alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §285c–6. Advisory council subcommittees

There are established within the advisory council for the Institute appointed under section 284a of this title a subcommittee on diabetes and endocrine and metabolic diseases, a subcommittee on digestive diseases and nutrition, and a subcommittee on kidney, urologic, and hematologic diseases. The subcommittees shall be composed of members of the advisory council who are outstanding in the diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of the diseases for which the subcommittees are established and members of the advisory council who are leaders in the fields of education and public affairs. The subcommittees are authorized to review applications made to the Director of the Institute for grants for research and training projects relating to the diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of the diseases for which the subcommittees are established and shall recommend to the advisory council those applications and contracts that the subcommittees determine will best carry out the purposes of the Institute. The subcommittees shall also review and evaluate the diabetes and endocrine and metabolic diseases, digestive diseases and nutrition, and kidney, urologic, and hematologic diseases programs of the Institute and recommend to the advisory council such changes in the administration of such programs as the subcommittees determine are necessary.

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title IV, §432, as added Pub. L. 99–158, §2, Nov. 20, 1985, 99 Stat. 847.)
EX-10.1






Exhibit 10.1




EXECUTIVE OFFICER FY2006 VARIABLE COMPENSATION PLAN





	1.	 	Proposed corporate goals for FY06 – officer performance based compensation will be based on
the following Company-wide revenues (in millions of dollars):





	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	
 
	 	Q1
	 	Q2
	 	Q3
	 	Q4
	 	FY
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Revenue targets

	 	*
	 	*
	 	*
	 	*
	 	*







	2.	 	The decision to award variable compensation is subject to evaluation each quarter by the
Compensation Committee, which will consider recommendations by the CEO, and is based on both
company performance (as specified above) and each executive officer’s individual performance.






	3.	 	Assigned target bonus amounts will be paid in cash on a quarterly basis starting at
achievement by the Company of *% of the consolidated revenue target and continuing on a linear
basis to 100% achievement. Should the Company exceed the consolidated revenue target,
executive officers will receive additional bonus compensation calculated by extending the line
starting at *% at the same slope; e.g., the bonus will be double the target bonus in a
particular quarter if revenues are *% of corporate targets. Target bonus amounts are
established by the Compensation Committee in consultation with the Chief Executive Officer.






There is no obligation to exceed corporate revenue targets unless it is deemed in the
interest of the Company as a whole.




	4.	 	The Compensation Committee recognizes that the Q3 and Q4 targets are preliminary, and it is
likely that the CEO will ask for these numbers to be reviewed later in the fiscal year.






	5.	 	The compensation committee delegates to the CEO the power to award Company-wide bonuses to
executive officers provided that the method used to determine these bonuses is comparable to
that used to determine the bonuses for non- executive officers.






	6.	 	The participants in this plan shall be those persons designated from time to time by the
board of directors as the executive officers of the Company.





(* Certain information on this page has been omitted and filed separately with the Commission.
Confidential treatment has been requested with respect to the omitted portions.)
§ 1508.50 How is this part written? ( a ) This part uses a “plain language” format to make it easier for the general public and business community to use. The section headings and text, often in the form of questions and answers, must be read together.
( b ) Pronouns used within this part, such as “I” and “you,” change from subpart to subpart depending on the audience being addressed. The pronoun “we” always is the African Development Foundation.
( c ) The “Covered Transactions” diagram in the appendix to this part shows the levels or “tiers” at which the African Development Foundation enforces an exclusion under this part.
### §266. Special quarantine powers in time of war

To protect the military and naval forces and war workers of the United States, in time of war, against any communicable disease specified in Executive orders as provided in subsection (b) of section 264 of this title, the Secretary, in consultation with the Surgeon General, is authorized to provide by regulations for the apprehension and examination, in time of war, of any individual reasonably believed (1) to be infected with such disease and (2) to be a probable source of infection to members of the armed forces of the United States or to individuals engaged in the production or transportation of arms, munitions, ships, food, clothing, or other supplies for the armed forces. Such regulations may provide that if upon examination any such individual is found to be so infected, he may be detained for such time and in such manner as may be reasonably necessary.

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title III, §363, 58 Stat. 704; Pub. L. 107–188, title I, §142(a)(3), (b)(2), June 12, 2002, 116 Stat. 626, 627.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2002—Pub. L. 107–188, which directed substitution of "the Secretary, in consultation with the Surgeon General," for "the Surgeon General, on recommendation of the National Advisory Health Council," and striking out of "in a communicable stage" after "(1) to be infected with such disease", in section 363 of the Public Health Act, was executed to this section, which is section 363 of the Public Health Service Act, to reflect the probable intent of Congress.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Change of Name

"Secretary of Health and Human Services" substituted in text for "Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare" pursuant to section 509(b) of Pub. L. 96–88, which is classified to section 3508(b) of Title 20, Education.

