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POPULAR UPRISING IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 17, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Burns, Hon. William J., Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC .......................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by: 

Senator Robert Menendez ......................................................................... 37 

Senator Johnny Isakson ........................................................................... 38 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 4 

(III)

(1) 

POPULAR UPRISING IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 

THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, 

Corker, and Rubio. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. Good morning, 

everybody. Happy St. Patrick’s Day to all and welcome to this hearing on the Mideast—on events within the Mideast. 

And I am particularly pleased, the committee is particularly 

pleased to welcome here one of our most able and distinguished 

diplomats. And he will be discussing what is obviously one of the 

most pressing regions of concern and one of the areas of greatest 

consequence to the foreign policy of the United States at this particular moment in time. 

Under Secretary Bill Burns has served in the Foreign Service for 

nearly 30 years, including as Ambassador to Jordan, Russia, and 

as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. And in the years 

that I have served on the committee, I am sure Senator Lugar 

shares this and Senator Corker, I think he is one of our more capable diplomats, Foreign Service professionals that we have had the 

occasion to be able to work with. 

I thank you, Mr. Secretary, for making time to be with us today 

when we know that you are enormously pressed and we look forward to your filling us in on the inspiring and troubling events that 

are unfolding in the Arab world. 

From the experiences that you have had in Jordan and elsewhere 

in the Near East as Secretary, clearly you have as strong a perspective on the changes that are sweeping across the Middle East 

as anybody, and we are fortunate to have your experience at this 

historic moment. 

In 2 short months we have seen stirring triumphs in Tunis and 

Tahrir Square, unprecedented protests in Sana and Manama, brutal crackdowns in Tripoli and obviously concerning events unfolding with respect to Benghazi now. And these uprisings clearly constitute one of the most remarkable, momentous developments of 

2 

our time. They also present a huge challenge for all of us, for the 

people of the region and for America’s relationship with the people 

in the region. 

So how we respond, as I said yesterday in comments I made at 

the Carnegie Endowment, how we respond is really going to shape 

our strategic position with respect to the Middle East as well as 

how people in the Middle East and around the world, and particularly Muslims, are going to see us. And I think it will shape that 

view for years to come. 

Clearly the remarkable transition that took place in Egypt, the 

events of Tahrir Square, that transformation was a victory, above 

all, for the people of Egypt. They did it. And they did it in a most 

amazing way. But, it was also a victory for democrats, small ‘‘d’’ 

obviously, democrats around the world, because it showed that 

political change, even change of that level of consequence, can be 

brought about peacefully. 

If this now can be translated, the liberation that has taken place 

in Egypt can be translated, and Tunisia, into lasting democracy, 

then the entire new Arab Awakening is going to carry a vital message, and that is that ordinary people can take their future into 

their own hands and have the ability to be able to command it, 

have a huge impact and determine for themselves how they are 

going to be governed. 

I want to also underscore, and again, I pointed to this yesterday 

but I want to repeat it, because I think it is an important concept, 

that the developments of Egypt and Tunisia represent a huge blow 

against extremism. A successful democracy in Egypt will demonstrate that al-Qaeda’s belief that change requires the cowardly 

violence of terror is wrong and it will weaken the position of states 

like Iran that repress their own people and use terrorist organizations to advance their interests. 

Also, just as we did in Eastern Europe immediately after the fall 

of the Berlin Wall, I think we have the ability to play a hugely constructive role in what happens and how events unfold in the Middle East and we can affirm the values of democracy as well as 

serve the larger strategic interests of our friends and allies, and of 

the people of these countries as well as ourselves by seizing this 

moment and recognizing the opportunity that it presents. And that 

is why I am working with Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman 

on legislation to support these new and fledgling democracies in 

that region. 

I call people’s attention to the SEED Act. In 1989 it was signed 

by President George H.W. Bush, and it was legislation that was 

aimed at helping governments reform out of the autocracies that 

they once were. Well similarly, we want to do that. We want to 

help governments reform their security sectors, build transparency, 

strengthen the rule of law and help their leaders incorporate the 

aspirations of their people into the day-to-day work and life of 

those countries. 

Ultimately we want to support the transition to democratic rule 

in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as these other countries that are still 

struggling, and we want to encourage movement toward democratic 

reform in the Middle East as a whole. 

3 

Our approach to the Middle East I think—I think this may be 

stating the obvious, but the obvious doesn’t always get translated 

into reality around here and it needs to. Our policies toward the 

Middle East are going to have to change. For decades we were 

driven by our—purely, mostly by our addiction to oil, foreign oil. 

And democracy and human rights were frankly overshadowed to 

some degree by the political realities created by that economic and 

addictive reality. And too often over the past decade we saw regimes in the region chiefly as tools in the fight against terrorism, 

while looking away from abuses that we knew were unconscionable. Yes, we would raise them privately, myself included, but the 

result was that we had relationships that focused mostly on leaders 

rather than people. That is part of the price we pay, folks, for our 

energy paradigm that we are locked into. 

I have said for years that we would liberate American foreign 

policy if we could liberate ourselves from that dependency. And so 

now we cannot afford to continue to simply see the Middle East in 

the context of 9/11, we have to see it in the context of 2011 and 

of this changing reality. 

As the people of the region demand reform our approach to the 

region has to embody the core values of our country. And at the 

most basic level that means that we have to be consistent in encouraging governments everywhere to respond to the hopes and 

needs and rights of their citizens. We need to emphasize the programs that will strengthen our engagement with people, which is 

one of the core objectives of the legislation that we’re working on. 

So, does that mean you have a cookie-cutter approach to every 

country? The answer is, ‘‘No’’; every country is different. Egypt isn’t 

Jordan and Jordan isn’t Libya and nor are any of them Bahrain or 

Saudi Arabia. Each has its own culture, its own sectarian realities. 

But we have to push back, in all cases, against a consolidation of 

power that has bred economic stagnation, corruption, popular dissatisfaction and governments that are really, in many—in some 

cases, quite divorced from the needs, concerns, and hopes of their 

people. We need to encourage the establishment of institutions that 

translate the will of the people into action and that promote transparency and accountability. 

Now, obviously the story coming out of the Arab world today is 

not all good news. So we will be especially interested in the 

Secretary’s views on the troubling events unfolding in Libya and 

Bahrain. In Libya, after the brutal attacks on his own people, by 

Colonel Qaddafi, has been completely discredited as a leader by 

every other—certainly by most of the friends and allies of the West 

as well as Arab countries—the Arab communities having spoken 

out in a rather remarkable way in the last weeks. 

The international community cannot simply watch from the sidelines as the Libyan people’s quest for democratic reform is met 

with violence. The Arab League’s call for a U.N. no-fly zone is an 

unprecedented signal, a rather remarkable transformation and 

statement that the old rules of impunity for autocratic leaders don’t 

stand. 

But time is running out for the Libyan people. The world needs 

to respond immediately, the United Nations Security Council 

should act now, today, to pass a resolution that the United States 

4 

has shown real leadership in helping to craft, that would provide 

the range of options necessary to avert a humanitarian disaster. 

And whatever the final outcome, Qaddafi has no legitimacy to govern, will have no legitimacy to govern, he will govern, if he does, 

by force and force alone, and the will of the Libyan people, in my 

judgment, will ultimately prevail. 

In Bahrain, soldiers backed by helicopters and tanks have 

cleared Pearl Square. But it is clear, violence will not solve the 

underlying problems of Bahrain, it will in fact most likely make 

them worse and it risks a regional escalation. So we urge the parties to engage in the national dialogue that is so critical to chart 

a path forward of real reform. 

Under Secretary Burns, I know that you have given an awful lot 

of thought, and are now, to each of these issues over many years. 

So we look forward to hearing from how you think the situation in 

the region is developing and how the United States ought to 

respond to it. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. I join the chairman in welcoming Secretary 

Burns. I am very pleased that the Foreign Relations Committee is 

engaged in this timely meeting to discuss the challenges stemming 

from the upheaval that has swept the Middle East over the past 

3 months. There has been dramatic change, but we are only at the 

very beginning of a long process. 

How these movements develop and coalesce into organized political parties and how the governments of the region respond to their 

citizens’ demands, will impact the United States interests for decades. There is a long-term opportunity for a more peaceful, stable, 

and prosperous Middle East as a result of this popular movement, 

but we have been encouraging more representative and tolerant 

governance throughout the region for many years. As Americans, 

we should honor those in the region who are speaking out in 

defense of values that we hold dear. 

At the same time we should acknowledge that the movements 

are not about us. Our response needs to reflect this reality, and 

should encompass a broader public debate about the goals and limits of the United States role in the Middle East, especially as it 

pertains to potential military intervention. 

During the last 2 weeks, I have expressed my deep concern that 

discussions of the United States policy options in the Middle East 

have focused on a no-fly zone or other military intervention in 

Libya. Clearly the United States should be engaged with allies on 

how to oppose the Qaddafi regime and support the aspirations of 

the Libyan people. But given the costs of a no-fly zone, the risks 

that our involvement would escalate, the uncertain reception in the 

Arab street of any American intervention in an Arab country, the 

potential for civilian deaths, the unpredictability of the endgame in 

a civil war, the strains on our military, and other factors, I am 

doubtful that United States interests would be served by imposing 

a no-fly zone over Libya. 

5 

With roughly 145,000 American troops still in Iraq and Afghanistan and with a budget that, according to the President’s own proposal, will carry a deficit of approximately $1.5 trillion this year, 

we have to recognize that war spending is especially difficult to 

control. In this broad context, if the Obama administration decides 

to impose a no-fly zone or take other significant military action in 

Libya, I believe it should first seek a congressional debate on a declaration of war under article I, section 8 of the Constitution. 

I also have made the point that if American forces go to war in 

Libya, we should ask Arab League governments and other governments advocating for American military action to pledge resources 

necessary to pay for it. This is not unprecedented. More than $50 

billion in foreign contributions were received to offset United States 

costs in association with the first gulf war in 1991. 

Beyond the civil war in Libya, it is important for our country to 

focus on the transitions in Egypt and Tunisia, security in the Persian Gulf, and the potential impact the instability is having on our 

efforts to counter terrorist threats, particularly emanating from 

Yemen. 

I am concerned that there has not been sufficient discussion and 

debate about the constitutional reforms needed in Egypt, and that 

reports indicate only the former ruling party and the Muslim 

Brotherhood have come out in favor of the proposed referendum, to 

be held in less than 48 hours. I appreciate that the administration 

has encouraged the Egyptian Government to seek election help 

from groups like the International Foundation for Electoral 

Systems. Elections are difficult to organize. They require planning 

and technical expertise. From my own experience monitoring democratic transitions, as far back as the Philippine People Power Movement in the 1980s, I can attest to the importance of getting 

elections right. Egyptians will make their own decisions, but I hope 

we are doing everything possible to give them the tools to be 

successful. 

Similarly, it is important for us to support Tunisia’s transition. 

We must not forget that the wave of popular movements was 

sparked by a Tunisian example, and the establishment of a stable, 

democratic Tunisia would similarly reinforce the power of peaceful 

protest. In the midst of their own political challenges, the 

Tunisians have made remarkable contributions to the safety and 

well-being of refugees fleeing the violence in Libya, and they 

deserve our support. 

Developments this week in Bahrain are a cause of concern. The 

deployment of Saudi forces to Bahrain is reportedly designed to secure vital infrastructure. What are the prospects for meaningful 

dialogue between the government and the opposition? Not only will 

events in Bahrain affect the wider Persian Gulf region, but that 

country hosts a critical United States naval presence, vital to ensuring freedom of navigation. 

We must remain vigilant in the fight against terrorists who seek 

to kill Americans. The most recent attempted terrorist attacks on 

United States soil have come not from Pakistan or Afghanistan, 

but from Yemen. How is the administration reacting to continuing 

instability in Yemen? What are the implications for our fight 

against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? I will appreciate, as 

6 

will all of our members this morning, the insights of Secretary 

Burns on these very difficult issues and we look forward to our discussion. 

I thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY 

FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, good 

morning and thank you very much for this opportunity to appear 

before you again. 

Less than 3 months ago a desperate Tunisian street vendor, tired 

of too many indignities and too many lost hopes, set fire to himself 

and sparked a revolution still burning across an entire region. That 

single act, at once tragic and noble, has brought the Middle East 

to a moment of profound transformation as consequential in its 

own way as 1989 was for Europe and Eurasia. It is a moment of 

enormous promise for people and societies long denied freedom and 

dignity and opportunity. It is a moment of great possibility for 

American policy. A moment when the peaceful, homegrown, nonideological movement surging out of Tahrir Square offers a powerful repudiation of al-Qaeda’s false narrative that violence and 

extremism are the only ways to affect change. 

But it is also a moment of considerable risk, because there is 

nothing automatic or foreordained about the success of such transitions. Helping to get them right is as important a challenge for 

American foreign policy as any we have faced since the end of the 

cold war. 

