Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Review of the National Bio and Agro-Defense 
 


Facility Site Selection Process
 
 

OIG-11-13 November 2010 
~~~,~

Office ofInspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

Homeland 

NOV 17 2010 Security

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (GIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses issues pertaining to the department's site selection process for the 

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility. It is based on interviews with employees ana 

officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of 

applicable documents. 

We trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. 

We express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this 

report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................1 
 


Background..........................................................................................................................2 
 


Results of Review ................................................................................................................4 
 


DHS Complied with Appropriation Authority and Other Requirements ......................5 
 


DHS Fairly Evaluated and Rated Prospective Sites Using A Qualitative and 
 

Quantitative Scoring Process ....................................................................................11 
 

Meetings with the Under Secretary Created Perceptions That Some Consortia 
 

Gained an Unfair Advantage ....................................................................................27 
 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................32 
 


Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report .......................................33 
 


Appendix C: NBAF Chronology...............................................................................35 
 


Appendix D: Major Contributors to this Report ........................................................38 
 


Appendix E: Report Distribution ..............................................................................39 
 


Abbreviations 

A/C/O Acquisition/Construction/Operations 
 


APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
 


ARS Agricultural Research Service 
 


BSL Biosafety Level 
 


CEQ Council on Environmental Quality 
 


DHHS Department of Human and Health Services 
 


DHS Department of Homeland Security 
 


DOD Department of Defense
 
 

EIS Environmental Impact Statement 
 


EOI Expressions of Interest 
 


FAD Foreign Animal Diseases 
 


FAQ Frequently Asked Questions 
 


FAR Federal Acquisition Regulations
 
 

HBAC Kansas (Heartland Bio Agro Consortium) 
 


HHS Health and Human Services 
 


HSPD-9 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 
 


KBA Kansas Bioscience Authority
 
 

NBAF National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility 
 


NEPA National Environmental Policy Act 
 

PIADC Plum Island Animal Disease Center 

ROD Record of Decision 

S&T 

USDA 

Science and Technology 

U.S. Department of Agriculture 

I 
 

 

OIG
 
 Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

In January 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

requested expressions of interest from government agencies, 

industry, academia, and other parties and organizations interested 

in proposing a location to build a new National Bio and AgroDefense Facility (NBAF). Twenty-nine consortia responded. 

Following a three-year site evaluation process, on January 16, 

2009, DHS selected the Manhattan Campus site in Manhattan, 

Kansas, as the preferred NBAF site. Members of Congress wrote 

the Inspector General to express concerns that the NBAF site 

selection process appeared to be biased and inconsistent with 

federal law, and requested that we review the process. 

DHS carried out the site selection process fairly, and we did not 

identify any evidence of bias. It adhered to requirements contained 

in congressional appropriations and the National Environmental 

Policy Act of 1969. It followed a pre-approved site selection plan 

consistent with federal guidelines for identifying future 

government facilities. Federal subject matter experts established 

sound evaluation criteria that resulted in comprehensive 

assessments of all prospective sites. DHS informed the public of 

the importance of in-kind contributions and weighed them fairly. 

We determined that the former Under Secretary for Science and 

Technology’s (Under Secretary) decisions during the process were 

not pre-determined. 

Meetings between elected officials and the Under Secretary created 

perceptions that some consortia gained an unfair advantage during 

the site selection process. We could not substantiate that these 

meetings affected the site selection process. In addition, we 

determined that the Under Secretary’s appointment of a 

representative of the Kansas Heartland Bio Agro Consortium to the 

Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee 

was not an attempt to influence, and did not influence, the site 

selection process. We make no recommendations in this report. 

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Background 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD) “Defense of 

United States Agriculture and Food” establishes a national policy 

to defend the nation’s agriculture and food system against terrorist 

attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD-9 mandates 

that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 

accelerate and expand development of current and new 

countermeasures against the intentional introduction or natural 

occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and zoonotic diseases 

(disease transmitted from “animal” to humans). 

Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) located on the 

northern tip of Long Island, NY, performs much of the Nation’s 

current animal disease research. Built in the 1950s, PIADC is 

nearing the end of its lifecycle, and it cannot accommodate 

research on highly pathogenic agents and zoonotic diseases. DHS 

proposed to build a new National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility 

(NBAF) to be co-located with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service--Veterinary Services 

and Agricultural Research Service. Co-locating the NBAF with 

USDA will enable research, diagnostics, and responses to 

outbreaks in agricultural animals from a single facility. 

The proposed NBAF will consist of an integrated highcontainment Bio Safety Level-4 facility with laboratories for an 

estimated 250 to 350 scientists and support staff.1 DHS began 

designing the facility in 2009, and expects to begin construction of 

the central utility plant in FY2011. DHS expects construction of 

the NBAF to be completed by FY2016 and fully operational in 

FY2018. DHS estimates the project may cost as much as $775 

million. 

The DHS Appropriations Act of 2006 (PL 109-90), authorized 

DHS to select a future NBAF site. In 2006, DHS requested 

Expressions of Interest (EOI) submissions from federal, state and 

local government agencies, industry, academia, and other 

interested parties and organizations. DHS received 29 

submissions. It assessed the submissions against four primary site 

evaluation criteria: 

1

 A biosafety level is the extent of the biocontainment precautions an enclosed facility must have to study 

dangerous biological agents. Levels of containment range from the bio safety level 1 (lowest) to bio safety 

level 4 (highest). 

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•	 Proximity to research capabilities; 

•	 Proximity to workforce; 

•	 Community acceptance/cost sharing/integrated 
 


partnerships, and; 
 


•	 Acquisition/construction/operations requirements. 

An interagency working group composed of technical specialists 

from DHS, USDA, and other federal agencies developed the 

criteria and sub-criteria. In August 2006, DHS narrowed the list of 

sites to 18 sites (one consortium subsequently withdrew). An 

evaluation committee comprised of federal agency employees 

visited the 17 sites and recommended four sites to the Under 

Secretary. The Under Secretary added an additional site. 

In July 2007, S&T initiated an Environmental Impact Statement 

(EIS) process to evaluate the potential environmental 

consequences of constructing and operating the NBAF at the five 

sites, plus Plum Island. The sites were: 

•	 South Milledge Avenue site; Athens Georgia; 

•	 Manhattan Campus Site; Manhattan, Kansas; 

•	 Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora, Mississippi; 

•	 Umstead Research Farm Site; Butner, North Carolina; and, 

•	 Texas Research Park Site; San Antonio, Texas. 

The Under Secretary decided to include Plum Island because it 

“appear[ed] to meet the NEPA requirement that the proposing 

Federal agency evaluate the range of all “reasonable alternatives” 

to a proposed action.” 

During the 60-day EIS scoping period from July to September 

2007, DHS sought public comments and conducted public 

meetings at each site. DHS received more than 3,870 comments 

during the period. DHS addressed concerns about public health in 

the event of an accident, potential effects on the population, and 

the ability of affected communities to evacuate the area. Other 

issues under review included proximity of animals susceptible to 

the diseases studied, the environmental effects to biological and 

natural resources, and the resources required for the construction 

and operation of the NBAF, including in-kind contributions to 

offset infrastructure costs. In December 2008, DHS published the 

NBAF Final EIS. On January 16, 2009, DHS published its Record 

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of Decision (ROD), which announced the Manhattan Campus site 

in Manhattan, KS as the preferred NBAF site. 

Results of Review 

DHS evaluated and rated prospective sites fairly, and we did not 

identify any evidence of bias. It sufficiently documented the 

process used to select Manhattan, KS as the future location of the 

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility. 

DHS complied with guidance contained in congressional 

appropriations, completed the NBAF Environmental Impact 

Statement (EIS) in accordance with the National Environmental 

Policy Act, and followed a department-approved site selection plan 

consistent with the General Services Administration’s procedures 

for selecting prospective sites for future government facilities. 

With the assistance of other federal subject matter experts, DHS 

established sound evaluation criteria that resulted in 

comprehensive written assessments of all prospective sites. A 

steering committee led by the Science and Technology’s Office of 

National Laboratories and consisting of senior federal officials, 

unanimously recommended the Manhattan Campus site to the 

then-Under Secretary for Science and Technology and as the 

Selection Authority, he accepted the committee’s recommendation. 

In July 2007, during DHS’ process to select the five final sites, the 

Under Secretary added the Flora Industrial Park site in Flora, 

Mississippi and subsequently added the Plum Island site. 