#### Termination of War and Emergencies

Joint Res. July 25, 1947, ch. 327, §3, 61 Stat. 451, provided that in the interpretation of this section, the date July 25, 1947, shall be deemed to be the date of termination of any state of war theretofore declared by Congress and of the national emergencies proclaimed by the President on Sept. 8, 1939, and May 27, 1941.

#### **Executive Documents**

#### Transfer of Functions

Office of Surgeon General abolished by section 3 of Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1966, eff. June 25, 1966, 31 F.R. 8855, 80 Stat. 1610, and functions thereof transferred to Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare by section 1 of Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1966, set out as a note under section 202 of this title. Office of Surgeon General reestablished within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health, see Notice of Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health, Mar. 30, 1987, 52 F.R. 11754.
#### Lorna JOHNSON; Douglas Barnes, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Tim PAUL; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-35363.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 12, 2007 *.

Filed March 21, 2007.

Lorna Johnson, Curlew, WA, pro se.

Douglas Barnes, Curlew, WA, pro se.

Rolf H. Tangvald, Esq., USSP-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Spokane, WA, Richard A. Latterell, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Employment Litigation Section, Kenneth L. Greene, Esq., Sara Ann Ket-chum, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: KOZINSKI, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Lorna Johnson and Douglas Barnes appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action for damages against Internal Revenue Service employees for actions associated with the collection of federal taxes after appellants failed to file returns for tax years 1995 through 2004. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Steel v. United States,*813 F.2d 1545, 1548 (9th Cir.1987), and we affirm.

Even if appellants’ claim was cognizable under 26 U.S.C. § 7433, the district court properly held that their correspondence challenging the IRS’s authority and requesting a refund of taxes already collected did not constitute exhaustion of administrative remedies as required under 26 U.S.C. § 7433(d)(1). *See*Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7433-1(d) & (e) (setting forth the requirements for exhaustion of administrative claims); *see also Conforte v. United States,*979 F.2d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir.1992) *643(affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under section 7433).

To the extent appellants attempted to allege any other basis for suit, the district court properly held their claims barred by sovereign immunity. *See Gilbert v. DaGrossa,*756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir.1985) (a suit against IRS employees in their official capacities is essentially a suit against the United States).

Appellants’ remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
November 22, 2011

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

BREANNA MARIE BAKER, Appellant

NO. 14-08-00779-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

____________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. Having 

considered the record, this Court holds that there was no error in the judgment. The Court 

orders the judgment AFFIRMED, that the appellant pay all costs expended in this appeal, 

and that this decision be certified below for observance.
(June 27, 1977)

#### Julio J. Anselmo et al., Appellants, v Bush Universal, Inc., Respondent.

— In an action to recover damages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered October 31, 1975, which dismissed the complaint. Judgment affirmed, with costs. In our opinion, the dispute herein, involving the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, is solely under the jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board (US Code, tit 45, § 153, subd [i]; see, *Andrews v Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co.,*406 US 320; *O’Mara v Erie Lackawanna R. R. Co.,*407 F2d 674, affd *sub nom. Czosek v O’Mara,*397 US 25). We note that appellants, in their complaint, allege that the dispute arose under the Railway Labor Act; thus they should be estopped from asserting, for the first time on this appeal, that the action is one based solely upon contract principles. The fact that the respondent is not an actual party to the agreement does not change the result. As the alleged guarantor of the defunct railroad’s agreement with appellants, it now stands in the shoes of the railroad. The case of *Czosek v O’Mara*(397 US 25, *supra),*relied upon by appellants, is inapposite. There, the employees sued the union for breach of the latter’s duty of fair representation. In no way did it involve, as does the present action, the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, Trial Term was correct in finding that it lacked jurisdiction and in dismissing the complaint. In view of the foregoing conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to discuss the other points raised by appellants. However, we do note that the procedure adopted *636by the trial court did not deprive appellants of a fair trial. Hopkins, J. P., Hargett, Shapiro and Suozzi, JJ., concur.
### §2036. Repealed. Pub. L. 95–91, title VII, §709(c)(1), Aug. 4, 1977, 91 Stat. 608

Section, act Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, §26, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, §1, 68 Stat. 926, established a General Advisory Committee to advise the Atomic Energy Commission on scientific and technical matters relating to materials, production, and research and development.