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the starting point for sensible 

policy is to understand clearly what is at play and what is at stake 

in the Middle East today. The revolutions that began in Tunis and 

in Cairo are not about us, they are about the brave, proud, and determined people of Arab societies intent upon better governance 

and more economic opportunities, intent upon erasing the disconnect between the rulers and the ruled that for so long had been 

so stifling for so many. And they are about the universal values 

that the President spoke about 2 years ago in Cairo, the right of 

peaceful assembly, freedom of speech, and the right to determine 

one’s own destiny. 

The most intense impression I had 3 weeks ago, after visiting 

Tahrir Square and meeting youth leaders, was the remarkable 

sense of public empowerment. It is fueled by a communications revolution that stripped governments of their old monopoly on the flow 

of information, made people more aware of what others had in 

other societies that they didn’t and helped them mobilize without 

central leadership or conventional political organizations. 

If the indigenous energy and drive of the new Arab Awakening 

is its most potent ingredient, it is also a vivid reminder that stability is not a static phenomenon. Political systems and leadership 

that fail to respond to the legitimate aspirations of their people become more brittle, not more stable. Popular pressures to realize 

universal values will take different shapes and different societies, 

7 

but no society is immune from them. Political systems are a little 

like bicycles, unless they are peddled forward they tend to fall over. 

The long held conceit of many Arab leaders was that there were 

really only two political choices, the autocrats you know or the 

Islamic extremists you fear. That proposed a convenient rationale 

for blocking real political outlets or broaden participation and it ultimately produced the spontaneous combustion of Tahrir Square. 

The inconvenient truth is that many, if not most of us involved 

in American policy in the Middle East in recent decades have 

sometimes fallen prey to that same conceit. We recognize the tinder 

that was accumulating in the region, the combustible mix of closed 

systems and corruption and alienation and indignity, documented 

so eloquently in the Arab Human Development reports. We tried 

to drive home that concern to leaderships in the region, but we 

didn’t always try hard enough. So it is good to apply a little humility as we enter this new era unfolding before us. 

The honest answer, also, is that as much as it is in our long-term 

interest to support the emergence of more transparent and more 

responsive governments, who will ultimately make stronger and 

more stable partners, the short term is likely to be pretty complicated and unsettling. As in other democratic transitions in other 

parts of the world, there is a danger of authoritarian retrenchment, 

especially if economic stagnation persists and newly elected leaders 

don’t produce practical improvements in people’s daily lives. 

Successful transitions are about a lot more than just elections. 

Institutions have to be built, too, with checks and balances and an 

independent media to hold people accountable. There will be plenty 

of vulnerabilities to exploit and no shortage of predatory extremists 

ready to take advantage. And there will be plenty of hard tradeoffs for American policymakers with popularly elected governments 

sometimes taking sharper issue with American policies than their 

autocratic predecessors did and elections sometimes producing 

uncomfortable results. 

None of that argues for pessimism, in my view, although it is a 

fact that the Middle East is a place where pessimists rarely lack 

for either company or validation. I actually see considerable cause 

for optimism in what is underway in the region. I am not naive, 

and nearly three decades of experience in the Middle East have 

stripped me of most of my illusions, but there is no mistaking the 

very real opportunities before us if we employ a thoughtful, carefully integrated strategy. 

The key to a successful strategy, it seems to me, is to make common cause with people and leaders in the region, as well as our 

partners outside it, in pursuit of a simple, positive agenda. We 

should contrast that with the fundamentally negative agenda of 

violent extremists who are much better at describing what they are 

against than what they are for, at describing what they want to 

tear down, rather than what they want to build up. 

Beyond our obvious interests in developing greater energy independence and leading by the power of our own democratic example, 

there are at least four main elements for such a positive agenda. 

First is support for peaceful democratic change. In countries that 

are taking decisive steps away from old systems and toward democracy, we have a deep stake in stable transitions. Secretary Clinton 

8 

emphasized our commitment to Egypt’s success, in Cairo earlier 

this week, underscoring the hugely important demonstration affect 

of Egypt’s experience for the rest of the region. The Secretary 

stressed that same reality in Tunisia today, noting that no one will 

ever forget where this wave of change began. 

In countries where protests have emerge, but change is uncertain, such as Bahrain, we will continue to urge serious political reform as well as urgent, peaceful dialogue between governments and 

opposition leaders. In countries working to stay ahead of the wave 

of popular protests, such as Jordan and Morocco, we will continue 

to emphasize the importance of taking reform seriously now as a 

way of creating positive avenues of citizen engagement and avoiding sharp conflicts later on. And in the sad and violent case of 

Libya, we are working hard to maximize international pressure for 

Qaddafi’s departure and to support the courageous Libyans who 

have risen up to regain their rights. 

Following the Arab League’s important and unprecedented call 

for urgent measures to protect civilians in Libya and establish a 

no-fly zone, we are pressing for a new U.N. Security Council resolution to authorize a range of further actions against the Qaddafi 

regime. 

A second element, closely connected to the first, is strong support 

for economic modernization. In the short run, that means helping 

Egypt and Tunisia, for example, to navigate past significant difficulties created by political turmoil and the temporary collapse of 

tourism. But that also means thinking boldly and ambitiously 

about how we can promote genuine long-term modernization. We 

strongly support the Enterprise Fund that you, Mr. Chairman, and 

Senators McCain and Lieberman have proposed. Secretary Clinton 

just announced that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 

OPIC, will provide up to $2 billion to stimulate private sector investments in the Middle East and North Africa. 

It is also crucially important to consider trade liberalization initiatives for key Arab States in transition, ideally in cooperation 

with the European Union. In the process we can help encourage 

intraregional trade and integration in a region in which both are 

in short supply. We can help produce private sector jobs desperately needed to keep pace with demography and expectations. 

And we can help spread the benefits and opportunities of economic 

growth across Arab societies rather than just to a narrow circle at 

the top. 

The success of political transitions will require strong, practical 

economic results and creating a sense of economic hope. Much of 

that obviously depends on Arab countries themselves who need to 

put themselves in a better position to compete in a very 

unsentimental global marketplace, but it is deeply and urgently in 

our self interest to do all that we can to help. 

The third element of a positive American agenda for the Middle 

East is renewed pursuit of comprehensive Arab/Israeli peace. The 

status quo between Arabs and Israelis is no more sustainable than 

the sclerotic political systems that have crumbled in recent months. 

Neither Israel’s future as a Jewish democratic state, nor the legitimate aspirations of Palestinians can be secured without a negotiated two-state solution. While it is a truism that only the parties 

9 

themselves can make the hard choices necessary for peace, there 

is also no substitute for continued, active American leadership. 

A fourth element is our own huge and enduring stake in regional 

security, in strengthening ties to the GCC states, in fighting terrorism and preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons and 

setting off a catastrophic regional arms race, in not losing sight of 

Iraq’s own critical democratic transition and reintegration into the 

Arab world. We have to remain clear-eyed and resolute about the 

threat that Iran’s behavior poses across a number of areas and 

equally straightforward in our support for the aspirations of Iranian citizens for freedom and dignity. 

Beneath Tehran’s bluster the truth is that nowhere in the region 

is the disconnect between rulers and ruled any greater than it is 

in Iran. It is the height of hypocrisy for Iran’s leaders to profess 

their enthusiasm for democratic changes in the Arab world while 

systematically denying them to their own people. 

Mr. Chairman, this is one of those moments that come along only 

very rarely in the course of human events. It is full of historic opportunities and some very large pitfalls for people in the Middle 

East and for the United States. It is a moment which demands our 

attention and our energy and as much creativity and initiative as 

we and our partners around the world can generate. 

I look forward very much to working closely with you and Senator Lugar and the members of the committee in the weeks and 

months ahead. 

Thank you, once again, for the opportunity to appear before you 

today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF UNDER SECRETARY WILLIAM J. BURNS

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you again. 

Less than 3 months ago, a desperate Tunisian street vendor, tired of too many 

indignities and too many lost hopes, set fire to himself and sparked a revolution still 

burning across an entire region. That single tragic act, has brought the Middle East 

to a moment of profound transformation, as consequential in its own way as 1989 

was for Europe and Eurasia. 

It is a moment of enormous promise for people and societies long denied full freedom and dignity and opportunity. It is a moment of great possibility for American 

policy, as well as a moment when the peaceful, homegrown, nonideological movement surging out of Tahrir Square offers a powerful repudiation of al-Qaeda’s false 

narrative that violence and extremism are the only ways to effect change. The result 

of all these reform movements could be greater peace, democracy, and prosperity in 

the region, which would advance all of our interests. But is also a moment of considerable risk, because there is nothing automatic or foreordained about the success 

of such transitions. Helping these countries’ reformers to achieve their goals is as 

important a challenge for American foreign policy as any we have faced since the 

end of the cold war. 

While the spark that launched the Tunisian revolution was a spontaneous act 

born of one individual’s feelings of frustration and disenfranchisement, the underlying regional demographic, economic, political, and environmental challenges he 

faced remain a longstanding concern of ours. The Middle East faces the profound 

problem of a massive youth bulge coming of age in an environment without economic or political opportunity. Youth unemployment in some cases is greater than 

30 percent. Many college-educated urban youth are unable to find jobs. Widespread 

corruption and lack of free speech fuel a sense of individual disenfranchisement, a 

sense shared across the region. The revolutions that began in Tunis and Cairo are 

about the brave, proud, and determined people of Arab societies, intent upon better 

governance and more economic opportunities, intent upon erasing the disconnect between the rulers and the ruled that for so long has been so stifling for so many. 

10 

And they’re about the universal values that the President spoke about 2 years ago 

in Cairo—the right of peaceful assembly, freedom of speech, and the right to determine one’s own destiny. 

If the indigenous energy and drive of the new Arab awakening is its most potent 

ingredient, it is also a vivid reminder that stability is not a static phenomenon. 

Political systems and leaderships that fail to respond to the legitimate aspirations 

of their people become more brittle, not more stable. Popular pressures to realize 

universal values will take different shapes in different societies, but no society is 

immune from them. As Secretary Clinton said, ‘‘the challenge is to help our partners 

take systematic steps to usher in a better future where people’s voices are heard, 

their rights respected, and their aspirations met. This is not simply a matter of 

idealism. It is a strategic necessity.’’ 

The long-held conceit of many Arab leaders was that there were really only two 

political choices—the autocrats you know or the Islamic extremists you fear. That 

provided a convenient rationale for blocking real political outlets or broadened participation, and it ultimately produced the spontaneous protests in Tahrir Square 

and elsewhere throughout the region. We have long recognized the tinder that was 

accumulating in the region, the combustible mix of closed systems and corruption 

and alienation and indignity documented so eloquently in the Arab Human Development Reports. We tried to drive home that concern to leaderships in the region, with 

President Obama underscoring in his June 2009 Cairo speech that nations that protect universal rights are ultimately more stable, successful and secure. Secretary 

Clinton left no room for ambiguity when she warned regional leaders in Doha earlier this year that they needed to embrace reform or see the sands shift underneath 

their feet. At the same time, successive administrations have sought cooperation on 

crucial shared priorities, such as combating terrorism, curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, promoting Middle East peace, and securing stable energy supplies. 

As much as it is in our long-term interest to support the emergence of more transparent and more responsive governments, who will ultimately make stronger and 

more stable partners, the short term is likely to be complicated and maybe even unsettling. As in other democratic transitions in other parts of the world, there is a 

danger of authoritarian retrenchment, especially if economic stagnation persists and 

newly elected leaders do not produce immediate practical improvements in people’s 

daily lives. Successful transitions are about a lot more than just elections; institutions have to be built too, supportive policies, effective checks and balances, and an 

independent media to hold governments accountable. 

There will be plenty of vulnerabilities, and no shortage of predatory extremists 

ready to exploit them. And there will be plenty of hard tradeoffs for American policymakers, with popularly elected governments sometimes taking sharper issue with 

American policies than their autocratic predecessors did, and elections sometimes 

producing uncomfortable results. 

Secretary Clinton just returned from Egypt and Tunisia; in both countries, she 

listened to the concerns and goals of civil society, political activists, and government 

officials, and emphasized the enormous importance we attach to their success in 

building new democratic and durable political structures. In responding to the 

changes in the region, we are guided by clear core principles. We support the universal right to freedom of expression, association, and speech, as well as to be free 

from fear of harassment, reprisal, intimidation, and discrimination. We oppose violence as a tool for political coercion. We support the right of each country to determine its own path, recognizing the unique context of each situation. We believe 

political transitions should be deliberate, inclusive, and transparent, with a broad 

and inclusive dialogue that engages women, minorities, and people from all religious, economic, and social backgrounds. 

