD) of the FBI, he articulated

the FBI's concerns. First was the directive from the President to include all the infonnation the

IC had on Russian involvement in the 2016 presidential election, and this included material that

FBI held. Even though the Assistant Director suggested that "the FBI didn't want to stand

behind it," it qualified for this directive. Second, the question immediately became how to

handle this infonnation in the drafting of the ICA. Tliis was ultimately resolved by including the

infonnation as Annex A, a two-page summary attached only to the most classified version of the

ICA (i.e., the "Memorandum to the President" version)."^ FBI officials told the Committee that

they "would have had a major problem if Annex A had not been included," and that FBI believed

they "had to put everything in."'^^

The Assistant Director for|m|recounted a conversation with FBI Assistant

Directoi tui CD on December 22, and recalled the FBI's interest in "weaving their dossier in the

acnial text of the repon." Assistant Director forH^^stated there was no "visibility, at the time

of the writing of the report, into the sub-sourcing dynamic for that dossier .. . because of the siibsourcing, I felt [it] was not appropriate for inclusion in the report and would detract from the

report." The Assistant Director ^or|^^|told the Committee that when she asked the FBI

Assistant Director for CD for more infonnation on the sources for the dossier, the Assistant

Director for CD told her that the FBI's primary source "had not provided infonnation regarding

lini

11 1 (U) ^^HAnalyst 2. SSCI Transcript of tlie Interview with Analysts Panel, July 18. 2017, p. 151.

112 (I') hirt'iview with Bill Priestap, Assistant Director. Counterintelligence Division, FBI, April 13, 2017.

113 (U) Interview with (Section Chief, Counterintelligence Analysis Section. CD-I, FBI] April 21, 2017.

38

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMIT! EL SENS! i 1VE - RUSSIA IN VES1 IGAi ION ONLY

the svib-soiirccs. but that [FBI was] able to independently corroborate some of the sub-sourcing.

But he did not provide the names or reliability for the sub-sources." Assistant Director for

^^Usaid the FBI Assistant Director told her. "We feel ver\' strongly that it should be included

and woven into the text," to which Assistant Director foiH^| stated they would have to

"agree to disagree" and that her recommendation would be that the infonnaiion "not be included

in the report. At a minimum. I was thinking it should be pulled out and put in an annex.""^

When asked to comment on Annex A as it appears in the ICA, Assistant Director

forfimsiated that she concurred with most of the language on the first page of what became

Annex A of the ICA."^ However, from where the text in Annex A begins with "the most

politically sensitive claims by the FBI source alleging a close relationship between the President

elect and the Kremlin." the Assistant Director for^m^tated "from there on down, I can tell

you that there is no information coming from ^^^^sources that would corroborate any of

that.""®

The Assistant Director noted the FBI insisted on including the

Steele reporting because "they didn't want to look like they were hiding anything," and that "[t]o

me. that sounded fair.""^ The Assistant Director foi^^m|and her deputy reviewed the material

and sent a copy to Director Brennan and Deputy Director Cohen."® Tlie Assistant Director for

^Hiold the Committee that her understanding was that "the analysts were very much against"

putting the FBI material in the ICA."® "[I]t was very uiivetted information." according to the

Assistant Director forj^^, and "some of it made sense.'"^ "[I]f you look at the theme, are the

Russians trying to mess with our elections, that theme is certainly accurate. But the details were

really—we wouldn't be able to come up with a good analytic confidence in them before the ICA

was due."^^' Ultimately. "[e]verybody agreed that it would just be an annex, and then it was

agreed there would be a big caveat put on top of the annex, that this is totally unvetted,

unverified.'»122

The CIA analysts interviewed by the Committee recalled "at one point the FBI

wanted [the bieele reporting] in the text [of the ICA]. The FBI wanted it in one fonii. We had it

in a big text box on page 4.... We had a bitter argument with the FBI to put it in an annex.

One analyst acknowledged that the material was already circulating, and that "[i]f we hadn't

114 (l') SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [AC^^^^]. May 25, 2017, pp. 48-51. 53-54,61.

"Memorandum to the President" veisktu <>) the ICA only. p. 27.

|]. May 25. 2017, pp. 53-54.

|J. May 15. 2017. pp. 77-78.

116 (11) SbCl Transcript of the Interview with [A!

