alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
225 A.2d 217.

#### Louis A. Fazzano *et ux. vs.*Zoning Board of Review of the City of Warwick.

JANUARY 6, 1967.

Present: Roberts, C. J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin and Kelleher, JJ.

*509Per Curiam.

This is. -a petition for certiorari brought by two remonstrants to review a decision of the zoning board granting the applicant relief from the minimum lot width requirements of -the zoning ordinance .and thereby permitting the construction of two duplex dwellings on property located in a resident A-7 zone. That use, -although permitted in a district A-7 zone in 1961 when this application was fil-ed, is no longer allowed under .the ordinance as now amended. At the hearing before us the applicant did not request leave to intervene and the board defended. They concede that their earlier action was a nullity and agree with the petitioners’ contention that their decision must be quashed. They suggest, however, that in the interests of achieving substantial justice we so fashion our mandate .as to permit the applicant, if it -offers the city the cul-de-sac abutting the .property as a street, to file anew under the ordinance as it was in 1961.

In common-law certiorari the only judgment is to- quash either -the writ or the record. In the latter instance the inferior tribunal will not be directed to make a new record. *Newport Poster Advertising Co.*v. *City Council,*84 R. I. 155; Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, §185, p. 213. While the scope of the r-elief which may be ordered is broader in zoning matters where -certiorari is statutory, the ■board has failed to direct our attention to any instance where the judgment we have ordered has been extended to the limits now suggested. In the circumstances, the decision of the board must be quashed.

*510
      *Coffey, Ward, McGovern and Novogroski, Charles J. McGovern,*for petitioners.

*James R. Morriss, City Solicitor, Howard R. Haronian, Assistant City Solicitor,*for respondent.

The petition for certiouari is granted, the decision of the zoning 'board of review is quashed, and the records certified to this court are ordered returned to the respondent board with our decision endorsed thereon.
### §18384. Decadal results

NASA shall take into account the current decadal surveys from the National Academies' Space Studies Board when submitting the President's budget request to the Congress.

(Pub. L. 111–267, title VIII, §805, Oct. 11, 2010, 124 Stat. 2833.)
#### § 151.9 Evidence of insurance required for diplomatic license plates and waiver of fees.

The Department of State will not endorse on behalf of any person subject to the Act or any mission any application for diplomatic motor vehicle license plates or any application for waiver of motor vehicle registration fees without prior receipt of satisfactory evidence from the Chief of Mission or other duly authorized official that the required insurance is in effect.
§ 191.3 Definitions. When used in this subchapter, unless otherwise specified, the terms— ( a ) *Family member* means ( 1 ) a spouse,
( 2 ) an unmarried dependent child including a step-child or adopted child,
( 3 ) a person designated in official records or determined by the agency head or designee thereof to be a dependent, or
( 4 ) other persons such as parents, parents-in-law, persons who stand in the place of a spouse or parents, or other members of a household when fully justified by the circumstances of the hostage situation, as determined by the Secretary of State.
( b ) *Agency head* means the head of an agency as defined in the Act (or successor agency) employing an individual determined to be an American hostage. The Secretary of State is the agency head with respect to any hostage not employed by an agency.
( c ) *Principal* means the hostage whose captivity forms the basis for benefits under this subchapter for a family member.
§ 1508.630 May the African Development Foundation impute conduct of one person to another? For purposes of actions taken under this rule, we may impute conduct as follows: ( a ) *Conduct imputed from an individual to an organization.* We may impute the fraudulent, criminal, or other improper conduct of any officer, director, shareholder, partner, employee, or other individual associated with an organization, to that organization when the improper conduct occurred in connection with the individual's performance of duties for or on behalf of that organization, or with the organization's knowledge, approval or acquiescence. The organization's acceptance of the benefits derived from the conduct is evidence of knowledge, approval or acquiescence.
( b ) *Conduct imputed from an organization to an individual, or between individuals.* We may impute the fraudulent, criminal, or other improper conduct of any organization to an individual, or from one individual to another individual, if the individual to whom the improper conduct is imputed either participated in, had knowledge of, or reason to know of the improper conduct.
( c ) *Conduct imputed from one organization to another organization.* We may impute the fraudulent, criminal, or other improper conduct of one organization to another organization when the improper conduct occurred in connection with a partnership, joint venture, joint application, association or similar arrangement, or when the organization to whom the improper conduct is imputed has the power to direct, manage, control or influence the activities of the organization responsible for the improper conduct. Acceptance of the benefits derived from the conduct is evidence of knowledge, approval or acquiescence.
§ 1306.8 Application. ( a ) MCC shall aggressively collect claims and debts in accordance with this part and applicable law.
( b ) In accordance with the FCCS: ( 1 ) MCC will transfer to the Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service (FMS) any past due, legally enforceable non-tax debt that has been delinquent for 180 days or more so that FMS may take appropriate action to collect the debt or take other appropriate action in accordance with applicable law and regulation; and
( 2 ) MCC may transfer any past due, legally enforceable debt that has been delinquent for fewer than 180 days to FMS for collection in accordance with applicable law and regulation. (See 31 CFR part 285).
#### Lynn S. JOWERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAKESIDE FAMILY & CHILDREN’S SERVICES, INC.

