Whither the Bulldozer?

Nonviolent Revolution and the

Transition to Democra cy

in Serbia

B r i e f l y. . .

• Yu goslav pre s ide nt Slobodan Milosevic fell from power in October 2000 after a concerted campaign of stra t e g ic no n v io l e nt action that was similar to de mo c ra t ic re v ol u t io ns in other count r ie s, thus of f e r i ng a para d igm for fo re ign-supported stra t e g ic

non v io l e nt action against other autocra t ic re g i me s. 

• The opposition’s effectiveness de p e nded on a broad coalition of political partie s, no ngov e r n me ntal org a n i z a t io ns, me d ia, and labor unio ns. 

• While fo re ign assistance helped to build and sustain the broad ant i - M i l o s e v ic coalit ion, ind ige nous org a n i z a t io ns and action were mainly re s p o nsible for dr i v i ng event s. 

• The tra ns i t ion to de mo c racy in Serbia is far from complete, and cont i nu i ng pre s s u re

f rom civil society is cruc ial to sustaining the pro c e s s.

• The org a n i z a t io ns that ge ne rated the mo v e me nt against Milosevic need to re - e ng ineer the mselves to be effective in a mo re de mo c ra t ic enviro n me nt .

• These same org a n i z a t io ns have a cruc ial role to play in pre s s i ng the new go v e r n me nt

to unde r t a ke effective ant i - c o r r u p t ion, account a b i l i t y, and truth and re c o nc i l ia t io n

e f fo r t s, as well as military and police re fo r m .

• Fo re ign assistance should focus not only on political parties but should cont i nue to

support a broad ra nge of no ngo v e r n me ntal org a n i z a t io ns, labor unio ns, think tanks,

a nd me d ia .

• Lo ng-term peace and stability in the Balka ns cont i nue to re q u i re the establishme nt

of ge nu i ne and stable de mo c ra c ies in Serbia and the ent i re Balkan re g io n .

I n t ro d u c t i o n

W hen Yugoslav pre s ide nt Slobodan Milosevic was fo rced from power in October 2000, few

a nalysts could have pre d icted that he would be swept away by a massive no n v io l e nt

mov e me nt rem i n i s c e nt of the East European re v o l u t io ns of 1989. As pre s ide nt of both

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

August 6, 2001

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

This report focuses on the largely no n v io l e nt re v ol u t ion that led to the re moval of Yu goslav pre s ide nt Slobodan Milosevic from of f ice and the rise

to power of the Demo c ra t ic Opposition of Serbia

(DOS). Pa r t icular attent ion is paid to the role of

no n v io l e nce in the re v o l u t ion and the role of Serb ia’s civil society in the country’s tra ns i t ion to

de mo c ra c y. Written by Institute cons u l t a nt Albert

C e v a l l o s, the report is based on nu me rous int e rv iews with civic activists and re p re s e ntatives of

t he de mo c ra t ic opposition, stude nt gro u p s, 

i nde p e nde nt me d ia, and the United States go v e r nme nt, as well as an analysis of available litera t u re

s u r ro u nd i ng these event s. It is also based in part

on a confere nce cospons o red by the United States

I nstitute of Peace and the Helsinki Committee fo r

Human Rig hts in Serbia, “Whither the Bulldo z e r ?

R e v o l u t ion, Tra ns i t ion, and Demo c racy in Serbia , ”

held on Ja nuary 30–31, 2001 in Belgra de.

The views ex p ressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of

Pea c e, which does not advocate specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

I nt ro duc t io n 1

P l a nt i ng the Seeds of Change 2

Otpor’s Stra t e g y 3

I nt e r na t io nal As s i s t a nc e :

Slow but Cruc ia l 4

T he Stra t e g ic Use of 

No n v io l e nt Ac t io n 5

“ He’s Finishe d ! ” 6

F o rg i ng Allia nces: 

Kee p i ng the Opposition Un i t e d 7

E l e c t io ns Pro v ide the Mo me nt 8

P ro b l e ms in the Tra ns i t io n 9

What No w ?1 0

C o nc l u s io n1 2
S e r b ia and Yu go s l a v ia, Milosevic had pre s ided over four wars in as little as ten years,

i nc l ud i ng one against the NATO allia nc e. In add i t ion, for the past year Milosevic had been

s t o k i ng tens io ns ins ide Serbia itself through a vic ious campaign of political re p re s s io n .

As hara s s me nt of opposition, civic, and me d ia activists inc re a s e d, one journalist lame nted “the dawn of the Milosevic Dictatorship” (Laura Rozen, “Milosevic’s Me d ia Blacko u t , ”

w w w.salon.com, May 18, 2000). If any t h i ng, Milosevic’s heavy hand led most experts to

p re d ict that he would go the way of ano t her European dic t a t o r — R o ma n ian pre s ide nt

N icolae Ceausescu, who was re moved in a bloody coup and whose exe c u t ion was televised na t io nw ide. “Save Serbia and Kill Yourself, Slobo” became a popular re f ra i n

t h ro u g hout the country in the weeks leading up to pre s ide nt ial electio ns that Milosevic

hoped would ex t e nd his stay in power.

But when protesters stormed the fede ral parlia me nt and other key pillars of the

reg i me, pre c i p i t a t i ng the collapse of the go v e r n me nt, little blood was she d. To be sure,

s o me of the de mo ns t rators were pre p a red to fig ht. The de mo c ra t ic mayor of Cacak,

Velimir Ilic, led a fo rce of 1,000 arme d, disaffected members of the police and military

w ho had fo u g ht in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Cro a t ia. Ilic’s final orders to his men befo re the y

set out for Belgra de were, “To da y, we will be free or die” (Timo t hy Garton Ash, “The Last

R e v o l u t ion,” New York Review of Books, October 19, 2000, p. 12). Milan Pro t ic, the ma y o r

of Belgra de at the time, at one point stormed a police station, seized its weapons, and

resolved to de f e nd his of f ice from Milosevic by fo rc e. Ne v e r t he l e s s, key units of the polic e

a nd army refused orders to fire upon the de mo ns t rators and instead melted away int o

t he cro w d s. After all the vio l e nce of the past de c a de, the tra ns i t ion of power was thrust

s udde n l y, almost unex p e c t e d l y, upon Serbia. 

Mo nt hs later, details cont i nue to eme rge about the final days of the Milosevic re g i me ;

t hey ma ke clear that a complex combina t ion of fa c t o r s — i nc l ud i ng wide s p read frustrat ion over Yu go s l a v ia’s ma ny wars, its shattered econo m ic infra s t r uc t u re, and inc re a s e d

gov e r n me nt rep re s s io n — c o ntributed to his de m i s e. Of the s e, one factor that must be

s i ngled out for its role in mo b i l i z i ng public opinion against Milosevic is the clever camp a ign of stra t e g ic no n v io l e nt action wie l ded by the stude nt-led Otpor (“Resistanc e ” )

mov e me nt. Initially created in 1998 to protest go v e r n me nt re p re s s ion at Belgra de Un iv e r s i t y, Otpor quickly eme rged as a dr i v i ng fo rce behind efforts to pro mote de mo c racy in

S e r b ia. It did so by ado p t i ng the stra t e g ies and tactics of other successful no n v io l e nt ,

p ro - de mo c racy mo v e me nt s. In the pro c e s s, Otpor helped bre a t he life into Serbia’s de mo ralized civil society and, in turn, the country’s fa c t io nalized political opposition. The

mov e me nt was also often fo rced to employ ne w, untested tactics along the way, thu s

l e nd i ng the re v o l u t io n — a nd Serbia’s new de mo c racy—its own unique chara c t e r.

