COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

CENTER FORD 

AND 

TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY 

v. Record No. 2158-95-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

BRYANT S. BYRD FEBRUARY 20, 1996 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Susan B. Potter; Vandeventer, Black, 

Meredith & Martin, on brief), for 

appellants. 

 (Johnny C. Cope; Saunders, Stephenson, 

Cope, Olson & Yoffy, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Center Ford contends that the Workers' Compensation 

Commission erred in finding that the doctrine of equitable 

estoppel prevented it from relying upon the statute of 

limitations contained in Code § 65.2-601 as a defense to 

Bryant S. Byrd's claim for benefits. Upon reviewing the record 

and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's 

decision. Rule 5A:27. 

 On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the party prevailing below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. 

v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). We 

must uphold factual findings made by the commission if supported 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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by credible evidence. James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 8 Va. 

App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989). 

 On April 13, 1992, Byrd sustained a compensable left leg 

injury while working for employer as a mechanic. He reported the 

injury to employer, who filed a First Report of Accident with the 

commission on May 29, 1992. On June 2, 1992, the commission 

issued a notification letter to Byrd, enclosing a workers' 

compensation guide. Byrd denied receiving the letter or the 

guide. 

 Byrd testified that he received a Memorandum of Agreement 

("MOA") from employer's insurance carrier, which he signed and 

returned to the carrier. Byrd stated that when he telephoned 

Alice Pleasant, the carrier's representative, she assured him 

that she would send the MOA to the commission as soon as she 

received it from Byrd. Shortly thereafter, Byrd began to receive 

compensation checks. Based upon these events, Byrd assumed that 

he did not need to do anything else to file a timely claim. 

Employer voluntarily paid compensation to Byrd from May 3, 1992 

through July 5, 1994. 

 Pleasant admitted that she sent the MOA to Byrd on June 30, 

1992. However, she denied that Byrd ever called her about the 

MOA or that she ever received a signed MOA back from him. 

Pleasant admitted that it was possible she sent the MOA to the 

commission and that the commission did not receive it. 

 On July 6, 1994, Pleasant filed an application to suspend 
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Byrd's benefits alleging that he failed to cooperate with 

vocational rehabilitation. On July 11, 1994, the commission 

notified Pleasant, with a copy to Byrd, that no award had ever 

been entered. 

 On October 13, 1994, Byrd's attorney filed an application 

for benefits seeking entry of an award and resumption of 

compensation. Byrd admitted that he received a copy of the 

commission's July 11, 1994 letter stating that no award had been 

entered. He did not understand the significance of this letter 

until he consulted an attorney. 

 "Code § 65.1-87 [now Code § 65.2-601] provides that the 

right to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act is 

forever barred 'unless a claim be filed' with the . . . 

Commission within two years after the injury by accident." 

Keenan v. Westinghouse Elevator Co., 10 Va. App. 232, 233, 391 

S.E.2d 342, 343 (1990). It was undisputed that the claim filed 

by Byrd's attorney on October 13, 1994 was not timely. 

 To prove estoppel, a claimant must show by clear, precise 

and unequivocal evidence that he relied to his detriment upon an 

act or statement of employer or its agent to refrain from filing 

a claim within the statutory period. Rose v. Red's Hitch & 

Trailer Servs., Inc., 11 Va. App. 55, 59-60, 396 S.E.2d 392, 

394-95 (1990). However, a claimant need not prove a false 

representation, concealment of a material fact, or fraudulent 

intent, in order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
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Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 324-25, 416 

S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992), aff'd, 245 Va. 337, 428 S.E.2d 905 

(1993). In addition, it is well settled that employer is not 

estopped as a matter of law from relying on the limitation period 

provided by Code § 65.2-601 merely because it made voluntary 

payments to a claimant. See Bowden v. Newport News Shipbuilding 

& Drydock Co., 11 Va. App. 683, 686-87, 401 S.E.2d 884, 886 

(1991). 

 In holding that employer was equitably estopped from relying 

on the statute of limitations, the commission found as follows: 

 Not only did the employer pay compensation 

benefits for more than two years, it paid 

cost-of-living benefits, hired a vocational 

rehabilitation consultant to work with the 

claimant, sent the claimant a Memorandum of 

Agreement and filed an Application for 

Hearing seeking to suspend benefits. These 

actions are all actions that evidence the 

employer accepted the claimant [sic] and 

support the claimant's testimony that he 

relied upon employer's actions to his 

detriment. 

 It was undisputed that employer accepted Byrd's claim as 

compensable and sent him the MOA. The commission was entitled to 

accept Byrd's testimony that he signed and returned the MOA to 
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Pleasant, and that she assured him she would send the MOA to the 

commission. Byrd began receiving compensation checks shortly 

after his conversation with Pleasant. The commission could 

reasonably infer from Byrd's testimony that he relied upon 

Pleasant's actions and statements, which did in fact induce him 

to refrain from filing a claim within the statutory period. 

Because Byrd's testimony provides credible evidence to support 

the commission's decision, we cannot find as a matter of law that 

the commission erred in ruling that employer was equitably 

estopped from relying upon the statute of limitations. 

 For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.