alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### John R. Trzaska, Respondent, v Cincinnati, Inc., et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

[715 NYS2d 810]

—Order insofar as appealed from unanimously reversed on the law without costs, motion denied and affirmative defenses based upon General Obligations Law § 15-108 reinstated. Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries that he sustained in a work-related accident. The injuries occurred when he was setting up a brake machine allegedly manufactured by Cincinnati, Inc. and sold by Pitney Bowes, Inc. (defendants). Cincinnati, Inc. commenced a third-party action against plaintiffs employer. While the third-party action was pending, plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with his employer. Defendants then were granted leave to amend their answers to assert General Obligations Law § 15-108 as an affirmative defense *(see, Ward v City of Schenectady,*204 AD2d 779, 780).

That part of Supreme Court’s order granting plaintiffs motion to dismiss the affirmative defenses based upon General Obligations Law § 15-108 must be reversed. Defendants are entitled to a setoff under General Obligations Law § 15-108 based upon the settlement of plaintiff with his employer. Under the circumstances of this case, plaintiffs employer is a “person! ] liable or claimed to be liable in tort for the same injury” within the meaning of General Obligations Law § 15-108 (a) *(see, Madaffari v Wilmod Co.,*96 Misc 2d 729, 731).

In *Tassone v Haggar Apparel Co.*(259 AD2d 1035), relied upon by plaintiff, the plaintiff employee commenced an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a work-related accident. He released his employer from age discrimina*1049tion, wrongful termination and other employment-related claims unconnected to the personal injury action. General Obligations Law § 15-108 (a) did not apply in *Tassone*because the release was not given to the employer “for the same injury” for which the plaintiff sought recovery (see, *Bauman v Garfinkle,*235 AD2d 245). To the extent that our decision in *Tassone*holds that General Obligations Law § 15-108 does not apply to a settlement between an injured person and his or her employer, it is not to be followed. (Appeals from Order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Notaro, J. — Dismiss Pleading.) Present — Green, J. P., Wisner, Hurlbutt, Scudder and Kehoe, JJ.
Case 3:08-cv-01227-JSW   Document 114   Filed 04/28/10   Page 1 of 1
Editorial Note on Part 240
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 240 appear at 57 FR 36501, Aug. 13, 1992, and 57 FR 47409, Oct. 16, 1992.

§ 240.14a-15 Differential and contingent compensation in connection with roll-up transactions. ( a ) It shall be unlawful for any person to receive compensation for soliciting proxies, consents, or authorizations directly from security holders in connection with a roll-up transaction as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, if the compensation is: ( 1 ) Based on whether the solicited proxy, consent, or authorization either approves or disapproves the proposed roll-up transaction; or
( 2 ) Contingent on the approval, disapproval, or completion of the roll-up transaction.
( b ) This section is applicable to a roll-up transaction as defined in Item 901(c) of Regulation S-K (§ 229.901(c) of this chapter), except for a transaction involving only: ( 1 ) Finite-life entities that are not limited partnerships;
( 2 ) Partnerships whose investors will receive new securities or securities in another entity that are not reported under a transaction reporting plan declared effective before December 17, 1993 by the Commission under section 11A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78k-1); or
( 3 ) Partnerships whose investors' securities are reported under a transaction reporting plan declared effective before December 17, 1993 by the Commission under section 11A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78k-1).
[59 FR 63684, Dec. 8, 1994]
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA
F OURTH D ISTRICT

KERRY MCAULEY , Appellant,

v.

SIMON PROPERTY GROUP, INC. , Appellee

.

No. 4D 16

- 2247

[ December 14, 2017 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Cheryl Caracuzzo , Judge; L.T. Case No. 50

- 2012

- CA

011139

- XXXX

- MB

.
Kerry McAuley, Boca Raton, pro se.

Edgardo Ferreyra, Jr. and Jack Luks of Luks, Santaniello, Petrillo & Jones, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.
Affirmed.

G ERBER , C.J., C IKL IN and L EVINE , JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### The People of the State of New York v. Gerald Garde.

