HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOP

THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROB

HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOL

SPACE 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON COMME

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORT

UNITED STATES SENA

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

OVERSIGHT ON RECENT PROBLEMS WITH THE HUBB

TELESCOPE AND THE SPACE SHUTTLE 

JULY 10, 1990 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

36-688 0 WASHINGTON : 1990 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales O

U.S. Government Printing Oftice, Washington, DC 20402 
COMMITEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE. AND TRANSPORTATION 

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOWE. Hawaii 

WENDELL H. FORD, Kentucky 

J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska 

ALBERT GORE JR., Tennessee 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV. West Virginia 

LLOYD BENTSEN. Texas 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada 

CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia 

JOHN C. DANFORTH. Missouri 

BOB PACKWOOD. Oregon 

LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota 

TED STEVENS. Alaska 

ROBERT W. KASTEN. JR., Wisconsin 

JOHN MCCAIN. Arizona 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

SLADE GORTON. Washington 

TRENT LOTI', Mississippi 

KEVIN G. CURTIN. ChrefCounselandSqfDirecror 

WALTER B. MCCORMICK, JR.. Minonty Chief CarnselandSqfDirecror 

SUBCOMMTIFE ON SCIENCE!, TECHNOLOGY. AND SPACE 

ALBERT GORE, JR.. Tennessee. Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

LLOYD BENTSEN. Texas 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RICHARn H. BRYAN. Nevada 

CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia 

LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

ROBERT W. KASTEN. JR.. Wisconsin 

TRENT LOTI', Mississippi 

(11) 
C ONTENTS 

Opening statement by Senator Gore ............................... Opening statement by Senator Pressler .......................... by the Chairman .....................................

LIST OF WITNESSES 

Bulkin, Bertram R.. director, scientific space programs, Lockheed M

Space Company, Inc ..................................................... Fisk. Lennard A,, Ph.D., Associate Administrator, 

Ap lications, NASA ....................... gepared statement ........................ ................. Lenoir, William B., Ph.D., Associate Admi 

NASA .................................. ................................... 

Rich, John C., president, Hughes 

Rodney, ,George A.. Associate 

Prepared statement ..... .............. 

Letter of August 3, 19% ....._.. 

Prepared statement .................... Questions of Senator Gore an 

.................... 

Maintamability. and Quality Assurance, NASA ....... .. .................................

Tnompson. James R., Jr., Deputy Administrator, NASA ............................

. . . . , , . . , . . , , . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . 

(111) 
HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE AND THE 

SHUTTLE PROBLEMS 

TUESDAY, JULY 10,1990 

U.S. SEN

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TfU.h’SPORT

SUBCOMhlrrrEE ON SCJENCE, TECHNOLOGY. AN

Wa

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:15 p.m. 

Staff members assigned tothis hearing: Steve Palmer, senior 

Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Albert Gore, Jr., presidin

member, and Louis Whitset, minority staff counsel. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GO

Senator GORE. The subcommittee will come to order. 

I would like to apologize to our witnesses and our guests 

starting this afternoon. As I am sure has been explained to you

a lengthier than we expected classified session on aspects of 

cannot for good and valid reasons be discussed fully in an op

members of this subcommittee who are not with us right no

actively during this classified session, as did my colleagues wh

We have undertaken a responsibility to protect the classifie

made up the bulk of the session which began this morning and 

starting time for this hearing. Although some of our questions 

the understandings we bring with us from that session, we tak

of course, the obligation to protect the national security informa

earlier. 

Today we embark upon the second hearing of our Subcomm

Technology and Space to examine problems with the Hubble 

We will also focus on the hydrogen fuel leaks in the Space S

and Atlantis which have grounded the entire US. Space Shutt

The difficulties with the Hubble and the space shuttle p

disturbing and, without judging the cause of these two incidents

to reaffm my strong belief in the need for established q

procedures and strong effective program management by N

essential to successful development of the long-term, tech

programs NASA has under way to explore our solar system, 

of distant planets, and uncover the origins of the universe. 

In the wake of the Challenger disaster, it quickly became app

had neglected its mandate for quality control. NASA figures su

the number of quality assurance personnel was slashed by 70 

(1) 
1970 and 1985. The Marshall Space Flight Center, one of the 

Hubble Space Telescope, suffered the biggest setback, as thei

control was slashed and 87 percent of its quality contro

eliminated during that time he. 

I am concerned that with cuts like these, NASA may 

manpower necessary to question the contractors on their acti

procedures used with respect to the Hubble. As such, I inten

other things, whether NASA was in a position to independent

of the Space Telescope prior to launch. It is my very sincere be

to NASA’s quality assurance and program management cann

sacrificing the quality of the space program. History tells us that the Hubble program was beset w

technical difficulties. It has also been alleged that NASA had 

an overly ambitious schedule. NASA itself has ackno

management structure developed for the Hubble Space Teles

been optimal, to say the least. 

NASA’s problems in managing the Hubble become clear 

that during its 12 years of development there were a total of 15 

between the Marshall and Goddard Space Flight Ce

headquarters. It seems to me that NASA would be wise to us

Telescope as a case study for new managers on how to avoid c

projects. 

We will also direct a significant portion of our attention 

shuttle program and the ongoing investigation to determin

hydrogen fuel leak. The unding of this Nation’s principal s

system has potentially ar greater implications than the blu

Telescope. It is, therefore, essential that we understand how tw

occurred after so many successful shuttle launches as well 

stopped. This is a safety issue of the highest priority, as I thi

We have wiited many years for the Hubble Space Teles

question the importance of the space shuttle system to 

program. The purpose of this hearing is to help us to determ

errors have been made and, if so, they must be quickly iden

and, more importantly, avoided in the future. A commitment 

and strong program management may well be the key to the f

U.S. space program. 

As NASA continues to focus on the larger and larger and m

start-ups, there must be a high level of assurance that suffic

exists to merit the taxpayer investment. Before concluding this statement, let me recognize our w

first panel consists of 

J. R. Thompson, Deputy Administrator at NASA; 

Len Fisk, Associate Administrator for Space Science and 

was with us a week ago; Bill Lenoir, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight

George Rodney, Associate Administrator for Sa

Maintainability and Quality Assurance. Our second panel will include representatives from the tw

on the Hubble: John Rich, President of Hughes Danbur

Corporation, formerly Perkin-Elmer Corp.; and Bert Bulkin, 

manager of the Hubble at Lockheed Missiles and Space Com

company’s Director of Scientific Space Programs. 

Let me see if either of my colleagues has a statement. 
Senator Pressler. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR PRES

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, I shall just summar

because I want to hear the witnesses, and we have already spe

time in the closed session. 

Let me, first of all, say that all of us in Congress who care ab

have had high hopes for the Hubble Space Telescope. Throug

we were told that Hubble represented a landmark breakthroug

telescope with more than ten times the power of any ground-b

With its sharp lens, Hubble was to unlock the secrets of the u

be capable of viewing the remnants of the “big bang” that cr

20 billion years ago. It promised not only to support good res

our young people about science as a career. 

The latest troubles with Hubble, therefore, are so disappo

expectations were so great It is my understanding that defe

mirrors will eliminate the use of thp, main camera in the tele

impossible to perform about half the experiments planned for 

I am hopeful, however, that NASA will devote maximum t

to restore Hubble’s vision. I also hope that NASA will give ser

to an early shuttle mission to repair the Hubble defects. As it 

not visit Hubble until 1993, which would mean three years of 

This tragedy must be avoided if possible. 

I am eager to hear from our witnesses today about how 

Hubble mirrors came about How did distorted mirrors slip pa

and testing process? I have read that the telescope’s various ele

tested as an integrated system prior to launch. If this i

Subcommittee must ask why. 

Again, I have great confidence in NASA’s formidab

engineering talent which throughout its history has manag

impossible. I am hopeful that NASA can correct the defects in 

Telescope so it can realize our great expectations. 

I would also like to commend NASA on their quick and sy

to the fuel leak problems in the space shuttle program. 

procedures caught the fuel leak in the Columbia space shuttle 

The Columbia problems prompted NASA to test the Atlantis 

scheduled for a July 15 mission. Those tests turned up a simila

shuttles are undergoing detailed NASA tests to locate and re

leaks. Further, NASA has kept Congress and the publi

throughout this process. 

One additional area in which I have a fair amount of intere

method of budgeting causes something like this-for examp

contract out for special engineers to do a short-term project 

technicians behind, so to speak-and if, indeed, a part of this p

the way funds are allocated by Congress. If we had more lon

programming and budgeting, indeed, could high-quality en

project for a long time? 

If any of the witnesses could address issues of that sort

appreciative. 

With its talent and experience in space transportation, I 

NASA will soon move past these setbacks and return the s

position as the world’s premier manned space flight vehicle. 
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our witne

the Hobble Space Telescope and Space Shuttle programs. Th

Senator GORE. Thank you very much. 

Senator BRYAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

In the interest of time and the fact that all of us were eng

had anticipated in the classified briefing, I will forebear m

this time. 

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Senator Bryan. 

Welcome, gentlemen, your prepared statements will be in

in full. I want to encourage you to summarize them and spea

of what you have to tell us this morning. In reviewing the p

not in any way to be critical of them, I found that they were 

ours have been. But if you can summarize the high points an

what we are here to discuss, we would appreciate it. 

Senator Hollings has a statement that he would like to h

record. 

[The statement follows:] 

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMA

It is a tragedy that after 12 years and $1.6 billion for the development, i

the Hubble Space Telescope. a flaw that has so completely blurred its 

undetected. Of course, we do not yet know the precise cause of the problem

a spherical aberration will render much of the Telescope's science poten

several years. 

At the same time, but pehaps of far greater importance because of it

lives of future shuttle astronauts, NASA has continuing difficulties in ide

hydrogenfuelleakintheSpaceShuulesColumbisandAtlantis. Whilethese

unique to the two orbiter assemblies, the fact remains that we must find the 

it before we again risk the lives of any astronaut. 

This hearing, which is a follow-up to our session on June 29, is an impo

process. Today's session will enable the Members of this Committee to q

for managing the Hubble Space Telescope program, the Space Shuttle pro

Quality Assurance program within NASA. 'Ihe first panel represents muc

and we are formnate to have them with us. I am also pleased that representa

Missiles and Space Company and Hughes Danbury Optical Systems wil

these witnesses will help us better understand the current situation,as well a

must take to improve NASA and the U.S. space program. 

It is our responsibility to work together to solve the problems encounte

and the space telescope. As Chairman of this Cunmittee, I intend to work 

Senator GORE. We are honored to have as our lead-o

Thompson, Jr., Deputy Administrator of NASA, who was 

Center Director at Marshall for some of the time involved h

can supplement some of the answers of those who have lin

did not years ago. If you could give us an overview to lead off, Mr. Thom

you J.R.; I am so used to doing 

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. THOMPSON, 

ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTI

ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman a

the Committee. 

I certainly appreciate the opportunity to appear here today 

I have no written testimony but would like to summarize 

comments. 
As you know, I have asked to join this hearing, since I am prob

NASA manager that is in the agency today who has had the most d

responsibility on the Hubble Space Telescope program. And 

involvement in the development of the space shuttle propulsion sy

back almost two decades. 

My management oversight of Hubble began when I returned 

director in late 1986, when we were at that time in the early phases 

for returning the space shuttle to flight; and certainly more recen

past year here in headquarters, as NASA’s deputy administrato

actively involved in the final flight readiness reviews prior to 

personally feel directly responsible for the success of this missio

I, with many others, applauded the launch of the Hubble; and si

been equally proud of our NASA and contractors’ teams m

systematic checkout of the Hubble system. As we worked through 

a deployment suspense, solved the interference issue with the hig

the guide star acquisition work that has already been accomplishe

with the fix of the bit reversal of the fine guidance electronics wh

South Atlantic anomaly, the space craft jitter issue caused by 

induced gra@ance and the solar my booms now we believe is b

all of the above. 

And now we are dealing with the problem of fixing the optic

telescope assembly itself. Certainly I think from what I have read

running away from Hubble. I am not, and NASA is not I think it 

and it is not justified. I am convinced in a very quick order we w

feet on Hubble. I have been with this agency far too long to revert t

Monday morning quarterback every time something does not wo

But do not get me wrong, Senators; I get as irritated as anyon

more so than most, at mistakes. And I think we will learn from wh

we have made. I am convinced, though, that rigorous anal

engineering are going to return Hubble to specification perfo

believe that we have got the right team in NASA today to do the 

Before closing, let me just give you a word on the hydrogen lea

found on two successive space shuttles. NASA today is doing e

told this Committee, what I told this Committee, as we

Administrator Dick Truly on several occasions, as we testified he

during the shuttle recovery period after the accident. And that ver

was, we would not launch until we are ready. Today we are n

believe with the work that is in process, that we will be back in 

do it within a fairly short period of time. 

At this point, Senators, 1 would like to pause and sto

colleagues-and I would suggest we start with Len Fisk on my 

would like to add any remarks to my opening statement. And the

more than happy to try to answer your questions. Senator GORE. Whichever order you care to go in is perfect

We had a lengthy and informative session with Dr. Fisk a little o

and we will be glad to hear from you again now, Dr. Fisk. And 

you joining us in the classified session as well. 

STATEMENT OF LENNARD A. FISK, Ph.D., A

ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SPACE SCI

APPLICATIONS, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS A

ADMINISTRATION 
Dr. RSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. Le

to date on what has happened since the last time we talk

week. 

We have put together, on Hubble, essentially two pane

The first was to look at the data that we had from Hubble j

did, in fact-that the best explanation to date is that w

aberration. 

That panel met last week. And its report did, in fact, c

that the most straightforward explanation of our problem 

in the mirrors. But I think perhaps most important here, th

conclusion that it is a very straightforward correction that 

Hubble to its full capability, that the aberration is in fact su

that it is a straightforward matter to incorporate in the 

instruments a full correction to this problem. 

The second panel that has met is chaired by Dr. Lew 

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and is chartered in re

happened to the minors to cause the aberration when they 

early 1980s. That panel also met on Thursday and Friday 

a very productive meeting in that they put into two categ

were used in constructing the mirror-those that are like

this size, and those that are not likely. They have focused 

processes that could have caused an error of this size to t

in fact did occur. 

Over this week and next, there will be an extensive rev

going on and of the physical systems that were used to pro

physical systems still exist in their original configuration

looking for evidence that would allow us to determine wh

made. 

This panel will meet two weeks from yesterday-and 

will meet two weeks from yesterday in Danbury, CT to 

that review. They will also examine PriJiJOsdS for sub

unable to find the error by physical examination of 

examination of the documentation. 

We will at some point have to begin to think about test

secondary mirror and of the metrology unit itself which 

primary mirror. We will examine those test procedures tw

decide where to go from there. 

[The statement follows:] 

STATEMENT OF DR. LENNARD A. RSK. ASSOCIATE ADMI

SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS, NAS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subconrrm 'ttee I am pleased to h

to the Subcommittee on the status of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST

assez":G conduaed on HST overthe weekend of June 23%. 

is experiencing what we believe is sphericel abemtiq or an inability 

precise point. I want to stress that our understanding of this anomaly 

under study; however, NASA feels it is important to maintain our plic

and the Congress. As I stated at the last hearing, I am prepared to pro

testimony you deem appropriate to keep you and the other members o

this situation as it unfolds. 

First, this spherical aberration is significant because it prevents Hu

primaryrequiremenu,namely,that"7Opercentofthetotalenergyofa st

within a radius of 0.10 seconds of arc." Hubble is currently able to focus 

energy into that same area. However, and let me stress this again, thi

Hubble from answering the fundamental questions about the universe it 

red before this Subcommittee on June 29th. I n
exciting. and unique science will be amdud using Hubble in the near-term 

15-year lifespan. beginning almost immediately. Hubble will not be able to cond

activities in the near-tem, but it will be able to substilute significant science in 

impomt areas. And over the next few years. Hubble’s capabilities will be ful

us to recapture the science that will be deferred in the interim. 

It is imponant to member that NASA was established to do challenging mi

require men and machines that push the envelope of technology to its limits. The 

abilities should be, and must be, how we react when amfmted with adversi

efficiently we overcome this problem. I am confident that we can, and will, Ov

Clearly. the first step has to be finding out the cause of this abe-rration. As 

hearing, I have established the Hubble Space Telescope Investigation Board to 

of this anomaly. This Board wiU be a working group charged to review, analy

facts and circumstances regarding the manufacture, development and testing 

Telescope Assembly. 

lhis Board is chaired by Dr. Lew Allen, the Director of the Jet Propulsio

composed of world-renowned experts in optical systems and spacecraft quality 

past week, the other members of the Baud were formally anncunced. They are

Charles P. Spoelhof (Retired) Vice President. Eastman Kodak Co. 

George A. Rodney NASA’s Associate Administrator for Safety and Missio

John D. Mangus Head, Optics Bran&, Space Technology Division NAS

Prof. R. (Bob) Shannon Director, Optical Sciences Center University of Ar

Dr. Roger Angel Professor of Astronomy, Steward Observatory University 

The Board held its first preliminary meeting in Washington, D.C. on July 5 

Board‘s public statement following its first session is enclosed. 

The second step is to continue the process of characterizing this problem 

impacts on the scientific goals of Hubble. Our goal will be to maximize the scien

in the near term, as well as Over its 15- year lifespan. Last week, the Hubble Sci

authored a white paper which summarizes their preliminary assessment of the i

program. With your permission, I request that the Science Working Group’s w

into the record. 