The key to a successful U.S. strategy is to make common cause with people and 

leaders in the region—as well as our partners outside it—in pursuit of a simple, 

positive agenda. U.S. assistance and leadership has a crucial part to play in meeting 

the crescendo of challenges in the Middle East and North Africa. Whether building 

international support for the swift and unanimous imposition of strong sanctions on 

Colonel Qadhafi and those who still stand by him—imposing a travel ban, an assets 

freeze, and an arms embargo—or securing the unprecedented recommendation of 

the Human Rights Council for suspending Libya’s membership from the Council as 

well as a consensus decision of the U.N. General Assembly to suspend Libya, which 

is the first time any country has been suspended from the Council—U.S. interests 

have been enhanced in multilateral channels. 

The first element of our approach to the Middle East is support for peaceful democratic change, reflecting the very different situations that are unfolding. In countries 

that are taking decisive steps away from old systems and toward democracy, such 

as Egypt and Tunisia, we have a deep stake in stable transitions. As the traditional 

11 

bellwether for the Middle East—politically, economically, and culturally—Egypt’s 

success is vitally important to the region and to us. We will continue to support civil 

society voices urging the immediate lifting of the Emergency Law and encouraging 

real oversight of the new National Security Agency, in the wake of Egypt’s very 

positive decision to dissolve the discredited State Security Investigations Agency. 

We support a thoughtful sequencing of a constitutional referendum and elections 

that will provide the time and space necessary to allow political parties to organize, 

build support, and campaign—which we also see as critical steps in helping the 

Egyptian people truly have a choice when they turn out to vote. We acknowledge 

the Egyptian military’s valuable role in overseeing the transition process and look 

forward to continuing three decades of cooperation with that institution. We will 

hold its leaders to their commitment to genuine reform in Egypt. The same holds 

true in Tunisia, a middle-income country with an educated population and tradition 

of tolerance, where we can provide important support in strengthening civil society, 

the media, and the understanding of a sound framework for elections. 

In countries such as Bahrain and Yemen, where we are witnessing escalating protests but change is uncertain, we will continue to press vigorously for serious political reform as well as productive dialogue between governments and opposition leaders. This is particularly critical in Bahrain, where there can be no military solution 

to the lack of trust across Bahrain’s sectarian divide. This is not just a simple matter of restoring law and order, but addressing real political grievances. Aggravating 

sectarian divides will only lead to decreased security over the long term. A focused 

dialogue that produces meaningful constitutional reforms addressing the legitimate 

grievances of the Shia population would be a defeat for those, including Iran and 

al-Qaeda, seeking to co-opt regional sectarian strife for their own benefit. The stakes 

are high. In Yemen, terrorist violence from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

threatens the security and well-being of the Yemeni people, the broader Arabian 

Peninsula, the United States homeland, our friends and allies. Declining water and 

petroleum resources, a fractured polity that few have confidence in, an underdeveloped civil society, and institutions too weak to mediate competing tribal and 

regional demands make combating terrorism and promoting sustainable development that much more difficult. The international community must promote dialogue 

and reforms that will set the stage for a Presidential election in 2013, in which 

President Saleh has pledged not to participate. 

In countries working to stay ahead of the wave of popular protests, such as Jordan and Morocco, we will emphasize the importance of taking reform seriously now 

as a way of creating positive avenues of citizen engagement and avoiding sharp conflicts later on. As always, timely reform is the best possible antidote to subsequent 

upheaval. Both King Abdallah and King Mohammed have announced significant reform initiatives. In Morocco, these include a popularly elected Prime Minister with 

greatly enhanced powers; a fully independent judiciary; strengthened Parliament 

and civil society; greater public accountability and other measures to combat corruption; more institutionalized protections for human rights and civil liberties; significant transfers of power from appointed administrators to elected municipal and 

regional officials; and institutionalized protections for Amazigh (Berber) rights. In 

Jordan, the King has called for new laws that will yield a more representative 

Parliament and facilitate the formation of new political parties. Implementing these 

reforms in a credible and transparent manner will build confidence and credibility 

in both governments as agents of responsible change. 

And in the sad and violent case of Libya, we are working hard to maximize international pressure for Qadhafi’s departure, and to support the courageous Libyans 

who have risen up to regain their rights. We also worked tirelessly for the adoption 

of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970, which required the freezing of assets of 

Qadhafi and several family members and banned their travel, as well several other 

key Libyan leaders. At the same time, the United States froze the assets of the Government of Libya. We are now moving as rapidly as we can in New York to see if 

we can get additional authorization for the international community to look at a 

broad range of actions. As the President stated, all options remain on the table. At 

the same time, we are working with our partners to identify and disrupt the flow 

of mercenaries into Libya, in order to deny Qadhafi another weapon against his own 

population. We will continue to respond to the humanitarian crisis unleashed by 

Qadhafi, with our $47 million in emergency relief providing food, water, shelter, 

medical supplies, and evacuation assistance to those fleeing the violence. 

A second element of a successful U.S. strategy, closely connected to the first, is 

strong support for economic modernization. In the short run, that means helping 

Egypt and Tunisia, for example, to navigate past significant difficulties created by 

political turmoil and the temporary collapse of tourism. In Egypt, for instance, it 

means helping the authorities sustain, and build popular support for, the hardVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:21 Aug 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\031711-G.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
12 

fought structural reforms of the last decade that produced 7 percent annual growth 

rates and $10 billion a year in foreign investment, while also helping to extend the 

benefits of economic growth to all parts of Egyptian society. Not only in Egypt, but 

across the region, economic growth needs to be restored in a way that provides opportunity to the young, the unemployed, and those who have not been part of the 

formal economy. In the longer run, that also means thinking boldly and ambitiously 

about how we can promote genuine modernization. 

We strongly support the Enterprise Funds for Egypt and Tunisia that you, Mr. 

Chairman, and Senators McCain and Lieberman have proposed. Secretary Clinton 

just announced that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation will provide up 

to $2 billion to stimulate private sector investments in the Middle East and North 

Africa. In addition, the U.S. has established unique outreach efforts under the State 

Department’s Global Entrepreneurship Program to catalyze private and public resources in building an effective ecosystem for innovation and business startups. 

It is also crucially important to consider the expansion of trade opportunities for 

key Arab States in transition, including trade liberalization initiatives, ideally in cooperation with the EU, to help the Arab world compete globally, provide education 

relevant to market needs, create an environment conducive to private sector investment, and alleviate poverty among large segments of the population. In the process, 

we can help encourage intraregional trade and integration in a region in which both 

are in short supply. The U.S. is actively engaging with Egypt, for example, to address outstanding issues in order to expand the Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) program, which allows duty-free entry to the U.S. for Egyptian products. Through initiatives like this, we can help produce private sector jobs desperately needed to keep 

pace with demography and expectations. And we can help spread the benefits and 

opportunities of economic growth across Arab societies, rather than just to a narrow 

circle at the top. 

The success of political transitions will require strong, practical economic results, 

and creating a sense of economic hope. Much of that obviously depends on Arab 

countries themselves, who need to put themselves in a better position to compete 

in a very unsentimental global marketplace. But it is deeply and urgently in our 

self-interest to do all that we can to help. 

A third element of a positive American agenda for the Middle East is the pursuit 

of comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. The status quo between Arabs and Israelis is 

no more sustainable than the sclerotic political systems that have crumbled in recent months. Neither Israel’s future as a secure Jewish, democratic state nor the 

legitimate aspirations of Palestinians can be secured without a negotiated two-state 

solution. While the parties themselves must ultimately make the hard choices necessary for peace, there is also no substitute for continued active American leadership. We continue the persistent, day-in-and-day-out, high-level American engagement, working privately with all parties to create an environment for resumed, 

meaningful and substantive negotiations on all core issues. We are committed to ensuring that political changes on Israel’s borders do not create new dangers for Israel 

and the region, and we welcome the Egyptian leadership’s rapid and repeated reaffirmation of its international treaty obligations. 

A fourth element is our own huge and enduring stake in regional security—in 

strengthening ties to the GCC states; in fighting terrorism; in preventing Iran from 

developing nuclear weapons and setting off a catastrophic regional arms race; in 

maintaining our partnership with Iraq as Iraq goes through its own crucial democratic transition and reintegration into the Arab world. We have to remain cleareyed and resolute about the threat that Iran’s leaders pose across a number of 

areas—and equally straightforward in our support for the aspirations of Iranian citizens for freedom and dignity. The truth is that nowhere in the region is the disconnect between rulers and ruled any greater than it is in Iran. The hypocrisy for 

Iran’s leaders to profess their enthusiasm for democratic changes in the Arab world 

while systematically denying them to their own people is clear to all, including Iranian citizens. 

Working with Congress and our international partners, we will continue to intensify efforts to hold Iran accountable for its persistent failure to comply with its obligations under 6 UNSC resolutions and 10 IAEA Board of Governors resolutions. 

Iran’s refusal to enter into a constructive dialogue with the P5+1 helped forge a 

strong international consensus behind the toughest set of U.N. Security Council resolutions to date. Working with the EU, Australia, Norway, Japan, Canada, and 

South Korea, we have tightened those sanctions further. Even as we have left the 

door open to engagement, we have sharpened the choices confronting the Iranian 

leadership. Since July 2010, we have designated 90 entities and 25 individuals for 

their involvement in and support of Iran’s nuclear program and terrorist activity. 

We have also designated 10 individuals for their involvement in human rights 

13 

abuses in Iran, and along with a number of other member states, we strongly condemned Iran’s record at the Human Rights Council. Finally, we have used the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act to disrupt Iran’s energy sector by sanctioning one of Iran’s most important oil companies. Sanctioning 

this firm, which secures much of Iran’s foreign investment and supplies of refined 

petroleum, has chilled its relationships with foreign traders and investors. We have 

also secured the withdrawal of five major international oil companies from Iran 

using CISADA’s special rule provision. With the drying up in Western energy investment in Iran, we have denied the regime the profits, the technology, and the 

know-how that comes with it. 

Mr. Chairman, this is one of those moments that come along only very rarely in 

the course of human events. It is full of historic opportunities, and some very large 

pitfalls, for people in the Middle East, and for the United States. It is a moment 

which demands our attention and our energy, and as much creativity and initiative 

as we and our partners around the world can generate. I look forward very much 

to working closely with you and Senator Lugar and the members of this committee 

in the weeks and months ahead. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well thank you, Mr. Secretary. We are delighted 

to have you, as I said. 

How would you characterize the progress to date and the process 

as it goes forward in Egypt, with respect to the military council? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think Egyptians have made 

remarkable progress in recent weeks, especially when you consider 

that it was only a little less than a month again that the Mubarak 

era ended. The military and the Supreme Armed Forces Council 

has played a responsible role. We have in place a new transition 

government that I think has widespread credibility amongst the 

population. A few days ago the Egyptian leadership took the significant step of disbanding the state security apparatus which was 

a long-held demand of the youth activists and many of those in 

Tahrir Square. And as Senator Lugar mentioned earlier, there 

have been amendments drafted in the Constitution, a referendum 

scheduled in a few days for Egyptians to vote on that. 

Having said all that, I think Egyptians themselves recognize that 

there are a number of challenges before them. As you look at experiences around the world and Senator Lugar mentioned the Philippines, it takes time and space to organize new political parties 

and so elections require very careful preparation, especially for the 

Parliament and that’s a theme that many thoughtful Egyptians 

have stressed and Secretary Clinton discussed that when she was 

in Cairo a couple of days ago. 

The CHAIRMAN. Did she get a response from them with respect 

to the timing? 

Mr. BURNS. I think there is a discussion that is going on within 

the leadership about, you know, how best to sequence these steps. 

Obviously these are decisions that Egyptians themselves have to 

make, but I think they are weighing carefully all of those considerations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’m going to be there on Sunday and I will 

be meeting with them and I hope we can weigh in and encourage 

that. I think the advisability of having the Presidential race before 

the parliamentary race is obvious and everybody I have talked to 

seems to indicate that that would be better, but it is not certain 

at this point. Is that correct? 

14 

Mr. BURNS. No, sir. I think that is an issue that the Egyptians 

are still debating amongst themselves, but it is a healthy debate 

that is going on. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. What is your sense of the degree to which 

the civil society, which has always been present but under the 

radar screen in Egypt, to what degree is it now surfacing with— 

I mean what is the level of robustness of that and the energy within it? What do you sense? Are people seizing this moment? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think Egyptians are seizing it with enormous 

pride and enthusiasm. And it is very hard not to come away from, 

not just Tahrir Square, but discussions with Egyptians, especially 

youth leaders, civil society activists, and not feel not only impressed but their feeling of optimism about what is possible in 

Egypt. 

You know, as I said, there are a number of challenges on the 

road ahead but I am convinced that Egyptians are entirely capable 

of solving those problems and building the kind of political system 

that they deserve. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you share with us, I know it is not the place 

to go into all of the specifics, but Secretary Clinton met with 

Mahmud Jibril, the representative of the Libyan opposition. And 

many people have been sort of saying, well who is the opposition 

and so forth. Can you describe that a little bit—what her conclusion was or the State Department’s sense of that meeting and the 

opposition itself, perhaps? 