Planting the Seeds of Change

O p p o s i t ion to the Milosevic go v e r n me nt existed from its first days in power. But the

s t a t e - c o nt rolled me d ia, the country’s security fo rc e s, and its fina nc ial re s o u rces cons i st e ntly left opposition activists in Serbia with little room to ma ne u v e r. When ma s s i v e

a nt i - M i l o s e v ic de mo ns t ra t io ns erupted in Ma rch 1991 in Belgra de, for ins t a nc e, they were

q u ic k l y, and vio l e nt l y, dispersed by polic e. Again in 1992, tho u s a nds of stude nts chanti ng “Slobo, You Are Saddam!” wrapped a mile-long black ribbon aro u nd the fede ral parl ia me nt to protest the sie ge of Sarajevo. During ano t her de mo ns t ra t ion, state-run

t e l e v i s ion abruptly ceased tra ns m i s s ion ra t her than bro a dcast events—a pattern that

would repeat itself over the next ten years. Protests also erupted when it was disclosed

that the go v e r n me nt had been secretly funne l i ng funds out of the accounts of private

c i t i z e ns to finance the war in Bosnia .

S e r b ia’s opposition was also often bitterly divided over its own strategy and tactic s,

its leadership seemingly mo re bent on de s t ro y i ng one ano t her politically than in 

p ro mo t i ng de mo c ra c y. Milosevic skillfully exploited these differe nces to re main in power.

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an indep e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t ion cre a t e d

by Cong ress to pro mote re s e a rch, educ a t ion, and

t ra i n i ng on the pre v e nt ion, ma na ge me nt, and re so l u t ion of int e r na t io nal conflic t s. Established in

1984, the Institute meets its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an array of pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng

re s e a rch gra nt s, fellowships, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng

p ro g ra ms, confere nces and worksho p s, libra r y

s e r v ic e s, public a t io ns, and other educ a t io na l

a c t i v i t ie s. The Institute’s Board of Directors is

a p p o i nted by the Pre s ide nt of the United States

a nd confirmed by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ker ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • S eymour Martin Lipset ( V ic e

C h a i r man), Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, P re s ide nt, Pe a c e

L i n k s, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Ad v o -

cacy Dire c t o r, Phy s ic ia ns for Hu man Rig ht s, Wa s h i ng t o n ,

D.C. • M a rc E. Leland, Esq., Pre s ide nt, Ma rc E. Leland &

As s o c ia t e s, Arlington, Va. • M o ra L. McLean, E s q . ,

P re s ide nt, Afric a - A me r ica Ins t i t u t e, New York, N.Y. •

María Otero , P re s ide nt, AC C ION Int e r na t io na l ,

S o me r v i l l e, Ma s s. • B a r b a ra W. Snelling, State Sena t o r

a nd fo r mer Lie u t e na nt Governo r, She l b u r ne, Vt.

• S h i b l ey Te l h a m i , A nwar Sadat Chair for Peace and

D e v e l o p me nt, University of Ma r y l a nd 

• Harriet Zimmerman, V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is ra e l

P u b l ic Affairs Committee, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R SE X O F F I C I O

Lorne W. Cra n e r, As s i s t a nt Secretary of State fo r

D e mo c ra c y, Hu man Rig ht s, and Labor • Paul G. Gaffney

II, V ice Adm i ral, U.S. Navy; Pre s ide nt, Na t io nal Defens e

Un i v e r s i t y • Donald H. Rumsfeld, S e c retary of Defense 

• R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States 

I nstitute of Peace (no n v o t i ng)
This tactic was ma de clear after news was leaked of secret me e t i ngs between Milosevic

a nd some of the opposition’s most pro m i ne nt political leaders at the he ig ht of pro t e s t s

a g a i nst the go v e r n me nt’s theft of mu n icipal electio ns in the winter of 1996–97. Comp ro m i s i ng the leaders’ role in the fledg l i ng Za j e d no (“To ge t her”) opposition mo v e me nt ,

M i l o s e v ic then moved to the opposition’s rank and file, again orde r i ng his police to cra c k

down and send i ng scores of de mo ns t rators to ho s p i t a l s. 

But with each add i t io nal abuse, and with Serbia’s econo my fa l l i ng further into ruin

because of go v e r n me nt corruption and int e r na t io nal fina nc ial sanc t io ns, the go v e r nment’s legitimacy wore thin. In a bid to silence do me s t ic criticism, the re g i me ado p t e d

c o nt ro v e r s ial laws in the spring of 1998 limiting me d ia fre e do ms and political assembly

at the country’s universitie s, both venues being hotbeds of the small pro de mo c ra c y

mov e me nt. But the laws did mo re than clamp down on dissent; they also sig naled that

t he gov e r n me nt felt inc re a s i ngly vulne rable and thre a t e ned by the opposition. Tho u g h

p rotest against the re g i me was not a new phe no me non, it would be an inc re a s i ngly da ngerous endeavor from then on as the go v e r n me nt employed even mo re vio l e nt me a ns

to retain its hold on power.

S uch was the case after war erupted in Kosovo in February 1998. As was the case

with Bosnia and Cro a t ia in the early 1990s, Serbian state me d ia whipped the count r y

i nto a na t io nalist fre n z y. Pro p a g a nda portrayed opposition activists as unpatrio t ic and

s y m p a t he t ic to Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population. As clashes between Serbian polic e

a nd the Kosovo Libera t ion Army (KLA) escalated, Milosevic labeled the opposition as

t raitors cons p i r i ng to re v o ke Serbia’s authority over the pro v i nc e. NATO’s subsequent

b o m b i ng in Ma rch 1999 enhanced Milosevic’s position at ho me as he sought to portra y

h i mself as the na t ion’s lone de f e nde r. Ant i - N ATO and pro - M i l o s e v ic de mo ns t rators de f ie d

t he bombing and held ra l l ies thro u g hout Serbia, ma ny of them on bridges NATO warp l a nes would most likely target. At the same time, Milosevic ma na ged to bring the fa r -

r ig ht na t io nalist leader of the Serbian Radical Pa r t y, Vojislav Seselj, and the leader of

t he Serbian Renewal Mo v e me nt, Vuk Dra s ko v ic—his two stro ngest rivals—into the go ve r n me nt as deputy prime ministers, again effectively splitting the opposition and limi t i ng its ma ne u v e r i ng room. 

In the first two weeks of the war, Milosevic swiftly seized the initiative and mo v e d

to silence dissent once and for all. Inde p e nde nt journalist Slavko Curivija was killed—

by state security age nt s, some claimed—as he walked to his ho me with his wife. Feari ng for their lives, opposition leade r s, along with tho u s a nds of young men avoid i ng the

draft, fled to ne ig h b o r i ng Hu ng a r y, Bosnia - He r z e go v i na, and Mo nt e ne g ro. The go v e r nme nt inc reased hara s s me nt of the inde p e nde nt me d ia by fining and shu t t i ng down tho s e

outlets that re b ro a dcast fo re ign ne w s, an act that was ex p l icitly outlawed by the no t or ious me d ia law. As a result, journalists began cens o r i ng their own re p o r t s, careful no t

to challenge the re g i me dire c t l y.

O t p o r ’s Stra t e g y

T hough the mass de mo ns t ra t io ns against NATO helped Milosevic to cons o l idate his power

in the short term, the re g i me’s efforts to capitalize on the bombing and inc rease its

a u t hority ultimately backfire d. Ma ny Serbs grew angry with Milosevic for leading Serbia

i nto yet ano t her losing conflict as well as further into poverty and isolation. In add i t io n ,

t he re was wide s p read disillusio n me nt, even ange r, with the opposition, especially as some

of its leaders had proven to be no less na t io na l i s t ic than Milosevic. This frustra t ion was

heig ht e ned du r i ng the war once Dra s ko v ic joined the go v e r n me nt. Despite credible thre a t s

a g a i nst his life, ma ny were also disappointed that Zo ran Djind j ic, pre s ide nt of the Democ ra t ic Pa r t y, chose to wait out the bombing in ne ig h b o r i ng Mo nt e ne g ro. As the war came

to a close, dissatisfa c t ion with both the go v e r n me nt and the opposition was stro ng .

