About the Repor

This report was originally written in shorter form for the U. S. 

Institute of Peace’s (USIP) former Africa director, Jon Temin, 

who was seeking clues about what factors led to Myanmar’s 

political transition to see if they might offer constructive 

lessons for other contexts where authoritarian governments 

open up to democratic transitions. The idea of expanding it for 

publication came from USIP Associate Vice President Colette 

Rausch and Interim Director of USIP’s Program for Religion 

and Peacebuilding Susan Hayward, and I am grateful to 

them for their expert guidance and encouragement. It 

would not have come about without them. 

About the Autho

Priscilla Clapp is a retired U.S. foreign service officer who 

served as U.S. charge d’affaires in Myanmar from June 1999 

to August 2002. She has remained involved for more than 

fifteen years in policy research on Myanmar and currently 

serves as a senior adviser to USIP and the Asia Society. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 369 April 2

© 2015 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Conten

The Decay of Military Rule 3

Developing an Orderly Retreat 4

The Power of Personality 6

The Role of External Actors 9

Future Prospects 12

What Lessons Can We Learn? 14

Priscilla Clapp

Myanmar

Anatomy of a Political Transition

Summary

• Since the end of the Cold War, many countries have attempted to transition from authoritarian governments to democracies, with varied results. The political transition that began in 

Myanmar with the elections of 2010 was planned, as the leadership moved gradually toward 

democratization while keeping in place many of the authoritarian structures of the previous 

government during the transition.

• Myanmar’s transition has been marked by a number of key elements. Among them are a strong 

and persistent democratic opposition with an iconic leader; twenty years of detailed planning 

by military leadership to establish its version of democracy, which incorporates political opposition in one form or another while assuring continuity for the military; willingness to tolerate 

competing centers of power in the new government; and a fortuitous combination of personal 

dynamics to provide an opening for reform and a serious break with the past.

• The parliamentary elections of 2015 and the presidential election that will follow in early 

2016 represent a tipping point in Myanmar’s transition. The outcome will serve as a litmus 

test for whether the country can continue down the road to genuine democracy. The unpredictability of the election undoubtedly contributes to a popular sense of unease about the 

sustainability of reforms. 

• Despite this, Myanmar’s transition remains one of the most promising in recent years and is 

worthy of strong support and assistance from the international community. It may already 

offer valuable lessons for other countries attempting to transition from authoritarian to 

democratic government.

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, many countries have attempted to transition from authoritarian governments to democracies, with varied results and many false starts. Most often these 

attempts at transition are precipitated by social movements, mass protest, or instability, and 

not a planned move by the leadership. The political transition that began in Myanmar with the 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369

elections of 2010 is a rather unusual example of a planned transition, as the leadership staged 

gradual steps toward democratization while retaining many of the authoritarian structures 

of the previous government during the transition. The new structures of governance now in 

place are still far from meeting the standards of genuine democracy. But the process has been 

relatively inclusive of the former regime’s opponents—both democracy advocates and ethnic 

minorities—thereby attracting great interest and support from the international community. 

This study analyzes the elements that brought Myanmar’s transition about and the issues that 

threaten to arrest and complicate it five years later, in the present.

Myanmar endured more than five decades of military rule and domination since General 

Ne Win’s military coup of 1962. The 2010 vote was not the country’s first attempt to return 

to elected governance. In 1974, Ne Win introduced a socialist constitution and single-party 

parliament, albeit one dominated by the military. In 1990, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) held multiparty elections but refused to seat the parliament when the 

democratic opposition won an overwhelming majority of seats. The 2010 effort was more 

far-reaching and carefully mapped than previous attempts: The State Peace and Development 

Council (SPDC)1 had spent twenty years painstakingly drafting a new constitution to pave the 

way for multiparty elections that would guarantee continuing military control over the political 

process, which they christened “discipline flourishing democracy.” This 2008 constitution was 

clearly a model of electoral authoritarianism, common to many developing countries, where 

dictatorships of one kind or another seek to cloak themselves in an elected veneer.

The outgoing military regime openly manipulated the elections of 2010 to produce the 

desired outcome: a quasi-elected government in which uniformed military were appointed 

to one-quarter of all parliamentary seats. All positions of authority were occupied by senior 

military leaders from the SPDC who had taken off their uniforms on the eve of the elections and run for office. Observers both inside and outside the country thus expected the 

new government to be simply a rehash of the SPDC in civilian clothing, with the uniformed 

military embedded in the center, holding veto power over all crucial decisions and poised to 

reinstate martial law at will—all according to the new constitution. 

There was surprise and disbelief, therefore, when the new president immediately 

announced his intention to undertake sweeping political and economic reforms of a dimension unimaginable for more than fifty years. Why, after laying such meticulous plans for 

a long, controlled transition, did the new ex-military leadership decide to undertake such 

far-reaching change so quickly? 

The answer lies in two fundamental factors. First, the provisions in the 2008 constitution guaranteeing military control over essential parts of the political process gave military 

leaders the confidence to open the economy and expand the political space. Although the 

constitution promised broad freedoms and opportunities for participation in the political 

process for opposition and ethnic minority parties, it also left the old security structures 

and repressive regulations in place. Thus, leaders believed they could maintain internal security and stability as they gradually released constraints on the civilian population. Perhaps 

most important may have been the confidence it instilled in the senior general, who retired 

from office once the new leadership was in place.

The second factor was the particular array of personalities who landed in key positions in 

the new government and their apparent determination to signal a distinct break with the past. 

Seasoned observers believe that the key to their behavior was Senior General Than Shwe’s decision to step back from power and allow those he had put at the head of the new government 

to proceed as they felt best.2 After testing the waters by articulating increasingly sweeping 

reforms, initiating contacts with former enemies of the state in the democratic opposition—

especially National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whom the SPDC had 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

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e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institu

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Di

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and 

Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham 

H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, 

NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC 

Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil and 

Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Offi

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369 3

continually demonized—and the armed ethnic minority opposition, they saw that their moves 

did not elicit a negative reaction from the former senior general. This was the signal leaders 

needed to move ahead with a more dramatic reform program, particularly macroeconomic 

restructuring to produce the economic development that had eluded previous military governments. The leadership recognized that this would require ending the country’s self-imposed 

isolation and opening Myanmar to the world. They also recognized that a degree of political 

liberalization was needed, both to invigorate the civilian population at home and to respond 

to the demands of Western governments. Myanmar’s leaders seem to have calculated these 

plans within the five-year time frame of the new government’s first term—the only period of 

time they could be certain of controlling. This may have been what lent a sense of urgency to 

the early reforms.