11" (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [AI

118 (U) /bid..pp. 76. 78.

119 (U) Ibid., p. 77.

120 (U) Ibid.

121 (U) Ibid.

122(11) Ibid., p. 78.

123 (U) ^^^HAnalyst 1, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Analysts Panel. July 18. 2017, p. 155.

39

COMMITIFE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMin EF SFNM l lVF - RUSSIA INVFSllGATION ONLY

addressed it. it would have either created the impression aniuiig people who didn't go through

the soiircing tliat we had relied on it, which we didn't, or that we were unaware of it."^^^

Deputy Director for Analysis stated, "We would have never included that report

in a ClA-onh^ssessinenl because the source was so indirect. And we made sure we indicated

we didn't use it in our analvsis. and if it had been a CIA-only product we wouldn't have included

it at all."^''

(U) Director Clapper later reiterated to the SSCI in a closed hearing in May 2018:

I don ^ think you'II find in any of the footnotes in the ICA any reference to the

aossien We thought it important to include a summary description of it, but it was not

included as an organic part of the ICA. Maybe a difference without a distinction, but

to us that was a vety important point. For our part, particularly

the CIA and ODNI, since we could not validate the second and third-order assets,

that's why we did not use it as part of the assessment. We felt—and the whole

reason particularly for Jim Comey's part—that we had a duty to warn the

President-elect that it was out there, and that was the whole point. But it was not

included as an organic part of the assessrnent.^^

Director Brennan reiterated the CIA's reservations about the FBI's Steele

material, iiuiing that the DDA^^|"was very concerned about polluting the ICA with this

material," and that "there was siitl opposition, especially from CIA. to include that material

either in essence or in substance in that report." which "was not used in any way as far as the

judgments in the ICA were concerned."''" Director Brennan stated:

Jim Comey and the FBI felt strongly that, here is a very sensitive document that is

being produced by CIA, NSA, and FBI about Russian attempts to interfere in the

election and Russian attempts to denigrate one candidate and promote prospects

of the other. The FBI has acquired this information that comes from a former

foreign intelligence officer from a pretty respectable service, ^^^that includes

information of potential kornpromat related to Donald Trump. i>o Jim Comey,

with some elegance said: How can we hove this report and deliver it to the

outgomg President and the incoming President and for he, Jim Comey, to be

completely silent on this dossier that a lot of people have seen and that the FBI

124 (IJ) mAnaiysi, ibid., p. 152.

125(11) L'-pmy Director for Analysis, ibid.

126 (U) Closed SSCI Hearing with Former Inteliigence Directors, May 16. 2018, pp. 33-34.

127 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Inteiview with John Brennan, former Direaor, Central Intelligence AgetKy, June 23.

2017, pp. 60-65.

40

coMMiri Ft sr Nsmvi - russia invfsi igation only
COMMintt StNSiliVfc-RUSSIA INVtSl IGATION ONLY

was following up on and doesn "t know whether or not Mr. Trump is aware or

not?'^^

When Brennan appeared before the SSCI in a closed hearing in 2018, he stated:

Initially FBI wanted it incorporated into the assessment itself. We all pushed

back on that. They wanted it to be included as the lost portion of the assessment

if it wosn i even going to be used as a finding. We pushed back against that. But

Jim Comey made a very strong case, which we didnt object to, that it needed to

accompany the assessment because it was related to the issue, and we didntknow

where the FBI's investigation was as far as some of those things.^^

a call from

Director Brennan volunteered to the Committee that around the time he received

Iwiio said that:

[Hje wanted to make sure that I understood and that others in the senior

officialdom of the U.S. government understood that that officer, Steele, had been a

/brnier||||[|||||||o/'/irer. but bad no current relationship withf^f and that dossier

was not put together in any way with llHsnpporr. So he wanted to make sure

there was a separation there.^^

(U) Director Comey addressed the question of tlie dossier and its placement when

asked by SSCI Chaimian Burr whether lie "insisted that the dossier be part of the ICA in any

way, shape, or fonn?" Director Comey replied:

I insisted that we bring it to the party, and I was agnostic as to whether it was

footnoted in the document itself, put as an annex. I have some recollection of

talking to John Brennan maybe at some point saying: I don t really care, but I

think it is relevant and so ought to be part of the consideration.^^

(U) NSA played no role in the debate over the Steele reporting and the ICA. NSA

analysts told the Committee they had "no role in drafting, nor role in its inclusion, no role in

reviewing the source material, became aware of it as it was appended."^^ NSA analysts first

I2fi{l') fM.. pp. 60-61.

