alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §§14731 to 14735. Repealed. Pub. L. 111–314, §6, Dec. 18, 2010, 124 Stat. 3444

Section 14731, Pub. L. 105–303, title II, §201, Oct. 28, 1998, 112 Stat. 2854, related to requirement to procure commercial space transportation services. See section 50131 of Title 51, National and Commercial Space Programs.

Section 14732, Pub. L. 105–303, title II, §202, Oct. 28, 1998, 112 Stat. 2855, related to acquisition of commercial space transportation services. See section 50132 of Title 51.

Section 14733, Pub. L. 105–303, title II, §204, Oct. 28, 1998, 112 Stat. 2856, related to potential privatization of the Space Shuttle program. Subsec. (a) was repealed and reenacted as section 50133 of Title 51. Subsec. (b), requiring feasibility study, and subsec. (c), requiring reports to congressional committees within 60 days after Oct. 28, 1998, were repealed as obsolete.

Section 14734, Pub. L. 105–303, title II, §205, Oct. 28, 1998, 112 Stat. 2857; Pub. L. 106–65, div. A, title X, §1067(21), Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 775, related to use of excess intercontinental ballistic missiles. See section 50134 of Title 51.

Section 14735, Pub. L. 105–303, title II, §206, Oct. 28, 1998, 112 Stat. 2857, required report to certain congressional committees regarding national launch capability no later than 180 days after Oct. 28, 1998.
#### In the Matter of Marion Weiser, as Administratrix of the Estate of Adolph Weiser, Deceased, Appellant, v. City of New York et al., Respondents.

In a supplementary proceeding to enforce a judgment, the petitioner, a judgment creditor, by permission of this court, appeals from an order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, made and entered May 1, 1961, affirming *667an order of the City Court of the City of New York, Kings County, made and entered October 26, 1960, which: (1) denied her motion, pursuant to section 794 of the Civil Practice Act, to direct the Kings County Trust Company, as a third party, to apply moneys in its possession credited to the respondent judgment debtor, the City of New York, in satisfaction of the judgment for $400 recovered by her in her representative capacity against the city; (2) granted the city’s cross motion to partially satisfy her judgment by the setoff of two judgments totaling $315.64 obtained by the city in the Municipal Court of the City of New York against her intestate husband during his lifetime; (3) directed that the said two judgments of the city be set off against the said $400 judgment obtained by petitioner in the Municipal Court against the city; (4) directed the respective Clerks of the Municipal Court to make proper entry of such discharge of the judgments mentioned; and (5) vacated the subpoena duces tecum issued to the third party, Kings County Trust Company. Order of the Appellate Term and order of the City Court modified on the law by adding thereto a provision declaring that petitioner’s (the judgment creditor’s) attorney has an attorney’s lien for his services upon the $400 judgment obtained by plaintiff against the city; a provision declaring that such attorney’s lien is prior and superior to the city’s right to set off its judgments against petitioner’s judgment; and a provision directing that the city’s setoff of its judgments shall be reduced by the amount of such attorney’s lien as subsequently fixed by the court. As so modified the orders are affirmed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the City Court for hearing to determine the amount of the said attorney’s lien and for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. In our opinion, it was properly held that the city’s judgments should be set off against petitioner’s judgment (Civ. Prac. Act, § 269; *Otto*v. *Lincoln Sav. Bank of Brooklyn,*268 App. Div. 400, affd. 294 N. Y. 798). But an attorney’s lien on the funds he created should 'be granted priority over setoff judgments *(Beecher*v. *Vogt Mfg. Co.,*227 N. Y. 468). The present record, however, contains no evidentiary showing as to the nature and quality of the services rendered by petitioner’s attorney or as to the value of his services. Hence, a hearing should be held and the amount of the attorney’s lien should be determined on the basis of all the relevant facts adduced *(Matter of Recher*v. *Gumpp,*253 App. Div. 731; *Matter of City of New York [Coblentz],*11 A D 2d 240, 250 *et seq.)*Beldock, P. J., Christ, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Wright, Appellant.