Mr. BURNS. Well the Secretary had a long and quite thorough 

discussion with Mr. Jibril and I think came away impressed with 

his seriousness. We are familiar with a number of the other members of the Libyan National Council and have been similarly impressed, at least with those with whom we have spoken, about 

their commitment to building a stable Libyan society. We are still 

in the process of trying to talk to other members of the council and 

developing a clearer picture, so I don’t want to pretend that we 

have a full picture in which we have total confidence. But we have 

been impressed so far with, you know, what they’ve said, about 

what their ambitions are and what their sense of how the outside 

world can help. 

The CHAIRMAN. And what kind of future are they describing to 

you for Libya? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, what they have described, at least so far, is a 

future in which they want to build democratic institutions, a secular future for Libya in which, you know, the broad range of 

Libyan citizens are able to participate in a way that they haven’t 

been for the last four decades. So it is easier, certainly, to paint a 

picture like that than it is to construct a new system. But, in terms 

of what they have said to us, it has been generally positive. 

The CHAIRMAN. What is the impact of the French recognition of 

the opposition? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, what we are focused on, Mr. Chairman, is, you 

know, much more the building of practical ties to the Libyan 

National Council, quite apart from the formal issue of recognition. 

We have authorized the Libyan National Council to open a representative office in Washington—— 

15 

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I’m not suggesting that we do that. I am 

not at all suggesting, I am just asking what the impact is on the 

thinking of some of our allies with respect to the events unfolding 

and the ability to try to put pressure on Qaddafi, et cetera, as we 

go forward. 

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think it is a step along side the practical 

measures that we and others are taking with the Libyan National 

Council to enhance their credibility and to underscore the importance of building an alternative future for Libya. 

The CHAIRMAN. What do you understand the situation to be now 

with respect to Qaddafi’s forces in Benghazi? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, it is a very fast moving situation, as you know 

very well. Qaddafi’s forces have made significant strides on the 

ground, over the course of the last 24, 48 hours. I believe they are 

only about 160 kilometers from Benghazi right now. So the situation is very fluid, but they have made advances, taking full advantage of their overwhelming military—or superiority in military firepower, at least. 

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that is principally articulated 

through a certain number of tanks and a certain number of artillery pieces. Is that correct? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes. In addition to the capabilities of the Libyan Air 

Force. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. And the Air Force, there have been I think 

slightly less than 20 but somewhere in that vicinity of sorties per 

day? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, sir; I think that is right. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. With respect to the situation in Bahrain, it 

has obviously taken a dangerous turn in the last couple of days. 

What is your sense of the ability now of the Crown Prince to convene a meaningful national dialogue given the violence that has 

taken place and the movement of Saudi troops into Bahrain? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is obviously a very complicated situation. I mean we have strongly supported, we continue 

to strongly support the Crown Prince’s efforts to begin a serious national dialogue. We have urged both the government and the opposition parties to engage in that dialogue. 

As Secretary Clinton said yesterday, we and many others around 

the world are alarmed and troubled by the situation we see and we 

have continued to emphasize that there is no security solution to 

the legitimate aspirations of Bahraini citizens, that there has to be 

a political solution which you can only arrive at through dialogue. 

And that is a point we are going to continue to emphasize, particularly when we see excessive use of force against demonstrators. 

And we have continued to call on all parties, including hard-line 

oppositionists to avoid violence. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have any leverage besides our voice? Is 

there any—I mean if you connect the dots, are there ways in which 

you believe we have an ability to be able to have an impact or are 

we kind of on the sidelines watching? And if so, what do we do 

with respect to the balance of the principles that we espouse with 

respect to Tahrir Square versus now? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, Mr. Chairman, we are committed to applying 

those universal principles in every situation that emerges, whether 

16 

it is in Bahrain or any place else. As I said in my opening remarks, 

in the case of societies like Bahrain where protests have begun, 

change is still uncertain. We are going to continue to do everything 

we can. We are not the only voice in this, there are others in the 

international community voicing similar concerns, to urge a resumption of political dialogue, the dialogue the Crown Prince has 

tried to start. Because that is the only way, I think in which you 

can produce the kind of outcome that Bahraini’s deserve. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Burns, I’m very much concerned, as my opening statement pointed out, not only about recent events in Libya or Bahrain 

or Yemen, but likewise about potential United States involvement 

in any of these situations and the conditions in which we could 

become involved. 

We had long discussions in this committee before our participation in Iraq, for example. One can say that undertaking was of a 

different magnitude altogether, but the idea was to overthrow the 

regime of Saddam Hussein and to bring about a democratic Iraq 

as a shining symbol in the Middle East. 

Now we are at a point in which, as I understand it, our Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, is quoted as saying yesterday, ‘‘We are interested in a broad range of action, which would 

protect civilians and halt the killings.’’ She said the Security Council needs to, ‘‘be prepared to contemplate steps that include but go 

beyond a no-fly zone.’’ 

One press account says that the draft resolution introduced by 

the British and the French contains controversial language authorizing, ‘‘all necessary measures,’’ to protect civilians. This could be 

interpreted as permitting strikes against government ground forces 

and the use of combat forces on the ground in Libya. 

Now, I mentioned the Arab League endorsement of the no-fly 

zone in my opening statement. The Arab League in its statement 

reportedly opposed any ‘‘foreign intervention’’ in Libya. The Arab 

League later noted that its approval of a no-fly zone would expire, 

‘‘at the end of the crisis,’’ whatever that may be defined as. 

I mention all of this simply because I want to ask you precisely 

what authorities are we seeking in New York? Assuming the Security Council would vote in favor of the resolution, whether it is supported by the French or the British or ourselves, what role do you 

envision the United States military forces and, separately, those of 

other countries, having to play? 

And furthermore, the President has not yet really spoken directly 

to United States national interests at stake in Libya, aside from 

our opposition to Qaddafi and the protection of innocent civilians. 

Does the President plan to spell out what our national interests are 

in Libya that might justify the use of our Armed Forces? 

And finally, there is at least a report that Qatar and the United 

Arab Emirates have agreed to participate in a no-fly zone. Does 

this Arab commitment include financial support of this operation, 

which will be expensive? Even the no-fly zone alone, without the 

no-drive zone or the rest of it, is expensive. We’re having huge debates every day on the floor of the Congress about our national 

17 

budget and yet this seems to proceed in a manner entirely divorced 

from this. It will not be that way for long. 

So, I ask you all of this in one set of questions because of the 

constraint of time. But could you explain, generally, what the administration’s view is? 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar and those are 

all very fair concerns and very fair questions. 

I’d make several points in response. First, as I said we and others in the international community have been increasingly concerned, over the course of the last few days, with what is developing in Libya. The Secretary General of the United Nations 

warned yesterday of the dangers of a true humanitarian catastrophe, given the past behavior of Mr. Qaddafi and his regime. 

Second, as you said, the Arab League, last Saturday, took a quite 

important and unprecedented step when it called for the United 

Nations to authorize measures to protect civilians in Libya, including a no-fly zone. Since that time we have been working actively 

in the Security Council to pursue such a new resolution, which the 

Lebanese, along with the British and French, have put forward. 

And as Ambassador Rice described yesterday, among the options 

that are being discussed today are measures including a no-fly 

zone, but not limited to that, to protect civilians from bombardment 

by Qaddafi’s forces. 

I don’t know what the Security Council ultimately is going to 

produce. We are working hard to try to produce a serious resolution 

and produce it quickly, given the pace of events on the ground. 

We have emphasized, in addition, two things. The first is that we 

want this to be an international response with authorization from 

the Security Council. We are not seeking a unilateral effort here. 

And second, beyond the statement that the Arab League issued, we 

are interested in active Arab partnership in such an effort, both in 

the measures that would be taken and also, potentially, in the 

financial support for them. And those are discussions that we have 

begun, including with particular Arab States that have expressed 

an interest and a willingness to participate in this. 

My final comment would simply be to emphasize that I know the 

President and Secretary Clinton take very seriously the importance 

of continued close consultation with the congressional leadership on 

these very important issues and I know the White House will remain in touch with the congressional leadership on this in the days 

ahead. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, let me then be more direct in terms of congressional consultation. That is important and certainly welcome. 

My view is that there should be considerably more than that. There 

should be congressional participation. Specifically, if we are going 

to declare war against Libya, then we ought to have a congressional declaration of war. Now what I question is, Is the administration authorized, constitutionally, to simply proceed into a conflict in Libya involving American forces without a declaration of 

war? 

We have unfortunately, I think, participated in some wars in recent years in which there was not a declaration of war by the Congress. I would like to prevent that from occurring again. And I 

think we are on the threshold, not only with regard to Libya but 

18 

also the stream of civil wars currently taking place in the region. 

Now is it our policy, generally, that the administration might simply participate in select civil wars on behalf of what it believes is 

the best interest of the country by simply citing humanitarian concerns? What is your view about the congressional debates and a 

declaration of war against the sovereign State of Libya, if that is 

our intent? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, I’d say two things, sir. First, I agree with you 

that we need to be extraordinary careful in how we approach these 

kind of situations and we also need to approach them with a sense 

of humility about our role and our influence. And the President and 

Secretary Clinton and others have been very, very careful in how 

they have looked at the situation that has emerged in Libya as well 

as elsewhere in the region. 

That is why we have attached so much emphasis to making this 

an international response authorized by the U.N. Security Council 

and attach so much importance to active Arab partnership, not just 

declarations, in any such effort. 

So I agree with you, we need to be very, very careful on these 

issues. And I understand the seriousness of the concern you raised 

about the nature, not just of consultation but of efforts between the 

administration and the Congress and I will convey that very 

directly to Secretary Clinton and the White House. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Under Secretary Burns, thank you for being here, for your great 

service to the country. 

I wanted to ask, in light of the previous questions you’ve answered about the region I want to ask you about two places in particular, one is Iran and one is Lebanon. 

First of all, with regard to Iran, we know that last year we made 

tremendous progress, not just here in Washington, but in other 

parts of the world as well, to get sanctions in place. I wanted to 

ask you about ways that the administration either is planning to, 

or believes we should, increase our ratchet up the sanctions on 

Iran. And I know, on page seven of your testimony, the bottom of 

that second full paragraph, you talk about the impact of sanctions 

and some of the results. I’d ask you to speak to that. 

But then second, how do we, on a parallel track, but even as important, how is the administration going to continue to support the 

democratic opposition, domestic opposition, sometimes known as 

the Green Movement, even as we are implementing and I hope, 

increasing sanctions? 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you very much, Senator Casey. 

As you know, as we have discussed before, we are continuing to 

work very hard to apply the unprecedented sanctions which are 

already in affect against Iran, building on the platform of U.N. 

Security Council Resolution 1929, but also making full use of our 

own new national laws, as well as what the European community 

has done. And I think we’re making significant progress in that direction and we’re going to continue to push quite hard, I think it’s 

had an impact on the capacity of the Iranians to attract new investment in their energy sector, it has had an impact on what is 

19 

already a very badly mismanaged Iranian economy. So we are 

going to continue to press very hard on that front. 

With regard to human rights and the rights of Iranian citizens 

to the same kind of freedom and dignity and opportunity that you 

see sweeping across the Arab world, as I said, it really is the height 

of hypocrisy for the Iranian leadership to on the one hand applaud 

those kind of steps in the Arab world and at the same time deny 

those same rights to their own people. We have designated 10 senior Iranian officials, just over the course of the last few months, for 

human rights abuses and that is a process that we are going to 

continue. 

As you know, we will continue to try to apply, constructively, assistance in expanding Internet freedoms, for example, for Iranian 

citizens to help them find their voice and pursue the kind of rights 

that people elsewhere in the region are pursuing right now. 

Senator CASEY. And I appreciate that answer. It seems as if everywhere you look in the region you see the impact that Iran is 

having. The regime is having an impact, just by way of one example, Hezbollah and the destabilizing impact that has on Lebanon 

and the region, Hamas, wherever you look you see Iranian fingerprints, Afghanistan, Iraq. So I would urge the administration to do 

everything possible to increase sanctions, even as the ones that are 

authorized now are being implemented. 

Let me move, and I know we don’t have a lot of time, but I 

wanted to move to the question of Lebanon. I was there in July. 

It is remarkable, just my own sense of it, but it is remarkable the 

heavy presence in that country and especially in Beirut that 

Hezbollah has, almost as if it is an organized crime force that has 

a really intimidating influence on leaders. You are in a meeting 

with a government official, you just mention the word Hezbollah 

and you can see them almost physically recoiling or becoming 

tense. 