Closed SSCI Hearing wiili Former Intelligence Directors, May 16, 2018, pp. 34-35.

SSCI Transcript of the Interview with John Brennan, fonner Director. Central Intpllispnrp Aopnrv

Ini ' j _'i I" p 65 WliPii Brpnnan appeared before the SSCI in 201R. he added thatl

see Closed SS^

h , I 11!.., t,| , , M.,-, 1(., p .J-J

131 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Closed SSCI Hearing with James Comey, Former Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, June 8. 2017, p. 49.

132 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with National Security Agency Panel, May 18, 2017, p. 86.

4!

COMMITI HI- Sf NSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMlTlEt StNSI 1 IVfci - RUSSIA INVtS 1 IGAilON ONLY

heard of the iiifomiatioit on December 29 and had no insights into Stcclc's source netwoik, and

the Steeie material had no effect on NSA's views of the Key Judgments of the ICA.^

(U) Admiral Rogers recalled that he heard of this from his team of analysts on December

29 while reviewing a draft of the ICA to which this material had been appended. Admiral

Rogers's initial reaction was that the Steeie information ought not be in the body of the ICA, but

"let's put it in the appendix."'^

Director Clapper said he "first heard" of the Steeie material in a conversation

with Director Brennan "around the IS"" of December."^^^ The NIOs were witting of some of the

conversations regarding the Steeie material, but "had almost no say in this," and recalled a

"unanimous sense that this was not germane to tlie judgments and findings in the paper" and "did

not add value."'^ The NIO for Russia and Eurasia said that they were "comfonable placing it in

the annex" because "that remained tnie to the task."^^^

On December 27, a SVTC was held between the four deputies of CIA, NSA,

FBI, and ODNl. in order to reach an agreement on where to place the Steeie materials in the

ICA, with the FBI insisting it remain in the body of the ICA. No agreement was reached and,

according to the CIA senior officer assigned to the ICA, Director Brennan left It to the analysts to

make the call on where to put it. On December 28, Director Comey was still insisting the

document be in the body. On December 29, Deputy Director Cohen and Deputy Director

McCabe agreed to place tlie material in an annex.

Director Brennan recalled to the Committee: "So as long as it was separated

from the ICA's substance and judgments and as long as it was not going to be part of the foniial

briefing we gave on the ICA. we felt, ok, Jim [Comey], you want to do it, okay. We're not going

to object.

D. (U) Finalizing the ICA

With the placement of the Steeie material resolved, the ICA was formalized as a

Mpnmr;jiiHiini fn Hip President, dated December 30, 2016, and handed to the NIOs at the NIC.

133 (U) Ibid.

134 (U) SSCI Transcnpi of the Interview witlt Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, Director, National Security

Agency, and Commander. U.S. Cyber Command. March 19. 2018. pp. 69, 71.

135 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Closed Hearing; Former Intel Directors Panel on Russian Interference, May 16.

2018, p. 107.

136 (IT) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIG

for C\4)er Issues], May 9, 2017. pp. 90, 92.

13"(!') fhfd..p. 93. '

38 inrarufow with

2017. p. 62

iipt of the Interview with John Brennan. former Director. Central Intelligence Agency. June 23,

42

COMMi n FI SI NSI1 [VI - Ktssi \ IN\ 1 S I K.ATION ONLY
( OMMITIEF SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONI Y

2. (U) FDI Reporting

The sentence summarizes a kev point in this analytic line, which is that

This citation, to FBI reporting, resulted in significant conhision in the

^oininitlee's review of tlie ICA. The original set of ICA source documents made available to the

Committee in March 2017 included a December 27, 2016, FBI Letterhead Memorandum

supporting footnote 222. This LHM did not match the document cited in the footnotes of the

ICA. which referred to an LHM of the same date with a different heading.^^

360 FBI,

(,

lOciober 18. 20161

I lt«- 1 HM siibiniftpri ro rho irA '^n^irrp hook rp\ifns'fKl by the Committeel

all of which are also redacted.

