J-S04044-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

TENTH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH

v.

PHILIP SNYDER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1321 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered April 18, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 190703016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 31, 2024

We have twice remanded this matter to the trial court for further factual 

findings concerning the scope of a preliminary injunction regarding its physical 

distance limitation. My learned colleagues remand for a third time. I 

respectfully dissent as I would hold that the trial court has offered sufficient 

facts to justify the limitation.

The Tenth Presbyterian Church (“the Church”) excommunicated the 

appellant, Philip Snyder (“Snyder”), in 2016. Snyder then began protesting 

outside a church located at 1701 Delancey Street. Shortly thereafter, Snyder 

unsuccessfully sued various members of the Church and its administrators for 

defamation. Following that loss, Snyder increased his protests. His conduct 

prompted the Church to seek and obtain a preliminary injunction in July of 

2019. The scope of that injunction with respect to its distance limitation is 

before this Court for the fourth time. 
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The validity of the injunction is not at issue; i.e., this appeal does not 

entail an assessment of whether Snyder’s free speech rights were lawfully 

restricted in the first instance. Nor is the scope of the injunction at issue in 

terms of the conduct it proscribes. The only issue is whether the trial court

offered sufficient facts to justify a 350-foot buffer zone around six Church

buildings. I begin my assessment of that question with a brief overview of 

the factual and legal conclusions underpinning the injunction. The latest order 

summarizes the essential facts:

Th[e c]ourt finds that . . . Snyder . . . has engaged in aggressive, 

and disruptive behavior that is harassing to employees, 

congregants, and the owners of [the Church]. The evidence 

demonstrates that Mr. Snyder’s actions outside the church, 

frightened congregants to the point where they did not feel safe 

to attend church services.

Order, 4/18/23, at unnumbered 1-2. The impetus for the injunction was 

Snyder’s verbal harassment of the Church’s attendees as they made their way 

to services. He mailed over 100 pages of material to approximately 200 

members of the Church and declared that he would not stop his activities until 

all of the Church’s leadership resigned. Snyder also claimed that said 

leadership was plotting to assassinate him. The trial court credited testimony 

from Douglas Baker, the Church’s administrator, that Snyder made specific 

threats. Baker testified that several members informed him that Snyder made 

direct threats against the Church’s senior minister. Baker testified that Snyder 

became increasingly animated after his defamation suit failed. Following the 

verdict, Snyder ramped up his social media presence, posting clips of his 
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confrontations with church members. Snyder’s protests could be heard during 

church services. The Church requested a preliminary injunction barring 

Snyder from coming within 1,000 feet of the various buildings. 

The trial court granted the injunction, setting the distance at 5,000 feet. 

We upheld the injunction except for that restriction, which we vacated because 

it “places Snyder well beyond the point at which his constitutional right to 

protest is utterly extinguished.” Tenth Presbyterian Church v. Snyder, 

266 A.3d 640, 2021 WL 4839339, at *7 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential 

decision). On remand, the trial court imposed the 1,000 feet restriction 

originally requested by the Church as to specific properties, but its order 

vaguely indicated that other properties could be included. “While the order 

lists the street addresses of five such properties, the restriction is not 

necessarily limited to those specified.” Tenth Presbyterian Church v.

Snyder, 285 A.3d 917, 2022 WL 4101153, at *4 (Pa.Super. 2022) (nonprecedential decision) (internal quotation marks omitted). We vacated the 

order, criticizing the trial court’s blanket 1,000-foot ban for “disregard[ing] 

our prior finding that the Church’s requested relief of a uniform 1,000-foot 

distance restriction is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to balance the 

congregants’ ability to access Church [p]roperties with Snyder’s right to free 

speech.” Id. The trial court entered a new order on remand, which 

“shortened the distance requirement to 500 feet and made several factual 

findings in support of the new restriction.” Tenth Presbyterian Church v. 

Snyder, 296 A.3d 569, 2023 WL 2292067, at *1 (Pa.Super. 2023) (non-
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precedential decision). In support of the 500-foot limit, the trial court cited 

an internet search result indicating that a typical city block is between 310 

and 323 feet in length. We again remanded, agreeing with Snyder that the 

court failed to comply with our directive.