Although the Under Secretary had the discretion to include 

additional sites if he determined that it was in the best interest of 

the government, the addition of the Flora, Mississippi site created 

the perception that he disregarded the steering committee’s 

analysis in favor of this site. There was no evidence that the Under 

Secretary favored any particular site for other reasons or 

inappropriately influenced the steering committee’s selections. 

Increasing the number of finalists from five to six had no affect on 

which site was ultimately selected. 

Members of Congress and some of the consortia questioned 

whether DHS fully informed the public of the importance of inkind contributions. DHS clearly stated in the EOI that submissions 

were the first step in a process, and that it would ask for more 

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information from the interested consortia during subsequent stages 

of the site assessment process, which it did. Following responses 

to the EOI, DHS communicated that it preferred, but did not 

require, in-kind contributions or other offers of support and it 

collected and assessed consortia’s in-kind contributions as a subcriterion. 

DHS met all National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) required 

timeframes for the public comment periods. However, some 

consortia perceived that DHS hastily considered last-minute 

comments to the Final Draft EIS, when it issued the Final EIS only 

days after the comment period closed. We did not determine that 

the short turnaround time meant DHS did not consider all 

comments. NBAF officials noted that DHS responded to late 

comments received after the public comment period to the extent 

practicable. 

There was confusion regarding ground rules for meeting with the 

Under Secretary. The fact that elected officials met with the Under 

Secretary during his visits to prospective NBAF sites and at his 

Washington, DC office, created a perception that some consortia 

had an unfair advantage in the NBAF site selection. In addition, we 

determined that the Under Secretary’s appointment of a 

representative of the Kansas Heartland Bio Agro Consortium to the 

Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee 

was not an attempt to influence the site selection process. 

DHS Complied with the Appropriation Authority and 

Other Requirements 

DHS complied with guidance contained in Congressional 

appropriations, completed the NBAF Environmental Impact 

Statement (EIS) according to the National Environmental Policy 

Act , and devised and followed a department-approved site 

selection plan consistent with the General Services 

Administration’s procedures for selecting prospective sites for 

future government facilities. 

DHS’ Authority to Select a Future NBAF Site 

The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2006 

P.L. 109-90, authorized DHS to select a future NBAF site. The 

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appropriation did not include acquiring the land for the site or 

initiating the construction of the NBAF. The site selection process 

did not constitute a procurement activity and was not subject to 

Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). 

The Act provided DHS $23 million “to select a site for the 

National Bio and Agro defense Facility” and to “perform other preconstruction activities.” Fiscal Year 2007 House Committee 

Report 109-699 stipulated that DHS “submit a project schedule, 

including expected completion dates and funding requirements for 

all phases of the project to the Committee within 45 days after the 

date of enactment of this act.” 

In response, in December 2006, DHS proposed a plan to select the 

future facility location, known as the National Bio and AgroDefense Facility Project Schedule. The plan included the project 

schedule, expected completion dates, and a preliminary funding 

requirement estimate of $451 million based on a 500,000 square 

feet facility. The cost estimate did not include the costs of 

infrastructure or related site-specific characteristics, or for 

decommissioning the PIADC. According to DHS’ report to 

Congress, under United States Code Title 41, Section 14, DHS 

“did not have the statutory authority to acquire the land upon 

which the NBAF would be built,” and therefore NBAF funding 

and activities were restricted to site selection and pre-construction 

activities leading to the identification of a site for a future NBAF. 

The NBAF project schedule described the Science and Technology 

Office of National Laboratories’ responsibility to develop a nonsite-specific conceptual design, including the facility concept, 

technical requirements, and footprint. The schedule established 

key milestones for the site assessment and selection process and 

targeted October 2008 for a final decision. DHS envisioned the 

site selection plan as a multi-tiered, multi-phased approach 

encompassing the NBAF conceptual design and feasibility study, 

site visits to prospective locations, and issuing a Notice of Intent 

for the Environmental Impact Study, among other key activities. 

A former Deputy Secretary for DHS directed S&T to pursue inkind contributions for NBAF sites and infrastructure to help offset 

future budget appropriations requested for construction. In its 

report to Congress, DHS discussed the process to accept in-kind or 

other contributions. DHS is authorized to accept gifts such as inkind contributions and land under the authority granted the 

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Secretary pursuant to Title 6 of the United States Code, Section 

453, and section 507 of Public Law 108-90, DHS Appropriations 

Act of 2004. 

In subsequent appropriations, Congress directed DHS to conduct 

further risk and threat analysis. Specifically, DHS’ Fiscal Year 

2009 Appropriations Act (PL 110 -329) stipulated that none of the 

available NBAF funds “shall be obligated for construction of a 

National Bio and Agro-defense Facility...until the Secretary of 

Homeland Security completes a risk assessment of whether footand-mouth disease work can be done safely on the United States 

mainland and this assessment is reviewed by the Government 

Accountability Office.” As of April 2010, Congress had not 

appropriated funds for the construction of the NBAF. 

DHS Designed and Implemented the NBAF Site Selection Process 

According to Accepted Federal Practices 

DHS based its site selection plan on the General Services 

Administration’s Site Selection Guide, and the contributions of an 

interagency work group comprised of DHS S&T, Health and 

Human Services (HHS), and the United States Department of 

Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

(APHIS) and Agricultural Research Service (ARS). The guide is 

used by GSA’s real estate and design professionals, federal 

agencies, and stakeholders. The guide instructs users how to 

acquire future sites, the guide outlines the site selection process, 

presents best site selection practices, and identifies potential 

participants, their roles, and when various activities of the process 

should occur. It provided overarching guidance for the NBAF site 

review process. DHS’ plan described the NBAF mission criteria, 

sub-criteria, department preferences, and the process it would 

follow to select a site. DHS program officials responsible for 

designing and managing the NBAF process adhered to these 

standards to achieve a fair and transparent site selection process. 

DHS convened the interagency work group to develop the NBAF 

site evaluation criteria by addressing the key requirements for the 

NBAF facility. The interagency group’s goal was to ensure that 

the future NBAF met the interdependent needs of DHS and each 

member’s respective agency to protect the nation against biological 

threats to human health and animal agriculture. Federal officials— 

subject matter experts with biosafety, research, and facility design 

and operations experience—established the evaluation criteria to 

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guide the assessment of potential NBAF sites. Everyone we 

interviewed commented that the criteria were widely accepted by 

the working group’s respective agencies, industry, academia, and 

other parties and organizations. 

DHS Completed the Environmental Impact Statement According 

to the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations and NEPA 

Members of Congress and consortia raised concerns regarding 

whether the draft and final NBAF Environmental Impact 

Statements complied with NEPA. They also expressed a concern 

that the NBAF EIS did not provide enough detailed information to 

allow for substantive decision-making. 

NEPA requires that all federal agencies prepare detailed statements 

assessing the environmental impact of and alternatives to major 

federal actions significantly affecting the environment. After a 

final EIS is prepared and at the time of its decision, a federal 

agency will prepare a public record of its decision addressing how 

it incorporated the EIS’ findings into the agency's decision-making 

process, including consideration of alternatives. 

DHS documented each step of the site selection and the EIS 

processes, and maintained a complete administrative record of 

them. DHS posted records of public meetings, the Draft EIS, the 

Final EIS, and other supporting documentation and technical 

studies on its website and made them available to the public. S&T 

also initiated additional studies and reviews to support the EIS 

process and its final site selection decision. 

DHS assembled experienced federal managers to manage and 

oversee the EIS process. It hired a contractor to conduct the EIS. 

We did not review the contractor’s technical performance. 

However, the contractors and the federal employees involved with 

scoping activities, public meetings, and review of the Draft EIS 

described it as one of the most comprehensive and transparent EIS 

projects they had conducted. 

We determined that DHS’ EIS process complied with the Council 

on Environmental Quality’s regulations and the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Council on Environmental 

Quality (CEQ) coordinates federal environmental efforts and 

works closely with agencies and other White House offices in the 

development of environmental policies and initiatives. Congress 

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established the council within the Executive Office of the President 

as part of NEPA and the Environmental Quality Improvement Act 

of 1970 provided additional responsibilities. DHS adhered to all 

timeframes for public comment period durations established by 

NEPA and CEQ regulations and requirements. DHS also 

evaluated and reported on a “No Action Alternative,” which would 

keep national biodefense research operations at the Plum Island 

facility. 