In the next few months, NASA will be working with the Space Telesco

(STScl) and the Science Working Group to replan the scientific program for H

Stockman reported at the last hearing, our initial assessment is that approxima

observations originally scheduled for HST are still viable. Again, as Dr. 

previously, pan of the peer review panel that selected HST’s first-year o

reconvened to reevaluate the proposals in light of Hubble’s current suength

remember that since there were ten times as many observations approved o

scheduled during the first year, there is little doubt thai HST will continue to b

The rhird step of this process will be to develop and implement a long-

aberration. Our preliminary assessment is that the inclusion of a relatively sma

lens in the fmt of the second generation instruments should eliminate the sci

aberration. We believe that this solution should be very straightforward and s

significant cost or schedule impact in the development of the new instrume

explore accelerating the delivery of the new instruments, especially the second 

Camera. to funher minimiz the scientific impact 

Remember, what we are talking about here is not “losing science’’ as has 

press; but rather, altering the mix across areas of science for the next few years

period, we will be deferring sme significant science, primarily in visible 

substituting equally sigmfkant science. The bottom line is that visible light im

smaller podon of on-target observation time while ultraviolet observation

astrometry will occupy a larger portion during the first few years. We fully 

second generation instruments have been delivered on orbit. that all the scienc

be successfully completed. And when examined overits full 15-yearoperatid

distribution of observation time across the science program will even out 

1 should also note that there appears to be the potential for acquiring a

ultraviolet imaging science. We have formed a “tiger team”to review the potent

image processing or reconstruction techniques. It is thought that such technique

three times more resolution than the current performance and thereby make 

science viable. We should have some more definitive answers on this by mid-A

In conclusion, 1 would like to emphasize three points. First, we are commit

and when the problems in the Optical Telescope Assembly occurred which 

sphene aberration, and how this aberration could go undetected prior to lau

commtted to strive forward in understanding this problem relative to its impact 

of the program and subsequently maximize the scientifk return of this facility 

and the long term. Finally. we are committed to develop and implement a long

aberration to assure that the full potential of the Hubble Space Telescope is r

Flight Center 
we will witness discoveries by the scientific community that will be charam

Dr. Bahd so aptly stated. ‘When we read the history books of this decade

pnswiption for the Hubble mirror was slightly askew. But we wiU notice tha

chapters in the undemanding of the universe. It will be an intellad revol

’Ihank you very much. 

Senator GORE. We are going to hold our questions until 

have finished. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM B. LENOIR, Ph.D

ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SPACE FLIGH

AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Dr. LENOIR. Thank you. I will submit for the record my 

than highlight that, what I will do is to bring it up to date, s

yesterday, and our efforts continue. 

As you know on the STS-35 or the orbiter Columbia, we 

from that vehicle on both the orbiter’s side and the externa

laboratory in California, undergoing tests. Those tests are c

have verified that it does leak. 

Because of different thermodynamic conditions between w

pad and what we see in the laboratory, we cannot say that it is 

magnitude, but it is roughly equivalent. Our work continu

isolate exactly where in the complex umbilical system it is c

As of yesterday it would appear that the seals around the sha

pipe, if you like, are suspect at this point and may be providi

total leak. 

Until yesterday we felt that the main interface on that 

disconnect plane was highly suspicious. Yesterday we measu

leakage at that point, so we have to revisit that conclusion a

the data again. STS-38, or the Atlantis vehicle, remains on pad A at th

experienced the first leak. We are in the process of reinstrum

significant instrumentation to that configuration in order to lo

the leak comes from and to quantify it. 

The testimony that we submitted yesterday indicates tha

that on Saturday. We are running somewhat ahead of sche

schedule indicates that we will be into that test on Friday m

holds with us, Friday should hold. Again we will be isol

quantify the leak. 

There are some similarities and some differences betwee

We must keep our minds open that we may be dealing with t

independent leaks. 

We have reviewed our paperwork, our people, our qua

everything that we have done to date in getting ready for e

and we have detected no anomalies. 

I should emphasize that at no time was our safety com

indicated, our process was put in place in order to recogn

concerns and to not fly. That is exactly what we have done. 

With that, I will stand by for questions. 

me statement follows:] 

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLJAM B. JXNOJR, ASSOCIATE ADMIN

OF SPACE FLIGHT, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE A

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommioee: 
During the launch attempt for the STS-35 mission on May 29.1990. a hydro

limits established to maintain safe operating conditions was demd by onb

deteaion systems. Leakage was detected both in the aft compamnent and e

hydrogen external Worbiter umbilical assembly. 

A subsequent tanking test that incaporated special ground instrumentatio

leak to the free space between the two halves of the umbilical assembly. The 

capability to load propellant into the external tank and transfer prcpellant from 

the Space Shuttle main engines during launch. The umbilical disconnect assem

point between the orbiter and the external tank after main engine cutoff. 

The design of the umbilical disconne~ has remained essentially the same th

flight program except that a safety modification to incorporate a valve latc

inadvertent closure, was authorized after the Challenger acddent. Data fro

determinedthatthedesign changes incorporatedbythismodificationdidnotcont

Following rollback and orbiter demate. the LH2 External Tank (ET) side 

removed and tested at Rockwell International, Downey, Calif. The testing w

precisely controlled liquid hydrogen test conductions. No leaks were detecte

NASA conducted a modified prapellant loading test of the STS-38 Space Shu

the safety and integrity of the orbiter/ET umbilical. The test revealed a hydrog

indicate the leak is in the vicinity of the umbilical mating plates. It apn to b

17-inch line but possibly with a contribution from the 4-inch line. The le

temperature dependent. It is not as high as STS-35 but it exhibits many of the s

Leonard Nicholson, Depty Director. Space Shuttle Program, leads the N

charged vjth analyzing the cause of the leak and determining corrective action

four work ws have been formed: 

Design and Analysis Team-m assess the flight hardware and ground 

hardware designs, fabrication and test programs. and assess ground processing 

compliance with design intent. 

Hardware Processing Team-m review all Kmedy Space Center proced

ET and orbiter processing. including "as run" data, problem repom, proces

personnel certification. 

Data Analysis Team- analyze data from the tanking tests and applicabl

trends, defime additional tests and instrumentation needed to understand and iso

leak and review all tesfs currently planned for completeness and appropriatene

Fault Treemest Requirements Team-to develop and provide to the oth

idenwg failure scenarios and identify additional tests and data requirement

An independent team, headed by Wayne Liales, Deputy Director, Marshall 

Huntsville. Ala., also-has been formed with senior NASA and contractor rep

expem inliquid hydrogentechnology. Whilethey willworkindependentlyof the

they will report to Nicholson and suppon the team as appropriate. 

An extensive investigation is being performed to isolate the source of the 

both the STS-35 and STS-38 vehicles. In the interest of safety. all potential lea

the very low probability of a parent metal flaw, are being investigated. A detaile

aspects of the STS-35 and STS-38 component history, including accept

requirements and data, and design changes, is being performed. 

STS-35 Umbilical Tesring Columbia is in the Orbiter Processing Facility (O

of the LH2 umbilical from Columbia was shipped to Rockwell International 

mated to its external tank umbilical in a special test fixture. On July 7. enginee

in a series of tests in which the mated umbilical was exposed to super coldliquid h

similar to conditions on the launch pad. The umbilicals were heavily instrum

source or sources of the ld. Sensors detected hydrogen leakage in the umb

exceeded design specification. Instrumentation measured a total leakage of a

cubic inches per minute (sam). Conrinuing tests on July 8 resulted in leak rates 

an apparent complex dependence on temperature. 

Following calibration checks to venfy the accuracy of the leak detectors. an

to the test equipment to ensure a good quality of liquid hydrogen was flowing th

the tests were repeated on July 8 to venfy what was observed during the firs

results were similar. Analysis of the data continues in an effort to precisely deter

STS-35 Tanking Test Meanwhde, engineers are preparing for a second on-p

STS-38 vehicle to isolate and idenufy potential leak sources. The test is curre

14. 

To date, leak detectors at the launch pad have been reverified to be cal

additional instrumentation is being installed around the umbilicals. Technic

around all critical joints which are suspect, and detectors are being placed ins

a precise measurement of any hydrogen that may leak out of those joints. 

Other Accomplishments-The investigation team has eliminated one of the 

leak, a minor misalignment between the external tank and the orbiter 3 cent

measured on both the STS-35 and STS-38 vehicles. Analysis has shown that the 
compliance to accommodate misalignments much larger than that measured 

and still meef design specifications. 'his analysis has effectively ruled out 

cause of the leak. 

In addition to the work already described, the investigation team has calib

the launch pad at KSC and umducted a mapping test with gaseous helium t

were performing properly. 

-conducted visual inspection of STS-35 orbiter and ET seals and shipped 

in liquid hydrogen test @PARA8 =-developed a comprehensive test plan 

and KSC tests. 

-compiled and baselined a comprehensive data package for members of 

to use as a common stahg point for the investigation. 

- started a detailed review of the development history of all the externa

to date, with a special focus on 32 tanks (series 2000) which exhibited a hig

during qualification testing than any other series of tanks, and a comprehensi

data which qualified those umbilicals for flight 

-begun an exhaustive investigation into the history of the umbilical se

Program. -stanedadetailedreviewofthe"asrun"procedurrsusedtomatetheextr

-begun a painstaking analysis of the data from the STS-35 launch scrvb a

test to calculate as accurately as possible the leak rates based on the conce

measured during those two events. 

- conducted a review to identify other potential test facilities which d

simulate the launch configuration of the external tank and orbiter umbilicals. 

The ET/Orbiter umbilical is fuUy developed and qualified flight hardwar

functional requirements stipulated by specification. An acceptance test proce

to venfy the manufacturing process for each canpent delivered, has 

performance requkments. The ATP stipulates the use of liquid tutrogen as a

for liquid hydrogen, which is extremely dangerous and volatile to handle. 

The disconnect component specification allows a maximum hydrogen le

cubic inches per minute (scim) for the mated disconnect assembly at cryog

scims for the ET and 50 scims for the orbiter). The ATP has a more stri

disconnect, which is 50 scims. This allowable leakage rate was established 

temperature and media differences between liquid nitrogen and liquid h

disconnect underwent ATP testing with Liquid hydrogen because there ar

producuon units. Until the leak investigation is complete. Shuttle flights have been sus

Shuttle fleet to flight status is the highest priority in the Space Flight Off

resource within the Shuttle program is being brought to bear on solving this pr

team is in place conducting the investigation and making sipfkant progre

believe the source of the leak can be isolated quickly and the problem fixed wi

to the Shuttle flight program. 

Independent of these events, a component redesign to replace the curren

with a new design, has been underway and is well into the preliminary d

disconnect incorporates sigfiicant safety improvements. including redundan

Senator GORE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Rodney. 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE A. RODNEY, 

ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SAFETY, R

MAINTAINABILITY, AND QUALITY ASSURANC

AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. RODNEY. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of 

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the functions and activ

the Office of Safety and Mission Quality. I might add that is 

title than you are used to hearing; we have been going by th

Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance. We ha

assure you that it has had no impact on my roles and respons

Senator GORE. That sounds like a good decision. 

Mr. RODNEY. Just a few words about what constitutes our 

program. First, we are not talking just a single department-

commitment by NASA, really; and the responsibility for safe
in the program management and in the line management In my 

line management is our center directors, who implement the prog

Our safety and quality organization works in conjunct

organizations. We share the responsibility for the safety and qua

the specific safety and quality policies and requirements. We ve

hardware meets the engineering and program requirements. We 

reviews, analysis, and independent assessment that the system 

has the highest probability of mission success. 

Now, when a program is successful, you will very rarely hea

When we have a problem like we are having right now, 

responsibility for the fact that we did not discover that problem 

Since Challenger, we have developed a system and provid

that meet the findmgs of the Rogers Commission and the variou

inputs of the time. In fact, after Challenger, Mr. Chairman, as y

your opening remarks, you had some very pointed observa

significant reductions that had occurred in the quality world. W

that situation. 

I will give you a few statistics. Between 1986 and 1990, in 

area, we have increased our civil service roles by 58 percent, fr

Now, included in there, one of the areas that you were wome

NASA Marshall Space Flight Center. We have increased that are

from 107 people approximately at that time to 245. My headqu

increased from 33 to 78. The support contractors that are in dire

civil service group-these are not the contractors that build our 

are the ones that support us-has just about, well, has slightly mo

from 711 to 1453. So we have ma& significant improvements 

available. 

We have developed an aggressive, pro-active operation whic

step of the program design, the development, the test, the buil

We are active members in the design reviews, the test-readin

launch-readiness reviews. Unlike the Rogers Commission, we 

member in those reviews, and I sit beside Bill Lenoir at the l

reviews. 

We do independent assessments throughout the operation to 

and balance on program decisions, and we have a separate safet

that concentrates on safety issues. 

We have concentrated OUT early efforts on the space shuttle

to flight, we have espoused safety first and schedule second. 

Lenoir stated, our current standdown is not the first evidence tha

is well ingrained in NASA operations. It was one of the car

Challenger and it is being well honored. Another cardinal lesson of Challenger was a lack of com

candor concerning technical issues within NASA. The openn

used in discussing our current problems and preceding ones is 

I believe, that we have corrected this deficiency. 

My office also has many initiatives in process to better insu

and mission success of our future programs. To just mention a 

an inherent part of almost any program, and we have an active pr

to improve the manufacturing, the design, and the testing of ba

One of the sources of some of our problems is deficienc

packaging design. We have a program working to improv

packaging. We have an active, very active role in improvemen

EEE parts, piece parts, which are the source of many failures 
programs. We have a very active program to improve those. W

funding, I want to do that on some of the mechanical parts

Kapton wire, which is the aerospace standard wiring, to see 

that issue. 

NASA has taken the lead among government agencies to 

so-called GIDEP, the Government Industry Data Exchange 

things more than just EEE parts. There are a lot of-I can go 

list. 

Now, a few words concerning our immediate problems. Y

Lenoir describe the status of the space shuttle hydrogen leak

whether we have a very subtle hardware quality issue, 

engineering issue. It is obviously not easy to trace down, 

literally hundreds of people working the issue. 

We are all very concerned why we have this particular sit

We are proceeding in an order1 fashion and will insure the 

shuttle. We will enhance the dty of the space shuttle and it

at the same time. 

Now, in respect to the Hubble telescope, you are probably 

member of Dr. Allen's review team that is chartered to isola

present problem. I particularly wanted to be a member of this 

in question all occurred before my tenure with NASA.1 wan

what lessons learned we may need to apply to future program

Now, I might add that this is not a cop-out. The fact that th

me does not mitigate my responsibility as I sit here. As part 

will examine in detail the roles and activities of the 

maintainability, and quality assurance activities durin

development period of the telescope. 

It might interest you that we have been active since 

Challenger, and I might sketch a few of the things we have do

were active participants in the program recertification review 

in which we re-reviewed the critical failure modes and effec

hazard analysis. One of the things that came out of this revie

we did have a re-inspection to check the staking of the b

assembly. 

We were very instrumental in the decision of changing fr

to nickel hydrogen batteries. We were instrumental in the d

determine whether we should do a thermal vacuum test after t

We also conducted a variety of independent analyses of such th

model as it impacted the electrical profile, the electrical power 

at the solar array degradation over time, and we re-review

factors of safety on the composite structure. 

Now, these latter analyses, by necessity, were done rather 

but are indicative of the types of independent design analy

approach to safety and quality is doing on new programs. Another interesting thing: we have done everything possib

of communication so people feel free to air their concerns. It i

that prior to the program office revealing the telescope pro

evidence of anyone approaching our organization to ques

testing of the mirror assemblies. 

That concludes my remarks, and I thank you for the oppo

[The statement follows:] 
13 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE A. RODNEY, ASSOCIATE ADMINIS'IR

SAFETY AND MISSION QUALITY, NASA 

Mr. Chairman and distuinguished members of the subcunmitke. I appreciate 

discuss the functions and activities of the Office of Safe and Mission Quality 

inception as the Office of Safe Reliability, Maintain&& and Quality Assura

July 1986, the OSMQ has re!kued NASA's overall approach to safety and 

Although we have recentl changed our Office desi nation to OSMQ, we hav

orientation. The Office orsafety and Mission &ty is still the primary ad

SWQA The current level of SWQA involvement within NASA was not i

years ago when the early Hubble Space Telescope conapt and design activities 

thebriefCyearpuiod,theOSMQhasestab~hednewNASA-widepoliues andpr

and quality in support of NASA programs. 

ndent assessm

all NASA programs as related to SWQA requirements. OSMTus-ce engi

at Headquarters and throughout the NASA community actively participate 

development of NASA systems, projects, and products from initial omcept and 

and operati- The objective is toinfuse SRMBrQA requirements at the earliest po

development Our goal is to work in parmersbip with program and project manage

safety and quality consideraticms are inherent to each initiative. 