T he question for de mo c ra t ic activists then was how to push into action a populatio n

3

M i l o s evic’s heavy hand led most

experts to predict that he wo u l d

go the way of another Euro p e a n

d i c ta tor—Romanian pre s i d e n t

Nicolae Ceausescu. . . .

Though the mass demonstra t i o n s

against NATO helped Milosevic to

consolidate his power in the

short term, the regime’s effo r t s

to capitalize on the bombing

and increase its authority

ultimately backfire d .
cowed by a de c a de of re p re s s ion, especially cons ide r i ng that opposition political leade r s

had failed to mobilize sig n i f ic a nt support in the past. By turning to no n v io l e nt techniques of protest, such as ma rc hes and the perfo r ma nce of skits on busy street corne r s,

t he stude nts who created Otpor—several of whom had been active in the mass stre e t

demo ns t ra t io ns of 1996—hoped to resuscitate Serbia with de mo ns t ra t io ns of ind i v idua l

c o u ra ge. The idea was to deprive the re g i me of the fear that had become its gre a t e s t

weapon and the reby withdraw the cons e nt of Serbia’s go v e r ne d. So Otpor launc hed a

massive re c r u i t i ng campaign, de c l a r i ng that Serbia deserved better than what the Milos e v ic go v e r n me nt was capable of de l i v e r i ng. The stude nts imme d iately created a ne t w o r k

of of f ices outside of Belgra de, whe re spont a neous ex p re s s io ns of discont e nt and unre s t

w e re gro w i ng. Such a network was no t e w o r t hy because opposition political parties of t e n

neglected to establish a credible pre s e nce outside of Belgra de by opening of f ic e s, canv a s s i ng support, and so fo r t h .

T he reg i me re t a l ia t e d, hara s s i ng and arre s t i ng scores of activists within the org a n iz a t ion’s first few weeks of activity. But the sig ht of police abusing no n v io l e nt de mo ns t ra t o r s, ma ny of them young stude nt s, only helped to swell Otpor’s ra n k s. Recruitme nt

s o a re d, tra ns fo r m i ng Otpor from a stude nt-led org a n i z a t ion into a popular mo v e me nt

that ultimately claimed mo re than 70,000 activists, inc l ud i ng pens io ne r s, pare nt s, and

rep re s e ntatives of political parties and inde p e nde nt me d ia. Even judges who owed the i r

p o s i t io ns to the go v e r n me nt risked being fired to join the campaign. As the mo v e me nt

g rew at the end of 1999 and into the beginning of 2000, civic activists from ma ny of

S e r b ia’s other no ngo v e r n me ntal org a n i z a t io ns (NGOs) became embolde ned and int e ns if ied their own pro de mo c racy effo r t s. All of this led one member of Otpor to surmise, “Fear

is a powerful but vulne rable weapon because it disappears far faster than you can re c reate it” (Roger Cohen, “Who Really Bro u g ht Down Milosevic?” New York Times Magazine,

November 26, 2000, p. 46).

International Assistance: Slow but Crucial

Pol i t ical and fina nc ial assistance from the West ultimately proved cruc ial to the birth of

demo c racy in Serbia, but it was slow in coming. Until the war in Kosovo, ma ny in the

i nt e r na t io nal community re g a rded Milosevic as a potent ial partner ra t her than the sourc e

of ma ny of the re g ion’s pro b l e ms. During the war in Bosnia, for ins t a nc e, countless diplomats visited Belgra de, implicitly tre a t i ng Milosevic as the key to peace. State me d ia re i nfo rced this ima ge ins ide Serbia as Milosevic was pic t u red shaking hands and sipping

drinks with int e r na t io nal emissarie s. The view of Milosevic - a s - Pe a c e ma ker was only re i nforced when he sig ned the Dayton Ac c o rds in 1996, fo r mally bring i ng the Bosnian war,

w h ich he had do ne so much to incite and spons o r, to a close. 

T he story was much the same with Kosovo. As tens io ns mo u nted the re in 1998—muc h

of it directly ins t igated by police and para m i l i t a r ies under Milosevic’s comma nd — ne got iators rushed to Belgra de to secure coopera t ion with efforts to avert a larger conflic t .

By now a master at stoking conflict for his own political gain, Milosevic balke d. In Ko s ovo, a massive no n v io l e nt mo v e me nt led by Ibrahim Rugova buckled under the pre s s u re

of the re g i me’s inc re a s i ng vio l e nc e. Kosovo’s ethnic Albania ns inc re a s i ngly threw support

b e h i nd the KLA, which was eng a g i ng the Yu goslav Army and Serbian police mo re and

mo re in a lethal game of cat and mo u s e. 

By mid- to late 1998, reports of ma s s a c res were gra b b i ng he a d l i nes in ne w s p a p e r s

a ro u nd the world. As pre s s u re mo u nted for action, and after ne go t ia t io ns in Rambouillet,

F ra nce failed to secure any me a n i ngful solution, NATO de l i v e red on its promise to int e rv e ne militarily. Int e r na t io nal conde m na t ion spread as the Yu goslav Army expelled tho us a nds of civilia ns into ne ig h b o r i ng Ma c e do n ia and Albania. Grim fo o t a ge of atro c i t ie s

committed by Serbian police and para m i l i t a r ies sparked further outra ge. Cont r i b u t i ng to

t he country’s isolation, Milosevic and four of his top aides were subsequently ind icted in

4

The idea was to deprive the

regime of the fear that had

become its greatest weapon and

t h e re by withdraw the consent 

of Serbia’s gove r n e d .

“ Fear is a powerful but 

v u l n e rable weapon because it

disappears far faster than 

you can re c reate it.”
May 1999 by the Int e r na t io nal Criminal Tr i b u nal for the Former Yu go s l a v ia (ICTY) for war

c r i mes and crimes against hu ma n i t y. As the war drew to a close, the situa t ion as far as

t he int e r na t io nal community was conc e r ned was clear: Milosevic had to go .

That cons e nsus opened the way for sig n i f ic a nt support to be directed toward the country’s ge nu i ne pro de mo c racy activitie s. Donors and go v e r n me nts aro u nd the world began

c o m b i ng Serbia for org a n i z a t io ns and activists willing to take the risks associated with

w o r k i ng in Serbia. Ant i - M i l o s e v ic sent i me nts soared high ins ide the country fo l l o w i ng the

w a r, pro v id i ng ample opportunity to work with hu man rig hts NGOs, stude nt gro u p s, and

o p p o s i t ion political partie s. Support was also given to int e r na t io nal org a n i z a t io ns with

similar ex p e r ie nce building de mo c racy in Eastern Euro p e. A massive infusion of aid went

to support inde p e nde nt me d ia and alternative me a ns of distributing ne w s, such as the

I nt e r net. The U.S. go v e r n me nt went so far as to erect a series of ra d io tra nsmitters aro u nd

t he periphery of Serbia in the hopes of pro v id i ng ge nu i ne news cont e nt from a stream of

s e r v ic e s, inc l ud i ng Vo ice of Ame r ica, the BBC, and Age nce Fra nc e - P re s s e. Although re p o r t s

differ on the amo u nt of assistance the U.S. go v e r n me nt contributed to de mo c ra t i z a t io n

e f forts in Serbia, most reports cite the total at aro u nd $25 millio n .