On July 31, 2007, as required under NEPA, DHS published in the 

Federal Register (72 FR 41764-41765) a Notice of Intent to prepare 

the NBAF EIS to evaluate the environmental impacts of 

constructing and operating the proposed NBAF at one of the 

reasonable site alternatives. Subsequently, DHS conducted 

scoping meetings near the six site alternatives, along with one 

regional meeting in Washington, DC. More than 1,350 people 

attended the scoping meetings. Nearly 300 people provided oral 

comments at the public meetings, and DHS received more than 

3,870 comments during the scoping period. The 60-day scoping 

period ended on September 28, 2007. DHS documented the 

scoping process and related issues in the February 2008, NBAF EIS 

Scoping Report, and posted the report on its website. 

On June 27, 2008, as also required under NEPA, DHS published 

the Notice of Availability of the NBAF Draft EIS in the Federal 

Register (73 FR 36540-36542). The public comment period 

extended through August 25, 2008. DHS held 13 public meetings 

in July and August 2008 at the same locations as the 

aforementioned scoping meetings or at nearby alternate locations. 

During the 60-day NBAF Draft EIS public comment period, more 

than 1,770 individuals attended the public meetings and 378 

individuals provided DHS oral comments. In total, the public 

comment period yielded, and DHS analyzed, more than 5,400 

individual written and oral comments. 

DHS conducted programmatic and planning studies in 2008 in 

addition to the NEPA requirements. It used relevant information 

from these reports in the preparation of the NBAF Final EIS and in 

committee and the Under Secretary’s analysis of the final group of 

potential sites. These studies and reports were: 

(1) Threat and Risk Assessment; 

(2) Site Cost Analysis; 

(3) Site Characterization Study; 

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(4) Plum Island Facility Closure and Transition Cost Study 

dated July 2008; 

(5) The Final Selection Memorandum for Site Selection for 

the Second Round Potential Sites for the National Bio 

and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF); and, 

(6) The Plum Island Memorandum for the Record. 

In August 2008, DHS posted all of the reports on its website (with 

redactions) except the Threat and Risk Assessment, which was 

designated For Official Use Only. 

In December 2008, as required by 40 CFR 1502.14, DHS 

identified the NBAF Preferred Alternative Selection and described 

its rationale in the NBAF Final EIS. In its Preferred Alternative 

Selection memorandum, which DHS published on its website, 

DHS described in detail the basis for and process used to select the 

Preferred Alternative. DHS clarified that according to CEQ 

regulations the environmentally preferred alternative is the 

alternative that causes the least impact to the environment and best 

protects, preserves, and enhances historic, cultural, and natural 

resources. 

In the EIS, DHS identified the “No Action Alternative,” the 

continued operation of the PIADC, as the environmentally 

preferred alternative because it would have the least environmental 

impact—only minor and temporary effects from construction of 

infrastructure upgrades—in the short term. However, DHS 

determined that the PIADC site did not satisfy the NBAF’s 

purpose or mission. 

DHS distributed approximately 3,000 copies of the NBAF Final 

EIS and NBAF Final EIS Executive Summary to members of 

Congress and other elected officials; federal, state, and local 

government agencies; native American representatives; public 

interest groups; public reading rooms; and to individuals. DHS 

also posted the Final EIS and the Executive Summary on its 

website. 

In January 2009, pursuant to 40 CFR Parts 1500-1508, and DHS 

Directive 023-01 (Environmental Planning Program), DHS 

prepared and published a Record of Decision (ROD) on the 

proposed site, construction, and operation of the NBAF in 

Manhattan, KS. The ROD presented the information and analysis 

developed in the NBAF Final EIS including public comments, and 

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consideration of such factors as national policy, site evaluation 

criteria, threat and risk assessment, costs, security, and other 

programmatic requirements. The ROD included written responses 

to questions, issues and concerns submitted in response to the Final 

EIS by the consortia offering NBAF sites. The ROD also 

described DHS’ review and consideration of comments and 

concerns submitted by the public. DHS collected and responded to 

public comments during the EIS draft development and final EIS 

publication. 

DHS met all Timeframes for the Public Comment Periods 

Required Under NEPA 

Congress raised concerns that DHS did not conform to NEPA 

requirements during the 30-day comment period. DHS complied 

with NEPA’s comment period requirements. It met all timeframes 

and expanded comment periods because of the length and 

complexity of the EIS scoping process. For example, DHS 

expanded the EIS scoping period deadline by 30 days and the 

deadline to respond to the Draft EIS by 15 days. Although DHS 

expanded the public comment periods for the scoping period and 

the draft EIS, it did not expand the comment period for the final 

EIS because it believed doing so was unnecessary. DHS made the 

site selection only days after the final comment period ended. On 

December 12, 2008, DHS published its Notice of Availability for 

the NBAF Final EIS in the Federal Register. On January 16, 2009, 

it published its ROD, only four days after the comment period 

ended. However, the timing of the ROD fueled perceptions that 

DHS did not adequately consider comments on the Final EIS. We 

could not substantiate these perceptions. 

DHS Fairly Evaluated and Rated Prospective Sites Using a 

Qualitative and Quantitative Scoring Process 

Members of Congress and some consortia questioned DHS’ site 

selection scoring process. Congress asked us to review how 

precisely did DHS assess, weigh, and score the criteria and 

financial support and whether the process was transparent. They 

also questioned how DHS convened its steering committee and 

whether its members were qualified. 

We evaluated DHS’ scoring methodology and determined that it 

carried out the process fairly and without bias. DHS officials and 

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other federal subject matter experts with extensive experience in 

facility design and operations, bioresearch, and bio-safety 

established evaluation criteria that were sound, widely accepted, 

and resulted in comprehensive assessments of all prospective sites. 

DHS also conducted site visits in a fair and transparent manner. 

We did not determine that the Under Secretary’s decision to add 

two sites during the list of final sites was arbitrary, pre-determined, 

or an attempt to influence the steering committee. In addition, we 

determined that DHS informed the public of the importance of inkind contributions and its process for collecting, assessing, and 

scoring in-kind contributions from interested consortia was 

reasonable. 

The Scoring/Evaluation Process 

DHS executed each phase of the site selection process—evaluation 

of consortia responses to the EOI and the first cut from 29 to 18 

sites, the second cut from 17 to 5 sites, and the EIS process leading 

to the final decision—in a logical and transparent fashion. DHS 

documented each step of each committee and its individual 

members’ assessment and scoring process. Except for not 

disclosing some details supporting the steering committee’s 

evaluation and ranking of the final sites under consideration, DHS 

clearly articulated its criteria, sub-criteria, and preferences and how 

it weighed and scored them. The scoring process became more 

refined and detailed with each round. The Under Secretary 

considered the recommendations of the steering committee before 

making his decision. 

DHS Reviewed Responses to the Request for Expressions of 

Interest Thoroughly 

On March 31, 2006, DHS received 29 EOI submissions from 24 

consortia in response to the EOI. On May 24, 2006, to guide its 

review of the submissions, DHS approved and issued an 

Expression of Interest Selection Plan for Potential Sites for NBAF. 

The plan identified and guided the selection of the steering and 

criteria evaluation committees and their process to review the 

prospective NBAF sites who responded to the initial EOI. The 

plan identified and defined the role of the Selection Authority, to 

include responsibility for making the final site selection. The June 

2006 Results of NBAF EOI Review, described how the committee 

considered each of the consortia proposals. We determined that 

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the criteria committees and steering committee adhered to the plan 

and documented their decisions. 

The plan described the composition of the EOI Evaluation Board, 

which included a steering committee, three criteria committee 

chairpersons, the criteria committee members as well as their 

duties and functions. DHS selected federal agency staff with 

relevant expertise to conduct the NBAF site selection process. All 

“voting” committee members and chairpersons were federal 

employees and criteria committee members represented multi-DHS 

component offices including S&T, Office of the Chief Medical 

Officer, Management, Safety and Health, Asset Management, and 

the Coast Guard, as well as agencies from DOD, USDA, and HHS. 

To ensure objectivity and rigor in the review process, DHS 

selected members of the steering and criteria committees based on 

their technical and professional skill backgrounds. DHS asserted 

that it vetted these individuals for any past or on-going associations 

with the consortia, allied organizations, or educational institutions 

within those states who had responded to the EOI. 

The plan set forth the site evaluation process, criteria factors and 

sub-factors derived from NBAF mission requirements. It also 

defined the adjectival rating system of excellent to unsatisfactory 

that individual committee members would apply to each site 

proposal and for consensus committee scoring. It contained a 

review sheet to rate the sites. 

