FRAGILITY

STUDY GROUP

AND THE CHALLENGE OF

WILLIAM J. BURNS • MICHÈLE A. FLOURNOY • NANCY E. LINDBORG

September 2016

U.S. LEADERSHIP

STATE FRAGILITY
Destruction in Homs, Syria 

resulting from the violence that 

has ravaged the country since 

2011, June 3, 2014.
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 1

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report is the culmination of the work of the Fragility Study Group, a joint project of the Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace (Carnegie), the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), and the United States 

Institute of Peace (USIP). Launched in fall of 2015, the Study Group benefited from wide-ranging interviews with 

experts within and outside the U.S. government and from the counsel of a Senior Advisory Group comprising 

scholars, former policymakers, and civil society leaders. The chairs wish to acknowledge the Study Group 

staff, Alexa Courtney (Executive Director) and Noah Sheinbaum (Special Assistant), along with Matan Chorev 

(Carnegie), Loren Schulman (CNAS), and Linwood Ham (USIP), whose tireless efforts made this report possible.

CONTENTS

Executive Summary 2

Fragility 7

Principles for Engagement 9

From Principles to Practice 18

Conclusion 27

Notes 28

Appendix I: Senior Advisory Group 30

Appendix II: Chair Bios 31

Appendix III: Credits 32

September 2016
2 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

At the very moment when 

challenges to the postWorld War II U.S.-led 

international order are growing 

in number and complexity, Americans are asking hard questions 

about the type of global leadership 

role they want their country to 

play. After a decade and a half of 

unceasing war and sustained economic unease in the wake of the 

worst financial crisis in a generation, Americans—and their elected 

representatives—are increasingly 

looking homeward. The temptation 

to hunker down and wait for this 

moment of disorder to pass is 

understandable, but shortsighted. 

We simply do not have that luxury. 

There is too much at stake—for 

American interests, for the interests of our allies and partners, and 

for global peace and security.

The simultaneity of proliferating 

challenges and constrained appetite and resources to address them 

will require the incoming administration to demonstrate remarkable 

discipline and imagination in where 

and how it chooses to deploy 

American leadership. 

Nowhere is this more urgent 

than in the U.S. response to the 

challenge of state fragility. Given 

the inbox awaiting the next administration, fragile states may seem 

like a distant and abstract concern. 

They are not. They are at the 

center of much of today’s regional 

disorder and global upheaval. 

And the driver is the absence—or 

breakdown—of a social compact 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

between people and their government. The challenge is only likely to 

become more acute over time as 

states struggle to keep pace with 

rising citizen demands. 

The United States and its 

international partners have made 

notable progress in coming to 

grips with the fragility challenge. 

There is a more nuanced understanding of the problem and a 

growing convergence around the 

essential elements of sound policy. 

The hard truth, however, is that 

for all the progress and hard-won 

experience of the past two decades, our performance is falling 

short of the mark, handicapped by 

bureaucratic politics; the pursuit of 

maximalist objectives on unrealistic timelines; the failure to balance 

short-term imperatives with longterm goals; the habit of lurching 

from one crisis to the next; missed 

opportunities to act preventively; 

and too much of a focus on how 

our bureaucracy looks, and not 

enough on how it works.

There is no simple prescription 

to address fragility. The United 

States cannot—and should 

not—try to fix every fragile state. 

We can—and should—articulate 

sound and realistic policy principles to determine where and 

how to invest scarce resources 

and attention to maximum effect. 

And we can—and should—play 

a leadership role in shaping the 

global response and strengthening 

the capacity of key institutions and 

partners to do their part. 

As the chairs of the Fragility 

Study Group, the three of us come 

at this problem from different 

professional backgrounds and 

experiences, but we all agree that 

when the defense, development, 

and diplomacy communities talk 

past one another, U.S. policy 

suffers. With inputs from a distinguished and diverse Senior 

Advisory Group, we suggest four 

principles of engagement to guide 

a more disciplined approach to 

the challenge of fragile states. 

Taken together, we believe these 

principles will position the United 

States to make a more meaningful 

difference at lower cost and with 

manageable risk. We recommend 

the following Four “S” Framework. 

Given the inbox awaiting the next 

administration, fragile states may seem like 

a distant and abstract concern. They are not. 

They are at the center of much of today’s 

regional disorder and global upheaval.
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 3

STRATEGIC

Concentrate efforts where America’s interests are greatest, paying 

special attention to states whose 

fragility could upend regional 

order. Work closely with international organizations and partners 

to strengthen their capacity 

to respond effectively where 

their immediate interests are at 

stake and where second- and 

third-order effects of fragility and 

instability increasingly have global 

repercussions. Prioritize prevention by addressing the festering 

root causes of fragility before 

they bubble over into conflict and 

instability. Invest in resilience, 

which will reduce demands on the 

United States by enhancing the 

ability of fragile states and societies to manage shocks locally and 

nonviolently. Be vigilant against 

short-term actions that may 

undermine long-term objectives 

and further exacerbate fragility.

SYSTEMIC

Tackle security, political, 

and capacity challenges in relationship to one another and not in 

isolation. It is one thing to bring the 

entire toolkit of statecraft to bear. 

It is another thing entirely to make 

sure that toolkit works in concert 

toward shared goals. 

SELECTIVE

Focus on cases where U.S. interests and leverage are greatest, 

where goals are attainable, and 

where those goals also align with 

the interests and capacities of local 

partners. Empower international 

partners and institutions to lead 

where they have greater stakes 

and influence. When our interests 

are high, but our leverage is low, 

we should insist that, at minimum, 

our engagement does not make 

things more fragile, while exploring 

and refining available sticks and 

carrots to alter the incentives of 

elites and other key actors. 

SUSTAINED

Domestic political support 

is essential to achieving desired 

outcomes. It takes decades for a 

country to transition from fragility 

to health; policy frameworks must 

acknowledge this reality and invest 

patiently and flexibly over time. 

We cannot sustain the present 

pace of reactive and expensive 

crisis response. Nor can we dive 

headfirst into complex environments without a shared sense of 

what can be achieved and greater 

confidence that it will have the 

required political backing and 

budgetary resources. We must be 

straight with the American people 

and our partners about both the 

limits of our means, and the costs 

and consequences of inaction.

Translating these principles into 

action will be a formidable test for 

the next administration. Mutual 

responsibility and accountability 

will be essential to reframing our 

engagement with fragile states and 

with international partners and, 

just as importantly, within our own 

government. Three priorities stand 

out: 

1. Getting our own house in order 

by ensuring greater coherence 

and alignment among executive 

branch agencies and between 

the executive and legislative 

branches; 

2. Building more effective partnerships among international 

partners and between them and 

fragile states; and 

3. Sharpening the tools to help 

fragile states more meaningfully strengthen state-society 

relationships.

We believe these recommendations would allow the administration to deliver a more disciplined, 

realistic, sound and ultimately 

effective approach. This paper will 

be accompanied over the coming 

months by a series of policy briefs 

to explore specific policy, political, 

and bureaucratic aspects of this 

challenge in greater depth.1

We have no illusions about the 

complexity of this challenge or 

about the limits of U.S. influence. 

But we are confident about the 

continued promise of principled 

American leadership to help 

states and societies write their 

own future.
4 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

Presidents Clinton (above) and Bush (below) meet 

with advisors in the White House Situation Room.
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 5

STRATEGIC

Concentrate efforts where America’s interests are 

greatest, paying special attention to states whose 

fragility could upend regional order.

• Prevent or mitigate future crises 

• Couple prevention with resilience

• Be rigorous about trade-offs 

• Strengthen international partnerships that 

promote openness and transparency

SYSTEMIC

Tackle security, political, and capacity challenges in 

relationship to one another and not in isolation.

• Develop a more proactive, adaptive, and 

synchronized interagency policy planning and 

implementation process for fragile states 

• Foster an awareness that interventions 

focused on only one dynamic will have unintended consequences

• Work toward a shared understanding among 

interagency actors about how best to deploy 

America’s foreign policy tools and work with 

one another

SELECTIVE

Focus on cases where U.S. interests and leverage are 

greatest, where goals are attainable, and where those 

goals also align with the interests and capacities of 

local partners.

• Identify the most effective sources of U.S. 

leverage to incentivize local change

• Play to complementary strengths of international partners to avoid costly and counterproductive duplicative efforts

• Align American interests and actions with 

local aspirations and solutions

• Work together where interests align, but do 

not overlook divergence

SUSTAINED

Domestic political support is essential to achieving 

desired outcomes. It takes decades for a country to 

transition from fragility to health; policy frameworks 

must acknowledge this reality and invest patiently and 

flexibly over time.

• Avoid getting involved too late and leaving 

too early

• Structure realistic, flexible, and politically 

feasible plans

• Invest in success

AT A GLANCE

DEFINITION

Fragility is the absence or breakdown of a social contract between people and their government. 