Provisions similar to this section were contained in section 1802(b) of this title prior to the general amendment and renumbering of act Aug. 1, 1946, by act Aug. 30, 1954.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4059 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4059

 To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to establish a position for a 
   representative of Indian Tribes on the Joint Board overseeing the 
      implementation of universal service, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 16, 2012

   Mrs. Bono Mack (for herself, Mr. Inslee, Mr. Cole, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. 
 Grijalva, Mr. Kildee, and Mr. DeFazio) introduced the following bill; 
       which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to establish a position for a 
   representative of Indian Tribes on the Joint Board overseeing the 
      implementation of universal service, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TRIBAL REPRESENTATIVE.

    (a) In General.--Section 254(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 
(47 U.S.C. 254(a)) is amended by striking ``advocates.'' and inserting 
``advocates, and one member of such Joint Board shall be a Commission-
appointed Tribal representative nominated by the Commission's Office of 
Native Affairs and Policy.''
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 410(c) of the Communications Act 
of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 410(c)) is amended in the third and fourth sentences 
by striking ``State'' each place it appears and inserting ``State, 
Tribal, and utility consumer advocate''.
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent v. Harold Sink, Appellant.

Motion granted and time for argument of appeal enlarged to include September 1962 Term.
226 A.2d 819.

#### Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Company *vs.*Dennis D. Sheehan, Assessor *of Taxes of the Town of North Kingstown.*

FEBRUARY 21, 1967.

Present: Roberts, C. J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin, Kelleher, JJ.

*Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons, Matthew W. Goring, Edward M. Watson,*for plaintiff.

*S. Everett Wilkins,*for defendant.

Joslin, J.

This statutory petition brought under G. L. 1956, §44-5-26, as a challenge to the legality of a tax assessed as of December 31, 1964 by the assessor of taxes of the town of North Kingstown was dismissed by a justice of the superior court on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to set forth facts .upon which relief would be granted. The challenged assessment was against the tangible personal property which, in *Brown & Sharpe, Mfg. Co.*v. *Cote,*101 R. I. 668, 226 A.2d 814, we held was not taxable in the city of Providence. In .the light of that decision, the plaintiff concedes that its appeal has no merit.

For that reason, we deny and dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal pro forma and with prejudice, and we remit the cause to the superior court for further proceedings.
### §1884. Repealed. Pub. L. 99–159, title I, §109(h), Nov. 22, 1985, 99 Stat. 890

Section, Pub. L. 95–99, §6, Aug. 15, 1977, 91 Stat. 833, related to the establishment, etc., of the Resource Center for Science and Engineering.
#### Milton L. Culver, Respondent, v. Keenan Brothers Realty Company and Others, Appellants.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. All concur.
Need to return call by / at/between and

. Signature: Project No.: 0 317.00.005. 522 Page 1 of 1

Project Name: DMR20 11 

### CBI?

Yes

No TELEPHONE CALL RECOR D

Incoming

Outgoing Date: 01/0 4 /13 Time: 9:30 am

pm

Company Name: Missouri Department of Natural Resources

(MO DNR) ERG Staff Name: Kimberly Bartell

Contact Name: Travis Abernathy Contact Phone Number: ( 573 ) 840

- 9787

General Subject: 2011 DMR Concentration Values and Units



### TOPICS DISCUSSED AND ACTION TAKEN

Missouri DNR

– 573

- 751

- 0763

Water Pollution Control Branch

– 573

– 751

– 1300

On January 4 th , 2013 at 9:30am I called the Water Pollution Control Branch of the Missouri DNR (573

- 751

- 1300). I was told to contact the county offices for DMR information.

St. Louis office

– 314

- 416

- 2960

SE Region (for facilities in Bunker, MO)

– 573

- 840

- 9750

I called the St. Louis office and was transferred to Mary Alice Hukill (314

- 416

- 2960) and left a message for

her. She returned my call and stated that she believed the iron and total residual chlorine concentrations should

be in micrograms per liter not milligrams per liter for the St. Louis Co. Water facility (NPDES: MO0003727).

She said she would pull a DMR for the facility and double check and get back to me. At 4:30pm Ms. Hukill

returned my call and confirmed that the concentrations for iron and total residual chlorine should be in

micrograms per liter not milligrams per liter.

I called the SE Regional office and was transferred to Travis Abernathy (573

- 840

- 9787). I gave him the names

and NPDES ID’s for the three facilities in question: Fletcher Mine, Brushy Creek Mine, & Doe Run Co. West

Fork Facility. He stated that all concentrations s hould be in micrograms per liter not milligrams per liter. He

also stated that I could Google the NPDES IDs and the facility permits should show up.