DHS considered each prospective site’s proximity to research 

capabilities applicable to the NBAF mission, to be the most 

important criteria. It considered proximity to workforce, 

acquisition/construction/operations (A/C/O), and community 

acceptance/cost sharing/integrated partnerships to be equal in 

importance. The steering committee established the three 

evaluation committees: research and workforce; community 

acceptance; and A/C/O. 

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Table 1: Site Evaluation Criteria 

The A/C/O criterion included sub-criteria for: (1) land acquisition 

and development potential; (2) environmental compatibility, 

including the presence of existing environmental concerns 

regarding contamination or environmentally sensitive areas; and 

(3) adequacy of utility infrastructure. Cost-sharing and in-kind 

contributions or support was a sub-criteria factor under 

consideration in the assessment of each prospective site’s 

community acceptance factor. As part of this sub-criteria, 

committee members assessed the consortia’s proposed in-kind, 

matching, or third-party financing contributions. During the EOI 

submission review, DHS did not collect additional information 

about possible contributions from the consortia to evaluate their 

responses. 

Individual criteria committee members were responsible for 

assessing each site’s strengths, weaknesses, and deficiencies 

against one of the evaluation criteria. After committee members 

evaluated the sites individually, their entire committee discussed 

each site and produced a consensus adjectival rating, which ranged 

from excellent to unsatisfactory. Each criteria committee 

chairperson was required to report their committee’s rationale for 

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their adjectival ratings to the steering committee and document 

their analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, deficiencies and risks 

to support the assignment of the adjectival rating. Each committee 

documented its basis for the top ratings under each criterion for the 

sites selected to continue the process and provided reasons why it 

did not recommend the other sites for consideration. 

The steering committee discussed the individual committee chair’s 

reports and based on numerical scores given to each site, 

recommended in rank order its site preferences to the Under 

Secretary. On August 9, 2006, DHS selected 18 of the initial 29 

sites for further review and evaluation. The former Under 

Secretary joined DHS in August 2006, and therefore was not 

involved in the initial cut from 29 to 18 sites. 

DHS Documented its Review of the 18 Sites That Advanced to the 

Second Round 

On December 8, 2006, DHS communicated specific and detailed 

instructions to the 12 consortia representing the 18 sites still under 

consideration regarding “(1) additional information to complete the 

next phase of the evaluations; (2) DHS’ preferences for certain 

criteria; (3) instructions on how to submit the requested 

information; and (4) information on the next steps in the process.” 

Responses were due by February 16, 2007. DHS stated that it 

would give strong preference to sites: 

•	 Within a comprehensive research community with existing 

research programs in areas related to the NBAF mission 

requirements (veterinary, medical and public health, and 

agriculture); 

•	 Within proximity to skilled research and technical staff 

with expertise in biological and agricultural research 

facilities operations; 

•	 Within proximity to training programs to develop skilled 

research and technical staff with the needed expertise; 

•	 With title to a minimum 30-acre site deeded at no cost or 

minimal cost to the federal government, either by in-kind 

contribution, sale, or quit claim, where DHS could 

construct the entire NBAF; 

•	 With in-kind contributions offered by the consortium, state 

government, local government, or private entities such as 

deeded land at no cost rather than sale, new utility 

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provisions and/or upgrades, sewer, electricity, water, and 

new roadways; 

•	 With a proposing consortium or other organizations that 

will assist DHS in the NEPA process to conduct the 

environmental analysis at the proposed site; and, 

•	 With a proposing consortium that demonstrates local and 

national agriculture stakeholder and community member 

support or, at a minimum, does not oppose locating the 

NBAF at the proposed site. 

In February 2007, DHS issued its Site Selection Plan for the 

Second Round Potential Sites for the National Bio and AgroDefense Facility. The plan specified an eight-step process DHS 

would follow to review the remaining sites before the second cut, 

and determine which sites would undergo the NEPA-mandated 

Environmental Impact Statement process. This plan was very 

similar to the methodology DHS used to evaluate responses to the 

EOI. It provided specific detailed descriptions and expectations 

for each step of the site assessment activity. The steering 

committee chair oversaw and coordinated the entire evaluation 

process, and steering committee members each chaired one of the 

three criteria committees. DHS used the same three criteria 

committees as discussed above. 

Chart 1: 2nd Round Selection Process 

However, the second round differed from the first round in several 

respects. First, DHS sought and considered additional information 

from the consortia related to the four criteria. Second, DHS 

evaluation teams visited each site. Third, the criteria committees 

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not only provided the steering committee an adjectival rating, but 

also included a numeric rating in the written assessment of each 

site to evaluate and rank the sites. Finally, the plan called for the 

steering committee to reduce the list of sites and forward their 

recommendations to the Selection Authority. 

With respect to the numerical rating, S&T developed an evaluation 

tool—a computer generated database—to provide a transparent 

process from individual reviewers through the final selection. In 

addition, the tool helped reviewers track and report the strengths, 

weakness, and deficiencies of each site, using the criterion. We 

learned how reviewers used the tool, and we accessed the system 

to review samples of scoring data from each reviewer. 

We confirmed that at least initially, each criteria committee 

member individually reviewed all of the data and information 

collected on each site for their respective criteria. Individual 

reviewers had access to the system to assign a numerical score. 

These numerical consensus ratings corresponded with an adjectival 

rating, ranging from excellent (90-100) to marginal (50-69). 

Reviewers were able to enter comments in the database, as well as 

address the site’s strengths, weaknesses and deficiencies. 

Reviewers could not see the scores and comments of other 

committee members during their review. 

After assigning scores to each sub-criterion, the system calculated 

the numerical score to obtain a weighted average. Like the first 

round, the criteria committees also used consensus ratings. Each 

criteria committee’s members collaborated to review the adjectival, 

numerical, and written commentary on each of the sites. Based on 

these discussions, the committees derived a consensus score for 

each sub-criterion and calculated the weighted average. 

Committee chairs consolidated the consensus comments and 

ratings into committee reports for consideration by the steering 

committee. The steering committee reviewed the criteria 

committee ratings and evaluation comments, individually and as a 

group, for each of the potential NBAF sites and identified 

information to clarify or validate during up-coming site visits. 

The evaluation tool was used for pre-site visits and post site visits; 

both consensus ratings were recorded. After the steering 

committee went on site visits to confirm and verify information in 

consortia’s proposals, it reevaluated the scores. It could change the 

scores based on new information uncovered through site visits. 

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When the steering committee changed a score, it documented its 

rationale in the evaluation tool. We did not identify any 

discrepancies in the scores from each criteria committee report and 

scores in the Final Selection Memorandum, which outlined the 

steering committee’s recommendations. 

DHS Reviewed the Alternative Sites to Recommend the Preferred 

Alternative and Documented Its Analysis 

DHS used a four-step process to evaluate the remaining sites and 

determine the preferred site. It did not use numerical scoring in the 

final selection. An adjectival rating, represented by color was 

assigned to each site, ranging from green, excellent to red, 

satisfactory. During this process, the steering committee reviewed 

the ratings from the first round selections, evaluated new data, the 

Threat and Risk Assessment, and EIS; and lastly, determined 

overall site ratings and rankings. The steering committee did not 

change any of the “research” and “workforce” scores. However, 

scores were adjusted for A/C/O and community acceptance given 

the committee’s knowledge of new information on certain sites. 

We did not identify any evidence of ratings changes without a 

corresponding rationale. The steering committee documented all 

adjustments in the ROD. For example, the steering committee 

reduced one consortium’s rating for community acceptance, given 

emerging residential opposition. Explanations for such changes 

were addressed in the ROD. 

The Under Secretary Acted within His Authority, and Decisions 

were Transparent 

The plan described in very specific terms the duties and decision 

process for the Under Secretary as the Selection Authority. It 

clarified that the Selection Authority shall only base a decision on 

the information in the first round EOI responses, the responses to 

DHS’ December 2006 “Additional Information Request” 

memorandum to consortia, and data validation and site 

observations gathered during the site visits performed by the 

steering committee for the 18 potential NBAF sites. The Under 

Secretary could only weigh public records, media reports, or 

information generated by third party sources approved and 

reviewed by the steering committee into his final decision. 

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The Under Secretary also considered the steering committee’s 

recommendations. He based his final selection on information 

received in each round. He made the final selection after each EIS 

process was completed and the steering committee made its final 

recommendation. This was consistent with GSA guidelines, which 

stated, “Developing support among decision-makers and obtaining 

project approvals are necessary for the success of the project. 