SRMBrQA resources have increased each year, allowing NASA to succe

integrated technical and managerial approach to SRMBrQA 'Ibis has been acco

through the careful selection of highly qualified personnel for each task area. 

demonstrated performance of SRMBrQA personnel lends immediate credibility 

technical evaluations that wz must perform. The mtal civil service workforce for 

at Headquarters and the field cmters has increased frcm 845 in 1986 to approxim

Thepenonnelaredistributedbasedontheneeds of cmtactivities. As one would

concentrations of SRM&QA personnel are at the field centers whicfi dire

launchjmission activities (Kennedy Space Center, Johnson Space Center, Ma

Center. and Gcddard Space Flight Center). Our govemment SRM&QA work for

by a contractor SRM&QA woxicforce that exceeds 6,000 people providing us wi

totalof approximately7,600ple. Thesededicatedmdividuals areworkinginm

of the SRM&QA environment from the Headquarters level down to the C

contractors. Detailed information regarding NASA-wide SRM&QA stafiing is sh

I. SRM&QA funding has increased every year since the OSMQ was initially esta

our current funding level is approximately $578 million, an incmse of 22.5 per

years. The details of our funding over the ast 3 fiscal years are shown in Attach

At NASA Headquaners, the overall kMBrQA program encompasses a v

professionals in the following areas: Safety; Reliability, Maintainabdity and 

@M&QA); Program Assurance; systems Assessment and Trend Analysis; Qual

Improvement; and the Space Statim Freedan Program (SSFP) Safety and Produ

TheSafetyDi~ionprovidesoversightofallNASAprograms andactivitiesto

the probability of accidents and hazards by achieving an optimum level of safety a

and program development. This division assures that safety risks are eliminated 

acceptable level consistent with program objectives for cost, schedde, and perfo

The RM&Q.'. Division formulates and implements policies, pmdures. 

research technology objectiveslplans to assure that RM&QA practices within 

consistent with NASA goals, prescribed law, and federal regulations. This divis

technology development programs that advance the state-of-the-art in as

Additionally, it plans and administers NASA product assurance activities. 

The Program Assurance Division provides common SRMBrQA policies for a

As a member of the Space Shuttle Management Team, this division actively 

prelaunch and launch decision process, which includes signing the Certificate 

and voting on the launch goho go decision. 

The Systems Assessment and Trend Analysis Division is the result of a rec

the Data Systemsfl'rmd Analysis Division and Systems Assessment Division. Th

rigomsly staffed with experienced civil service and contractor personnel. Since 

year, this division has completed significant independent assessments that are 

Shuttle program activities and has direued a NASA-wide trend analysis pro

As amulti-discipline organization. the OSMQ performs ind 

.~ 

Headqukh and the NASA Centers. 

Within NASA. the OSMO Quality and Productivity Imurovement Programs O

recognizes timely'delivery if high iuality, error- f&, &-effective pkducts 

Office develops, pranotes, and applies advanced technology and manage

contribute to NASA quality and productivity improvement. 

Ihe SSFP Safety and Produd Assurance office plans, directs. implem

SRM&QA activities pertaining tothe technical execution and physical readiness 

This Office performs overall technical oversight of the SSFP to ensure develo

36-688 - 91 - 2 
14 

being conducted on a sound engineering basis with proper controls. In 

identifying and precluding riskshazards that can cause loss of life, pers

structural damage to the Space Station. 

Our efforts at Headquanels are significantly amplified by the suppon p

organizations at NASA field installations, including the centers, laborato

contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. ?he on-site, day--day involv

organizations in the development and operations of NASA programs a

ensuring mission safety and quality. 

The OSMQ concentrated most of iu early SRM&QA efforts on the S

NASA was moving toward Shuttle return-to-flight in 1988, the SRM&Q

"safety fmt, schedule second" approach to launch operations. NASA 

endorsed this approach. The recent standdown d the Space Shuttle progr

in the External Tank/Ohiter hydrogen umbilical disconnect system 

considerations have become paramount withiu NASA. Since return-to-f

increased, we have been able to apply our SRM&QA assets across a broa

As you are undoubtedly aware, the NASA Office of Space Flight (OS

extensive test and analysis program to identify and ultimately correct 

Tank/Miter hydrogen umbilical disconnea system. The Associate Adm

and the Director of Space Shuttle are conducting open status briefings at le

the public advised of all analysis findings. The OSMQ is closely mon

addition,theOSMQis supporringtheseOSFactivities withdataextracted

reporting systems resident at the field centers and contractor locations

independent reviews/assessments of the collected data. 

Mso, we have begun to focus more intently on NASA payload program

providing oversight of payload-related activities at the caters that p

development (Goddad Space Flight Center, Lewis Research Center, Lang

Research Center, and the Jet Propllsion Laboratory). It is impossible to s

Hubble problem would have been detected if our cumnt OSMQ organi

However, wearenowtakingamoreactiveroleintheearlyphases ofprogra

where wecanbterinfluencethe requirementsfortestandevaluation The

is less than for manned systems. 

As the Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Quality, I was r

as a member of the Hubble Space Telescope meal Systems Board of Inv

July 2, 1990, the Board is tasked to review, analyze, and evaluate th

regarding the manufacture, development, and testing of the Hubble 

Telescope Assembly. This distinguished Board, which is headed by Dr. L

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, began its investigative activities on Ju

manufacturing,inspection,andtestingrecords willbereviewedindetailbyt

Until our investigation is complete, it would be premature to speculate o

Our SRM&QA organization at the Marshall Space Flight Center 

Contract Administration Services WAS) representative at the Hughes 

Inc. facility (formerly the Perkin-Elmer Co.) in Danbury, Connecticut t

records related to the Hubble Space Telescope at that facility. These re

Material Review Board as well as the detailed manufaauring and insp

information will be used by the Board of Investigation. 

With regard to NASA's program hardware in general, the OSMQ h

Standards Division to develop and implement NASA-wide standards 

state-of- the-art and next generation applied technologies. The emphas

technology that directly contributes to hardwareimprovements and SRM&

as a major means of reducing program risk. ?his includes improved bat

parts, and beaer packaging design and manufacturing standards. 

Another aspect of our early involvement in applied technology venture

in the SSFP to integmte SRM&QA requirements into the early stages o

Safety and Product Assurance Office plans, directs, implemmts, and eva

pertaining to the technical execution and physical readiness of the Spac

mvolvement has been cited by a number of technical panels as fun

SRM&QA factors are "designed in" rather than added on at later st

approach-of doing it right the first time-is realized in long-term savings i

SSFPO actively considers our requirements and issues in their programm

'Ihis type of moperation (with program management and engineering at 

decreasing risk and increasing the potential for mission safety and opera

In conclusion, the current SRM&QA organization is strucnued to ex

support all NASA programs from their early design phases through testin

believe it is an effective organization to carry out NASA requirements. 

Senator GORE. Thank you very much. I am going to 

10-minute clock on our questions. I anticipate we will have 
First of all, I think it is quite appropriate, Mr. Thompson, that 

of the many successful NASA accomplishments, even with

program, which is the focus of so much scrutiny now, after th

occurred. Indeed, there have been remarkable achievements in so

of problems of the kind which are to be expected in a program of t

The problem that was not expected is the one which is the fo

our discussion here today. I also think it is appropriate, Mr. Rod

remind us of the many changes and improvements which have alre

by NASA in beefing up the quality control ability within the agen

of the Challenger tragedy. And indeed, as you indicated, I did ha

interest in that. And I want to say I have been impressed by what 

in beefing up NASA's quality control capability. 

In spite of all those good things, I am sure that all four of you u

clearly why the public is concerned, and why it is necessary, in 

ambitious agenda NASA now has on the drawing boards, to h

on-going review of these matters that have not gone well, and that 

troublesome to NASA and to the whole country. 

Dr. Lenoir, first of all, with regard to the fuel leaks in the shutt

understanding that the umbilical assemblies now believed to be 

the problem were tested, and that actually 23 of the 60 assemblie

first test. I also understand that two of those that failed are the on

Instead of using the test failure as a trigger for redesigning 

assembly, what was redesigned was the test. The test was made 

The new test used a liquid nitrogen which is 100 degrees warm

hydrogen which is used in shuttle operations. The second redesign 

a bill of good health. 

Even though they failed the first test, they were put on the sh

two of those that failed are the culprits in grounding the shuttle f

Is that essentially correct? 

Dr. LENOIR. No. 

There has been a lot written on this subject recently, and most 

with the wrong flavor. Let me go back and describe what happen

of what you say, some of which is true, some is not. The test was 

We have thrse. different ways that we have tested the external 

umbilical. The orbiter side of the umbilical is a component that i

over, so it gets tested once, is connected to an orbiter, and it gets 

The tank side of the umbilical is connected to the tank, and w

with the tank. So we keep buyicg new ones, and then mating t

and using them. Those new ones that we buy have to be acceptan

call it. The early ones were tested mated to a flight orbiter umbi

Senator GORE. What they call a slave unit? 

Dr. LENOIR. No, it was an actual orbiter umbilical that co

orbiter-the flight unit. And we could do that until we accepted 

flight unit and connected it to an orbiter. Then it was no longer a

test. 

At that point we began using what was called a slave unit. 

Senator GORE. Okay. 

Dr. LENOIR. And then because of some difficulties assoc

Senator GORE. Now, wait a minute. The difficulties associat

sequence, we then later had a third way of doing it. 

included the failure of the two units that are causing the problem 
Dr. LENOR No. But what drove us to going to another 

some of the difficulties in going through and actually perfo

invented something very similar to the slave unit called the o

Senator GORE. Okay. Just wait a minute. Let me interject 

Is it true that the two umbilical assemblies that are the ca

right now, grounding the shuttle fleet, failed the test with the 

Dr. LENOR No. 

Senator GORE. Is it true that 23 out of 60 assemblies failed 

sequence? 

Dr. LENOIR. To the best of my knowledge, none has fai

comes in two parts, Senator. And the procedure, as originall

a sequence of functional tests, where we cycle valves and 

external tank umbilical connected to the orbiter slave unit Th

a leak test, where we put liquid nitrogen into it and we meas

If that assembled unit, the tank umbilical and the slave u

leak rate below a certain level-I believe it is 50 stand

minute-then we remove the slave unit and replace it with a b

this is all part of the original test procedure, unchanged, and 

The premise there being that the slave unit is not flight 

maintiined to the same ngorous specifications that the 

therefore is it more likely to be the subject of the leak than t

Senator GORE. Now wait a minute. Let me just be clw o

You are telling us that, contrary to widely spread rep

assemblies failed the test when the slave unit was used, is th

Dr. LmOm No, the test is the total test. 

Senator GORE. But wait a minute. I am trying to under

telling me. There have been wide reports that when the sla

the testing program, approximately a third of the connector

those which failed are the two involved in the shuttle ground

us now that that is just made up out of whole cloth, that it 

nothing to that? 

Dr. LENOIR. Iam taking issue with the use of the word “

at that step in the procedure, the leak rate on those 20-plu

than we were looking for, so we followed the procedure to the 

the orbiter slave unit. We replaced it with a closing plate th

leak, and we repeated the test. We did nothing different to the 

would introduce or fix a leak. 

Senator GORE. Well, now 2O-plus, do you mean 23? 

Dr. LENOIR. I do not know the exact number. 

Senator GORE. Twenty-three out of 60 is what I am advis

been reported 33 out of 60, but I am advised that it is 23 ou

not have an acceptable leak rate during that part of the test. I

Dr. LENOIR. Those numbers are not exactly correct bec

60 units that way. I will find the sheet here eventually. Senator GORE. h4r. Rodney? 

Mr. RODNEY. Ibelieve we tested 27 with that setup. 

Senator GORE. You tested 27 that way and 20 plus faile

have the leak rate that you considered acceptable? h4r. RODNEY. I would have to count them. 

Senator GORE. Yes, please count them up. 

Dr. LENOIR. Itlooks like 23 total. 

Senator GORE. 23 of 27? 

Dr. LENOR. 18. 
Senator GORE. 18 of 27? 

Dr. LENOR. They did not fail the test at that step. Senator GORE. They just had an unacceptably high leak rate

Dr. LENOIR. For that configuration. We, therefore, remo

configuration, the nonflight half. We repeated the test with th

they all passed. 

Senator GORE. Did it cause you concern that 18 of 27 

acceptable leak rate during that part of the testing program? 

Dr. LENoIR. At that time it did not, because what we thought 

and for that matter today still think, was the slave unit that was d

Senator GORE. Is it true that of those 18 which did not have a

rate during that phase of the testing, two of those are the ones n

shuttle fleet? 

Dr. LENoIR. That is correct. It is also true that many of thos

exhibited no leak whatsoever. 

Senator GORE. Many ox two? 

Dr. LENoIR. One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, ni

Senator GORE. Okay, now wait a minute. There were eight in 

during thct testing sequence at one point; is that correct? 

Dr. LENOIR. That is close, and that figure of eight comes f

number is seven. 

Senator GORE. Now of those seven in a row that failed, the 

leaking were part of that seven in a row; correct? 

Dr. LENOIR. That is correct. 

Senator GORE. Now of that seven, one flew successfully. O

was on Mission 33 which flagged the problem for you. Am I st

Dr. LENOR. 29. 

Senator GORE. 29 flagged the problem for you; correct? 

Dr. LENOIR. Which flagged a problem. It is not clear it is th

Senator GORE. Okay, so that is two of them. One flew s

flagged a problem which may or may not be the same proble

leaking. Where are the other three? 

Dr. LENOIR. They are connected to tanks waiting to fly. 

Senator GORE. Now when you took these 18 that did not ha

leak rate during that phase of the testing and continued the test

used liquid nitrogen; correct? 

Dr. LENOIR. That is correct. 

Senator GORE. Which is 100 degrees warmer than liquid hy

what is leaking; correct? 

Dr. LWOIR. That is correct. 

Senator GORE. The leaks have occurred at the very low temp

high flow rates, but the testing used 100 degree warmer liq

different flow rate, also? 

Dr. LENOIR. Yes. Basically, it is a static test with no flow ra

Senator GORE. With no flow rate? 

Dr. LENoIR. That is correct. 

Senator GORE. Okay. I guess the question that begs is since 

one part of the testing program and since they are failing n

intermediate test, the test in between was at conditions which did 

the ones they have to go through. Was there something fund

with your testing program? 

Dr. LENOIR. The issue that you bring up on using liquid nit

hydrogen is under review at this time, We suspect that that may n
and distressful enough test on these units, but we have not 

conclusion definitively. That is suspect. 

We do not believe, however, that changing that would nece

the problem. It is not clear at this point it is on the tank side. 

Senator GORE. Okay. I am going to yield in just a second. I

want to focus in on the Hubble, but the common denominat

inadequate testing. Adecision within NASA to be Satisfied with 

which did not approximate the conditions under which the um

was going to be used in that case or the final assembly of the H

how it was going to be totally configured in space, to test it 

was put into orbit. 

In both cases, the testing program, which is part of quality a

handled in a way that caught the mistakes which have now sh

view of how this is being managed. That is what I want to hom

questions. Mr. THOMPSON. Senator, I think there is no question but tha

encounter you can trace it back to some fundamental issue as

of testing or could have been flushed out with additional test

the details of the Challenger accident, there was that thread th

I think these are real time judgments that we have to make 

may well be that in these two valves that we are tallcing ab

orbiters that are leaking there may be something in the lot to w

in the way we are testing or in some other subtle issue that 

clever enough to date to find. 

I do not think that we take issue that once we have a proble

look back on it and if we had done this and this and this we w

it. That has been said to me too many times through my expe

I am as convinced as you that more testing has just got to b

we are faced with these decisions, and we make what we be

judgments at that time. 

Senator GORE. Well, when you had seven in a row that failed

to use that word. You do not have to accept it. Mr. THOMPSON. As Bill indicated, at that time the suspicion 

was that the problem was on the ground support side-- 

Senator GORE. In the testing. Mi, THOMPSON. On the ground support side of the hardw

._ 

the flight article. 

Senator GORE. You concluded that the most likely explan

-- test itself was flawed. 

Mr. RODNEY. That is correct. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, with the ground support hardware. 

Senator GORE. But then you followed it up with a test that 

Mr. THOMPSON. In retrospect that may turn out to be. I am 

is the case. 

We are not about to go out to the pad, roll out with anyt

really concerned we have a problem. Clearly on these las

confident that once we trace this thing to ground that we wil

reason and certainly never do that again. 

Senator GORE. Let me just say one other thing here. If I w

chairs and answering the questions instead of asking them, I a

the way I sense that you do. You have done so many things 

performed such a tremendous service to this country that, wh

wrong, you feel like you get no credit for what you have don
lot of great people at NASA who do their best and give their a

more heartsick than the rest of the country about these problem

coming to light. You know, if the American people are going to have the con

ability to handle projects like these, we have to get to the bottom 

When there is a pattern of what looks like inadequate testing 

quality assurance which ends up grounding the entire shuttle flee

Hubble telescope crippled for at least three years and causing o

then the public has a right to set a very high standard before agree

with an ambitious new agen&. which requires a very high stand

insure success. 

Mr. THOMPSON. You bet. We do not take exception with he

probings like this. We are much harder on ourselves than we re

newspaper and go through here today. 

Senator GORE. All right. Senator Pressler. Senator PRESSLJX. Thank you. 

I would like to ask, aiid indeed I would join in the remarks o

that you have done so many things so well and this is not just a 

fault here. But, on how we do these things better, perhaps it 

Congress-the way we appropriate money to these agencies w

structure for engineers is perhaps lower than it is in the private se

although this was contracted out, the highly challenging things 

do are performed, and then those engineers leave either because 

have expired because they are more expensive, or some other r

technicians who remain to do the testing are not of the Same qua

familiar with the program. 

Is there some change in the personnel shucture of the way eng

or contracted for that could yield a better result here? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, let me just state that certainly I think t

the Senate mentioned earlier relative to the turnover in the Hubbl

at Marshall, at the center, and at headquarters, are right on target

the Same thing over the last several years in the space station. A

people that have left NASA have indicated publicly one of the 

happens to be the competitive salary. 

