United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

 

Argued May 12, 2008 Decided July 22, 2008 

No. 06-3172 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

MELVIN ERIC GEORGE, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 06cr00043-01) 

 Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. with her on the briefs was A. 

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony W. Miles, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance. 

 Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. 
2 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Florence Y. 

Pan, and Frederick W. Yette, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

 Before: GINSBURG, BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit 

Judges. 

 Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

 BROWN, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Melvin George 

of robbing a Citibank branch of $2,095, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2113(a). For this crime he received a sentence of 

ninety-two months in prison followed by three years of 

supervised release. Mr. George’s sister, Janene George, gave 

crucial testimony against him. At trial, Mr. George wanted to 

cross-examine his sister about her mental illness. Doing so, 

he believes, would have shown she was neither competent nor 

credible. The district court, finding no basis for this 

assumption, refused to let defense counsel cross-examine Ms. 

George about her mental health; on that basis Mr. George 

appeals his conviction.1 We affirm. 

I 

 Mr. George moved into his sister’s Washington, D.C. 

apartment on December 7, 2005. She gave him some clothing 

to wear, including a black coat and a green, beige, and orange 

kufi hat. Just one day later, Mr. George left the apartment in 

the late morning, wearing the kufi hat, and returned a few 

hours later with a bag full of cash. He counted the money at 

 

1

 Originally, Mr. George also challenged the district court’s practice 

of accepting questions from jury members to pose to witnesses. He 

concedes the same issue arose in United States v. Rawlings, 522 

F.3d 403, 407–08 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Reply Br. 3. Therefore, our 

decision in Rawlings that such a practice is not per se improper,

522 F.3d at 407–08, disposes of this challenge. 
3 

his sister’s kitchen counter, and when she asked Mr. George 

where he got it, he said, “I robbed the bank,” and told her 

where the bank was. Ms. George estimated she saw $2,200 to 

$2,400 laid out on her counter. 

 Indeed, at just that time somebody had robbed a 

Columbia Road bank of $2,095. A security camera captured 

the transaction: a six-foot tall man wearing a patterned kufi, a 

black coat, and wire-rimmed glasses showed the teller a 

demand note, received the cash she gave him, and left 

carrying the cash in a distinctive bag. A detective inspected 

the video and prepared a description of the suspect, which the 

police circulated by the end of the day. 

 Mr. George’s sister eventually identified him from the 

description, but reporting his crime took a surprising amount 

of perseverance. The response of police officials ranged from 

derogatory to dismissive. At Ms. George’s first attempt, the 

day after the robbery, the detective at the police station who 

listened to her story told her to “[g]et . . . out” because she 

was “a snitch.” On her second attempt, she reported the 

robbery to her apartment complex’s rental office; the police 

were called. The responding officer, encountering Mr. 

George in the hallway after Ms. George had identified him as 

the suspect, asked Mr. George what was wrong with his 

sister and was she “lunching.” The officer left her $1.15 for 

bus fare to come downtown and make a report. Finally, on 

December 14, 2005, Ms. George met the detective who was 

investigating the Citibank robbery; he showed her the 

“wanted” posters for the first time. Two weeks later she 

returned bearing what she said were Mr. George’s kufi and 

the cash bag, as well as other physical evidence. 

 At trial, Mr. George’s sister was the government’s star 

witness. Because the surveillance video was too fuzzy for a 
4 

positive identification, her testimony that Mr. George was the 

person seen on the videotape was critical. Similarly, she 

connected Mr. George to the kufi she gave the police. 

Although an FBI forensic analyst found it impossible to tell 

whether this was the kufi seen in the video, Ms. George 

asserted it was the same hat. Moreover, she testified Mr. 

George claimed to have robbed a bank, and she saw him with 

cash roughly equivalent to the amount obtained in the 

robbery. 