This report describes the two parallel factors in Myanmar’s transition to explore whether 

its elements might be instructive for formulating orderly transition elsewhere. Although 

Myanmar’s transition still has many major challenges to overcome and is by no means 

assured, the political and economic liberalization achieved during its first three years has 

opened unexpected new possibilities—for better or for worse—for the country’s future. 

Given the many chaotic attempts to replace authoritarian governments that we are witnessing today, it is possible that Myanmar’s experience may hold some valuable lessons.

The Decay of Military Rule

For more than fifty years, Myanmar was controlled by a military government with only two 

consecutive leaders at the top, both of whom ruled with an iron fist.3 The top leaders were 

the final authority on all matters concerning governance and security and surrounded themselves with military sycophants. Those who gave any appearance of deviating from the top 

general’s program were quickly purged. A group of senior military officers whom Ne Win had 

purged became the early backbone of the democracy movement in 1988. Learning from this 

example, Senior General Than Shwe, who followed Ne Win in 1992, made it clear that when 

senior officers were retired from his government, they should keep far away from politics if 

they wanted to stay out of jail and keep their pensions. 

The military leaders’ paramount objective was to hold the country together in the face 

of one of the world’s longest running civil wars, in which multiple nonstate ethnic armed 

groups, combined with a communist insurgency at one stage, were fighting for independence 

or to overthrow the Rangoon government. The leadership came to believe that the country’s 

civilian population was too fractious and undisciplined to participate in governance, and for 

most of the period, political activity was banned by law and punishable by jail.

The military regime suffered from a glaring weakness, however: an inability to manage the 

economy. It centralized the economy in the hands of the military, diverted valuable resources 

to the military apparatus, and starved the civilian economy. Leaders kept a tight grip on the 

most crucial civilian commodities, such as rice and cooking oil, hoping to ensure there would 

always be enough to prevent popular unrest. Their arbitrary and often inept manipulation of 

the levers of the economy, however, often caused sudden, severe hardship for urban populations, leading to major popular protests, most famously in 1988 and 2007. After the country 

joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997, many of the top leaders 

began traveling in the region to attend ASEAN meetings and could see how far behind Myanmar had fallen. The country’s almost feudal conditions made it a drag on ASEAN, whose original 

members were advancing rapidly both politically and economically. Furthermore, after 1990, 

the regime’s harsh repressions drew increasing waves of political and economic sanctions from 

Although Myanmar’s transition 

still has many major challenges 

to overcome and is by no means 

assured, the political and 

economic liberalization 

achieved during its first three 

years has opened unexpected 

new possibilities for the 

country’s future. 
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369

Western governments. Senior U.S. officials began to boycott major ASEAN meetings to protest 

the group’s decision to embrace Myanmar.

In the final decade of military rule, many top generals used their control over the country’s 

resources more actively to enrich themselves and their families through crony business relations with Chinese, Thai, and other Asian companies seeking access to energy, minerals, timber, 

and other assets Myanmar had to offer. The kleptomania fueled the government’s battles with 

nonstate armed groups where the resources were concentrated, and profits were funneled 

directly into the pockets of the military leaders, leaving the population in ever greater poverty. 

After twenty years, the corruption of the military regime had reached a peak, and even those 

at the top must have known it was time to turn the corner.

Developing an Orderly Retreat

When Ne Win stepped down amid the chaos of the 1988 popular uprising, he instructed his 

cabinet to return the country to multiparty parliamentary governance. His military successors took this as an order and began almost immediately to plan a transition. They intended 

to create a clone of the military’s Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government with 

multiple parties rather than just one, except that one party composed of trusted members of 

the former BSPP would dominate. Leaders believed they could make this transition simply by 

holding elections and encouraging a plethora of small parties to participate, knowing that the 

small parties would be unable to compete effectively with the pro-military party. They staged 

the 1990 elections with little thought to the structure of government that would follow, and 

they threw as many roadblocks as possible in the way of the antimilitary parties as they 

campaigned for office. They did not write a new constitution to determine how the elected 

government would form and govern, and they did not anticipate the breadth and depth of 

popular resentment of the military itself. 

When the NLD, the main opposition party—actually a collection of smaller democracy parties who joined forces to compete with the pro-military party—won an overwhelming majority of seats in the new parliament, the military leaders realized they had badly misjudged the 

mood of the people, and halted the transition immediately. They believed that all the blood 

they had spilled holding the country together over the years would be lost in the chaos and 

confusion of untested civilian leadership. They began to crack down on opposition leaders 

and decided that they would need much better preparation before embarking on political 

transition. So they spent the next twenty years developing a new constitution, holding the 

democracy movement in check with harsh repressive measures, insulating themselves from 

reprisals and punishment from Western governments by embracing their Asian neighbors, and 

building a strong military force that could prevail against internal enemies.

Meanwhile, the world moved forward, merging into an increasingly globalized economy, 

rewarding the Asian tigers with rapid economic development and drawing them into the 

global community and its evolving social and political standards. Myanmar descended to the 

lowest international rankings for almost every indicator: economic development, political 

governance, respect for human rights, transparency and corruption, and human and narcotics trafficking. External pressure on the military regime was mounting steadily, and its 

ASEAN partners were becoming impatient. After the regime’s egregious attack on Aung San 

Suu Kyi in 2003, ASEAN governments began to speak out, and even China chimed in. Thailand proposed that ASEAN should develop a roadmap for transition in Myanmar, anticipating 

that the 2006 date for Myanmar to assume the chair of ASEAN was fast approaching. To preempt the Thai initiative, the military regime quickly came up with its own seven-step plan, 

beginning with completing the new constitution and ending with seating a new multiparty 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369 5

civilian government. In 2005, Myanmar agreed to step back from the ASEAN presidency until 

it had completed its transition. Nonetheless, the SPDC continued to dawdle. 

In 2007 and 2008, the regime was confronted with two major events that it failed to 

handle well. A sudden and ill-considered decision in September 2007 to remove government 

subsidies from fuel prices increased transportation costs exponentially, throwing public 

transportation into crisis and causing a wave of inflation and commodity shortages for the 

large urban population. As in 1988, this triggered a public protest that large numbers of 

Buddhist monks and nuns quickly joined, demonstrating their solidarity with the people. 