The Strategic Use of Nonviolent Ac t i o n

As the int e r na t io nal campaign to pro mote de mo c racy in Serbia began to me rge with effo r t s

u nder way ins ide the count r y, Otpor devoted itself to de v e l o p i ng the stra t e g ies and tact ics of successful no n v io l e nt action. The mo v e me nt learned such eleme nts in part from the

work of re t i red Ha r v a rd professor Gene Sharp, whose books The Politics of Nonviolent Ac t i o n

(Boston: Porter Sarge nt, 1973) and From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation ( B a ng kok: Committee for the Restora t ion of Demo c racy in Burma, 1993)

have become the corne r s t o ne of no n v io l e nt mo v e me nts aro u nd the world.

In add i t ion, Robert He l v e y, a re t i red U.S. Army colonel who worked closely with Sharp

in the past, traveled to Budapest on behalf of the Int e r na t io nal Republican Institute in

early 2000 to assist Otpor in de v e l o p i ng its stra t e g y. Helvey enc o u ra ged the stude nts to

a p p roach their campaign mo re systema t ically by he l p i ng the mo v e me nt de f i ne its objectives and ide ntify challenges in pro mo t i ng de mo c racy in Serbia. At Helvey’s ins i s t e nc e,

Otpor also analyzed the sources of power within Serbian socie t y, inc l ud i ng the “pillars

of support” that sustained the re g i me — s uch as cont rol of the me d ia and the count r y ’ s

security fo rc e s — a nd potent ial pillars of support for the de mo c ra t ic opposition as well. 

Otpor and Helvey also cons ide red some of the opera t io nal aspects of how to de v e lop a successful no n v io l e nt mo v e me nt: tactics for re c r u i t i ng support from a wide spectrum of Serbian citizens, inc l ud i ng winning support from within the ranks of the

gov e r n me nt itself; the psycho l o g ical effect of fear, and me t hods and techniques fo r

o v e rc o m i ng it; psycho l o g ical me t hods de s ig ned to improve public opinion of Otpor and

its objectives; crisis ma na ge me nt and the importance of leadership in mo me nts of crisis; and how to avoid unnecessary risk that could jeopardize the mo v e me nt or, worse,

t he lives of its activists.

T he rigor of Helvey’s approach conveyed an important feature of no n v io l e nt actio n :

“ S t rategy is just as important in no n v io l e nt action as it is in military action” (Sharp,

Politics of Nonviolent Ac t i o n , p. 493); the point for both is to maximize impact by capi t a l i z i ng on available re s o u rces and a conflict’s ever-chang i ng dy na m ic s. Us i ng time

effectively or re t a i n i ng a psycho l o g ical edge over an oppone nt, for exa m p l e, are both

keys to successful stra t e g ies in waging conflict, be it no n v io l e nt or vio l e nt. As Gand h i

h i mself once observed: “An able ge ne ral always gives battle in his own time on the

g ro u nd of his cho ic e. He always re t a i ns the initiative in these respects and never allows

it to pass into the hands of the ene my” (as quoted in Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent

Ac t i o n , p. 500).

Otpor understood that it had ent e red a war against the go v e r n me nt and that the 

5

As the international campaign

to promote democra cy in Serbia

began to merge with effo r t s

under way inside the country,

Otpor devoted itself to deve l o ping the strategies and tactics of

successful nonviolent action.

“ S t rategy is just as importa n t

in nonviolent action as it 

is in military action.”
c o ns e q u e nces of its campaign could bring inc reased re p re s s ion, or even death, at the

h a nds of a much mo re powerful adversary. To guide its strategy in this hig h - s t a kes effo r t ,

Otpor looked at other successful no n v io l e nt mo v e me nt s — how they were created and

what tactics were useful in their struggles. 

Otpor leaders distributed Serbia n - l a ng ua ge versio ns of Sharp’s From Dictatorship to

D e m o c r a c y to its activists. And, with assistance from his Politics of Nonviolent Ac t i o n,

t hey developed a list of tactics that had proved effective in challeng i ng authority elsew he re, inc l ud i ng org a n i z i ng sit-ins, protest ma rc he s, and cons u mer boycotts. The point

was to ind i rectly and cons i s t e ntly challenge the go v e r n me nt on ma ny levels. In so do i ng ,

Otpor hoped to change the power imbalance in the country by ex p o s i ng the re g i me ’ s

w e a k nesses and lessening the grip of fear it held on the population. Sharp’s work pro v e d

so useful that Otpor subsequently praised it as “an astound i ngly effective blueprint fo r

c o n f ro nt i ng a brutal re g i me” (e-mail to Albert Cevallos, Ma rch 22, 2001). Helvey’s impact

was likewise appare nt: “We are grateful for what he did for de mo c racy in Serbia” (comments by Otpor activist Srdja Po p o v ic at the “Whither the Bulldozer” confere nc e, Ja nuary 30–31, 2001, Belgra de ) .

“ H e ’s Finished!”

With its youthful membership and strict adhe re nce to no n v io l e nc e, Otpor won the symp a t hy of the bro a der population. The mo v e me nt also directly challenged Milosevic ’ s

a u t hority by plastering its symbol—a clenc hed black-and-white fist that riffed off of

C o m munist pro p a g a nda, and the slogan “Gotov Je!” (“He’s Finished!”) thro u g hout Serb ia. To aid in this effort, the mo v e me nt created a ma r ke t i ng wing re s p o nsible for de s ig ni ng the sleek and highly visible posters, t-shirts, and leaflets that would ma ke it one of

t he best-known “bra nds” in Serbia. In one ins t a nc e, Otpor activists thro u g hout the count r y, hop i ng to send a powerful me s s a ge to the go v e r n me nt about their stre ngth, posted

t e ns of tho u s a nds of posters in do z e ns of towns and cities in just one ho u r.

In a bid to attract mo re re c r u i t s, while at the same time ex p o s i ng the brittleness of the

reg i me, the mo v e me nt also employed hu mor and sarcasm in its campaig ns and posters, a

t a c t ic that it had learned from Sharp’s Politics of Nonviolent Ac t i o n. This tactic inc re a s e d

exp o ne nt ially the arsenal of optio ns available to the no n v io l e nt mo v e me nt. In one hig h l y

p u b l icized inc ide nt, after police had ra ided Otpor’s Belgra de of f ice and confiscated hu ndreds of the mo v e me nt’s posters and info r ma t ion bulletins without a search warra nt, one

of the mo v e me nt’s spoke s p e r s o ns anno u nced it would in any case receive a new shipme nt

of mat e r ials the next afternoon. When police arrived and, again without a permit, confiscated the boxe s, they were embarrassed to find that they were in fact empty. Otpor had

not only exposed illegal police tactics in fro nt of the me d ia, it also re g a i ned the upper hand

in its tit-for-tat battle with the re g i me by hig h l ig ht i ng police ine p t i t ude.

Otpor worked hard to keep the re g i me of f - b a l a nce in a variety of add i t io nal ways:

• Building a decentralized network of local Otpor chapters. T he mo v e me nt conc e nt rated on

de v e l o p i ng its own ins t i t u t io nal stre ngth, challeng i ng the re g i me not only in Belgra de

but thro u g hout Serbia as well. It opened of f ices thro u g hout the country and re c r u i t e d

activists from all walks of Serbian life, inc l ud i ng pro m i ne nt athletes and re p re s e nt a t i v e s

of the Serbian Ortho dox Chu rch. To limit Milosevic’s ability to co-opt its leade r s, or simply arrest or “disappear” them, Otpor int e nt io nally de c e nt ralized its activitie s. Its leadership was kept secret and it hardly ever met as a full group. Only one or two ke y

i nd i v iduals oversaw cont rol of the mo v e me nt’s re s o u rc e s. Otpor bra nc hes aro u nd the

c o u ntry acted on their own initia t i v e, with little dire c t ion from the cent e r.

• Chipping away at Milosevic’s traditional power base. A no t her cent ral eleme nt of a stra t eg ic non v io l e nt mov e me nt is its ability to deprive its oppone nt of cont rol. This me a ns

a t t a c k i ng an oppone nt’s ability to cons o l idate cont rol, lessening the impact of vio l e nt

6

Otpor activists throughout the

c o u n t r y, hoping to send a

p owerful message to the gove r nment about their strength, 

posted tens of thousands of

posters in dozens of towns and

cities in just one hour.

Another central element of a

s t rategic nonviolent move m e n t

is its ability to deprive its 

opponent of contro l .
ret a l ia t ion while at the same time ma i nt a i n i ng no n v io l e nt discipline, and most cruc ia l l y, alie na t i ng an oppone nt from its tra d i t io nal bases of support. Ac c o rd i ng l y, Otpor

w o r ked to “turn” against the re g i me cons t i t u e nc ies tra d i t io nally supportive of it—fro m

p e ns io ners to police of f ic e r s. By joining pens io ner strike s, send i ng flowers to the military on Army Day, and building an umbrella big and welcoming enough to accommodate diverse members of Serbian socie t y, Otpor silently recruited sympathizers in

numbers that would not become ent i rely appare nt until the final days of the re g i me.

Also, by cultivating ex t e r nal assistance in the form of diploma t ic and fina nc ial support, Otpor had the re s o u rces to develop its int e r nal infra s t r uc t u re and ima ge abro a d.

• Staying flexible and one step ahead of the regime. F rom its earlier work with He l v e y,

Otpor also understood that a successful stra t e g ic no n v io l e nt mo v e me nt must be able

to re c o nc e p t ualize its role vis-à-vis the fluid and evolving conflict in which it is

e ng a ge d. This me a ns assessing pre v ious events in lig ht of re s u l t s, adjusting of f e ns i v e

a nd de f e nsive opera t io ns accord i ng l y, and sustaining cont i nuity between actio ns and

o b j e c t i v e s. Otpor exe rcised these optio ns by ado p t i ng a de f e nsive posture in the summer of 2000 after hu ndreds of its activists had been arrested that spring and, in orde r

to conserve re s o u rces and personnel for future actio ns, re f ra i n i ng from further activity until electio ns were called in July. By this time, owing to a tip from a sympathe t ic

gov e r n me nt ins ide r, the mo v e me nt had alre a dy printed upwards of sixty tons of elect io n - related ma t e r ials in ant ic i p a t ion of the coming campaig n .

Fo rging Alliances: Keeping the Opposition United 

Otpor realized early on that it had to overc o me the int ra ns ige nce and fra c t io u s ness of

o p p o s i t ion political partie s. This me a nt spend i ng countless hours behind the scene s

p re s s u r i ng the parties’ leade r s, who had come toge t her to form the Allia nce for Change

in June 1998, to re main united. Members of Otpor re ma i ned affiliated with various part ies or their youth wing s, assisting in this effort. Otpor also actively recruited sympathizers from within the ruling party’s youth wing s, from whom it learned valua b l e

i n fo r ma t ion such as what events were being planned to counter its own effo r t s. 

O nce the opposition finally began to coalesce, and ho p i ng to capitalize on ne w fo u nd

popular discont e nt with Milosevic, to call for electio ns, Otpor cont i nued to insist that

t he opposition re main united. At its ra l l ie s, which dwarfed those spons o red by the political partie s, the stude nts shoved political leaders on stage en ma s s e, de t e r m i ned to sho w

a united fro nt. The sheer size of the Otpor mo v e me nt de ma nded the political opposit ion’s attent ion. Thanks in part to these effo r t s, and despite the bre a kdown in late 1999

of the Allia nce for Change—yet ano t her victim of the int e r ne c i ne rivalry that plagued

e a r l ier opposition effo r t s — ne go t ia t io ns that would ultimately create the much stro nge r

D e mo c ra t ic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition were alre a dy under way.

S ig n i f ic a nt allia nces were also fo rged between Otpor and re p re s e ntatives of the

c o u ntry’s civil socie t y, inc l ud i ng NGOs and the inde p e nde nt me d ia. Whe reas the s e

g roups once re p re s e nted a disparate opposition coalition, the circ u ms t a nces unde r

w h ich they now worked yie l ded collabora t ion unseen befo re in Serbia. After journa l i s t

M i roslav Filipovic was imprisoned in July 2000 for re p o r t i ng atro c i t ies committed by the

Yu goslav Army in Kosovo, for ins t a nc e, do z e ns of local NGOs and Otpor distributed

nat io nw ide petitio ns calling for his re l e a s e.

F o l l o w i ng ano t her inc ide nt in which a journalist was arrested for displaying a poster

in his window de c r y i ng the lack of press fre e dom, Otpor activists cons t r ucted ma ke s h i f t

jails—out of ne w s p a p e r s, no less—on city streets to re p re s e nt the prison Serbia had

b e c o me. Reflecting its ra p id growth, the coalition of NGOs, Otpor, and the inde p e nde nt

med ia also cospons o red a caravan of large pro de mo c racy rock concerts that tra v e l e d

t h ro u g hout Serbia. In add i t ion, a sig n i f ic a nt number of civic and special int e re s t

7

. . . Otpor worked to “turn”

against the regime constituencies traditionally supportive 

of it—from pensioners to 

police of f i c e r s.
g roups—supported by int e r na t io nal NGOs, such as the Na t io nal Endo w me nt for Demo crac y, the Na t io nal Demo c ra t ic Ins t i t u t e, and the Int e r na t io nal Republican Ins t i t u t e —

ex p a nded their pre s e nce thro u g hout Serbia du r i ng this period by working and re c r u i t i ng

actively outside of Belgra de. Such was the case with the Ne z a v i s nost labor union and

G17+, the latter a political mo v e me nt that evolved out of a group of pro de mo c racy econo m i s t s. By the summer of 2000, civil society had laced Serbia with a network of NGOs

a nd pro de mo c racy activists.

T he end result of these ex p a nd i ng allia nces was far from assure d. The pro de mo c ra c y

mov e me nt’s successes bro u g ht with them even harsher re p re s s ion. Arrests and beating s

of Otpor and other civic activists were so fre q u e nt that the U.S. Departme nt of State

w a r ned that Milosevic had plunged the country “closer to open dictatorship than ever

b e fo re” (Country Reports on Hu man Rig hts Pra c t ices 2000, “Fede ral Republic of Yu gos l a v ia,” February 2001). NGOs allied with the no n v io l e nt mo v e me nt, such as Wo men in

Black and the Hu ma n i t a r ian Law Cent e r — u s ually no mo re than an irritating thorn in the

s ide of the re g i me — c a me under inc re a s i ng attack (Amnesty Int e r na t io nal, press re l e a s e,

August 18, 2000).

T he broad coalition persisted, ho w e v e r, belie v i ng that the go v e r n me nt could no t

re main in power fo rever simply by re l y i ng on brute fo rc e. Whe never an Otpor or NGO

activist was arrested or beaten, local me d ia were alerted, which in turn bro u g ht citizens

out onto the streets de ma nd i ng an ex p l a na t ion and a stop to the vio l e nc e. Over the prev ious year the mo v e me nt had worked hard to develop re l a t io ns, and thus sympathie s,

with the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y. Every arrest bro u g ht with it inc reased scrutiny and

c o nde m na t ion of the Milosevic re g i me from outside Serbia, hig h l ig ht i ng the importanc e

of de v e l o p i ng a conc rete infra s t r uc t u re and support network. Each event ultima t e l y

served to unde r m i ne Milosevic and embolden the gro w i ng pro - de mo c racy mo v e me nt .