 Understanding the importance of Ms. George’s 

testimony, defense counsel made considerable efforts to 

impeach her credibility. Counsel cross-examined Ms. George 

about a pending assault charge on which she was negotiating 

a plea deal with police and brought out that she had once 

assaulted and temporarily imprisoned her lover. The defense 

also emphasized Ms. George’s twenty-year history of PCP 

use—an addiction she admitted had continued throughout 

December 2005. Finally, the defense wanted to crossexamine Ms. George about her mental health history. She 

had been hospitalized at the Psychiatric Institute of 

Washington in April 2005 and had been diagnosed with 

bipolar disorder. The disorder had persisted since 1990 and 

symptoms included “episodes of rage, anger, irritability, and 

racing thoughts,” leading to “behavior that is life threatening, 

destructive, or disabling to self or others.” However, the 

doctor observed “no clear psychotic symptoms.” The district 

court refused to allow this line of cross-examination, 

concluding that the sister’s records did not provide a basis 

“upon which to cast doubt on her ability or her willingness to 

tell the truth” and that even if they did, an expert would be 

needed to interpret the significance of bipolar disorder for the 

jury. Tr. 233–34. 
5 

II 

 The right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses is a 

fundamental guarantee of the Confrontation Clause of the 

Sixth Amendment. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 

678–79 (1986). Accordingly, a violation of this right is 

reversible error unless the government shows it was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 680–81. Whether the right 

was violated must be gauged with respect to “the particular 

witness, not . . . the outcome of the entire trial.” Id. at 680. 

The central question is whether the jury would have received 

“a significantly different impression of the witness’s 

credibility had defense counsel been permitted to pursue his 

proposed line of cross-examination.” United States v. Davis, 

127 F.3d 68, 70–71 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Thus, there is rarely a 

Confrontation Clause violation if “defense counsel is able to 

elicit enough information to allow a discriminating appraisal” 

of the witness’s credibility. United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 

1330, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

 Below that threshold, “a trial court retains broad 

discretion to control cross-examination.” United States v. 

Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The court 

“may prevent questioning that does not meet the basic 

requirement of relevancy.” Id. In particular, defense counsel 

“must have a reasonable basis for asking questions which 

tend to incriminate or degrade the witness.” Id. 

 Denying cross-examination about Ms. George’s mental 

health did not violate Mr. George’s right to confront her, in 

part because she had already been impeached by much more 

damning evidence. Ms. George freely admitted she hoped to 

receive a reward for implicating her brother in the robbery. 

Defense counsel elicited information about the plea 

bargaining in which she was simultaneously engaged, a 
6 

substantial source of bias. In addition, counsel crossexamined Ms. George about the violent behavior that had led 

to her arrests. She had manifested violence towards her 

cousin and towards her lover, and a jury could reasonably 

infer she was less than kind to those close to her. These lines 

of cross-examination already suggested Ms. George had 

powerful motives to lie about her brother and no 

overwhelming inclination to resist. 

 Mr. George now says the real point was that his sister’s 

mental illness decreased her competence, as opposed to her 

desire, to tell the truth. We are unable to find this argument 

in the trial record, but regardless, defense counsel severely 

undermined Ms. George’s competence as well. Counsel 

established by cross-examination that Ms. George had used 

PCP for twenty years, that she had used PCP during 

December 2005, and that she had tested positive for PCP 

around the time she testified to the grand jury. Tr. 297–99. 

PCP is a dissociative drug that can cause delusions and 

hallucinations and, with long-term use, memory loss. James 

C. Munch, Phencyclidine: Pharmacology and Toxicology, 

U.N. Office of Drug Control Bull. on Narcotics, 1974 No. 4, 

at 9. Thus, it is often relevant “to develop the matter of drug 

addiction in an effort to attack a witness’s competency and 

capacity to observe, remember and recall.” United States v. 

Kearney, 420 F.2d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Defense 

counsel had the opportunity to apply Ms. George’s PCP use 

in this way. 

 Against this background we must test whether the 

additional cross-examination Mr. George wanted would have 

provided “a significantly different impression” of his sister’s 

credibility. Mental health records may, but do not 

necessarily, “cast doubt on the accuracy of a witness’[s] 

testimony.” United States v. Smith, 77 F.3d 511, 516 (D.C. 
7 

Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Slade, 627 F.2d 293, 304 

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (mental history has the potential to be 

relevant impeachment evidence). Mental illness “is relevant 

only when it may reasonably cast doubt on the ability or 

willingness of a witness to tell the truth.” Smith, 77 F.3d at 

516. A defendant proposing a line of cross-examination has 

the responsibility to make some proffer suggesting its 

relevance. Davis, 127 F.3d at 71 (“[We cannot conclude that 

. . . a reasonable jury might have received a significantly 

different impression . . . since defense counsel made no 

proffer . . . .”). 