When the government failed to prevail on the monks to desist from their protests, security 

forces were deployed to halt the demonstrations by force. These forces ended up firing on 

monks and demolishing monasteries, to the horror of Myanmar’s people and the international community. 

In early May 2008, the worst cyclone in Myanmar’s history, Cyclone Nargis, swept across the 

Irrawaddy delta, killing between one hundred thousand and two hundred thousand people and 

leaving millions devastated. The military leadership, bunkered in its new capital of Naypyitaw, 

refused to recognize the magnitude of the devastation and failed to provide assistance or allow 

international aid into the country. Although ASEAN and the United Nations eventually joined 

forces with the government to develop a structure for delivering assistance, the damage had 

been done. The civilian population of Rangoon and other large urban centers pitched in to 

help the people of the delta, clearly defying the government. Some in the upper reaches of 

the military were dismayed by the government’s inadequate response. 

The failure of top military leaders to deal more effectively with Myanmar’s crises was probably in part a result of their preoccupation with final preparations for a political transition. 

On the eve of the so-called Saffron Revolution of 2007, the government was finally moving 

forward with its seven-step roadmap, concluding the constitutional drafting process. The 

new constitution was written amid the turmoil of 2007 and presented for approval in a mock 

public referendum only days after the cyclone struck in 2008. Not long after this, the regime 

announced that elections would be held in 2010 for a new multiparty parliament. 

In hindsight it is clear that serious cleavages were developing between conservatives and 

moderates inside the regime. The conservatives were arrayed around Senior General Than Shwe, 

himself a committed conservative and chief beneficiary of the corrupt economy. The moderates, 

part of the inner circle, apparently concealed their liberal tendencies to avoid being purged. 

However, it appears that they were also consulting actively with members of the business community who were urging wide-ranging political and economic reforms once the transition got 

under way. A key source of advice to the moderates was a group called Egress,4 which had been 

formed ostensibly as a private educational institution to provide technical and quasi-political 

training to young people. Rumor has it that Egress advisers helped draft President Thein Sein’s 

inaugural speech, in which he outlined major political and economic reforms. 

There is little question that Than Shwe choreographed the outlines of the constitution 

and the transition plan, along with the 2005 move to the new capital of Naypyitaw, where 

the outgoing and incoming governments could be shielded from Rangoon’s congestion and 

chaos. Most observers believe that he was acting on Ne Win’s 1988 orders to return the country to multiparty parliamentary government and realized that, as his own years advanced, 

he needed to leave a legacy better suited to the modern world than the sclerotic military 

government over which he and his predecessor had presided. Many also believe that, while 

he wanted to fashion a military-dominated government, he also wanted to ensure that 

it would not be amenable to one-man rule, so that he and his family would be protected 

when he stepped back. Previous leaders had consistently been brought to a sad end by their 

successors. Ne Win jailed and then exiled his predecessor, U Nu. Than Shwe placed Ne Win 
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369

under house arrest, where he met an ignominious end in 2002. What Than Shwe may not 

have anticipated was the extent of the more liberal thinking developing around him in the 

SPDC’s final few years, as the seven-step plan moved toward its denouement.

With all the pieces in place for a carefully managed transition and the type of government that would follow, elections took place in November 2010. To avoid another upset by 

the opposition, the regime effectively sidelined the NLD by detaining Aung San Suu Kyi and 

constructing draconian election laws to encourage the NLD to opt out of the elections.5 The 

giant government party and the electoral commission further manipulated the elections to 

ensure that the government party would win at least as many seats as the NLD had taken in 

1990. Unsurprisingly, it gained an overwhelming majority. Provisions for gradually dismantling 

the SPDC were incorporated in the constitution, including absolving all SPDC members of 

responsibility for any actions their government had taken. All existing laws remained until the 

parliament could pass new laws to replace them. When the new parliament began to meet in 

early 2011, Than Shwe sat in the chair until new leadership could be elected. Interviews with 

senior government officials confirm that Than Shwe personally guided the selection of the 

top leaders—president, vice presidents, parliamentary speakers, military commander-in-chief, 

and most of the ministers. He placed his most trusted generals and former generals in the top 

positions,6 inadvertently or not, building competitive centers of power that would check and 

balance each other to prevent any one leader from gaining primacy.

With the seating of the new president at the end of March 2011, Than Shwe and his 

deputy, Vice Senior General Maung Aye, stepped back and went into retirement. Maung Aye 

suffered a debilitating stroke shortly after retirement, and Than Shwe settled into a relatively anonymous existence. Many of the top officials in the government and party say they 

visit him occasionally to keep in touch but deny that he has an active role in guiding the 

new government. Most observers, including well-placed officials, do not believe that he is 

so detached. There has been no clear evidence of his involvement, except perhaps in cases 

of senior military promotions and assignments. However, so long as he is alive, the aura of 

his authority will hang over the government.

The Power of Personality

No matter how carefully the plans were laid for transition, they could not predetermine the 

effects of new leadership personalities on its implementation. As one of the leading authorities on Myanmar’s military has described it, the surprise in this transition is attributable to 

the fact that “a handful of personalities with particular histories, quietly held agendas, and 

established hierarchical allegiances upon which they could rely...landed in the right jobs at 

the right time.” 7

President Thein Sein

In his inaugural address on March 31, 2011—in a move that may have surprised Than Shwe—

President Thein Sein outlined plans for sweeping economic and political reforms, suggesting 

that policies of the past had failed. He began to talk about reducing poverty, responding 

to public opinion, encouraging political activity, and inviting exiles to return—all subjects 

that had been forbidden under the SPDC. Thein Sein also appointed three civilian experts as 

senior advisers for economic, political, and legal affairs and began acting on their advice. He 

empowered two ministers in his new government to take on major reform programs, one for 

structural economic reform and one to begin peace negotiations with the country’s armed 

ethnic groups.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369 7

In August 2011, Thein Sein approved the participation of NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and 

invited her to visit him at home for a serious exchange of views. A month later, citing public 

opinion as the deciding factor, he announced the immediate suspension of Chinese construction on a controversial dam at the confluence of the two rivers that form the headwaters 

of the Irrawaddy, the country’s central artery. By October, he had reached agreement with 

parliamentary leaders and the election commission to amend the election laws as an inducement for the NLD to compete in by-elections for some forty-five seats in parliament, so as to 

bring Aung San Suu Kyi into the new government and encourage her to engage positively in 

the democratization effort. 