Fragile states suffer from deficits of institutional capacity and political legitimacy that increase the risk 

of instability and violent conflict and sap the state of its resilience to disruptive shocks.

FOUR “S” FRAMEWORK

FRAGILITY

STUDY GROUP
6 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

PRIORITY ACTIONS

DOMESTIC 

COMPACT

Ensure that the U.S. government works in a more integrated fashion, rather than at 

cross purposes, to address and 

mitigate fragility.

1. Build strategic foresight into 

the regular decision-making 

process at the National Security 

Council (NSC) and schedule 

regular senior-level discussions 

about fragility that elevate early 

warning and preventive action.

2. Work with Congress to 

identify specific fragile states 

for long-term investment and 

engagement strategies, and 

resource for success.

3. Reform human capital and 

management strategies to 

reflect policy needs, promote 

unity of purpose, and prioritize 

relationship-building in fragile 

states.

FRAGILE-STATES 

COMPACT

Invest in the tools and approaches for U.S. government 

use that are needed to help 

fragile states foster legitimate 

state-society relations.

1. Broaden the base of information used to inform decisionmaking by building local knowledge networks and making 

them more accessible in real 

time to U.S. and international 

policymakers.

2. Develop critical, underresourced capabilities to 

address the needs of fragile 

states: security sector engagement; anti-corruption; civil 

society support; public-private 

partnerships; leadership influence and coercion tools; elections; education and exchanges; 

learning and evaluation.

INTERNATIONAL 

COMPACT

Better synchronize efforts 

between the United States 

and international partners in 

fragile states.

1. Expand the partnership 

model pioneered by the 

New Deal for Engagement 

in Fragile States.

2. Develop partnership 

strategies based on shared 

interests in fragile states and 

unique sources of expertise and 

capability.

3. Build the capacity of key 

international and regional organizations to face the challenge 

of fragile states.

1. Invest in security and justice for all citizens.

2. Support legitimate government, characterized by inclusive politics, accountable institutions, 

and reconciliation.

3. Cultivate locally-led and locally-owned solutions where partnership is possible.

4. Create inclusive, equitable economic growth.

5. Sustain engagement.

SUPPORTING PEACE AND STABILITY 

IN FRAGILE STATES: THE COLLECTIVE WISDOM
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 7

T he next administration will 

have to navigate an international landscape filled 

with daunting national security 

challenges: ambitious and revisionist states, transnational terrorism, 

new cyber threats, and fears 

of nuclear proliferation, among 

others.

Fragile states lie at the root of 

today’s global disorder, from chaos 

in the Arab world to the refugee 

crisis and from pandemic diseases 

to economic malaise.2

 Fragility has 

contributed to the spike in violent 

conflict since 2010, with a record 

65 million people displaced from 

their homes at the end of 2015.3

Fragility can make it more difficult 

to address public health emergencies, as seen with the precipitous 

spread of Ebola, and to counter 

transnational criminal networks 

that deprive citizens of their dignity 

and economies of their potential. 

In short, in a world that is more 

complex and interconnected than 

ever, fragility is pushing us closer 

to a new normal of “unpredictable 

instability.”4

U.S. efforts to prevent fragility 

and mitigate its consequences 

continue to fall short. Meeting this 

growing challenge head-on will 

require a re-imagined approach—

one defined by careful prioritization, shared frameworks for action, 

and effective partnerships.

FRAGILITY 

WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS

This Study Group defines 

fragility as the absence or

breakdown of a social 

contract between people 

and their government. 

Fragile states suffer from 

deficits of institutional 

capacity and political 

legitimacy that increase 

the risk of instability and 

violent conflict and sap 

the state of its resilience to 

disruptive shocks. 

FRAGILITY DEFINED

HISTORICAL POLICY APPROACHES 

Addressing fragility has been an 

evolving bipartisan priority for 

more than two decades. 

In the late 1990s, the Clinton 

administration’s National Security 

Strategy for a New Century recognized that states “unable to 

provide basic governance, safety 

and security, and opportunities 

for their populations” could potentially “generate internal conflict, 

mass migration, famine, epidemic 

diseases, environmental disasters, 

mass killings and aggression 

against neighboring states or 

ethnic groups—events which can 

threaten regional security and U.S. 

interests.” 

President George W. Bush’s first 

National Security Strategy (NSS) 

reiterated that warning and listed 

“failed states” as one of six “threats 

to U.S. interests.” After 9/11, the 

Bush administration prioritized the 

need to address the exploitation 

of weak states by terrorists. As the 

2002 NSS explained, “The events of 

September 11, 2001, taught us that 

weak states, like Afghanistan, can 

pose as great a danger to national 

interests as strong states.” The 

2006 NSS took the point further, 

recognizing that “Weak and impoverished states and ungoverned 

areas are not only a threat to their 

people and a burden on regional 

economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals.” 

The Obama administration has 

sustained a focus on state fragility, 

naming it in the 2015 NSS as one 

of “the top strategic risks to our 

interests” and pledging to prioritize 

efforts to address it. 
8 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

THE ONGOING CHALLENGE

Despite the decades of scholarship 

and hard-earned experience, 

we have yet to come up with an 

effective and sustainable approach 

to fragile states. Conflicts spread 

and crises continue to catch us 

by surprise. For all the good work 

within and outside government, 

there is still no shared understanding across U.S. government 

agencies about the best way to approach fragility. Fragility itself lacks 

a prescriptive element—it does 

not always help identify where the 

stakes are highest, where or how 

we should invest scarce resources, 

and where we can make the most 

meaningful difference.5

 Furthermore, across the U.S. government 

there is no clear or shared view 

of why, how, and when to engage 

fragile states. 

Notwithstanding efforts to 

achieve a more coordinated 

response, different U.S. agencies 

continue the injurious habit of 

talking past one another. Despite 

important progress, security, 

development, economic, humanitarian, and political stovepipes 

persist in every stage of effort, 

from assessment to decision-making and lessons learned. The 

result is the lack of a shared 

understanding of strategies and 

goals for fragile states and the absence of the integrated, sustained 

effort required to balance shortterm imperatives with longer-term 

objectives. It also is tempting to 

become distracted by emergent 

crises rather than focus where 

our interests and opportunities 

are greatest. We often lurch from 

one crisis to the next, limiting our 

ability to act preventively, or maintain a long-term strategic focus. 

The U.S. policymaking process 

has few incentives for early action 

in response to early warning or 

longer-term perspective, and 

much of our prevention toolkit 

is likewise poorly resourced and 

understood. We embark on complex endeavors with insufficient 

understanding, strategy, funding, 

flexibility, and focus. And efforts 

to improve our response have too 

often been cosmetic—rethinking 

how our bureaucracy looks, but 

not how it works. 

These problems are not unique 

to the United States; no state or 

international body has fully cracked 

the fragility code, nor organized 

and equipped itself to address effectively such a complex challenge. 

In fact, the growing number and 

diversity of stakeholders, national 

agendas, technical priorities, 

authorities, and politics have at 

times confused as much as clarified 

the response. The World Bank and 

the United Nations have begun 

to embrace the need for new 

approaches to tackle fragility and 

build resilience, but these reform 

efforts are still in their early days.

A refugee camp in Rwanda, July 6, 2006. 

There are 65 million displaced globally 

in 2016, including 21.3 million refugees.

Across the U.S. government there is no clear or 

shared view of why, how, and when to engage 

fragile states. These problems are not unique 

to the United States; no state or international 

body has fully cracked the fragility code.
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 9

PRINCIPLES 

FOR ENGAGEMENT 

A NEW APPROACH

T he new administration, a coming change in leadership at the United Nations, and an emerging global 

consensus about the fragility challenge make this an opportune moment to recalibrate our approach. 

The United States cannot and should not try to “fix” every fragile state. Nor can we ignore this challenge; 

all fragility has the potential to affect U.S. interests to some extent, especially when left to fester. There is simply 

too much at stake for our interests, our partners, and the global order. A sound and realistic policy framework 

is urgently needed to help our policymakers determine where, when, and how to invest scarce resources and 

attention to maximum effect.

Flags of the world outside of the United Nations 

headquarters in New York, March 21, 2007.
10 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

agreed outcomes—can serve 

as an effective approach for 

making progress toward these 

longer-term aspirations. Compacts 

have become an established 

method by development actors 

to incentivize economic growth 

and poverty alleviation. They have 

not, however, been designed or 

managed to explicitly target and 

address the vulnerabilities most 

relevant for counteracting fragility. 

For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) takes a 

principled approach to offering 

financial and technical assistance 

to select partner countries that 

meet a minimum threshold of 

development and good governance, but many fragile states 

cannot qualify for MCC assistance. 

And the Partnership for Growth, a 

compact-based alliance between 

the United States and “high-performing developing countries,” 

aims to “accelerate and sustain 

broad-based economic growth” 

but does not address deficiencies 

in the political compact.10

It is time to think as imaginatively about how to escape the 

fragility trap as we have about how 

to escape the poverty trap. 