We know what has happened, we know that there is a transition 

going on, Prime Minister Hariri is out and they are in a transition 

phase. I guess in light of that change and the destabilized environment, and in light of the direct threat that Hezbollah presents for 

the region, for our own security, what assurances, what checks can 

we put in place, as Members of Congress, to make sure that when 

the administration comes to us and says, we have been aiding the 

LAF, the Lebanese Armed Forces and want to continue that dollars 

don’t get in the hands of forces that we don’t want to end up in 

or that Hezbollah will use our dollars. The administration has a request for 2012 of $2271⁄2 million, what assurances can you provide 

us and what checks do we have to make sure that those dollars 

don’t aid and abet and benefit Hezbollah? 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you very much, Senator. 

We have a number of safeguards and end-use checks in place 

now to ensure that equipment and training that we provide to the 

Lebanese Armed forces, which does play a very important stabilizing role as a national institution in Lebanon, are used properly 

and the way that we intend them to be used. And we are continuing those training and equipment programs as the new Lebanese Government is formed. 

20 

As you know, Prime Minister Makati is still in the process of 

forming that government. And we have made clear that we are 

going to review our assistance program once that government is 

formed, once we see what its program is and its policy statements 

are. 

We have made clear to the Prime Minister-designate that we will 

judge him and his government by their actions not just their words. 

He said that he is committed to a unity government that reflects 

the views of the wide spectrum of Lebanese. He said that he is 

committed to fulfilling Lebanon’s international obligations. And as 

I said, we are going to judge by the actions that flow from that. 

So once a new government is formed, you know, once its platform 

is made clear, then we will take a very careful review of our assistance program in light of that. But in the meantime we will continue to apply the safeguards and end use monitoring mechanisms. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary Burns 

for your great service to our country. 

The declaration war question that was asked by Senator Lugar, 

I noticed that was not answered and in other hearings I’ve been in 

I notice people have been moving way beyond the no-fly zone saying that in essence that really isn’t enough to protect civilians and 

now people are beginning to talk about a no-drive zone, which obviously means a whole different level of engagement. 

So, I would just like a yes, no. Does the administration believe 

that if we are going to have a military effort of any kind in Libya, 

that we need a declaration of war by Congress? It is a yes, no 

answer. 

Mr. BURNS. Senator, I can’t give you a yes, no answer, what I 

can tell you is that we take very seriously the concern you raised 

and I will certainly convey it to Senator Clinton and the White 

House and we will be in very close touch with congressional leadership. 

Senator CORKER. Was that a legal question that we need to ask? 

Or I mean it is a—— 

Mr. BURNS. No, it is—— 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. I mean it seems to me it is a 

pretty clear cut yes, no. I mean do you all feel that you need to 

come to us for a declaration of war or not? 

Mr. BURNS. It is—— 

Senator CORKER. I mean you have to be talking about that, I 

know. 

Mr. BURNS. Right. No; it is a very important question, I can’t 

answer it for you right now, honestly. But we certainly owe you an 

answer to that. I understand. 

Senator CORKER. It seems like it would be a very important 

answer if we are having serious dialogue with the United Nations 

over committing forces there. 

I mean you know, the other thing that has been sort of interesting to me as we have had other briefings in classified settings 

and in not classified settings, but no one seems to know who the 

opposition is. I mean can you tell me who it is we would be joining 

21 

forces with on the ground or anything about their ideology or what 

their goals are? 

Mr. BURNS. Well Senator, as I mentioned before, we have had a 

number of contacts with the members of the Libyan National Council, which was formed relatively rapidly in Benghazi a few weeks 

ago. Secretary Clinton met with Mahmud Jibril one of the—— 

Senator CORKER. I understand about the meeting, but do we 

know, from those meetings, I’m no really worried about the chain 

of events, but do we know who the opposition is? Do we know what 

their goals are? 

Mr. BURNS. We do have a sense from those—the leaders with 

whom we have met in the Libyan National Council that their goals 

seem to be to try to create a democratic system in Libya, a secular 

symbol, that they seem intent upon realizing the rights that Libyans are seeking. They are looking for outside help in that effort. 

But as I said before in response to the question from the chairman, you know, we are still in the process of trying to develop as 

full a picture as we can. Based on the meeting we have had so far, 

that is the picture that we have had. 

Senator CORKER. Would it be good to—before committing U.S. 

troops and military action and money—would it be good to sort of 

know more fully who it is we are coming to the aid of? 

Mr. BURNS. I think we are developing a pretty clear picture, but 

certainly we are trying to flesh out that picture as fast and as comprehensively as we can. 

Senator CORKER. Are there potentially other extremist groups 

that are coming into the area to fight against Qaddafi that may in 

fact be the very people we dislike greatly? Is there a chance that 

we actually could be aiding the efforts of extremist groups who are 

potentially involved in the area? 

Mr. BURNS. There is certainly the potential that extremist groups 

could try to take advantage of this or extremist fighters could, and 

we are very well aware of that. On the other hand, I think there 

is also a very real danger that if Qaddafi is successful on the 

ground that you also face, you know, a number of other considerable risks as well, the dangers of him returning to terrorism and 

violent extremism himself, the dangers of the turmoil that he could 

help create at a very critical moment elsewhere in the region. But 

we are very mindful of the risks that you mentioned about extremists taking advantage of this. 

Senator CORKER. So in light of that, I know Senator Lugar asked 

the question about national interest, could you, I know the President hasn’t yet stated what our national interest is, but could you 

give a stab at that? 

Mr. BURNS. Sure. I think we have first, part of our national interest is avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Libya. That is not 

something that is shared only by the United States, that is why 

there needs to be an international response with active Arab participation. Second, I think at a moment of truly profound change 

across the region, what we have an important national stake in, is 

in demonstrating in places like Egypt and Tunisia where people 

are moving in a positive direction, that those transitions succeed. 

But in places like Libya where there is a real danger of increasing 

violence and turmoil and repression, that the international commuVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:21 Aug 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\031711-G.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
22 

nity, the Arab world as a part of that, stands against that kind of 

an outcome. 

So what is at stake here, in terms of American interests is about 

more than just Libya, it seems to me. 

Senator CORKER. And the genesis of what happened, what is 

happening right now in Libya you consider to be similar to what 

has happened in Egypt then, because again, it seems to me we had 

a much better sense of what was causing activities in Egypt and 

it seems to me we have a very vague sense of that in Libya. But 

your judgment is that it is driven by the same things? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, sir. My judgment is that it is the same aspirations of people to realize their human rights that is at the core of 

what is driving the situation in Libya right now. Libya has always 

been a much more opaque society for us or anybody else, including 

in the Arab world, to understand compared to a place like Egypt. 

So you are right, there are a lot of question marks but I think, honestly, that what is driving this is the same aspirations that you see 

elsewhere in the Arab world today. 

Senator CORKER. And do we have a sense of what China and 

Russia might do at the Security Council as it relates to Libya? 

Mr. BURNS. It is hard to predict, sir. You know, they have some 

concerns, I think, about some of the measures that are being debated right now. And it is a debate that has literally gone on as 

we speak. 

Senator CORKER. And is it your judgment that, like I think, most 

people that we have heard from recently, that at this point a nofly zone really does no good with Qaddafi and his troops being 

where they are. So really we wouldn’t be talking about a no-fly 

zone unless we were just trying to act as if we had done something, 

we would really talking about much more than that, aren’t we, 

really dealing with the tanks that are on the ground, moving into 

civilian populations? I mean that is really what we would have to 

be talking about unless we were just trying to act like we were 

doing something. Is that correct? 

Mr. BURNS. That is exactly why, in the Security Council right 

now the debate is about measures that include a no-fly zone but 

go beyond it. I think a no-fly zone can have an important, positive, 

practical effect but I think honestly we have to look at other measures as well. 

Senator CORKER. Well, I appreciate your service and your candor 

and certainly I always enjoy seeing you. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Secretary. 

I want to continue to pursue Senator Corker’s line of questioning, 

because I am still not sure what we support. It seems to me a dangerous proposition to urge people to seek democracy and revolt and 

then not help them. I am concerned, as I listen to your answers, 

with what happens if Qaddafi prevails. The situation in Libya is 

rather grave, and I think we are going to miss an opportunity to 

promote democracy, with a small ‘‘d’’, throughout the region, be 

seen as on the side of those who have aspirations of freedom and 

ultimately be able to help shape the course of events that flow from 

23 

those ideals, not only in Libya but beyond. And at the rate that it 

is going Qaddafi is probably going to capture Benghazi if we don’t 

see some movement there by the international community. 

So, what are we seeking to support? I read the statements and 

get a sense it is like the Texas two-step; we want to support this 

but we are concerned about that. So, are we talking about acting 

if the international community was on board, beyond the no-fly 

zone? Are we talking about targeted airstrikes on Qaddafi’s tanks 

and heavy artillery? Are we talking about jamming Libyan Government radio signals? Are we talking about using the $32 billion in 

frozen assets to provide significant humanitarian relief? What are 

we talking about here, if we are serious about trying to help and 

shape the outcome here? 

Mr. BURNS. Senator Menendez, we are talking about a whole 

range of measures that go beyond, including steps that go beyond 

the no-fly zone. That includes a number of the steps that you mentioned. That is what is being debated in the Security Council right 

now. And we—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m sorry to interrupt you, sir. 

Mr. BURNS. Sure. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Beyond discussing it, are we advocating it? 

Are we leading the effort at the Security Council or are we just in 

eliciting mode? 

Mr. BURNS. No; we are, as Ambassador Rice said yesterday, we 

are actively pursuing this because of our concern, not only about 

the situation on the ground, the dangers of a humanitarian catastrophe but in response to what was a quite unprecedented call from 

the Arab League for action by the Security Council to protect civilians. So we are trying to look as urgently as we can at the situation on the ground and then press for action in the Security Council, just as quickly as we can produce it, ideally today. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And what are we seeking to pursue at the 

Security Council? What is the scope? What would we be happy to 

support? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, as Ambassador Rice said yesterday, we are 

pursuing, along with the Lebanese, the British, French, other partners in the Council, measures that include a no-fly zone but could 

go beyond it. And I can’t in this session, since the debate is going 

on in the Security Council right now, go into a lot of detail about 

that, but there are measures short of boots on the ground that 

could be taken by the international community, including active 

Arab participation to address some of the very real dangers that 

mentioned. That is what we are pursuing. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So let’s say, God forbid, that Qaddafi prevails at the end of the day. Do we have any doubt in our mind having seen what the international community said but didn’t do, that 

he will revert to a series of views that will not be in our national 

or security interests? 

Mr. BURNS. I think there is a very real danger of that and I 

think there is a very real danger that you could see a reversion to 

support for terrorism, you can see a very real danger of efforts to 

destabilize the region that already faces more than its share of 

challenges right now, with the political transitions going on in the 

24 

neighborhood. So I think there is a great deal at stake here and 

that is what creates a real sense of urgency on our part. 

Senator MENENDEZ. In a slightly different context, but still in 

Libya, has the State Department engaged the former Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel Jalil in a conversation and as part of that conversation sought to verify his statements that Qaddafi ordered the 

bombing of the Pan Am 103 flight? 

Mr. BURNS. I don’t know, Senator, if that conversation has taken 

place yet, but we certainly will pursue it with the Department of 

Justice. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, as Qaddafi certainly has a price tag on 

his head, while we have access to him along with an opportunity 

to engage him and hopefully even video-tape a conversation, I 

would hope that we don’t lose a precious opportunity to verify his 

public statements. We always had suspicions to that effect, and 

this would be evidence that Qaddafi ordered the bombing of the 

Pan Am 103 flight in which several hundred Americans lost their 

lives, including many from my home State of New Jersey. 

And as someone who has pressed forth on this issue, I don’t want 

to lose a golden opportunity to ensure that we have information 

that could lead to a prosecution regardless of the results in Libya. 

So I really hope that you, i.e., the State Department—I raised this 

with Secretary Clinton as well when she was here—as well as the 

Justice Department will take advantage of this opportunity. Can 

we get you to pursue that? 

Mr. BURNS. I agree with you, we will. 

Senator MENENDEZ. All right. Finally, I want to follow up on 

Senator Casey’s comments with reference to Lebanon. Hezbollah is 

likely to have a dramatically increased role in this new Lebanese 

Government. Where is the United States redline in our relationship 

with Lebanon? Are we willing to maintain a relationship with a 

government that is controlled by a terrorist group? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, as I said, you know, Prime Minister Mikati, the 

Prime Minister-designate, has asserted that he wants to form a 

unity government which reflects the will of all Lebanese. He has 

asserted that Lebanon is committed to fulfilling its international 

obligations. It remains to be seen what kind of government he is 

going to form and exactly what platform that government is going 

to put forward. And as I said before, we will judge that government, when it is formed, by its actions. 

As you know, we are firmly convinced that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization. We don’t deal with Hezbollah, but we will have 

to wait and see exactly what that government looks like and what 

it stands for. 

Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

I guess I will start kind of with a question couched in a statement and I want to be frank about it, because this is really troubling. From everything I have read, from folks we have been talking to, from all the accounts that are out there, the United States, 

quite frankly, looks weak in this endeavor, it looks unwilling or 

maybe even unable to act in this capacity. Even worse, I think 

25 

really calling attention to it with Britain, France, the Arab League 

are all out there calling not just attention to this but specifying 

specific actions they would like to see taken. We have seen criticism from the Libyan resistance and Libyan opposition as to our 

position, puzzlement as to where the United States is a new phase. 

I would ask you basically to comment, not just on the Libyan situation, but on the impact that our inaction and quite frankly, you 

know, our puzzling inaction to most of the people around the world, 

what impact that is having on the image of the United States in 

the region and around the world with regards to future potential 

conflicts. Is the message that we are sending that when future conflicts arise the United States actions are difficult to predict, they 

may be none, that the—that basically people—you know, leaders— 

that the way basically to repress and bring down resistance like 

this is to be brutal? What are we going to do if there is a bloodbath 

after this? 

The President of the United States has specifically said Qaddafi 

must go, but has done nothing since saying that, except have internal debates about it for a week and a half or two. Congressional 

leadership in both parties have strongly called for a no-fly zone and 

other actions and nothing has happened. I mean all of this I think 

comes—is a toxic brew that is really undermining the perception of 

the United States and our ability to influence events, not just in 

this area of the world, but all over the world. 

Has there been any analysis done on the impact this is having 

on the perception of the United States in the region and around the 

world, the damage that this inaction is doing? 

Mr. BURNS. Well Senator, I guess I would say two things in response. First, in general as I, you know, tried to emphasize in my 

opening remarks, we understand exactly what is at stake across 

the Middle East right now. What is at stake in terms of doing 

everything we can to support successful transitions in places like 

Egypt and Tunisia, which I think hold enormous opportunities not 

just for the peoples of those countries, but for the United States. 

We also understand what is at stake at Libya and I believe we 

have acted, the President, Secretary have acted quite energetically 

in recent weeks to press for the first U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970 to freeze more than $30 billion in Libyan regime assets 

in the United States, to establish contact with the Libyan National 

Council, to work actively with the Arab League, which as I said 

last Saturday produced a quite unprecedented call for the Security 

Council to authorize specific measures to protect Libyan civilians. 

And that is what we are embarked upon in New York right now, 

working very actively, leading an effort, along with the Lebanese, 

the British and French, to try to produce exactly those kind of specific measures. And we feel a real sense of urgency about this for 

all the reasons that you mentioned. 

Senator RUBIO. But to say we are pressing the United Nations 

and that is energetic action, the Security Council, is to basically 

say the United States—and to say that is what we are going to 

limit ourselves to, what we are basically saying is the United 

States may feel strongly about something but we are not doing 

anything that the Chinese and Russians don’t agree with. 

26 

Mr. BURNS. I think what is important here, the administration 

is committed to trying to make this an international response. We 

have seen some significant steps taking particularly by the Arab 

League, which are quite unprecedented. And we believe that we 

are going to have a greater impact and more effectiveness if we do 

this as an international response rather than a purely unilateral 

one. 

Senator RUBIO. I understand. But Russia and China don’t care 

about this stuff, they are never going to get involved in these 

things. I mean they don’t care that Muammar Qaddafi is going to 

massacre people. So if Russia doesn’t care and China doesn’t care 

and we care but won’t do anything about it, who is it up to, the 

French? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, but Senator, I actually think it is possible to 

produce a new Security Council resolution, I just don’t share the 

judgment that it is not possible. I think, you know—— 

Senator RUBIO. Well, when is that resolution going to happen? 

After the bloodbath, in the middle of the bloodbath? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, I hope very much that we will see a vote today. 

We are pushing very, very hard, along with others in the Security 

Council, to produce that because exactly as you say, the situation 

on the ground is moving very fast. 

Senator RUBIO. And do you think the administration’s ongoing 

deliberations on what to do as Qaddafi closes in and basically seals 

the deal, is that strengthening our hand with China and Russia? 

Are they—do they feel pressure now to go along with this or do 

they—or are they sitting back and kind of saying, well the President said Qaddafi must go, but Qaddafi is not going anywhere and 

you guys don’t have the guts to do anything about it? I mean does 

that strengthen our hand in the Security Council? 

Mr. BURNS. No; I think what strengthened our hand and that of 

others in the Security Council is what the Arab League did and I 

think the Russians and Chinese take that seriously and I think 

they take seriously the, you know, very active effort that we are 

making in New York right now to produce a new resolution. 

Senator RUBIO. What is the administration’s message to Libyan 

dissidents and democracy activities that may be watching or reading about this tomorrow? What is our message to them? Is our 

message, hold on, we may have a Security Council resolution in a 

few days, just—well what is our message to them? 

Mr. BURNS. Our message is that we support the realization of the 

same universal rights in Libya that we are seeing realized in Egypt 

and Tunisia and elsewhere in the region. 

Senator RUBIO. And we support it by the issuance of forceful and 

strongly worded statements? 

Mr. BURNS. No. We support it by pushing beyond statements for 

practical actions. We have taken some already, we are seeking 

more in New York and working with Arab partners. And that’s—— 

Senator RUBIO. So unless it is the dissidents and the activists, 

the people that have the bravery to stand up to Muammar Qaddafi 

and then maybe thinking to standing up to people like the Iranian 

regime and in other places, our message to them is, you guys go 

ahead and do this stuff and if we can ever get the Russians or 

Chinese to come around, we may or may not join you? 

27 

Mr. BURNS. No; what the Libyan National Council, representatives of the opposition with whom we have met, have argued for 

is to work with the Arab League, with Arab States and work with 

the Security Council. 

Senator RUBIO. The Arab League is saying do a no-fly—they are 

saying do something now. 

Mr. BURNS. What the Arab—— 

Senator RUBIO. So are the French and British. 

Mr. BURNS. What the Arab League said is that they want to 

Security Council to authorize that kind of a step and that is exactly 

why we are working actively—— 

Senator RUBIO. I know, but I think all of us want them to authorize it too, but they are not going to. Russia and China are not 

going to do this. They don’t care. In fact they—I think they enjoy 

anything that destabilizes us because it strengthens their hand 

around the world. 

Mr. BURNS. Yesh, I just don’t share the assumption that we can’t 

produce a new resolution. I think we can. 

Senator RUBIO. So the bottom line, because I know my time is 

running out and—the bottom line is that this administration’s 

strategy to Libya is the following. If we can get Russia and China— 

we think we have a real chance to get Russia and China to go 

along with strong action in Libya and we are going to continue to 

work on that and hopefully we can get that in place before Muammar Qaddafi massacres or continues to massacre people in an all 

out bloodbath? 

Mr. BURNS. I think we can produce a new Security Council resolution. 

Senator RUBIO. When? Today? 

Mr. BURNS. I hope we can today, that is exactly what we are 

pushing for. 

Senator RUBIO. And what will the resolution be? What do you 

think we can secure? 

Mr. BURNS. What we are pushing for is to secure a resolution 

that includes a number of very specific measures to protect Libyan 

civilians that includes, but is not limited to a no-fly zone and we 

will see whether we can produce that, but that’s what we are 

at—— 

Senator RUBIO. Do we have a timetable by when that needs to 

be produced? I mean do we have a—is there a point in time where 

we think, OK if we don’t get a Security Council resolution by this 

point in time then we have got to move on to something else? Does 

such a thing exist? 

Mr. BURNS. Our hope is to produce a vote on a new Security 

Council resolution along those lines as early as today. That is what 

we are pushing hard for. 

Senator RUBIO. And if it fails is there a backup plan? 

Mr. BURNS. I am not assuming that it is going to fail. I think 

we can produce a resolution. 

Senator RUBIO. So we don’t—but assuming it fails, because you 

know, let’s say it does, because it is—just one member could block 

it, assuming it fails, what do we do then? Do we have a plan for 

that or we haven’t had that—— 

28 

Mr. BURNS. Well Senator, we have thought through lots of possibilities, but I just don’t assume it is going to fail. I think we can 

produce one. 

Senator RUBIO. So if it fails we don’t have any idea what we will 

do next? 

Mr. BURNS. We have lots of ideas about what we might do. I just 

don’t assume that it is going to fail. I think it is possible to produce 

it. 

Senator RUBIO. Is there any ideas you can share with us or—— 

Mr. BURNS. As I said, our focus is to try to produce the resolution 

that is what lots of people in the Arab world and the international 

community support right now. 

Senator RUBIO. So there is not one idea you can tell me about 

that we will do if it fails? 

Mr. BURNS. We are doing lots of things already that we will continue to do to step up the economic pressure, sanctions on—— 

Senator RUBIO. Not one idea? Not one you can tell me? 

Mr. BURNS. That is one I just mentioned. 

Senator RUBIO. OK. 

Mr. BURNS. And I do that we can produce a Security Council resolution, which I think would provide the kind of platform we need 

to step up effective international pressure on Qaddafi. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Secretary Burns, thank you very much for your 

leadership and service, appreciate it very much. 

The challenge we have in the Middle East is the fact that we 

deal with so many countries that we need their strategic relationship but they don’t share our values. And we have to make choices. 

Their strategic relationships are important for our military, they 

are important for our intelligence community, they are important 

for many, many different reasons, including our war against extremists and terrorists. But there is one country in the Middle East 

where we do not have to make that choice and that country of 

course is Israel. 

And it is clear that as countries have gone through transition, 

there have been actions taken that could have an impact on Israel. 

You saw in Egypt the use of the Suez Canal by Iran and according 

to published reports that may have had a consequence to Israel’s 

security. There have been concerns about weapons being made 

available to Hamas as a result of some of the upheavals in some 

of the Arab States. There is a question as to how Iran is operating 

within the region that could also have an impact on Israel. 

So my question to you is, Has the administration been in close 

contacts with our Israeli allies assessing what impact these 

changes are having on the security of Israel, our closest ally in the 

Middle East? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, Senator Cardin, we have certainly stayed in 

close touch, particularly with regard to Egypt, given the obvious security implications in Gaza and along the border. It was encouraging that early on the Egyptian military leadership and the 

Israelis worked out arrangements so that Egyptian military units 

could replace police units close to the Gaza border to help ensure 

security there. 

29 

It was also quite encouraging that the Supreme Armed Forces 

Council in Egypt very early on, after the end of the Mubarak era, 

reaffirmed Egypt’s commitment to the Egypt/Israel peace treaty. 

But to answer your question, yes, we are in close touch with the 

Israelis on all these issues. 

Senator CARDIN. We saw that—I mean it is clear that our relationship with particularly the military in Egypt made it clear of the 

conditions that must be met for the United States to continue to 

be involved with Egypt from the point of view of aid. I am concerned whether that message is going to be continuously repeated. 

It seems to me that the United States plays a major role in the 

Middle East. We have foreign aid, military assistance, development 

aid and the list goes on and on and on. I think we have a right 

to expect accountability on the use of those funds, not just that 

they will respect the rights of its citizens, which to me is very important, but that it will join us in our fight against extremists and 

terrorists. 

Is that message being clearly delivered? 

Mr. BURNS. Sir, this is with regard to Egypt or—— 

Senator CARDIN. Regards to all—any country in which we have 

a substantial—have a significant relationship which is going 

through a change. 

Mr. BURNS. Sure, yes sir, I mean because we believe that we 

have shared concerns about violent extremists that aren’t limited 

to relations with particular leaders or particular governments. And 

you know, whether it is Egypt or, you know, other partners in the 

region, we certainly put a high priority on those kind of concerns 

and those kind of goals and will continue to do that. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, let me put it in the negative. I was trying 

to do it in the positive. If we find that Egypt or any country in the 

Middle East takes positions that are contrary to their international 

commitments as it relates to the peace process and to Israel, or 

they take steps that are counter to our objectives in our fight 

against terrorists, are we prepared to cut off our financial assistance to those countries? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, we obviously have to weigh, in terms of our 

own interests, the nature of our relationships and our assistance 

relationships with any country. But I guess what I would emphasize with regard to Egypt is what we have seen before is a 

reaffirmation of Egypt’s commitments to its international treaties, 

including the Egypt/Israel peace treaty and a reaffirmation of its 

commitment to work with us and lots of others against violent extremism, which is as much important an interest of Egypt as it is 

of the United States. 

Senator CARDIN. Well Secretary Burns, you are giving a very diplomatic answer. But let me just tell you, I think there is concern 

here in Congress as to keeping a very close eye as to developments 

in countries in which U.S. taxpayers are being asked to provide 

help to make sure that there is respect for the human rights of its 

citizens, including dealing with gender equity issues and dealing 

with good governance and anticorruption efforts, but also what 

these countries are doing to fight extremists and terrorists and 

whether they are a constructive partner in the peace process that 

we are moving forward with in the Middle East. And we are going 

30 

to be watching that closely and we hope that message will be very 

clear as to where we are on that issue. 