Elections Provide the Moment

D e s p e rate to keep up the appeara nce of his go v e r n me nt’s legitima c y, and confide nt that

he had suffic ie ntly ne u t ralized the opposition, in July 2000 Milosevic called for electio ns

to be held in late September. With the assistance of int e r na t io nal NGOs and do no r s,

o p p o s i t ion political parties and do me s t ic NGOs were de t e r m i ned to avoid the mistake s

of pre v ious election campaig ns. Un i t y, ge t t i ng out the vote, and mo n i t o r i ng the elect io ns became cruc ia l .

• Opposition unity. O p i n ion surveys spons o red by int e r na t io nal org a n i z a t io ns and conduc ted by local NGOs showed that a united opposition could in fact defeat Milosevic at the

p o l l s. The surveys also revealed that public distrust of Dra s ko v ic and Djind j ic, the oppos i t ion’s two most pro m i ne nt leade r s, ran high. To be successful, the DOS not only ne e ded to quell its own rivalries but also had to put fo r w a rd a cand idate who could cre d i b l y

c h a l l e nge Milosevic. After conduc t i ng add i t io nal opinion surveys, the opposition cho s e

Vojislav Ko s t u n ica, the leader of the Demo c ra t ic Party of Serbia and a relative unkno w n

o u t s ide of political circ l e s, as its cand ida t e. Dra s ko v ic’s refusal to recognize the DOS de c is ion to field a single cand idate against Milosevic, and his ins i s t e nce on putting fo r w a rd

a Serbian Renewal Mo v e me nt cand ida t e, isolated him from supporters, ma ny of who m

w e re by now abando n i ng the party to join the DOS. Mo nt e ne g ro’s de c i s ion to boycott

f e de ral electio ns deprived de mo c ra t ic activists of a sizable ant i - M i l o s e v ic voting bloc and

a dded to the great strain that the opposition was alre a dy unde r.

• Getting out the vote. In conjunc t ion with a large coalition of NGOs and the DOS,

Otpor again used its network to launch a massive ge t - o u t - t he-vote campaign, fo c u si ng on Serbia’s youth, which tra d i t io nally had not participated in the electora l

p rocess and thus re p re s e nted a large, untapped cons t i t u e nc y. Under the dual banners of “He’s Finished” and “It’s Time,” Otpor activists aro u nd the count r y, in coord i na t ion with do z e ns of NGOs as well as the DOS coalition, once again org a n i z e d

8

A r rests and beatings of Otpor

and other civic activists we re 

so frequent that the U.S.

Department of State wa r n e d

that Milosevic had plunged the

country “closer to open

d i c ta torship than ever befo re. ”

The broad coalition persisted,

h oweve r, believing that the 

g overnment could not remain in

p ower fo rever simply by re l y i n g

on brute fo rc e.
c o ncerts featuring pro m i ne nt Serbian mu s ic ia ns and actors, culmina t i ng in a large

demo ns t ra t ion in Belgra de just days befo re the electio ns.

• Election monitoring. DOS also began re c r u i t i ng election monitors who could deter the

gov e r n me nt from stuffing ballots. It did this in conjunc t ion with an NGO, Center fo r

F ree Electio ns and Demo c racy (CeSID), tra i n i ng opposition activists to conduct ex i t

polls and tabulate parallel vote counts du r i ng electio ns. Pre p a ra t io ns were so ex t e nsive that by the time electio ns did roll aro u nd upwards of 15,000 volunteers had been

t ra i ne d. The opposition used add i t io nal opinion polls spons o red by pro de mo c ra c y

NGOs to focus its effo r t s, and campaign me s s a ges were tested in fro nt of sample aud ie nces befo re being used in public.

T he campaign worke d. Ac c o rd i ng to various mo n i t o r i ng groups and inde p e nde nt

me d ia, mo re than 70 perc e nt of Serbia’s eligible voters had go ne to the polls, and a

majority of votes were for DOS cand idate Ko s t u n ica. Milosevic’s refusal to recognize the

results sparked outra ge that in turn led the opposition to call for na t io nw ide strike s. The

c o u ntry res p o nded: scho o l s, public tra ns p o r t a t ion, the a t e r s, and, perhaps most import a nt, mine r s — l o ng a bastion of support for the ruling party—joine d.

By this point, opposition leaders had spent countless hours me e t i ng with hig h - ra n ki ng police and military of f ic ials to get a promise that vio l e nce would not be used at peaceful ra l l ie s. In add i t ion, as one opposition leader pointed out, the seemingly spont a ne o u s

rev o l u t ion on the streets of Belgra de fo l l o w i ng Milosevic’s dismissal of the electoral re s u l t s

was carefully planne d, much like a military campaign. “We wanted to keep the police preo c c u p ied in differe nt places, that’s why I said only one bus [of protesters] from Ko l u b a ra , ”

ref e r r i ng to the massive miners’ strike that fo rced police to travel the re instead of cons o l ida t i ng its fo rces in Belgra de (New York Times, October 15, 2000, p. A12).

In the capital itself, the opposition likewise organized what seemed to be spont aneous protests in an effort to preoccupy polic e. This inc l uded the “sudden” bre a kdo w n

of cars in the middle of the do w ntown area’s busiest int e r s e c t io ns at the he ig ht of rush

ho u r. Other “spont a neous” protests and strikes were planned thro u g hout ma ny of Belg ra de’s ne ig h b o r hoods and outlying suburbs in order to further cons u me valuable polic e

re s o u rc e s. Support for the strikes was so wide s p read that even the police and military

s e e med to he s i t a t e, uns u re which way the political winds would blow.

That answer would come on October 5: After weeks of unc e r t a i nt y, a teeming cro w d,

many of whom came from outside the capital, stormed the Yu goslav fede ral parlia me nt .

As the police re t re a t e d, leaving behind their weapons, the crowd surged fo r w a rd and —

with the assistance of a local fa r mer’s bulldo z e r — c ra s hed through the parlia me nt buildi ng’s do o r s. Realizing that the re v o l u t ion would be left incomplete if it stopped the re,

t he crowd then took over state-run me d ia fa c i l i t ie s. 

To be sure, the re were some vio l e nt clashes with the police on the streets of Belgra de

that da y, and reports filtered in of both police and citizens being injured in the chaos.

O ne young woman die d, though reports differ on the circ u ms t a nces surro u nd i ng he r

death. But once again displaying the importance of strategy in successful no n v io l e nt

a c t ion, it has since been revealed that the popular libera t ion of the parlia me nt and some

of the me d ia fa c i l i t ies was a carefully cho re o g ra p hed event (Misha Glenny, “Letter fro m

B e l g ra de: The Rede e me r s,” The New Yo r ke r, October 30, 2000, p. 77). After mo nt hs of

e s c a l a t i ng conflict, a mo v e me nt wie l d i ng stra t e g ic no n v io l e nce had helped to bring

down the go v e r n me nt of Slobodan Milosevic, who re s ig ned the next da y.

P roblems in the Tra n s i t i o n

In the period imme d iately fo l l o w i ng the re v o l u t ion, efforts focused on sho r i ng up the

g a i ns of the opposition, especially in advance of Serbian parlia me ntary electio ns in

D e c e m b e r. These efforts inc l uded sig n i f ic a nt do nor support in allevia t i ng the ene rgy 

9

. . . as one opposition leader

pointed out, the seemingly

s p o n taneous revolution on the

s t reets of Belgrade fo l l ow i n g

M i l o s evic’s dismissal of the 

e l e c to ral results was care f u l l y

planned, much like a milita r y

c a m p a i g n .