3021 FBI. LHM I Rfview for POHLS Taskinq on Russian Infliirnrr in

{he I'lt '-idi'iiiuil Taskinq. December 2". 2016 (ICA hMiiiuue 222)

fni backgioimd. see also SSCI Tiaiibcupf oj

August 22,2017, pp. 12-17.

115

COMMITIEL SLNSI11\ L - RUSSIA 1N\ LS1IGATION ONLY
COMMI ri EE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESl IGAl lON ONLY

Xtie LHM nrlginaily submitted to the Committee was an FBI

summary oi uidieuctU i Lii iwd received from Christopher Steele.^ The LHM specifically cites

the various "company reports" that are included in the Steele material, wliich are a compilation

of reports all titled (and numbered as) "company reports." Submission of tliis memo for footnote

222 appears to have been an FBI error, as the LHM did not support the ICA language cited.

When the Committee noted this anomaly to the FBI in repeated conversations, as well as noting

repeated statements by FBI and CIA that no Steele material was used in the ICA. the FBI

withdrew this document.

It was not until January 28. 2018. tluit tl)p FBI submitted to the

Committee the LHM cited in the ICA foomotes. Review for POTUS

Tasking on Russian Influence in the 2016 Presidential Election."

3. (U) CIA Reporting

previously discussed, the Steele material was summarized in Annex A of the ICA. "Additional

Repoiiiiig I luiii an FBI Source on Russian Influence Efforts." Hie reports in the Steele material are labeled

"companv reports," which the FBI rife as such in their LHM under the designation "CROWN."

364 FBI. LHM Review for POFL^S Tnslcin^ on Russian Influence in (he 2016

Pre-J- '"(<(' Tasking, DeceninTi j^jTiiMhA iootnole 222).

116

COMMIT!EE SI \s| [ IVI - KLssi \ IN\ I sIK.ATION ONLY
COMMin EE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

IX. (U) ThelCAAnnexes

(U) Tlie ICA includes an unclassified, twelve-page addendum that provides

recommendations jointly prepared by DHS, FBI, and tlie NIST to protect U.S. election

infrastructure and political entities.

(U) The addendum represents a partial response to the original presidential tasking for

the ICA, wlilch included a request for recommendations. According to Director Clapper, "[wjhat

we ended up doing was focusing on the cyber things that could be done. Tliat's what generated

separately on an unclassified basis the best practices paper that DHS and FBI did.'""^

(U) Tlie Committee addresses election seairity issues in Volume 1 of this report,

including some of the recommendations made in this annex.

A. Annex A: Additional Reporting from an FBI Source on Russian

Influcme Efforts

Annex A represents a summary of information provided to the FBI bv

Christoplier Sieele. The annex cites ^^^freports. ^"d

Ihe^^bBl references

two LHMs, one of whicii is a summary reports. The second LHM,

"Additional CROWN Reporting for USIC Tasking," was erroneously provided to the Committee

402 (U) SSCl Transcript of the Interview with James Clapper, Former Director of National Intelligence. July 17,

2017, p. 42.

127

COMMITIEE SL-NblllVE - RLSSL\LN\ LsilGATION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

as the supporting material for footnote 222. The final citation is an open source reference to an

October 31, 2016, piece in Mother Jones.

Annex A includes qualifiers for the Steele material, but does not mention the

private clients who paid for Steele's work. Tlie Committee found no evidence that analysts

working on the ICA were aware of the political provenance of the Steele material.

CIA shared drafting responsibility for the first portion of Annex A, which states,

"Some of the 1-Bl source's reporting is consistent with the judgments in this assessment," and the

first three footnotes of the ICA are reprised.

The annex language notes, however, that one aspect of the Steele material

. The assertion that the Kremlin "regretted its derision to

Tlie Committee asked I

"We had no reporting of that at all.

the Committee's report.)

m

|whether they had any "intelligence that

responded.

For more information on this material, see elsewhere in

B.

4031

I h IK'' I i;i' Hi'' Ikii'Ia I'x.v ith Xn.iK Panel. .Inly 18. JUi~, p. 34. For

Stetrle inaleuai Vr>\e f Pf<ifienrin>

F/t'it? Jntlwnre Operation,I

128

COMMIT! EL bL.NSl i i\ L - RL SbL\ L\ \ Lb 1 lUATION ONLY