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“[T]here is little time 

to waste in defining the 

negotiation process and 

roles. With nationwide 

elections scheduled for April, 

there is a brief window for 

defining the process and 

roles before negotiations are 

likely to begin in earnest.”

January 22, 2010 

Negotiating Sudan’s Post-Referendum 

Arrangements

Summary

•	 With Southern Sudan’s referendum on whether to remain part of Sudan or secede approaching, it is vital that the international community encourage and support negotiations on postreferendum arrangements, which include issues ranging from wealth sharing to citizenship 

rights to security arrangements. Good coordination among the international community 

will be essential.

•	 A single mediator with a clear and strong mandate should lead negotiations on postreferendum arrangements, supported by a contact group or group of friends that can insert 

targeted pressures and incentives into the process. The mediator needs to be strong enough 

to prevent “forum shopping” and contain or co-opt spoilers.

•	 States and non-state actors that wish to play a central role in negotiations on post-referendum 

arrangements should demonstrate a long term commitment to Sudan and to overseeing 

implementation of any agreement.

•	 Negotiations on post-referendum arrangements and the ongoing negotiations on Darfur 

should be kept separate.

Sudan is less than one year away from a landmark event: the referendum on whether Southern 

Sudan will remain part of a united Sudan or secede. As many have acknowledged, including some 

leaders in the North, Southerners are likely to vote to secede, leading to the first new, internationally recognized state created in Africa since Eritrea. Managing this probable divorce thus takes 

center stage, but who will orchestrate this process? Who will mediate between Khartoum and 

Juba? How can the international community help, rather than hinder, the possible division of 

Africa’s largest country into two?

The answers to all these questions start with good international coordination and cooperation.

Any negotiations concerning what are widely referred to as “post-referendum arrangements” risk 

devolving into chaos if they are not properly planned and coordinated. Sudan’s two main political 

parties and signatories to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)—the National Congress 

Party (NCP) representing many in the North, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 

representing much of the South—have agreed, in the legislation governing the referendum, that 

there are at least nine post-referendum issues that need to be sorted through: citizenship; currency; 

public service; status of the Joint Integrated Units (military units comprising soldiers from both 

Northern and Southern armies); agreements and international covenants (the primary issue being 

what happens to treaties and other agreements to which Sudan is a signatory); debts and assets; 

Jon Temin

E-mail: jtemin@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.4726

peaceBrieF6
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

oil concessions and production, transportation and exporting; water; and ownership (largely of 

land). Negotiations on these issues could result in an amendment to the CPA (a “CPA-plus”) or an 

entirely new agreement. Regardless of the nature of the document produced, it is the coherence of 

the process for negotiating these issues that could, if there is a vote for secession, be the difference 

between a peaceful divorce and return to war.

It is vital that negotiations happen under the auspices of a single lead mediator. Candidates 

may include the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, General Scott Gration, and former South African 

President Thabo Mbeki. Whoever the mediator, he or she needs to be realistic about the size of the 

task at hand; negotiating these complex issues will require substantial time, technical expertise 

and human resources.

The identity of the mediator may be less important than maintaining a broad consensus within 

and outside Sudan that he or she is in the lead, and that other states and non-state actors are 

prepared to fall in line and support the mediator. The challenge is that many states and non-state 

actors have massive stakes in Sudan’s future, from Sudan’s nine neighboring countries, to China and 

its thirst for Sudanese oil, to the U.S. and its vocal advocacy community, to the African Union and its 

unfulfilled promise of African solutions to African problems, to the United Nations Mission in Sudan.

All of these players will want to be involved in, and influence the outcome of, negotiations 

on post-referendum arrangements. A lesson learned from the CPA negotiations should not be 

forgotten: “when possible use the same internal and external actors during the negotiations and 

implementation phase, in order to keep the momentum of the signing.”1

One of the reasons CPA implementation went off track was the wandering eye of the states that 

made the CPA possible; some assumed that their work was done with the signing, while others 

turned their attention to Darfur.

The lead mediator will need to be strong enough to say when interested states and non-state actors can be involved in negotiations, and when they need to back off. Equally important, he or she 

will need to be able to deter any competing initiatives, so there is a single forum for negotiations. 

One of the most destructive aspects of the multiple Darfur peace processes has been the “forum 

shopping” dynamic by which some of the negotiating parties have been able to play various 

initiatives against each other, resulting in little progress. Only recently has a general consensus 

developed that Doha is the single venue for Darfur negotiations.

The mediator will also need to be strong enough to contain or co-opt outside spoilers. For example, some neighboring states may try to act as spoilers if they don’t feel sufficiently involved in 

negotiations, or that their interests aren’t being considered (a good reason for neighboring states 

not to serve as mediators themselves). The Sudanese parties may encourage spoilers if they see an 

opportunity to gain from the disruption. The mediator will need the support of the international 

community to deter such efforts.