As noted, we asked the trial court to set forth why its 1000-foot 

restriction was the least necessary distance “to protect Church 

property, permit the congregants’ and Church employees access 

to the Church and to hold services without distraction, with the 

least possible impingement on Snyder’s constitutional right to 

convey his dissatisfaction with the Church and its leadership on 

public streets and sidewalks.”

On remand, the trial court, in setting its new distance requirement 

at 500 feet, did not cite any record evidence or receive any new 

evidence. Instead, the trial court cited its own internet research 

that a “typical” city block is 310 to 323 feet in length, seemingly 

concluding that keeping Snyder around a block-and-a-half away 

from the Church was the only way to ensure that his protest does 

not deter congregants and employees of the Church from 

accessing its properties.

The problem with this conclusion, however, is that it is not clear 

what evidence the trial court is relying on for its finding that 500 

feet is appropriate under the facts of this case, taking into 

consideration the physical layout of the Church’s properties and 

the surrounding neighborhood. Like it failed to do before, there 

is no evidence that the trial court, in setting its distance 

requirement, weighed the physical characteristics of the Church’s 

property and then tailored its distance requirement so that Snyder 

could still meaningfully protest the Church and its leadership. In 

the absence of such evidence in this case, we are left to conclude 

that the trial court’s distance requirement of 500 feet—which 

would be well over the length of a football field—still puts Snyder’s 

protests well out of sight of the Church and, therefore, effectively 

extinguishes his constitutional right to protest. Thus, like we did 

before, we are constrained to vacate the trial court’s order with 

respect to its 500-foot distance requirement.

Id. at *6 (cleaned up).
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The court then vacated the prior order and entered a new one, setting 

a distance limit of 350 feet as to the six properties, which brings us to this 

appeal. The Majority concludes that we must remand yet again, as the record 

must include “evidence which demonstrates that the distance limitation 

imposed by the trial court is narrowly tailored to the particular characteristics 

of the Church properties and the practical considerations attendant to the need 

to ensure safe and peaceful access by congregants and employees to those 

properties.” Majority Memorandum at 12. Indeed, the Majority notes that 

the more onerous distance limitations imposed in prior orders may have been 

valid. Id. at 12 n.5 (“[A]lthough the trial court elected to reduce the distance 

limitation following each prior remand, those reductions might not have been 

necessary if the trial court had directed this Court to record evidence 

demonstrating that the distance limitation was narrowly tailored to the 

particular facts of this case.”). The Majority concludes that the trial court has 

once again failed to follow our order to provide specific facts. Anticipating the 

trial court’s frustration, the Majority offers some direction as to the type of 

facts the court should consider, such as “whether the Church has any on-site 

parking in which congregants and employees may park for work, meetings, 

services, events, functions, etc., and if so, whether such on-site parking is 

sufficient to accommodate employees and congregants.” Id. at 12-13. If 

there is no on-site parking, the court “should consider how far a distance from 

Church properties do employees and congregants generally need to park in 
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order to attend work, meetings, services, events, and functions at Church 

properties.” Id. at 13. 

I appreciate my learned colleagues’ effort to guide the trial court on 

remand. However, I think that we have lost sight of why we upheld the 

injunction and are demanding that the trial court supply a level of precision

that the law does not require. I conclude that the trial court adequately

balanced Snyder’s right to protest against the security interests of the Church 

and its members. With respect to the 350-foot buffer zone, the trial court 

made these findings:

5. Th[e c]ourt also finds that a [350]. . . foot restriction upon 

[Snyder] from the above-mentioned properties is the least 

necessary to protect Church property and permit congregants as 

well as employees to access to both the Church and its services. 

6. A restriction of [350] . . . feet will represent the lease [sic] 

possible impingement on Snyder’s [c]onstitutional right to convey 

his dissatisfaction with the Church and its leadership on public 

streets and sidewalks, while [at the] same time allow employees, 

and congregants to access the church and grant them the ability 

to hold services without fear of harassment, distraction[,] or 

safety concerns.

Order, 4/18/23, at unnumbered 4 (footnote omitted).