Identifying who is responsible for making each decision and 

recognizing when decisions are needed are equally important.”2 

 

DHS documented all of these decisions in the ROD, released to the 

public on January 16, 2009. It stated that the Under Secretary’s 

decision was determined by: 

(1) 	 The site's ability to satisfy the evaluation criteria 

published in the EOI; 

(2) 	 The ability to satisfy DHS’ preferences (including inkind contributions to offset infrastructure costs) 

communicated to all second round potential NBAF 

sites; 

(3) 	 Confirmation of the site offers for site infrastructure; 

(4) 	 The environmental impacts identified in the NBAF 

Final EIS; and, 

(5) 	 Information contained in supporting documents 

including the Threat and Risk Assessment, Site Cost 

Analysis, Site Characterization Study, and The Plum 

Island Facility Closure and Transition Cost Study. 

DHS reported in the ROD that the EIS analysis indicated that there 

would be “very little difference in environmental impacts” among 

the other five site alternatives. The ROD noted “a lack of strong 

differentiation” between the finalist sites regarding the EIS and the 

threat and risk assessment.” Consequently, the Under Secretary 

wanted to select a site that would “optimize the capability to 

diagnose and cure large animal diseases” and was proximate to 

research capabilities. The Manhattan Campus site in Manhattan, 

KS: 

•	 Best met its mission needs due to its proximity to Kansas 

State University, its Colleges of Veterinary Medicine and 

Agriculture, and the newly constructed Bio-Security 

Research Institute; 

2

 General Services Administration’s Guidelines for Decision Making, p.16. 

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•	 Was among the least expensive locations; 

•	 Was environmentally acceptable; and, 

•	 Demonstrated strong community acceptance for an agrodefense research facility. 

DHS Evaluation Team Conducted Site Visits 

Members of Congress expressed concerns regarding how DHS 

researched and assessed the prospective NBAF site workforce, 

research capabilities, consortia in-kind offers, and state or local 

support or opposition. During April and May 2007, evaluation 

teams consisting of DHS, DHHS, and USDA employees visited 

the 17 NBAF sites. DHS selected its team members based on their 

evaluation criteria expertise. 

The purpose of the visits was to verify the information provided 

and representations made in the EOI submissions and additional 

information submitted; view any observable physical conditions 

and constraints at the proposed site; and, if applicable, view the 

site's utilities and infrastructure. 

We interviewed NBAF evaluation team members who conducted 

the site visits, and representatives from all of the consortia visited. 

We reviewed plans developed for the site visits and letters sent to 

the consortia in advance and we reviewed documents generated as 

a part of these visits. There was no evidence that the evaluation 

teams provided an unfair advantage for any consortium 

In advance of these visits, DHS asked consortia to prepare updated 

information to respond to specific questions about their site; advise 

regarding their site’s suitability to the NBAF mission criteria; and 

confirm offers for in-kind contributions and other support. DHS 

notified each consortium by letter that the committee visits would 

be tightly scheduled with an identical timeline and scripted 

delivery of information that included a: 

•	 30-minute DHS presentation on the selection process and 

criteria; 

•	 2-hour presentation from consortia on the requested site 

additional information; 

•	 1 1⁄2 -hours or less for lunch and an evaluation team 
 

question and answer session; 
 

•	 3-hours or less to tour potential site; and, 

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•	 1-hour or less for a wrap-up discussion and final question 

and answer session. 

Also in advance of the site visit, DHS sent each consortium a 

detailed list of site and consortia–specific questions and issues for 

clarification. For example, DHS asked consortia for: 

•	 Information on utility easements on the site; details 

regarding the provision of the required utilities for chilled 

water, distilled water and steam; 

•	 Their intent regarding in-kind contributions; 

•	 Clarification of plans to provide the necessary linkages to 

the agricultural and veterinary expertise, infrastructure, and 

programs required for the NBAF mission; 

•	 Their plans to recruit and retain the necessary scientific 

staff and workforce at the proposed site; and, 

•	 Challenges of recruiting and maintaining the necessary 

staff at a rural location. 

To ensure consortia received the same information during the 

committee visit, the steering committee chair made the same 

presentation at each location. DHS informed consortia that the 

group would only accept (1) a copy of the consortium’s 

presentation given during the site visit and (2) additional 

information that clarified or responded to information requested by 

the committee. 

During the scripted presentation, the steering committee chair 

delivered information from prepared slides on the NBAF criteria 

and preferences, the selection process, and selection schedule. 

DHS only accepted written questions from the consortia. DHS 

posted all questions and its official answers on the NBAF website 

after concluding the site visits. 

The Under Secretary was Authorized to Add Sites for Further 

Consideration 

Members of Congress expressed concern regarding DHS’ 

methodology to identify the final six sites, specifically, that the 

Under Secretary placed subjective emphasis on certain strengths 

and weaknesses while appearing to ignore the steering committee’s 

numerical scores. During DHS’ July 2007 selection to five sites, 

the Under Secretary added the Flora Industrial Park Site in Flora, 

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Mississippi and shortly thereafter added the Plum Island site. 

Congress questioned whether the Under Secretary actually made a 

truly objective and merit-based decision. We did not identify any 

evidence that the Under Secretary favored a particular site. 

Increasing the number of finalists from five to six had no affect on 

which site was ultimately selected. 

The Under Secretary Disagreed with the Steering Committee’s 

Assessment of Flora, Mississippi Site 

On July 10, 2007, DHS issued its Final Selection Memorandum: 

Site Selection for the Second Round Potential Sites for the NBAF. 

This memorandum described the process used and provided 

specific details of the selection process to decide the final list of 

potential NBAF sites. Although the Under Secretary was 

responsible for considering the steering committee’s 

recommendations, he also had the authority to include additional 

sites based on his discretion. In addition to naming the Georgia, 

Kansas, North Carolina, and Texas sites among the finalists, the 

Under Secretary also included the Mississippi site, despite the fact 

that the Steering Committee ranked 13 sites higher. This decision 

was subjective in that he acted based on what he believed to be a 

significant strength of the consortium. Although the Under 

Secretary had the discretion to include additional sites if he 

determined that it was in the best interest of the government, the 

addition of the Mississippi site created the perception that he 

favored a particular site. 

In the memorandum, the Under Secretary stated that, “My decision 

is the result of my integrated assessment and evaluation of the 

strengths, weaknesses, and risks associated with each proposed site 

against DHS’ evaluation criteria and preferences. The 

memorandum documents the basis for the selection decision for 

each site and it provides the following discussion of the decision to 

include the Flora, MS site in the final group of five (the Plum 

Island site was added later): 

“Based on the final evaluation results presented by the 

Steering Committee, as reported to and discussed with me 

by the Steering Committee Chairperson, I evaluated the 

information submitted by the consortia and personally 

visited each second round potential NBAF site, giving 

careful consideration to each of the evaluation criteria and 

DHS preferences set forth in the Site Selection Plan and 

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their relative weighting. The adjectival ratings and 

corresponding numerical scores appearing in the following 

discussion of the proposed sites (both those I selected and 

those I did not select as reasonable alternatives in the 

Notice of Intent for the NBAF Environmental Impact 

Statement Process) result from the evaluation process 

followed by the Criteria Committees and the Steering 

Committee. This evaluation process is described at the 

beginning of this Final Selection Memorandum. I took the 

Steering Committee’s adjectival ratings and numerical 

scores for each site into strong consideration; but, as my 

discussion below illustrates and as the Selection Authority, 

I at times placed emphasis on certain strengths I saw in a 

proposal which offset certain weaknesses. On other 

occasions, I found certain proposal’s weaknesses as more 

insurmountable than the Steering Committee had and, 

accordingly, those weaknesses offset the proposal’s 

strengths.” 

Specifically addressing the addition of the Flora, Mississippi site, 

the evaluation committee scoring, and steering committee 

recommendation for the Flora, Mississippi site, the Under 

Secretary stated: 

“I note that the Research and Workforce Committees 

provided the consortium low scores in both the Research 

and Workforce evaluation categories and, while I take the 

Committees’ concerns to heart, I do not concur with the 

low scores they assigned for their respective evaluation 

criteria due to the Battelle led consortium’s proposed 

workaround (“when built, they come”) which I found to be 

a significant strength offsetting what otherwise would have 

been a significant weakness.” 