Cooperation and Development 

(OECD) published its annual 

fragility report, States of Fragility, 

underscoring that fragility occurs 

on a continuum, and that it occurs 

not just across states but also 

within them. 

Goal 16 of the new Sustainable 

Development Goals (SDGs) announced at the 2015 U.N. General 

Assembly calls on the international community to “promote 

peaceful and inclusive societies 

for sustainable development, 

provide access to justice for all, 

and build effective, accountable, 

and inclusive institutions at all 

levels.” 9 Goal 16 recognizes that 

global development efforts will 

stall absent a more serious effort 

to tackle pervasive fragility. 

These are enormously ambitious and complex aims—far more 

easily stated than implemented. 

Nevertheless, they are based 

on accumulated evidence and 

research, and serve as useful 

guideposts for sound policymaking and effective structures of 

engagement. 

Compact models—or agreements among parties designed 

for mutual accountability toward 

There is growing recognition that 

at its core, fragility is about the 

failure to forge a minimally inclusive, legitimate, and accountable 

compact between the state and 

society. 

Previous landmark efforts, 

including the 2003 report of the 

Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, have warned against 

pushing for change from the 

outside when there is insufficient 

internal support.6

 Developing local 

partnerships and supporting locally led solutions, and giving such 

efforts time to work, is paramount 

for success.

The World Bank’s 2011 World 

Development Report argued that 

institutional legitimacy is the key 

to stability and counteracting 

what the bank’s leader at the time 

once called the “witches’ brew of 

ineffective government, poverty, 

and conflict” found in fragile states.7

Also in 2011, a landmark global 

policy agreement, the New Deal for 

Engagement in Fragile States, identified new mechanisms to coordinate 

financial and political investments 

in fragile states. The agreement, 

between self-identified fragile-state 

governments, international donors, 

and civil society organizations, 

was designed explicitly to create a 

framework for mutually accountable, internationally coordinated 

action, based on the principles of 

more locally owned, inclusive, accountable systems of governance.8

More recently, in 2015, the 

Organization for Economic 

COLLECTIVE WISDOM: WHAT IS NEEDED IN FRAGILE STATES

It is time to think as imaginatively about how 

to escape the fragility trap as we have about 

how to escape the poverty trap.
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 11

1. Invest in security and justice for all citizens.

2. Support legitimate government, characterized by inclusive 

politics, accountable institutions, and reconciliation.

3. Cultivate locally-led and locally-owned solutions where 

partnership is possible.

4. Create inclusive, equitable economic growth.

5. Sustain engagement.

SUPPORTING PEACE AND STABILITY 

IN FRAGILE STATES: THE COLLECTIVE WISDOM Libyan rebels celebrate 

after seizing the town of 

Al Bayda from government 

forces, February 25, 2011.

The Tunisian National Dialogue 

Quartet in Vienna. The Quartet 

received a Nobel Peace 

Prize for their work moving 

Tunisia towards participatory 

democracy, February 29, 2016.
12 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN FRAGILE STATES: 

TOWARD A MORE DISCIPLINED APPROACH 

Four principles should inform decisions about when and how to engage fragile states: strategic, systemic,

selective, and sustained. This Four “S” framework should help the next administration invest scarce resources 

and attention to maximum effect.

A systemic approach to fragility would help us make 

sense of complexity and more effectively address 

fragility in all of its interconnected dimensions. This 

would include seeing each individual effort as just 

one piece of a broader puzzle; viewing threats and 

opportunities as dynamic, evolving, and interdependent; and considering how specific tools and 

approaches interact with one another. This means 

developing strategies and programs that tackle 

security, political, and capacity challenges in relationship to one another and not in isolation. Such 

a systems mindset should be supported by new or 

strengthened tools, processes, and approaches that 

enable policymakers to identify relevant patterns and 

leverage points against which the United States can 

plan, act, and adapt accordingly.

• Develop a more proactive, adaptive, and 

synchronized interagency policy planning

and implementation process for fragile states, 

predicated on a locally informed, holistic understanding of the challenges and leverage points for 

U.S. engagement. 

• Foster an awareness of unintended consequences caused by interventions that focus on 

only one dynamic within a broader system.12

• Work toward a shared understanding among 

interagency actors about how best to deploy 

America’s foreign policy tools and work with one 

another: Diplomacy and security must be achieved 

locally; development and security are political

concerns; and diplomacy and development cannot 

be separated from security and stability.

A strategic approach to addressing fragility begins 

with the recognition that not all fragile states affect 

U.S. national interests to the same degree. We should 

prioritize action in fragile states where stakes in 

regional order are greatest. A number of fragile states 

sit on major geopolitical fault-lines with a real impact 

on regional order and key U.S. interests like terrorism, 

mass displacement, and energy security. This would 

require attention to places like Tunisia, whose future 

matters for regional order in the Maghreb, just as 

Nigeria’s matters to West Africa and Ukraine’s to 

Europe. A strategic approach also would invest in 

building the capacity of key partners to meet the 

fragility challenge.

• Prevent or mitigate future crises by identifying 

and addressing sources of fragility before they boil 

over into conflict and instability. 

• Couple prevention with resilience by investing 

in states and societies with the will and potential to 

respond to internal or external shocks. 

• Be rigorous about trade-offs between long-term 

objectives and short-term actions that risk undercutting strategic aims.

• Strengthen international partnerships that 

promote openness and transparency, which 

are crucial antidotes to fragility (e.g., the Open 

Government Partnership).11

STRATEGIC SYSTEMIC 
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 13

A sustained approach requires sound and adaptable policies based on the realities of the slow and 

uneven pace of change, as well as the recognition 

that broad political support is an indispensable 

prerequisite for success. Fleeting engagements can 

exacerbate fragility, waste resources, and undermine 

our credibility. Different fragile states and different 

U.S. interests and influence will call for differentiated 

approaches. At times, the most that can be achieved 

in the near- to medium term is preventing complete 

state breakdown or humanitarian catastrophe (e.g., 

Burundi). At other times, stakes and potential will 

call for a significant and comprehensive engagement 

(e.g., Colombia), or encouraging positive progress 

and selectively filling the gaps (e.g., Tunisia). There 

will also be cases where our main objective will be 

to help build and sustain regional coalitions that can 

take the lead (e.g., Africa’s Great Lakes region). 

• Avoid getting involved too late and leaving 

too early. Complete state failure and descent into 

violence cannot be the only call to action, just as 

“free and fair” elections cannot be the sole barometer of success. 

• Structure realistic, flexible, and politically feasible plans. Use these plans as a basis for building 

the bipartisan political consensus necessary to 

sustain continued resourcing for the duration of 

the engagement. We should aim to protect key 

foreign policy interests from short-term politics 

that threaten to undermine financing and support 

for those interests. Engaging Congress early and 

often is critical.

• Invest in success. Make sure that partners 

pursuing reform receive sustained support and 

assistance. 

• Avoid the trap of maximalist goals on unrealistic timelines. Building pluralistic, vibrant democracies can be a generational effort. We must align 

expectations around outcomes and time frames to 

ensure a realistic measure of success and ability to 

sustain efforts over time.

A selective approach would calibrate American support 

to instances where our interests and leverage are 

greatest, where goals are achievable, and where those 

goals also align with the interests and capacities of 

local partners. This means empowering international 

partners and institutions to lead where they have 

greater stakes and influence. Where the United States 

lacks a willing partner, we will need to avoid taking 

steps that exacerbate fragility while employing a suite 

of tools to entice, isolate, or bypass obstinate partners 

and make progress where we can. 

• Identify the most effective sources of U.S. 

leverage to incentivize local change. U.S. leverage 

can take many forms beyond financial assistance, 

including participation in regional or global economic and security architectures, training and 

exchanges, diplomatic support, and the enormous 

contributions of our private sector and civil society 

organizations. 

• Play to complementary strengths of international partners to avoid costly and counterproductive duplicative efforts—and be transparent 

about weaknesses and gaps. We should also allow 

partners to take the lead where their influence and 

interests are greatest.

• Align American interests and actions with 

local aspirations and solutions. The goal for 

U.S. policy must be to help people write their own 

future on their own terms. Local partners define 

the range of the possible and help determine what 

is “minimally acceptable.” The degree and scope of 

our support—and rhetoric—should ideally reflect 

the ambition, will, and objectives of a broad base of 

the local population. 

• Work together where interests align, but do 

not overlook divergence. We must be careful not 

to overestimate alignment with partners, to ensure 

that our efforts do not inadvertently exacerbate 

conflict dynamics in fragile states.