. . . once again displaying the

i m p o r tance of strategy in

successful nonviolent action, 

it has since been revealed that

the popular liberation of the

parliament and some of the

media facilities was a care f u l l y

c h o re o g raphed event 
crisis that the opposition had inherited from the pre v ious re g i me. The re were in add i t io n

a host of other pro b l e ms that the new go v e r n me nt, he a ded by Ko s t u n ica, ne e ded to

a ddress: amo ng them, investig a t i ng the ma ny crimes of the pre v ious re g i me and re s c ui ng an econo my that had been plunde red by Milosevic.

Otpor launc hed several new campaig ns, inc l ud i ng one capitalizing on the ima ge of

t he bulldozer that had been used to storm the parlia me nt. In a thinly veiled warning to

t he ousted go v e r n me nt, its posters re a d, “In Serbia the re are 5,675 re g i s t e red bulldo zers and several million potent ial dr i v e r s. . . . WE ARE WATCHING YOU!” As December

nea re d, a new ge t - o u t - t he-vote campaign enc o u ra g i ng Serbia’s voters to “Finish the

Job,” “Seal the Deal,” and “Use Your Brain” was launc he d.

Nev e r t he l e s s, conc e r ns mo u nted that support for ma ny of the org a n i z a t io ns that contributed to the re v o l u t ion had evapora t e d. Ins t e a d, fo re ign assistance shifted its fo c u s

f rom the opposition and civil society activities to those of the new Yu goslav go v e r n me nt .

W hen Otpor first launc hed its “Bulldozer” campaign, fo re ign diplomats suggested that

t he mes s a ge that would instead be conveyed would be one against the newly elected,

a nd ostensibly fra g i l e, go v e r n me nt. The mo v e me nt was thre a t e ned with a re t ra c t ion of

p o l i t ical and do nor support if the campaign pro c e e de d. Otpor refused to re l e nt, sugges t i ng instead that it was in any case just as important to re m i nd the de mo c ra t ic fo rc e s

that the y, too, would be held accountable for their actio ns. 

O t her org a n i z a t io ns faced similar threats to their support. Such was the case with the

S t ude nt Un ion of Serbia (SUS), which pro moted de mo c racy and tolera nce in its activitie s

a nd which rep re s e nted tho u s a nds of university stude nts across the count r y. SUS collabo rated with ma ny of the NGOs that advocated de mo c racy and was an active partic i p a nt

in the “It’s Time” campaign. But the lack of func t io n i ng computers and pho t o c o p ie r s

( a nd even heat) in its Belgra de he a d q uarters sig naled that the org a n i z a t ion was strugg l i ng to make ends meet even as mo ney rushed in to support Serbia’s new de mo c ra t ic

gov e r n me nt. No ne t he l e s s, SUS re ma i ned active and is curre ntly working with the ne w

gov e r n me nt to repeal the re p ressive laws that Milosevic imposed on the universitie s.

Perhaps a mo re basic question confro nt i ng Serbia was what role—if any — g ro u p s

s uch as these should assume in the country’s tra ns i t ion to de mo c ra c y. As ma ny observers

p o i nted out, the primary objective of these org a n i z a t io ns — i nde e d, their very ra i s o n

d ’ ê t re—had been fulfilled. Now they could either dissolve or, if need be, re main a watchdog of the new go v e r n me nt. Othe r s, ho w e v e r, int e r p reted the de mo c ra t ic changes to

mean inc reased opportunity, or even re s p o ns i b i l i t y. 

T he answer did not come easily. When Otpor anno u nced at the beginning of 2001 that

it would be tra ns fo r m i ng itself into a political party, cont roversy erupted. Ma ny of the

mov e me nt’s own activists re g a rded this de c i s ion as treason. It sma c ked of the same

p o l i t ical ambition that they had initially set out to defeat. News reports circulated that

Otpor of f ices outside of Belgra de would not recognize the mo v e, and its future ro l e

rema i ned ambig uo u s. At the same time, other politically active NGOs, such as G17+, also

put fo r w a rd plans to develop into legitimate political partie s.

As a result, anxiety swelled that ge nu i ne de mo c racy in Serbia could not be built by

foc u s i ng solely on political partie s. Experie nce in postwar tra ns i t io ns elsewhe re, as well

as the tra ns i t io ns from communism to de mo c racy in other cent ral and eastern Euro p e a n

nat io ns, suggested instead that a vibra nt civil society was cruc ial for the successful tra ns i t ion to peace and de mo c ra c y. Demo c ra c y — l i ke the re v o l u t ion befo re it—ne e ded to be

built from outside the cent e r, and from the gro u nd up, with the support of a wide bre a dt h

of org a n i z a t io ns active thro u g hout all of Serbia .

What Now ?

A l t hough Otpor may have set off the initial spark, it is in the end impossible to cre d i t

a ny single ind i v idual or org a n i z a t ion with the do w n fall of Milosevic. Countless brave and

1 0

. . . concerns mounted that support for many of the org a n i z ations that contributed to the 

revolution had eva p o ra t e d .

. . . anxiety swelled that

genuine democra cy in Serbia

could not be built by fo c u s i n g

solely on political parties.
u n no t iced ind i v iduals and org a n i z a t io ns played a critical role behind the scene s, he l p i ng

to create the wave that would wash away the old gua rd. In add i t ion, the re was a sign i f ic a nt number of people from within the Milosevic go v e r n me nt who were for whatever re a s o ns also willing to collaborate with the de mo c ra t ic opposition. But in assessing

t he impact of Serbia’s no n v io l e nt mo v e me nt in the aftermath of the re v o l u t ion, a senio r

U.S. diplomat de c l a re d, “We hope the new ge ne ra t ion of leaders will come from Otpor’s

ranks” (Roger Cohen, “Who Really Bro u g ht Down Milosevic?” New York Times Magazine,

November 26, 2000, p. 118).

S uch a sent i me nt is mo re than a re f l e c t ion of the role that the mo v e me nt played in

mo b i l i z i ng Serbs to take to the stre e t s. It is also an ins ig ht into the critical role that a

non v io l e nt mov e me nt plays in a civil society and a na t ion’s fledg l i ng de mo c ra c y. Ma ny

of the org a n i z a t io ns and ind i v iduals re s p o nsible for successful no n v io l e nt mo v e me nt s

e l s e w he re have go ne on to positio ns of inc reased re s p o nsibility and autho r i t y. In sho r t ,

re v o l u t io nary leaders some t i mes ma ke good leaders of de mo c ra t ic states. Though add it io nal analysis is ne e ded to fully unde r s t a nd the re l a t ion between no n v io l e nt mo v ement s, civil socie t y, and the de v e l o p me nt of de mo c racy in such places, it is possible to

infer from the ex i s t i ng evide nce that support for such org a n i z a t io ns du r i ng the tra ns it ion counts almost as much, if not mo re, as it did prior to the tra ns i t io n .

In Serbia, this me a ns that support must cont i nue to be fo r t h c o m i ng for groups that

helped create the re v o l u t ion in the first place, especially because ma ny re p re s e ntatives of

t he old re g i me — s uch as Serbian pre s ide nt Milan Milutino v ic, ind icted along s ide Milosev ic by the IC T Y, and a host of police and army personnel with questio nable pasts—re ma i n

in place. Along those line s, priority must be given to the efforts of a wide swath of NGOs

devoted to the ma ny serious challenges now fa c i ng the count r y. The cre a t ion of a large r

network of pro de mo c ra t ic fo rc e s, inc l ud i ng dy na m ic political partie s, inde p e nde nt me d ia ,

f ree tra de unio ns, open universitie s, and an inde p e nde nt jud ic ia r y, re ma i ns cruc ial. Ne w

o rg a n i z a t io ns anxious to become involved in the de mo c ra t ic process should also be given

p o l i t ical and do nor support whe rever feasible. Fina l l y, support should be aimed at long -

term gra s s roots effo r t s, not ind i v idual leaders or short-term re s u l t s, especially because virt ually all observers pre d ict the event ual disint e g ra t ion of the DOS coalitio n .