The trial court concluded that the restriction will still “permit [Snyder] 

to continue to exercise his constitutional right to freedom of speech,” while 

“keep[ing] him sufficient distance away from [the Church] property so as to

prevent any egregious distraction[,] harassment[,] or safety concerns by 

congregants, employees, or owners.” Id. at n.3. In selecting the 350-foot 
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requirement, the trial court “considered the specific physical characteristic of 

the properties[,] age[,] and lack of security infrastructure.” Id. 

I conclude that these reasons are sufficient. Snyder argues that the 

“trial court did not consider—and conducted no analysis—as to whether there 

is a distance between twenty feet and 350 feet at which Snyder’s protests 

would no longer be heard from inside the Church.” Majority Memorandum at 

10. However, the trial court’s justification for the restriction goes well beyond 

noise disturbances. The trial court specifically accepted that several 

churchgoers were “frightened . . . to the point where they did not feel safe to 

attend church services.” Order, 4/18/23, at unnumbered 2. In our first 

decision, we explained that “orders affecting First Amendment rights ‘must be 

tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case.’” Tenth 

Presbyterian Church, 2021 WL 4839339 at *3 (quoting Carroll v. 

Comm’rs, 393 U.S. 175, 184 (1968)). The injunction “must be couched in 

the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted 

by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order.” Id. 

(emphasis in original). I conclude that the order meets these criteria. The 

“pin-pointed objective” here is the safety concerns, and the validity of the 

350-foot buffer zone must be considered in conjunction with that objective. 

The Majority, in contrast, is focused on the language “couched in the 

narrowest terms,” largely overlooking the “pin-pointed objective” that justified 

limiting Snyder’s free speech rights. I appreciate the concern that the 350-

foot buffer zone may not be the narrowest possible limitation. However, that 
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concern will always apply. Requiring the trial court to precisely specify why it 

went with 350 feet instead of, say, 337 feet, is a bit like trying to clearly 

identify when a pool of water becomes deep. In truth, there’s a spectrum,

and the trial court must be given some leeway. I fully agree with our prior 

decisions that 5,000 feet and 1,000 feet were too restrictive.1 I am less sure 

about our rejection of the 500-foot buffer, but that decision is the law of the 

case and the trial court on remand further reduced that distance by 150 feet. 

The reality is that the trial court had to select a rough approximation that 

allowed Snyder to still convey his displeasure towards the Church while 

protecting the Church’s members as they go about their business and attend 

services. 

In requiring “the least possible infringement on Snyder’s constitutional 

right to protest,” Majority Memorandum at 11-12, the Majority’s approach 

sounds like the “strict scrutiny” standard applied to content-based speech 

restrictions. “For the state to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show 

that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it 

is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc.

Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). But the “narrowly drawn to 

achieve that end” test does not apply to this injunction. Recall that in our 

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1 This author joined the memorandum authored in the first decision, which 

involved the 5,000-foot restriction.
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decision upholding the injunction, we cited Carroll for the appropriate 

standard, which states, in relevant part:

An order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be 

couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pinpointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the 

essential needs of the public order. . . . In other words, the order 

must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the 

case.

Carroll, 393 U.S. at 184.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the Carroll standard is 

not the same as strict scrutiny. In Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 

512 U.S. 753 (1994), the High Court dealt with a permanent injunction “which 

prohibits antiabortion protesters from demonstrating in certain places and in 

various ways outside of a health clinic that performs abortions.” Id. at 757. 

In determining what standard applied, the Court held, “when evaluating a 

content-neutral injunction, we think that our standard time, place, and 

manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous.[2] We must ask instead whether 

the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than 

necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Id. at 765. 

Our prior decisions have not examined whether the injunction is 

content-neutral, and we unfortunately lack advocacy on this point given the 

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2 Time, place, and manner restrictions are subject to “intermediate scrutiny.” 

See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) 

(“[R]egulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an 

intermediate level of scrutiny . . . because in most cases they pose a less 

substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public 

dialogue.”). 
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limited nature of our remand orders. I conclude that the restrictions are 

content-neutral and thus strict scrutiny does not apply. The hallmark of a 

content-neutral restriction is that it is “justified without reference to the 

content of the regulated speech,” Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.

Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976), and 

that is the case here. I recognize that, by targeting Snyder as an individual, 

the injunction is necessarily based on the content of his protests and the 

viewpoint it expresses. The Madsen Court addressed this same point: 

An injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a particular group 

(or individuals) and regulates the activities, and perhaps the 

speech, of that group. It does so, however, because of the group’s 

past actions in the context of a specific dispute between real 

parties. The parties seeking the injunction assert a violation of 

their rights; the court hearing the action is charged with 

fashioning a remedy for a specific deprivation, not with the 

drafting of a statute addressed to the general public.

The fact that the injunction in the present case did not prohibit 

activities of those demonstrating in favor of abortion is justly 

attributable to the lack of any similar demonstrations by those in 

favor of abortion, and of any consequent request that their 

demonstrations be regulated by injunction. There is no 

suggestion in this record that Florida law would not equally 

restrain similar conduct directed at a target having nothing to do 

with abortion; none of the restrictions imposed by the court were 

directed at the contents of petitioner’s message.

Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762–63.

Similarly, this injunction is due to Snyder’s conduct in expressing his 

messages, not the content or viewpoint of the messages themselves. That 

point is relevant to the scope of the injunction. “An injunction is narrowly 

tailored to protect a significant public interest when its scope does not exceed 
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that which is necessary to protect the interest involved. The permissible scope 

of the restriction also depends on where, in the spectrum from conduct to pure 

speech, the speech in question lies.” Klebanoff v. McMonagle, 552 A.2d 

677, 680 (Pa.Super. 1988). We have accepted the trial court’s factual findings 

relative to the threat posed by Snyder, and I conclude that the 350-foot 

restriction is narrowly tailored.

Finally, I find pertinent the Madsen Court’s discussion of a 300-foot 

buffer zone. One of the conditions imposed by the injunction was that 

“petitioners refrain from physically approaching any person seeking services 

of the clinic ‘unless such person indicates a desire to communicate’ in an area 

within 300 feet of the clinic.” Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773. The purpose was 

“to prevent clinic patients and staff from being ‘stalked’ or ‘shadowed’ by the 

petitioners as they approached the clinic.” Id. The Court held that this 

restriction was invalid. 

But it is difficult, indeed, to justify a prohibition on all uninvited 

approaches of persons seeking the services of the clinic, 

regardless of how peaceful the contact may be, without burdening 

more speech than necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure 

access to the clinic. Absent evidence that the protesters’ speech 

is independently proscribable (i.e., “fighting words” or threats), or 

is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat 

of physical harm, this provision cannot stand. 

Id. at 774.

In contrast, the trial court here made specific factual findings that 

Snyder “escalating and troubling pattern of aggression, intimidation, and 

threats to congregants and Church employees as they come and go from 
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services, such that many congregants fear for their safety and many no longer 

attend Church services.” Majority Memorandum at 11. Thus, unlike the 

invalid buffer zone in Madsen, the trial court imposed a buffer zone to ensure

that the Church membership could exercise their own constitutional right to 

freedom of religion without being subject to harassment. Furthermore, unlike 

the injunction in Madsen, which applied to certain individuals and members

of specific organizations, this injunction targets Snyder in his individual 

capacity, and is specifically justified by his own past behavior. 

Due to the safety concerns, I conclude that the 350-foot buffer zone 

burdens no more speech than necessary. Snyder is not prohibited from 

expressing his disapproval of the Church, its leadership, its members, or any 

other topic. Forcing him to remain 350 feet away from the property of the 

Church strikes a sufficient balance of Snyder’s right to continue protesting and 

alert the public and Church of his grievances while safeguarding the Church

and its members. “One may register a public protest by placing a vulgar 

message on his jacket and, in so doing, expose unwilling viewers. 

Nevertheless, that does not mean that he has an unqualified constitutional 

right to follow and harass an unwilling listener, especially one on her way to 

receive medical services.” Id. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). 

Similarly, Snyder has the right to present his messages, but he does not have 

the right to harass the Church’s membership. 

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent as I conclude that the 

trial court’s findings are sufficient to justify the physical distance limitation.