 The days are long past when any mental illness was 

presumed to undermine a witness’s competence to testify. 

The category of mental illnesses includes a wide variety of 

conditions, of varying degrees of severity and substantially 

different effects. Simply labeling a witness as having “mental 

health problems,” Def.’s 2d Mot. in Limine 3, or alluding to 

her “issues with rage, anger, [and] racing thoughts,” Tr. 233, 

does not provide a basis for thinking she cannot correctly 

perceive reality. Mental illness is most highly relevant when 

“the witness exhibited a pronounced disposition to lie or 

hallucinate, or suffered from a severe illness . . . that 

dramatically impaired her ability to perceive and tell the 

truth.” United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 82–83 (1st Cir. 

1992). We have recognized mental illness as potentially 

relevant in a broader range of circumstances, so that, for 

example, depression could in some cases be relevant to 

credibility. Smith, 77 F.3d at 516. Nevertheless, some 

indication is needed that a particular witness’s medical history 

throws some doubt on the witness’s competence or 

credibility. Id. at 516–17 (on the basis of hospitalization 

alone, “without viewing the medical records,” no way to 

decide whether the witness’s mental health was relevant); 

compare United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1346 (D.C. 
8 

Cir. 1991) (cross-examination allowed when a witness had a 

history of hallucinations) and United States v. Lindstrom, 698 

F.2d 1154, 1164 (11th Cir. 1983) (cross-examination allowed 

when the witness’s treating psychiatrist wrote “[s]he 

chronically misinterprets the words and actions of others” 

(emphasis omitted)) with Butt, 955 F.2d at 82–84 (crossexamination excluded on mental health of a witness who was 

simply “an angry and alert individual” with “atypical 

depression,” “rejection sensitivity,” “impulsivity and 

despair”) and United States v. Jimenez, 256 F.3d 330, 343–44 

(5th Cir. 2001) (“[A] diagnosis of schizophrenia or a 

psychosis will be relevant . . . [F]or witnesses whose mental 

history is less severe, district courts are permitted greater 

latitude.”). 

 Nothing in Mr. George’s proffer at trial indicated why 

bipolar disorder would cause Ms. George difficulty in 

perceiving reality or motivate her to hurt her brother.2

 The 

bouts of anger and self-destructiveness she experienced are 

just the sort of mental problem about which courts have often 

prohibited cross-examination. See, e.g., Jimenez, 256 F.3d at 

344 (no cross-examination about a witness’s suicidal 

tendencies, especially considering the cross-examination 

about his drug use and criminal activity). We do not 

foreclose the possibility that testimony by an expert, which 

the trial judge suggested, could have shown evidence of Ms. 

George’s condition to be relevant to her credibility and 

sufficiently distinct from evidence of drug use and violence 

that the Confrontation Clause might require its admission. 

 

2

 The defendant points to an evaluation of Ms. George by the 

District of Columbia Department of Mental Health three months 

after trial to show what cross-examination would have revealed. 

This record was not available at trial and therefore could not have 

supplied a reasonable basis for thinking cross-examination about 

Ms. George’s mental health would have been relevant. 
9 

But without such testimony, Mr. George’s counsel had only 

words such as “episodes of rage” and “racing thoughts.” 

Mental illness is not a generic badge of incompetence or 

dishonesty.3

 Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in excluding 

this cross-examination. The court diligently applied the 

standard we developed in Smith, asking whether Ms. 

George’s mental illness would reasonably cast doubt on her 

ability or willingness to tell the truth. Having concluded it 

would not, it suggested the possibility of an expert to explain 

why her bipolar disorder would be relevant. In the absence of 

any further proffer by defense counsel, it was reasonable for 

the district court to exclude cross-examination on the issue. 

III 

 For the reasons given above, the judgment of the district 

court is 

Affirmed. 

 

3

 Because our conclusion that Mr. George’s right to cross-examine 

Ms. George was not violated depends both on the limited relevance 

of the mental health evidence he offered and on the nature of the 

background impeachment evidence he introduced at trial, we do not 

address whether a trial judge could, consistent with the 

Confrontation Clause, exclude more relevant evidence solely on the 

ground that other impeachment evidence had already been used at 

trial.