No. 06-3234-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 29, 2007.

Lynn S. Jowers, pro se, for Appellant.

Joseph M. Martin, Jackson Lewis, LLP, White Plains, NY., for Appellee.

*25PRESENT: JOSEPH M. McLaughlin, josé a. cabranes, Circuit Judges, and RICHARD W. GOLDBERG Judge.*

*

The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Lynn S. Jowers appeals *pro se*from a decision of the District Court granting defendant’s motion for dismissal of plaintiffs complaint on the grounds that the complaint was time-barred and equitable tolling was not warranted. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that defendant, his former employer, violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) by failing to accommodate his disability and terminating his employment because of his disability. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, the issues on appeal and the procedural history.

Having carefully reviewed all of plaintiffs arguments, we affirm the District Court’s decision for substantially the same reasons set forth in that decision. We have considered all of plaintiffs arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
§ 17.4 Equity and good conscience. ( a ) *Defined.* Recovery is against equity and good conscience when— ( 1 ) It would cause financial hardship to the person from whom it is sought;
( 2 ) The recipient of the overpayment can show (regardless of his or her financial circumstances) that due to the notice that such payment would be made or because of the incorrect payment either he/she has relinquished a valuable right or changed positions for the worse; or
( 3 ) Recovery could be unconscionable under the circumstances.
( b ) [Reserved]
#### § 270.60a-1 Exemption for certain business development companies.

Section 12(d)(1) (A) and (C) of the Act shall not apply to the acquisition by a business development company of the securities of a small business investment company licensed to do business under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 which is operated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the business development company.

[46 FR 16674, Mar. 13, 1981]
Case 3:08-cv-01075-CRB Document 12 Filed 04/07/10 Page 1 of 2Case 3:08-cv-01075-CRB Document 12 Filed 04/07/10 Page 2 of 2
#### § 1750.3 Scope and application.

This standard shall apply to devices furnished with household refrigerators manufactured and introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate commerce after the effective date (October 30, 1958) which enable such refrigerators to be opened from the inside. The requirements of this standard shall apply to household refrigerators in their normal operating position only. The releasing feature(s) of the device shall be accessible from all spaces which (a) are bounded by interior walls or shelving, (b) are directly accessible when the exterior hinged door(s) is (are) opened, and (c) have a minimum dimension of 20.3 centimeters (8 inches) or more and a volume of 56.6 cubic decimeters (2 cubic feet) or more either with all shelving in place or as the result of the removal or the rearrangement of any or all of the shelving.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRI MILLER and ERIC MILLER,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

OPERADORA DE HOTELES VILLA

MEXICANA,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 08-00176 JSW

ORDER (1) DISCHARGING

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND

(2) SETTING CASE

MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

The Court has received and considered Defendant’s Response to the Order to Show

Cause, issued on January 4, 2010. The Court HEREBY DISCHARGES the Order to Show

Cause. The Court SETS a further case management conference for April 30, 2010 at 1:30 p.m. 

An updated case management statement shall be filed by no later than April 23, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2010 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:08-cv-00176-JSW Document 40 Filed 03/23/10 Page 1 of 1
### §290aa–11. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section, act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title V, §509D, as added Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. 100–690, title II, §2052(a), 102 Stat. 4207, and amended, which related to the collection of data on mental illness and substance abuse, was renumbered section 505 of act July 1, 1944, by Pub. L. 102–321, title I, §105, July 10, 1992, 106 Stat. 334, and transferred to section 290aa–4 of this title.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-1686

STACY FACEMIRE,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

and

HEATHER MORRIS; PAMELA STUMPF; LULA V. DICKERSON; LISA 

WILKINSON; KATHRYN A. BRADLEY,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS; CHIEF JUSTICE 

TIMOTHY PAUL ARMSTEAD, in his official capacity as Chief Justice,

 Defendants - Appellees,

and

COMMISSION ON SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS; JIM JUSTICE; JOHN B. 