And I will mention one other point. You mentioned of course the 

United Nations and trying to engage the United Nations, which I 

think is important, I hope this—we can get international support 

for our policies. 

There is another international organization that has a role in the 

Middle East and that is the OSCE, it has a Mediterranean dimension in which Egypt and Jordan and Israel, Tunisia are all members. So it does offer us a platform that we could extend getting 

the international community involved in more of the institutionbuilding where the United States has not always been as effective 

as an international organization can be. 

I hope you will take back the message that there is a good track 

record within OSCE. And we would ask some of the other countries, as they are going through transition, to look at becoming a 

partner within OSCE that could help them in developing the institutions they need to have open and fair and free elections, to deal 

with freedom of expression and the right of minority communities, 

et cetera, all which are critically important for stability in these 

emerging countries. 

Mr. BURNS. Now, Senator Cardin, I agree with you absolutely. I 

think there is a lot in the experience of some OSCE member countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, in terms of their building a 

democratic societies and how they navigated complicated transitions that would be useful to people in the Middle East wrestling 

with some of those same questions. And to be honestly, they bring 

to that effort less of the baggage sometimes than the United States 

does. 

The only other comment I would make quickly back to your earlier question is that I truly do believe, as I said in my opening comments, that successful transitions, particularly in Egypt but also in 

Tunisia, are in many ways the best antidote to the narrative of violent extremists, whether it is al-Qaeda or any place else, because 

what it does, I think, is put a lie to the notion that the only way 

you can affect change in the Middle East is through violence and 

extremism. 

What it demonstrates is that through peaceful, nonideological, 

home-grown movements you can produce what I believe the vast 

majority of people in that region want. And so that is why I think 

we have such a deep stake in doing everything we can at least to 

help get those kind of transitions, to help Egyptians get their transition right. 

Senator CARDIN. Well I agree with that. And again I thank you 

for your service and your leadership. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Burns, welcome. You have a reputation, well deserved, of being one of the finest diplomats in the State Department. You certainly demonstrated 

that today under questions from both viewpoints. 

I would tend to identify myself more closely with the line of questioning you received from Senator Lugar and Senator Corker. Before I ask you or discuss this, I can’t not say that today, if we were 

31 

talking about humanitarian issues—clearly not the subject of this 

hearing, but I think we would be putting a lot more emphasis on 

what has been going on in Japan. We have a situation over there 

where we have seen entire towns obliterated, where tens of thousands of people are dead or missing and half a million people are 

living in shelters. The power grid has been damaged and the ability 

of the normal institutional systems to handle that has really been 

affected. They are an ally, they are a friend. 

We have done some good work with our military and in other 

areas, but I would hope we could get that up on the radar screen 

much higher in terms of what our government’s ability to assist the 

Japanese can be. People tend to think this is a rich country, and 

therefore they can handle this. But, when your public services are 

designed on one level and you have these multiple calamities, we 

really should be discussing that. 

With respect to the subject of this hearing, I find your testimony 

to be optimistic, quite frankly. I have been on this committee now 

for 41⁄2 years, there is a tendency when somebody is coming over 

talking about an administration position, we are talking about reform movements bringing greater peace, democracy, prosperity. 

These certainly are aspirations. But when you look at this region, 

I think you and I both have been in and out and different hats for 

many years, and we know that there is a lot more going on that 

are going on vary in scope and intensity from country to country. 

They involve sectarian factions, religious differences, and true extremist movements which we cannot ignore. I think Senator Corker 

had some good questions on that line that are bent on manipulating these sorts of movements that are otherwise well-intentioned. And I don’t think we should take our eyes off that. 

I remember when I was a journalist in Beirut, when the Marines 

were there in 1983. During one firefight a Marine turned around 

to me and said, ‘‘never get involved in a five-sided argument.’’ This 

tends to repeat itself in our policies in this part of the world. 

So any approach that we take to a situation, even with some of 

the compelling circumstances in Libya, really needs to be taken 

carefully with the understanding that there are down sides, that 

these things are easily begun and very difficult to end and to adhere to the principles of international law. 

Could you describe the nature of our official diplomatic relations 

with the Government of Libya? 

Mr. BURNS. Senator Webb, we have suspended the operations of 

our Embassy in Tripoli and their operation in Washington. So we 

no longer have diplomatic representatives accredited—I mean accredited to that government. We have allowed—we have made it 

possible for the Libyan National Council to open up a representative office in Washington. And as I mentioned before, at a whole 

variety of levels we have established contacts with them. So, the 

short answer is we have suspended the operations—— 

Senator WEBB. But we do have diplomatic relations? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, we haven’t broken diplomatic relations—— 

Senator WEBB. So we have official diplomatic relations with the 

Qaddafi regime? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. In terms of international law? 

32 

Mr. BURNS. Yes. I’d have to—I don’t want to misled you, Senator. 

Honestly I can try to get you an accurate answer on that, but we 

have suspended the operations of our Embassy there. We have not 

formally broken diplomatic relations. 

Senator WEBB. Right. That was the answer that I received to the 

questions that we put forward last week that we actually still do 

have diplomatic relations. So, in terms of international law, it becomes rather awkward when we are supporting a movement yet to 

be fully defined and in my view in its attempt to overthrow a government which we still formally recognize. 

Mr. BURNS. It is certainly a complicated proposition, but it is—— 

Senator WEBB. Oh, and that is—I don’t mean to cut you off but, 

that goes really to Senator Lugar’s point—whether it is a declaration of war or some other official signal that would indicate that 

this is not a government that we recognize, before we participate 

in any way in assisting an attempt to overthrow it. This may sound 

clinical, but I think it is very important in terms of how we address 

situations around the world. 

You mentioned the Libyan National Council and the discussions 

that have been ongoing and the fact that they might be opening up 

an office here. Can you tell us to what extent the members of this 

counsel actually represent the totality of the country and the ability to govern? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, to the best of our knowledge the 30-some members of the council have been drawn from around the country, not 

just in the east but the west as well, a fairly broad tribal representation, because as you know Libya is a very tribal society. And so 

they have clearly made a serious effort to represent, you know, the 

vast majority of Libyans in the council. 

As I said before, you know, we have known a number of these 

officials before in their previous capacities. We have had extensive 

conversations with them since then. I do not want to pretend that 

that enables us to have a full picture of the entire membership of 

the council, but those with whom we have met have struck us as 

being positive and serious. 

Senator WEBB. Can you identify other forces? Senator Corker 

mentioned people coming in from the outside, but other forces who 

are participating in the opposition that might have a different view 

of the way that the Libyan National Council is describing its 

aspirations? 

Mr. BURNS. There certainly are other forces in Libya extremist 

groups including some who have fought in Afghanistan and elsewhere who we have been concerned about for a long time. It is certainly possible, as Senator Corker mentioned, that they will try to 

take advantage of the chaos in Libya right now. All I can tell you 

is we are being very, very careful in whom we deal with and we 

are very mindful of the dangers of extremist of one form or another 

trying to take advantage of this situation. So the risk is present, 

you are right. 

Senator WEBB. Right. I would hope we take that same kind of 

care in terms of how we would approach any direct involvement in 

that country as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

33 

Let me just ask a couple questions. When we engaged in Kosovo 

what was the diplomatic status? 

Mr. BURNS. In Kosovo I would have to check, I mean I think we 

still had relations at that time with Belgrade. 

The CHAIRMAN. And when we engaged did we have any declaration of war or authorization of use of force? 

Mr. BURNS. I don’t recall that there was a declaration of war. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. And at this point in time, when we 

bombed Serbia, did we have diplomatic relations? 

Mr. BURNS. I believe we did. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. I think we have to be really thoughtful, and 

I know you are being, but I think all of us here need to be recognizing the precedents that exist. When Ronald Reagan sent cruise 

missiles into Qaddafi’s palace and we killed his daughter, did we 

have any authorization from Congress? 

Mr. BURNS. I don’t recall that we did. 

The CHAIRMAN. We did not. We had a—potentially a finding but 

I am not even convinced there was a finding. 

I do think the questions raised by my good friend and ranking 

member and Senator Webb and others are valid, but I think it is 

critical to measure the standard as we have applied it and the exigencies as they face us at this particular moment. 

I don’t think anyone is talking about the potential of intervention 

as I think the Arab community has talked about it, which would, 

in their mind, mean another occupation, troops coming in, people 

being on the ground. And I think that is their definition of intervention. 

But it would be completely inconsistent to call for a no-fly zone 

and not understand that there could be planes flying and so forth. 

So again I think, you know, all of the questions raised are valid. 

I’m confident the administration is going to examine them very, 

very closely. I have always taken the position, I think Senator 

Lugar knows this, that it is better to proceed with the authorization and support of Congress if you have the time and if the opportunity provides for it. It is always better, because we represent the 

people and as a branch of government that has the constitutional 

power with respect to war or that kind of thing it is better. But 

life does not always present us with circumstances that afford us 

the opportunity to do that. And we haven’t always—Republican 

and Democratic Presidents alike have had to make tough choices, 

faced with the moment. 

I appreciate your testimony here enormously today. Let me just 

ask you very, very quickly, the Bahraini situation, obviously this 

is a redline for the Saudis, too, so it puts us automatically into that 

relationship. And I wonder if you might just speak for a moment 

to the—to sort of how you see that playing out at this point in 

time. I know we have had conversations with everybody. Is there 

a next step that is clear to us, given the clearing of the square, 

Pearl Square, and the violent turn of the last 24 hours? 

Mr. BURNS. Well Mr. Chairman, I mean the next step has to be, 

in our view, resumption of the national dialogue that the Crown 

Prince tried to start a couple of weeks ago. And that is what we 

are going to press very hard, not just on the government but on the 

opposition as well, to begin. 

34 

I know that is a very complicated proposition amidst the recent 

violence and that is why we have spoken out, Secretary Clinton 

spoke out again yesterday quite clearly against the excessive use 

of force against demonstrators, because you have to create an atmosphere in which you can have that kind of serious political dialogue. There are legitimate concerns that have been raised by lots 

of Bahraini citizens, and until they are addressed it is going to be 

very difficult to see the kind of stable future for Bahrain, which I 

continue to believe is possible. And we will do everything we can, 

working with others, to encourage that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well thank you, Mr. Secretary. It is fair to say 

that I remember the celebrations of the early 1990s when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union ceased to be the Soviet Union 

and the cold war effectively ended and everybody jumped up and 

down and it was this terrific moment. And obviously it has unleashed forces that were repressed for a long period of time in 

many of those countries, which we are still dealing with. 

It is interesting to see how they have been able to transition in 

Eastern Europe and in other parts of the world they have sort of 

stayed static. It is very interesting to look at the difference between 

Turkey and Egypt. They—in the 1950s, in the age of Pan-Arabism 

and so forth, there was really almost an equality of GDP, quality 

of per capita income and so forth and here is Turkey soaring in so 

many ways, economically, a major player globally, a democracy 

that is balancing itself and hanging in there and a great contributor to so many efforts and interests. And Egypt kind of just got 

stuck. And the people, the difference between the standards of living and the opportunities and the confidence of the country and so 

forth, it really shows, you know, enormous juxtaposition. 

So obviously this is a big moment and there is a lot that can 

transition out of it. And I am convinced that if we can do this well, 

and when I say ‘‘we’’ I don’t mean us, I mean all of us together, 

it is going to have a profound impact on people’s perception of the 

possibilities in a lot of other troubled spots in the world. That is 

what I see. When you define America’s national interests this outcome can really make—you know, we have been fighting this War 

on Terror for—since, well it is 10 years now, and we have been 

doing things about terror for a long time before that. But this 

global engagement on it—and this is part of it, this is absolutely 

a big part of it, with a new opportunity to redefine it in a very different way. If that isn’t in our national interest I don’t know what 

is. 

And I think as we look at Pakistan and Afghanistan, the 

amounts of money we are spending there, to not fight for this outcome would, in my judgment, complicate our lives even more significantly in those places. So I do see it in a larger strategic place 

and I think it is important for the administration, Mr. Secretary, 

to be defining that a little more. To be—I think the President needs 

to articulate that, why is this important to us. Because a lot of 

Americans don’t have that automatic sense, I think even some of 

our very high elected—not elected, appointed officials who are involved in this debate right now have not necessarily either embraced or expressed that view. And I think that short changes the 

35 

opportunities of this moment, that is just my perception. I don’t 

know if you would agree or disagree? 