SELECTIVE SUSTAINED 
14 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

FOUR “S” ENGAGEMENT

TWO CASE STUDIES 

PLAN COLOMBIA

Colombia’s experience recovering from near state failure serves as a powerful example of what sustained, integrated, and disciplined engagement in a fragile state can achieve. In 2005—the first year of the Fragile States 

Index—Colombia was listed as the 14th most fragile state, one spot behind North Korea.13 Colombia was beset 

by violence perpetrated by both a Marxist insurgency and drug kingpins who used cocaine revenues to hollow 

out the state and capture its security forces. Through decades of engagement, the United States created a 

strategic, systemic, selective, and sustained partnership with Colombia, resulting in a much more stable and 

prosperous country that today ranks as the world’s 61st most fragile state.14

Such an engagement is not easily replicable and does not come cheaply. The United States spent over $8 

billion on Plan Colombia from 2000 to 2012 to safeguard regional stability.15 Such comprehensive, enduring 

endeavors are not possible in all cases and must be reserved for those countries of top strategic import. But 

Colombia is an example of how they can succeed when properly conceived, executed, resourced, and sustained 

across administrations. Even constructive partnerships such as this one have their share of blemishes, from 

human rights abuses to ongoing narco-trafficking in Colombia and in other regions driven by market forces 

resulting from Colombia’s success.16

Against the backdrop of seemingly intractable challenges posed by 

fragility, a few examples of notable success stand out.

Secretary Kerry and Ambassador Whitaker meet with Colombian President Santos and Foreign Minister 

Holguin in Bogota, Colombia, December 12, 2014.
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 15

STRATEGIC 

SYSTEMIC 

In the 1990s, Colombia was awash in narco cash. This 

money fueled a guerrilla insurgency, imperiling an 

elected government. Colombia’s fragility threatened 

regional stability, and the drug trade produced violent 

spillovers in neighboring states and in the United 

States itself. This posed an unacceptable threat to 

American security and offered a clear rationale for 

action. The United States asked itself two critical 

questions that would frame its approach: “What 

was Colombia prepared to do?” (What was the local 

appetite for change?); and “In what way could we 

organize ourselves to help Colombia reform and rebound 

successfully?” (How could the United States be a good 

external partner?)

As a result of effective prioritization and policy development, the United States was able to marshal a unified, 

systematic approach to assisting Colombia to achieve 

shared priorities. In Colombia, deep historical, institutional relationships between the U.S. State Department 

and the Colombian National Police, as well as between 

the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Colombian military, laid the groundwork for the partnership. 

The United States possessed an array of foreign 

assistance tools that were of great interest to the 

Colombian government. The United States was therefore able to construct a unified plan based on what it 

knew the Colombian government was already doing 

and what the U.S. government could do to strengthen 

that effort. Given the long-term, iterative nature of the 

task, the United States sought to institutionalize the 

policy by creating a system whereby each participating 

U.S. agency brought its own resources to the table. 

The State Department’s Bureau of Inter-American 

Affairs (now the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs) 

served as the central coordinating body, which ensured 

that people would not be worn out as they typically 

were through interagency secondments. The collaboration worked because of the shared recognition 

that multidisciplinary efforts were needed to address 

Colombia’s challenges. 

The U.S. approach evolved over the years to match 

the will of local partners. At first, the United States 

attempted to coerce Colombia to the negotiating 

table. The U.S. government exerted political pressure 

on President Ernesto Samper, who was beholden to 

the traffickers, by revoking his visa privileges in 1996 

and cutting off most foreign assistance to Colombia. 

But the 1998 election of President Andrés Pastrana 

brought a more willing partner to the table. Colombia 

wanted to rid itself of the “narco-state” label and to 

end the cycles of torturous violence that had plagued 

it for decades. To build trust and confidence, the 

United States cooperated to address the highest 

priority counternarcotic and security objectives, and 

over time expanded the collaboration to the social, 

economic justice, and rule of law objectives.

While historically the United States had provided aid 

on a year-by-year basis, under Pastrana it agreed to 

commit funding for programs and personnel for an 

initial three-year period. Furthermore, resources for 

Plan Colombia were provided through a supplemental 

Congressional appropriation, meaning that no departments or agencies had to take funds from elsewhere 

within their budgets. Crucially, burden-sharing and 

Colombian buy-in enabled success. Local commitment 

ensured that Colombia would carry more than its fair 

share, making the effort sustainable and expanding it 

beyond basic security objectives to a shared agenda 

for transformational change. Remarkably, Plan Colombia has endured across three administrations with 

strong, consistent bipartisan support in Congress and 

with billions of dollars in uninterrupted financing.

SUSTAINED 

SELECTIVE 
16 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

MYANMAR

Myanmar, also known as Burma, a reclusive military dictatorship since 1962, offers another example of a strategic, systemic, selective, and sustained approach. Today, Myanmar is undergoing a fragile but hopeful transition 

after the 2015 election of the National League for Democracy (NLD) under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. 

With U.S. and international support, the future holds promise for meaningful reform and transformation in the 

long-suffering country.17

Although not a major power, Myanmar sits at the 

geopolitical crossroads of Asia, between India to the 

west, China to the north, and fellow Southeast Asian 

states to the east and south. Myanmar is a member of 

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 

a critical body to U.S. regional interests. Myanmar’s 

coast includes sea lanes that link the Indian Ocean 

with the Pacific Ocean. Myanmar is also the epicenter 

of drug-resistant malaria and tuberculosis, is a major 

global and regional source of opium and methamphetamine, and has been a leading trading partner 

and arms market for North Korea in the past decade. 

Furthermore, in a region where democratic development has receded in recent years, the success of 

Myanmar’s transition may serve as an important model 

for other regional nations, as democratic failure may 

bolster the credibility of autocratic narratives. For all 

these reasons, the United States has a keen interest in 

the success of Myanmar’s nascent reform effort.

Beginning with the establishment of a “special representative and policy coordinator” for Myanmar, and 

extending into the operations of the U.S. Embassy 

after installation of an ambassador in 2012, the 

United States pursued an integrated, coordinated, 

systematic approach to Myanmar policy. An 

assistance-coordination group was formed in early 

2012. The group was chaired and directed by the 

special representative’s office, with extensive guidance and support, including detailed staff, from the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 

Later in 2012, Ambassador Derek Mitchell and USAID Mission Director Chris Milligan worked closely 

together in the field to implement assistance tailored 

to Myanmar’s unique local conditions. This work 

proceeded according to an explicit strategic vision 

developed in part through the Integrated Country 

Strategy process. The rest of the embassy country 

team, including the deputy chief of mission, defense 

STRATEGIC SYSTEMIC 

President Barack Obama hosts 

a town hall in Yangon, Myanmar, 

on November 14, 2014.
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 17

After 50 years of systematic degradation of every 

institution in the country (except the military), patience, persistence, and increased bureaucratic and 

financial resources devoted to Myanmar will remain 

critical for some time. Myanmar’s government and 

people have demonstrated a clear desire for a longterm relationship with the United States, viewing U.S. 

public and private investment as important to their 

continued reform and development and to our credibility as a partner in their time of need. U.S. official 

assistance increased substantially after 2011. Priority 

attention was given to health, rural development, 

democratic development, humanitarian assistance, 

peace support, promotion of interreligious tolerance, 

and public-private partnerships in the information 

and communications technology sector and among 

U.S. universities. Fulbright, Humphrey, and other 

educational scholarships expanded, and the Peace 

Corps opened an office with the intention to place 

volunteers on the ground in 2016. However, the level 

of USAID assistance flattened out over time, and after 

the historic 2015 elections, the United States did not 

increase funding to assist the new democratic government. (Others, including Japan, the United Kingdom 

and the European Union, did increase their assistance 

support after the election.) Regular visits by the U.S. 

secretary of state, the 2012 appointment of the first 

U.S. ambassador to Myanmar in 22 years, and two 

presidential visits in two years have reflected priority 

interest in Myanmar during the Obama administration. However, in the future, political symbolism will be 

less important than assisting the country’s economic 

development, peace process, military reform, religious 

and ethnic unity, and other urgent needs, to enable 

Myanmar to successfully transition to a less fragile 

and more coherent, peaceful, and democratic nation.

Although—and in some ways because—the United 

States pursued a policy of diplomatic and economic 

isolation of the former military regime for more 

than a decade, the people of Myanmar welcomed 

its re-engagement as reform gained momentum 

beginning in 2011. Key figures in senior levels of the 

quasi-military government were open to learning 

about the Open Government Partnership, signing up 

to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 

(EITI), and accepting workshops (and private advice) 

on a full spectrum of issues geared toward conforming to international standards. At the same time, the 

government released virtually all political prisoners, 

began serious peace talks with ethnic armed groups, 

broadened space for civil society, vastly expanded 

media freedom, and addressed its illicit arms trade 

with North Korea. These actions were all confidence-building measures that demonstrated serious 

interest to reform and work with the United States. 

