Joint Special Operations Task Force- Philippines 

A Monograph 

by 

MAJOR Stuart L. Farris 

U.S. Army 

School of Advanced Military Studies 

United States Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

AY 2009 

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Joint Special Operations Task Force- Philippines 

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14. ABSTRACT 

The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) indirect approach to irregular warfare (IW) offers senior 

U.S. policy makers and military commanders a suitable model worthy of consideration for conducting long-term military 

operations against terrorist networks inside a partner nation’s sovereign territory. However, the indirect approach does not 

represent a one-size-fits-all solution or approved template for conducting successful IW and defeating terrorist networks 

abroad. The JSOTF-P’s indirect approach to IW is tailored specifically to the unique conditions of the Philippines 

operational environment and the regional military objectives established by senior policy makers. The indirect approach 

employed by the JSOTF-P offers a model for the U.S. military to combat regional/global terrorism inside a partner 

nation’s sovereign territory under the following conditions: the U.S. has an established Country Team; the partner nation 

has established armed forces with an existing capacity to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations; the 

partner nation’s political establishment is sensitive to a large-scale, overt presence of American military personnel 

operating within the country or region; or the partner nation has a constitutional or otherwise legal prohibition against 

foreign military forces directly conducting combat operations within their sovereign territory. 

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Joint Special Operations Task Force- Philippines, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM- PHILIPPINES; Long War; 

Irregular Warfare; Indirect Approaches; Special Operations Forces; Counterterrorism; Counterinsurgency

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES 

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL 

Major Stuart L. Farris 

Title of Monograph: Joint Special Operations Task Force- Philippines 

This monograph was defended by the degree candidate on 24-03-2009 and 

approved by the monograph director and reader named below. 

Approved by: 

__________________________________ Monograph Director 

Jacob W. Kipp, Ph.D. 

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 Military Studies 

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Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. Graduate Degree 

 Programs 

iii
iv

Abstract 

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE- PHILIPPINES by MAJOR Stuart L. Farris, 

U.S. Army, 70 pages. 

 The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) indirect approach to 

irregular warfare (IW) offers senior U.S. policy makers and military commanders a suitable 

model worthy of consideration for conducting long-term military operations against terrorist 

networks inside a partner nation’s sovereign territory. However, the indirect approach does not 

represent a one-size-fits-all solution or approved template for conducting successful IW and 

defeating terrorist networks abroad. The JSOTF-P’s indirect approach to IW is tailored 

specifically to the unique conditions of the Philippines operational environment and the regional 

military objectives established by senior policy makers. 

 The indirect approach employed by the JSOTF-P offers a model for the U.S. military to 

combat regional/global terrorism inside a partner nation’s sovereign territory under the following 

conditions: the U.S. has an established Country Team; the partner nation has established armed 

forces with an existing capacity to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations; 

the partner nation’s political establishment is sensitive to a large-scale, overt presence of 

American military personnel operating within the country or region; or the partner nation has a 

constitutional or otherwise legal prohibition against foreign military forces directly conducting 

combat operations within their sovereign territory. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1

Purpose and Scope ....................................................................................................................... 2

Literature Review ........................................................................................................................ 3

Paper Organization ...................................................................................................................... 8

SECTION I: THE LONG WAR, IW, AND THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT . 8

The Military Implications of 9/11 ............................................................................................... 9

A Paradigm Shift: IW and Indirect Approaches ........................................................................ 10

Balancing Military Capabilities for an Uncertain Future .......................................................... 12

Summary ................................................................................................................................... 15

SECTION II: THE PHILIPPINES OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..................................... 16

The Importance of History and Governance ............................................................................. 16

Geography, Climate, and Infrastructure .................................................................................... 18

Population .................................................................................................................................. 20

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) ............................................................................. 21

Threat Groups ............................................................................................................................ 23

Summary ................................................................................................................................... 28

SECTION III: THE JSOTF-P APPROACH ................................................................................. 29

Origins ....................................................................................................................................... 29

Mission, Intent, and Operational Design ................................................................................... 31

Organization and Resources ...................................................................................................... 38

Summary ................................................................................................................................... 41

SECTION IV: ANALYZING THE JSOTF-P APPROACH ........................................................ 42

Applies Capabilities Indirectly .................................................................................................. 44

Legitimacy ................................................................................................................................. 45

Unity of Effort ........................................................................................................................... 47

Ensures Long-Term Sustainment .............................................................................................. 48

Economy of Force ..................................................................................................................... 50

Effectiveness .............................................................................................................................. 53

SECTION V: CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 56

Recommendations ..................................................................................................................... 57

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 61

v
INTRODUCTION 

We think there’s a model here that’s worth showcasing. There’s another way of doing 

business. We’ve been doing it for four years with some decent results--not grand results, 

but some decent results. We think it’s worthwhile.1 

— Lieutenant General David P. Fridovich, USA, 

Director, Center for Special Operations, United 

States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

The U.S. is over seven years into the fight against terrorism. No clear end is in sight, and 

many challenges remain. In addition to fighting a protracted, potentially multi-generational 

conflict against an ideologically motivated non-state actor in the form of al-Qaeda (AQ) and its 

associates, the uncertain strategic security environment of the 21st Century also requires the U.S. 

military to be prepared to fight and win conventional major theater wars, deter rogue nations 

possessing or attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), defeat asymmetric 

attacks, and provide support to civil authorities as required in the event of a declared domestic 

emergency or catastrophe. The key question then becomes, how can the U.S. military be 

prepared to successfully conduct and accomplish all of these tasks without exhausting its service 

members and their families, depleting other high demand, finite resources in the forms of money 

and materiel, and losing the essential support of the American people and the broader 

international community? 

In support of the Long War,2

 Special Operations Command- Pacific (SOCPAC) has 

employed a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to defeat terrorist organizations in the 

Philippines since September, 2002.3

 The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines 

(JSOTF-P) uses Special Operations Forces (SOF) in conjunction with members of the interagency 

 

1

CSM William Eckert, “Defeating the Idea: Unconventional Warfare in the Southern Philippines,” 

Special Warfare, no. 6 (November-December 2006): 18. At the time of this quote, Lieutenant General 

Fridovich was a Major General and the Commander, Special Operations Command-Pacific. 

2

In this monograph the term Long War is synonymous with what was named the Global War on 

Terrorism (GWOT) under the administration of former President George W. Bush. 

3

Special Operations Command, Pacific, Web Page, http://www.socpac.socom.mil (accessed 

January 29, 2009). SOCPAC is a subordinate unified command of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). 

1
to build the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) capacity to defeat terrorist organizations and 

networks that threaten the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and regional 

stability. This indirect approach4

 to conducting irregular warfare (IW)5 by, with, and through 

legitimate Filipino security forces maintains an extremely small and very limited American 

military signature and presence. This approach is perceived among many in the U.S. SOF 

community to be extremely successful in disrupting terrorist organizations in the Philippines. Yet 

this success has received only limited attention from U.S. service members outside of the SOF 

community and almost no attention from Western media. Some former members of SOCPAC 

argue that the success of JSOTF-P’s approach to IW in the Philippines make it a model for future 

U.S. military operations in support of the Long War. 

Purpose and Scope 

The purpose of this monograph is to research and analyze the JSOTF-P’s approach to 

conducting IW in the Philippines to determine if it offers a model for future U.S. military IW 

operations in support of the Long War. To offer a worthy model, the approach must accomplish 

the mission of disrupting or defeating terrorist networks in a manner that supports the objectives 

and policies specified in U.S. national strategy documents, maintains political legitimacy in the 

eyes of the American people and broader international community, supports unity of effort and 

cooperation amongst the interagency, and employs sufficient resources and capabilities that can 

be feasibly sustained by the U.S. military for at least the next twenty years. This monograph 

shows that as of early 2009 the JSOTF-P’s approach to conducting IW in the Philippines does 

 

4

U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) Number 3000.07,

Irregular Warfare (IW) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008): 14. This Directive defines Indirect means as: 

“Meeting security objectives by working with and through foreign partners.” It is the opposite of direct 

means, defined as: “Meeting security objectives through the U.S.-led application of military power.” 

5

Ibid. DoDD Number 3000.07 defines IW as: “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors 

for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and 

asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to 

erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” 

2
indeed offer senior U.S. policy makers and military commanders a suitable model worthy of 

consideration for conducting long-term military operations against terrorist networks in 

cooperation with a partner nation in a complex and socio-politically sensitive environment. 

The Philippines have a long history of insurgency and political instability, especially in 

the southern island of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. This monograph will not speculate on 

or attempt to identify the root causes of insurgency in the Philippines. Entire books have been 

written on this subject, and the root causes of insurgency are something that the GRP must 

ultimately address and resolve. Nor will this paper specifically address or examine the collective 

application of U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national 

power as part of a comprehensive strategy to promote political stability in the Philippines. While 

the integrated and coordinated efforts of all four instruments are certainly necessary for success in 

promoting political stability within any country or region, again, a study of that magnitude is 

beyond the limits of this paper. Therefore, the scope of this monograph is strictly limited to an 

unclassified examination of the JSOTF-P as an application of the military instrument of national 

power, and its suitability as a model for future U.S. IW operations to disrupt and defeat terrorist 

organizations and networks in support of the Long War. 

Literature Review 

Perhaps overshadowed by the on-going, large-scale, and highly scrutinized U.S. 

counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as of early 2009 there is not an 

abundance of literature that examines the effectiveness of the JSOTF-P approach to IW in the 

Philippines.6

 Initially, there are three journal articles written by senior SOF leaders, two of 

 

6

In August 2006, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, in conjunction with the Combat 

Studies Institute, hosted a three day symposium at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to discuss the history of U.S. 

Security Assistance (SA) to foreign countries. The symposium was attended by senior Army leaders, 

including General David Petraeus, along with numerous military historians and foreign policy academics. 

The topics of discussion and analysis spanned the history and lessons learned from U.S. SA efforts Haiti, 

Romania, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Africa, the Philippines from 1901 to 1917, and Iraq. There is no 

3
whom were instrumental in establishing the JSOTF-P and its approach to combating terrorism in 

the Philippines, that are worthy of mention. 

First, former SOCPAC Commander Lieutenant General David Fridovich and Lieutenant 

Colonel Fred Krawchuk’s 2007 Joint Forces Quarterly article entitled, “Winning in the Pacific--

The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach,” warns that the U.S. military cannot violate a 

sovereign nation’s territory to conduct unilateral kill or capture counterterrorism missions. The 

authors advocate an indirect approach to conducting IW of working by, with, and through 

indigenous forces and institutions in order to build their defense capacity to combat terrorism, 

dissuade potential terrorists, and address the root causes of terrorism. They specifically cite 

SOCPAC’s operations in the Philippines as a successful application of the indirect approach and 

describe it as “an effective model for addressing asymmetric threats.”7

Second, former JSOTF-P Commander Colonel David S. Maxwell’s 2004 Military Review

article entitled, “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: What Would Sun Tzu Say?” agrees in 

principle with Fridovich and Krawchuk’s assessment that employing SOF to advise and assist an 

allied country in achieving mutual security objectives is an efficient, indirect use of the military 

for combating terrorism. However, Maxwell’s discussion offers a candid and somewhat critical 

assessment of SOCPAC’s initial operations on the Philippines island of Basilan from October 

2001 to September 2002, citing several errors made by senior U.S. political and military leaders 

that limited the operations overall effectiveness. These errors included an overemphasis on force 

protection, a failure to adequately understand the various terrorist and insurgent forces in the 

 

mention or discussion of contemporary U.S. military efforts in the Philippines. See: U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command and Combat Studies Institute, “Security Assistance: U.S. and International 

Historical Perspectives,” The Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2006 Military History 

Symposium (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, August 8-10, 2006): 1-692. 

7

David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, “The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach,” 

Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 44 (1st Quarter 2007): 24-27. Lieutenant General Fridovich is largely 

considered the architect of the approach employed by the JSOTF-P. 

4
Philippines and how they interrelated, and an incomplete understanding of the Philippines 

Constitution concerning the operational limitations of foreign forces in the Philippines.8

 

Finally, in a 2006 Military Review article entitled, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN 

Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” Colonel Gregory Wilson describes the 

evolution of SOCPAC’s efforts in the Philippines and likewise argues the JSOTF-P’s approach, 

“offers a template for a sustainable, low-visibility approach to supporting America’s allies in the 

War on Terror.”9

 Wilson’s conclusion advocates employing Special Forces advisory teams in 

Iraq on a large scale, and contends that the U.S. “must employ a holistic approach that enhances 

the legitimacy of the host-nation government and its security forces in the eyes of the local 

populace.”10

More recently, two other articles have surfaced that specifically address the effectiveness 

of the JSOTF-P. In a 2007 article published in Third World Quarterly, Naval Postgraduate 

School Professor Hy Rothstein posits the thesis that, “U.S. success against irregular threats is 

inversely related to the priority senior U.S. officials (civilian and military) attach to the effort.”11 

Rothstein cites contemporary U.S. military operations in the Philippines to support his argument 

by stating, “When one investigates the return on investment in the global war on terror (GWOT), 

now increasingly described as the Long War, in Iraq versus the Philippines, it is clear that U.S. 

efforts in the Philippines are achieving great success with minimal resources, while efforts in Iraq 

are achieving limited success with almost unlimited resources.”12 However, Christian Science 

 

8

Colonel David S. Maxwell. “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: What Would Sun Tzu 

Say?” Military Review (May-June 2004): 20-23. Colonel Maxwell commanded the JSOTF-P from 2006 to 

2007. 

9

Colonel Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the 

Indirect Approach,” Military Review (November-December 2006): 11. 

10Ibid. 