A key difference between the Darfur negotiations and negotiations on post-referendum 

arrangements is that while artificial deadlines have been placed on Darfur negotiations, negotiations on post-referendum arrangements face a fixed deadline: the January 2011 referendum 

(aligned with the expiration of the CPA). The SPLM makes clear that the referendum will occur regardless of progress in negotiations, and the CPA makes no provisions for delaying the referendum.

Thus there is little time to waste in defining the negotiation process and roles. With nationwide 

elections scheduled for April, there is a brief window for defining the process and roles before 

negotiations are likely to begin in earnest. As those elections approach (assuming they occur—

still not a certainty), the parties will be increasingly consumed with campaigning. Their capacity to 

multitask is limited, so it is unlikely the parties will be able to meaningfully engage in negotiations 

Negotiating Sudan’s Post-Referendum Arrangements

page 2 • PB 6 • January 22, 2010
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

on post-referendum arrangements until after April (and maybe later, depending on the fallout 

from the election). This gives the international community a two- to three-month period that can 

be used to plan their part of the negotiation process and settle on roles.

Of course, such planning cannot be done in a vacuum; the NCP and SPLM must drive the process 

in collaboration with the lead mediator, with his or her mandate ideally coming from the parties 

themselves (with buy-in from the African Union and United Nations). Getting them to agree on 

the mediator may be difficult, as the SPLM favors renewed engagement by east African countries 

through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), while the NCP seems to favor a 

robust role for President Mbeki, who has an ambiguous mandate from the African Union to engage 

on CPA implementation. Between now and the elections, a focus of international engagement with 

the parties should be on reaching agreement on the mediator and his or her responsibilities.

The parties and mediator will also need to agree on the order in which post-referendum issues 

will be negotiated. Clearly some are more important than others: oil, citizenship and security 

arrangements rise to the top of the list. It is difficult to envision a smooth post-referendum period 

without the fundamental aspects of agreements on these issues in place before the referendum.

Some issues need to be sorted out prior to others. For example, in order to have meaningful 

conversations about how to handle the public service (the most pressing issue is the fate of 

Southerners working for the Government of National Unity in Khartoum in the event of secession) 

and land ownership (the key issue being land owned by Southerners in the North and vice versa if 

there is secession), citizenship issues must be sorted through first.

What role for states not directly involved in the mediation? A contact group or group of friends 

comprising states committed to supporting Sudan through the referendum and well beyond can 

be a useful tool for inserting targeted pressures and incentives into negotiations and providing 

technical assistance. The troika, comprised of the U.S., U.K. and Norway, was effective in this role 

during the CPA negotiations (Norway is an important actor in Sudan because of its expertise in 

oil sector management). More recently, the “E6”—the special envoys from the five permanent 

U.N. Security Council countries, plus the European Union special envoy—have met periodically 

to coordinate efforts, but there may be significant differences between the western countries, 

China and Russia. The troika may serve as a foundation for a contact group or group of friends; 

the committed engagement of its three members is essential. A contact group or group of friends 

will likely be larger than three members, but should not grow so large that it becomes unwieldy.

The Assessment and Evaluation Commission, a monitoring body created by the CPA, can also be a 

useful resource for the mediator and contact group or group of friends, but is sometimes hindered 

by its composition (members include NCP and SPLM officials). As with the choice of mediator, any 

members of a contact group or group of friends should demonstrate a long-term commitment to 

Sudan, whether it is one country or two. Membership should not be open to all.

Finally, some have suggested that negotiations on post-referendum arrangement be merged 

with the ongoing Darfur negotiations in Doha, in an effort to address some of Sudan’s fundamental 

challenges, especially relations between Sudan’s core (Khartoum and its environs) and periphery.

But these two negotiation tracks are in very different phases right now, with the Doha process 

possibly nearing success or failure (the NCP asserts that negotiations should conclude prior to the 

elections), and negotiations on post-referendum arrangements in their nascent stage.

For the latter to have a chance of success the issues need to be simplified and isolated to 

the extent possible, not complicated by dynamics in Darfur. Keeping these negotiating tracks 

separate will not help solve Sudan’s underlying challenges, but may help limit fallout from the 

coming referendum.

Negotiating Sudan’s Post-Referendum Arrangements

page 3 • PB 6 • January 22, 2010
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Endnote

1. Johan Brosche. “Sharing Power—Enabling Peace?,” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 

Uppsala University. http://www.pcr.uu.se/pcr_doc/other_pub/Sharing%20Power.pdf

About This Brief

This Peace Brief was written by 

Jon Temin, USIP’s Sudan Program 

Officer, and is based on meetings 

in Khartoum, Juba, Washington 

and elsewhere between August 

2009 and January 2010.

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

202.457.1700

www.usip.org

Negotiating Sudan’s Post-Referendum Arrangements

page 4 • PB 6 • January 22, 2010