The exception was military-to-military engagement, 

which proceeded slowly given the continued civil war 

and ongoing concerns (raised by both ethnic minority 

groups and the NLD, the political opposition) about 

the military’s role in the country’s democratic future. 

attaché, public affairs director, and Office of Transition 

Initiatives representative, among others, also adhered 

to a disciplined process that included the establishment of a number of internal joint working groups 

to address, inter alia, Rakhine State (Rohingya), intercommunal conflict, the peace process, and the 2015 

election. In that way, the embassy remained united 

in approach, systematic in implementation, and 

responsive to new developments. The “one post, one 

mission” partnership mindset reinforced by embassy 

leadership prevented the kind of sectoral stovepiping 

that would have undermined policy effectiveness as 

well as U.S. leadership among international missions 

in the country.

SELECTIVE 

SUSTAINED 
18 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

FROM PRINCIPLES 

TO PRACTICE 

PRIORITY ACTIONS FOR 

THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION

Translating these principles into action will be a formidable task for the next administration. We recommend focusing on three principal lines of effort, or compacts, each of which is defined by mutual responsibility and accountability: Domestic Compact: getting our own house in order by ensuring greater coherence and alignment among executive branch agencies and between the executive and legislative branches; 

International Compact: building more effective partnerships among international partners and between the 

international community and fragile states; and Fragile-States Compact: sharpening the tools to strengthen 

state-society relationships within fragile states. 

Taken alone, any one of these recommendations will be insufficient. But taken together, a process of coordinated horizon-scanning, prioritization, early warning, early action, strengthened partnerships, and refined tools 

can significantly improve U.S. engagement in fragile states.

Taken alone, 

any one of these 

recommendations 

will be 

insufficient. But 

taken together 

...they can 

significantly 

improve U.S. 

engagement in 

fragile states. A case investigation team 

working to monitor and 

control Ebola in Liberia, 

January 31, 2015.
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 19

DOMESTIC COMPACT

Ensure the U.S. government works in a more integrated fashion, rather 

than at cross purposes, to address and mitigate fragility.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Build strategic foresight into the regular decision-making process at the National 

Security Council (NSC) and schedule regular senior-level discussions about fragility that 

elevate early warning and preventive action.

Every NSC faces the challenge of 

balancing urgent crises with important long-term considerations. 

Early warning and more proactive, 

preventive action is critical to a 

more disciplined and effective 

approach. This will require analysis, 

assessments, and processes at the 

most senior levels of government 

that incentivize discussions about 

joint strategic, resource, and 

personnel planning and action. 

Illustrative Actions 

• Establish a strategic foresight 

cell within the Directorate of 

Strategic Planning of the National Security Council. Direct 

the foresight cell to identify 

top-tier fragile states of concern 

to U.S. interests (i.e. a “fragile-states watch list”), building 

on and integrating the work of 

the USAID Fragile States Alert 

List, the Political Instability Task 

Force (PITF)18 and other indices. 

• The foresight cell should lead 

regular joint assessments of 

priority countries to determine 

whether criteria for effective 

engagement are present.

• Develop shared diagnostics for 

fragile states that bring together 

regional and subject-matter 

experts from the interagency 

to inform planning and 

decision-making.

• Building on lessons learned 

from the Atrocities Prevention 

Board, establish a new quarterly 

NSC Deputies Committee meeting that uses the “fragile-states 

watch list” and the work of the 

foresight cell to consider policy 

implications of new developments in priority watch-list 

states and to monitor implementation of relevant strategies 

and planning. 

• As a part of this process, establish a working-level forum, 

to coordinate comprehensive 

assistance and programming to 

high-priority fragile states.

• Institute regular interagency 

tabletop exercises on priority 

fragile states focused on 

both early warning and crisis 

response scenarios, to build a 

deeper shared understanding 

of drivers of crisis and effective 

responses. 

• Ensure that all relevant 

agencies are included in such 

meetings and exercises (including USAID as outlined in 

Presidential Policy Directive-6, 

Treasury, Justice, and others 

with key expertise and tools)19

to develop a shared understanding of the challenge and 

the available responses.

2. Work with Congress to identify specific fragile states for long-term investment and 

engagement strategies, and resource for success.

Resetting relations with Congress 

is an essential prerequisite for 

improving policy effectiveness, 

sustaining a level of resourcing that 

matches what is needed in fragile 

environments, and strengthening 

our confidence in our ability to 

effect progress in such environments. In a time of scarce 

resources and reduced congressional appetite for foreign engagement, the administration should 

work with key members to focus 

on the most critical fragile states, 

and to agree on the level, type, and 

length of funding required for success. Just as Congress was able to 

sustain military and development 
20 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

financing for Plan Colombia for 

more than a decade, the future 

Congress can generate sustained 

political will for long-term strategies when aligned with clear 

strategic imperatives, achievable 

objectives, and realistic timelines 

outlining incremental steps toward 

progress. Without this mutual commitment, well-planned interagency 

efforts have been hampered by 

piecemeal funding with serious 

policy consequences.20

Illustrative Actions 

• Use the Four “S” framework 

to select a portfolio of priority 

fragile states for congressional 

engagement, informed by 

the strategic planning effort 

at the NSC and dialogue with 

members. 

• Work with Congress to create a 

multiyear, flexible funding mechanism (such as an expanded 

Complex Crises Fund) for these 

priority fragile states to allow 

for predictable and adaptable 

programming. This mechanism 

should help increase flexibility 

and responsiveness that is 

currently hampered by voluminous legislative earmarks on 

assistance budgets.

• Organize periodic, multiagency 

fragile-states briefings before 

Congress, focusing on these 

priority states and on the 

authorities that need to be reformed and refined to improve 

the quality of our engagements.

• Support expanded interagency 

transfer authorities for joint 

programming for priority fragile 

states, taking lessons from past 

efforts such as the 1207 Security and Stabilization program. 

A useful model might be an 

authority considered, but not 

incorporated, in the FY17 Senate 

National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA) that would have 

enabled resource transfers 

between DoD and USAID for 

specific challenges.

President Obama 

convenes a National 

Security Council meeting, 

April 19, 2013.
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 21

3. Reform human capital and management strategies to reflect policy needs, promote unity 

of purpose, and prioritize relationship-building in fragile states.

Systemic responses to fragility 

require a shared understanding 

of the combined U.S. government 

toolkit and capabilities. Too few 

government officials have relevant, 

cross-functional experience within 

the interagency that facilitates the 

shared sense of purpose and understanding needed to achieve the 

government’s strategic priorities in 

fragile states. This reality is driven, 

in part, by interagency promotion 

criteria and practices that deprioritize assignments outside home 

agencies. Finally, finding a balance 

between embassy security and 

the inevitable risks that come with 

local engagement will be crucial to 

enabling our personnel to develop 

requisite understanding and 

access. 

Illustrative Actions

• Learn from past efforts (e.g., 

the Civilian Response Corps 

and ongoing DoD efforts to 

track service member expertise) to develop an interagency 

mechanism to identify and track 

personnel expertise in relevant 

functional and regional areas. 

• Conduct a capabilities audit and 

catalog all relevant U.S. government tools and capabilities 

available to address fragility, and 

make the information easily accessible across the interagency. 

• Increase the shared understanding of the national security 

workforce by continuing and 

significantly increasing emphasis 

on the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) 21

program, with a particular 

focus on interagency rotations 

as a key component of leader 

recruitment, development, and 

promotion.

• For priority fragile states, 

identify assignment practices 

that will ensure continuity of 

critical relationships and expertise, including through incentives for extended hardship 

deployments. 

• Provide civilians serving in 

high-risk environments with 

standardized cross-agency 

training to conduct missioncritical work. 

U.S. Special Operations Task Force provides security for local shura, 

Uruzgan province, Afghanistan, March 16, 2013.
22 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

INTERNATIONAL COMPACT

Better synchronize efforts between the United States and international 

partners in fragile states.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Expand the partnership model pioneered by the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. 

The New Deal effectively captures 

the conceptual basis for a sound 

approach to fragile states, in 

support of five Peacebuilding 

and Statebuilding Goals (PSG): 

legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and 

revenue and services. A common 

criticism of the New Deal is that it 

has remained in the sole domain 

of finance and planning ministries, 

which has undermined its effectiveness. The New Deal “TRUST 

principles”—Transparency, Risk 

sharing, Using country systems, 

Strengthening capacities, and 

providing Timely and predictable 

aid—are essential to the effective 

functioning of all state systems. 

Illustrative Actions

• Champion support of and 

engagement on the New Deal 

beyond USAID within the U.S. 

government. 

• Incentivize expanded support 

of the New Deal in fragile states 

beyond ministries of finance and 

planning, to include all security, 

political, and development 

departments as well as across 

civil society.

• Apply New Deal “FOCUS principles” for engagement (Fragility 

assessment; One vision, one 

plan; Compact; Use Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals to 

monitor country progress; and 

Support political dialogue and 

leadership) to countries that 

might not embrace the “fragile” 

label (such as Nigeria, Myanmar, 

Ukraine and Georgia), but where 

the core approach remains valid. 

• Support mentoring state-to-state 

and society-to-society relationships between fragile states to 

share lessons and ideas. 