During the first year of the president’s term, there was a low-grade but intense struggle 

between reformers and those in the status quo camp, who preferred to move much more 

slowly with reforms and efforts to accommodate the SPDC’s former enemies. The status quo 

camp had at least one representative in the top leadership, who apparently used the aura 

of his previously close relationship with the retired senior general to deliberately undermine 

and question Thein Sein’s decisions and policies. Several well-placed ministers and senior government party (Union Solidarity and Development Party [USDP]) officials in the parliament 

became associated with his efforts to slow things down.

An early showdown between the two camps concerned differences over how to approach 

peacemaking with the armed ethnic minority militias, the so-called cease-fire groups.8 

Shortly after the new government was seated, fighting broke out in Kachin State as a result of 

misguided SPDC efforts just before the elections to force the cease-fire groups to assimilate 

into the national army as border guard forces. Seeing the renewed conflict as a threat to the 

new government’s stability, Thein Sein started his own peace process with all the cease-fire 

groups and assigned a trusted adviser and former general, Minister Aung Min, to lead the 

effort. However, the team that led the ill-fated border guard negotiation continued to direct 

negotiations with some of the key cease-fire groups. Fighting in Kachin State intensified, 

though Aung Min’s negotiations began to produce results. Most significantly, for the first 

time since independence, a cease-fire agreement was reached with one of the armed groups, 

the Karen. Shortly after this, the president consolidated all the talks under the control of 

Minister Aung Min, clearly distancing the new government from the previous government’s 

negotiating tactics. 

Early in the new government’s second year, the most senior of the conservative spoilers 

resigned from office, leaving a vacancy at one of the highest levels of the executive branch. 

The president used this to reorganize his cabinet, moving some of the more conservative 

ministers to less critical positions. He also appointed a number of technocrats to deputy 

minister positions to improve the ministries’ capacities to implement reforms. His two most 

trusted ministers and four others were moved into the president’s office as “superministers” 

with authority over other ministers, strengthening his own office’s management capacity. 

Parliamentary Speaker Shwe Mann

While the struggle between reformers and status quo officials was playing out in the executive 

branch, Myanmar’s rubber-stamp parliament was being transformed into a center of political 

activism under the leadership of the speaker of the lower house, former general Thura Shwe 

Mann. Undoubtedly impressed that the retired senior general had tolerated the president’s 

bold moves, Shwe Mann began to make some moves of his own in late 2011 and early 2012. 

As army commander and third-highest-ranking official in the previous government, he had 

expected to be a prime candidate for president in the new government. When he found that 

he had been relegated to the parliament, he apparently decided to deviate from the original 

plan and turn the parliament into an active proponent of reform and democratization. He 
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369

welcomed Aung San Suu Kyi and her party into the parliament in June 2012 and carved out 

a special place for them, establishing a Rule of Law and Tranquility Committee for the NLD to 

chair. He encouraged all members of parliament to engage actively in the business of legislation as equals, without regard to party, and he pursued an aggressive agenda of parliamentary 

oversight of the executive branch. He formed twenty-one new standing committees, in addition to the four prescribed in the constitution, to extend parliamentary oversight into every 

aspect of governance. In early 2012, he led the parliament in its first review of the president’s 

annual budget proposal and raised serious questions about it, including military spending. 

In the process, his parliament decided to eliminate one of the military-led ministries, arguing that it was redundant, and it refused funding for the irrigation sector of the Ministry of 

Agriculture, arguing that it could not be trusted until it addressed the widespread corruption 

a recent Auditor General report had exposed. Shwe Mann and other parliamentarians traveled 

widely during the first two years, studying other parliaments, how they operated, and the 

structures they formed to conduct their affairs independently.

The parliament serves as a bastion for the government party, which is populated largely 

by members of the former regime, their cronies, and former civil servants. When Shwe Mann 

became a proponent of reform and democratization, however, many of them felt liberated to 

act on their own reform instincts, and the party quickly divided into a variety of different 

interests. Speaker Shwe Mann used his authority in the parliament and as head of the USDP 

to prevent the more conservative old guard from derailing reform efforts. By encouraging all 

members of parliament to work together as equals without regard to party lines, he probably 

managed to strengthen the reformist trends in the government party by joining forces with 

other parties to outvote the more conservative elements of the government party and the 

military members of parliament. In the process, he created a largely consensual body that 

could mount serious challenges to the executive branch—at least during the first three years 

of the new government.9

Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing

The other key personality in the leadership has been the commander-in-chief of the armed 

forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Given extraordinary powers by the constitution 

to keep the military involved in the country’s political life, Min Aung Hlaing has seen his 

mission as one of protecting the military prerogatives derived from the constitution, in 

addition to ensuring the country’s security. He and the military leadership have generally 

gone along with the president’s reform program and accepted many—though not all—of 

the restrictions both the parliament and the president have imposed on military authority, 

particularly in the economic area. Although it is still unclear where the bottom line is for the 

military, constitutional amendments restricting the military’s role in the political process, 

which are currently under consideration in the parliament, have drawn negative responses 

from the parliament’s military members. For example, because the constitution requires a 

parliamentary vote of more than 75 percent for an amendment and military representatives 

occupy 25 percent of the parliamentary seats, the commander-in-chief is a key determinant 

of whether the constitution can be amended. The military—presumably acting at the behest 

of the commander-in-chief—has signaled its unwillingness to accept any modification 

of this provision. Most recently, the military members of parliament have proposed some 

constitutional amendments of their own. These would strengthen the key executive branch 

decision-making body, the National Defense and Security Council, giving it power to dissolve parliament and impose martial law more easily than the current constitution allows. 

The proposals were clearly designed to signal military discontent with the active parliament 

and the speed of the transition. Min Aung Hlaing himself is facing the age limit for retire-
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369 9

ment in 2015 and may decide to run for a seat in parliament, possibly becoming a potential 

candidate for president in 2016.