Explaining his rationale for adding the Flora, Mississippi site, the 

Under Secretary stated that he understood the ramifications of the 

decision, and reiterated that he sincerely believed the site deserved 

to be included among the finalists. 

The Under Secretary’s Addition of the PIADC Site to the Final List 

of Potential Sites Met NEPA EIS Standards and was Documented 

After the NBAF site selection process was underway, the Under 

Secretary decided to add the Plum Island Animal Disease Center 

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site to the final group of prospective sites. In a memorandum for 

the record entitled, An Addendum to the Final Selection 

Memorandum for the Site Selection for the Second Round 

Potential Sites for the NBAF, dated November 6, 2008, the Under 

Secretary documented the basis for that decision. He explained 

that: 

“During the site selection process to identify possible 

locations for the NBAF, the Department of Homeland 

Security did not believe it was appropriate to respond to its 

own Request for an Expression of Interest (EOI) with a 

property owned and managed by DHS... however, Plum 

Island is included in the NBAF selection process for 

evaluation concurrent with the five mainland sites because: 

1) Plum Island appears to meet the NEPA requirement that 

the proposing Federal agency evaluate the range of all 

“reasonable alternatives” to a proposed action; and 

2) PIADC currently fulfills a portion of the NBAF mission 

and potentially meets some of the NBAF evaluation 

criteria, including: Proximity to Research by performing 

Biosafety Level (BSL)-3/3AG research on three foreign 

animal diseases (FADs); Proximity to Workforce by having 

an existing skilled workforce in a BSL-3/3Ag environment; 

and, Acquisition Construction and Operations by the 

availability of Government-owned property.” 

The addendum explained that DHS’ evaluation of the Plum Island 

site used the same evaluation process it applied to all of the other 

sites it considered for the July 2007 second selection of potential 

NBAF sites. DHS based its assessment on the evaluation criteria it 

published in the initial Public Notice Soliciting Expressions of 

Interest (EOIs) for Potential Sites for the NBAF. It was also based 

on preferences DHS communicated to all second round potential 

NBAF sites by letter on December 8, 2006, and additional 

information collected by evaluation team members and the 

Selection Authority during site visits. 

In August 2008, DHS re-convened the criteria evaluation 

committees who conducted the pre-EIS site selection process for 

prospective sites. The evaluation committees used the evaluation 

criteria and preferences to assign scores and ratings to Plum Island. 

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The steering committee evaluated the criteria committees’ scores 

for Plum Island and included them as part of the addendum. 

DHS Informed the Public Regarding NBAF Criteria and 

Preferences Including In-Kind or Other Support 

Congress also raised concerns that DHS did not communicate 

openly about the importance of in-kind contributions. DHS 

demonstrated in its earliest planning that it was considering how it 

would accept in-kind contributions and cost share opportunities for 

the NBAF. DHS stated in the EOI that submissions were the first 

step in a process, and that it would ask for more information from 

the interested consortia during a subsequent stage of the site 

assessment process, which it did. After receiving responses to the 

EOI, DHS articulated that it preferred, but did not require, in-kind 

contributions or other offers of support, and its process for 

collecting, assessing, and scoring in-kind contributions from 

interested consortia was reasonable. 

In its December 2006 Report to Congress in Response to Senate 

Appropriations Report 109-273, DHS noted that Section 507 of the 

FY 2004 Authorization Act (P.L. No. 108-90) provided DHS with 

general gift acceptance authority and authority to accept in-kind 

contributions (cash, real property, and personal property). Using 

this gift acceptance authority, in September 2009 DHS 

provisionally accepted the land offered by the State of Kansas at 

the Manhattan Campus site. Senior DHS officials identified their 

preference for in-kind contributions during initial planning 

meetings. 

DHS initiated broad contact with the public regarding the NBAF 

site opportunity, criteria, and preferences in both the January 19, 

2006, EOI, published in the Federal Register and the January 17, 

2006, publication of Federal Business Opportunities. These 

announcements provided background on the proposed NBAF and 

its research mission, defined the four site criteria categories, and 

described the information required from interested consortia. 

Initial responses to the EOI were limited to 20 pages. DHS stated 

that the EOI “was the first step to consider site options” and it 

“reserved the right to request additional information and 

clarifications from consortia whose submissions were deemed 

worthy of further consideration based on the evaluation of their 

submitted materials.” 

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DHS accepted questions from the public and interested parties, and 

prospective responders to the EOI through February 16, 2006. 

DHS published common questions and answers in a Frequently 

Asked Questions list available to the public on the website 

www.dhs.gov/NBAF. The website was the primary method for all 

official communications to and from interested parties. It was 

linked to the Federal Register EOI, to NBAF and Plum Island fact 

sheets, and to descriptions of NBAF next steps and process for 

public involvement. 

In its response to the Frequently Asked Questions, DHS stated that 

it would consider and evaluate “all viable options for the NBAF 

location,” as well as “all viable options for how the site was 

obtained.” It stated that the method of acquiring the facility would 

be handled under a separate competitive procurement. Asked 

whether it “will take into consideration cost sharing opportunities,” 

DHS answered that it “strongly encourages cost sharing including 

cost sharing in-kind from state and local jurisdictions that could be 

applied toward construction and operations of the NBAF.” 

In December 2006, DHS wrote letters to each of the 17 consortia 

to communicate its preference for in-kind contributions. Along 

with detailed information on next steps in the process, DHS 

advised that it would “give strong preference to consortia with title 

to a minimum 30-acre site, deeded “at no cost or minimal cost to 

the Federal Government through in-kind contribution, sale, or quit 

claim.” In its letter, DHS also stated that it would “give strong 

preference” to offers of “in-kind contributions, e.g., deeded land at 

no cost rather than sale, new utility provisions and/or 

upgrades,e.g., sewer, electricity, water, chilled water, steamed 

water, etc., and new roadways” offered to DHS by the consortium, 

state government, local government, or private entities. 

In our interviews with representatives of the five final consortia, 

four consortia stated that DHS had made its preference for in-kind 

contributions very early in the site selection process. These four 

were aware of the importance of in-kind at least mid-way through 

the process. One consortium underscored that there was early and 

clear communication on this topic and stated “DHS’ interests in inkind contributions were stated in the very first NBAF site selection 

process announcement.” 

The June 2006, Results of NBAF EOI Review, described the 

consideration of “in-kind, matching or 3rd party financing 

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contributions” as one facet of the criteria committee’s Community 

Acceptance sub-criteria review. DHS described the methods used 

by criteria committee members to “record, assess, and score inkind contributions” in the May 24, 2006 Expression of Interest 

Selection Plan for Potential Sites for NBAF. 

Meetings with the Under Secretary Created Perceptions 

That Some Consortia Gained an Unfair Advantage 

Under Secretary Visits to Prospective NBAF Sites 

During April 2007, the Under Secretary visited the 17 prospective 

NBAF sites. Letters from the Science and Technology Directorate 

Chief of Staff were sent to all the consortia in advance of the site 

visits advising them that the purpose of the site visit was “to gain 

firsthand knowledge of your consortium's potential NBAF 

location.” The letters DHS sent to consortia providing guidance on 

the Under Secretary’s site visits did not prohibit or limit the 

participation of elected officials. Other than the letters, there were 

no other written ground rules addressing interaction with elected 

officials during his visits to prospective NBAF sites. Elected 

officials did meet with the Under Secretary during his visits to 

prospective sites. We could not substantiate that these meetings 

affected the site selection process. 

The fact that one or more consortia believed that elected officials 

were prohibited from such meetings created a perception that 

elected officials were attempting to, and had, influenced the site 

selection process. According to the letters to the consortia: 

“DHS is managing the site selection similar to a 

competitive acquisition to ensure that a rigorous selection 

process is followed. Fairness, integrity, and transparency 

are extremely important to DHS and we are very serious 

about treating each consortium fairly and equally. To that 

end, please respect the request not to provide additional 

handouts or presentations to Under Secretary Cohen. 

Under Secretary Cohen's visit is strictly a viewing of the 

physical site.” 

Additional conditions and ground rules established for the visit 

were communicated in the letter: Consortia were informed that 

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any information they wished to provide to DHS in response to the 

Steering Committee's requests for clarifications should be provided 

directly to the Steering Committee during its site visit. The entire 

site visit process was closed to the press and consortium 

representatives were limited to three people. The Under Secretary 

allocated one hour for each site visit, and DHS arranged his travel 

to the site. 

