alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 24, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-51019

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BENJAMIN VALLE-PERCHES,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:06-CR-582-ALL

--------------------

Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Benjamin Valle-Perches (Valle-Perches) appeals his 87-month

sentence for illegal reentry into the United States following

removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He argues that his

sentence was unreasonable because the district court failed to

properly weigh the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) and imposed a term of imprisonment greater than

necessary to satisfy the sentencing goals set forth in § 3553(a). 
No. 06-51019

-2-

The district court sentenced Valle-Perches within a properly

calculated advisory guideline range. Such a sentence is given

“great deference,” and we infer that the sentencing court

considered all the factors for a fair sentence under § 3553(a). 

See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519-20 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 43 (2005). Therefore, we conclude that

Valle-Perches has failed to show that his sentence was

unreasonable. 

Valle-Perches argues, in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), that the 87-month term of imprisonment

imposed in his case violates due process because it exceeds the

statutory maximum sentence allowed for the § 1326(a) offense

charged in the indictment. He challenges the constitutionality

of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony

convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the

offense that must be found by a jury.

Valle-Perches’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). 

Although he contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly

decided and that a majority of the Supreme court would overrule

Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi, we have repeatedly

rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres

remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268,

276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 298 (2005). VallePerches properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in
No. 06-51019

-3-

light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises

it here to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18
- 6849

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. CARLOS GERMAN LEMA NOGALES, a/k/a Carlos Felix Torres De La Villa, a/k/a Carlos German Lema

- Nogales, a/k/a German Lema, a/k/a Mark Ruiz Alvarez, a/k/a Oberto Rubi, a/k/a Charlie , Defendant

- Appellant

.

No. 18
- 6852

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. CARLOS GERMAN LEMA NOGALES, a/k/a Carlos Felix Torres De La Villa, a/k/a Carlos German Lema

- Nogales, a/k/a German Lema, a/k/a Mark Ruiz Alvarez, a/k/a Oberto Rubi, a/k/a Charlie,
Defendant

- Appellant.

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Greenville

. J. Michelle Childs , District Judge. ( 6:12

- cr
- 00328

- JMC

- 2; 6:15

- cv
- 03044

- JMC )2 Submitted : December 31, 2018 Decided: January 9, 2019

Before MOTZ and KEENAN , Circuit Judges , and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Carlos German Lema Nogales, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM: Carlos German Lema Nogales seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion and denying his motion to reconsider the
court’s denial of his motion for discovery and expansion of the recor d. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). * A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When
the dis trict court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 ( 2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable clai m of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Nogales has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and
dismiss the appeal

. W e deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and deny as moot Nogales’ motion for transcripts at the Government’s expense. We dispense with oral

* Because it was filed more than 28 days after the entry of the district court’s order, we construe Nogales’ motion to reconsider as filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A certificate of appealability is required for the order to be appealable. See Re id v. Angelone , 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part by United States v. McRae , 793 F.3d 392, 400 & n.7 (4th Cir. 2015).4 argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4073 

To authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to accept the quitclaim, disclaimer, 

and relinquishment of a railroad right of way within and adjacent to 

Pike National Forest in El Paso County, Colorado, originally granted 

to the Mt. Manitou Park and Incline Railway Company pursuant to 

the Act of March 3, 1875. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 17, 2012 

Mr. LAMBORN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to accept the quitclaim, disclaimer, and relinquishment of a railroad right 

of way within and adjacent to Pike National Forest 

in El Paso County, Colorado, originally granted to the 

Mt. Manitou Park and Incline Railway Company pursuant to the Act of March 3, 1875. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4073 IH

1 SECTION 1. ACCEPTANCE OF RELINQUISHMENT OF RAIL2 ROAD RIGHT OF WAY BY MANITOU AND 

3 PIKES PEAK RAILWAY COMPANY, COLORADO, 

4 OVER NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LAND. 

5 (a) AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT.—Notwithstanding the 

6 Act of March 8, 1922 (43 U.S.C. 912), the Secretary of 

7 Agriculture may accept the quitclaim, disclaimer, and re8 linquishment by the Manitou and Pikes Peak Railway 

9 Company, successor in interest to the Mt. Manitou Park 

10 and Incline Railway Company, of a right of way, more 

11 fully described in subsection (b), within and adjacent to 

12 Pike National Forest that was originally granted by the 

13 Secretary to the Mt. Manitou Park and Incline Railway 

14 Company pursuant to the authority provided by the Act 

15 of March 3, 1875 (Chapter 152; 18 Stat. 482) for the 

16 construction of a railroad and station in El Paso County, 

17 Colorado. 

18 (b) RIGHT OF WAY DESCRIBED.—The railroad right 

19 of way referred to in subsection (a) is located in the 

S1⁄2SW1 20 ⁄4 of section 6, Township 14 South, Range 67 

West, and N1⁄2SE 1 21 ⁄4 of section 1, Township 14 South, 

22 Range 68 West, Sixth Principal Meridian, Colorado, and 

23 is depicted in a tracing filed in the United States Land 

24 Office at Pueblo, Colorado, file 019416, on December 24, 

25 1914. 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 4073 IH

1 (c) LIMITED APPLICABILITY.—Nothing in this sec2 tion shall be construed to affect the right, title, and inter3 est of the Manitou and Pikes Peak Railway Company in 