11Hy S. Rothstein, “Less is More: The Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of 

Collapsing States,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 275. 

12Ibid. 

5
Monitor correspondent Jonathan Adams has questioned the success of the JSOTF-P approach to 

fighting terrorists in the Philippines, citing a resurgence of Abu Sayyaf Group activity on the 

island of Basilan, an island until recently believed by many Filipino and U.S. officials to be rid of 

terrorist presence.13

Until recently, there has been virtually no analysis or study on how terrorist groups end. 

Georgetown University Professor and the RAND Corporation Political Scientist, Dr. Seth G. 

Jones, addresses this troubling void in his September 2008 testimony before the House Armed 

Services Committee. In his study, Jones found that terrorist groups typically dissolve for two 

reasons: either members decide to employ non-violent tactics and join the political process, or 

local police and intelligence forces successfully kill or arrest key leaders within the group. He 

states that while historically counterterrorist strategies based on military force have not been 

effective, military force will be necessary when AQ is involved in the insurgency. Relevant to 

the JSOTF-P, Jones argues that when military force is required, indigenous forces are the forces 

of choice for reasons of legitimacy and possessing a better understanding of the environment in 

which they are operating.14 He further states that U.S. military forces can play a vital role in 

developing indigenous military and counterterrorism capacity, but should maintain a small 

signature and avoid conducting direct combat operations in Muslim countries which could 

decrease the legitimacy of the host nation government and facilitate terrorist recruitment.15

 

13Jonathan Adams, “In Basilan, Philippines, a US Counterterrorism Model Frays,” The Christian 

Science Monitor (December 11, 2008), http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1211/p04s04-wosc.html (accessed 

December 19, 2008). 

14U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: GPO, 12 April 2001, as amended through 17 October 

2008). JP 1-02 defines operational environment as: “A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and 

influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.” 

15U.S. Congress, House, Testimony presented by Seth G. Jones, RAND Corporation, before the 

House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and 

Capabilities on September 18, 2008. 

6
In order to understand U.S. military policy and priorities for the armed forces with 

respect to the Long War and the broader strategic security environment, it is necessary to closely 

examine the 2008 National Defense Strategy, the 2006 National Strategy for Combating 

Terrorism, and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. These documents are significant 

because they establish national level policy, priorities, and objectives for the U.S. armed forces 

and describe both the contemporary and foreseeable future military requirements for deterring or 

defeating threats and adversaries. Because these documents help shape and define the context of 

the contemporary strategic security environment, they are discussed in greater detail in the 

following section of this monograph. 

Finally, a thorough review of numerous U.S. military doctrinal manuals is necessary in 

order to clearly define and comprehend a wide variety of military terms and concepts. Since 

today’s military operations are inherently joint in nature,16 and because joint military doctrine 

assumes the pinnacle position within the Department of Defense’s (DoD) hierarchy of manuals, 

joint military doctrine is preferred as reference material over separate service (U.S. Army, U.S. 

Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, or U.S. Coast Guard) doctrine. Specifically, the author 

focused on reviewing and incorporating the following Joint Publications (JP) into the framework 

of answering the research question: JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States; JP 

1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations; JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations; and JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID). 

 

16U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007): GL-8. JP 1 defines joint as: “Connotes activities, operations, 

organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.” 

7
Paper Organization 

This monograph is organized into five sections: Section I establishes the broad context 

for the paper by describing the nature of the Long War, IW, and the strategic security 

environment. Narrowing the scope, Section II provides additional relevant context by articulating 

the unique characteristics of the Philippines operational environment, the organization and 

capabilities of the AFP, and the distinct yet interrelated nature of the terrorist, secessionist, and 

communist threats to the GRP. Having established the necessary context for understanding and 

evaluating the JSOTF-P approach, Section III initially discusses the origins of the JSOTF-P 

mission and then describes in detail the development of the approach to IW in the Philippines and 

the specific manner in which it is employed as of February 2009. Section IV then analyzes the 

utility of the JSOTF-P approach to date using the following five criteria: Applies Capabilities 

Indirectly, Legitimacy, Unity of Effort, Ensures Long-Term Sustainment, and Economy of 

Force.17 Finally, Section V concludes the paper by answering the research question and 

providing recommendations for potential countries and regions in which the JSOTF-P approach 

to IW might currently serve as a suitable means for disrupting or defeating terrorist threats in 

support of the Long War. 

SECTION I: THE LONG WAR, IW, AND THE STRATEGIC 

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 

It follows that to apply force with utility implies an understanding of the context in which 

one is acting, a clear definition of the result to be achieved, an identification of the point 

or target to which force is being applied- and, as important as all the others, an 

understanding of the nature of the force being applied.18

— General (Retired) Rupert Smith, British Army 

 

17The justification for selecting these criteria and their respective definitions are provided in 

Section IV. 

18General Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 2007): 8. 

8
In order to evaluate the utility of the JSOTF-P’s approach to conducting IW in the 

Philippines, it is imperative to first appreciate the broader U.S. strategic security environment 

within which this approach is being applied. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to describe 

the nature of the Long War, IW, and the relevant functions that both direct and indirect military 

approaches serve in support of achieving objectives therein. Additionally, this section reviews 

several U.S. national strategy documents to understand national security objectives with respect 

to the Long War and the need for maintaining a military capability to conduct traditional 

warfare.19

The Military Implications of 9/11 

The terrorist attacks conducted by AQ on September 11, 2001 were watershed events for 

the U.S. military, signaling an abrupt and final end to the supposed “peace dividend” of the postCold War era.20 Former President George W. Bush declared a “Global War on Terrorism” 

(GWOT), and the military is over seven years into two highly visible, large-scale 

counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Based largely on the 

political and military lessons-learned from the on-going U.S. efforts in these two theaters, 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates succinctly captures the essence of the Long War, IW, and the 

role of military force in his statement: 

What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular 

campaign- a struggle between forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. 

Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists 

 

19DoDD Number 3000.07 defines traditional warfare as: “A form of warfare between the 

regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed 

forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in 

an adversary’s government or policies.” 

20Colonel (R) David H. Gurney and Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman, “An Interview with George W. 

Casey, Jr.,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 52 (1st Quarter 2009): 15-19, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/ 

jfq_pages/editions/i52/6.pdf (accessed February 15, 2009). 

9
and other extremists. But over the long term, the United States cannot capture or kill its 

way to victory.21

This acknowledgement that the U.S. is involved in a protracted, global conflict against 

ideologically driven and typically non-state sponsored actors has forced the U.S. military to shift 

its cognitive, doctrinal, and operational focus from conducting traditional warfare to conducting 

IW. 

A Paradigm Shift: IW and Indirect Approaches 

DoD policy now recognizes that “IW is as strategically important as traditional 

warfare.”22 DoD’s current concept for IW is embodied in the September 11, 2007, Irregular 

Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Version 1.0. While not doctrine, this document 

was co-authored by U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the U.S. Marine Corps 

(USMC), and approved by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The 

IW JOC provides the current definition of IW and describes how future commanders might 

conduct protracted23 IW operations in support of national objectives in the 2014 to 2026 

timeframe. Additionally, the IW JOC provides senior policy makers and military commanders a 

framework strategy for conducting IW, as articulated below: 

Ends: Friendly political authority and influence over host population are secured and 

adversary control, influence, and support are denied. 

Ways: (This is the central idea of this concept.) The joint force will conduct protracted 

regional and global campaigns against state and non-state adversaries to subvert, coerce, 

attrite, and exhaust adversaries rather than defeating them through direct conventional 

military confrontation. IW emphasizes winning the support of the relevant populations, 

promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary control, influence, and 

 

21Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign 

Affairs (January-February 2009): 30. 

22U.S. Department of Defense, DoDD Number 3000.07, 2. 

23U.S. Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 

1.0 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007), 5. The IW JOC defines protracted as: “An operation, campaign, or war 

of such long duration that it requires multiple unit rotations for an indefinite period of time.” 

10
support. Unified action by the USG and its strategic partners is essential to winning an 

irregular war or campaign. While the direct application of military power may not be the 

primary means of winning IW, joint forces will often be required to support non-military 

instruments of power and set the conditions for strategic success. 

Means: Fully integrated US and partner conventional and nonconventional forces and 

capabilities. 

The key elements of the central idea are: 

• Using indirect approaches 

• Conducting protracted IW campaigns 

• Conducting campaigns on a regional or global scale 

• Focusing on the will of the people 

• Employing unified action 

Supporting ideas are: 

• Establishing a persistent presence for IW 

Protracted intelligence preparation of the environment 

Protracted operational preparation of the environment 

• Establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships to support IW 

• Expanding the role of general purpose forces to support and execute IW 

• Creating alternative command and control mechanisms for conducting 

and supporting IW. 24

Central to this strategy and this monograph is the acknowledged importance of “winning the 

support of the relevant populations, promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary 

control, influence, and support,”25 in conjunction with the idea of using indirect approaches as a 

key element in achieving the stated ends. 

The value of the indirect approach to the Long War and IW is further established by the 

Commander of USSOCOM, Admiral Eric T. Olson, whose command has lead responsibility for 

planning and synchronizing operations against global terrorist networks.26 During his March 5, 

2008 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Olson stated that the command’s 

first priority is to “deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats.” In pursuing that end, Olson 

 

24Ibid., 19. 

25Ibid. 

26The mission of USSOCOM is to, “Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend the 

United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks.” United States 

Special Operations Command, Web Page, http://www.socom.mil (accessed October 15, 2008). 

11
described USSOCOM’s strategy of employing “two essential, mutually supporting and often 

intertwined approaches--direct and indirect.” 27 The direct approach “addresses the immediate 

requirement to immediately disrupt violent extremist organizations,” while the indirect approach 

“addresses the underlying causes of terrorism and the environments in which terrorism activities 

occur. The indirect approach requires more time than the direct approach to achieve results, but 

ultimately will be the decisive effort.”28

Balancing Military Capabilities for an Uncertain Future 

To fully appreciate U.S. military objectives and requirements within the context of the 

Long War, IW, and the broader strategic security environment, U.S. national strategy documents 

must be examined. These documents are important because they describe and define America’s 

strategic security policies, objectives and military capability requirements as envisioned by the 

President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense. Specifically germane to the topic of 

this monograph are the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the National Strategy for Combating 

Terrorism (NSCT), and the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR). 

The June 2008 NDS is DoD’s capstone document for providing strategic guidance to the 

U.S. military for campaign and contingency planning, force development, and intelligence. The 

document describes a strategic environment for the foreseeable future that consists of long-term 

challenges posed by terrorists and violent extremist ideology, rogue states seeking nuclear 

weapons, the rising military power of other states, and a variety of irregular challenges. The 

strategy states that success will require long-term, innovative approaches, and emphasizes the 

critical role international partners will play. Five objectives are outlined: (1) Defend the 

 

27U.S. Congress, House, Statement of Admiral Eric T. Olson, U.S. Navy, Commander, United 

States Special Operations Command before the House Armed Services Committee on the Posture of 

Special Operations Forces, Combatant Commander Statement to the United States House Armed Services 

Committee (March 5, 2008): 3. 

28Ibid. 

12
Homeland, (2) Win the Long War, (3) Promote Security, (4) Deter Conflict, and (5) Win our 

Nation’s Wars.29 In discussing the objective “Win the Long War,” the strategy declares, 

“arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not 

the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern 

themselves.” The strategy then goes on to state, “Working with and through local actors 

whenever possible to confront common security challenges is the best and most sustainable 

approach to combat violent extremism.”30 However, equal emphasis must be given to the 

objective of “Win our Nation’s Wars,” which states, “Although improving the U.S. Armed 

Forces’ proficiency in IW is the Defense Department’s top priority, the United States does not 

have the luxury of preparing exclusively for such challenges. Even though the likelihood of 

interstate conflict has declined in recent years, we ignore it at our peril. . . . We must maintain the 

edge in our conventional forces.”31 In other words, the military must maintain a balanced ability 

to conduct both IW and traditional warfare. 

The NSCT is America’s pinnacle document for articulating the strategic security 

environment and U.S. strategic objectives with respect to combating terrorism. The 2006 NSCT

declares that America is in a Long War against transnational terrorists motivated by a hateful, 

oppressive, and murderous ideology. The strategy lays out six objectives for winning the War on 

Terror: (1) Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism; 

(2) Prevent attacks by terrorist networks; (3) Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states 

and terrorist allies who seek to use them; (4) Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue 

states; (5) Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for 

terror; and (6) Lay the foundations and build institutions and structures we need to carry the fight 

 

29U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008): 6. 

30Ibid., 8. 

31Ibid., 13. 

13
forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.32 It is important here to note that, 

upon close examination of the JSOTF-P’s mission and operational design that follows in Section 

III, it becomes readily apparent that the JSOTF-P efforts do in fact support all of the objectives 

stated above, either directly or indirectly. 

Finally, the QDR establishes a baseline for where DoD currently is with respect to 

strategic military requirements and capabilities and sets an azimuth for where it needs to go in 

order to remain relevant and dominant in defending the American people. The focus of the 2006 

QDR centers on Fighting the Long War, Operationalizing the Strategy, Reorienting Capabilities 

and Forces, Reshaping the Defense Enterprise, Developing a 21st Century Total Force, and 

Achieving Unity of Effort.33 The QDR describes an era of conflict defined by irregular warfare--

operations in which the enemy is not the regular or conventional military force of a nation-state.34 

In dealing with these threats, the QDR further suggests that the U.S. must often adopt, “an 

indirect approach, building up and working with others. This indirect approach seeks to 

unbalance adversaries physically and psychologically, rather than attacking them where they are 

strongest or in the manner they expect to be attacked.”35 However, consistent with the NDS, the 

QDR also acknowledges that the U.S. military cannot afford to put all of its proverbial eggs into 

the IW basket and must maintain a capability to, “Conduct and Win Conventional Campaigns.”36 

 

32The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) (Washington, DC: GPO, 

2006), 1. 

33U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) (Washington, DC: 

GPO, 2006): i. 

34Ibid., 1. 

35Ibid., 11. 

36Ibid., 38. 

14
Summary 

The U.S. is fighting a protracted, global IW campaign against an ideologically motivated, 

non-state actor. Winning this Long War is the military’s number two priority, second only to 

defending the homeland. Support from, and cooperation with, international partners is critical. 

At the center of the conflict is a battle for the support of relevant populations, not a battle to 

defeat or destroy an adversary’s army or military capacity. Therefore, the direct application of 

U.S. military force, although necessary at times, has limited utility. Indirect approaches, which 

require more time and patience to see results, are the preferred methods of attaining and 

sustaining long-term gains in this battle for legitimacy amongst the populace.37 

Yet despite the priority of the Long War and the emphasis on IW, the U.S. military must 

maintain a qualitative edge in conducting traditional warfare. A lapse in traditional warfare 

capability will likely tempt potential peer military competitors such as Russia and China to seek 

an advantage within it. The requirement to maintain traditional warfare capabilities while 

simultaneously conducting a protracted, global IW campaign implies the need for an economy of 

force in the Long War. It is within this broad strategic context that the foundation for 

understanding the JSOTF-P’s approach to IW in the Philippines is initially established, and it is 

within this context that the utility of their approach is largely evaluated. 

 

37“The prize, globally, is the population.” Remarks made by Lieutenant General David Fridovich 

to students attending the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 14, 

2009. Used with permission of Lieutenant General Fridovich, January 14, 2009. AQ agrees with 

Fridovich. In his 2005 letter to Al’Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Ayman al’Zawahiri 

(deputy to Usama bin Laden and chief Al’Qaeda strategist) writes, “the strongest weapon which the 

mujahedeen enjoy-after the help and granting of success by God-is popular support from the Muslim 

masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries. . . . In the absence of this popular support, the 

Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows, far from the masses who are distracted or 

fearful, and the struggle between the Jihadist elite and the arrogant authorities would be confined to prison 

dungeons far from the public and the light of day.” Ayman al’Zawahiri. “English Translation of Ayman alZawahiri’s letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” The Weekly Standard, (December 10, 2005), 

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/ 006/203gpuul.asp (accessed February 2, 

2009). 

15
SECTION II: THE PHILIPPINES OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

And therefore I say: Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be 

endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total.38

— Sun Tzu 

Now that an appreciation for the nature of the Long War, IW, and the strategic security 

environment is established, it is equally important to develop an understanding of the Philippines 

operational environment: the governmental, geographic, cultural, military, and threat 

characteristics that make the situation in the Philippines unique and distinct from other countries 

and conflicts throughout the world. To be clear, this section does not make the reader an expert 

on the Philippines. Rather, the purpose is to provide a broad overview of the Philippines 

operational environment in order to establish the additional context necessary to understand the 

conditions under which the JSOTF-P has developed its approach to IW and the logic behind 

which it conducts operations. 

The Importance of History and Governance 

The U.S. has a long history of political, economic, and military involvement in the 

Philippines. Following the defeat of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in 1899, the U.S. occupation 

of the Philippines was initially met by Filipino resistance. This led to the Philippine-American 

War which lasted until 1902, ending shortly after the Americans captured revolutionary leader 

General Emilio Aquinaldo.39 Following the victory, U.S. political oversight in the Philippines 

was intended to be very temporary, lasting only long enough to create conditions sufficient for 

creating a stable democratic government. However, it took over forty years for the Philippines to 

become an independent republic. After surrendering the Philippines to Japan in 1942 and then 

retaking it with the help of Filipino guerrilla forces from 1944 to 1945, the U.S. recognized the 

 

38Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971): 129. 

39U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Philippines,” November 2008, 

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm (accessed November 10, 2008). 

16
independent Republic of the Philippines on July 4, 1946.40 With a significant portion of its 

infrastructure and countryside destroyed the majority of post-World War II American 

involvement in the Philippines focused on reconstruction and assisting the Filipino people in 

establishing and maintaining functional democratic governance, economic livelihood, and 

sufficient military capacity to disrupt and defeat insurgent movements.41

With such enduring American political presence and influence, it comes as no surprise 

that in 2009 the GRP is a representative democracy modeled closely after that of the U.S. The 

Philippines’ Constitution, ratified in 1987, established an executive branch consisting of a 

president and vice president, a legislative branch consisting of a Senate and House of 

Representatives, and a judicial branch consisting of a Supreme Court.42 It is important to clarify 

that the Philippines’ Constitution does not explicitly prohibit or restrict U.S. military forces from 

conducting combat operations in the Philippines. It only prohibits the basing of foreign forces in 

the Philippines after the 1991 expiration of the Philippines-U.S. agreement on military bases.43 

However, the constitution provides for an exception to this policy if there is a ratified treaty and 

such a treaty has in fact existed between the U.S. and the Philippines since 1951.44 Thus, it is 

false to believe that the JSOTF-P approach to IW was selected simply by default or imposed defacto due to prohibitions contained in the Philippines’ Constitution. 

 

40Ibid. In 1962 Philippines Independence Day was changed to July 12, commemorating the date 

they declared independence from Spain in 1898. 

41U.S. Department of State. 

42The Philippines Constitution can be viewed on-line at: The Official Website Of The Republic Of 

The Philippines: http://www.gov.ph/aboutphil/constitution.asp (accessed November 14, 2008). 

43Article 18, Section 25 of the Philippines Constitution specifically states, “After the expiration in 

1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America 

concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the 

Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, 

ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and 

recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.” 

44Maxwell, “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines,” 22; The Avalon Project, “The Mutual 

Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines; August 30, 1951,” 

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp (accessed February 5, 2009). 

17
Geography, Climate, and Infrastructure 

The geography, climate, and physical infrastructure of the Philippines offer significant 

military challenges as well as some advantages from a combating terrorism perspective. The 

Philippines archipelago consists of over 7,000 islands, occupying an area slightly larger than the 

state of Arizona, with over 3,200 kilometers of open waterways connecting the islands (see figure 

1).45 The numerous islands and interconnected waterways present a challenge for military forces 

to effectively isolate terrorist cells and contain their movement between the islands. However, in 

the broader sense, the fact that the Philippines is an island nation makes it likewise extremely 

difficult for terrorists to seek sanctuary in a neighboring country, and hinders their ability to 

directly receive external support from a foreign sponsor. Unlike terrorists in many other parts of 

the world, terrorists in the Philippines do not have the convenient luxury of seeking sanctuary 

inside an unstable or sympathetic nation with shared borders.46

 

45Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA The World Factbook-Philippines,” November 2008, 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/rp.html (accessed November 10, 2008). 

46This stands in stark contrast to the American military’s experience fighting insurgencies and 

terrorists in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In Vietnam, the Viet Cong were able to use areas within the 

sovereign neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia for sanctuary to establish training and logistics 

bases that could not be overtly targeted by the U.S. military. Similarly in Iraq, terrorists and insurgents are 

able to move in to Iran and Syria in order to avoid combat with the U.S. military and Iraqi security forces. 

Finally, in Afghanistan, the Taliban and AQ are currently able to use the Federally Administered Tribal 

Area (FATA) in Pakistan as a sanctuary for logistical, ideological, and operational support that again, the 

U.S. military cannot directly target without violating Pakistani national sovereignty. 

18
Figure 1. The Philippines 

Source: Malcolm Cook and Kit Collier, Mindanao: A Gamble Worth Taking (International 

Policy Publication, 2006): vi. Copyright reprint permission for this figure was granted on 

February 18, 2009 by the Command and General Staff College copyrights coordinator. 

The terrain in the Philippines is generally mountainous jungle with narrow and densely 

vegetated lowlands along the coast. Monsoon seasons run from November to April in the 

northeastern part of the country and from May to October in the southwest. Not surprisingly, the 

transportation infrastructure is austere by Western standards. Available airports, improved road 

19
networks--less than 20,000 kilometers are paved--and rail lines are limited.47 The densely 

forested and rugged terrain, combined with a lack of sufficient roads and transportation 

infrastructure, provides excellent sanctuary for terrorist camps and makes it difficult for military 

forces to conduct, supply, and sustain continuous operations. Additionally, these conditions make 

it more difficult for the GRP to extend their influence in to the rural and more remote areas of the 

country, especially within the southern island of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, the regions 

in which the current population is most at risk for sympathizing with terrorists and/or 

insurgents.48

Population 

As of 2009, the Philippines have a diverse population of over 96,000,000 people and six 

distinct ethnic groups. The common religion is Christianity, with Roman Catholics alone 

constituting over 80 percent of the population. Muslims make up only 5 percent of the 

population, the majority of who live in the Sulu Archipelago and in central and western 

Mindanao.49 Literacy rates are high, with over 92 percent of the population aged fifteen and 

older able to read and write. While the official national language is Filipino (based on Tagalog), 

English is the language used both in the government and in educational instruction.50 The 

Philippines has approximately 5.3 million Internet users and an estimated cellular phone density 

of 60 mobile-cell phones per 100 people. There are an estimated 11.5 million radios in the 

country that can receive up to 381 AM and 628 FM channels and an estimated 3.7 million 

 

47Central Intelligence Agency. 

48Malcolm Cook and Kit Collier, Mindanao: A Gamble Worth Taking (Lowy Institute for 

International Policy Publication, 2006): 62-63. 

49U.S. Department of State. 

50Central Intelligence Agency. Other languages and dialects spoken in the Philippines include 

Tagalog, Cebuano, Ilocano, Hiligaynon, Bicol, Waray, Pampango, and Pangasinan. 

20
televisions that can receive over 250 broadcast stations.51 This demonstrates that in addition to 

sharing a common practice of governance and belief in democratic principles, the people of the 

U.S. and the Philippines largely share a common religion, a common language, and the education 

level and communication infrastructure required to communicate messages that can be received 

and at least acknowledged by a vast majority of the populace. Cultural differences aside, these 

commonalities undoubtedly facilitate cooperation between the two governments, the two 

militaries, and the ability to communicate their messages to a majority of the Filipino population. 

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 

Based on the long standing political and military ties, it should come as no surprise that 

the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) also bear close resemblance to those of the U.S. The 

AFP were established in 1935 and are a volunteer force of approximately 118,000 service 

members consisting of an Army, Navy (including Marine Corps), and Air Force.52 The 1987 

Philippines Constitution, much like the U.S. Constitution, places control of the AFP under 

civilian leadership with the president acting as commander-in-chief. Likewise, the Philippines’ 

Army, Navy, and Air Force fall under the Department of National Defense, which is led by the 

Secretary of National Defense who fulfills a role similar to the United States Secretary of 

Defense. The AFP are equipped with western military weapons, vehicles, aircraft, and equipment 

(primarily from the U.S., United Kingdom, and Germany) and is widely considered one of the 

more capable militaries in the region.53

Especially significant with respect to combating terrorism is the fact that the AFP has an 

established special operations capability within its Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as a joint 

 

51Ibid. 

52Ibid. 

53Armed Forces of the Philippines, “About Us,” 2004, http://www.afp.mil.ph/0/about.php 

(accessed November 18, 2008). 

21
special operations capability in the form of the Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG). 

Philippines Army Special Operations Forces consist of four units: the Special Forces Regiment 

(Airborne), the First Scout Ranger Regiment, the Light Reaction Battalion, and the Civil Affairs 

Group. The Special Forces Regiment was founded in 1962 and has approximately 1,200 

personnel trained to conduct unconventional warfare, reconnaissance, and direct action raids. 

The First Scout Ranger Regiment was first organized in the late 1940s and today consists of 

approximately 1,800 personnel whom some consider to be the most experienced unconventional 

fighters in the AFP. The Light Reaction Battalion (LRB) consists of approximately 400 

personnel taken from the Special Forces and Scout Ranger Regiments and is organized into three 

companies that are trained to conduct counterterrorist operations under the operational control of 

the JSOG. The Civil Affairs Group (CAG) evolved from the Public Relations Office (PRO) of 

the 1950s and consists of approximately 130 personnel trained in civil-military operations. Once 

a part of the Philippines Special Operations Command (SOCOM), today the CAG falls directly 

under the control and supervision of the Headquarters of the Philippines’ Army.54

Naval Special Operations forces consist of the Naval Special Warfare Group (NSWG) 

and the Force Reconnaissance Battalion (FRBn). The NSWG consists of approximately 400 

personnel, organized into 8 company-sized Naval Special Warfare Units (NSWU) that are trained 

to conduct special operations in the sea, air, or land (SEAL) in support of naval and/or maritime 

operations. One NSWU remains attached to the JSOG in order to conduct maritime 

counterterrorist operations, as required. The FRBn traces its lineage to the Scout Raider Platoon 

of the 1950s, and today consists of approximately 500 marines organized into three 

reconnaissance companies deployed to support and assist Marine Corps Brigades.55

 

54Antonio R. Lastimado and Arturo G. Rojas, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines and Special 

Operations” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 23-24. 

55Ibid., 25. 

22
The Air Force special operations capability is provided by the 710th Special Operations 

Wing (SPOW) and consists of approximately 2,000 personnel capable of conducting combat 

operations against enemy forces, coordinating air strikes, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and 

civil disturbance control. One squadron is attached to the JSOG in order to support 

counterterrorist operations.56

Finally, the Joint Special Operations Group is a joint military organization that 

constitutes the AFP’s dedicated counterterrorist force. Consisting of the Light Reaction 

Battalion, a SEAL company from the NSWG, a squadron from the 710th SPOW, a special 

tactical helicopter element, a special tactical airlift element, three K-9 teams, three EOD teams, 

and three K-9 dog teams, JSOG is trained to conduct reconnaissance and direct action missions 

against terrorist targets, as well as to conduct Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT).57

Thus, the AFP is a well-established, well-equipped, motivated, and regionally capable 

military modeled closely after the armed forces of the U.S. More importantly, resident within the 

AFP is an established and capable SOF whose organization and missions closely mirror those of 

U.S. SOF, to include a joint organization trained and equipped to conduct counterterrorist 

operations. Again, these factors certainly facilitate the JSOTF-P’s efforts, as they are able to 

work with and refine an established military organization with existing capability, and not 

required to build or re-build a national military architecture that did not previously exist or had 

been eliminated. 

Threat Groups 

To complete a description of the Philippines’ operational environment, one must have a 

general understanding of the various domestic and regional militant groups and organizations that 

 

56Ibid., 25-30. 

57Ibid., 26-30. 

23
threaten the GRP, regional stability, and potentially the U.S. These threat groups can broadly be 

categorized as secessionists, communists, and terrorists.58 While the scope of this monograph 

focuses specifically on the terrorist threat, it is impossible to address the terrorism aspect alone 

without discussing the additional and long standing threats posed by both the secessionists and 

communists, and acknowledging the interconnected relationships amongst all three groups.59

The Philippines’ Muslim population is concentrated in the southern islands of Mindanao 

and Sulu and constitutes almost 20 percent of the local populace.60 Filipino Muslims have long 

considered this region their ancestral homeland, tracing a presence as far back as the thirteenth 

century, well before Spain’s attempts to colonize the Philippines began in 1565. Referred to as 

“Moros” by the Spanish, these Muslims successfully resisted Spain’s efforts to colonize the 

southern Philippines for over 300 years, but eventually succumbed to American colonization in 

1914.61 The point is the Moros of the southern Philippines have claimed the region as their own 

independent territory for over 700 years, a political reality that is difficult for the GRP to 

overcome or cast aside, and it is from this history that the secessionist groups make their claims 

for regional secession and independence. 

In 2009 there are two primary Muslim secessionist groups in the southern Philippines. 

The first group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), was brought in to the political 

process by signing a cease-fire agreement with the GRP in 1996. As part of the agreement, the 

 

58JSOTF-P Staff, “Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines,” JSOTF-P Command Briefing 

(Powerpoint Presentation), 2006. 

59Colonel William Coultrup, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 14, 2008. 

Colonel Coultrup assumed command of the JSOTF-P in October 2007 and is scheduled to remain in 

command until the summer of 2009. Addressing the complexity and interconnectedness of the various 

threat groups in the Philippines, Colonel Coultrup made the analogy of capturing a Filipino terrorist 

wearing a T-shirt with the words, “ASG,” on the front of the shirt, “MILF,” on the back of the shirt, a tag 

on the inside of the shirt that says, “Made by JI,” while wearing a “National People’s Army” (communist) 

hat on his head. 

60United States Institute for Peace, The Mindanao Peace Talks: Another Opportunity to Resolve 

the Moro Conflict in the Philippines, Special Report (Washington, DC: Institute for Peace, 2005): 3. 

61Ibid. 

24
government agreed to establish Muslim autonomy in provinces and cities in which the populace 

voted to be a part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This effectively 

ended the MNLF’s 25 year armed conflict with the GRP for independence.62

The second group is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or MILF. The MILF first 

appeared in the southern Philippines in 1977 as a splinter group from the larger, already 

established MNLF. However, the MILF did not become a truly independent movement until 

1984, citing differences in goals and making charges of corruption against the leadership of the 

MNLF.63 While the MNLF decided to achieve its goal of self-determination by way of autonomy 

reached through the political process, the MILF regards this concept of limited self-rule as 

completely unacceptable.64 Intent on creating a sovereign Islamic state governed by Sharia law 

in Mindanao, the MILF is the largest insurgent group operating in the area and has between 

15,000 to 20,000 dedicated operatives with an additional part-time and passive support base of 

several thousand more.65 Their strategy to establish an independent Islamic state in Mindanao 

focuses on a four-point program of action consisting of military offensives (attacks against the 

AFP), diplomatic offensives (reaching out to Islamic countries for support), mass actions (efforts 

to convert Christians and tribal religious followers to Islam), and negotiations with the 

government (in an effort to gain political advantage).66 The MILF receives financial support 

from local benefactors and various international Islamic organizations, as well as conducting 

kidnap-for-ransom operations and other forms of extortion. Yet in an effort to prevent 

undermining an ongoing series of on-again, off-again cease-fire agreements between the two 

 

62Ibid., 2. 

63Leonardo I. Pena, “Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency 

Strategy” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007): 14. 

64United States Institute for Peace, 2. 

65Kim Kragin, Peter Chalk, Sarah A. Daly, and Brian A. Jackson, Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: 

Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 

28. 

66Pena, 17-18. 

25
sides, the GRP has requested that the MILF not be placed on the U.S. State Department’s list of 

foreign terrorist organizations.67 

The communist movements in the Philippines seek to remove the GRP through force and 

to replace it with a communist government structured along a socialist model. In classic fashion, 

a primary component of their strategy is to mobilize primarily peasants and disenfranchised 

members of the working class against the government by leveraging complaints of political, 

social, and economic injustice combined with the specter of American imperialism.68 

The communists are split into two main factions: Reaffirmists who favor the Mao-based 

strategy of rural revolution, and Rejectionists, who favor a strategy of urban revolution similar to 

the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The Reaffirmists represent the greater threat due to their larger 

numbers and their ability to exert influence on a very large and susceptible rural population. As 

of 2005, communist party membership was estimated at almost 10,000, with an ability to 

mobilize an additional 120,000 member fighting force consisting of militia members and mass 

activists in both rural and urban areas. Additionally, the communists claim to have a rural 

support base in excess of 600,000 people, although these numbers cannot be easily qualified. 

Nevertheless, their sheer numbers combined with a rural population susceptible to communist 

ideology make the communists the single greatest threat to Philippines National Security.69

Finally, and of specific interest to this monograph, there are two major terrorist 

organizations operating within the Philippines: the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and Jemaah 

Islamiyah (JI). The ASG was founded in 1989 by former members of the MNLF who had fought 

in Afghanistan as Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union. Motivated by their experience in 

Afghanistan and the exposure to Islamic fundamentalism, the founding members returned to the 

 

67Ibid., 15. The U.S. State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations is available from: 

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm. 

68Ibid., 7. 

69Ibid., 7-10. 

26
Philippines intent on establishing an independent Islamic State of Mindanao and eliminating all 

Christian influence in the southern Philippines.70 With an estimated strength of 1,270 militants in 

2000, the ASG’s strength estimates in 2009 are at 300 to 500 members, a result of successful AFP 

operations in the traditional ASG strongholds of Basilan and Jolo islands that began in 2002.71 

Having suffered significant losses in leadership and personnel, the ASG currently appear to have 

no real strategy for achieving their goals other than conducting limited terrorist operations such as 

kidnapping and bombings. Nevertheless, the ASG is still considered the greatest threat to 

security in central Mindanao and appears to be regrouping with the support of other regional 

Muslim secessionist groups such as the MILF and terrorist groups such as JI.72

JI is a regional terrorist organization affiliated with AQ and seeks to establish a panregional Caliphate across Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, southern Thailand, and the southern 

Philippines. Their strategy for accomplishing this is strictly through terrorism, and they are 

responsible for conducting several significant bombings against Western targets in Bali, Jakarta, 

and the Philippines since 2002. Initially, many experts believed JI to be a very hierarchically 

structured organization, comprised of a central command in Indonesia, a subordinate group of 

dedicated regional militants, and an additional base taken from other established Islamic militant 

groups throughout the region. However, as a result of a 2003 offensive against JI by regional 

police in Malaysia and Singapore, experts now believe that JI has had to assume a much flatter 

organizational structure and that the majority of their attacks are being carried out by Islamic 

radicals with a similar agenda that operate on a relatively independent basis. While the 

ideological epicenter of the organization remains in Indonesia, many terrorism experts believe 

 

70Kragin et al., 31. 

71However, the ASG has shown resurgence in activity in Basilan in 2009. This is addressed later 

in Section IV. 

72Pena, 18-21. 

27
that the southern Philippines has become the primary area in which JI is working to achieve its 

regional objectives.73

Summary 

The political, geographic, cultural, social, and military histories and characteristics of the 

Philippines constitute a complex operational environment which is unique from other countries 

and regions in which the U.S. military is conducting operations in support of the Long War. 

From a military perspective, these factors combine to present the JSOTF-P with several distinct 

challenges and advantages. The primary challenge lies in the ability to understand and appreciate 

the uniqueness of the socio-cultural environment, and to relate this understanding to the 

objectives, methods, and interconnected nature of the Muslim secessionist, communist, and 

terrorist threats, all while operating within the firm parameters established by senior U.S. political 

and military leaders.74 At the tactical level, challenges for sustaining long-term operations are 

posed by the rugged and dense terrain combined with a lack of improved roads and transportation 

infrastructure, particularly within the focus regions of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. 

Yet despite these challenges, the Philippines operational environment does provide some 

significant advantages for the JSOTF-P. Despite various cultural differences, the Philippines and 

U.S. share a long political, military, and economic history and a vital common ground of 

democratic government, Christian religion, the English language, and similarly structured, highly 

compatible militaries. This common ground supports close political and diplomatic cooperation 

between the two countries, enhances the interoperability of their militaries, and generally supports 

a positive perception of American presence amongst the majority of Filipino people. Indeed, the 

 

73Kragin et al., 25-28. 

74Coultrup. 

28
special relationship between the U.S. and GRP certainly helps to foster favorable conditions for 

the JSOTF-P’s efforts. 

SECTION III: THE JSOTF-P APPROACH 

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. . . . It is their war, and you are to help 

them, not win it for them.75

— T. E. Lawrence 

This section describes the circumstances under which the JSOTF-P was established and 

articulates the JSOTF-P’s specific approach and methodology to conducting IW in the 

Philippines. It begins by briefly discussing the origins and establishment of the JSOTF-P and the 

development of the indirect approach to IW in the Philippines. Next, it provides a detailed 

description and analysis of the JSOTF-P’s current mission, intent (desired end state), and 

operational design expressed in logical lines of operation (LOO).76 Finally, this section will 

describe in general terms the JSOTF-P’s task-organization, disposition, and assets and resources 

employed in support of accomplishing the mission and achieving the desired end state. 

Origins 

The U.S. Army’s First Special Forces Group (Airborne) (1st SFG(A)) was present and 

active in the Philippines prior to the events of 9/11.77 In fact, from March to July 2001, elements 

of 1st Battalion, 1st SFG(A) had been conducting an advisory assistance mission with the AFP 

and were helping them in developing plans to target terrorist organizations, specifically the 

ASG.78 These assistance efforts continued in earnest following the May 21, 2001 ASG 

 

75T. E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin (August 20, 1917). 

76U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP 3-0), Joint Operations (Washington, DC: 

GPO, 2006, Incorporating Change 1, 13 February 2008). JP 3-0 defines lines of operation as: “logical lines 

that connect actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s).” 

77Colonel David Maxwell, “Commander’s Summary of the Joint Special Operations Task Force 

Philippines (JSOTF-P)” (2006). 

78Ibid. 

29
kidnapping of more than a dozen wealthy Filipinos and three American citizens, including a 

missionary couple, from a resort on the Island of Palawan. The ASG transported the hostages to 

their jungle stronghold on the island of Basilan and held them for ransom. In the aftermath of 

9/11, these events led SOCPAC, USPACOM, the State Department, and ultimately the Bush 

administration to seize an opportunity to expand the GWOT and to more aggressively target the 

ASG by establishing Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P), which 

officially commenced in early 2002.79 

The initial command and control headquarters for OEF-P was Joint Task Force (JTF) 

510,80 the forerunner of the JSOTF-P. Under the leadership of SOCPAC Commander Brigadier 

General Donald Wurster and 1st SFG(A) Commander Colonel David Fridovich, JTF 510 

developed a strategy that employed U.S. SOF in support of the AFP to combat and defeat the 

ASG on the island of Basilan. According to Lieutenant General Fridovich, “The first thing we 

did was to read the Constitution of the Philippines in order to understand what we could and 

could not do.”81 Aware that the constitution did not specifically prohibit U.S. soldiers from 

conducting combat operations within the Philippines, SOCPAC nevertheless understood the 

potential for increased tension within the polity generated by the local press and images of 

American soldiers fighting on Filipino soil.82 Thus, at its very core the JTF 510 strategy was 

based on an appreciation of Philippines sovereignty and recognition of the potential internal 

political repercussions of American military forces conducting overt and/or unilateral military 

 

79Wilson, 4. 

80Globalsecurity.org, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) Joint Task Force 510, 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/socpac.htm (accessed December 20, 2008). JTF 510 is 

USPACOM’s rapid deployment joint task force in which SOCPAC serves as the nucleus. JTF 510 is 

specially tailored for deployment in support of contingencies and crises that require a rapid SOF response 

within the USPACOM area of responsibility. 

81Remarks made by Lieutenant General David Fridovich to students attending the School of 

Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 14, 2009. Used with permission of 

Lieutenant General Fridovich on January 14, 2009. 

82Maxwell, “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philipines,” 22. 

30
operations within the Philippines. Therefore, in 2002 1st SFG(A) and SOCPAC developed an 

indirect approach of working by, with, and through the AFP to combat the ASG on the island of 

Basilan.83 

The indirect approach in the Philippines relies on the inherent ability of SOF to maintain 

a small physical signature while simultaneously building and developing the host nation’s 

military capacity to locate, isolate, and defeat terrorist networks, providing civil affairs (CA) 

forces and assets to assist in humanitarian aid and civic action programs, and offering information 

operations (IO) assets and enablers in order to positively influence the local population and 

delegitimize terrorist and insurgent groups. This approach emphasizes close coordination and 

cooperation with the host nation political leadership, its law enforcement agencies, and especially 

the U.S. Country Team and interagency. The essence of this approach continues today under the 

JSOTF-P, which emerged in July of 2002 following JTF 510’s initially highly successful efforts 

against the ASG on the island of Basilan.84

Mission, Intent, and Operational Design 

As of January 2009, the mission statement of the JSOTF-P reads, “JSOTF-P, in 

coordination with the U.S. Country Team,85 conducts Foreign Internal Defense (FID) with the 

Republic of the Philippines Security Forces in order to defeat JI and ASG High Value Individuals 

and neutralize enemy safe havens.”86 The significant aspects of this mission statement are 

threefold. First, it acknowledges the absolute importance of coordinating all efforts and working 

 

83Fridovich and Krawchuk, 24. 

84Ibid. 

85JP 1-02 defines Country Team as: “The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising 

body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each 

represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission.” The Country 

Team is charged with implementing U.S. foreign policy objectives within the country to which they are 

assigned. 

86The JSOTF-P mission statement was provided by Lieutenant Colonel Chad Clark, currently 

serving as JSOTF-P J-5 (Chief of Plans). 

31
in conjunction with the Country Team. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley and research assistant 

Michael Casey Jr. describe the Country Team as, “the critical intersection where plans, policies, 

programs, and personalities all come together. The Country Team builds the American image 

abroad and implements strategy.”87 Former JSOTF-P Commander Colonel David Maxwell 

echoes these remarks by bluntly stating, “When dealing with sovereign countries, the tip of the 

spear is the Country Team.”88 The mission statement of the JSOTF-P is unique in that it 

explicitly acknowledges that in order for U.S. military operations in the Philippines to be 

executed, they must be coordinated and nested with the efforts and objectives of the Country 

Team, the organization that is responsible for implementing and executing U.S. foreign policy 

objectives within a given sovereign country. 

The second significant aspect of the mission statement is that in accordance with Joint 

SOF doctrine it accurately defines the overall JSOTF-P mission as the SOF Core Task of FID.89 

As defined in JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (December 17, 2003), FID is, “the 

participation by civilian and military agencies of a government (in this instance, the U.S. 

Government) in any action taken by another government (in this instance, the GRP) to free and 

protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” Accurately defining the overall 

mission in terms of a doctrinal SOF Core Task, instead of using terms and phrases representing 

non-doctrinal SOF Core Tasks such as counterinsurgency or capacity building, helps ensure 

 

87Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey Jr, “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First 

Line of Engagement,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 47 (4th Quarter 2007): 146. 

88Colonel David S. Maxwell, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, September 18, 2008. 

Colonel Maxwell commanded the JSOTF-P from 2006 to 2007. 

89U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

(Washington, DC: GPO, 2003). JP 3-05 outlines nine Special Operations Core Tasks. They are: Direct 

Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Unconventional Warfare 

(UW), Counterterrorism (CT), Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CP/WMD), Civil 

Affairs Operations (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Information Operations (IO). 

32
clarity and proper understanding of the mission across members of the JSOTF-P, the interagency, 

and the AFP/GRP.90

The third and final significant element of the mission statement is that it states the 

JSOTF-P’s purpose is to defeat JI and ASG High Value Individuals and neutralize enemy safe 

havens.91 Due to the domestic political situation within the Philippines and the fact that the 

MNLF, MILF, and communist movements are viewed as internal political problems and not 

terrorist threats, by directive the JSOTF-P is strictly limited to supporting and enabling AFP 

operations against declared terrorist organizations such as JI and ASG.92 The oft-times 

interconnected nature of these terrorist, secessionist, and communist groups undoubtedly 

complicates matters when it comes to targeting enemy individuals, networks, and cells,93 and the 

JSOTF-P must continually coordinate and vet potential targets through the Country Team in order 

to ensure the credibility and legitimacy of their collective efforts is maintained in the eyes of the 

GRP and the Filipino people.94

 

90Lieutenant Colonel Chad Clark, JSOTF-P J-5 (Chief of Plans), Electronic correspondence with 

author, January 8, 2009. 

91JP 1-02 does not provide a definition for the term defeat. However, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-

90, Tactics (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), defines defeat as: “a tactical mission task that occurs when an 

enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated 

force's commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the 

friendly commander's will and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly 

forces.” JP 1-02 defines neutralize as: “To render ineffective or unusable.” JP 1-02 does not contain a 

definition for High Value Individual (HVI). However, the concept of an HVI is very similar to a High 

Value Target (HVT), which JP 1-02 defines as: “A target the enemy commander requires for the successful 

completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important 

enemy functions throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest.” In other words, HVIs are terrorist 

leaders whose position or function is so important or critical to the organization that their defeat 

significantly degrades the organizations operations or renders them unable to accomplish their desired 

objectives. 

92Clark. 

93Major Owen Ray, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 8, 2009. Based on 

his observations while serving as a Joint Support Detachment (JSD) Commander in the JSOTF-P from 

February to July 2004, Major Ray was of the opinion that the Judge Advocate General (JAG) was the 

busiest officer on the JSOTF-P staff, having to constantly thoroughly review operations to ensure the 

targets were legal and consistent with applicable DoD directives. 

94Coultrup. 

33
As articulated by JSOTF-P Commander Colonel William Coultrup, the desired end state 

for JSOTF-P operations in the Philippines is that, “JI leadership and safe havens have been 

neutralized and the conditions for their presence no longer exist.”95 This desired end state 

requires a strategy that simultaneously targets and addresses the need to eliminate the symptoms 

of terrorism (in the form of terrorists and their safe havens) as well as the disease (the root causes 

that drive people to terrorism). To accomplish this, the JSOTF-P has designed a military 

campaign that works along four simple logical lines of operation. They are Capacity Building, 

Targeted Civil-Military Operations (CMO), Information Gathering and Sharing, and Information 

Operations/Influence Operations.96 Explained graphically, the JSOTF-P’s operational design is 

depicted in figure 2:97

 

95Ibid. 

96Unless footnoted otherwise, the majority of information on the JSOTF-P campaign design and 

logical lines of operation in this portion of the monograph was provided from interviews conducted by the 

author with Colonels Maxwell and Coultrup on September 18, 2008 and October 14, 2008 respectively, at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Additional information was derived from a JSOTF-P command briefing 

(powerpoint presentation) provided by Colonel Maxwell and used with his permission on September 18, 

2008. 

97Figure 2 is based upon a power point slide developed by the JSOTF-P staff while under the 

command of Colonel Maxwell in 2006. The slide has been modified by the author to accurately reflect the 

operational design currently employed under the command of Colonel Coultrup. Copyright reprint 

permission for this figure was granted on March 11, 2009, by the Command and General Staff College 

copyrights coordinator. 

34
(as of JAN 09)

TargetedCMO

InformationGathering and Sharing

Advise and Assist AFP counterpartsIOT

create a secure and stable environment

InformationOperations(InfluenceOps)‐ Emphasize

the success of GRP effortsin the first two lines of

operation in orderto positively influence perceptions

aboutGRP legitimacy

* GRP Led / US Facilitated civic action and

humanitarian assistanceprojectsimpact

target population and demonstrateGRP

concern forregional citizens

Collect, Fuse, andDisseminate timely

and accurate intelligence to the right

agencies

CapacityBuilding

GRP

Democracy

Regional

Stability

End State

‐JI leadershipand

safehavens neutralized

‐ Conditionsfor their

presenceno  longer exist

InformationOperations

Figure 2. JSOTF-P Operational Design 

Source: JSOTF-P Staff, “Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines,” JSOTF-P Command 

Briefing (Powerpoint Presentation), 2006. 

The Capacity Building line refers to building Philippines military capacity to conduct 

COIN and counterterrorism (CT) operations by employing U.S. SOF to train, advise and assist 

select military units and organizations within the AFP. At the tactical level, this is accomplished 

primarily by U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers and U.S. Navy SEALs training select AFP 

companies, platoons, and/or squads in small unit infantry tactics, marksmanship, maritime 

interdiction operations, radio communications, use of night-vision goggles, calling for and 

directing close air support (CAS), combat-lifesaver instruction, and small-unit leadership training 

and development. The corresponding AFP battalion and brigade commanders and their staffs 

receive training in intelligence collection, analysis, processing, and dissemination techniques, 

how to plan and integrate CAS to support ground maneuver forces, and how to develop plans and 

operations that are logistically sustainable. These efforts are essentially mirrored and tailored 

accordingly at selected higher level AFP headquarters, including General Headquarters (GHQ), 

the highest level headquarters in the AFP. Ultimately, this training builds the AFP’s capacity to 

35
conduct COIN and CT operations and enhances their ability to provide security to the Filipino 

citizens, thereby increasing the legitimacy and credibility of the AFP and as an additional result, 

the GRP.98 

The Targeted CMO line refers to conducting various infrastructure development and 

reconstruction projects in which JSOTF-P personnel train the AFP to build and improve such 

things as roads, bridges, shelters, and other forms of hardened infrastructure. Additionally, 

JSOTF-P medical personnel conduct frequent medical, dental, and veterinary seminars in which 

they teach members of the AFP how to better treat and care for various (human and 

animal/livestock) medical conditions, ailments, and injuries. This “train the trainer” concept has 

an exponential effect, as the AFP then takes this training into remote villages where they pass on 

to the villagers the new skills they have learned. This methodology puts a “Filipino face” on 

every operation, ensures the AFP is in the operational lead and most importantly, demonstrates 

the government’s care and concern for the people, thus reinforcing government legitimacy.99 

Finally, it is important to highlight the use of the word “Targeted” in describing this line of 

operation. These projects and seminars are not conducted at random locations on an ad-hoc basis, 

or in well developed areas with sufficient physical infrastructure and medical care facilities. 

Targeted CMO are conducted in specific areas, as identified by the JSOTF-P and AFP and 

approved by the GRP, as being at risk for cooperating or sympathizing with terrorist or insurgent 

organizations due to high levels of poverty and unemployment, low levels of education and 

literacy, and other potential socio-economic and demographic indicators.100

The Information Gathering and Sharing line denotes the JSOTF-P’s efforts to assist the 

AFP in the timely collection, fusion, and dissemination of accurate information and intelligence 

 

98Eckert, 19. 

99Coultrup. 

100Ibid.; Maxwell, Interview. 

36
across and among the appropriate military units and other supporting agencies. To support this 

line of operation the JSOTF-P employs what they call Liaison Coordination Elements (LCEs). 

LCEs are small, specially organized and tailored teams of U.S. SOF personnel that co-locate with 

and assist a designated AFP headquarters with information and intelligence collection, 

processing, analysis, and fusion. LCEs are typically located at selected AFP brigade level 

headquarters up to and including General Headquarters (GHQ). When necessary, the LCEs can 

“reach back” to the JSOTF-P for additional intelligence collection assets and capabilities, such as 

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or additional casualty evacuation support, to assist AFP 

operations.101 Likewise, if and when specific mission resource requirements exceed the 

capability of the JSOTF-P, the JSOTF-P can coordinate with SOCPAC and USPACOM for 

additional intelligence and operational support, as required.102 

Finally, the Information Operations (IO) line is used to inform the Filipino people of the 

successes the government has had with the Capacity Building and Targeted CMO lines of 

operation, thereby positively influencing and increasing public perception and support for both 

the GRP and the AFP. The JSOTF-P expands the formal definition of the IO acronym to include 

“influencing others,” and works to positively influence the Filipino population through 

transparent public affairs and multi-media efforts that tell the people: (1) what the JSOTF-P and 

AFP are going to do, (2) why it needs to be done, (3) how it is going to be done, and most 

importantly, (4) how it will benefit the people of the Philippines.103 This technique of informing 

the local people before operations take place as opposed to after they occur provides the JSOTF-P 

and the AFP with the information initiative, ensuring that the Filipino people are aware of the 

intended purpose of AFP activity, which to a large extent pre-empts the terrorist’s ability to 

 

101Wilson, 9-10. 

102Ray. 

103Eckert, 21. 

37
misrepresent the actions of the AFP. As former JSOTF-P Command Sergeant Major William 

Eckert states, “Everything we do in the security, capacity building and CMO arenas can go awry 

if we fail to communicate our plans and objectives to the local populace.”104 

Applied collectively and simultaneously, JSOTF-P operations along these four logical 

lines of operation are designed to achieve the desired end state of neutralizing JI and ASG 

leadership and safe haven and eliminating the conditions that allow them to exist. Ultimately 

these efforts are intended to strengthen the Philippines’ democracy, thereby supporting and 

facilitating the U.S. regional-strategic objective of maintaining regional stability.105 

Organization and Resources106

The JSOTF-P consists of members from all armed services as well as various U.S. 

government agencies. The Army contribution typically consists of personnel to augment the 

JSOTF-P staff, a reinforced Special Forces company, a Civil Affairs company, and a Military 

Information Support Team (MIST).107 The Navy provides personnel to augment the JSOTF-P 

staff and a Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU) consisting of a SEAL platoon (+/-), a 

supporting boat detachment, and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) detachment. The Air 

Force provides personnel to augment the JSOTF-P staff, liaison teams to coordinate with the 

Philippines Air Force (PAF), a weather detachment, and several fixed and rotary wing aircraft to 

support operations. Finally, general purpose forces (GPF), often in the form of U.S. Marines or 

 

104Ibid. 

105Coultrup. 

106As of January 2009, the JSOTF-P has been operating for over seven years under four different 

commanders. The specific level and amount of resources applied to the effort as well as the task 

organization have remained generally, but not exactly, consistent. Thus, the following discussion will not 

provide exact numbers and current locations, but rather provide the reader a general understanding of how 

the JSOTF-P operates and the assets and resources it has at its disposal. 

107A Military Information Support Team (MIST) is a small team of soldiers that assists in the 

creation, design, and production of various media messages and products such as newspaper 

advertisements, posters, leaflets, and radio/television advertisements that support JSOTF-P, AFP, and GRP 

IO objectives. 

38
Army infantry from the 25th Infantry Division or Guam National Guard, provide security for 

JSOTF-P base camps and facilities, and are also available to reinforce and support other 

operations when and where needed. Altogether, the combined number of U.S. service members 

assigned to the JSOTF-P is approximately 500.108 

Staffed with less than seventy personnel, the JSOTF-P headquarters is located in the 

western archipelago town of Zamboanga on the island of Mindanao. The core operational 

elements of the JSOTF-P are the reinforced Army Special Forces Company, the NSWTU 

consisting of Navy SEALs, and the Army CA Company. Augmented by conventional forces and 

other supporting personnel (MISTs) when and where necessary, these core elements are task 

organized as cross-functional teams into three subordinate headquarters of approximately 100 to 

150 personnel each and are known as Task Force (TF) SULU, TF MINDANAO, and TF 

ARCHIPELAGO.109 Although the specific disposition of these elements and the affiliation with 

a certain AFP counterpart may change based on tactical and operational requirements, a typical 

disposition of JSOTF-P and AFP forces is depicted in figure 3 on the following page.110

 

108Coultrup. 

109Coultrup. JP 1-02 defines task force as a temporary grouping of units, under one commander, 

formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.

110Figure 3 provided courtesy of Colonel David S. Maxwell and depicts the JSOTF-P disposition 

in 2006. Copyright reprint permission for this figure was granted on March 11, 2009 by the Command and 

General Staff College copyrights coordinator. 

39
EASTMINCOM

10th ID 6th ID

TF MINDANAO

1st ID

WESTMINCOM

TF 61

JSOTF HQ

TF THUNDER

LCE

TF COMET

TF SULU

TF 62

LCE

TF ARCHIPELAGO

40th IB

LCE

TF LIGHTNING

LCE

NAVSOU 8

LCE

CAVITE

AFP GHQ

JSOTF MCE

MANILA

LEGEND

Western Mindanao Command units

Eastern Mindanao Command units

JSOTF-P units

Figure 3: Example JSOTF-P DISPOSITION 4th ID

Figure 3. Example JSOTF-P Disposition 

Source: JSOTF-P Staff, “Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines,” JSOTF-P Command 

Briefing (Powerpoint Presentation), 2006. 

The JSOTF-P’s supporting resources and enablers, specifically in terms of aviation and 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, are best described as austere.111

Military fixed-wing air support is provided by only a handful of available aircraft, some of which 

are provided by contract. None of these airplanes are designed for offensive military purposesthey are essentially used for transporting personnel, logistics, and when necessary, 

medical/casualty evacuation.112 Likewise, military rotary-wing air support comes mainly in the 

form of two helicopters, both Blackhawk variants, with a few more again provided by contract. 

 

111Maxwell, Interview; Coultrup. 

112JSOTF-P Staff, “Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines,” JSOTF-P Command 

Briefing (Powerpoint Presentation), January 2009. 

40
These helicopters are also primarily used in a logistics role, and bring the grand-total of aircraft 

employed by the JSOTF-P to less than ten.113 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) assets are 

similarly limited and are provided by a handful of tactical level drones equipped only with 

cameras and possessing a limited operational range. Further, the ability of these UAVs to collect 

and transmit imagery is severely constrained by the thick and densely vegetated Filipino terrain, 

essentially limiting their effectiveness to observing open roads and waterways.114

Summary 

The JSOTF-P was established in the aftermath of JTF 510’s successful operations against 

the ASG on the island of Basilan in 2002. These efforts continue under OEF-P as a vehicle for 

the U.S. to assist the AFP and GRP in neutralizing ASG and JI leadership and denying them 

sanctuary and safe haven in the Philippines. The 1st SFG(A) and SOCPAC developed an indirect 

approach to conducting IW in the Philippines thanks to a sound understanding of the operational 

environment which recognized the following conditions: the presence of an existing and wellestablished U.S. Country Team; the existing capacity of the AFP to conduct CT and COIN 

operations; the potential for adverse political impacts within the Philippines if the U.S. conducted 

unilateral military operations inside their sovereign borders; the corresponding additional 

potential for internal political backlash resulting from a large-scale and/or highly visible 

American military presence; and finally, SOF’s ability to train, advise, and assist foreign 

militaries while maintaining a very low signature and requiring very limited logistics support. 

To that end, the JSOTF-P mission statement emphasizes working with the Country Team 

and by, with, and through legitimate Filipino security forces to neutralize JI and ASG and to 

eliminate the conditions that allow them to exist. To accomplish this, the JSOTF-P operational 

 

113Ibid. 

114Coultrup. 

41
design is based on four simple logical lines of operation: Capacity Building, Targeted CMO, 

Information Gathering and Sharing, and Information/Influence Operations. Every effort and 

operation is applied along one or more of these four lines, focused on gaining the support of the 

population while simultaneously neutralizing terrorist leaders, networks, and sanctuaries. All of 

these operations are ultimately planned, led, and conducted by the AFP. The members of the 

JSOTF-P remain in the background and provide direction, training, advice, and informational 

support as required. 

SECTION IV: ANALYZING THE JSOTF-P APPROACH 

We can point to successes in Colombia and the Philippines and other places around the 

world as positive examples of long-term, low-profile, low-footprint, high-quality 

engagements. Our collective challenge is to help the practitioners of counterinsurgency 

get it as right as possible.115

— Admiral Eric T. Olson, USN, Commander, USSOCOM 

The purpose of this section is to evaluate the JSOTF-P approach to conducting IW in the 

Philippines to determine if it provides a model for future U.S. military operations in support of 

the Long War. Since the current JSOTF-P mission statement defines its operational task as the 

SOF Core Task of FID, the logical and perhaps default criteria with which to analyze and 

evaluate the JSOTF-P approach are the principles of Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). 

IDAD is, “the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself 

from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The strategy focuses on building viable political, 

economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society.”116 The principles 

of IDAD are: Unity of Effort, Maximum Use of Intelligence, Maximum Use of PSYOP and CA, 

Minimum Use of Violence, and A Responsive Government. These principles are designed to 

 

115Staff Sergeant Michael J. Carden, “Special Operations Focus Efforts Outside of War Zones,” 

American Forces Press Service (February 10, 2009), https://webmail.us.army.mil/ iframe_lr.html (accessed 

February 18, 2009). 

116U.S. Department of Defense, JP 3-07.1, Appendix B, B-1. FID is a military component that can 

be employed to support a host-nation’s IDAD strategy, at the request of the host-nation. 

42
support the four interdependent functions of IDAD which are Balanced Development, Security, 

Neutralization, and Mobilization.117 Using the principles of IDAD as evaluation criteria, the 

JSOTF-P, within the context of its role as the military element of a broader whole-government 

strategy, receives high marks in all categories, as their logical lines of operation, campaign design 

and tactical actions are tailored specifically to support these principles. 

Yet as logical as these criteria may be for generically evaluating the effectiveness of the 

JSOTF-P within the context of the Philippines’ broader IDAD strategy, they are largely 

insufficient for evaluating the employment of the JSOTF-P within the specific context of the 

Long War and U.S. strategic security requirements of the 21st Century. Sufficient evaluation 

criteria should include the principles required for sustaining a protracted, global IW campaign 

against an ideologically based enemy, and be consistent with the principles, concepts, and 

priorities outlined and described in U.S. national strategy documents, senior-leader policy 

statements, and emerging IW doctrine.118 Therefore, in addition to examining national strategy 

documents and the principles of IDAD, the Principles of War (and Other Principles)119 and SOF 

Imperatives120 were reviewed and considered in order to select and develop criteria that are both 

suitable and relevant to the nature of the Long War, IW, and the 21st Century strategic security 

environment. As a result, the author selected the following five (largely interrelated) criteria for 

evaluating the JSOTF-P’s approach to IW. They are: Applies Capabilities Indirectly (SOF 

 

117Ibid., B-1-B-5. 

118JP 1 states, “The context of IW is marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state actors 

for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population,” I-1. 

119Appendix A to JP 3-0 lists and defines the Principles of War. They are: Objective, Offensive, 

Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity. Other 

Principles (of War) are listed as: Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy. 

120Department of the Army, FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: GPO, 

2006). Chapter 1 lists and defines the SOF Imperatives. They are: Understand the Operational 

Environment, Recognize Political Implications, Facilitate Interagency Activities, Engage the Threat 

Discriminately, Consider Long-Term Effects, Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of Special Operations, 

Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects, Apply Capabilities Indirectly, Develop Multiple Options, 

Ensure Long-Term Sustainment, Provide Sufficient Intelligence, and Balance Security and 

Synchronization. 

43
Imperative), Legitimacy (Other Principle of War), Unity of Effort (Principle of IDAD), Ensures 

Long-Term Sustainment (SOF Imperative), and Economy of Force (Principle of War).121

Applies Capabilities Indirectly 

The first criterion for evaluating the JSOTF-P approach to IW is Applies Capabilities 

Indirectly.122 This is defined as the extent or degree to which U.S. military operations are 

conducted by, through, and/or with legitimate host-nation forces, instead of directly by U.S. 

forces. The criterion was selected because U.S. national strategy documents such as the NDS and 

the QDR, senior civilian and military leaders such as Secretary of Defense Gates and Admiral 

Olson, and the IW JOC all articulate that the military should, whenever possible, employ indirect 

approaches to conducting IW.123 The need to emphasize indirect approaches is perhaps best 

articulated by noted journalist and author Robert Kaplan when he writes: 

As free societies gain ground around the world, the U.S. military is going to be 

increasingly restricted in terms of how it operates. An age of democracy means an age of 

frustratingly narrow rules of engagement. That is because fledgling democratic 

governments, besieged by young and aggressive local media, will find it politically 

difficult--if not impossible--to allow American troops on their soil to engage in direct 

action.124

The JSOTF-P’s indirect approach to IW in the Philippines makes this criterion relatively easy to 

evaluate- in fact, it meets the criterion by definition. As discussed in Section III, all JSOTF-P 

operations are conducted exclusively by, through, and with designated AFP units. To date there 

have been no unilateral U.S. military operations conducted by units or service members assigned 

 

121The definitions for these criteria have been taken from the appropriate source listed in 

parenthesis and modified by the author as required in order for them to be more relevant to the context of 

IW and the Long War. As defined in current doctrine, the Principles of War are largely written within the 

context of traditional warfare. 

122FM 3-05, Chapter 1, 1-14. 

123See Section I of this monograph. 

124Robert D. Kaplan, “Imperial Grunts,” Atlantic Monthly Online (October 2005), 

www.theatlantic.com/doc/200510/kaplan-us-special-forces/2 (accessed February 10, 2009). 

44
to the JSOTF-P.125 Former JSOTF-P Commander Colonel David Maxwell highlights this fact in 

his 2006 Commander’s Summary when he writes: 

The most important aspect of this mission is that U.S. forces are not doing the fighting. 

They are providing assistance to Philippine security forces to allow them to fight and win 

against terrorist organizations. Thus, U.S. forces are able to contribute to the 

accomplishment of mutually beneficial U.S. and Philippine strategic objectives in the 

battle against terrorism “through, by, and with” Philippine forces.126

Legitimacy 

The second criterion to evaluate is Legitimacy, defined as U.S. military actions are 

undertaken in a legal and moral manner that maintains the support of the host nation populace, 

the credibility of the host nation government and its security forces, and the support of the 

American populace.127 This criterion was selected because U.S. IW efforts will most likely fail if 

they are perceived as illegitimate among the host nation and/or U.S. domestic population, or act 

to discredit, delegitimize, or undermine the host-nation’s security forces and/or government.128

The JSOTF-P approach can be evaluated as extremely legitimate, which in-turns supports 

the legitimacy of the AFP and GRP. The indirect approach of the JSOTF-P was based and 

developed on a sound understanding of the Philippines operational environment and has been 

employed in a legal and moral manner that is consistent with and appreciates both Filipino and 

American political, military, and social values and culture.129 Therefore, JSOTF-P remains 

legitimate with the GRP; as of early 2009, JSOTF-P has been continuously operating in the 

 

125JSOTF-P Staff, “Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines,” JSOTF-P Command 

Briefing (Powerpoint Presentation), January 2009. 

126Maxwell, “JSOTF-P.” 

127JP 3-0, Appendix A, A-4 - A-5. 

128FM 3-05, Chapter 1, 1-14. 

129Julie Alipala, “Congress Team After 1 Visit: US Forces’ Stay in RP Legal: No American 

Interference in Mindanao,” Inquirer.net. (October 2, 2008), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/ 

nation/view/20081002-164235/US-forces-stay-in-RP-legal(accessed January 19, 2009). In October 2008, 

members of the Philippines bicameral Legislative Oversight Committee on the Visiting Forces Agreement 

(LOVFA) declared that the presence of American forces in the Philippines is currently legal and in 

accordance with the agreements established between the Philippines and United States in the Mutual 

Defense Treaty of 1951. 

45
Philippines for almost seven years, at the request of and with the explicit consent of the GRP. 

The JSOTF-P is legitimate with the Filipino people; the vast majority of Filipinos are supportive 

of the presence of American soldiers and appreciate the assistance they provide.130 

The JSOTF-P seems to be legitimate with the American people, although this may be by 

default due to the lack of large scale coverage by Western media; the vast majority of the 

American populace is unaware of the JSOTF-P and their operations in the Philippines. Finally, 

the JSOTF-P is legitimate with the AFP; the assistance and influence that the JSOTF-P provides 

the AFP has not only increased AFP capacity to effectively conduct COIN and CT, but also 

improved legitimacy of the AFP with the Filipino people. Perhaps the level of influence the 

JSOTF-P has had on increasing AFP legitimacy is best captured in the remarks of AFP Major 

General Juancho Sabban, Commander of Task Force Comet131 and a soldier who has been 

fighting various insurgent groups in the Philippines for over thirty years: 

For three decades we were using a strategy of force. It turned out to be a vicious cycle. 

We would have body count syndrome. Commanders would become popular because 

they were warrior-like. But I saw the more we destroyed, the more the number of enemy 

increased. There were so many instances of collateral damage and innocent lives being 

sacrificed. Just by passing through fields with so many battalions we were already 

stomping on crops and that makes people resent the military. In the course of a firefight 

school buildings would get burned, houses would be razed to the ground, civilians caught 

in the crossfire. Everything was blamed on the military.132

Through the advice and assistance of the JSOTF-P, the AFP has changed its strategy from largescale, “clear and sweep” operations to focusing on CMO and employing more surgical, 

intelligence-driven operations to identify, locate, and defeat terrorists. This shift in strategy, 

 

130Ray. 

131Task Force Comet consists of two marine brigades and is the AFP’s main effort for combating 

ASG and JI on Sulu Island. 

132Max Boot and Richard Bennet, “Treading Softly in the Philippines: Why a Low-intensity 

Counterinsurgency Strategy Seems to be Working There,” The Weekly Standard 14, no. 16 (January 1, 

2009), http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/956zznwj.asp (accessed 

December 29, 2008). 

46
based largely on the influence of the JSOTF-P, has gone a long way in enhancing the credibility 

and legitimacy of the AFP in the eyes of the local Filipino populace.133

Unity of Effort 

The third criterion to evaluate is Unity of Effort, which is defined as the coordination and 

cooperation among all forces and agencies towards a commonly recognized objective.134 This 

criterion was selected because successful IW efforts by the U.S. will ultimately require 

cooperative whole of governance participation. This necessitates the U.S. military cooperating 

and coordinating closely not only with the host-nation’s security forces, but also with all U.S. 

interagency partners involved as well. 

The JSOTF-P supports Unity of Effort first by acknowledging that they are not in chargethey are the guests of, and are supporting, the AFP and GRP.135 In fact, the JSOTF-P does not 

attempt to define, organize, or take direct responsibility for any Philippine territory-commonly 

referred to in military circles as organizing or arranging the “battle space.”136 Instead, the 

military terrain in which the AFP and JSOTF-P operate is organized, defined, controlled by, and 

ultimately the responsibility of the AFP. Again, the AFP is in the lead, the JSOTF-P is acting in 

support.137

The JSOTF-P further supports Unity of Effort by ensuring close cooperation and 

coordination with the Country Team. Recognizing that military operations ultimately must be 

subordinate to, and in support of, political objectives, the JSOTF-P maintains continuous liaison 

 

133Ibid. 

134JP 3-07.1, Appendix A, B-3. 

135JSOTF-P Staff, “Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines,” January 2009. 

136Maxwell, Interview. Organizing the battle space is a common American military practice in 

which commanders establish the geographic boundaries within which they will operate and be responsible 

for, referred to as the Area of Operations (AO). The AO is then typically subdivided into smaller AOs or 

sectors in which subordinate commanders will operate and are responsible for. 

137Ibid. 

47
with the Country Team, and the command group participates in weekly Country Team meetings 

which include a weekly update briefing to the Ambassador.138 Direct coordination and 

cooperation with the interagency members that comprise the Country Team is critical. These 

interagency partners include various organizations from within the Department of State, 

Department of Justice, and Department of Treasury, as well as elements of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community.139 Again, the JSOTF-P maintains close and direct liaison with all of these 

organizations to ensure their efforts are nested and mutually supportive of the broader, collective 

American effort. In particular, the JSOTF-P works closely with the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) to coordinate and de-conflict proposed humanitarian assistance and civic 

action/reconstruction projects in order to ensure efforts are not being duplicated in the same areas 

and limited resources are not being wasted.140 Thus, by acknowledging and being comfortable 

with conducting all activities and operations in support of the AFP, and further, by ensuring all 

JSOTF-P operations are both nested and synchronized with the broader efforts of the Country 

Team, Unity of Effort is achieved. This goes a long way in maintaining the credibility and 

legitimacy of American diplomatic and military presence in the Philippines in the eyes of the 

Filipino people and the GRP.141

Ensures Long-Term Sustainment 

The fourth criterion to evaluate is Ensures Long-Term Sustainment, which is defined as 

providing host-nation security forces with training and capabilities that can be maintained without 

 

138Maxwell, “Commander's Summary of the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines 

(JSOTF-P),” 2006. 

139Maxwell, Interview; Coultrup. 

140Ibid. 

141Ibid. Both Colonels Maxwell and Coultrup stated the JSOTF-P maintained a positive and 

healthy relationship with the various interagency organizations in the Philippines. Of course, personalities 

do come in to play and there can be certain frictions at times. Yet according to Colonels Maxwell and 

Coultrup, the U.S military and interagency partners in the Philippines understand their respective roles and 

functions and work closely together to ensure cooperation and unity of effort. 

48
continuous U.S. assistance.142 This criterion was selected because the object of building hostnation military capacity is to eventually enable them to suitably meet their specific internal and 

external security needs without external assistance. Providing training and capabilities that will 

require an enduring U.S. military presence to supervise or maintain is otherwise 

counterproductive.143 

While simple in concept, this principle is one that some commanders can be reluctant to 

apply, as the availability and capability of American military technology to provide quick and 

immediate tactical solutions is often hard to turn down by both sides. Yet the JSOTF-P 

understands the importance of ensuring long-term sustainment, and therefore makes the deliberate 

effort to ensure that all training, enabling assets, and other military resources provided for use to 

the AFP can be effectively employed, maintained, and sustained by the AFP without requiring 

continuous U.S. military oversight and/or support.144 Thus the training, assets, and resources 

provided to the AFP are often low-tech by current American military standards, but that is really 

just what is needed by the AFP. The materiel provided is simple, sufficient, and reliable; 

important characteristics of any military hardware that is often employed in a wet, dense, and 

mountainous environment.145 Most importantly, all training, resources, and assets provided on 

behalf of the JSOTF-P are offered based on an assessment of the AFP’s ability to independently 

operate and sustain them over the long-term.146

 

142FM 3-05, Chapter 1, 1-14 - 1-15. 

143Ibid. 

144Coultrup. 

145Ibid. As Colonel Coultrup stated bluntly, “ISR doesn’t work so well in the jungle.” 

146Maxwell, Interview; Coultrup. 

49
Economy of Force 

The fifth criterion to evaluate is Economy of Force, which is defined as allocating 

minimum essential forces and resources and employing them in the most effective way 

possible.147 This criterion was selected for two reasons. First, a central component of AQ’s 

strategy for defeating the U.S. is the concept of conducting a protracted (multi-generational), 

irregular-war of exhaustion in which the American military overextends itself and overtime is 

weakened to such an extent that it can no longer support and/or defend U.S. interests abroad.148 

Second, in addition to fighting the Long War, the U.S. military must simultaneously maintain a 

capability to conduct traditional warfare. With a rising China, a resurgent Russia, and the stark 

reality (as history has shown) that ultimately the future is impossible to predict, the U.S. military 

at large cannot afford to become solely an IW-centric force. It must be a balanced force capable 

of conducting IW while simultaneously maintaining an ability to conduct decisive traditional 

warfare.149 Therefore, in order to prevent reaching strategic military culmination in the Long 

War against terror, and in order to maintain a force still capable of successfully defending U.S. 

interests through traditional warfare if required, the U.S. military, when and where possible, 

should employ an economy of force. This will help the U.S. preserve precious and limited 

human, material, and fiscal resources required to win the Long War and will additionally 

facilitate the GPF’s ability to train and maintain a qualitative edge over peer competitors in the 

ability to conduct traditional, “high intensity” military operations. 

The limited number of military personnel, supporting assets such as fixed and rotarywing aviation platforms and ISR assets, as well financial resources allocated to the JSOTF-P 

 

147JP 3-0, Appendix A, A-4. 

148Abu Bakr Naji (translated by William McCants), “The Management of Savagery: The Most 

Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass” (John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard 

University): 65-66 and 69-70. 

149Robert M. Gates, “The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right Balance,” Joint Forces 

Quarterly, no. 52 (1st Quarter 2009): 4. 

50
makes its mission a true economy of force.150 Again, there are only approximately 500 total 

personnel assigned to the JSOTF-P. Most subordinate units and personnel assigned serve four to 

six month tours. Only the JSOTF-P Commander and Command Sergeant Major serve tours of 

one year.151 The limited number of personnel allocated to the mission reduces the requirement to 

continually task the same units to deploy,152 and when combined with relatively short duration 

deployments,153 helps to ensure that the JSOTF-P mission is sustainable over the long-term and 

mitigates the risk of “burning out” the force (and their families) due to consistently deploying the 

same units and personnel for long duration. 

The small numbers of supporting military assets such as aircraft, UAVs, and other 

intelligence and operational enablers provided to the JSOTF-P is a challenge the commander 

must continually manage and deal with.154 With less than ten available fixed and rotary-wing 

aircraft and a similar amount of tactical UAVs, the JSOTF-P additionally operates without the 

luxury of the Predator UAV, AC-130 gunship, and satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions 

(JDAMs), all of which have been put to good use in Afghanistan and Iraq and have proven very 

effective in locating and destroying terrorists and their safe havens.155 Nevertheless, the limited 

amount of resources afforded the JSOTF-P also provides certain benefits. First, the small number 

of aviation and tactical UAV platforms helps to make their availability sustainable over the long-

 

150Coultrup. 

151Clark. 

152For example, the JSOTF-P requirement for Special Forces soldiers consists of one SF Company 

consisting of approximately 100 Special Forces soldiers. 1st SFG(A) currently has eight SF Companies 

assigned that can potentially be tasked to support the JSOTF-P mission (and this will increase to eleven 

companies available by FY 11 with the 2006 QDR directed growth of adding one SF Battalion to each SF 

Group). Theoretically speaking, if 1st SFG(A) was the only SF Group tasked to support the JSOTF-P 

mission (which they are not, National Guard SF Companies have supported the mission in the past), 1st 

SFG(A) could send one SF Company every six months, and it would take three-and-a-half years before any 

one company would have to return to the Philippines in support of the JSOTF-P. 

153This is in comparison to Iraq and Afghanistan in which military personnel, specifically U.S. 

Army Soldiers, typically serve 12-18 month tours of duty. 

154Coultrup. 

155Boot and Bennet, 2009. 

51
term because the quantities are not sufficient enough to seriously compete with the demands or 

requirements in other military theaters of operations. Second, the limited amount of resources 

helps ensure they are prioritized and balanced against the requirements and capabilities of the 

AFP to employ and sustain them independently over the long-term, which coincidentally supports 

the principle of Ensures Long-Term Sustainment. And third, the lack of high-tech and often 

classified resources afforded the JSOTF-P has forced them to seek creative, low-tech solutions 

that suitably fill the void in capability, and often with good results.156 

Last, but not least in analyzing Economy of Force, and especially in light of the on-going 

2009 economic crisis within the U.S., the budget allocated towards the JSOTF-P’s efforts in the 

Philippines must be addressed.157 The U.S. spends $52 million per year in the Philippines.158 By 

comparison, in the U.S. government’s overall budget for 2007 the state of Alaska received over 

$209 million from the defense appropriations bill alone.159 Additionally, current estimates 

suggest the war in Iraq costs over $100 billion a year, with efforts in Afghanistan costing $30 

billion annually.160 By these comparisons alone, the relative low cost of JSOTF-P operations, 

due in part to the limited number of U.S. military personnel, equipment, and resources employed 

 

156Coultrup. The author will not expound on the specific modifications to equipment and/or 

techniques developed and employed by the JSOTF-P in order to protect sources and methods and Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). The take-away here is that one should not become over-reliant on 

technology for solutions to tactical or operational problems. In fact, lack of technology can be a good thing 

in that it forces one to think critically and creatively in order to develop a suitable, acceptable, and most 

importantly, sustainable solution. Defaulting to technology for answers is often the “easy way out.” 

157Thom Shanker, “After Stimulus Package, Pentagon Officials Are Preparing to Pare Back,” New 

York Times, February 17, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/us/politics/18defense.html (accessed 

February 18, 2009). On February 17, 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law an $800 billion 

economic stimulus bill. Resourcing this bill may pressure the President to identify programs for budget 

cuts, and the Pentagon is bracing. Secretary of Defense Gates has stated in Congressional testimony, “One 

thing we have known for many months is the spigot of defense funding opened by 9/11 is closing.” 

158Boot and Bennet, 2009. 

159Citizens Against Government Waste, 2007 Pig Book Summary, http://www.cagw.org/site/ 

PageServer?pagename=reports_pigbook2007 (accessed January 21, 2009). 

160Boot and Bennet, 2009. 

52
and required to be sustained, make the indirect approach applied in the Philippines both very 

affordable and fiscally sustainable to the U.S. military budget over the long-term. 

When one combines the low financial cost of operations in the Philippines with the 

austere amount of military personnel and resources provided, it becomes apparent that the 

JSOTF-P epitomizes the Economy of Force definition of allocating minimum essential forces and 

resources and employing them in the most effective way possible. Under its current organization, 

the Economy of Force nature of the JSOTF-P enables the potential for long-term U.S. presence in 

the Philippines (as required) without overtaxing the military’s human, material, and fiscal 

resources. This is critical if the U.S. is to succeed in fighting and winning the Long War while 

simultaneously maintaining a qualitative edge over peer competitors in traditional war fighting 

capabilities. 

Effectiveness 

There remains one more criterion by which the JSOTF-P must be evaluated; 

effectiveness. In other words, how well is the JSOTF-P’s indirect approach actually 

accomplishing the mission of neutralizing terrorist leadership and safe havens in the Philippines 

by building AFP military capacity, conducting targeted CMO, sharing information, and 

influencing the population? To be sure, there have been periodic setbacks to the mission. The 

immensely successful efforts of the AFP and JSOTF-P against the ASG on Basilan from 2002 to 

2004 were unfortunately marginalized in the following years by a premature withdrawal of AFP 

and JSOTF-P forces from the area. Sensing the ASG had been effectively defeated in Basilan, 

the AFP withdrew the vast majority of its forces--13 of 15 battalions--from the island, before the 

gains in security could be effectively consolidated and sustained. This created a vacuum that 

allowed the ASG to return.161 

 

161Ibid. 

53
In early December 2008, a battle erupted between the AFP and ASG in Basilan resulting 

in the deaths of five AFP soldiers and wounding another twenty-four. Some reports claimed up 

to 3,000 people fled their villages as a result of the violence.162 In January 2009, members of the 

ASG kidnapped three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) employees working in 

the Sulu province; as of March 2009 they are being held for a ransom of $5 million and their 

exact whereabouts are unknown.163 These events further demonstrate the difficulty in eradicating 

terrorist presence in an area for good. The AFP and JSOTF-P must have the patience to remain 

in an area that has been cleared of terrorists long enough to see that the gains in security are 

consolidated and able to be managed and sustained by local security forces over the long term. 

Withdrawing from a location or region before these conditions are set creates a vacuum that 

allows the terrorists to return.164

Despite these setbacks, it is hard to refute the overall effectiveness of the JSOTF-P’s 

indirect approach. The military capacity of the AFP to fight terrorists and terrorism has improved 

significantly. Aviators now possess a basic capability to fly using night-vision goggles (NVGs). 

Tactical level commanders are more proficient at developing intelligence to target terrorist 

networks and cells, and the soldiers are more proficient in the military fundamentals of shooting, 

moving, and communicating.165 Thanks to combat focused medical training provided by the 

JSOTF-P, the number of wounded AFP soldiers surviving their injuries has increased 

significantly, a factor that greatly enhances a soldier’s morale and willingness to fight. And at the 

more senior levels, AFP commanders are now better able to conduct integrated air, maritime, and 

 

162Adams, 10-12. 

163Deutsche Press Agentur, “Abu Sayaff demands $5-M for ICRC hostages in the Philippines,” 

Mindanao Examiner (January 18, 2009): 1. 

164Maxwell, Interview; Coultrup. 

165Maxwell, “Commander’s Summary of the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines 

(JSOTF-P),” 2006. 

54
land operations.166 Finally, the emphasis on Targeted CMO has seen a corresponding 

improvement in the participation and representation by many of the local government officials in 

the southern Philippines.167 

Yet history is never written in the present. Therefore, it is too early to truly judge or 

evaluate the effectiveness of the JSOTF-P’s indirect approach to IW in the Philippines--this can 

only be done accurately with the passage of time. Colonel Coultrup estimates the success of 

JSOTF-P operations as of October 2008 to be approximately at the “70 percent to 75 percent 

level.”168 Perhaps the true measure of the effectiveness of the JSOTF-P’s indirect approach as it 

stands in 2009 lies in the fact that since 2002, JI and ASG have been essentially neutralized in the 

Philippines. The ASG has not conducted a significant attack against the Filipino populace since 

2005, and their total numbers have been reduced from more than 1,200 in 2002 to less than 

500.169 In the absence of strategy, ASG has now largely turned to the criminal activities of 

kidnapping and narco-trafficking. Likewise, in 2009 JI personnel estimates in the Philippines are 

less than 100, and International Crisis Group (ICG) senior advisor Sidney Jones believes there are 

less than 50 foreign fighters (mostly Indonesians and Malaysians) present in Mindanao.170 JI’s 

regional connections with AQ have been largely degraded, and at the moment their vision of 

establishing a pan-regional caliphate across southeast-Asia seems nothing more than wishful 

thinking. Overall, as of 2009 the JSOTF-P’s indirect approach to IW in the Philippines has been 

effective. 

 

166JSOTF-P Staff, “Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines,” January 2009. 

167Ibid. 

168Boot and Bennet, 2009. 

169Ibid. 

170Estrella Torres,”50 Jihadists Stranded in Mindanao,” The Business Mirror (January 20, 2009): 

1. 

55
SECTION V: CONCLUSION 

This is a model, not the model.171

— Major General Salvatore Cambria, USA, Commander, SOCPAC 

Major General Cambria’s words in reference to the JSOTF-P remind us that there is no 

pre-formatted, cookie-cutter template or silver bullet formula for winning the Long War. His 

point is well taken and cannot be overstated. As the great Prussian military theorist Carl von 

Clausewitz writes, “it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve 

as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time.”172 It is critical to 

remember that the JSOTF-P’s method of employing the indirect approach to IW in the 

Philippines, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures further employed therein, are developed 

and tailored in accordance with the specific requirements of the mission and executed 

appropriately within the unique context of the Philippines operational environment.173 It is 

therefore both unwise and unfair to make direct comparisons or to attempt to evaluate the 

effectiveness of U.S. military operations in the Philippines with on-going operations in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. Each theater of operations represents a unique and distinct environment 

with unique political and military considerations and objectives. Indeed, this is true whenever 

and wherever U.S. military forces have been deployed throughout history. 

Thus, the indirect approach is not a one-size-fits-all solution to winning the Long War. 

To be sure, there will be events and circumstances in the future that should and will require a 

direct U.S. military approach to IW. Such circumstances may include taking direct military 

action within the borders of a rogue, hostile, or lawless country to deny a terrorist group access to 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), or actions to prevent or pre-empt an imminent terrorist 

attack against the U.S. homeland or against interests deemed vital to national security. 

 

171Boot and Bennet, 2009. 

172Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 161. 

173Maxwell, Interview. 

56
Considering all of the above, does the JSOTF-P’s approach to conducting IW in the 

Philippines offer a suitable model for future U.S. military operations in support of the Long War? 

The answer is yes, under certain conditions. The indirect approach, as employed by the JSOTFP, offers a model for the U.S. military to combat regional/global terrorism inside a partner 

nation’s sovereign territory in which: the U.S. has an established Country Team; the partner 

nation has established and functional armed forces with an existing capacity to conduct COIN and 

CT operations; the partner nation’s relevant population,174 and therefore the political 

establishment, is sensitive to a large-scale, overt presence of American military personnel 

operating within the country or region; or the partner nation has a constitutional or otherwise 

legal prohibition against foreign military forces directly conducting combat operations within 

their sovereign territory. 

Recommendations 

In accordance with the conditions outlined above, the following three recommendations 

are offered for employing an indirect approach to IW in support of the Long War: 

First, DoD should employ an indirect approach to IW in Pakistan and India in order to 

facilitate the defeat of regional terrorist threats and to help reduce political and military tensions 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Pakistan and India. In conjunction with on-going military 

operations in Afghanistan, and integrated/synchronized with the efforts of the Pakistani and 

Indian Country Teams, USCENTCOM and USPACOM should employ SOF in Pakistan and 

India (respectively) in order to further build each nation’s military capacity to defeat terrorist 

groups and reduce lawlessness within their borders. These military efforts should be developed, 

coordinated, and integrated as part of a broader political, economic, and informational strategy for 

 

174In the case of the Philippines, the relevant population is the Muslim Filipinos living in 

Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Without their support, the ASG and JI ultimately have little chance of 

achieving their aims. 

57
defeating terrorist networks not just in Afghanistan, but throughout Central Asia and the Indian 

sub-continent. Additionally, military efforts in these countries should be developed and 

coordinated as part of a broader American effort to reduce existing political and military tensions 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Pakistan and India. 

Second, in accordance with Article 27 (Deterrence of Security Threats) of the Agreement 

Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United 

States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary 

Presence in Iraq, upon request by the Government of Iraq, DoD should adopt an indirect 

approach to IW in Iraq by employing SOF, augmented by elements of the GPF as required, to 

continue to strengthen the Iraqi Security Forces’ capacity to combat internal and external terrorist 

threats and insurgent groups.175 A complete and total U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 

is unwise in that it potentially sets conditions for the re-emergence of terrorist and insurgent 

movements who will seek to exploit the newly created security vacuum and challenge the nascent 

 

175United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, “Agreement Between the United States of 

America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the 

Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq,” http://74.125.47.132/ 

search?q=cache:WTc4PhhLqeIJ:www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/SE_SOFA.pdf+us+iraq+sofa+agreeme

nt&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us (accessed January 27, 2009). Section 1 to Article 24 (Withdrawal of the 

United States Forces from Iraq) states, “All U.S.forces shall withdraw from Iraqi territory no later than 

December 31, 2011.” However, Article27 (Deterrence of Security Threats) provides an exception and 

retains the potential for continued, albeit limited, U.S. military presence by stating: “In order to strengthen 

security and stability in Iraq and to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability, the 

Parties shall work actively to strengthen the political and military capabilities of the Republic of Iraq to 

deter threats against its sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and its constitutional 

federal democratic system. To that end, the Parties agree as follows: In the event of any external or internal 

threat or aggression against Iraq that would violate its sovereignty, political independence, or territorial 

integrity, waters, airspace, its democratic system or its elected institutions, and upon request by the 

Government of Iraq, the Parties shall immediately initiate strategic deliberations and, as may be mutually 

agreed, the United States shall take appropriate measures, including diplomatic, economic, or military 

measures, or any other measure, to deter such a threat. The Parties agree to continue close cooperation in 

strengthening and maintaining military and security institutions and democratic political institutions in 

Iraq, including, as may be mutually agreed, cooperation in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi 

Security Forces, in order to combat domestic and international terrorism and outlaw groups, upon request 

by the Government of Iraq. Iraqi land, sea, and air shall not be used as a launching or transit point for 

attacks against other countries.” 

58
Iraqi government and security forces for power.176 Utilizing SOF in an indirect approach will 

provide select Iraqi Security Forces with the continued military training, advice, and assistance 

they require, while respecting Iraqi sovereignty and maintaining a very small and limited 

American military signature and logistics footprint. 

Finally, when and where terrorist organizations threaten to emerge within the African 

continent, and when requested by a partner African nation, DoD should employ the indirect 

approach as the primary means for conducting IW within the United States Africa Command 

(USAFRICOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). African nations have been very open about their 

concerns over the establishment of USAFRICOM as strictly a vehicle for the U.S. to continue 

prosecuting the GWOT.177 African sensitivities to the issue are such that, as of 2009, 

USAFRICOM has been unable to find a suitable home on the continent and its headquarters is 

currently located in Stuttgart, Germany.178 Since one of the key strengths of the indirect 

approach to IW is that it minimizes the signature and presence of U.S. forces and respects the 

sovereignty of the partner nation, the indirect approach may be a palatable alternative for some 

African countries. Additionally, the indirect approach is consistent with the stated USAFRICOM 

objective of “Building Partner Capacity.”179

This monograph concludes with the words of Lieutenant General Fridovich, who captures 

the essence of the JSOTF-P’s efforts as, “a demonstrable example of a successful interagency, 

 

176Anne Gearan, “Pentagon: Iraq Pullout Plan Being Prepared,” Army Times (January 18, 2009), 

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/01/ap_iraq_pullout_plan_011509w/ (accessed January 27, 2009). 

In a July 2008 statement made in response to the possibility of withdrawing all U.S. combat troops from 

Iraq within two years, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen said, “I think the 

consequences could be very dangerous. It is hard to say exactly what would happen. I’d worry about any 

kind of rapid movement out and creating instability where we have stability.” 

177Dr. Amy Zalman, “AFRICOM: Controversial Command Suspected of Bringing US War on 

Terro to Africa,” About.com, July 15, 2007, http://terrorism.about.com/od/globalwaronterror/a/ 

AFRICOM.htm (accessed January 27, 2009). 

178U.S. Africa Command, Web Page, “About U.S. AFRICOM,” http://www.africom.mil/ 

AboutAFRICOM.asp (accessed January 29, 2009). 

179Ibid. 

59
multinational indirect approach to combating terrorism.”180 Applied within the context of the 

Long War, the indirect approach to IW as employed by the JSOTF-P offers senior U.S. policy 

makers and military commanders “a” model (not “the” model) worthy of consideration for 

conducting long-term military operations against terrorist networks in cooperation with a partner 

nation in a complex and sensitive socio-political environment. 

 

 

180Major General David P. Fridovich, interview by Jeff McKaughan, Pacific Warrior: Building 

Capacity and Partnerships Throughout the Region. Orignally published in Special Operations Technology, 

5, no. 2 (March 15, 2007), http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2007/04/interview-us-commanding-generalspecial.html (accessed February 18, 2009). 

60
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