The Under Secretary told us his main two ground rules were: “No 

written briefs were to be delivered; and, no “step aside” meetings 

with politicians. One of the consortia stated it recalled being told 

verbally by the steering committee chairperson that elected 

officials were prohibited from attending the Under Secretary site 

visits. Another consortium stated it was told in advance, who 

could interact with the Under Secretary or the Steering Committee 

during site visits. However, other consortia did not recall that a 

DHS official delivered such a prohibition verbally or in writing. 

According to the Under Secretary, each of the consortia “had 

broken different rules” set forth by DHS in the April 18, 2007, 

letter, in addition to his request for “‘no politicals.’” He stated, “all 

had overstepped the rules set” for the site visit. During the site 

selection process, consortia were hearing information about each 

other's Under Secretary site visits. Two consortia stated they heard 

some consortia did not adhere to DHS’ instructions about access 

by politicians. 

Several consortia and the Under Secretary described short “meet 

and greet” sessions that were conducted by some national level 

political figures. Three of the five consortia recall national and 

local political leaders participating in site visits. Of those three, 

one consortium stated a local elected official drove the Under 

Secretary to a few places including the potential NBAF site. The 

Under Secretary mentioned he also had breakfast with this official 

without the presence of other individuals. 

During another site visit, both the consortium and the Under 

Secretary mentioned an “overland” view of the potential sites via 

helicopter. Reports of this visit surfaced in the media, which 

added to other consortia’ perceptions of partiality and unfairness. 

The Under Secretary refuted allegations made about this visit, 

stating “in hindsight, he is still glad he went and “eyeballed” each 

site to see the lay of the land, to take in any considerations for 

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threats from terrorism.” The Under Secretary did not observe 

anything improper during his site visits. 

Meetings with the Under Secretary in Washington, DC 

The Under Secretary stated he had an open door policy and 

welcomed the opportunity to speak with consortia representatives 

or any elected officials in Washington, DC during the selection 

process. We confirmed there were no restrictions to meeting with 

the Under Secretary in his office. However, DHS did not formally 

notify consortia that the Under Secretary would honor meeting 

requests by consortia or elected officials. All of the final five 

consortia agreed they did not receive any information on political 

contact with the Under Secretary and confirmed that the Under 

Secretary granted elected officials access to him. 

Steering Committee members and the Office of General Counsel 

(OGC) attorney advised were concerned about potential 

perceptions stemming from these meetings. Despite their 

warnings, the Under Secretary met with anyone who wanted to see 

him, and as far as they knew did not decline to meet with any 

elected official. 

We determined that during the site selection process, the Under 

Secretary met with elected officials representing four of the five 

final consortia. On some occasions, consortium representatives 

and elected officials were present. When the Under Secretary met 

with any elected official, there was an S&T official present. Both 

the Under Secretary and NBAF program officials described the 

meetings as very brief, lasting only about 30-45 minutes, and 

informational only. One DHS official stated, “these meetings were 

a ‘waste of time’ because the Under Secretary only relayed that 

DHS was conducting a transparent process.” One consortium 

representative stated the Under Secretary “insisted they not bring 

any documents” to the meeting. 

The Under Secretary as well as consortia representatives 

anticipated that political leaders would take an interest in the 

NBAF process and want to show their support, and the Under 

Secretary was not concerned about impairing his own objectivity. 

One DHS official stated elected officials were aggressively 

pursuing “the opportunity to visit the Under Secretary in 

Washington to promote the ‘we are fighting for you’ objective to 

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constituents.” In one instance, there were approximately 20 

individuals representing their consortium. 

The majority of the final five consortia believed this aspect of the 

process was “to be expected” but not necessarily “inappropriate.” 

Yet the lack of established ground rules on visits in Washington 

created a perception that the Under Secretary afforded some 

consortia’s delegations greater access. Although the Under 

Secretary did not seek these meetings and we could not 

substantiate that these meetings compromised the NBAF site 

selection process, DHS may have benefitted by limiting the 

number of times a consortium could meet with the Under 

Secretary. 

The Under Secretary Appointed a Bio Scientist Affiliated with the 

Kansas (Heartland Bio Agro Committee (HBAC)) to the Homeland 

Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee 

In July 2007, the Under Secretary re-appointed a bio-scientist to 

the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory 

Committee who was affiliated with the Kansas Heartland Bio Agro 

Facility Consortium that was bidding for the NBAF site. The 

committee serves as a source of independent, scientific, and 

technical planning advice for the Under Secretary. The bioscientist 

has been a board member of the Kansas BioScience Authority 

(KBA) since its inception. The KBA and Kansas State University 

formed the Kansas HBAC. Having been appointed to this advisory 

position, it raised concerns that not only did the bio-scientists have 

unique access to the Under Secretary and could leverage that 

access to help the Kansas consortium, but that the Under Secretary 

had pre-selected the Kansas consortium. That the bioscientist met 

with the Under Secretary in his office in March 2007 while 

representing the Kansas consortium added to the speculation that 

the site selection process was tainted. 

The bioscientist was familiar to S&T officials who recommended 

his reappointment to the Under Secretary because he had served on 

the committee previously. Then-Under Secretary Dr. Charles E. 

McQueary first appointed him to the committee in February 2004 

due to his expertise in biosciences, and he served on the committee 

until it suspended activities in 2006. 

We interviewed both the Under Secretary and the bioscientist 

about his appointment, their relationship, the meeting in the Under 

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Secretary’s office, interaction between the Under Secretary and the 

committee, and whether they ever discussed the NBAF process 

during committee meetings. The Under Secretary asserted he was 

unaware of the member’s affiliation with the Kansas consortium, 

that his appointment had nothing to do with the NBAF mission, 

and it was an oversight by S&T officials vetting potential 

committee members. The Under Secretary said he had little 

interaction with the whole committee and no one-on-one 

conversations with this committee member. He stated that the 

committee member never made a direct representation on behalf of 

the Kansas consortium to him or the steering committee. 

As a board member for one of the two entities comprising the 

Kansas consortium, the committee member described that 

“listening in on phone calls” was the extent of his involvement in 

the NBAF process. Based on his description of his involvement, 

we surmised that he did not spearhead the Kansas HBAC effort 

and did not attempt to use his position on the committee to advance 

the interests of the Kansas HBAC. He acknowledged that he 

attended the meeting with the Under Secretary but did not 

participate in the discussion. He also stated at the end, he felt like 

it was a waste of his time because others did most of the talking 

and he did not contribute anything. 

The Under Secretary did not intend to influence the steering 

committee or undermine the site selection process. In addition, the 

committee member’s ability to influence the outcome of the site 

selection process was mitigated by the lack of interaction with the 

steering committee, which recommended the Kansas site to the 

Under Secretary. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We conducted this review in response to a request from 17 

members of Congress representing congressional districts in Texas 

and Georgia who expressed concerns that the NBAF site selection 

process appeared to be biased and inconsistent with federal law. 

Our objectives were to determine whether S&T completed the 

NBAF Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) according to the 

National Environmental Policy Act; how the directorate 

established, assessed, weighed, and scored site evaluation criteria; 

why S&T did not inform the public of the importance of in-kind 

contributions in the first public notice requesting Expressions of 

Interest; and S&T’s rationale for allowing the public only 30 days 

to comment on the final EIS. We also gathered information and 

data relative to a concern that S&T officials afforded some 

delegations greater access, or were inappropriately lobbied. 

We interviewed S&T staff and contractors, representatives of other 

federal agencies including the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and 

others who managed or participated in the NBAF site selection 

process. These interviews included the NBAF steering and 

evaluation committees, and the former Under Secretary. We 

interviewed individuals representing the consortia that submitted 

Expressions of Interest for the NBAF site. 

We collected and reviewed documents and records relevant to the 

development of the NBAF Environmental Impact Statement, 

including public meetings and materials requested from consortia 

during the EIS process. We gathered information and documents 

relevant to S&T officials’ interaction, contacts, and 

communications with the consortia and elected officials. We 

traveled to two of the five final sites under consideration— 

Manhattan, Kansas and San Antonio Texas--to interview 

concerned parties and collect documents. 

We performed fieldwork from August 2009 to May 2010. Our 

review was conducted under the authority of the Inspector General 

Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards 

for Inspections issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and 

Efficiency. 

Review of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility 
 


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Mr. Richard L. kinner

Inspector Ocneral

. . Department of Homeland ecurity

Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. kinner:

Thank you for the opportunity to re iew and comment on the Office oflnspector Oeneral

(010) Draft Report: Review ofthe National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) Site

election Process.