NLD Leader Aung San Suu Kyi

When she took her seat in parliament, Aung San Suu Kyi was immediately elevated into 

the leadership of the new government by virtue of her status as the country’s democracy 

icon. Reformist leaders needed her in their reform process to give it credibility at home 

and abroad, so her decision to join the government, despite her strong opposition to the 

constitution, was a major concession to the government’s leadership. In the parliament, 

she chairs the Committee on Rule of Law and Tranquility, created for her by Speaker Shwe 

Mann, and she has sided with him in his challenges to the executive branch and the 

president. She has also maintained her own relationship with the president, though it is 

not always comfortable. At least once, she, Shwe Mann, and the president have consulted 

together and released a joint statement on communal violence. She has also reached out 

to military and ex-military officials in parliament and attempted unsuccessfully to meet 

with the commander-in-chief. 

Over the past two years, Aung San Suu Kyi has campaigned to change the provision in the 

constitution that makes her ineligible for the presidency. For a while she concentrated all her 

energies on this single theme. Later she switched her focus to Article 436 of the constitution, which elaborates the procedures for amendments, giving the military its veto. Both 

President Thein Sein and Speaker Shwe Mann have expressed their support for her access to 

the presidency, always pointing out that it will first require a constitutional amendment. 

They probably believe that the army, and not they, holds the key to changing the constitution. In 2014, the NLD leader spoke out strongly against the military role in the political 

process and the barrier this poses to the country’s democratization. Her working relations 

with the military have thus remained problematic.

The Role of External Actors 

The motivation and design for the political transition in Myanmar was largely homegrown, 

but such transitions do not occur in a vacuum, free from external influence. Factors in the 

international environment, particularly in Myanmar’s immediate neighborhood, were inherent in the transition’s planning process. During the last twenty years of military rule, the 

international community, under pressure from Western governments and institutions, sought 

to impose onerous political, economic, and legal pressures on the country in hopes of forcing 

the generals to reform. The generals adamantly defied these pressures and relied on their 

Asian neighbors to shield them from the worst of the international retributions. However, 

once the elected government had been put in place in 2011, the new leadership immediately invited foreign assistance and advice and strove to meet modern political and economic standards. All the external influences the military leadership had been staving off for 

decades began to flow into the country, and the plans for a gradual transition evaporated. 

The Regional Environment

Myanmar’s security concerns have been internal since its independence in 1948. The country is located in what is now a relatively peaceful and friendly neighborhood in Southeast 

Asia, and it managed on the whole to avoid involvement in any of the regional conflicts 

that affected its neighbors during the Cold War. The regime has exhibited no external or 

expansionist ambitions and has long enjoyed friendly relations with the countries on its 

Once the elected government 

had been put in place in 2011, 

the new leadership immediately 

invited foreign assistance and 

advice and strove to meet 

modern political and economic 

standards. All the external 

influences the military leadership 

had been staving off for decades 

began to flow into the country, 

and the plans for a gradual 

transition evaporated.
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369

borders. Its large military forces have not been perceived as a threat to its neighbors or the 

region; they have been structured and equipped largely to fight internal insurgencies and to 

maintain repression. Even when neighbors have given support and refuge to armed ethnic 

groups and political opposition, the military government has never allowed this to impede 

good neighborly relations.

By 2008, therefore, Myanmar’s military government could expect welcoming support from 

its ASEAN colleagues, who had made the transition a condition of Myanmar assuming the 

ASEAN presidency. Likewise, its giant neighbors, China and India, had pressed in the past 

for reforms that would improve the country’s investment climate.

The Hostile Post–Cold War Spotlight

At the height of the Cold War conflicts in Indochina, General Ne Win—who had seized power 

in 1962—scrupulously shielded the country from the outside world to cope unimpeded with 

the internal communist-led insurgency inside what was then Burma. The military leaders 

who replaced Ne Win in the wake of the popular uprising of 1988 could see that his extreme 

isolationist policies had left the country far behind its neighbors. Hence they began to open 

the economy to foreign investment, particularly from Asian neighbors.

With the 1990 elections for a multiparty parliament, the new military regime also took a 

first step toward sharing power with civilians, believing that the party sympathetic to the 

military would easily win. This process halted when they lost badly to the democratic opposition. The changing post–Cold War world, however, no longer allowed them the freedom to 

repress the civilian population with impunity.

Furthermore, the emergence of Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership of the democracy movement 

following the 1988 uprising catalyzed a sustained and unprecedented international interest in 

promoting respect for human rights and democratic practices in Burma, much of which she 

orchestrated personally through trusted friends, family, and officials of foreign governments. 

The International Sanctions Regime

U.S. sanctions, which were imposed gradually over a ten-year period, were the most punitive. 

They banned U.S. investment, imports from Myanmar, and the use of U.S. financial services in 

Myanmar (e.g., banking, credit cards). They severely restricted visas to the United States for 

government and military officials and their families, as well as holding visits by U.S. officials 

to Myanmar to the level of deputy assistant secretary. Congress also refused to credential an 

ambassador, leaving the United States with a charge d’affaires to serve in place of an ambassador for twenty-two years. The United States refused all military assistance to Myanmar but 

provided generous humanitarian and political assistance to political opposition groups in exile 

in Thailand and the United States. It refused to send senior officials to ASEAN meetings for 

many years or to host any high-level ASEAN meetings. Finally, it even refused to recognize the 

name change from Burma to Myanmar that the new regime instituted in 1989. 

Because U.S. economic sanctions were largely unilateral, they had only a marginal effect 

on Myanmar’s underdeveloped economy and were largely negated by Asian investment and 

trade. Financial sanctions did bite, however, particularly against the so-called cronies, who 

were denied access to international banking, though this was a relatively narrow band of the 

economy at that time. While not as harsh as U.S. sanctions, the European Union, individual 

European governments, and Australia also imposed their own; trade and investment were 

lightly restricted and some financial services were denied. They joined the United States in 

providing generous assistance to the exiled political opposition. Through international financial institutions, Western governments jointly sustained a veto on both financial and technical 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369 11

assistance to Myanmar, impeding the major source of foreign economic development aid that 

its neighbors had enjoyed over the years. This was only marginally offset by the humanitarian 

assistance that UN agencies and a number of international nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) managed to provide inside Myanmar from 1990 on.