Today, because of the attractiveness of the work, we do not ha

hiring young people out of college. They love the type of work w

certain high cost of living areas, like in Washington and out in C

it gets a little tougher. But at our other centers that is not the pro

What you are alluding to, retaining the skilled managem

engineering personnel, is a problem. And yes, Congress can c

with that. And I believe that steps are underway, unless tuned ar

of this year, to I think make a major advance in that direction an

Senator PRESSLER. Does anybody else want to comment on t

[No response.] Senator PRESSLER. All right. Let me ask you this. 

As I understand it, the Space Shuttle Columbia and the Space 

have had almost identical hydrogen fuel line leaks. Has the re

Shuttle, Discovery, been checked for fuel line leaks? 

Dr. LENOIR. No, the requirement-well, the setup that is req

is essentially to be flight ready, mated with a tank, and out o

Discovery is in the orbiter processing facility undergoing pre

mission in October. 
And until we resolve what our current problem is, we are mo

on any modifications on Discovery. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Even if we knew that the rest of these val

did not leak-let me just assume we knew that-we cannot 

really understand this thing. We have been bitten too many ti

finesse something, and we are just not going to do it here. 

Senator PREssm. Let me ask this, switching back to the H

I guess in layman’s terms, it is my understanding that the Hubble 

was never tested as a system before its launch, as a total syste

a basic question, why was not this ground-based testing perfor

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, you are right, it was not tested. The 

an all-up system. At that time, we did not feel it was necessary

Now let me ask Len if he would like to expound on that. 

Dr. FISK. It is important to know that there were many, many 

of the spacecraft system, including the working of the instrumen

system over the time. What was not done is a combined test o

working together in the optical telescope assembly. 

It was judged, and I think in retrospect it was judged corre

of doing the test and the cost of building a test facility that w

Hubble :o its accuracy-remember we were building the world

here, and therefore we would have had to build essentially the 

test facility to test the world’s greatest mirrorPat was not a 

make. 

Now, as always, if you have a problem, you say, well, there 

a test that found that problem. And my guess is that, as we lo

going to find that there were other tests that we could have don

done that would have revealed this problem. But I do not think t

test decision was a bad one. 

Senator PRESSLER. But I think in terms of the public percepti

be guided just by what people perceive, but people SAY. My w

comes off the assembly plant, even though it has all been teste

in and turns the switch and sees if it will go vrmm, or whatev

It is hard for a layman such as myself to understand why the 

was never tested as a total system. Is that unusual? 

Dr. RSK. No, I do not think so. Again, the amount of tests 

the telescope facility itself, seeing that every piece of electroni

of the instruments had a clear path to the telescope, that the 

going to deploy, and the fine guidance sensors were going to 

things were adequately tested, and the fact that this works on 

does is proof of that testing. The one test that was not done was building a facility in wh

the two mirrors and test them to show that the focal plane was 

of the wavelength of light. And in very simple terms, we would 

built a test facility which had its optical properties as perfect or 

that, and build it in such a way that you introduce no conta

telescope. 

For example, J.R. mentioned earlier about thermal vacuum 

decision that several of us here were respoiisible for at the en

of whether or not we should do a second thermal vacuum test

done in the 1985-86 time frame. And there was a lot of people 

ought to do another one. Maybe it is not accurate any more. 

And we decided that the risk of doing that was too high 

going to learn. It proved to be a wise decision. There are not any 
21 

with the telescope. If the telescope were on orbit at the mom

thermal problems, some of us would be very embarrassed that tha

decision to have made. But you make those calls in the program

I do think we are going to find that there were tests that shoul

that would have revealed this problem that were simpler to do t

end-to-end tests, and perhaps there will be criticism that they w

the end-to-end test was a question of cost, risk and what you lea

Senator PRESSLFX Okay, well, that is good to have that exp

out in the general public, if they read that the Hubble Space Teles

tested as a system before its launch, those of us who are in 

defending the program have a hard time explaining that And I c

such very much a layman. 

Mr. THOMPSON. But it is true that in the optical area that w

end-to-end test for the reasons that Len mentioned. The structu

the assembly level were done, acoustic tests, as he mentioned, t

tests. These are tradmffs we made. And I am sure once we pinpo

in the investigative board, we will all look back and say, gee, we c

that test €or a fraction of what the pain has been to go through it 

that parade. 

Senator GORE. Would my colleague yield on this point. Bec

with the way the exchange was left on this last point 

I think it is not just a technological decision, I think it is a phil

Regardless of how confident you are in the testing of the compon

there is something about a final assembly test that gives you a 

fail-safe procedure, that can catch problems which get through 

I personally believe that it was a mistake not to build in

requirement of a final assembly test on the complete telescope 

configured once it was put into orbit. 

Now what do you think in retrospect, Mr. Thompson? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, in retrospect, if we find the problem i

one of the minors, that our experts now seem to be quite confid

in some type of test, and it may be an all-systems test, would hav

thing to do. 

I am just guessing, but I suspect we will be ab!e to look back o

out some kind of test. 

Senator GORE. Well, without compromising any of the cla

which we delved into earlier, let me state my understanding of 

about, carefully, and ask you to comment. 

There were two bidders, Kodak and Perkin-Elmer. Perkin

Hughes Danbury. Both bidders had experience that was relevant 

they would bring to the Hubble. One of the bidders did propose a 

test. The winning bidder did not. The winning bidder,Perkin-Elm

Danbury , had a different testing philosophy and expertise that wa

oriented toward aspects of the Hubble which at that time were th

most difficult challenges to solve. 

What I think went wrong is that NASA chose Perkin-Elmer f

were valid, and may have been valid, because, as we have seen, th

challenges-what were thought to be the most difficult challeng

been met. 

But what went wrong is, in my opinion, NASA did not re

bidders include in their bid proposal a final assembly test to ch

testing. 
22 

telescope as it would be configuredin orbit before it was put 

have been done. It could have been done. But it was not do

Now, you can argue with that conclusion by saying wel

know how to test all of the components in such a sophi

thought we would catch any such defect. But separate 

technological decision, there is a question of “how much con

to place in component testing?” And how much are we go

that no matter how good these component tests are, there 

final assembly test that gives us a reality check and lets us 

finally going to operate. 

When you build a ship, you test it in the water before it is 

build an automobile, you drive it before you buy it. Wh

anything, the final test is the final product. When you are pu

performer goes through the part of the play that that perso

the director, or the person responsible for it, before openi

us have a dress rehearsal to see how everything fits together

should have been required before the Hubble was flown. 

Now that is the way I readW. THOMPSON. Senator, I would state certainly tha

mentioned relative to the sequence of events with the contr

And in retrospect, perhaps an all-up systems test could 

should have been done, certainly on our large programs, 

going back to the Apollo, we ti to do component testing 

we flew was when the vehicle saw the all-up test. The sa

have got a biggie facing us on the,Space Station, the as

Station. We are going to go through that in a very agonizin

that at the module level and what we can do at the modul

the right thing to do. 

But right now, as you know, we are not envisioning an al

for the Space Station because today we do not believe it is ne

loves more testing more than a lot of us in NASA. And so

not think we are going to take exception to your position b

it. 

Dr. RSK. The only other thing, if I may just make one 

when you decide you have got to test components togethe

how they are going to interact. There is some complicate

the components and you want to how whether all the part

expect them to do. 

I think we ought to remember here that the design 

Telescope is a very standard design for an optics system. T

about this thing. It is a type of Cassegrainian telescope y

optics book and see what the shape of each of the mirrors 

But please just let me finish my point here. I think that 

to be unhappy, to be concerned, that we were unable to det

shape of each of the mirrors individually. I mean, there is 

some place that we did not determine the shape of each m

had the test on each mirror individually been correct, th

would have worked together because the formula for putt

such a standard formula. 

Mr. THOMPSON. But even if we had done something w

at the next higher level would have caught whatever error 

Senator GORE. I am encroaching on my colleagues’ tim

let me just finish this sequence with one other question. 
Not everything that the United States does in space is public k

it is fair to say that we have ex rience as a nation in putting optic

or describing them, we have put optical satellites into orbit of va

It is my understanding that as a matter of course, there is alw

final assembly test. Even if the component testing is done to the n

realize you can get all the components and test them separately

got to have one final element, and that it is common sense to put th

and test them the way they are going to look and function in or

way we have done it before. And that was not required by NASA in 

Now, Dr. Fisk, do you think that is an unfair characterization

Dr. FISK. I would just as soon not comment on other program

absolutely correct that we did not require an end-to-end test of t

is certainly a decision that we will review. 

The main thing you want from your test program is to find th

judgment was made as to whether that was a test that would have fo

And if we had run an end-to-end test, we would have known ab

absolutely. If we had run some other tests which were proba

conduct @an the end-toend test, we probably also would have fo

Senator GORE. Senator Pressler, I apologize. 

Senator PRESSER. No, I think that was a good follow-up. L

Chairman, that I have to go make a presentation in our caucus, s

have to depart But I do have some questions for the record regar

the argument that NASA could have employed certain DOD te

military satellites. Some of those may fall into a classified area. 

But I guess the final question that I have is will the Hubble pro

effect on the way we view similar big science projects like Mi

Earth? And what is your judgment of the results of this situation

Dr. FIsK. I think Hubble had a lot of interesting managemen

of which were learned and understood before the current pro

conducting science programs, I think we have learned them very 

Hubble had a multi-center management. Whenever we can av

do that. Mission to Planet Earth is managed by the Goddard Spac

The Ad:.anced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility is managedby Marsh

Center alone. Hubble had associated contractors, which caused s

If we can avoid it, we do not do that. AXAF has a single prime co

In the case of end-to-end testing, in the case of the Ad

Asuophysics Facility, because it is in fact substantially simpler to 

than it is in visual light, there is an end-to-end test facility being 

Marshall today to test the AXAF mirrors as a single system. Mr. THOMPSOK. Let me not leave that answer just there, tho

personally do not agree that projects spread across NASA center

a bad thing. Hell, that is the way we did Apollo; very succes

multiple contractors, multiple centers, a lot of end-to-end tests, 

And we conducted Skylab in the same way. And we did the Spa

effectively, successfully, at multiple centers, across a number of 

And today our plan is to do the Space Station the same way. S

to leave the impression that the way we are structured to conduc

is flawed, in a sense, because I personally do not believe it is. 

I believe in retrospect on this, we have got to go back and p

the comments that were made relative to the way we tested, a

assumptions we made, are more where the lessons are, as oppo

orbit prior to the placement o p" the Hubble in orbit. Without chara
structure the way we do business. I think once this is behin

back and reflect on it, 

Again, I want to restate for this committee, I am highly 

program is going to go forward and be highly successful. Bu

to look at the management lessons lmed and not just the t

But I do not want to leave the impression that multi- cente

is not the way to go if that is meant by big science, because 

successful past and are planning a successful future along th

Senator PREsSm Thank you very much. I regret that I 

Chairman. 

Senator GORE. Thank you. Dr. Lenoir, before focusing 

Hubble in the remainder of our questions here, let me go bac

the shuttle fuel leaks. I get the impression that when you 

procedure was probably-in giving you an anomalous resul

your suspicions about the accuracy of the test Procedure, but 

new phase of the testing program, without determining whe

which produced what now looks like a bad batch, and which w

now looks like a bad batch, without settling your suspicion

in error and not the equipment itself. Why would you not 

before installing the umbilical assemblies on the shuttle? 

Dr. LENOR Because the way we had put the test toget

before wedid it that we would likely have leaks. If we did, the

be from the simulation side, the unreal part, and we would i

the flight part, the external tank umbilical. We could have re

only the orbiter slave unit in there, and then had it leaked, w

yes indeed, that is what is leaking. We did not do that, because we did perform a test that we f

and verified that our flight external tank umbilical did not le

in liquid nitrogen, it did not leak. 

The suspicious part of the test to me is not that we replace

a blanking plate, but that we did it with liquid nitrogen and n

I might add, and I do not want to appear defensive, I have d

the batch, and the whole process, to make sure that we fully u

their roles. To date, we have not found any connection of th

other than the suspicious correlation that says, “two of those 

leakers”. 

On the other hand, if I look at the alignment of the tank to 

most out of line are these two. We studied that exhaustively 

not a factor, because we have the ability to accommodate mo

actual misalignment So we are looking at everything we pos

statistical events that may just be a numerical coincidence. 

Senator GORE. Ido not know quite how to phrase this, bu

that is an issue. It is not the only time where there have be

which seem to identif a serious problem, and NASA, inst

study. Right now, we in this subcommittee are being told that th

flights necessary to assemble the space station will carry with 

high probability of another shuttle tragedy, and we are only 

by NASA’s protest that there is something wrong with the st

comes and says, “Do not believe that. Those figures are off

NASA did on the test procedure that identifed the two umb

now grounded the shuttle fleet. You shot the messenger, in 

” 

evidence yielded by x e test or study, challenges the validi
Now, when another messenger comes and says, this mission, a

designed, an 88 percent chance of another shuttle tragedy. Again

the messenger and says, “That study is wrong, do not believe it”. 

to a point where we have got to have more. When a test or a stu

is a high likelihood of a serious problem, in this case an 88 perc

alleged of a shuttle tragedy with the mission program that is now 

this case 18 out of 27 umbilical units failing at least one part of t

no longer going to be satisfied with NASA saying that test cann

That is too pessimistic. It seems to me the burden of proof has to 

NASA. 

I have confidence you can meet that I understand and I want 

fact that this is a new management team in NASA, changes have 

Mr. Rodney pointed out, since the Challenger tragedy. But the min

set is also an issue. The willingness to shoot the messenger. Th

shoot the messenger and to not give credence to test results or st

to raise questions that might cause Congress to slow down or rec

these large missions. 

We had it again on the study by the astronaut office about the nu

required on the space station, They Came in here and sat right at 

they said; we have studied this, and we feel like there is going to b

for an extraordinary number of EVAs, and if we are going to h

EVAs, we will have to redesign the space station or develop a 

But NASA officials come right afterwards and say, “No, do not be

study is preliminary, premature, cannot be relied upon, and in no c

to have to redesign the space station” 

There is a pattern, it seems to me. Then we get into this busine

this is part of the mind set in the Congress, and I have been a p

want to be supportive of NASA, and I am supportive of NASA, 

a position where anybody that accepts one of these pessimistic st

hostile to NASA. And you get a mind set in the relationship betw

the Congress where there are two camps; there are those who are 

there are those who want to just cut all the money. You are eithe

and you accept everything that NASA says, and you shoot the 

brings bad news, and you reject all pessimistic studies; or, at the 

you just want to cut the program to the bone and just not have a

in space and ambitious missions. 

Well, we cannot accept those two extremes anymore. We h

hard-nosed scrutiny of exactly how these missions are going to b

order to rebuild the public confidence and support for NASA, the

a dialogue between NASA and those who are authorizing and ap

money in behalf of the American people which results in very c

And, not just candor; I am not saying there has been a lack of 

it does not come across that way. I am saying that there is a kin

them” mind set, whereby the automatic tendency is just to reject 

news. That, in spite of the new management team, in spite of th

quality assurance and control, in spite of the confidence that I an

subcommittee have, and others have, in the individuals who 

management team, I think there is still something in what in th

would be called the corporate culture. I do not know what you 

NASA. Mind set is the closest I can come to it There is still s

attitude and approach which has that “shoot the messenger” qu

if you think that is unfair, Mr. Thompson, tell me so. 
Mr. THOMPSON. I would like to do that, because I do believ

when you say somebody in NASA takes exception to some s

the top of NASA does not take exception to that. As a matter of 

of occasions, on a number of podiums, and I suspect in this ro

have stated that it will not be too long before we have anothe

going to have many more leaks. You have just got to re-look a

the shuttle at the time of the Challenger accident. 

Senator GORE. Wait a minute. Are you saying that you a

there is an 88 percent chance of losing a shuttle and crew w

missions needed to build the space station? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Senator, I am not going to get into the num

me tell you this. Let me just say this, because I am going to 

At the time of the Challenger accident, the reliability was 96 p

the unreliability, it is 98. Halve it again, it is 99, the unreliabilit

rate over the next decade of what, 100, 120 missions? Very 

unreliabilities or reliabilities, however you want to look at it, w

another one. 

And so, we do not take any exception to that. We are hying t

as we can. We do not have, I believe, the wrong mind set in NA

cautious at the Cape. We are most cautious in our assembly, an

of these valves. In the check out of these valves down there

may well look back and say, “We should have had an earlier a

have to see what the problem is there, but do not let me com

saying, the top of NASA does not ever believe we are going to f

Space flight is not easy. 

Senator GORE. When you say “we are going to lose anoth

the space station half built and a shuttle, with its crew, are los

continue launching? Do you believe this nation will then cont

shuttle to finishup the space station? Mr. THOMPSON. Certainly, I believe that. I think we are go

and find out what went wrong. The contrary position is, unless 

me we are never going to lose another one, then let’s don’t la

and certainly, I do not believe thac and I Cannot convince y

going to lose another one in the next decade. 

Senator GORE. Let me just say this. If you believe it is a 

percent or higher, that we will lose a shuttle with its crew dur

the space stationMr. THOMPSON. I did not say during the building of the s

fly the next 100 times, we are likely to lose one. Now we hav

we have a lot of escape mechanisms now, we have abort optio

before, so there are ways to recover. 

If the point that we started on was NASA has not stated tha

about the unreliabilities to the tune of 1 or 2 percent, that is ju

stated, I know, as has Dick Truly, on too many occasions th

space flight. We accept that. Because of that, we are taking t

have to at the Cape today. 

Senator GORE. If there is a high risk of losing a shuttle and 

construction of the space station, we need to know that befor

that space station. If we lose a shuttle and its crew when th

halfway completed, then that raises the very real likelihood tha

not tolerate a continuation of the same kind of program and b

risk of losing a third shuttle and its crew. 
If we know now that there is a high likelihood of that occu

program, then it is time to look hard at the way that program is 

Mr. THOMPSON. I have not used the words “high likelihood

going to get into that numbers game. I am going to say that ther

flight. If I stand here and tell the Congress we are not going to l

and if we fly 100 times, that does not pass the sanity check. Senator GORE. That is going to extremes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. One in 100, one in the next decade if we a

Ym. 

Senator GORE. The Office of Technology Assessment says th

flights over the next three to four years there is a 50/50 chance o

orbiter, another shuttle, if you assume a reliability of 98 percen

Mr. THOMPSON. I agree with that, if you assume a reliabilit

That is just mathematics. I agree with that. I do not accept the f

next 30 flights there is a high risk of losing one. We have had ten i

back on the hardware and the data after those flights, we have 

close to losing a flight. 

On the other hand, I am going to be very open with this Co

this committee in saying that if we fly enough there is still the ris

Do I think that we have the right caution in the agency and 

uptight enough to proceed with the shuttle and the space station 

science progrms beyond that? The answer is yes, I believe we 

So this dialogue with the Congress is certainly, I believe-I wil

because this is not the first the that I have expressed my conce

testing. We have to do more. Finally, you come down to mone

Senator GORE. It is not just money. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Itis not just money. It is attitude. 

Senator GORE. You testified a moment ago that you believed 

shuttle and its crew halfway through the construction of the s

would assume that the country wouldMr. THOMPSON. I do not think that is going to happen. Senator GORE. I understand that. You do not believe that it is 

and we all hope it does not happen. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I have not seen America quit. I have not se

and I do not believe we will. Now they may well damn dema

NASA, and that is okay. I like this oversight because it will ce

us to go back and dig deeper, but we have the people with t

thinking right in NASA today. I believe that. 

Senator GORE. All right, let me back up and ask the questi

started to ask. 

You testified a moment ago that in your opinion if we did l

its crew halfway through the construction of the space station

the country would pause to assess the nature of the problem b

with the construction of the space station using the same shuttl

I think that if we know at the beginning that there is a proble

high likelihood-you describe it however you wantMr. THOMPSON. There is not a high likelihood. We do not b

beginning. I did not say that halfway through the program I exp

and that we ought to just pause a little bit and then go on. I do 

going to happen. There is still risk in space flight, but I am 

America will not quit. 

Senator GORE. There is no demand for zero risk in space flig

into the problem of extremes. I am trying to get at the assumptio

~ 
would look at the program that way if we lost another shuttle 

the construction. 

It comes back to the quality assurance and the reliability 

program that gives us that reliability. I think that while you wi

risk, you have to deal with the likelihood that if halfway throu

this you have another shuttle loss and lose the crew, the Nation 

reassess the project. That might or might not be the right decisi

depends on what happened and why and all of that. 

The degree of risk that is acceptable has to be calculated wi

Mr. THOMPSON. We certainly agree with that, and we go th

day. We have instilled it in OUT people, and that is why we have 

programs in place. 

Let me just kind of recap a minute, because we smed this l

your concern that NASA was of a mindset to put aside any rep

any more risk in space flight. In the last two minutes we have go

Senator GORE. No, not any risk; not any more risk. 

Mr. THOMPSON. There is risk in space. 

Senator GORE. Are you familiar with the study that calcula

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, I am very familiar with it. 

Senator GORE. Do you accept that? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, the arithmetic is right. If you assume 

percent in the next three or four years, you have a 50 percent c

That does not relate to today’s space shuttle. 

Senator GORE. What do you think the chance of failure is in 

four years? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I think the chance is very, very low with 

have in place now. I think over a decade or a decade and a half 

possibility we will have at least an infight abort. 

A concern I would have is that there has been too much turno

and we tend to forget some of the problems of the past. That 

issue we have today to try to instill. Because of leaks, let us g

time and look at the way we are doing business so that we are 

trap. I think it is very low, just to get to the heart of your questio

make sure that you understand that NASA today is very con

consequences not just to our projects but certainly to the lives in

of the country and that kind of thing. We have the people in pl

Senator GOFE. Well, we are now getting reports that more s

have to be added for the Station. Has that decision been made 

Mr. THOMPSON. No. We have got a sequence we are working 

through the preliminary design review now. And we will come 

at the right time. I would not be surprised to see a swing of 

minus, as we finalize that. 

Senator GORE. You do not think that it is fair to tell us at t

now likely more shuttle flights will be needed for the Space St

designed? 

Mr. THOMPSO~’. I suspect by the time we get there and w

logistics, then I suspect there may be more involved than, ye

said. 

Senator GORE. But you said a minute ago, there may be few

Mr. THOMPSON. Fewer what? 

Serator GORE. Shuttle flights. 

risk? 
Mr. THOMPSON. No. 

Senator GORE. You said maybe one or two, plus or minus. 

Mr. THOMPSON.o. I would not be surprised on the assembl

Senator GORE, I am talking about the number of shuttle fligh

Mr. THOMPSON. Toassemble it, I think the number we have got 

Senator GORE. What about taking the components up? Mr. THOMPSON. Taking the components. up. 

Senator GORE. Pardon me? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Taking the components up. 

Senator GORE. Will there be plus or minus flights? Is there an 

there will be fewer flights? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I think it is going to be about the number we bas

which is 18. 

Senator GORE. Why all these persistent reports that there is a we

that is going to necessitate a greater use of the shuttle to get it up t

Mr. THOMPSON. We have a weight problem, Senator, in every 

run early. 

Senator GORE. But at the present time you do not think that it is 

the Congress, we now can tell you, we are not ready to make the 

but based on what we know now about where the weight problem 

think there is a likelihood that more shuttle flights are going to be 

talking now about the resupply, the logistics. 

take the components up, and to assemble them. 

right, plus or minus a couple. 

Mr. THOMPSON. No,weight is coming out. 

Dr. LENOR That would be premature. That is correct. 

Mr. THOMPSON. We are not going to end up putting all the bell

on this space station that people may want. Senator GORE. Well, let me just say that the Nation asks astr

their lives. That is why they are heroes and regarded as heroes. T

manned space flight. There cannot be a zero percent failure rate. 

point you get a failure rate that is not reducible further. 

But the effort to get it to the lowest possible level must be ma

must be made, even at higher costs. 

Mr. THOMPSON. We agree. 

Senator GORE. The problem that I think comes into this is that t

involved sometimes brings a risk of its own. A risk identified by th

risk that Congress is going to cross a threshold beyond which it w

support the program in question. And the mind set that I was tryin

earlier has to do with the balancing of those two questions. 

I have been getting the feeling, too frequently to make me com

NASA at times idenMies that risk that the cost is going to push 

the point where it will approve the program as a risk that it is goi

too high a cost on the other side. That is what 1 think has bee

uncomfortable about what I have been watching in the agency. 

Now back to the Hubble. 

If you want to comment on that, please feel free to do so. 

Mr. THOMPSON. No, I certainly sense your concern. 

I can assure you that I just do not believe that we are over the

what number will Congress buy, and that is the way we run our p

No, we feel very strongly in the total President’s budget that 

today for next year. And we are not making those kind of aadeoff

as prior administrators and deputies have stated, if the budget ge
point, we will cancel the program. We just canceled a p

Marshall SpaceFlight Center just within the last month beca

And the OMV is one of the last programs in N.4SA tha

Senator GORE. Well, it is really a little bit more sophis

just stated it. Because before you get to the point where you 

it or go forward, you get to a point where you can kee

eliminating testing, and then problems occur. 

Mr. THOMPSON. If you went through the sequence 

happened with the OW, for example, over the last several 

we have cut back on, it is capability. Until we finally got t

signals relative to the budget reality we were dealing with

we just had to look hard at. So I do not think we are work

you are most concerned about. 

Dr. LENOR Yes, Senator, if I could take our current hy

and look at it in the context of your recent statements, I 

broken into the chain of a potential accident, and that we ha

accident by finding this problem the way we found it. It 

painful to sit and look at the very high likelihood that 

potentially more shuttle flights, and that we will spend mon

getting back to our safe configuration. 

But we have not shirked from that. We are moving forwa

the leak is. We will fix the leak. And we will look back an

could we have done differently in the past that would 

encountering this problem. 

Senator GORE. Well, I think that ought to be said. I said 

ago myself, and I want to reiterate,it now. The fact tha

discovered is, in part, a testament to the rigorous procedures 

to identify the problem. And you deserve credit for that. 

While we look back at what I believe were flaws in the 

umbilical assemblies, and it is easier to do that in hinds

adequate credit for the fact that you have gone through the

identify the problem before it produced a failure at the p

deserve that credit, and I think that is appropriate. 

Dr. LENOIR. Yes, sir. 

And when we have even better hindsight because we k

flaws were, then we also intend to go back in rigorous restu

we have done differently to have avoided this. 

Senator GORE. Now you said, Mr. Thompson, that the 

be fixed in quick order, if1 remember your statement correc

order” mean? We have been told it is at least three years. 

that, are you? 

h4r. THOMPSON. No, no. I think you are aware of-numbe

to prejudge what the board is going to come up with. On th

can bound it in terms of an updated instrument- Senator GORE. Three-year minimum? 

Mr. THOMPSON.-and resupply that. Whether som

between now and then, we have got teams off looking a

NASA, we have given a charge to a group of people to 

innovative and see what we can do. There are-I will ju

comes out. But, no, on the outside a couple, three years. And if we can be clever, I think there is a lot of things th

enhancement. And I know you are quite familiar with so
31 

there. A lot can be salvaged there. There are a lot of other PIS that c

in the program. But let me ask Len to give you aSenator GORE. It cannot be fixed any sooner than three years, ca

Dr. FISK No, I am not sure that is accurate. We are currently stud

we can accelerate the replacement instruments. Three years is the 

are on at the moment. We are asking the question, “Can it be done 

Could it be done in a year-and-a-half with a replacement instrume

examine whether or not a repair mission can be mounted at that tim

Senator GORE. And that assumes that it will get in the priorit

shuttle flights? 

Dr. RSK. I am absolutely confident that if we had the instrumen

that we would get all the priority we need. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Or some other thing short of a new insmen

bootstrapped onto another mission. 

Senator GORE. Do you think it might be sooner than three year

Dr. Fw. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator GORE. How soon? 

Dr. FISK. Well, until I know-we are just guessing. In the 

replacement instrument in question, it is not only a question of re

it, it is a question of technical people. Do we have people that cou

shifts a day, rather than two shiftsaday? I mean, there are thosekind

that are going to have to be asked. 

But, please, do not anybody lose sight of the fact that Hubble is 

very busy telescope over the next two years, even if we do not ma

spherical aberration problem. The ultraviolet capability, the 

capability, the spectroscopy capability, dl of those things are 

producing exciting scientific results independent of the spherical a

Senator GORE. I was watching the Tonight Show, and Jay Len0 

there is precious little humor in any of this-but Jay Leno said th

that the Hubble is not really out of focus, it is just that the universe 

is one of the discoveries, he opined. 

I do not know how to react to what you have just said about the 

the possibility that it can be fixed in quick order or more quickly 

told a week ago. Should we put much stock in this? Or should w

as we are looking at the space program, should we plan on the lik

will take at least three years? 

Dr. RSK. Let me answer this as straightforward as I can. The 

schedule of the W/PC replacement instrument, which was un

before we discovered this spherical aberration problem, called for t

to be installed on orbit in June of 1993. So if you do nothing el

should be an instrument available to fly on a flight in June of 199

problem. 

We have asked the project to report, I believe, on the 24th of 

possible it would be to accelerate the development schedule. We 

that point what it will cost, and whether it is even technically feas

Senator GORE. So in two weeks we will know whether or not th

can be completed quicker than in time for a flight three years from 

Dr. RsK. That is the plan. 

Mr. THOMPSON. As well as, I think, get a better feeling for wha

doneSenator GORE. All right. 

Mr. THOMPSON.-~O improve the capability. 

Y 
Senator GORE. Now, Dr. Lenoir, what is your estimate of 

fleet will be grounded? 

Dr. LENOR. Again, that requires some speculation. Frank

if we do not get one mission off prior to Ulysses. I will be 

weeks from now, we do not feel we understand the problem 

in place and are in processing for the next mission. 

Senator GORE. Do you know with certainty, now, on t

that the problem exists with the primary mirror? 

Dr. FISK I do not know with certainty. The optical exp

at the data and understand the nature of this telescope thin

the primary mirror. There are additional tests that we will ru

confirm it in one way or the other. 

Senator GORE. Now your HST independent optica

concluded, and I quote, “Replacement instruments can 

spherical aberration error of the telescope assembly, 

performance targets can be met.” That seems to assume tha

what the problem is. 

Dr. FLSK. Well, that is right. You may also notice in the 

review panel, that they confum that they believe that there i

in the mirrors. And it is actually not necessary to know whet

or the secondary in order to make the correction, althoug

useful. It is particularly useful in helping us to begin to under

back in 1980 and 1981. 

Senator GORE. They also conclude the spherical aberr

corrected with any of the existing hst conmls. 

Dr. FIsK. That is correct. and more than that, we wou

because the spherical aberration thzt we have in the mi

spherical, if you like, that we know we can correct it. and if 

the shape of the mirror by using the actuators, we might pu

pattern in, which therefore would be harder to correct in th

Senator GORE. That seems to imply, then, that the repl

are the indicated fix and that nothing else is going to solve 

dr. fisk. Well, it is two things. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Why do you not tell him what we are t

Dr. FISK No, I am not going to tell him. 

Dr. FISK. The replacement instruments are things you kn

is not in question. We have got a lot of ingenuous people 

other ways that you could do this thing, including on-orbit 

are way out of sight, that you would not even try. But we 

license to everybody in the project to think about more im

this than simply replacement instruments, and as we had 

people in this project, the astronomers, the scientists, ever

stubborn, and it would not surprise me to find out that they 

something even more imaginative. Senator GORE. Now, before we go to the contractors, le

few more things briefly. The other bidder did include a pl

testing, correct? Dr. FISK. That is correct. 

Senator GORE. NASA did not require in the bid spe

‘bidders agree to perform final assembly testing, correct? 

Dr. FISK. I believe that is correct, yes, They did re

considerable detail, which was reviewed, and certified and 
Senator GORE. Now, the question of whether or not final asse

the telescope should be required prior to launch was addressed 

bids were opened and the contract was awarded. Was that decisio

final assembly testing reopened after the bid was awarded? 

Dr. FISK. Let me answer in two ways. We have asked the Lew 

go through this in considerable detail, and so let me speak from 

of the project, which will be subject to the review of the Lew All

was an issue which was revisited and reaffirmed at various po

development of the mirror. There are various references to it in 

with the science teams and so forth, but that process was reviewed 

decision was reaffmed. 

Senator GORE. When you say it was revisited and reaffirmed, t

somebody in NASA was not quite sure that that original decisio

Why was it revisited? 

Dr. FISK. Senator, I think you are over-interpreting that. The t

the Hubble Space Telescope was under constant discussion throu

mission. I mean, the things like the recent thermal vacuum test. 

Senator GORE. No. I want to concentrate on this one point, Dr

cover the whole waterfront. The question of whether a final assem

be required before launch, that question, you have testified, was 

the contract was awarded to a bidder which did not include such 

correct? 

Dr. FISK. It is my understanding, and please bear in mind tha

about a history that I am learning about. 

Senator GORE. You were not personally there at the time? 

Dr. FISK. I am not looking for an excuse. I am telling you tha

what I have been told by the project. 

Senator GORE. Do you happen to know Mr. Thompson? Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I can just state from what I know, an

never heard of an issue being brought up, and certainly sinc

Marshall that wanted to re-question, or reopen, or re-look back 

of this end-to-end optical test, certainly in other areas, as Len in

like in the thermal vacuum test, we did that. We went to the ma

of discussion, but I never heard word one, and I chaired a ser

reviews every third month with the scientists, with the PI’S, wit

from Perkin-Elmer, with Lockheed, and I never heard it brough

Senator GORE. What? After the bid? After the bids were ope

Mr. THOMPSON.o. I am tallring about ltom ’86 on as we w

“are we okay”, as others were off working on the shuttle and now 

to readdress what we were going to do with the Hubble. Should 

retest that or something else, and I never heard it brought up. 

Senator GORE. Okay. Now, you have this quarterly review 

program and you never heard this point revisited. When you 

“revisited”, Dr. Fisk, what are you thinking about? Are you think

magazine, some journal article that somebody wrote? 

Dr. FISK. No. All I am sayingSenator GORE. I know there was one of those. 

Dr. FISK. Well, there is two points that you raise. One is that th

on Hubble, including the lack of this system test, was commo

mean, it was not a secret. It was published. It was discussed. Th

for example, in the discussions of the science meeting, for exa

occurred in the 1979-80 time frame. I am sorry, I do not keep the 

in which the project informed the scientists that they were, in fa
34 

end-teend test, which I view as a revisiting of the issue. Th

It might be also commented that there was no ripple as a re

you know, a lot of other very controversial issues going on 

time concerning fine guidance sensors, instrument develop

Senator GORE. Can you supply us the document wher

informed the scientists they were not doing an end-to-end 

Dr. FISK. I will be very happy to. 