MCCUSKEY; PATRICK MORRISEY; JOHN PERDUE; MAC WARNER; WEST 

VIRGINIA OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE; WEST VIRGINIA OFFICE 

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL; WEST VIRGINIA STATE AUDITOR’S 

OFFICE; WEST VIRGINIA STATE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR; WEST 

VIRGINIA STATE TREASURER’S OFFICE,

 Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at 

Wheeling. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (5:19-cv-00339-JPB)
2

Submitted: December 2, 2020 Decided: December 8, 2020

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Michael Ranson, Cynthia M. Ranson, RANSON LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Charleston, 

West Virginia; G. Patrick Jacobs, LAW OFFICE OF G. PATRICK JACOBS, LC, 

Charleston, West Virginia; Teresa C. Toriseva, TORISEVA LAW, Wheeling, West 

Virginia; Robert G. McCoid, MCCOID LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia, 

for Appellants. Bryan R. Cokeley, Mark C. Dean, Robert L. Bailey, STEPTOE & 

JOHNSON PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Stacy Facemire appeals from the district court’s order dismissing her suit as barred 

by claim and issue preclusion. In her opening brief, Facemire fails to challenge the basis 

for the district court’s order. Even after being alerted to her failure in Appellees’ brief, 

Facemire still did not address res judicata in her reply brief. Accordingly, we conclude 

that Facemire has waived any objection to the district court’s conclusions. See 

Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 

28(a)). As such, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### § 1508.225 How do I know if a transaction in which I may participate is a covered transaction?

As a participant in a transaction, you will know that it is a covered transaction because the agency regulations governing the transaction, the appropriate agency official, or participant at the next higher tier who enters into the transaction with you, will tell you that you must comply with applicable portions of this part.
### §300aa–17. Subrogation

#### (a) General rule

Upon payment of compensation to any petitioner under the Program, the trust fund which has been established to provide such compensation shall be subrograted 1 to all rights of the petitioner with respect to the vaccine-related injury or death for which compensation was paid, except that the trust fund may not recover under such rights an amount greater than the amount of compensation paid to the petitioner.

#### (b) Disposition of amounts recovered

Amounts recovered under subsection (a) shall be collected on behalf of, and deposited in, the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund established under section 9510 of title 26.

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title XXI, §2117, as added Pub. L. 99–660, title III, §311(a), Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 3770; amended Pub. L. 100–203, title IV, §4307(7), Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1330–225; Pub. L. 101–239, title VI, §6601(m)(2), Dec. 19, 1989, 103 Stat. 2291.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1989—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101–239 substituted "the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund established under section 9510 of title 26" for "the trust fund which has been established to provide compensation under the Program".

1987—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 100–203 struck out par. (1) designation before "Upon" and struck out par. (2) which read as follows: "In any case in which it deems such action appropriate, a district court of the United States may, after entry of a final judgment providing for compensation to be paid under section 300aa–15 of this title for a vaccine-related injury or death, refer the record of such proceeding to the Secretary and the Attorney General with such recommendation as the court deems appropriate with respect to the investigation or commencement of a civil action by the Secretary under paragraph (1)."

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1989 Amendment

For applicability of amendments by Pub. L. 101–239 to petitions filed after Dec. 19, 1989, petitions currently pending in which the evidentiary record is closed, and petitions currently pending in which the evidentiary record is not closed, with provision for an immediate suspension for 30 days of all pending cases, see section 6601(s)(1) of Pub. L. 101–239, set out as a note under section 300aa–10 of this title.

1 So in original. Probably should be "subrogated".
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

VICTUAL MCNEAL,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-1500

[October 4, 2018]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Ernest A. Kollra, Jr., 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 11-004413CF10A.

Victual McNeal, Indiantown, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

TAYLOR, FORST and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Thomas C. Duryee, Appellant.

[722 NYS2d 776]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Counsel’s motion to be relieved of assignment granted *(see, People v Crawford,*71 AD2d 38). (Appeal from Judgment of Livingston County Court, Alonzo, J.— Burglary, 2nd Degree.) Present — Pigott, Jr., P. J., Pine, Hayes, Wisner and Kehoe, JJ.
### §1592. Authority of Secretary

Subject to the provisions and limitations of this subchapter and subchapter VIII of this chapter, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary") is authorized to provide housing in any areas (subject to the provisions of section 1591 of this title) needed for defense workers or military personnel or to extend assistance for the provision of, or to provide, community facilities or services required in connection with national defense activities in any area which the President, pursuant to the authority contained in said section, has determined to be a critical defense housing area.