While pro v id i ng the type of support necessary to further the de mo c ra t i z a t ion of Serb ia, do nors sho u l d, ho w e v e r, be careful not to create the type of de p e nde ncy that has

s u f focated civil society in other tra ns i t io nal count r ie s. In Bosnia and Cro a t ia, for exa mp l e, many local initiatives suffered once attent ion, and thus fina nc ial re s o u rc e s, shifted

to Kosovo. Like w i s e, civic org a n i z a t io ns in Kosovo decry the loss of support that the fa l l

of Milosevic, and thus the re s t r uc t u r i ng of int e r na t io nal prio r i t ie s, has me a nt for the i r

own initia t i v e s. The point for do nors and civil society alike is to grow beyond the re v ol u t ion and the re g ion’s ma ny conflic t s. Cultivating a self-sustaining civil society inc re a ses the like l i hood of successful de mo c ra t ic tra ns i t io ns.

For their part, NGOs, stude nt gro u p s, and other re p re s e ntatives of Serbia’s civil society must cont i nue to ask what their role is in a ne w, de mo c ra t ic socie t y. Some, such as

F ree Serbia, have alre a dy suggested that they can export their own ex p e r ie nces and

l e s s o ns pro mo t i ng de mo c racy to other count r ie s, most notably Belarus and Burma. Others have noted that perhaps the greatest cont r i b u t ion of civic org a n i z a t io ns would be to

focus on the ra m p a nt corruption that plagues the count r y. Inde e d, the wide s p read crimi na l i z a t ion of most all of the Balka ns over a de c a de of wars will cont i nue to plague effo r t s

at stability for some time to come.

T he curre nt go v e r n me nt in Serbia took a step in the rig ht dire c t ion when, unde r

s t ro ng pre s s u re from the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y, it arrested Milosevic in Ma rch 2001.

T he go v e r n me nt’s anno u nc e me nt that the fo r mer pre s ide nt would be tried for corruptio n

a nd related crimes fell short of what ma ny, inc l ud i ng re p re s e ntatives of the country’s civil

s o c iety and int e r na t io nal do no r s, cons ide red necessary to truly establish de mo c ra c y. Ye t

M i l o s e v ic was handed over to the ICTY on June 28.

If Serbia wishes to move into the future, it must do so by addre s s i ng the large r, and

1 1

Indeed, the widespre a d

criminalization of most all of

the Balkans over a decade 

of wars will continue to plague

e f forts at stability for some

time to come.
more ex p l o s i v e, question of war crime s. Establishing accountability would not only dist a nce the curre nt go v e r n me nt from the crimes committed by the pre v ious re g i me, it would

also set the standa rd by which future crimes are judge d. As Serbia attempts to re - e s t a blish its legal and jud ic ial systems, both of which were badly ra v a ged by Milosevic, the

e ng a ge me nt of civic groups in these endeavors can yield sig n i f ic a nt advant a ge s. For one,

t he process of establishing a proper historical re c o rd pro v ides citizens an opportunity to

learn about the country’s role in the re g io n — i nc l ud i ng its past, pre s e nt, and future.

I ndee d, exp e r ie nce suggests that a na t ion cannot move beyond a de b i l i t a t i ng sense of

collective guilt until it learns to assign ind i v idual re s p o nsibility and account a b i l i t y. 

This will not be easy in Serbia. Ac c o u ntability raises unc o m fortable questio ns for ma ny

p e o p l e, inc l ud i ng some of those who curre ntly constitute the ne w, de mo c ra t ic go v e r n me nt .

N G O s, stude nt gro u p s, and other re p re s e ntatives of civil society may thus wish to fo c u s

t heir efforts on the ma ny aspects of re c o nc i l i ng Serbia’s past. Inde p e nde nt me d ia can assist

in the process by de v o t i ng attent ion to the me c h a n ics of justice and other hu man rig ht s

i s s u e s, further dissemina t i ng the unde r p i n n i ngs of a stro ng de mo c ra t ic state. B92, the

i nde p e nde nt ra d io station that for so long was a favorite target of Milosevic, is a prime

example of the role civil society can play as it endeavors to pro mote the establishme nt of

a credible truth and re c o nc i l ia t ion commission that addresses Serbia’s re c e nt past.

S e r b ia faces an add i t io nal number of challeng i ng issues, any of which its civil society may choose to eng a ge. For ins t a nc e, as long as the re is confusion over the indep e nde nce of Mo nt e ne g ro (as the tentative me m b e r, next to Serbia, in the Fede ra l

R e p u b l ic of Yu go s l a v ia) and Kosovo, Serbia will cont i nue to exhaust itself trying to

def i ne what it is. Civic groups can, in the interim, cont i nue to pro mote de mo c ra c y,

i nc l ud i ng the core values of mu t ual tolera nce and respect for hu man rig ht s, until issues

of final status are re s o l v e d. Civic org a n i z a t io ns may also choose to focus on the establ i s h me nt of a genu i ne rule of law or privatization efforts (both of which are int r i ns ic a lly tied to ant ic o r r u p t ion efforts and the issue of accountability). Reform of Serbia’s polic e

a nd military is ano t her important area in which the country’s civic org a n i z a t io ns ma y

play a rol e. Fina l l y, to address any or all of these issues, Serbia’s civil society may cho o s e

to re a l ign itself into a watchdog ro l e, re p re s e nt i ng the ma ny aspects of Serbian life and

t he ma ny challenges the country fa c e s.

C o n c l u s i o n

After a de c a de of de v a s t a t i ng wars and crippling int e r na t io nal isolation, the ex t e nt to

w h ich the new de mo c ra t ic go v e r n me nt of Serbia can ho nor a commitme nt to no n v io l e nc e

will go a long way in bring i ng the country back into the fold of the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y. Recent events in the Presevo Valley area of southern Serbia, whe re vio l e nce has

erupted between local ethnic Albania ns and Serbian polic e, suggest that this may alre a dy

be the case, as the go v e r n me nt seeks to reach a diploma t ic solution. As one Otpor

activist comme nt e d, “No n v io l e nce ma de the re v o l u t ion; no n v io l e nce should ma ke the

peace” (“Yu go s l a v ia: An Incomplete Revolution,” United States Institute of Pe a c e, October 17, 2000).

In sum, long-term peace and stability in the Balka ns cont i nue to re q u i re the establ i s h me nt of ge nu i ne and stable de mo c ra c ies in Serbia and thro u g hout the re g ion. Establ i s h i ng such polities would greatly inc rease the chances of solving the Balka ns’ ma ny

c o m p l ex tens io ns and conflicts by chang i ng, in effect, the cont ext in which pro b l e ms

a nd issues are addre s s e d. Civil society is key to this pro c e s s. Demo c ra t i z a t ion of the

B a l ka ns would in add i t ion go a long way towards int e g ra t i ng the re g ion with the rest of

E u ro p e. Of course, such a goal re ma i ns a long-term process that will not in and of itself

resolve all of the imme d iate crises in the re g ion. Ho w e v e r, the de v e l o p me nt of a ne w

gene ra t ion of leaders who respect political pluralism, ma r ket re form, rule of law, tolera nc e, and, in short, de mo c racy will hasten the return of peace and stability to the re g io n .

For mo re info r ma t ion, see our Web site

( w w w. u s i p . o rg), which has an online

e d i t ion of this report cont a i n i ng links

to related Web sites, as well as

a dd i t io nal info r ma t ion on the topic.

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 7 2

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Was h i ngton, DC 20036

. . . as long as there is confusion

over the independence of 

M o n t e n e g ro and Ko s ovo, Serbia

will continue to exhaust itself

trying to define what it is.