The Sustainable Development 

Goals projected on the 

United Nations building in 

New York, September 2015.
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 23

2. Develop partnership strategies based on shared interests in fragile states and unique 

sources of expertise and capability. 

Regardless of U.S. strategic interests, there are instances where we 

have limited resources and limited 

leverage. In other cases, efforts are 

not coordinated among donors, 

leading to a cacophony of assistance that fails to help or may even 

harm fragile states. Based on the 

principles outlined in the New Deal, 

and countries’ strategic interests, 

allies and partners should build 

on each other’s strengths to make 

progress in a greater number of 

states than otherwise possible. 

Furthermore, by conceptualizing 

partnerships broadly, the international community can allow those 

with the greatest interests and 

most relevant capabilities to take 

the lead, resulting in more efficient, 

less expensive, and more effective 

strategies.

Illustrative Actions

• Build upon past and ongoing 

efforts to track capability 

and capacity across specific 

donors and functional areas, 

and organize a comprehensive 

effort to collate and publicize 

a map of the landscape of 

actors (including states, nongovernmental organizations, 

and the private sector) as well 

as their respective comparative 

advantages (e.g., police training, 

mediation, etc.) for building 

integrated fragile-state strategies. While the resource should 

be accessible to all parties, it 

ultimately should be owned, 

managed, and updated by an 

international, multilateral entity 

such as the United Nations, the 

World Bank, or the Organization 

for Economic Cooperation and 

Development. 

• Institute a U.S. governmentwide commitment to inclusion 

of key civil society stakeholders 

in ad hoc multilateral mechanisms (like “Friends of” coalitions and the Bonn/Chicago/Tokyo meetings for Afghanistan22) 

which are critical for long-term 

success.

• Establish harmonized priorities 

and reporting systems that 

encourage the participation 

of nongovernmental organizations in such forums, such as 

the “Grand Bargain” between 

donors and aid agencies, 

announced at the 2016 World 

Humanitarian Summit, to reform 

humanitarian assistance.23

3. Build the capacity of key international and regional organizations to face the challenge 

of fragile states.

International bodies such as 

the United Nations and regional 

institutions such as the African 

Union (AU), the Association for 

Southeast Asian Nations, the 

Lake Chad Basin Commission 

(LCBC), and the Central American 

Integration System (SICA), among 

many others, are potentially 

well-positioned to address 

fragility within a regional context. 

As the challenges of fragility are 

often transnational, working 

within these international and regional institutions can help foster 

more complete regional solutions 

to regional problems. 

Illustrative Actions

• Work with each regional organization to establish local capabilities for monitoring fragility and 

developing mitigation plans. 

• Provide active support for 

initiatives and partnerships (e.g., 

Community of Democracies, 

Open Government Partnership, 

Inter-American Democratic 

Charter, Sustainable Development Goal 16 and other normative, values-based efforts) that 

offer clear evidence and incentives for legitimate and capable 

governance.

• Work with the United Nations 

and key regional organizations 

(e.g., African Union) to develop 

strategies for increased regional 

peacekeeping and peace-building capacity, and continue 

efforts to improve the training, 

equipping, and resourcing of 

peacekeepers.24

• Encourage United Nations member states to direct their investments into multilateral funding 

streams for counterterrorism, 

governance, rule of law, and resilience initiatives to support regional 

capacity-building efforts.
24 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

FRAGILE-STATES COMPACT

Invest in the tools and approaches for U.S. government use that are needed 

to help fragile states foster legitimate state-society relations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Broaden the base of information used to inform decision-making by building 

local knowledge networks and making them more accessible in real time to U.S. and 

international policymakers.

Non-governmental organizations, 

civil society, the humanitarian community, and the private sector have 

deep roots and local networks in 

all fragile states, but their perspectives rarely inform or influence 

policy decisions. Additionally, 

non-reporting U.S. government 

entities, such as USAID, cultivate 

unique data in fragile states but 

do not have the institutionalized 

mechanisms to systematically 

share it across the interagency. 

Such agencies and departments 

should be enabled to provide as 

well as consume fragility-relevant 

information; likewise, packaging it 

to identify long-term trends and 

opportunities, rather than simply 

informing crisis response, is critical 

to policymaking related to fragile 

states. 

Illustrative Actions

• Adapt formal assessment, 

planning, and evaluation tools 

and processes currently used 

across the interagency to be 

more responsive to sources of 

fragility and resilience, in line with 

the new proposed “fragile-states 

watch list” and NSC assessments 

(e.g., charge State and USAID to 

jointly adapt such tools as Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0, 

Interagency Conflict Assessment 

Framework, Conflict Assessment 

System Tool, etc.).

• Establish formal processes 

and requisite expectations for 

all agencies to regularly share 

fragility-relevant data and 

reporting with their interagency 

counterparts, without undue 

classification that hampers their 

ability to work with non-government partners. 

• Expand investment in, and 

cross-agency access to, big-data 

analytics tools to better organize, learn from, and apply data 

on fragility challenges.

2. Develop critical, under-resourced capabilities to address the needs of fragile states. 

The United States has often 

under-resourced capabilities that 

have proved essential to effectively 

reverse fragility, mitigate its externalities, or increase willingness or 

ability of partners to take on these 

challenges. Success in assisting 

fragile states with their transitions 

will require rethinking when and 

how such capabilities are applied 

but also reconsidering the capabilities themselves.

Security Sector Engagement:

Much of the conceptual 

groundwork for effective and 

evidence-based security sector 

engagement has been laid in 

Presidential Policy Directive 23, but 

leadership investment is needed 

for its implementation. Rather than 

starting anew, the next administration should build upon this 

progress to ensure that the United 

States has the capacity to engage 

effectively not only with partner 

militaries but also ministries, police, 

and judicial systems. In fragile 

states in particular, emphasis on 

equal provision of security as a 

public good, respect for human 

rights, and access to justice must be 

strengthened in security assistance 

programming. In countries where 

such reform is not yet possible, 

U.S. policymakers should seriously 

consider whether security assistance programs can be effective. 

To support such decision-making, 

implementing agencies should 

continue to strengthen still-nascent 

security monitoring and evaluation 

approaches, ensuring such efforts 

are used to inform relevant planning and policy decisions.25
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 25

Conflict Mediation: The 

United States urgently needs to 

strengthen and grow its bench of 

trained and tested conflict mediators within the State Department 

to prevent and resolve violent conflicts more effectively. The current 

demand for these professionals, 

both for U.S.-led and international 

efforts, also provides an opportunity to reconsider the traditional 

role and profile of mediators, 

including what role non-traditional 

mediators might play. Likewise, the 

State Department should revisit 

how such mediation efforts are 

stood up, staffed, organized, and 

supported to ensure they have 

access to the greatest possible 

leverage, expertise, flexibility, and 

expeditionary enablers. 

Anti-Corruption: In fragile states, 

corruption is a corrosive force 

that erodes the social fabric of the 

state, weakening government legitimacy. Therefore, efforts to mitigate 

fragility must meaningfully address 

systemic corruption to give other 

investments in local capacity and 

legitimacy the opportunity to 

succeed. Countering corruption requires a deeper understanding of 

the power dynamics, motivations, 

and means of state and non-state 

actors, including recognition of 

both formal and informal power 

structures that govern society. 

Comprehensive understanding 

of kleptocratic networks in fragile 

states needs to be developed 

and shared as a matter of course, 

starting with strengthening relevant intelligence requirements 

supported by technical and expert 

staff across the U.S. interagency. 

Likewise, anti-corruption efforts 

should figure into U.S. policy 

approaches to fragile states more 

broadly—whether security or 

economic assistance, trade or 

exchanges—rather than be assigned to specialized personnel 

with narrow missions.26

Elections: Long considered a 

milestone in democratic reform, 

elections can also have a polarizing 

and destabilizing impact in fragile 

environments, particularly when 

rushed, conducted in the absence 

of appropriate political inclusivity, 

or when lacking foundational 

elements to ensure a secure, safe, 

and transparent election. State 

and USAID should jointly conduct 

a systemic review of the role and 

impact of elections conducted in 

states across the fragility spectrum, as well as the effectiveness 

of international assistance in 

setting conditions for safe and 

A child admires election artwork, 

Afghanistan, March 2014.
26 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

secure political transitions. These 

assessments should be used to 

inform the portfolio of U.S. and 

partner assistance, as well as to 

establish political benchmarks for 

fragile states.

Civil Society Support: The United 

States needs sharper and more 

innovative tools and strategies to 

help create and preserve open 

space for civil society across a 

broad range of issues, including 

democracy and good governance, 

public health, education for girls, 

and equitable service provision. 

