IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-0443

Filed May 17, 2017

IN THE INTEREST OF J.R. and E.W.,

Minor Children,

K.P., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Benton County, Susan F. Flaherty, 

Associate Juvenile Judge.

A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights. 

AFFIRMED.

Patricia J. Meier of Nidey Erdahl Tindal & Fisher, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, 

for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ana Dixit, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Robert W. Davison, Cedar Rapids, for minor children.

Robert B. Fischer of Robert B. Fischer Law Firm, Vinton, for father of J.R. 

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
2

DANILSON, Chief Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights,

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arguing

termination is not in the children’s best interests due to the closeness of the 

parent-child bond and the fact that the children are in a relative placement. 

We review termination proceedings de novo. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 

110 (Iowa 2014). 

“Termination of parental rights under chapter 232[2]follows a three-step 

analysis.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). First, we determine if a 

ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been established. Id. at 

706-07. We then apply the statutory best-interest framework set out in section 

232.116(2) to decide if the grounds for termination should result in a termination 

of parental rights. Id. at 707. Finally, we consider if any statutory exceptions set 

out in section 232.116(3) should serve to preclude termination of parental rights.

Id.

The mother does not contest that grounds for termination exist,3so we 

need not discuss this step. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

The statute informs us that in determining whether termination is in the 

children’s best interests, we are to “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s 

safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of 

the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of 

the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Determining the best interests of the 

 

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J.R.’s father’s parental rights are not at issue. E.W.’s father is unknown.

2 All statutory references are to the 2016 Iowa Code.

3 The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code 

section 232.116(1)(f) (as to J.R.), (1)(h) (as to E.W.), and (1)(l) (as to both). 
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children “requires considering what the future holds for the child[ren] if returned 

to the parents.” In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997). “When making 

this decision, we look to the parent[’s] past performance because it may indicate 

the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.” Id.

Here, the mother continues to struggle with a long history of unresolved 

mental-health and substance-abuse issues, which struggle places the children at 

risk of inadequate supervision. The mother contends: “Given the closeness of 

the relationship between [the mother] and the children, and the fact that [the 

mother] has only just begun to seriously address her mental health, it would be in 

the children’s best interests to afford [the mother] several more months to make 

progress.” We disagree.

The children have been waiting longer than the statutory time frame, and 

the mother has only “just begun” to address her issues. “[O]ur legislature has 

carefully constructed a time frame to provide a balance between the parent’s 

efforts and the child[ren]’s long-term best interests.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. 

Waiting for fourteen months to make an effort is too late. We adopt the juvenile 

court’s findings:

[The mother] has been given sufficient time to demonstrate 

that she can maintain sobriety and achieve stable mental health. 

Over the course of the past fourteen months, she has not yet

followed through with the most basic action steps of consistently 

participating in substance abuse treatment and mental health 

counseling. The children would continue to be at imminent risk of

harm if returned to the care of their mother due to [the mother]’s 

inability to establish a sufficient period of sobriety or stable mental 

health. [The mother] acknowledged in her testimony that, if using

methamphetamine, she is not a safe caretaker for her children. In 

addition to becoming “edgy,” her memory is affected by 

methamphetamine use. [The mother] testified that she plans to 

begin mental health counseling, but has not yet scheduled an 
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appointment with her chosen counselor. She currently has 

medication prescribed when she was at Horizons for inpatient 

treatment in early January, but she has not scheduled an 

appointment yet to obtain a refill, testifying that the doctor told her 

she didn’t need to until she was almost out of medication. Clearly, 

based on the lack of progress by [the mother], if the children were 

returned to her custody they would be subjected to the same 

adjudicatory harms that led to their removal from their mother's 

custody.

[The mother] acknowledged that she is not yet in a position 

to safely resume care of her children. She knows that she needs 

more time to achieve sustained sobriety and also to address her 

co-occuring mental health treatment needs and resolution of past 

trauma. She acknowledges that her current home is not safe for 

the children. She has no employment and no source of income, 

relying on her mother for financial support. [The mother] has asked 

for additional time to continue to work on these issues. However, 

after reviewing the record and [the mother]’s lack of any real, 

sustained progress over the course of the past fourteen months, 

the court is unable to find a reasonable basis to believe that 

additional time would allow [the mother] to safely resume care of 

the children anytime in the reasonably near future.

Considering the physical, mental, and emotional needs of these children, asking 

them to continue waiting is not in the children’s best interests. 

We also disagree with the mother’s claims that placement of the children 

with a relative and the close bond between mother and children make termination 

unnecessary. Section 232.116(3) states: “The court need not terminate the 

relationship between parent and child[ren]” if the court finds “[a] relative has legal 

custody of the child[ren]” or if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that 

termination would be detrimental to the child[ren] at the time due to the closeness 

of the parent-child relationship.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a), (c). “‘The factors 

weighing against termination in section 232.116(3) are permissive, not 

mandatory,’ and the court may use its discretion, ‘based on the unique 

circumstances of each case and the best interests of the child[ren], whether to 
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apply the factors in this section to save the parent-child relationship.’” A.M., 843 

N.W.2d at 113 (quoting In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 474-75 (Iowa Ct. App.

2011)).

Here, the legal custody of the children was with the department of human 

services. Because legal custody is with the department, section 232.116(3)(a) 

does not apply. See id. And while the juvenile court noted the bond between 

mother and J.R. may be strong, it also noted the bond “may not be a healthy 

bond.” We agree there is a strong bond but the bond is with a mother who has 

failed to begin mental-health counseling, has not been able to complete 

substance-abuse treatment, and has shown little progress in fourteen months. 

We do not find the parent-child bond here precludes termination of the mother’s 

parental rights. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.