Enlargement of time granted. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, McNally and Stevens, JJ.
January 2 8 , 2015

Mr. Paul Gretch

Director

, Office of International Aviation

United States Department of Transportation

12 00 New Jersey Ave. , S. E

. Washington, D.C. 20590

Re: American Airlines’ Application for Statement of Authorization

( Code

- Sharing with SriLankan Airlines Ltd.)

(Docket DOT

- OST

- 201 5

- 0010 )

Dear Mr. Gretch:

We have polled the air carriers on the attached service list regarding

American Airlines’ Applica tion for a Statement of Authorization . We received no

objections.

Accordingly, we respectfully request expedited consideration of the

Statement of Authorization requested in the Application.

Sincerely,

Howard Kass

Vice President

– Regulatory Affair s

Robert A. Wirick,

Managing Director, Regulatory and

International Affairs

Abigail Donovan

Director, Congressional and Federal Affairs

11 01 17 th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036 ( 202 ) 326

- 5 15 3 Fax: ( 202 ) 898

- 4810CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that, on January 2 8 , 2015 , I caused to be served a copy of the

foregoing L etter by email upon those addressees listed below:

englets@state.gov (Department of State)

cristinasa@state.gov (Department of State)

brian.hedberg@dot.gov (Department of Transportation)

todd.homan@dot.gov (Department of Transportation)

peter.irvine@dot .gov (Department of Transportation)

laura.remo@dot.gov (Department of Transportation)

brett.kruger@dot.gov (Department of Transportation)

john.allen@faa.gov (Federal Aviation Administration)

dan.weiss@united.com (United)

steve.morrissey@united.com (U nited)

gmurphy@crowell.com (Counsel for United)

sascha.vanderbellen@delta.com (Delta)

chris.walker@delta.com (Delta)

______________ ________

Abigail Donovan
#### Nathan Grossman et al., Respondents, v George Wisser et al., Appellants.

— In an action to recover brokerage commissions, defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated February 4, 1977, which denied their motion for an order of preclusion. Order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. As determined by the Special Term, the bill of particulars is neither insufficient nor defective. Martuscello, J. P., Latham, Hargett and O’Connor, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-7819

ARCHIE JEROME CHADWICK,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

ARCHIE GEE, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge. (CA95-2174-S)

Submitted: January 11, 1996 Decided: January 25, 1996

Before RUSSELL, HALL, and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Archie Jerome Chadwick, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr.,

Attorney General, Tarra R. DeShields-Minnis, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying

relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) petition. We have reviewed

the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. Chadwick v. Gee, No. CA-95-2174-S (D. Md. Oct. 16, 1995). We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Edgewater Foods International, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending November 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Michael Boswell, Acting Chief Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods indicated.





Date:  January 14, 2008



/s/  Michael Boswell

Michael Boswell,

Acting Chief Accounting Officer
#### § 212.1 Purpose and scope.

This subpart contains the rules that the United States Agency for International Development (hereinafter “USAID” or “the Agency”) follows in processing requests for records under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. 552. The rules in this subpart should be read in conjunction with the text of the FOIA. Requests made by individuals for records about themselves under the Privacy Act of 1974, are processed under Subpart O. Definitions of FOIA terms are referenced in subpart L of this part.
ADVANCED AERODYNAMICS & STRUCTURES, INC.
                        (A Development Stage Enterprise)


                 Statement Re: Computation of Per Share Earnings



<TABLE>
                                                      For the Three Months Ended           For the Nine Months Ended
                                                             September 30                         September 30
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        1996              1997              1996              1997
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<S>                                                <C>                <C>                <C>               <C>
Net loss                                           $  (380,000)      $(2,365,000)       $(1,726,000)      $(4,242,000)
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weighted average number of Class B
Common Stock shares outstanding                      2,000,000         2,000,000          2,000,000         2,000,000
Common Stock equivalents from the issuance
of Bridge Warrants computed using the
treasury stock method                                1,400,000                            1,400,000
Weighted average number of Class A
Common Stock shares outstanding                                        6,900,000                            6,900,000
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     3,400,000         8,900,000          3,400,000         8,900,000
                                                 =================================================================================
Net loss per share                                       ($.11)            ($.27)             ($.51)            ($.48)
                                                 =================================================================================
</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Edith G. Doig, Deceased. Stephen G. Doig, Jr., Appellant; American Bible Soceity et al., Respondents.