With Western governments in the lead, the United Nations was active in collective 

efforts to pressure Myanmar’s military government, harshly condemning Myanmar’s human 

rights record in the General Assembly each year, keeping Myanmar constantly on the Human 

Rights Council agenda in Geneva but, thanks to China’s veto, failing to pass any meaningful resolutions in the UN Security Council. The United Nations also formed a Friends of 

Burma group, consisting of many concerned governments from Asia and the West, who met 

periodically to discuss strategies for coordinating international efforts to move the military 

government forward. The secretary general appointed a special envoy for Myanmar, who 

visited regularly to encourage dialogue between the generals and Aung San Suu Kyi. For a 

brief period in 2000 and 2001, the special envoy spurred a dialogue that resulted in Aung 

San Suu Kyi’s release from detention, with permission to travel around the country for the 

first time since 1989. Unfortunately, she was detained again in 2003, and from this point 

the generals merely humored the UN special envoy during his periodic visits.

In the final years and months before the 2010 elections, international human rights 

activists tried to convince the United Nations to form a commission of inquiry into crimes 

against humanity by all the parties—government and nongovernment—perpetrating violence against civilians inside Burma. This gained enough momentum to win the support of 

several smaller governments. The U.S. government, however, was only lukewarm to the idea, 

and it never gained traction in the United Nations. Eventually Myanmar’s transition rendered 

it moot. One can only speculate whether such a move might have interfered negatively with 

the regime’s willingness to move forward with the transition when it did.

Assessing the Effects of External Pressure

In the tradition of the Ne Win government before it, even as the military government prepared 

for transition, up to 2011 it was determined to limit any foreign influence on the state, the 

economy, the society, and ethnic Burman culture. It was thus prepared to resist firmly all foreign attempts to intervene. Efforts by Western democracies and human rights advocates were 

perceived as hostile attempts to disadvantage and destabilize the country and to complicate 

the plans for a gradual political transition. Aung San Suu Kyi was seen as an agent of these 

hostile Western powers and an instigator of Western sanctions; the official press portrayed her 

as an “axe handle,” an instrument born of the tree it is designed to cut down. The language 

of democracy and human rights was mocked and treated as inimical to the country’s national 

culture. Although the population widely dismissed the government’s campaign against the 

West and the opposition, it was certainly inculcated in the military itself.

However, as the country’s Asian neighbors became a buffer against Western opprobrium 

and punishment, and were considered friends and protectors, they could at least marginally penetrate the curtain of secrecy and isolation around the leadership. As the pace of 

Chinese economic transformation accelerated and political development in key ASEAN 

countries moved them toward democracy, the immediate environment around BurmaMyanmar changed, inevitably affecting interaction between Myanmar and its neighbors, 

both politically and economically. As the generals formed their plans for transition, they 

studied the experiences of their neighbors’ political and economic transitions from authoritarian governments to more liberal systems; the results of their study are reflected in many 

aspects of the 2008 constitution. In the final years before the transition, Myanmar’s Asian 
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369

neighbors were able to influence the pace of the transition, if not the transition itself. All in 

all, the friendly neighborhood was probably the most important positive external influence 

on the transition.

Western sanctions and punitive policies, on the other hand, created a barrier to Western 

communication with and influence on Myanmar’s military leadership, minimizing the effects 

of Western pressure. Western observers almost entirely discounted the regime’s plans for 

transition; there were no serious attempts to engage with the regime on its plans until 

the final year before the elections of 2010, when the regime was most intent on insulating 

its plans from outside influence. Therefore, it was a surprise when the new government 

embarked on its reform program. This suggests that, as much as the military leadership 

resisted outside pressure before transition, many in the leadership were listening, probably 

realizing that this kind of change would be crucial to enticing the political opposition into 

the effort and gaining international support for the new government. 

As mentioned above, one can question whether Myanmar’s transition would have proceeded differently in the absence of sanctions and extreme political pressure from the West. 

Because the initial plans for transition to multiparty parliamentary governance were already 

under consideration before any sanctions were imposed, the sanctions cannot be said to 

have brought about the transition in the first instance. At the same time, there is no question that the form and intensity of Western pressure on the military regime supported and 

strengthened the political opposition and presented the ideal of liberal democracy as the 

most legitimate alternative to military rule. Ultimately these ideas took root inside some 

elements of the military leadership and its civilian advisers and became incorporated into 

the new government’s approach to policy.

Future Prospects

The parliamentary elections of 2015 and the presidential election that will follow in the new 

parliament in early 2016 represent a tipping point in Myanmar’s transition. Most will see the 

outcome as a litmus test for whether the country will continue down the road to genuine 

democracy. Over the past year, relations among the country’s top four leaders have become 

intensely political as they position themselves for the elections, making working relations 

at the top less than cordial, complicating key decisions, and raising public concern that the 

reforms are stalling. At this stage, the unpredictability of the election outcome undoubtedly 

contributes to a popular sense of unease about the sustainability of the reforms. 

Several key issues hang in the balance. First is the question of whether the main political 

actors, both individuals and political parties, are ready to govern by coalition and compromise. 

The USDP—the government party—cannot win the overwhelming majority it achieved in 

2010, which gave it uncontested control of the parliament and thus the presidency for the first 

five-year term. As the by-elections of April 2012 dramatically demonstrated, Aung San Suu 

Kyi and the NLD party have great electoral strength and could well become the single largest 

party in the parliament in 2015, if the elections are relatively free and fair. The ethnic minority constituencies will mostly go to the ethnic parties, who now see the parliament as key to 

gaining their political rights in the future. Although the parliamentary seats reserved for the 

military will remain at 25 percent, at least for now, the balance of power in the parliament will 

be much more evenly distributed among these four groups than it is now, requiring coalition 

building to arrive at a majority vote for the president, as well as for all parliamentary activity 

in the next five-year term. 

Second, the peace process may not reach a successful conclusion before the election, if 

it continues at its current pace with both parties refusing to make the final compromises 

In the final years before the 

transition, Myanmar’s Asian 

neighbors were able to influence 

the pace of the transition, if not 

the transition itself. All in all, 

the friendly neighborhood was 

probably the most important 

positive external influence 

on the transition.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369 13

necessary to reach a universal cease-fire agreement. Lack of resolution in the peace process 

will probably tarnish the government party for the voting public, because the government 

has encouraged expectations of reaching a cease-fire before the elections. If there is no 

cease-fire, the army will be seen as the spoiler. Furthermore, if the army continues its 

attacks on ethnic armed forces, leading to the exclusion of large ethnic constituencies from 

the elections, as happened in 2010, the credibility of the peace process will suffer a serious 

blow. Finally, if the president decides to postpone the elections because of the failing peace 

process, as he once suggested, the credibility of the reform process itself would be questioned. On the other hand, if a national cease-fire agreement emerges before the elections, 

it will be to the government party’s credit.