[821 NYS2d 531]

Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Timothy J. *1299Drury, J.), rendered December 3, 2003. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of arson in the second degree, criminal mischief in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him after a jury trial of, inter alia, arson in the second degree (Penal Law § 150.15). Contrary to defendant’s contention, the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence *(see generally People v Mateo,*2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], *cert denied*542 US 946 [2004]; *People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). We reject defendant’s further contention that County Court erred in permitting testimony regarding defendant’s financial and academic problems and conclude that the court properly determined that the probative value of that testimony outweighed any prejudicial effect *(see People v Trumbach,*31 AD3d 1054 [2006]; *see generally People v Till,*87 NY2d 835, 836-837 [1995]). Although we agree with defendant that the court erred in failing to give the requisite limiting cautionary instructions with respect to that testimony *(see Trumbach,*31 AD3d at 1055; *see generally Till,*87 NY2d at 837; *People v Satiro,*72 NY2d 821, 822 [1988]), we conclude that the error is harmless *(see People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]). We further conclude that, contrary to the contention of defendant, he received meaningful representation *(see generally People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present — Hurlbutt, J.P., Scudder, Gorski and Green, JJ.
### §2297g. Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund

#### (a) Establishment

There is established in the Treasury of the United States an account to be known as the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund (referred to in this subchapter as the "Fund"). The Fund, and any amounts deposited in it, including any interest earned thereon, shall be available to the Secretary subject to appropriations for the exclusive purpose of carrying out this subchapter.

#### (b) Administration

#### (1) In general

The Secretary of the Treasury shall hold the Fund and, after consultation with the Secretary, annually report to the Congress on the financial condition and operations of the Fund during the preceding fiscal year.

#### (2) Investments

The Secretary of the Treasury shall invest amounts contained within the Fund in obligations of the United States—

(A) having maturities determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be appropriate for what the Department determines to be the needs of the Fund; and

(B) bearing interest at rates determined to be appropriate by the Secretary of the Treasury, taking into consideration the current average market yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States with remaining periods to maturity comparable to these obligations.

(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title II, §1801, as added Pub. L. 102–486, title XI, §1101, Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2953.)
Filed 5/15/13 Estate of Giraldin CA4/3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

Estate of WILLIAM A. GIRALDIN, 

Deceased. 

___________________________________ 

CHRISTINE GIRALDIN et al., 

 Plaintiffs and Respondents, 

 v. 

TIMOTHY GIRALDIN et al., 

 Defendants and Appellants. 

 G041811 

 (Super. Ct. No. A240697) 

 ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR 

 PUBLICATION, DENYING 

 PETITION FOR REHEARING, 

 AND MODIFYING OPINION; NO 

 CHANGE IN JUDGMENT 

 The request for publication contained in the letter filed April 30, 2013 by 

attorney William A. Salzwedel is DENIED. The clerk of this court is directed, pursuant 

to rule 8.1120(b) of the California Rules of Court, to forward to the Supreme Court, 

within 15 days of the finality of the opinion in this case, a copy of attorney Salzwedel’s 

request, together with a copy of the opinion, and this denial order. It does not appear that 

our opinion meets the standards set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); 
2

attorney Salzwedel’s letter is merely a vehicle to express disagreement with the merits of 

the decision. 

 The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant Timothy Giraldin May 2, 2013 

is DENIED. 

 The opinion filed April 16, 2013 is hereby modified in the following 

particulars: 

 (1) On page 7 of the slip opinion, replace “The surcharge order was” in the 

second full paragraph with the words “The two surcharge orders were” such that the 

sentence now reads: “The two surcharge orders were based on the trial judge’s 

determination that by 2001 William lacked the mental capacity to authorize the 

SafeTzone investment or any other transaction Timothy undertook with regard to the 

trust.” 

 (2) On page 13 of the slip opinion, replace the first sentence of the 

disposition with: “The two surcharge orders discussed in this opinion and based on 

Timothy’s actions during William’s lifetime are reversed, and the matter remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” 

 These modifications do not affect a change in judgment. 

 BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. 

I CONCUR: 

ARONSON, J.
#### Josephine T. Sheridan, Respondent, v. Edward B. Schlesinger, Appellant.

Pursuant to the stipulation of the attorneys for the respective parties herein, Josephine Sheridan, administratrix, etc., of Josephine T. Sheridan, deceased, is substituted as plaintiff-respondent in the place and stead of said deceased, in the above-entitled action and appeal, and the title of said action is amended to read as follows: “ Josephine Sheridan, administratrix of the goods, chattels and credits of Josephine T. Sheridan, deceased, plaintiff-respondent, against Edward B. Sehlesinger, defendant-appellant.” Beldock, Acting P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Patrick J. Rogers, Appellant, v Daniel W. Joy, as Commissioner of the Department of Rent and Housing Maintenance, Respondent.

— Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on April 4, 1977, dismissing petitioner’s article 78 proceeding, which sought to vacate respondent’s determination denying its application for a certificate of eviction, unanimously reversed, on the law, and vacated, without costs and without disbursements, and petition granted to the extent of remanding the matter to respondent for the issuance of a certificate of eviction. Respondent concedes that it is "fully cognizant of the rulings by the courts which state that a landlord seeking a certificate of eviction need not occupy an uncontrolled vacant apartment and thus diminish the income from his property”. Such concession obviously results from the law established in an unbroken line of cases including *Matter of Campbell v Reichman*(28 NY2d 950); *Matter of Berlinrut v Leventhal*(43 AD2d 522); *Matter of Reres v Gabel*(19 AD2d 724) and *Matter of McCabe v Gabel*(22 AD2d 939). In *Matter of Berlinrut (supra),*this court summarized the established law as follows: "The owner is not required to occupy an apartment that is not controlled and thus diminish his income from his property. The administrative inquiry into good faith should be restricted to a search for the landlord’s honest *546intention to gain possession for bis own use [citing cases].” Nothing has been shown which would persuade us to decline to follow the cases cited above. Concur — Birns, J. P., Evans, Capozzoli and Markewich, JJ.
#### Albert H. Ford, Respondent, v. The State of New York, Appellant.

— Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.
### §2292. Authorization of appropriations for research and development program; authority to enter into contracts; period of contracts; equivalent amounts for research and development program

There is authorized to be appropriated to the Commission, in accordance with the provisions of section 2017(a)(2) of this title, the sum of $3,000,000 as an initial authorization for fiscal year 1959 for use in a cooperative program of research and development in connection with the types of reactors selected by the Commission and the Community under the joint program. The Commission may enter into contracts for such periods as it deems necessary, but in no event to exceed five years, for the purpose of conducting the research and development program authorized by this section: Provided, That the Community authorizes an equivalent amount for use in the cooperative program of research and development.

(Pub. L. 85–846, §3, Aug. 28, 1958, 72 Stat. 1084.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was enacted as part of the EURATOM Cooperation Act of 1958 which comprises this subchapter, and not as part of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which comprises this chapter.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-2277

DR. SIMON BANKS, Doctor of Law Former Administrative Law 

Judge t/a Judge Banks’ Group,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALEXANDRIA; THE COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY, 

ALEXANDRIA; THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 17-1081

DR. SIMON BANKS, Doctor of Law Former Administrative Law 

Judge t/a Judge Banks’ Group,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALEXANDRIA; THE COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY, 

ALEXANDRIA; THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:16-cv-01309-LO-TCB)

Submitted: March 13, 2017 Decided: March 22, 2017
2

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, DIAZ, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Simon Banks, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Dr. Simon Banks appeals the 

district court’s orders denying his emergency motion for a writ 

of mandamus, his motion for reconsideration, and his motions for 

injunctive and declaratory relief. We have reviewed the record 

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the 

reasons stated by the district court. Banks v. Circuit Court of 

Alexandria, No. 1:16-cv-01309-LO-TCB (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2016; 

Oct. 24, 2016; filed Dec. 20, 2016, entered December 21, 2016). 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Jerry DOW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W. HUTTO; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-15387.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 12, 2007.*

Filed March 19, 2007.

Jerry Dow, Represa, CA, pro se.

Before: KOZINSKI, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jerry Dow, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm.

Dow’s amended complaint alleged that he injured his back while at his prison job and that he was charged for the medical treatment, even though worker’s compensation insurance should have covered the charges. The district court properly concluded Dow failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. *See Estelle v. Gamble,*429 U.S. 97, 105-06, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).

We decline to consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. *See Barcamerica Int'l, USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc.,*289 F.3d 589, 595 n. 6 (9th Cir.2002).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### § 144.149 Program accessibility: Discrimination prohibited.

Except as otherwise provided in § 144.150, no qualified handicapped person shall, because the agency's facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by handicapped persons, be denied the benefits of, be excluded from participation in, or otherwise be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity conducted by the agency.
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### §2000gg–1. Nondiscrimination with regard to reasonable accommodations related to pregnancy

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a covered entity to—

(1) not make reasonable accommodations to the known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of a qualified employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity;

(2) require a qualified employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions to accept an accommodation other than any reasonable accommodation arrived at through the interactive process referred to in section 2000gg(7) of this title;

(3) deny employment opportunities to a qualified employee if such denial is based on the need of the covered entity to make reasonable accommodations to the known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of the qualified employee;

(4) require a qualified employee to take leave, whether paid or unpaid, if another reasonable accommodation can be provided to the known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of the qualified employee; or

(5) take adverse action in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment against a qualified employee on account of the employee requesting or using a reasonable accommodation to the known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of the employee.

(Pub. L. 117–328, div. II, §103, Dec. 29, 2022, 136 Stat. 6085.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective 180 days after Dec. 29, 2022, see section 109 of div. II of Pub. L. 117–328, set out as a note under section 2000gg of this title.