Support for civil society must 

include effective leverage with 

leaders as well as new tactics 

for supporting and working with 

organizations under threat.27

Public-Private Partnerships:

Private-sector investments, if not 

understood and harnessed as a 

powerful incentive for action, may 

have a pernicious effect in fragile 

states. In May 2016, the World 

Economic Forum Global Agenda 

Council on Fragility, Violence, 

and Conflict published a report, 

“Responsible Investment in Fragile 

Contexts,” emphasizing the role 

businesses can play beyond typical corporate social responsibility 

interventions, to build resources, 

knowledge, capital, and networks 

to mitigate fragility.28 The United 

States must take into account 

the important role of the private 

sector in fragile states and work 

with corporations, investors, and 

financial institutions to support 

sustainable transformation. 

Leadership Influence and Coercion Tools: In instances where 

fragile states may have significant 

impact on U.S. interests but counterparts are unwilling to take difficult steps to transcend fragility, we 

should consider carefully whether 

we have the ability to influence 

this dynamic, as well as the limits 

of our own leverage. Over the last 

several years the United States 

has developed a growing toolkit of 

incentives and coercive measures 

to influence the calculus of leaders 

worldwide (e.g., targeted financial 

sanctions, asset freezes, and travel 

restrictions). While the authorities 

underlying these tools have grown 

increasingly sophisticated, our 

understanding of the specific economic and political effects, impact, 

and appropriate role in U.S. foreign 

policy is still quite nascent. The 

next administration should craft 

a detailed framework, initiated 

by Treasury, for when and how 

such measures are in our national 

interest, how to apply more 

sophisticated measures in partnership with regional bodies, and 

in particular, how to set realistic 

goals for such efforts when their 

impacts may reverberate broadly 

throughout society, localized, and 

international markets.

Education and Exchanges: In 

countries with weak institutions 

and frayed state-society compacts, 

people-to-people exchanges can 

have outsize impact in the long 

run. Long-term educational and 

exchange programs remain a wise 

and strategic investment and 

should be fully integrated into our 

engagement strategies, especially 

when leverage with existing 

governments is limited. 

Learning and Evaluation: The 

United States needs a more 

robust learning agenda to collect 

data from past fragile-states 

engagements and incorporate 

lessons learned into future 

endeavors.29 Creating a process of 

consistent, strategic re-evaluation 

and capability repositioning, as 

close as possible to key decision-makers, will help ensure that 

the United States does not apply 

the wrong tools to the wrong 

problems. The next administration should direct the proposed 

NSC foresight cell to commission 

a series of studies to capture 

lessons learned from past U.S. 

engagements with fragile states 

and ensure that key findings and 

recommendations inform U.S. policy, approaches, and investment in 

capabilities going forward. 
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 27

State fragility is a generational challenge that will remain a central feature of the international landscape 

for the foreseeable future. Our response, however, can and indeed must evolve. We believe that prioritizing engagements that are strategic, systemic, selective, and sustained can help U.S. policymakers make 

wiser decisions about how to direct U.S. leadership at a moment of ever-mounting demands and ever-growing 

constraints on resources and public appetite for international engagement. 

We also recognize that a conceptual policy framework is not enough. Focusing policy changes and institutional reforms across three mutually reinforcing compacts can help bring this framework to life. We remain 

confident that a focused effort to get our own house in order, build more effective international partnerships, and strengthen key tools in the U.S. toolkit will position the next administration for greater success. 

CONCLUSION 

Sunrise over Gammarth, 

Tunisia, 2005.
28 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

1. At the time of this publication, the list of policy briefs 

and working titles includes: “Gender and Fragility” (Nora 

Dudwick, CNAS and Kathleen Kuehnast, USIP); “Congress’s 

Role in Addressing Fragility” (Katherine Kidder, CNAS); 

“First 100 Days Implementation Plan” (Loren Schulman, 

CNAS); “Transparency and Interagency Decision-making” 

(Loren Schulman, CNAS); “Fragility and Security Sector 

Reform” (Rachel Kleinfeld, Carnegie); “Closing Space for 

Civil Society and State Fragility” (Thomas Carothers, 

Carnegie); “Corruption and State Fragility” (Sarah Chayes, 

Carnegie); “The Fragility Learning Agenda: What Do We 

Need to Know?” (Andrew Blum, USIP); “Resilience and 

Fragility” (Lauren Van Metre, USIP); “Adopting a Movement 

Mindset to Address the Challenge of Fragility” (Maria 

Stephan, USIP); “Implementing a Unified Approach to 

Fragility: Lessons learned from Burma” (Jessica Davey, 

Chris Milligan, and Derek Mitchell); ”Preparing for Complex 

Conflicts” (Robert D. Lamb and Melissa R. Gregg, International Peace and Security Institute). For more information, 

please visit: http://www.usip.org/programs/projects/

senior-study-group-fragility.

2. Eighty-eight percent of all terrorist attacks in 2015 occurred in countries that were experiencing or involved 

in armed conflicts. Institute for Economics & Peace, 

“Global Terrorism Index 2015” (November 2015), http://

economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/

Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf.

3. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, “Global Trends: 

Forced Displacement in 2015” (June 20, 2016), https://

s3.amazonaws.com/unhcrsharedmedia/2016/2016-06-

20-global-trends/2016-06-14-Global-Trends-2015.pdf.

4. James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide 

Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Statement for the Record to the Committee on Armed Services, 

U.S. Senate, February 2016, http://www.armed-services.

senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper_02-09-16.pdf.

5. For example, countries as disparate as Haiti and Iraq rank 

next to each other on the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States 

Index (11th and 12th, respectively, in 2015).

6. Center for Strategic and International Studies and the 

Association of the U.S. Army, “Play to Win: Final report 

of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction” (January 2003), http://reliefweb.int/sites/

reliefweb.int/files/resources/44A3BEDEFCE6DB54C1256CD1003449F0-csis-play-jan03.pdf. 

7. Robert Zoellick, “Securing Development,” delivered at the 

U.S. Institute of Peace “Passing the Baton” Conference, 

January 8, 2009. 

8. The New Deal was a product of the International Dialogue 

on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, a unique multi

stakeholder partnership that includes the “g7+” group of 

countries affected by conflict and fragility, donors from 

OECD countries, and civil society organizations. The pact 

outlined new modes of operation for donor nations, 

including a commitment to locally owned and led development priorities, and and more inclusive planning processes 

in target countries. This new method of working was 

designed to promote five foundational Peacebuilding and 

Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), five FOCUS principles (Fragility 

Assessment; One Vision One Plan; Compact; Use PSGs to 

Monitor; and Support political dialogue) and five TRUST 

principles (Transparency, Risk sharing, Use and strengthen 

country systems, Strengthen capacities, and Timely and 

predictable aid): http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/. 

9. United Nations, “Goal 16: Promote just, peaceful, and inclusive societies,” http://www.un.org/

sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/.

10. Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Partnership for 

Growth,” https://www.mcc.gov/initiatives/initiative/

partnership-for-growth. 

11. Open Government Partnership “is a multilateral initiative 

that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight 

corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen 

governance. In the spirit of multi-stakeholder collaboration, 

OGP is overseen by a Steering Committee including representatives of governments and civil society organizations.” 

http://www.opengovpartnership.org/about.

12. For example, successful counternarcotics programs in 

Colombia pushed drug trafficking routes into Central America and West Africa, which has helped fuel greater violence 

in Mexico and finance terrorist operations in the Sahel, 

respectively. Mabel Gonzales Bustelo, “A sense of déjà vu: 

Illegal drugs in West Africa and the Sahel,” TheBrokerOnline.eu, January 28, 2015, http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/

Articles/A-sense-of-deja-vu-Illegal-drugs-in-West-Africaand-the-Sahel.

13. Fragile States Index 2005, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/

rankings-2005-sortable.

14. Fragile States Index 2015, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/

rankings-2015.

15. Michael Shifter, “Plan Colombia: A Retrospective,” Americas 

Quarterly (Summer 2012). Additionally, Colombia reciprocated, dedicating 1.1 percent of its annual gross domestic 

product to the war on drugs from 2000 to 2008.

16. This case illustration draws from an article by Senior 

Advisory Group member Ambassador Tom Pickering: 

Thomas R. Pickering, “Anatomy of Plan Colombia,” The 

American Interest, 5 no. 2 (November 1, 2009), http://

www.the-american-interest.com/2009/11/01/

anatomy-of-plan-colombia/.

17. Ambassador Derek Mitchell contributed immensely to the 

NOTES
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 29

development of this case illustration, including penning an 

initial draft.

18. The Political Instability Task Force (formerly the State 

Failure Task Force) was a CIA-sponsored effort to identify 

factors that increase a state’s vulnerability to political instability over a six-month to two-year period. The task force 

has identified more than 250 historical instances of acute 

instability occurring between 1955 and 2002. Jack Goldstone, Robert Bates, and Colin Kahl, “Political Instability 

Task Force: New Findings” (February 5, 2004), https://www.

wilsoncenter.org/event/political-instability-task-forcenew-findings#sthash.lACDazHe.dpuf.