(Sept. 1, 1951, ch. 378, title III, §301, 65 Stat. 303; Pub. L. 89–174, §5(a), Sept. 9, 1965, 79 Stat. 669.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Transfer of Functions

For transfer of functions to Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, see note set out under section 1581 of this title.
#### In the Matter of Robert J. Forrest (Admitted as Robert Forrest), a Suspended Attorney.

[718 NYS2d 813]

—Motion granted to the extent of reinstating petitioner as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the State of New York, effective the date hereof. No opinion. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Nardelli, Rubin, Andrias and Friedman, JJ.
## IN THE COURT O F CRIMINA L A PPEA LS OF TEXA S NO. WR-83,126-01
IN RE STE VEN BARK ER, Relator
ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF M ANDAM US CAUSE NO. F O-11-20797 IN THE 52 DISTRICT COURT N D F ROM CORYELL COUNTY
Per curiam . O R D E R
Relator has filed a motion for leave to file a writ of mandamu s p u rsuant to the orig inal jurisdiction of this Court. I n it, he contends that he filed an application for a writ of habea s corpus in the 52 District Court of Cory el l County , that more than 35 day s have elapse d, and that the

n d application has not y et bee n forwa rded to this Court. I n these circ umstances, additional f a c ts a r e neede d. Respondent, the District Clerk of Cory ell County , is or dere d to f

ile a response , which may be made by submitt ing the rec ord on such habea s corpus application, submitt ing a copy of a timely filed order which desig nates issues to be investigated ( see McCree v. Hampton , 824 S.W .2d 578, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)), or stating that2

Relator has not filed an application for a writ of habea s co rp u s in Cory ell County
. Should the response include an order desig nating issues, proof of the date the district attorne y ’s o ff i ce was
serve d with the habea s application shall also be submitted with the response. T his application for leave to file a writ of mandamus shall be held in abey ance until Respondent has su b m i t t ed the appropr iate re sponse. Such re sponse shall be submitted within 30 day s of the date of this order.
Filed: Apr il 29, 2015 Do not publish
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Sylvester THOMAS, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 06-10283.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 12, 2007.

Filed March 19, 2007.

Darcy A. Cerow, AUSA, USPX — Office of the U.S. Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Philip E. Hantel, Esq., Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: HAWKINS, THOMAS, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Sylvester Thomas appeals his sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment and 60 *587months’ supervised release, imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). We affirm.

I

Thomas contends that the district court was without jurisdiction to revoke supervised release because the original sentencing judge, Judge Manuel Real of the Central District of California, had retained jurisdiction. However, a close reading of the transfer form indicates that Judge Real was attempting to retain jurisdiction over changes to “the period” of Thomas’s term of supervised release. A decision to revoke supervised release for violation of conditions is not the same thing as a decision to change the period of supervised release. In short, by the very terms of the transfer order, Judge Real did not even attempt to retain jurisdiction over revocation proceedings. The District of Arizona therefore had jurisdiction to revoke Thomas’s supervised release and to resentence him. Given this result, we need not-and do not-reach the question of whether Judge Real had the power to retain jurisdiction over revocation proceedings after issuing a transfer order.

II

Under our deferential standard of review, we conclude that the sentence imposed was not unreasonable. The district court sufficiently grounded Thomas’s sentence in § 3553(a) factors. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court justified Thomas’s sentence by reference to Thomas’s history and characteristics, Thomas’s need for rehabilitation, the danger Thomas presents to the community, and the specific and general need for deterrence. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The district court sufficiently articulated the reasons for choosing the particular sentence imposed, as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). At the time he imposed the sentence, the district court referenced drug addiction, deterrence, and danger to the community, tying those § 3553(a) factors to his decision to give Thomas additional prison time.

Ill

Except in circumstances not present here, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are more appropriately raised on collateral review. *United States v. Robinson,*967 F.2d 287, 290 (9th Cir.1992). We therefore dismiss without prejudice Thomas’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as premature.

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22 - 0386 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. RYAN MITCHELL TUFF,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including January 6 , 2023 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening br ief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

November 28 2022

11/28/2022

Case Number: DA 22-0386