—In a proceeding to construe a will, the executor appeals from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Rockland County, dated October 26, 1976, which, *inter alia,*directed him to purchase annuities from the American Bible Society for certain persons pursuant to paragraph "fourth” of the testatrix’ will. Decree affirmed, without costs or disbursements, upon the opinion of Surrogate Skahen. Hopkins, Acting P. J., Margett, Damiani and Rabin, JJ., concur.
DENY and Opinion Filed September 29, 2020 

# S

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00706-CV IN RE L.C. AKA S .R.M., Relators Original Proceeding from the 330th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-20-07925Y MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Myers, Molberg, and Evans Opinion by Justice Evans Before the Court is relators’ July 29, 2020 petition for writ o f mandamus. In their petition, relators challenge the trial court’s order gran ting real party in interest’s petition for bill of review, which set aside the final order of adoption and reopened the case. After reviewing relators’ petiti on, real party’s response, and the mandamus record, we conclude that the pe tition does not comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure in multiple respects. To start, the petitio n is not signed. See
T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 9.1 (requiring all filings to be signed); In re Hargesheimer , No. 07- 03-0553-CV, 2004 WL 42261, at *1 (Tex . App.—Amarillo Jan. 8, 20 04, orig.–2– proceeding) (denying mandamus petition because it was unsigned, among other reasons). Relators have also failed to file either a reporter’s record from the bill of review hearing or a statement that no testimony was taken. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.7(a)(2); In re Daniels , No. 05-20-00501-CV, 2020 WL 2715406, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 26, 2020, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus p etition for relator’s failure to file a reporter’s record or statement that no testimony was taken, among other reasons). Further, relators have not supplied a pro per copy of the July 8, 2020 order granting the bill of review. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.3(k), 52.7(a) Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus without prejudice to refiling a petition that satisfies the requirements of the Texa s Rules of Appellate Procedure. We also lift our stay order issued on August 5, 2020

.

200706F.P05 /David Evans/ DAVID EVANS JUSTICE
# Task Force January 28, 2010

BY HAND Document Control Office Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics Room6428 U .S . Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., N . W . Washington, DC 20460

Re : Testing Consent Order for Ethylene Dichloride (Docket No. OPPT-2003-0010) Dear Sirs : a : .,

Enclosed for your information, in sextuplicate pursuant to the Enforceable Consent Agreement for Ethylene Dichloride ("EDC"), 68 Fed. Reg. 33125 (June 3, 2003) (the "ECA"), is an article that will be published in the journal Food and Chemical Toxicology that assesses acute and neurotoxic effects of inhaled EDC in Fischer 344 rats . Please do not hesitate to contact me if there is any question about this submission. Sincerely,

Enclosures cc : John E. Schaeffer W . Caffey Norman, Esq. P.O . Box 331, Millwood, VA 22646 (540) 837-1602

Peter E. Voytek, Manager 

# 4

9 ;)~ 

# u~qm~0uiwq~u0NU~ii~inuuui~nii ui
CONTAINS NO CBI 5071621 

# ;3~ 4 3 3 L
EXHIBIT 32.1
                                                                    ------------


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Pacific Biometrics, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2006 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ronald
R. Helm, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

     1. the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


Date: May 12, 2006

                                       /s/ Ronald R. Helm
                                       ----------------------------
                                       Ronald R. Helm,
                                       Chief Executive Officer
**Exhibit 32.3**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of MarkWest Hydrocarbon, Inc. (the “Company”),on Form 10-Q as amended by this Form 10-Q/A for the period ending March 31,2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), I, James G. Ivey, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,certify, to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, asadopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) The Reportfully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ JAMES G.  IVEY |   |
|--------------------|--------|

 

JamesG. Ivey

Chief Financial Officer

 

October 20,2005

 

----
#### In re CARMICHAEL.

[INQUISITION OS’ LUNACT.]

1. *To what witness may testify.*— A witness can not be asked, on the trial of an inquisition of lunacy, “Whether, in his opinion, the defendant was capable of taking care of himself and managing his affairs.

Appeal from the Probate Court of Talladega.