Following a tlu'ee-year site selection process the Department of Homeland ecurity

(DH ) considered environmental impacts, public comment on the BAF Draft

nvironmentallmpact tatement (DEI ) and the Final EI (FEI ), national policy

evaluation criteria, threat and risk asses ment . costs site characterizations. ecuriry, and

other programmatic requirements in its decision to site, cOnstruct. and operate the BAr

in Manhatlan, Kan as. Upon con ultation with then ecretarie of Homeland ecurity

and Agriculture, the former Under ecretary for cience and Technology acting a the

site election Authority, accepted the unanimou recommendation ofthe teering

Commitlee (comprised of Federal employee subject matter experts) and selected

anhattan, K as the ite for the B F.

We concur with the 010 draft report conclu ions that DH carried out the site election

process fairly that oro found no evidence of bia . that OJ-! adhered to requirement

contained in Congressional appropriations and the ational Environmental Policy Act

(N PAl, that Federal subject matter experts established ound evaluation criteria lhat

resulted in comprehen ive a e ment of all pro p cti e sites, and that 01 I informed

the public ofthe importance of in-kind contributions and weighed that evaluation factor

fairly. 010 determined that the nder ecretary for cience and TeclulOlogy's decisions

during the ite selection process were not predetemlined and that 010 could not

substantiate the allegation, from orne of the competing on ortia, thaI meeting between

elected officials and the Under ecretary for cience and Technology affected the site

selection proce . Additionally, 010 found that the Under ecretary' appointment of a

representative from the Kansas Heartland Bio Agro Con ortium to the Homeland

Security &T Advisory Commitlee was not an attempt to influence and did not

influence, the site election process.

We would like to clarify a few points in the 010 report (on pages 5 and 11) relating to

the public comment period during the El . 01 [ doe not oncur with the 01

comments that the Department "hastily" considered any last-minute comments to the

FEIS when it issued the FE! "only days after" the comment period closed (page 5 of the

010 report) or that there wa a 'hasty timing ofthc ROD' which created perceptions that

www.dhs.gov

October 6 2010

nder f!c1'Crury J()r ,nee arid Technology

. Ik""rtm nl or Hom.rond S«udly

Wa.,hlllginn.. 20528

Homeland

Security

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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DHS did not adequately consider comments in the EIS (page 11 of the 010 report). On

page I I. 010 stated that DHS complied with NEPA comment period requirements and

expanded comment periods when it "could:' DHS expanded the public comment period

for the EIS scoping period by 30 days and the DEIS by 15 days not because DHS "could"

do it, but because the length and complexity of the EIS scoping process and DEIS review

warranted the additional time. Moreover. DHS issued the Record of Decision (ROO) on

January 16. 2009 in the Federal Register. four days after the minimum required 30-day

comment period, because additional time was not warranted. All comments were

thoroughly reviev.'ed and considered in preparation ofthe FEIS and the ROO. All on-time

comments were addressed in the FEIS and all late comments (receh'ed after the public

comment period deadline) were collected. placed into issue categories. and responded 10

in the FEIS as late comments to the extent practicable. None ofthe late comments

substantially differed from the comments received before the close of the comment

period. Therefore. neither the FEIS nor the ROD was in fact published in a hasty manner

or done so in a manner that could create that perception.

We submitted technical and editorial comments under separate cover for your use in

preparing the final report, If you have any questions concerning this response, please

contact Mr. James Johnson (Director, Oflice of National Laboratories) at 202-254-6098

or Jam~'s.Johnson21//'dhs.gov.

Sincerely,

.. O'a

Tara O'Toole. M.D., M.P.H.

Under Secretary for Science and Technology

cc: Mr. Rolf A. Dietrich

Deputy Under Secretary for Science and Technology (Acting)

Mr. James Johnson

Director. Office of National Laboratories

Ms. Nicole Marcson

Assistant General Counsel for Science and Technology, Office of the

General Counsel

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

NBAF Chronology 

NBAF Chronology
 

2006 

•	 FY 2006- FY06 Appropriations Bill 

Congress appropriated $23 Million for NBAF. The Act 

provided DHS with $23 million “to select a site for the 

National Bio and Agro defense Facility” and to “perform 

other pre-construction activities.” 

• January 19, 2006- Notice of Request for Expression of Interest (EOI) for 

 Potential Sites 

DHS entered Expressions of Interest (EOI) in the Federal 

Registry requesting submissions from federal, state and 

local government agencies, industry, academia, and other 

interested parties and organizations. 

•	 February 2006- FAQ on DHS Website 

S&T accepted questions from the public and interested 

parties, and prospective responders to the request for 

expressions of interest through February 16, 2006. DHS 

published a Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) list 

available to the public on the website www.dhs.gov/NBAF. 

This document provides more information on cost sharing. 

•	 March 31, 2006- EOI Submissions Received 

S&T received 29 proposals for potential sites from 

respondents of the EOI. 

 

•	 August 9, 2006- First Down Selection 

After evaluating proposals against four evaluation criteria, 

DHS narrowed the list of sites from 29 to 18 sites (one site 

dropped out of the process). 

•	 August 9, 2006- Non-select Letter 

Notifications of non-selection were sent to AL, AR, AZ, 

CO, DC, FL, IA, NM, ND, and PA. 

•	 December 8, 2006- Select Letter/Request for Additional Information 

S&T sent a letter requesting additional information to each 

of the potential sites (17) selected in the first down 

selection for further evaluation. DHS communicated its 

preference for in-kind contributions in this letter. 

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Appendix C 

NBAF Chronology 

(February 16, 2007-Deadline for Responses) 

2007 

•	 

Committees visited the 17 sites to verify submitted 

information, visit physical site location and infrastructure. 

In advance of the site visits, each consortium was notified 

by letter on April 7 that the committee visits would be 

tightly scheduled with an identical timeline and scripted 

delivery of information. 

•	 April 2007- Under Secretary Site Visits 

Under Secretary visited the 17 sites to verify information, 

visit physical location and infrastructure. In advance of the 

site visits, each consortium was notified by letter on April 

18 that the committee visits would be tightly scheduled 

with an identical timeline and scripted delivery of 

information. 

•	 July 2007- Second Down Selection/Final Selection Memorandum 

After further evaluation of the remaining sites, DHS went 

from 17 to 6 prospective sites. 

•	 July 31, 2007- Notice of Intent (NOI) 

S&T issued the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare an 

Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which initiated the 

evaluation of the environmental impacts of constructing 

and operating the NBAF at the five prospective sites, plus 

the Plum Island site. 

•	 August-Sept 2007- Scoping Meetings 

DHS sought public comments and conducted scoping 

meetings at prospective sites. Written and oral comments 

were collected for the EIS scope. 

2008 

•	 February 29, 2008-“Best and Final” Offer Letter 

S&T provided consortia the opportunity to validate 

previously submitted in-kind information. Via letter, they 

requested consortia finalize and confirm in-kind 

contributions and other support (offsets to infrastructure 

costs). 

April –May 2007- Steering Committee Site Visits 

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•	 June 2008- Draft Version of EIS 

DHS issued NBAF Draft EIS to obtain public comments. 

•	 July-August 2008- Public Meetings 

S&T conducted these meetings to present criteria used in 

the selection process and collect public comments on the 

Draft EIS. 

•	 November 2008- Steering Committee Site Recommendation 

The Steering Committee presented their unanimous site 

recommendation to the NBAF Selection Authority (Under 

Secretary). 

•	 December 2008- Issued Final EIS/ 

Preferred Alternative Memorandum 

DHS announced the Manhattan, KS as the preferred 

alternative site, which was released to the press on 

December 5, 2008. 

2009 

•	 January 16, 2009- Record of Decision (ROD) 

On January 16, 2009, DHS published its Record of 

Decision (ROD), which announced the Manhattan Campus 

site in Manhattan, KS as the preferred NBAF site 

alternative. The ROD was based on the information and 

analysis in the NBAF final Environmental Impact 

Statement, including how each site was rated against the 

evaluation criteria. 

Appendix C 

NBAF Chronology 

(March 31, 2008- Deadline for Responses) 

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Appendix D 

Major Contributors to this Report 

William J. McCarron, Chief Inspector 

 Jim O’Keefe, Senior Inspector 

 Shawntae Brown, Inspector 

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Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Executive Secretary, Science and Technology Directorate 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.