Fletcher Mine (MO0001856) : Lead concentrations should be ug/L not mg/L

Brushy Creek Mine (MO0001848) : Copper, Lead, Cadmium, Zinc concentrations should be ug/L not mg/L

Doe Run Co. West Fork Facility (MO0100218) : Lead, Cadmium, Zinc, Copper should be ug/L not mg/L
#### In the Matter of Frances Kennedy, Respondent, v Christopher Tsombanis, Appellant.

[716 NYS2d 74]

—In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the appeal is from (1) an order of protection of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Freundlich, J.), dated June 19, 1997, which, after a hearing, upon finding that the appellant constituted an immediate and ongoing threat to the petitioner, directed, *inter alia,*that the appellant stay away from the petitioner, and (2) an order of the same court, also dated June 19, 1997, which found that the appellant had committed a family offense pursuant to Family Court Act § 841 and placed the appellant on probation for up to three years.

Ordered that the appeal from the order of protection dated June 19, 1997, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order of probation dated June 19, 1997, as placed the appellant on probation is dismissed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

Ordered that the order of probation dated June 19, 1997, is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.

The appeal from the order of protection dated June 19, 1997, must be dismissed as academic as that order expired by its own terms on June 19, 2000. Moreover, the appeal from so much of the order dated June 19, 1997, as placed the appellant on probation must also be dismissed as academic as the record reveals that the appellant was discharged from probation on July 6, 1999.

However, although the appellant has been discharged from probation, the finding that he committed a family offense pursuant to Family Court Act § 841 constitutes a permanent and significant stigma which might indirectly affect his status in potential future proceedings. Therefore, the appeal from so *316much of the order of probation as found that the appellant had committed a family offense is not academic *(see, Matter of Danielle C.,*253 AD2d 431; *Matter of Eddie E.,*219 AD2d 719).

The court providently exercised its discretion in refusing to allow the appellant to make applications in court in the absence of his attorney since the record indicates that he never unequivocally requested to proceed *pro se (see, People v McIntyre,*36 NY2d 10).

In addition, the record demonstrates that the appellant’s attorney afforded him meaningful representation *(see, Matter of Truick v Truick,*243 AD2d 572; *Matter of Morlando v Morlando,*240 AD2d 852). Ritter, J. P., Santucci, Krausman and Smith, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Charles Redden, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[716 NYS2d 122]

—Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed September 2, 1999, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because his employment was terminated due to misconduct.

*630Claimant was discharged from his employment after the employer discovered that claimant had falsely represented on his employment application that he had never been convicted of any felonies or misdemeanors. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board disqualified claimant from receiving benefits on the ground that he lost his employment due to misconduct. Notwithstanding claimant’s proffered excuse that the failure to disclose his criminal history was due to an oversight, substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits *(see, Matter of Napolitano [Commissioner of Labor],*264 AD2d 928; *Matter of Class [Alliant Food Serv.*— Commissioner *of Labor],*261 AD2d 772).

Claimant’s remaining contentions, including his claim of abuse of discretion on the part of the Administrative Law Judge in reopening the matter following the employer’s initial default *(see, Matter of Scott [New York City Dept. of Personnel*— Com*missioner of Labor],*265 AD2d 777), have been examined and found to be similarly unpersuasive.

Mercure, J. P., Spain, Mugglin, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
#### Sherman H. Yanuck, Appellant, v Medlyn Associates, Inc., et al., Respondents.

[716 NYS2d 869]

—In an action to re*224cover certain funds, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Werner, J.), dated August 17, 1999, which, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The parties were involved in two enterprises, each established for the purpose of purchasing real property and selling those properties at a later date. Over the years, one of the enterprises thrived while the other did not. The defendants then transferred certain proceeds from the successful enterprise to keep the second one afloat before dividing the proceeds equally among the parties.

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, a joint venture existed among the parties (see, *Tilden of N. J. v Regency Leasing Sys.,*230 AD2d 784; see *also, Ackerman v Landes,*112 AD2d 1081, 1082; *Davella v Nielsen,*208 AD2d 494).

Further, contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the evidence at trial demonstrated that there was no wrongful taking on the part of the defendants (see, *Vigilant Ins. Co. v Housing Auth.,*87 NY2d 36, 44; *Galtieri v Kramer,*232 AD2d 369; 23 NY Jur 2d, Conversion and Action for Recovery, § 22, at 230-231, § 127, at 370).

As the defendants were authorized to possess the subject property, no conversion could occur absent the plaintiffs demand for the property and the defendants’ refusal to provide it (see, *Boston Concessions Group v Criterion Ctr. Corp.,*250 AD2d 435; *Matter of White v City of Mount Vernon,*221 AD2d 345, 346). O’Brien, J. P., Goldstein, Florio and McGinity, JJ., concur.
#### §§ 4.2-4.4 [Reserved]