Third, because politics in Myanmar are still defined largely in terms of the long struggle 

of democratic forces against military domination, the inevitable losses by the government 

party in the election are likely to be interpreted as a popular vote against military participation in political governance, as it is currently enshrined in the constitution. Although the 

commander-in-chief and others in the military leadership have largely cooperated with 

the decisions made during the past four years to scale back many of their prerogatives, 

they have objected to constitutional amendments that would reduce their current political 

power—most significantly the constitutional provision that gives them veto power in the 

parliament over any proposed amendment. Furthermore, the amendments to the constitution the military has proposed reflect a strong distrust of the parliament. This, combined 

with the faltering peace process, suggests that the military may wish to decelerate the 

reform process, at least until the elections bring more clarity to the future balance of political power. Whatever the case, a politically reassertive military is likely to push voters toward 

the democratic opposition and ethnic parties.

Fourth, the rapid social and political changes the transition brought about have given 

rise to serious tensions in society, which were largely suppressed during the long military 

years. The most intense and intractable of these tensions has been between the Rakhine 

Buddhist population and Rohingya Muslim communities in the country’s Rakhine State along 

the border with Bangladesh. The violence against Muslims has spread also to the urban areas 

in some of the ethnic Burman regions in the center of the country, often ignited by radical monks spreading anti-Muslim vitriol through social media. This anti-Muslim sentiment 

has begun to affect the elections in several ways. Members of parliament have introduced 

proposals to severely limit the right of Muslims to vote. Monks have come out against a 

constitutional amendment allowing Aung San Suu Kyi to be eligible for the presidency and 

recommended voting for the government party in the election. Legislation is pending in the 

parliament to restrict interfaith marriage and limit the size of Muslim families. These themes 

are likely to permeate election campaigns in parts of the country, which, combined with 

ongoing ethnic tensions, could lead to electoral violence. 

Finally, the economic reforms have yet to improve the standard of living for the vast 

majority of the country’s population. While they have stimulated a rush of foreign investment, the large flows of money into the country have encouraged serious inflation in land 

prices, which in turn has rippled through the entire economy, further impoverishing the 

poor. The wealthy have been the main beneficiaries of the economic growth, expanding the 

gulf between rich and poor. 

On the plus side, the 2015 elections promise to be more democratic in many respects 

than those of 2010. First and foremost, the opposition party of greatest consequence—Aung 

San Suu Kyi’s NLD—will be running for parliament nationwide. Because it did not compete in 

the 2010 elections, the opposition footprint was miniscule. Second, the ethnic minority parties will be fielding more serious candidates than they did in 2010. Third, because the parliaThe economic reforms have 

yet to improve the standard of 

living for the vast majority of 

the country’s population. The 

wealthy have been the main 

beneficiaries of the economic 

growth, expanding the gulf 

between rich and poor. 
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369

ment has turned out to be a stronger locus of political activity than expected, this election 

will draw more experienced candidates, who chose to sit out the 2010 elections. This could 

be particularly evident in the quality of the USDP candidates. Finally, preparations for the 

elections—compiling of voter lists, political party training, training for election monitors 

and observers, and the presence of international observers—point to more transparent and 

orderly elections than those of 2010. 

Thus the 2015 elections pose a clear test for Myanmar’s transition. Can the elections be 

conducted fairly enough to ensure public confidence in the outcome? Will the peace process 

allow the full participation of ethnic minorities in the elections? Will election campaigning 

exacerbate communal tensions and encourage violence? Will the military leadership feel threatened by the election gains of the democratic opposition? Will the new parliament be able to 

negotiate a consensus among key leaders for the new government in 2016? Is the country’s 

new body politic mature enough to weather this challenge and reach a degree of national 

reconciliation that allows stable governance and continuing democratic development?

What Lessons Can We Learn?

Political transitions are by nature sui generis, being a function of the unique characteristics 

of a given country and population. This does not mean, however, that one cannot find parallels in particular aspects of various transitions, which could inspire replication elsewhere. 

The study of comparative political transition has already spawned a large body of academic 

work. This report seeks to add to this body of knowledge, with the hope that the transition currently under way in Myanmar can provide some useful lessons in how to launch and 

execute the difficult journey from dictatorship to democratic governance.

The pattern of transition in Myanmar has been marked by a number of key elements, 

chief among which have been a strong and persistent democratic opposition with an iconic 

leader; twenty years of detailed planning by military leadership to establish its version of 

“discipline-flourishing democracy,” designed to incorporate political opposition in one form 

or another while ensuring continuity for the military; willingness to tolerate competing centers of power in the new government; and a fortuitous combination of personal dynamics to 

provide an opening for reform and a serious break with the past. Here, in brief, are what I 

consider to be the most important factors guiding the transition.

Original intent. Ne Win set the course in 1988 when he ordered his successors to return 

the country to some form of multiparty parliamentary government, albeit with a firm military hand to guide it, as a successor to his Burma Socialist Programme parliament. The 

government that replaced the BSPP by military coup in 1988 set out almost immediately to 

follow his order.

Strong democratic opposition. The 1988 rebellion and the 1990 elections gave rise to 

a strong democracy movement spearheaded by a single organized party with a charismatic 

leader. Despite intense repression by the government, the party kept itself alive and organized and successfully set the agenda for a democratic transition.

External pressure. The brutal military repression of the 1988 rebellion and subsequent 

elections in 1990 focused international attention and support on the country’s democracy 

movement. As the military government repressed the democracy movement with ever more 

determination, the international community, spearheaded by Western governments and 

the United Nations, became equally determined to punish and isolate the military regime. 

As time passed, ASEAN neighbors began to join the chorus, urging a transition to civilian 

governance. International sanctions, particularly those governing the international financial 

institutions, hindered the country’s economic development.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 369 15

Careful planning. After the failed election of 1990, in which the democratic opposition 

trounced the government party, the SLORC/SPDC regime spent twenty years doggedly building the foundation for holding multiparty elections while maintaining military control of 

the country, keeping the democratic opposition in check through harsh repression, subduing 

nonstate ethnic armies with cease-fire agreements and military measures, and developing a 

strong crony entrepreneurial class to prevent foreign control of the economy in anticipation 

of inviting substantial foreign direct investment.