19. Presidential Policy Directive 6 (PPD-6) was issued on 

September 22, 2010 by the Obama administration. The 

first of its kind by a U.S. administration, PPD-6 stated that 

“development is vital to U.S. national security and is a 

strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the United 

States. It call[ed] for the elevation of development as a core 

pillar of American power and chart[ed] a course for development, diplomacy, and defense to mutually reinforce and 

complement one another in an integrated comprehensive 

approach to national security.” It provided clear objectives 

and an implementation roadmap, including calling for the 

Administrator of USAID to be included in NSC meetings, as 

appropriate. The White House, Presidential Policy Directive/

PPD-6: U.S. Global Development Policy Fact Sheet (September 

22, 2010), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/global-dev.pdf.

20. For example, in a comprehensive interagency plan for Iraq 

put forth in 2011, Congress decided to fully fund Defense 

Department lines of effort while cutting civilian agency 

funding, despite DOD support. Walter Pincus, “Gates 

pleads for ‘critically urgent’ funds for State Department’s 

work in Iraq,” Washington Post (February 17, 2011), http://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/17/AR2011021706545.html.

21. The National Security Professional Development program 

was launched in 2007 by the Bush administration, based 

on the three pillars of education, training, and rotational 

service. After a “strategic pause,” it was reinvigorated by the 

Obama administration in 2011. Catherine Dale, “National 

Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, 

Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress,” RL34565 

(Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2011), 

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34565.pdf.

22. From 2011-2012 the Special Representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan team led a diplomatic campaign to connect 

the military effort with the instruments of non-military 

power in South and Central Asia, including official development assistance, involvement of the private sector, support 

for civil society, and the use of both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. 

23. Signed at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, 

the Grand Bargain is a commitment to providing more, 

longer-term funding and less earmarking, in exchange for 

greater efficiency and transparency from aid agencies in 

the way those funds are spent. The deal between 30 representatives of donors and aid agencies includes a commitment to deliver at least 25 percent of humanitarian funding 

to local and national responders, which currently receive 

only about 1 percent. Ben Parker, “Is the Grand Bargain a 

Big Deal?,” irinnews.org, May 24, 2016, https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/05/24/grand-bargain-big-deal.

24. President Barack Obama issued a presidential memorandum to federal departments and agencies on September 

28, 2015, reaffirming the strong support of the United 

States for U.N. peace operations and directing a wide range 

of actions to strengthen and modernize U.N. operations 

for a new era. The memorandum—the first presidential 

guidance on multilateral peace operations in more than 

20 years—outlines U.S. efforts toward the following: 

building partner capacity; expanding U.S. contributions; 

driving reform; increasing U.S. commitments for officer 

staffing, specialized logistics and equipment support; and 

expanding peacekeeper exercises and training. The White 

House Office of the Press Secretary, Memorandum for the 

Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: United States 

Support to United Nations Peace Operations (September 28, 

2015), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/

pubs/2015peaceoperations.pdf.

25. For a typology illustrating the improved allocation of 

security sector assistance and detailed recommendations, 

see policy brief: Kleinfeld, “Fragility and Security Sector 

Reform.”

26. For insight on the corrosive effect of corruption in fragile 

states and detailed recommendations on “mainstreaming” 

corruption analysis, see policy brief: Chayes, “Corruption 

and State Fragility.” 

27. For recommendations to counter the closing space challenge and engaging autocracies, see policy brief: Carothers, 

“Closing Space for Civil Society and State Fragility,” and 

policy brief: Stephan, “Adopting a Movement Mindset to 

Address the Challenge of Fragility.”

28. The report outlines new strategies and offers case studies 

that illustrate how businesses can effectively operate 

in fragile settings to support government-led efforts to 

address inclusive governance, corruption, inequality, 

and other drivers of fragility. World Economic Forum 

Global Agenda Council on Fragility, Violence, and Conflict, 

“Responsible Investment in Fragile Contexts” (May 2016), 

http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC16_Responsible_

Investment_Fragile_Context.pdf.

29. For recommendations on a fragility learning agenda, see 

policy brief: Blum, “The Fragility Learning Agenda: What Do 

We Need to Know?”
30 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

General John R. Allen, USMC (Ret.)

Co-Director and Senior Fellow

Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence

The Brookings Institution

Hon. Howard Berman

Senior Advisor, Covington & Burling, LLP

Amb. Johnnie Carson

Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace

Jared Cohen

President, Jigsaw

Amb. Elizabeth Cousens

Deputy Chief Executive Officer

United Nations Foundation

Dr. David M. Crane

Former Chief Prosecutor

Special Court for Sierra Leone

Amb. Chester A. Crocker

James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies

Georgetown University

Amb. Paula Dobriansky

Senior Fellow, The Future of Diplomacy Project

JFK Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Harvard Kennedy School of Government

Diana Farrell

President and Chief Executive Officer

JPMorgan Chase Institute

Stephen J. Hadley

Chairman, U.S. Institute of Peace

General Carter F. Ham, U.S. Army (Ret.)

President, Association of the United States Army

Neal Keny-Guyer

Chief Executive Officer, Mercy Corps

Christopher Kojm

Shapiro Professor of International Affairs

George Washington University

Dr. Stephen D. Krasner

Professor of Political Science and Senior Felllow

Freeman Spogli Institute and Hoover Institution

Stanford University

Clare Lockhart

Director, Institute for State Effectiveness

Rt. Hon. David Miliband

President and Chief Executive Officer

International Rescue Committee

Amb. George Moose

Vice Chairman, U.S. Institute of Peace

Michael Morell

Former Acting Director and Deputy Director

Central Intelligence Agency 

Hon. Andrew Natsios

Executive Professor and Director

The Scowcroft Institute, Texas A&M University

Amb. Thomas Pickering

Vice Chairman, Hills and Company

Emma Sky

Senior Fellow, Jackson Institute for Global Affairs

Yale University

Hon. Vin Weber

Partner, Mercury

Dr. Jeremy M. Weinstein

Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow

Freeman Spogli Institute

Stanford University

APPENDIX I: SENIOR 

ADVISORY GROUP

The members of the Senior Advisory Group listed below provided input and feedback throughout the writing process. 

The opinions expressed in this report are the authors’ alone.
REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 31

WILLIAM J. BURNS

Ambassador William J. Burns is President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He retired from the U.S. Foreign Service in 2014 after a 33-year 

diplomatic career. He served as Deputy Secretary of State from 2011 to 2014. He 

previously served as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Ambassador to Russia, 

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Ambassador to Jordan, and 

Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East and South 

Asian affairs at the National Security Council.

APPENDIX II: CHAIR BIOS

NANCY E. LINDBORG

Nancy Lindborg is President of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Prior 

to joining USIP, Ms. Lindborg served as the assistant administrator for the Bureau 

for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) at USAID. Ms. Lindborg led DCHA teams in response to the ongoing conflict in Syria, the droughts 

in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, the Arab Spring, the Ebola emergency, and 

numerous other global crises. Prior to joining USAID, Ms. Lindborg was president 

of Mercy Corps. 

MICHÈLE A. FLOURNOY

Michèle Flournoy is Co-Founder and CEO of the Center for a New American 

Security. She served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 2009 to 2012. 

She was principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense in the formulation of national security and defense policy and oversight of military plans and operations. 

She led the development of DoD’s 2012 Strategic Guidance and represented the 

department in foreign engagements and before Congress. Prior to confirmation, 

Ms. Flournoy co-led President Obama’s DoD transition team. 
32 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

APPENDIX III: CREDITS

STUDY GROUP STAFF

Alexa Courtney, Executive Director

Alexa has spent the last 15 years helping organizations and communities thrive in complex environments 

globally. She is the founder and CEO of Frontier Design Group, a human security focused strategy and 

design firm committed to helping organizations and communities think differently, engage meaningfully, and 

accelerate their impact in the world by harnessing the tools of design and systems thinking. 

Noah Sheinbaum, Special Assistant

Noah is passionate about helping government achieve better results through interdisciplinary approaches and 

long-term strategic thinking. He is the Director of Strategy and Services at Frontier Design Group. Previously he 

was a management consultant in the private sector. 

PHOTO CREDITS

Inside front cover/1: Xinhua/Pan Chaoyue

4, top: William J. Clinton Presidential Library

4, bottom: White House photo

8: Elisa Finocchiaro

9: Valarie

11, top: صح ليبي/Public domain

11, bottom: Mahmoud

14: State Department photo/Public domain

16: State Department photo by William Ng

18: Neil Brandvold/USAID

20: White House photo by Pete Souza

21: U.S. Army photo by Spc. Wes Conroy

23: UN Photo/Cia Pak

25: USIP/Casey Johnson

27: Nicholas Gosse

Inside back cover: USIP/William Fitz-Patrick

Design by Sensical Design & Communication
Aerial view of 

Washington, DC, 2011.
www.cnas.org

@CNASdc

www.usip.org

@USIP

www.carnegieendowment.org

@CarnegieEndow