In the matter of John Carmichael, on tbe petition of Daniel Carmichael, bis brother, to have him declared *non compos mentis.*“On the trial before tbe jury,” as the bill of exceptions states, “the petitioner introduced a witness who testified, that he had known the defendant for fourteen or fifteen years, and had known him well for five or six years last past; that he had not seen him for five or six years prior to 1852, the defendant having been absent from the State; that he had lived within a mile of the defendant, from 1852 until about two years ago, when he (witness) removed about fourteen miles from him; that he was never in the defendant’s house,-nor had the de*617fendant ever lived with Mm, or stayed all night with him; that he only knew the defendant as he knew other neighbors, but was not intimately acquainted with him, and had never transacted any business with him; and that he had observed the appearance of the defendant, and the expression of his face and eyes. On this state of proof as to the witness’ knowledge and acquaintance with the defendant,” the court permitted the petitioner to ask said witness, against the defendant’s objections, the following questions: “Whether or not he was well enough acquainted with the-defendant to have an-opinion as to' his soundness or uusoundness of mind;” “what his opinion was, as to the soundness or .unsoundness of the defendant’s mind;” and “whether, in his opinion, the defendant was capable of taking care of himself and managing his affairs.” The answer of the witness to the last question was, “In my opinion, he is incompetent to take care of himself and manage his affairs.” The allowance of these questions, to each of which, with the answers thereto, the defendant reserved an exception, is now assigned.as error.

Jas. B. Martin, with Q-bo. S. Walden, for appellant.

L. E. Parsons, and Jno. White, *contra.*

.STONE, J.

The witness should not have been allowed to testify that, in his opinion, John E. Carmichael was incompetent to manage his affairs and take care of himself. Walker v. Walker, 34 Ala. 469 ; Hall v. Goodson, 32 Ala. 277; Stubbs v. Houston, 33 Ala. 555.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Seminole Oil & Gas Corporation, Respondent, v. Harry D. Mencher, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

Order, dated November 4, 1959, denying defendant-appellant’s motion to vacate plaintiff’s notice of examination before trial, dated July 29, 1959, unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to the respondent. No opinion. Order, dated November 4, 1959, denying defendant-appellant’s motion to vacate plaintiff’s notice of examination before trial, dated August 26, 1959, unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to the respondent. No opinion. Order, dated November 4, 1959, granting plaintiff-respondent’s motion to vacate defendant-appellant’s demand for a bill of particulars, dated August 26, 1959, unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to the respondent. No opinion. Order, dated November 4, 1959, granting plaintiff-respondent’s motion to vacate defendant-appellant’s notice of examination, dated September 21, 1959, unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to respondent. Defendant-appellant may, of course, serve a new notice to examine plaintiff before trial at the conclusion of the examinations by plaintiff of defendants. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Rabin, Valente and McNally, JJ.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDUARDO REYES,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD KIRKLAND, warden; 

et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 08-813 SI (pr)

ORDER

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in which they argued, among other

things, that they were entitled to qualified immunity. After defendants filed their motion,

plaintiff filed a "motion for request for production of documents," and a "motion for

continuance; renewal of motion to appoint counsel." Defendants opposed the motions, arguing

that discovery should be stayed pending resolution of their motion for summary judgment

because they raised a qualified immunity defense in it.

The U.S. Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that a district court should stay

discovery until the threshold question of qualified immunity is settled. See Crawford-El v.

Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987); Harlow

v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In light of the fact that defendants' motion for summary

judgment raises a qualified immunity defense, plaintiff's motion for discovery and motion for

continuance to obtain discovery are DENIED. (Docket # 51, # 52.) Discovery is now

STAYED pending resolution of the motion for summary judgment or other court order. 

Case 3:08-cv-00813-SI Document 59 Filed 05/03/10 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The court notes that, as a practical matter, plaintiff did receive the 30-day continuance

he requested because he did not file his opposition to the motion for summary judgment until a

month after the deadline. Plaintiff's opposition to the motion for summary judgment is deemed

timely filed, as is defendants' reply.

Plaintiff's renewed motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED for the same reasons

the court denied his original motion for appointment of counsel. (Docket # 51.)

The motion for summary judgment is now fully briefed and remains under submission.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2010 _______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-00813-SI Document 59 Filed 05/03/10 Page 2 of 2