Constitutional guarantees for military prerogatives. The careful planning outlined above 

included development of a constitutional legal structure that ensured that the new elected 

leadership would share the strong military culture that had held the country together, embedded the military in the political system, and protected the former military leaders against 

recrimination for past actions. This instilled confidence in the top military leadership that the 

transition could be executed without destabilizing the country or threatening their fundamental interests. The constitution provided for a staged, seamless transfer of power from the old 

government to the new government, with the institutions and policies of the old government 

remaining in place until the new government could gradually replace them, and with key members of the old government assuming top positions in the new government.

Competing centers of authority. The new constitution effectively replaced one-man 

authoritarian rule with a set of competing centers of power and authority—in the president, 

the parliamentary leadership, the military, and ultimately the democratic opposition—making it difficult, if not impossible, to revert to strongman rule without annulling the constitution. This led almost immediately to a more open and competitive political environment.

Retirement of previous leadership. Senior General Than Shwe’s decision to retire and 

leave the new leaders responsible for executing the transition was the first surprise element. When Ne Win stepped down, he continued actively to lead from behind the curtain, 

at least for a few years. Than Shwe was expected to do the same, so it was surprising when 

he retreated to relative invisibility after putting the new government in place. 

Closet liberals. The other element of surprise was the emergence of a strong group of 

liberals from within the previous SPDC leadership, once the senior general had stepped back. 

It was probably by chance that the people elected to the top positions in the new government, especially the president and speaker of the lower house, turned out to be determined 

reformers who recognized how far behind the country had fallen under the final years of 

military rule and knew that this sentiment was shared widely enough among their former 

colleagues to enure their support for serious reform. 

Participation of democratic opposition. The bold decision of President Thein Sein 

to invite NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi to play a key role in the new government and her 

equally bold decision to submit to an inherently undemocratic constitution—which she did 

not accept—strengthened the hand of reformers tremendously. It undoubtedly contributed 

significantly to public confidence in the new government.

Peace process with ethnic minorities. The new government decided to tackle differences with the armed ethnic groups in earnest and succeeded in significantly lowering the level 

of internal warfare. Although a durable political settlement is far from agreed on, the difficult 

issues of equality, rights, and shared resources are finally being joined for the first time.

Return of exiles. In his inaugural address, the president invited all exiles to return to 

help build the country and institute the reforms. He followed through by removing immigration barriers to their return, creating a safe environment for them, and incorporating 

many of those who led the pro-democracy uprising of 1988 in the current reform and peace 

processes. As political prisoners were released, they were also allowed to become politically 

active and advance the reforms.

Competing centers of 

authority. The new constitution 

effectively replaced one-man 

authoritarian rule with a set of 

competing centers of power and 

authority, making it difficult, 

if not impossible, to revert 

to strongman rule without 

annulling the constitution.
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Rapid rise of civil society. The government’s failure to respond to the devastation of 

Cyclone Nargis in 2008 gave the initial impetus to civil society, but as soon as the new government began relaxing restrictions on political and social activity, civil society began to 

organize in earnest. It is now a robust element of the transition, interacting with government 

institutions, often playing a mediating role in the absence of a reliable judicial system, and 

representing grassroots interests.

Public access to information. The private press has become equally robust, taking advantage of its release from censorship, pressing the government for full press freedoms, and providing a dramatic explosion of information on political, social, and economic subjects that was 

previously either unavailable or controlled by government censors. The press is now allowed, 

within certain bounds, to critically analyze the government’s performance.

Institutionalization and sustainability. The reformers are aware that the success of the 

program depends on implementing and institutionalizing a new system effectively, and are 

frustrated with the widespread inertia in the government at all levels. The president’s attempts 

to fight corruption and introduce administrative reforms throughout the government have met 

with resistance from civil servants unaccustomed to taking initiative or individual responsibility. It could take a generation or more to get beyond this. In the meantime, the country’s new 

democratic advances and institutions will remain extremely fragile and could easily succumb 

to inertia or misuse in the hands of corrupt populist leadership, as we have seen in a number 

of developing country political transitions.

Despite the formidable problems that lie ahead for Myanmar’s transition, it remains one of the 

most promising in recent years and is certainly worthy of strong support and assistance from the 

international community. It is especially encouraging that the new government has welcomed 

and responded positively to international advice and assistance, despite residual isolationist 

tendencies in certain parts of the population. As such, it may already offer valuable lessons for 

other countries attempting to transition from authoritarian to democratic government.

Notes

1. In 1997, the SLORC was renamed the State Peace and Development Council.

2. Two authoritative works on the dynamics of Myanmar’s transition are Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Understanding Recent 

Political Changes in Myanmar,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 34, no. 2 (2012), 197–216, and Mary Callahan, “The 

Generals Loosen Their Grip,” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 4 (October 2012), 120–31. This account draws heavily 

on those two sources, along with the author’s own interviews in Myanmar.

3. Although General Ne Win abolished the military Revolutionary Council in 1974 to install his Burma Socialist 

Programme Party with a one-party parliament, this was no more than a thin disguise for continued harsh military 

rule. Most senior officials in the BSPP government were military or ex-military, and Ne Win himself remained at 

the top. 

4. Some say the name of this group was meant to suggest a way out of the country’s syndrome of military 

governance. Egress also became the initial vehicle for facilitating the return of selected exiles on advisory visits.

5. Among other things, the NLD would have been required to expel all its members, including Aung San Suu Kyi, 

who were currently serving court-ordered imprisonment or detention.

6. Hlaing, “Understanding Recent Political Changes,” 204.

7. Callahan, “Generals,” 123.

8. The cease-fire groups, a collection of nonstate ethnic armies, were so named because they had concluded ceasefire agreements with the previous regime.

9. This pattern of operation in the parliament may have been a passing phenomenon unique to the early years of 

the new government, when party politics and identity had not fully developed and leadership authorities were 

relatively fluid and unsettled. 

Of Related Interest

• Managing Conflict in a World Adrift edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela 

Aall (USIP Press, 2015)

• Burma’s Long Road to Democracy by Priscilla Clapp (Special Report, November 2007)