Senator GORE. Was the tone of it to flag it for them and 

Dr. FISK. I would have to go back and reread it. It is a o

the project manager at the time, Mr. Kiefley, who said, “we 

group that there was not an end-to-end test being don

subsequent comment by anyone. 

Senator GORE. Presumably, the science group would alr

decision had been made, correct? 

Dr. FISK. Well, that was the point of my comment reaff

you the exact date and I will deliver the document to you. Senator GORE. Thank you. I appreciate that, We have c

on program management. Which office within NASA, 

responsible for defining the criteria by which to dec

adequately tested? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I think the chief engineering organ

consultation with the scientific people. The optical exper

management would be involved, because there is alway

wrong-would have been the driver for the decisions. Also 

disseminated throughout all areas of the Hubble Space Tele

people to make sure that we were all together in terms of 

you know, it had to start with engineering. 

Senator GORE. Okay. But was there one person or on

responsibility for deciding what would constitute an adeq

was ready to fly? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I will have to get you the history back 

the Source Evaluation Board. But the way 1 started this hea

much personally responsible as we went through the flig

Even if a mirror was ground 10 or 12 years ago, that it is 

smart enough to ask, “were all the right tests run?” And s

part of that process, as all of us at NASA were, that said, “

Senator GORE. Thank you. [The following information was subsequently received 

“‘he office with he responsibility for preparing and maintaini

specifications for all elements of the HST project was the Hubble Space T

the Marshall Space Flight Center. The primary positions within that org

Manager,Chief EngineerandProjeaSdentist Thenames oftheindividua

along with their approximate tenures. are listed below: 

Pro’ectMana er W&am Keaaey (1977-1980) 

Fred Speer (1980-1983) 

James B. Odum (1983-1986) 

Jerry Richardson (1986-1987) 

Fred S. Wojtalik (1988-present) 

Project Scientist 

C.R. O’DeU (1977-1984) 

Rokn Brown (1984-1987) 

Alber~ Boggess Ill (1987-present) 

Chief Engineer 

Jean R. Oliver (1977-present) 
35 

Senator GORE. Now Mr. Rodney, I have not asked many q

effort to establish an effective quality control program. But I am 

in your comments. Accordingly, I have a number of question

designed to flesh out what you have told us about the additional 

for quality control, and would appreciate your response. Because of the time constraints that we have we axe going to 

panel. Before you depart, I want to acknowledge your willing

committee members and staff on what is being found on the leak 

It is my experience that you have been up front with us and share

as it has come in and offered several times to brief us as the pro

do not want my comments about the mind set in reaction 

pessimistic assessments to be interpreted as a lack of candor. A

do not see it that way. And specifically, I do want to thank you f

in sharing information fully with us. 

In spite of the fact that, in my opinion, the American p

concerned about these problems and are justified in insisti

corrected and that NASA lean from them, it is also my sense, 

know and feel, that the American people continue to feel prid

has accomplished, what it is capable of accomplishing now and 

worst mistake we could make is to let a sends of problems lik

turn away from space exploration. That is the worst single mista

make. But by golly, we are going to insist that these problems n

but that we be given adequate and complete assurance that th

have been learned and that the proper changes and procedures 

I want to say again in conclusion on this panel that we 

distinction between mistakes and problems that occurred 10 y

current management of the program, which discovered this leak 

a tragedy; and which has added the quality assurance personnel 

with new procedures, will prevent a recurrence of problems l

want to express again my confidence in the individuals who are m

even as I restate the determination of this Subcommittee to con

a whole new way, at a whole new level of detail, to insist 

dialogue. And again, we appreciate you offering to do that, bo

mentioned, outside the hearing room on an informal and contin

that, we are going to move on to our final two witnesses today

Thank you very much for coming. 

[The following information was subsequently received for t

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR GORE AND THE ANSWERS OF M

Question 1. In your view, does NASA now have an adequate number of NA

and safety personnel? In that regard, have you been denied requests in recen

staffing resources by NASA or Mice of Management and Budget (OMB)? 

Answer 1. We have given this issue a great deal of attention across the NA

have added safety and quality staff at Headquarters and at the field centers pr

manned programs. We have, for some time, been reassessing our levels of ef

NASA activities. Part of our assessment of Hubble Space Telescope will be 

possible changes in the level and type of safety, reliability. maintainability 

(SRh4&QA) coverage for this rype of program. Through a series of audits. we h

at individual field centers to assure that they are adequately covered. All r

personnel resources for Code Q have been well supported by NASA senior mana

Question 2. In the broad perspective, what constitutes a good versus a b

assurance program? Looking back, how would you characterize NASA’s qual

the 198O’sl What are the differences between today’s quality assurance program 

1980’s? 

Answer 2. One effective measure of the goodness of a safety and quality 

the actual performance record. We have to consider NASA’s success record a
36 

level of undesirable incidents to detemrine if safety and quality are effective

level of MOUT(X(I, both budget and penonnel, were much less than toda

NASA's safay and quality progm should have been stronger in terms o

organizntional role. Today, we have made cglsiderable progress in correctin

reporr dkctly to the NASA Administrator at Headquarters and to the Cente

which was not always the case in the past. We have also made significant pro

the messenger" syndrome that was sporadically evident in the past. We hav

Repofiirg and Corrective Action (PRACA) systems and insured better m

significant problems. We havemuchgreateremphasis on quality through suc

Excellence Award, our overall Quality and F'roductivity Improvement Progr

prwisims in our award fee determinations. 

Queslion3. Arethercdifferentapproachesthatyourpeopletake with res

of manned and unmanned space programs? 

Answer 3. Basic quality assurance actions such as audits, inspeaion poin

and preventive actions are implemented in the same manner regardless o

category. The real differences lie in the requiRments imposed both on 

government people for each program. Historically, today's unmanned launc

manned launch vehicles. when the Shuttle Program was initiated, the Atla

their proven quality methods. The approach used by the Shuttle for quality 

from what we refer to as "unmanned" launch vehicles. One of the outputs 

the HST incident will be an assessment of any improvements to our current 

Programs. The recent changes in unmanned launch vehicle procurement, i.e., c

signifhntly reduced and changed the oversight exercised by government 

have changes from "controller? of the processes to the "limited observe

mandatory inspection points for the government quality people have been de

documents. The approval of operating procedures by the government has 

review board memberssp for the government no longer exists which me

replace. fly "as is", or swap hardware are made without government concu

Question 4. How does NASA ensure: that every employee and cantra

reliability, and safety? How do you avoid the natural tendency to assme tha

care of that? 

Answer4. To keep NASA management informed, we have designed saf

systems, servicing all centers, contractors, and Headquarters areas. T

Reponjng (SPR) System assures major problems originating at the contr

quickly brought to management's attention and are active until resolved. Th

all problems and serves an active role in trend analysis where histor;cal p

deiermine frequency of occurrence and response to recunence control. The 

System (NSRS) is a confidential, voluntary, and responsive channel to 

management of your safety ccncems about any NASA programs orprojeas

effort to keep its work force awareof and focused on safety, reliability and q

contractor work force, we have instituted the NASA Excellence Award for Q

This is a proactive program giving our contractors a set of "world class" cri

Joint NASNContractor Quality Circles and suggestion programs hav

encourage involvement and improvement opportunities. The Manned Fl

Program recognizes both NASA and contraaor employees for their outstan

Space Transportation System (STS) Program. We are, and have been, 

productivity (Total Quality Management (TQM)) and have been recognized 

of our centers receive the Quality Improvement Prototype Award. We are 

TQM awareness for the entire work force. Additionally, we are continually r

our safety and quality systemsthrough regularly scheduled and special audits 

does not become routine or complacent. Question 5. In manufactuxing. American mpanies have been faulted f

and reliability. Since 1970, US. auto makers have losimuch of the America

auto makers because Japanese cars have had beaerrepair record and fewer d

companies have made a concerted effort to improve the quality of their pro

now make much better cars. One thing they realized was that it is not enou

every part is made and installed properly, you also need to make sure that t

with reliability in mind. That might mean redesigning a particular comp

twenty parts rather than forty and thus much less likely to fail. Has that lesso

Answer 5. Yes, to the extent that this principle applies to aerospace 

continue to champion efforts to improve the reliability of currently operation

design changes to im rove reliability. One of the thrusts of NASA's Assu

(ASA) Program whicf is to carefully assess those components that are mos

new designs that are more reliable with reduced maintenance. However, the

differences when comparing automobile to aerospace reliability. Automob

designing for durability within relatively liberal weight and sizing constrai
premise that few failures are considered catastrophic. About the only place where red

in automobiles is the bde system. If you experience an alternator failure on a cou

night, you might not agree wlth this philosophy, but it significantly reduces the com

of the automobile. 

Inaeros acc,generallyspuking, wemustassumethatanyfailurecanneverbef

cases must Ee considered catastrophic. While there are different applications of thi

marmedandunmarmedprograms,thenetruultinbothcasesdrivesustosignifcant

that increases the- complexity of our designs and the number of parts involved. 

Question 6. When you look at the blueprints for the Shuale, I'm impssed by 

Complexity of the system. And since Challenger, many of the systems have bem m

complex as pats have ban added. (For instance, another O-ring and a heating eleme

each joint of the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's)). Is all this complexity necessa

engineers and contracton given incentives to simplify and streamline their designs, 

number of parts that could go wrong? 

Answer 6. Yes, Shuttle systems are very complex. This complexity is inherent w

It is compounded by the occasionally conflicting design qukments TO. minimize 

systems while increasing reliability and flexibility, provide redundan and improve 

Specifically addressing your questim on the SRB Joint as an%-. num

candidates for the Solid Rocku Motor (SRM) Field Joint were investigated prior to 

the current Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) dea A series of tests were 

on candidate 0-rin materials. It was determined that the%on used in the origina

best Combination o!matenal/physical propexties for the SRM joint O-rings. One pro

(and similar materials) is that it becomes stiffer or less resilient as it gets colder. F

meet the NASA requirnnent to track and follow the case on pressurization at ignit

calculated rate), they must be at least 70 degrees F. The joint heaters were the engin

keeping the joints well into the desired range of physical propmes. in spite 

temperatye at Kery~Yy Space Center (KSC). In this example, complexity increase

but rehabdity, flexlbdp, redundancy, and system safety have improved. NASA has a very ngorous design review system with Preliminary Design Revie

at 10 percent of design, Critical Design Reviews (CDRs) at 70 percent of des

&errifcation Reviews (DCR's) held at completion or 100 percent of design. N

scientists, and technicians carefully track the design through these reviews to assure 

have bem optimized, meet NASA requirements, and are the best engineering compr

A F+ure Modes Effects Analysis/Criti+ Items List (FMWCIL) is generate

all possible fdure modes. The design is renewed against the FMEA/CIL to reduc

effects associsred with these failures. 

NASA continuously encourages its contractors to suggest improvements to th

improve its cost, reliabdity, wei ht. ex.. through cotltract incentives and awards. 

Even though we have idended the causes and effects of many potential failure

many of the Shuttle systans to eliminate these failure modes before returning to flig

continue xo improve the design and reliability of the shuttle systems and compon

ccntinue to improve the overall reliability and safety of the system. The agency has 

equipments and components for modification and identified them in a budget line ite

Question 7. How would you characterize the relationship between NASA pe

qdty control people at contraaor facilities? More specifically, how would you 

relationship with respect to Hughes-Danbury on the HST? 

Answer 7. Our relationship with our quality associates at the NASA contractor

can also say this for our current association wih the Hughes-Danbury quality staff. 

very mrdial and genuinely helpful. The conditions that existed at Hughes-Danbury 

be assessed in the Allen Board Report. 

Question 8. In your view, is it prudent to rely upon the same contractors that d

development work for quality assurance? Does such a heavy reliance on this relatio

the pendulum has swung too far and that NASA should take stronger control of qual

the U.S. space progm? Answer 8. End item quality is clearly the responsibility of the contractor. A com

contract to design and manufacture an item is also held responsible to assure th

delivered product. Having a different company perform inspection would dy serve 

and lengthen schedules and could lessen accountability, ie., who is responsible for 

thehardware-thecompanythatmadeanonconformingpanorthe company that let 

partthroughthesystem? Generally,itisnotgoodforthequalitypeopletoreportto

that is directly responsible for manufactumg because that sometimes presents him 

over schedde versus hardware goodness. In the vast majority of cases with NASA 

quality people are equal in stature to the manufacturing management and both re

executive for conflict resolution. In sane cases, we do have additions to contracto

government mandatory. These critical inspection areas are verified by governmen

amcunt of government verification is frequently reviewed for adequacy. We are cur
both the quality requirements we lay on our con~acmrs and the degree a

review and surveillance. 

Question 9. That seems to indicate that yw acknowledge that there w

quahty assurance program in the 1980’s. Can you please tell the Submm

problems were and how they have been corrected? 

Answer 9. The focus problem with the HST has been traced to an 

corrector) used during the manufacture and testing of the primary mirr

today requiring that quality assurance must use the same measuring ins

special calibration verification would be required of the instrument prio

are unable to explain why quality assurance was not more intimately inv

cemficatim of the reflective null corrector in the 1978 and 1979 time fr

quality assurance today would assure that the instrument was inspected

certified. We will address this issue in more detail as pait of our final HS

Question 10. From the information that you have been able to obui

as a pan of the dr. allen’s investigation board-would you have advised 

hst be tested in combination? 

Answer 10. The level of testing performed on the HST appeared appr

the assumpticn that the individual elements were thoroughly tested 

specification requirements. As we now know, this assumpion was incor

Any test performed on the completed Orbital Telescope Assembly 

performed to demonstrate compliance to the overall system speciricatim r

would have been performed to find a specific problem, which at the tim

A cmplete system-level test would have been extremely expensive, com

It would probably have resulted in some fundamental changes in the fligh

a meaningful test to be accomplished. Based on our cUITent knowledge of 

of system, we would probably have been a very strong advocate of som

above that which was employed. 

Question 11. Based upon what you know, was there significant pre

Danbury quality control people not to slow progress of HS?? Have you 

of that pressure manifesting itself in the materials you have been review

Answer 11. TheNASAandPerlcin-Elmer (PE)qualityassuranceper

been under any more schedule pressure on the OTA program than has 

programs. There is always pressure on quality assurance to perform their 

manufacturing and engineering can continue their tasks; however, this pr

swpe of their activities. Because PE quality assurance was under the co

time‘the reflective null correaor was assembled and measured, it is poss

may have helpedaictate the very limited involvement by quality assuran

Question 12. Given NASA’s current relationship on quality assura

you tlunk emrs Wte this could occur again without detedon? 

Answer 12. The present NASA organization gives the safety reliab

organization an independent voice on all projects. This independenc

contractors’ facilities. The present requirements would not permit the qua

to be a pan of either the engineering or manufacturing organizations. It has always been a general philosophy that inspection will be p

metrology. There are cases where inspection may be required to use manu

there must be methods to venfy the accuracy of such tooling. 

The HST problem originated in the early program stages where 

philosophies were developed. We are continually looking at ways to im

involvement in the front end of the process rather than find the problem t

the end of the process. We believe we have strengthened our capabilit

throughout the design and build process. Out of our review of the HST w

for further improvements. 

Question 13. Can you please elaborate? What types of independent 

being conducted on the Shuttle fuel system? 

Answer 13. Basically, we are involving real-time with every step of t

Our involvement includes, but is not limited to, reviews OF. manufact

testprocedures, inspeaionprocedures, contamination control. and design 

the safety community is deeply involved in reviewing the concerns and 

propellantleaklimitsforthelaunchenvironmentThisis toensurethatwh

accepted will preclude both fire hazards and leaks that might grow in fli

Question 14. What was your office’s role with respect to the testin

Assemblies in 19841 When the 33 units failed the original receiving tests

static plate tests, did the quality assurance program taise any questions o

Answer 14. The prime contractors engineering organization has res

oversight and approval of vendor’s acceptance test procedures. The contr

and DCMC inspeaion are responsible for ensuring that the accepta

accordance with approved procedures. The approvedtest procedures forth
for use of a blanking plate to isolate the pan being tested from its mating half tes

the pan fail the fyst leak tesf All of the disconnects that failed the first leak test 

tested with the blanking plate as are required in the a ved test pmdure. ?

blanking plate is to isolate the item being tested fran lzg test equipment Nct

review of this problem has ken found to indicate this approach was technic

subsequently changed because it was an obvious awkward and costly process. Question I5 In your view, could and should this leak have bea deteaed prio

STS-35 was in the final stages of its launch countdown and STS-38 had been ro

Why did it take so lmg before these two leaks were detected? Are you satisfi

testing regime, using liquid nitrogen, for detecting leaks in these umbilical assan

Answer 15. It is not believed that this leak could have been found usin

procedures, beginning with ATP and continuing through assembly and pre-fl

believed that an acceptance test procedure capable of finding such leaks is possib

opportunity for finding these leaks exists at the vendor. However, the sens

systems to even the smallest leaks suggests that even a perfectly manufactured a

stiU develop leaks as a result of damage during shipment and assembly. In the 

the continued operation of the unit will develop wear but presently the signatur

to identify such deterioration. The delay in discovering these leaks is a direct resul

to the LH2 temperature and molecular size. Due to the hazards associated with t
40 

NASA-WIDE SRM&QA 

STAFFING TOTALS 

CIVIL SERVICE 

HQ 

JSC 

KSC 

MSFC 

ssc 

ARC 

LaRC 

LeRC 

GSFC 

TOTAL CIVIL SERVICE 

1986 

33 

159 

212 

107 

7 

33 

62 

72 

160 

845 

- 

- 

1987 

64 

170 

260 

180 

8 

35 

62 

90 

163 

1,032 

- 

- 

1988 

64 

195 

280 

235 

8 

37 

61 

84 

165 

1,129 

- 

- 

JPL WORKFORCE 228 258 264 

.SUPPORT CONTRACTOR 71 1 971 1,198 

MAJOR CONTRACTOR NIA 3,165 3,877 

DoD - 438 438 - -

438 

TOTAL 2,222 5,864 6,909 

* PRELIMINARY - UNDER DISCUSSION WITH DoD 

APPROXIMATE NASA SRM&QA FUN

(MILLIONS) 

Fy8 

CIVIL SERVICE 54 

JPL WORKFORCE 14 

SUPPORT CONTRACTOR 03 

MAJOR CONTRACTOR 267 

DoD 30 

R&D SPECIAL PROJECTS 6 

CODE Q R&D 14 

TOTAL (SRM&QA) $468 

FY9 

61 

16 

102 

268 

30 

6 

27. 

$505 

Senator GORE. Our final two witnesses on this next p

Bulkin, Director of Scientific Space Programs with Lockhe

Company and Mr. John C. Rich, President of Hughes Dan

to your statements. Your complete prepared statements w

record in full. 

Gentlemen, welcome. We are glad you are here today
I wish to advise and reassure both of you before you s

subcommittee has familiarized itself with the activities wh

performed on behalf of the United States of America in classified 

will take caution, as I know you do regularly, to avoid comprom

information with importance to our national security. Within tho

we look forward to exploring fully the problems which have been b

concerning the Hubble telescope. 

Mr. Bulkin, we will begin with you. Welcome, and please 

STATEMENT OF BERTRAM R. BULKIN, DIRECTOR, 

SPACE PROGRAMS, LOCKHEED MISSILES A

COMPANY, INC. 

Mr. BULKIN. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to be here 

with you and the committee the roles and responsibilities for the 

Telescope--- 

Senator GORE. Excuse me. If you could move that microph

closer to your voice, we could pick it up a little easier. 

Mr. Bum. Is that better? 

Senator GORE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Bum.-and to go over the Lockheed roles and respons

Hubble Space Telescope. My name is Bert Bulkin. I am the Direct

Space Programs for Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, S

Division. 

The Lockheed HST effort reports directly to me, and I have b

involved in the telescope program since 1973. I was the Hubble S

program manager through the year of 1985. 

Lockheed has been responsible for the design and developmen

Systems Module, which is the basic spacecraft, since conmc

October 1977. In addition, we supported Marshall Space Fligh

system engineering task related to the Hubble Space Telesc

external interfaces. We also had the responsibility for the physica

all associate contractor hardware, including hardware provided b

Space Agency. We are also under separate contract with NASA 

mission operations. 

Lockheed integrated the Optical Telescope Assembly provid

Danbury Optical Systems, the Widefield Planetary Camera provi

High Resolution Spectrograph provided by Ball Brothers

Photometer provided by the University of Wisconsin, the Faint 

provided by Martin Marietta, the Faint Object Camera and Solar h

by the European Space Agency, and the Scientific Instrument 

Data Handling subsystem provided by Fairchild Industries. 

We assisted Marshall Space Flight Center in establishing all in

the spacecraft among all the elements I previously described and 

to the spacecraft such as the tracking data relay satellite system, 

the mission specialists who will do the mission on orbit servicin

It was mentioned before that the Optical Telescope Assembl

from at that time Perkin-Elmer, today Hughes Danbury, in 1984

The Hubble Space Telescope assembly process started in Mar

proceeded to install all the flight hardware and started into func

verify that all systems were compatible with one another and 

functionally met their respective interfaces with the spacecraft. After showing the satisfactory functioning of all the hardwar

subjected the total system to environmental tests. These included 
42 

to assure that the spacecraft could withstand &he launch en

be experienced in the shuttle payload bay and a 57-day 

which simulated orbital conditions of vacuum and tempem

End-bend data was gathered in real time through a 

Science Institute and the Space Telescope Operations Cont

Space Flight Center. These tests, conducted from January 

were interactive for Lockheed in Sunnyvale, the Science In

Telescope Operations Control Center. 

With the shuttle fleet grounded after rhe Challenger acc

system were deemed prudent because of increased em

maintainability and safety. With all these upgrades comp

HST for shipment to Kennedy Space Center. 

At the Kennedy Space Center, verification testing wa

insure no shipping damage had occurred. Tests similar to th

at Lockheed were conducted through a satellite link bo

Sunnyvale and from Goddard Space Flight Center, in

Institute. 

Once in the shuttle bay, the Space Telescope Opera

confiewed the spacecraft for launch. 

During the testing of the Hubble Space Telescope prior 

probably the highest rate of testing hours on any other 

approximately 12,000 hours of power on testing. We init

than 3 million commands monitored over 8,000 data poi

over 1,000 test segments. 

After the launch on April 24, 1990, it achieved a nea

mile orbit. We have been supportingzhe operations from G

Center and Marshall Space Flight Center as well as Sunny

We are very roud of the performance on the HST a

effort by a lot of individuals involved. 

In addition to the basic challenge of the functioning 

environment of space on a one-shot mission, the challe

pointing has been met. In conjunction with the fine guid

by HKghes, our pointing contra1 system can track a star to 

accuracy of .007 arc seconds. This capability was demonst

lock was attempted in late May. 

Although there has been a temporary setback in achie

forth for the Hubble Space Telescope, we are confident tha

of priority in observing programs and image enhancem

processing techniques, important science can be realized 

In addition, we have developed crew aids, speci

procedures that have been validated by neutral buoyanc

mission specialist ~SUOMU~S that will enable the repl

instruments with corrective optics, as Dr. Fisk previously m

maintenance mission, bringing the HST to its full capabil

I have included as part of the statement the project rol

and a chronological sequence of events that have transpire

its inception and a couple of cutaway views of the teiesco

the OTA mated to the SSM equipment section. 

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to testif

today, and I am prepared to answer any of your questions

[The charts follow:] 

hardware and-so P tware is concerned. We believe it is testim
43 
44 

CROSS SECTION OF THE HUBBLE SPACE TEL

Senator GORE. Thank you very much. 

We will hold those questions, Mr. Bulkin, until we hea

STATEMENT OF JOHN C. RICH, PRESIDENT, HU

OPTICAL SYSTEMS, INC. 

Mr. RICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
I am John Rich, and I am President of Hughes Danbury Opt

Incorporated. And for the record, I need to submit that my office i

Co~e~tic~t, not in Virginia. Senator GORE. I misstated that. I guess you have offices in Arl

Mr. RICH. We have offices in the area 

Senator GORE. But your main office is in Danbury, Connecticu

Mr. RICH. My office is in Danbury, Connecticut. 

I appreciate your invitation to appear today before the Subcom

Let me make a comment back to the June 29th day. Had I r

invitation earlier I would have been pleased to appear at the 

conducted on the 29th. 

I would like to provide a little background on our company. Hu

Optical Systems, Incorporated, is, as has been mentioned, a form

the Perkin-Elmer Corporation. The division was acquired in Dece

this last December, by Hughes Aircraft Company, and we are pres

owned subsidiary of Hughes. 

We are designers and manufacturers of complex optical and e

systems. Our primary customers are the United States Governmen

aerospacecontractors. And we have worked closely with NASA an

Depamnent on a number of projects over the years. We have been 

the government of precision optics since the late 1930s. We are re

of the leading fms internationally in our field. 

Let me state very clearly that no one is more troubled than my c

I about the recent reports of a problem with the Hubble Space T

we will fully assist in analyzing, and we will do what we can 

problem. Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, Chairman of Hughes Aircraft C

publicly confirmed this, and has stated that the full range of Hu

capability is available for this effort. 

I also need to say at the outset that we do not have the answers to 

that are being asked as to exactly what is wrong with the Hubble

have caused it, or how it all may have come about. It is simply to

I am, however, here in the spirit of cooperation, and want to coop

way possible with the Subcommittee. 

Also, like the Subcommittee, I am in the process of reconstruct

of our work on Hubble, which goes back some 17 years. My 

complete, so I am not able today to address thoroughly every ques

to be answered. And I may have trouble--I may stumble on 

questions, Senator. 

I will, though, to the best of my ability, both in this statement an

any questions the Subcommittee may have, provide relevant info

based on the state of my knowledge today. Our involvement with the Hubble Space Telescope dates ba

which time we assisted NASA in early feasibility studies. At tha

undertook some concept design on the parts of the optical s

competitively awarded a contract to us in mid- 1977 to design an

optical telescope assembly, which is sometimes referred to as the 

fine guidance sensors for the Hubble Space Tele,, qx. 

This work involved primarily the preparation UI the two mi

certainly been in the newspapers lately, a primary and a seconda

the incorporation of the mirrors into a metering truss, which hold

proper relationship with one another, and also provides for their ad

the design and manufacture of the very precise fine guidance s

effect, aim and stabilize the telescope to permit it to perform its w
46 

Mr. Bulkin mentioned that in his opening statement. The two mirrors which havereceived substantial attenti

on this subject over the last few days are the 94 inches in d

and the 12 inch in diameter secondary mirror. And I have p

Mr. Chairman, a technical note published back in 1981 

specifications and useful information regarding the telesc

Senator GORE. Without objection, we will include 

reference. 

Mr. RICH. Chronologically, we started our work on th

1977. An order for the large primary mirror blank was pla

with Coming Glass Works. We received that blank a year 

polishing of the primary mirror was completed in Decemb

mirror fabrication process, including the coating, was c

1982. The secondary mirror, the smaller of the two, had 

Year. 

As has been mentioned, the entire optical telescope a

to and accepted by NASA in October 1984. We recogn

hearing that the Subcommittee is interested in quality con

activity, and the interface between NASA and its contr

very briefly each of those subjects in this prepared prese

The work which we do is, by its very nature, precision 

within tolerances that are measured in micrometers, that i

Accordingly, we have always emphasized quality contro

a substantial independent department to conduct these ac

NASA itself mandates that we and its other contrac

quality control system. We have conscientiously and ca

system. In addition to our quality control procedure

representatives in our plant who were responsible for ove

activities, including our quality control. 

With respect to testing our work product, the design of 

utilizes highly sophisticated computerized mathemat

themselves been verified through frequent use in the p

checks with other models. These models would genera

optical item that are analogous to an eye glass prescript

this prescription is then confirmed through repetition of th

processes and through peer review by other scientists and 

certainly done in the early days of the Hubble program. There was extensive review of the mirror designs 

telescope assembly in the scientific community. During 

optics are tested to determine their conformity with the p

use of measurement devices. The final precision measu

today’s technology, be made with optical devices as o

devices. 

Testing the OTA mirrorc employed lasers, precision 

interferometers, and prcL lwn reference optics. Som

questioned whether additional different tests should h

mirrors, and we will have a chance to go through this in s

to come. The mirror configuration test we developed an

NASA approved was the only test that we judged to be 

meet the program’s requirements. As for our relationship with NASA, I can only 

cooperation, with continual communication throughout th

again, is optical telescope assembly. Both we and NAS
Testing the OTA mirrors employed lasers, precision instrume

interferometers, and recision reference optics. Some press 

mirrors, and we will have a chance to go through this in some detai

to come. The mirror configuration test we developed and relied h

NASA approved was the only test that we judged to be sufficien

meet the program’s requirements. 

As for our relationship with NASA, I can only describe 

cooperation, with continual communication throughout the OTA pr

again, is optical telescope assembly. Both we and NASA have b

document decisions that were made about the optical telescope ass

is a great deal of information in the file, and considerable records v

throughout the program. 

We have high respect for the technical confidence and professio

of NASA’s scientists and engineers, and we have valued thei

oversight, and approval of our work throughout this program. 

Before concluding, I would like to briefly review the activ

undertaken to assist NASA and Dr. Lew Allen’s optical telesc

review board in better understanding and resolviihq tlus problem. A

request-rhat is Dr. Allen’s board-which we kkve is wholly ap

have provided the government with custod) ~f .dl critical do

hardware related to the OTA program. Tht.5~ will obviously 

reviewed as Dr. Allen’s review proceeds; and we will assist him 

we can to understand how documentation was generated, and how 

used. 

To start this process several of us did, indeed, meet with Dr. 

better part of two days last week All of us who have worked on th

Hughes Danbury are proud of our accomplishments. We are, as 

concerned about this problem. And we are therefore deeply comm

out what is wrong. This is a commitment that even our former em

We have recently been contacted by a number of former employ

volunteered to give their own time to help understand this, 

82-year-old retiree, the most renowned senior optical desig

Perkin-Elmer Corporation. 

In summary, we appreciate the opportunity to meet with the S

And again, I will try to candidly and directly answer any questio

subcommittee may have. 

[The following information was subsequently received for the 

questioned whether J ditional different tests should have been 

August 3.1990 

The Honorable Albert Gore, Chairman. 

Subcommittee on Science Technology andspace, Committee on Commerce. Scien

katwn, US. Senate. Wahington, Dc 

Dear Mr. CIWRMW 

I appreciated the rrtunity to tesnfy before your Subuxnmittee on July 10 re

problems with the Hu le Space Telescope. 

As promised at that time, I am enclosing the following information for the rec

1. Amplification of Mr. Rehnberg’s 1983 testimony. With respect to Senato

regarding J. D. Rehnberg ‘s statement. ‘This funding sho&U. in tum, resulted 

development testing, cut backs on critical support hardware, intemption in cer

effom, and in general, operational inefficiencies, ”the following is submined. 

Mr. Rehnberg has reviewed the testimony presented to Congressman Volkme

16,1983. He has also reviewed Congressman Volkmer’s letter dated May 

Perkin-Elmer to provide specific data pertaining to the status of the Hubble Space T

to our role on the program. We were asked to furnish information regarding fut

schedule risks. The comment regarding the elimination of developmtmt testing was 

in the testimony entitled Factors Affecting Program Growth. At uui pomt in tim
challenges of manufacturing and coating the primary and secondary 

testimony dealt with efforts then on-goin such as the Optical T

integration and test flow, the developnent of%e Fine Guidance Senso

of these two main items. Previous funding limitations and extreme prog

the elimination of development testing of subsystems as the OTA w

defd to later verification when the OTA was integrated with the 

Lockheed. 

OTA vibration, acoustic and thermal vacuum tests at Perk

accomplished at the “all up” systems level at Lockheed. A Fine Guid

also deleted to save cost and schedule, but, at Perkin-Elma insistence

subsequently designated a refuhished engineering model to be upgrad

Mr. Rehnberg believes the statement in context, taken with the co

clearly describe the intent at that point in time to delineate difficulties w

not with tests of mirror design and manufamre. 

2. Additional details regarding quality assurana. With respect to Sena

the details of how the Perkin-Elmer qualify control personnel function

lk e quality conml process of the HST program included the approv

designation of mandatary inspeaion points, the review of polished mirr

of test readiness reviews, the establishment of aperational readiness in

the system of engineerin changes, cmfigudon control, and material 

is desmibed in detail as !OOLLOWS. 

A. Formal procedures were developed by the Contractor’s eng

organizations, and then sequentially and independently approv

organization, the NASA on-site QA representative and, for certah type

Space Flight Center QA organization m Huntsville. 

B. Mandatory inspectlon points were identified by the contra

submitted to the local NASA QA for approval. The local NASA QA th

inspection points wouldrequireNASAinspectioninadditiontothecon

inspection by NASA was assigned to the local Defense Gmtract Adm

C. The review of polishedmirrortest data, involving interfmgram

was accomplishedbymntractorandNASApersanelqualifiedtointe

on-site QA function for the polished mirror tests was performed by 

designee. 

I). Test Readiness Reviews (TRR) were established and chai

organization to make sure that people, procedures and equipnent 

operations that involved the moving of the primary mirror. The local N

always in attendance or was represented. Both the contractor’s QA org

QA representative could dictate aaion items to be resolved before tte 

had to concur on the resolution of those items. 

E. Operational Readiness Inspeaions (Om were established and c

organization to make sure that people, procedures and equipment were 

augmented the local QA with additional representatives from Marshal

tests. The NASA QA team was led by a QA person fran Marshall in 

contractor’s QA and NASA QA could dictate action times to be reso

organizations had to concur on the resolutionF. Quality audits were conducted periodically from 1979 on. The

QA representative as well as additional NASA persmd tlaveling in 

Center. 

G. Engineering changes, configuration control and material r

independent approvals by the contractor’s QA organiul$on and the N

In addition, I would like to clarify one matter. I have now spoken 

who were actively involved in the Hubble program frun 1977 to 1982 

these discussions, it appesrs that the tolerances of the Hubble mirror

reliable test was me using the type of optics I briefly described in my te

a laser an interferometer and a reference optic called a null lens. T

consultants from the scientific cunmunify followed those tests and 

believed that other, less precise test were necessary. 

While it now appears that other tests may have revealed the appar

Hubble mirror I am not aware of any evidence that judgments made in 

were not sound. I am concerned in reading the-transcript of my testim

it may have implied that I and others at the Company now believe that 

of the mirrors were unsound. As I said in my prepared statement, that 

the final assessment on this issue must await tit ore detailed fact f

colleagues. 

uality control persm on the scene, the following is submitted. 
If I can provide the Subcunmite with any furrher information, I would be plea

Sincerely, 

Senator GORE. Thank you both for your statements. And let m

behalf of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the fact that you are in th

your answers to our questions here today will necessarily be co

limited base of knowledge, in that you have not completed your re

I think it is also worth saying that all Americans should be awar

outstanding and excellent contributions these two companies have m

years to our national security and space proms,, to a wide vari

that have benefitted all Americans. 