4 land held in fee title by the Manitou and Pikes Peak Rail5 way Company. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 237 (Friday, December 10, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Page 71849]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-27063]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--ANSI Accredited Standards Committee ``C37''

    Notice is hereby given that, on September 17, 2004, pursuant to 
section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), ANSI Accredited Standards 
Committee ``C37'' (``C37 Committee''), by its Secretariat, National 
Electrical Manufacturers Association (``NEMA''), has filed written 
notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal 
Trade Commission disclosing (1) the name and principal place of 
business of the standards development organization and (2) the nature 
and scope of its standards development activities. The notifications 
were filed for the purpose of invoking the Act's provisions limiting 
the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified 
circumstances.
    Pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act, the name and principal place 
of business of the standards development organization is: ANSI 
Accredited Standards Committee ``C37'', Rosslyn, VA. The nature and 
scope of C37 Committee's standards development activities are: test 
procedures for power switchgear equipment.
    Currently, C37 Committee maintains nine standards relating to test 
procedures for power switchgear equipment. The standards developed by 
C37 Committee are published by NEMA.

Dorothy B. Fountain,
Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 04-27063 Filed 12-9-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
§ 242.809 Staying of certification and tolling of review period pending jurisdictional determination. ( a ) A product certification made by a security-based swap execution facility pursuant to § 242.804 shall be stayed, or the review period for a product that has been submitted for Commission approval by a security-based swap execution facility pursuant to § 242.805 shall be tolled, upon request for a joint interpretation of whether the product is a swap, security-based swap, or mixed swap made pursuant to § 240.3a68-2 of this chapter by the security-based swap execution facility, the Commission, or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
( b ) The Commission shall provide the security-based swap execution facility with a written notice of the stay or tolling pending issuance of a joint interpretation.
( c ) The stay shall be withdrawn, or the approval review period shall resume, if a joint interpretation finding that the Commission has jurisdiction over the product is issued.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1059

In re: RANDY L. THOMAS,

Petitioner.

On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition

(3:07-cv-00130-GCM)

Submitted: April 19, 2012 Decided: April 25, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Randy L. Thomas, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Randy L. Thomas petitions for a writ of mandamus and a 

writ of prohibition, seeking an order vacating the district 

court’s February 13, 2008, order imposing a prefiling 

injunction, enjoining state officials and employees from certain 

conduct, compelling the state court to vacate a child custody 

order, addressing claims raised in prior actions, and imposing 

monetary sanctions. We conclude that Thomas is not entitled to 

mandamus or prohibition relief. 

Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used 

only in extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 

426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 

509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Further, mandamus relief is 

available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the 

relief sought. In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 860 F.2d 

135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988). Likewise, “a writ of prohibition is a 

drastic and extraordinary remedy which should be granted only 

when the petitioner has shown his right to the writ to be clear 

and undisputable and that the actions of the court were a clear 

abuse of discretion.” In re Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461, 1468 (10th 

Cir. 1983). Neither a writ of mandamus nor a writ of 

prohibition may be used as a substitute for appeal. Id.

(prohibition); In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 353 

(4th Cir. 2007) (mandamus). 
3

The relief sought by Thomas is not available by way of 

mandamus or prohibition. Accordingly, although we grant leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the petition. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
1809.507-2 Contract clause.

The contracting officer may insert a clause substantially the same as the clause at 1852.209–71,

Limitation of Future Contracting, in solicitations and contracts.

Parent topic: Subpart 1809.5—Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of Interest
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                          40,599
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  159,124
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (6,928)
<INVENTORY>                                    104,474
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               323,163
<PP&E>                                         255,076
<DEPRECIATION>                                (16,857)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 728,891
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          236,584
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                       2,982
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   728,891
<SALES>                                        197,402
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               197,402
<CGS>                                          114,120
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  114,120
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                76,659
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 (614)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,446
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,209)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,087)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,122)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,122)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
No. 937.

#### Long et al., Trustees, *v.*Stites et al.

June 1, 1937.