Mr. BURNS. No, Mr. Chairman, I think there is an enormous 

strategic opportunity here for the United States and for the peoples 

of the Middle East, notwithstanding all the very real risks that 

exist. And there are huge pitfalls out there as well. But I think we 

have a very deep stake in helping, to the maximum extent we can, 

peoples and leaders in the region to get these transitions right. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Burns, I suspect that the Senators have utilized your 

appearance to have our own very civil debate today on the question 

of Libya, and likewise broader issues. I agree with the chairman’s 

comments about the need for the President to attempt to articulate 

more clearly why not only Libya, but also the other countries in the 

Middle East, are especially important to us in terms of our national 

objectives or our national aspirations and ideals. 

I think, however, that it is probably clear to you as you’ve heard 

the testimony and responded to questions today from Senators that 

some Senators are indicating in a bipartisan way that they feel the 

President and the administration have not been forthcoming 

enough in meeting the problems of human rights in Libya. 

Perhaps the President feels some of this pressure. On the other 

hand, some of us, myself included, are saying that unfortunately 

we have been down this road before. The chairman has illustrated 

previous examples, under different administrations, where there 

was not the same call for a declaration of war. Certainly the probing we went through prior to the invasion of Iraq, and the resolutions that were offered, demonstraated much more of a desire to 

have an argument about these issues. Ultimately we went to war 

in Iraq, whether the reasons were understood to be clear at that 

time or not, or whether they turned out as Secretary Powell’s testimony at the time indicated. But I am just saying that you have to 

understand, and I think you and the President do, that even as we 

are having this hearing today on Libya, which is very important, 

I believe, to our country and the world, the major debate that has 

been going on on the floor of the Senate ever since the beginning 

of this session has been with regard to the budget of our country. 

This has taken place through passage of continuing resolutions so 

the government doesn’t shut down, as it will tomorrow if we do not 

vote affirmatively today, and threats that there will be no more 

continuing resolutions or that there will be no increase in the debt 

ceiling. And as people are pressed as to what this means, they say 

it means what we say, which is no more borrowing. 

This is the political situtation in our country that the rest of the 

world is looking at as we argue about the Libya situation today. 

I suppose I am saying, in terms of our own domestic politics, that 

we need to get sort of straight where we stand. 

Now, if we have a debate and decide to declare war on Libya, 

then Members of Congress who have voted that way have, I believe, an obligation to fulfill that role with regard to our Armed 

Forces, the State Department, and our diplomatic role. Otherwise 

we have a debating point in which Republicans can say that the 

President really doesn’t have the force and the ability to handle 

36 

these tough situations. On the Democratic side some may take the 

position of the chairman that we really ought to be there because 

of the humanitarian component, while others that we have heard 

this morning are somewhat more cautious about that. That is why 

this debate is necessary, I think, for our own domestic situation. 

And likewise, the opinion of the Congress lends credibility to the 

rest of the world as to the precise position of the United States 

with regard to this conflict. 

I am watching, as you are, resolutions being offered, and even 

votes in the House of Representatives, regarding the termination of 

foreign assistance and, among many, a desire really even to vote 

country by country on how we handle our foreign assistance going 

forward. Now that is a new business. And you can say, well it is 

after all one House of the Congress doing this and the other might 

reject any proposed legislation mandating such cuts. However, this 

is not a comfortable situation for those of you involved in foreign 

policy, as you proceed to Egypt in a delicate way, to know really 

what large numbers of Americans think about the level of funding 

we should be dedicating to foreign assistance programs. 

So, I appreciate very much your suffering through all of our 

questions and answers today. However, the reason for my pressing 

this issue is that we are going to have to have clarity on how we 

feel in the United States of America, apart from just the President 

or the Secretary of State or the Ambassador to the U.N., who are 

doing the very best they can, but the representatives of the American people more generally, regarding the way we should conduct 

ourselves in the Middle East in the midst of all this turmoil. 

Despite the fact that we have not really gotten into the weeds 

today as to what we are going to do in Bahrain, our strategic interests in that country are apparent given that the Fifth Fleet is 

there. The Saudis have moved 2,000 people into Bahrain, as they 

understand what their national interest seems to be. And we certainly are very supportive of our relations with Saudi Arabia, from 

Franklin Roosevelt to the present. 

But, do we have a new view with regard to how they handle 

human rights? Are we going to articulate really what happens with 

Yemen where you have a government that is authoritarian but appears to be tracking down al-Qaeda? These are questions down the 

trail, but not far down the trail, given the events in the Middle 

East. 

So I am hopeful that the President will, with your help, articulate what our national interests are. But likewise, we may in the 

Congress articulate where we stand with regard to the budget that 

may follow through on this or really with regard to the relationships we have discussed today concerning Libya. 

So, I appreciate your appearance and the chairman’s calling of 

this very timely hearing before we head out on a recess, out visiting with our constituents, but I believe the administration is not 

really engaging during a time in which events are moving rapidly 

in Libya, Bahrain, and maybe elsewhere. 

And so I will not foster any more consternation with more questions, but I appreciate, as always, your own diplomatic efforts and 

most specifically the recent trip you took to Egypt at a time when 

we really did need someone on the ground there who had an underVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:21 Aug 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\031711-G.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
37 

standing of the situation and has a vast array of diplomatic successes under his belt. I think your effort has brought some confidence with the Egyptian leaders in various types. I hope that you 

will help illuminate more, as you can, what you have found, who 

it is that we are going to be dealing with moving forward, what the 

broader prospects are, and how we can help foster democracy there. 

I suggest maybe it is a little premature to be having so many 

votes until you have established political parties and some dialogue 

between them and the institutions of civil society. That being said, 

I understand that this could be construed as gross interference 

even as we are attempting to help, as both parties have over the 

years with the International Republican Institute, the National 

Democratic Institute, and others. 

So thank you for coming. 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Senator Lugar, as always wise comments, 

thoughtful and important. I think the questions you raised obviously are ones that need to be answered. And I think your suggestions are very well taken. I am confident the administration does 

too. So thank you. 

Again, Secretary thanks so much for coming today. I think it has 

been helpful and it has helped to shed some light on the dynamics 

here as well. So I think that has been good. 

We stand adjourned. 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF UNDER SECRETARY WILLIAM J. BURNS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. In Bahrain, democratic protestors are calling on the United States to 

demand that King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa make immediate and real reforms. I 

recognize the value that the Bahrain monarchy has played as a U.S. ally in the region and a bulwark against Iranian influence, but the monarchy’s inaction, its failure to address the needs of its people, is feeding Iran’s influence in Bahrain and 

through the region—an outcome that cannot and does not serve Bahraini or Americans interests. 

• What options are on the table to support democratic reform in Bahrain and 

other nations? How are we going to reform our support through State and AID 

to reach out to small ‘‘d’’ democrats seeking peaceful democratic change in their 

countries? 

Answer. The administration recognizes the urgent need for political reform and 

further engagement with reform advocates in Bahrain. In Bahrain, civil society organizations and activists are often subject to government intimidation, censorship, 

and detention, to include teachers, human rights activists, journalists, bloggers, 

medical staff, and political activists. The U.S. Government is using all available and 

appropriate channels both in Manama and in Washington to engage local and international human rights groups, members of the opposition, religious figures, and the 

Government of Bahrain on political reform, a meaningful dialogue, and government 

transparency. We have called upon the Government of Bahrain to commit to real 

reform by releasing and accounting for those missing or detained, ceasing the attacks on hospitals and medical staff, and immediately halting acts of intimidation 

and harassment on civil society actors. In support of our commitment to reform and 

civil society, we have a range of programs that support civil society in Bahrain, including programming through the Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor 

(DRL) and the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) designed to train women 

in nontraditional fields, prepare for political campaigns, gain and develop the skills 

38 

needed to advocate for human rights for women, and foster entrepreneurship 

throughout the country. 

UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

Question. The United States reengaged with the U.N. Human Rights Council with 

the idea that it would be easier to reform the body from within than it was from 

the outside. Nonetheless, the Council continues to be plagued by inaction and by the 

presence on the Council of some of the most notorious human rights abusers in the 

world—Cuba is a Vice President of the Council. 

I welcomed the unprecedented decision of the U.N. General Assembly to remove 

Libya from the Council, despite the fact that its initial election to the body was an 

abomination. The fact that Syria is seeking to replace Libya on the Council further 

defies logic. 

The Libya resolution that I authored which passed this body by unanimous consent on March 1 urges the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to advocate for 

improving Human Rights Council membership criteria to exclude gross and systematic violators of human rights. 

• What steps are you taking to prevent Syria’s election to the Council and to improve membership criteria to exclude gross and systematic violators of human 

rights? 

Answer. As Secretary Clinton emphasized in Geneva recently, membership on the 

Council ‘‘should be earned through respect for human rights. That is the standard 

laid out by the General Assembly. This Council’s predecessor, the Human Rights 

Commission, lost its credibility in part because Libya was allowed to serve as its 

president. It should not take bloodshed for us to agree that such regimes have no 

place here.’’ 

While no U.N. body can expect to have only countries with perfect records on it, 

we are focused on keeping the most egregious and disruptive human rights abusers 

off the Council, as we did last year when Iran sought a seat. Countries that grossly 

and systematically violate human rights have no place on the Council. We succeeded 

in getting Iran to withdraw its candidacy last year and in suspending Libya’s membership this winter, and we firmly oppose Syria’s candidacy this year. 

In creating the Human Rights Council, all Member States committed to take ‘‘into 

account the contribution of candidates to the promotion and protection of human 

rights.’’ The United States considers the human rights record of each candidate for 

the Human Rights Council. While we do not as a matter of policy reveal our votes, 

the record of Syria speaks for itself. 

Syria’s candidacy particularly concerns us. Syria’s human rights record is deplorable. One can clearly see Syria’s troubling approach to human rights in its current 

violent and deadly crackdown on peaceful protestors. The United States is deeply 

troubled by violence and civilian deaths at the hands of security forces. We are concerned by the Syrian Government’s use of violence, intimidation, and arbitrary arrests to hinder the Syrian people’s ability to freely exercise their rights. Syria’s overall record makes it clear that Syria has no place on the U.N.’s only political body 

dedicated to the promotion and protection of human rights. 

Question. Please also comment on our efforts at the Council to establish a human 

rights monitor for Iran. 

Answer. The United States is proud to have joined other nations from around the 

world during the March 2011 session of the United Nations Human Rights Council 

(HRC) to establish a Special Rapporteur on Iran—something Secretary Clinton 

called for during her visit to the Council at the beginning of the session. Creation 

of this position was a signal achievement for the HRC, as it is the first countryspecific Special Rapporteur mandate authorized since the HRC replaced the Commission on Human Rights in 2006. 

The new Special Rapporteur mandate marks a significant step forward for the 

people of Iran because their rights will now be supported through international 

scrutiny by a country-specific U.N. mechanism. Thanks to the action taken by the 

HRC in establishing this position, the people of Iran will have a voice devoted to 

their human rights within the international community despite every attempt by 

the Iranian government to silence opposition and dissent. 

RESPONSE OF UNDER SECRETARY WILLIAM J. BURNS TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHNNY ISAKSON

Question. If Muammar Qadhafi is successful at violently suppressing, through 

military and other tactics, the Libyan opposition that is seeking a democratic transiVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:21 Aug 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\031711-G.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
39 

tion in Libya, what implications would that have for democratic transitions across 

the Middle East and North African region? And more specifically do you think that 

violent suppressions would spread across the region if Qadhafi is successful at suppressing the Libyan opposition? And what would the U.S. policy response look like 

if Qadhafi is able to suppress the opposition and violence spreads? 

Answer. A victorious Qadhafi would emerge unbowed and vengeful, sending a signal to other governments in the region that brutal repression and the use of force 

against civilians can be used to successfully resist popular calls for democratic reform. The regime would likely seek to retaliate by destabilizing the region and sowing conflict through military and economic policies, propaganda, and, possibly, support for terrorism. The fragile transitions to democracy in Tunisia and Egypt, which 

have close economic and social ties with Libya, would be especially vulnerable. 

Inside of Libya, the Qadhafi regime would also likely effect immediate, wide-scale, 

and bloody retaliation in the areas considered sympathetic to the opposition, especially in eastern Libya and the Berber regions in the West. We have already received credible accounts that thousands of young men between the ages of 18 and 

35 in areas recaptured by the regime have been selectively abducted, held in remote 

desert camps, and tortured. 

The United States has embraced the goal of removing Qadhafi from power and 

will pursue it in close coordination with our international partners through nonmilitary means, including sanctions and accountability measures. We have already 

imposed strong unilateral sanctions, freezing over $33 billion in regime assets; we 

are also coordinating with our European partners and the U.N. on applying additional and rigid sanctions. By freezing assets, restricting travel, and threatening 

prosecution at the International Criminal Court, we are pressuring and isolating the 

Qadhafi regime and ensuring that its members are held accountable for their actions. We are constantly assessing our policies as this very fluid situation develops, 

and future options may include increased diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on the Qadhafi regime, efforts to mitigate reprisals and killings within Libya, 

and additional humanitarian aid to help the victims of Qadhafi’s violence. 

Æ