I personally, Mr. Bullcin, put a statement in the record on the floor 

recently about the SR-7 1 program, just to pick one example. Here y

many years did that opeme-twenty? 

Mr. BULKIN. 20-some-odd years. 

Senator GORE. 27 years, I believe, flawlessly and came in be

above specs. Then, on its final retirement mission on the way to the 

in an offhand way, set the world speed record. I thought that was a 

And Per&-Elmer, now Hughes Danbury, has similar accomp

extraordinary excellence under its belt. To the employees of both c

me say that this inquiry into what actually went wrong with the H

not lessen their pride in what has been accomplished in both comp

years. 

But now let us get to the business at hand of how this could 

wrong. You were in the room when we questioned the witnesses 

earlier, I take it Is that correct? 

Mr. RICH. Yes, we were. 

SeMtOi GORE. In the exchanges concerning the Hubble, is there 

you would like to challenge or correct based on what you hear

example, that it is my understanding there were two bidders for the 

the telescope itself; the Perkin-Elmer Company, now Hughes D

Kodak, out of Rochester; and that both companies brought differen

the contest; and that Kodak, because of its expertise iri optics 

included in its bid an emphasis on some of the areas of strengt

whereas you included a little more emphasis on some of the areas of 

Perkin-Elmer had. I guess the pointing precision is something th

felt like you could do better than Kodak. And that was seen as the ma

of the Hubble, and NASA decided that -that is fair to say, is it no

Mr. RICH. That is fair to say. 

Senator GORE. NASA probably looked at your strength in that a

reason for awarding you the contract. Is that fair to say? Mr. RICH. I would say that was a heavy evaluation factor on the p

Senator GORE. That is probably a better way to put it than the w

the meaning is the same. 

And yet, because of Kodak’s strength in the optics part of it, they 

in their bid, and were more able to include in their bid, a provisi

assembly test of the completed telescope prior to launch. Is that co

Mr. RICH. Senator, unfortunately, I found out something here t

is that Kodak did put in their bid a final assembly test. So that is new 

to me. 

Senator GORE. Okay. Because of the bidding procedures a lot 

from the other bidders. 

JOHN C. RI

of attempting to find out exactly what went wrong, and we do un
Mr. RICH. Because of the bidding procedures. 

Certainly, 1 do not have the visibility of the other bidder

know. 

Senator GORE. They did. 

Let me ask you why you did not include in your bid 

assembly testing? 

Now, my overview of it leads me to believe that the re

did not has to do with the different experiences and 

companies. But focusing in on the decision by Perkin

Danbury, not to include in its bid a provision for final ass

you feel it was not necessary to do a final assembly test? 

Mr. RICH. hobably it would not do well to speculat

your question I do not have as part of my repertoire. I 

similar to the way that Dr. Fisk commented, that I 

costbenefit analysis on the cost of doing such a final test 

judgments and decisions made at that time. 

But just to repeat, I do not know for a fact at this stag

decisions made in that bid. 

Senator GORE. Let me state openly here that the cost of 

and facility for same included in the Kodak bid was$lO mi

not $150 million, but $10 million on a project that turned 

If you could have done a final assembly test for $10 

retrospect you would do it now. But going into it, tha

reasonable investment? 

Mr. RICH. I would say so. 

Senator GORE. It is not clear to me, that Hughes Danbury 

a final assembly test for as little as that. But the philos

decision not to perform a final assembly test is what I re

am given to believe that you had a different approach to t

ways more sophisticated than what other companies coul

of your pride in that sophistication, you really felt that t

component could be done so well that it was not nec

assembly test. 

Do you know enough at this point to respond to that a

Mr. RICH. Senator, my review of the proposal we mad

course I can sit down and read, did in fact point out the 

which we test in& i,iual mirrors and the test equipment a

we use. And tha~ has a strong point as we made that pro

Again, inforniation about the detailed tradeoff of tha

do not have the benefit of those analyses. 

Senator GORE. Now, assuming for a moment that the S

in its investigation so far in determining that this decisio

at the time the bids were opened, to your knowledge, du

of the telescope, did NASA ever raise with you the possib

test prior to their acceptance of the completed telescope? Mr. RICH. TG my knowledge, they never raised that fo

Senator GORE. Well, that leaves hanging the next q

informal discussion of whether or not that might be a go

Mr. RICH. The informal discussions, again, follow

Lennard Fisk earlier, that that subject was reviewed an

times. How far back in the program I do not know. Bu

familiar with the program people spoke occasionally of 
in the line of Lennard Fisk's comments, these were discussio

carried beyond that to my knowledge. Senator GORE. Were there people within your company who f

be a good idea to conduct a final assembly test? 

Mr. RICH. A good idea? Yes, I would suspect there are seve

thought it would be. 

Senator GORE. No, I am not Wng about in retrospect. I m

times these informal discussions took place, were there people in 

who felt at that time that maybe this should be added? 

Mr. RICH. Let me fry to answer it in the following way. If I w

now and bring various people into the room who were in the prog

and asked them, I would probably get several people who wou

always thought it would be a good idea. 

'Senator GORE. Okay. That is a candid and fair answer. I app

Mr. Bulkin, I am a little unclear about the relationship betwee

Perkin-Elmer, now Hughes Danbury. Did your company have 

delivering the completed telescope to NASA for launch? 

Mr. BULKIN. No, Senator. We were an associate contractor, a

Perkin-Elmer at that time was responsible directly to Marsha

Center, as we were. And we had very little dealings with the inte

testing of the optics themselves, just as the total optical telescop

delivered to Lockheed. 

Senator GORE. What was your responsibility under the contra

all of the parts of the full project? 

Mr. BULKIN. That is correct. We had the support systems mo

a primary development effort; and we had the requirements to 

interfaces with NASA. Since we were dealing with associate con

no direct authority to the other contractors; only through NASA. 

our primary role. 

Senator GORE. Is that your understanding of it also, Mr. Rich

Mr. RICH. Yes it is. 

Senator GORE. So the primary responsibility for determining t

was adequately tested and ready for launch rested with Hughes 

Mr. RICH. That is correct. 

Senator GORE. Who created the criteria for deciding how m

adequate? Did your company do that, or did NASA do that? 

Mr. RICH. Let me try it this way. NASA basically sent out a 

the program in the '76-'77 time frame. We respond to that with a 

in turn outlined our approaches to making things and to solving 

process of accepting that proposal, and subsequent ne

developments from that, it was a process, generally, of the com

how we would do things and NASA approving those processes 

Senator GORE. So according to that model, you essential

criteria for adequate testing and NASA approved your proposa

Mr. RICH. I believe that would have been the case. 

Senator GORE. Those criteria were created, at least in prelimi

the bid was submitted, correct? 

Mr. RICH. That is correct. 

Senator GORE. Were those criteria formally reviewed after 

awarded? 

Mr. RICH. Let me assume they were. I do not know for a f

easily checked. But in a program like this, it would be highly 
criteria were not reviewed regularly several times during th

yearsofthe rogram. 

the wrong word, but it is the best I can come up withe a m

it makes sense to have a final assembly test on a system lik

do you agree with that? 

Mr. RICH. In retrospect, it is easy to agree with that. 

Senator GORE. As I said when the NASA witnesses were h

it now, if there was one mistake that could be corrected 

occurring, it would be the decision by NASA not to require 

as an essential part of the criteria for what constituted ade

think I understand why Perkin-Elmer did not submit that. A

candid statement that in retrospect, you wish you ha

responsibility fairly lies with NASA in the constructio

approved. 

Of course, as-and I do not want to put words in your m

fair to say that Perkin-Elmer Hughes Danbury wishes it had 

criteria, and NASA wishes it had either approved it under 

or required it itself. 

Senator GORE. Let me ask both of you, are you fairly co

that the problem does lie in one or both of the mirrors? 

Mr. Bum. I believe so. 

Mr. RICH. I think we have seen a very open and prompt 

and results by NASA, and 1 believe they are zeroing in on 

have no reason to argue with the assessments they are ma

may seem. 

Senator GORE. Most people seem to be concluding it is th

there reason for thinking that it is probably the primary 

secondary mirror and that it is probably the primary mirror a

them? 

Mr. RICH. There is no particular reason to think that that 

primary mirror is harder to make than the secondary. It is l

data that NASA is trying to get out of the spacecraft now 

camera which might help pinpoint that a little better becaus

images. So maybe we will see. I think that is what Dr. Fisk 

Senator GORE. Okay. 

Mr. Bulkin, just because the primary mirror is larger a

make, is that the reason why most people seem to be assu

that is where the problem is? 

Mr. Bum. I believe so. 

Senator GORE. All right. Mr. Rich, how did your compa

quality control personnel? Did they come and visit your pla

with your employees and asking questions? Did they subm

Did they come and spend time with you? Can you give m

how that relationship unfolded? 

Mr. RICH. Yes. To the degree that I am able to find out in

from my personal memories, in the 1979, 1980, 1981 tim

basically three Marshall people in our plant full-time. At le

a full-time quality person. In addition to that, Marshall 

Defense Contract Administration Service, who resides in 

them during those times. 

Senator 8 ORE. I stated earlier that, as a matter of philos
Further, whenever there were major events, major pieces of har

completed, major reviews, major certifications taking place, NASA 

their staff in our plant in that time frame with people from Huntsvil

Senator GORE. How many people did they have in that office 

basis, again? 

Mr. RICH. In that time frame they had three, one of whom wa

quality person, one was basically the manager of the operation, and 

was an engineer who served in quality assurance functions of th

operations. So they had a lot of attention on quality activities and a lo

on the floor activities and a lot of attention on the certification of t

going on. 

Senator GORE. Now when they ballooned the number of perso

critical stages, that number of three would go up to what? 

Mr. RICH. When they ballooned, which was notreally until 1983, 

if 1 wrote it down here, went from-let’s see. If my memory serves m

ended up with about 25 people on site. 

Senator GORE. Now there have been reports that some of the 

scientists and outside experts asked by NASA to review this proce

the mirrors were being made had said they were often over

overwhelmed by the task and did not rigorously check crucial tests 

mirror manufacturer. I am quoting from an article by William B

Tuesday’s Washington Post with that particular point. 

Does it surprise you to hear that, or does that conform with you

their experience? 

Mr. RICH. It does not particularly conform to my memory, but the

group to ask than I. 

Senator GORE. Well, we will ask them. 

According to William Fastie, an optical expert at Johns Hopkin

one of the scientists appointed to monitor the polishing process-d

him? 

Mr. RICH. Yes, I do. 

Senator GORE. He said Perkin-Elmer had “more autonomy than 

have” and went on to say that you had “a sweetheart deal”. 

Why would he say that? 

Mr. RICH. Well, I saw that comment, and that comment distu

disappointed me. 1 do not know why he would say that. 

Just to pick up a little bit on the questions you asked previous

relationship with the NASA people, that relationship was a

professional and very serious. They were a very demanding custome

on the floor and during the certification processes. So I am surp

comment. 

Senator GORE. Now you know John Renberg? 

MR. RICH. Yes, I do. He reports to me, by the way. Senator GORE. He reports to you? 

Mr. RICH. Yes, he does. 

Senator GORE. He testified seven years ago that there was the e

development testing. What did he mean by that? 

Mr. RICH. This ssue was raised, of course, on June 24 I I the he

the subcommittee, and so I took a minute to talk to Mr. Rciiberg. T

and his statements at that time really had to do with the develo

development problems associated with the fine guidance sensor an

structural work and some of the latches for the science instrument
Mr. Renberg told me that those comments did not re

1980 and 1981 time frame, so that concern and that cr

issue. 

Senator GORE. That was not a mirror issue? 

Mr. RICH. That was not a mirror issue. 

Senator GORE. What about the cutbacks on crit

interruption in certain developmental efforts an

inefficiencies? Did none of those refer to the mirror op

Mr. RICH. My understanding from my conversation

Renberg is that the 1979, 1980 and 1981 time frame 

criticisms as was the 1982 and 1983 time he. 

Senator GORE. You said you have an independen

quality control? Mr. RICH. That is correct. 

Senator GORE. How many people in that departme

Hubble mirrors? 

Mr. RICH. During the 1979, 1980 and 1981 ti

approximately eight people associated with the program 

the quality conaol department. Senator GORE. Did they coordinate their efforts with 

person on the scene? Did they carry out their work in

their relationship like with the NASA quality control sp

Mr. RICH. I Cannot testify from personal observation 

probably should not speculate. I have no reason to think 

the most professional and the most proper. But I would 

a better answer, if I could, later. 

Senator GORE. Well, I am not really getting at ques

or propriety. I have no reason to question that. But I am 

of how the working relationship functioned, and if you 

that matter for the record. 

Mr. RICH. I would much prefer to do that rather than 

Senator GORE. That would be fine, if you could supp

would be very interested in it. 

Now at our first hearing on June 29, Dr. Fisk indica

structure with which NASAoversaw the Hubble was no

involved, poor communications between the dif

contractors. I do not want to put words in his mouth. Th

the essence of his testimony was. 

And then you have the scientist I quoted earlier say

autonomy”. You say you do not know why he said tha

Could it be that the loose and poorly coordinated mana

NASA could have resulted in more autonomy for Perkin

Mr. RICH. I will give you my personal opinion base

knowledge, but understanding of people and repom I 

The relationship that was criticized earlier by NA3A 

centers, and I think implied in some of the things Dr. 

for associate contractor relationships. He also got some 

Mr. Thompson. 

Senator GORE. Right. 

Mr. RICH. The relationship we had with Marshall w

We had a contract with them, and we understood who th

understood who the contractor was. So I guess I am wal

plant? 
I do not think that perception of loose management or loose 

structure in any way implied loose management per se. 

Senator GORE. Well, in conclusion, let me ask both of you one f

First of all, no, one penultimate question for you, Mr. Rich. T

Connecticut News Times reported a couple of days ago, I guess, th

know-how to catch optical aberrations because of past work, et ce

did not use it for some reason. I take it you challenge that charac

do you? 

Mr. RICH. Well, let us find out what the problem is, first, before 

it down and state all the facts and the conclusions and so forth

question we know what optical aberration is; we know what spheri

is--well, period. Senator GORE. Let me ask the final question of both of you. 

through this proceeding. You are familiar with the hearing that we 

And a certain understanding, a certain picture of what happened 

of this. Is there any part of that you would like to challenge? Do y

the view we are getting of this is somehow off or unfair, biased ag

picture somehow? Is there some facet of this you would like to ch

on what you have heard today? 

Mr. RICR No. I do not believe so. I think it is remarkable, th

quality of information you are getting from all sources. 

Senator GORE. Mr. Bulkin. 

Mr. BULKIN. At the risk of possibly minimizing a couple of the c

were made, you know the initial idea not to test end-toend proba

good idea. However, it was an inexpensive idea at the time. I am su

a major role. The $10 million, I cannot even discuss on how they 

for $10 million. But, with the requirement on the telescope bein

wave, that test procedure and process would have been very exp

time, it appeared that you could do it by analysis, it could be done

There were many things that were done by analysis. We qu

sub-systems by analysis without actually having to perform tests b

cost involved. If it were done correctly, it probably would have fo

A test naturally would have found the results, and the test did not h

exotic to find the problem that we have today, although the test at 

of it would have been a very expensive test set up, because it w

been looking for a gross error. It would have been looking for a pre

job, and a figure in the mirror. 

So, the testing of this instrument, including the fine guidance s

telescope, not considering the optics portion of that, and the perfo

telescope other than the optics, is going extremely well, and 

incorrectable problem that we have, and I think it can be corrected 

by the NASA witnesses earlier, and we are confident that it can b

You know, we are as disappointed as anybody as far as the resu

imagine. Our experience h been, you know, that you always test 

test, but when test processes get to be very expensive, you have to 

versus risks. 

Senator GORE. So, there are really two impressions that have co

two days of hearings thus far, that you would like to challeng

painting the Hubble as deep a tragedy as it seems to be. You wou

by pointing out again, that the Space Telescope probably can be f

lose up to three years worth of science on a major part of it, but i

be fixed, assuming the shuttle fleet gets back up and all that, whic

so, you would challenge that part of the impression that comes ou
And secondly, you would say that in your opinion, $10 

unreasonably low figure for what it would have cost to do 

I said earlier I do not think Perkin-Elmer could have done 

the bid figure for the facility to do it by the other bidder. N

of performing the test, maybe that is not in that figure. I d

to go back and check that. But even if it was double that 

something that would certainly seem reasonable in retrosp

should have seemed advisable at the time. 

I think, and I said earlier, that it is not as if the nati

complicated optical system in orbit. There are all kinds o

not going to characterize what has been done in the classi

say again, it is my understanding that we have always req

test, always, except with the Hubble. You do not challen

Mr. BULKIN. No. 

Senator GORE. All right. With that, let me just say in c

continue our investigation of this matter. I am ask

Subcommittee to interview a number of witnesses, incl

quality control personnel within the company and wit

manufacture of the mirrors. We do want to learn as much 

went wrong and why, as an effort to rebuild confidence in 

with that, our hearing will stand adjourned. Thank you 

coming today. 

Wereupon, at 3: 15 o’clock, p.m., the subcommittee 

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