*Mr. Greenberry Simmons*for petitioners. *Messrs. Allen P. Dodd, Edw. P. Humphrey,*and *Squire R. Ogden*for respondents.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 12-3053

___________________________

Mark E. Campbell

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Arkansas Department of Correction; Grant Harris, Former Warden, Arkansas

Department of Correction; John Whalen, Former Warden, Arkansas Department of

Correction; Darryl Golden, Former Deputy Warden, Arkansas Department of

Correction; James Banks, Warden, Varner Unit, ADC; Curtis Meizner, Assistant

Warden, Varner Unit, ADC; Ravonna Walker, Classification Officer, Varner Unit,

ADC; Cherya Jones, Sgt., Varner Unit, ADC; Larry May, Chief Deputy, Arkansas

Department of Correction

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Pine Bluff

____________

 Submitted: July 30, 2013

Filed: August 8, 2013

[Unpublished]

____________

Before WOLLMAN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.
Inmate Mark E. Campbell appeals following the district court’s adverse grant

1

ofsummary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Upon de novo review, see King

v. Iowa Dep’t of Corrs., 598 F.3d 1051, 1052 (8th Cir. 2010), and careful

consideration of Campbell’s arguments for reversal, we find no basis for overturning

the district court’s determination that Campbell exhausted his administrative remedies

only as to his failure-to-protect claim against Sergeant Cheryl Jones, see id. at 1052

(inmate must complete administrative exhaustion process according to applicable

procedural rules as precondition to bringing suit in federal court). As to the grant of

summary judgment to Jones, we agree with the district court that there were no

trialworthy issues. See Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (8th Cir. 2010)

(reviewing de novo grant of summary judgment, construing evidence in light most

favorable to nonmovant and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor; discussing

requirements to prevail on failure-to-protect claim); Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d

1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1998) (in assessing prison official’s response to known risk to

inmate safety, deliberate indifference issomething more than negligence but lessthan

actual intent to harm). The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Arkansas.

-2-
### §§1594h to 1594i. Repealed. Pub. L. 97–214, §7(3), (5), (9), (17), July 12, 1982, 96 Stat. 173, 174

Section 1594h, Pub. L. 85–241, title I, §103, Aug. 30, 1957, 71 Stat. 534, related to purchase of family housing for assignment as public quarters, and space and cost limitations.

Section 1594h–1, Pub. L. 87–554, title V, §503, July 27, 1962, 76 Stat. 239, related to improvement of family housing units, public quarters designation, and cost limitations.

Section 1594h–2, Pub. L. 90–110, title VI, §610(a), Oct. 21, 1967, 81 Stat. 305; Pub. L. 93–166, title V, §506(a), Nov. 29, 1973, 87 Stat. 675; Pub. L. 95–356, title V, §502(b), Sept. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 578; Pub. L. 96–418, title V, §502(b), Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1764, related to improvement of single family housing units and cost limitations of such improvements. See section 2825(b) of Title 10, Armed Forces.

Section 1594h–3, Pub. L. 96–418, title V, §505, Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1765, related to settlement of contractor claims on military family housing.

Section 1594i, Pub. L. 85–241, title IV, §406(a) Aug. 30, 1957, 71 Stat. 556; Pub. L. 85–685, title V, §512, Aug. 20, 1958, 72 Stat. 662; Pub. L. 86–149, title IV, §408, Aug. 10, 1959, 73 Stat. 321; Pub. L. 86–500, title V, §507(b), June 8, 1960, 74 Stat. 185; Pub. L. 87–70, title VI, §611(b), June 30, 1961, 75 Stat. 180; Pub. L. 88–174, title V, §510, Nov. 7, 1963, 77 Stat. 327, related to authorization of number of family housing units. See section 2822 of Title 10.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1982, and applicable to military construction projects, and to construction and acquisition of military family housing before, on, or after such date, see section 12(a) of Pub. L. 97–214, set out as an Effective Date note under section 2801 of Title 10, Armed Forces.
§ 230.131 Definition of security issued under governmental obligations. ( a ) Any part of an obligation evidenced by any bond, note, debenture, or other evidence of indebtedness issued by any governmental unit specified in section 3(a)(2) of the Act which is payable from payments to be made in respect of property or money which is or will be used, under a lease, sale, or loan arrangement, by or for industrial or commercial enterprise, shall be deemed to be a separate *security* within the meaning of section 2(l) of the Act, issued by the lessee or obligor under the lease, sale or loan arrangement.
( b ) An obligation shall not be deemed a separate *security* as defined in paragraph (a) of this section if, ( 1 ) the obligation is payable from the general revenues of a governmental unit, specified in section 3(a)(2) of the Act, having other resources which may be used for payment of the obligation, or
( 2 ) the obligation relates to a public project or facility owned and operated by or on behalf of and under the control of a governmental unit specified in such section, or
( 3 ) the obligation relates to a facility which is leased to and under the control of an industrial or commercial enterprise but is a part of a public project which, as a whole, is owned by and under the general control of a governmental unit specified in such section, or an instrumentality thereof.
( c ) This rule shall apply to transactions of the character described in paragraph (a) of this section only with respect to bonds, notes, debentures or other evidences of indebtedness sold after December 31, 1968.
(15 U.S.C. 77w)
[33 FR 12648, Sept. 6, 1968, as amended at 35 FR 6000, Apr. 11, 1970]
528.311-1 Contract clause. 		    Use the clause at FAR 52.228-7, Insurance–Liability to Third Persons, in solicitations and contracts, other than those for construction and those for architect-engineer services, when a cost-reimbursement contract is contemplated, unless the head of the contracting activity waives the requirement for use of the clause. 	  **Parent topic:** 528.311 Solicitation provision and contract clause on liability insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts.