Making Peace Possible

NO. 158 | February 2020

PEACEWORKS

Rethinking Transnational Terrorism

AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

By Martha Crenshaw
NO. 158 | February 2020

Making Peace Possible

The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of

the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

© 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace

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Peaceworks No. 158. First published 2020.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-796-1

GLOBAL

POLICY

ABOUT THE REPORT

Drawing on an extensive review of the recent literature, this report considers the extent 

to which civil war and military interventions by foreign powers function as drivers of 

and rationales for transnational terrorism. The research was supported by the Policy, 

Learning, and Strategy Center at the United States Institute of Peace.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Martha Crenshaw is senior fellow emerita at the Center for International Security and 

Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, and 

professor emerita of government at Wesleyan University in Connecticut. Explaining Terrorism, a collection of her essays on the causes, processes, and consequences of terrorism, 

was published in 2011. She is the author (with Gary LaFree) of Countering Terrorism (2017). 

Cover photo: Two men walk through a heavily damaged neighborhood in Raqqa, 

Syria, on April 4, 2019, more than a year after the city’s liberation from the Islamic 

State. (Photo by Ivor Prickett/New York Times)
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Contents

3 Civil War, Transnational Terrorism, and Military Intervention

9 Territory, Resources, and Ideological Messaging

13 Transnational Extremists and Local Conflicts

15 Do Extremists Win Civil Wars?

17 Third-Party Interventions and Transnational Terrorism

19 Conclusion and Recommendations
2 PEACEWORKS | NO. 158

Summary

Transnational terrorism poses a threat to all countries but is of immediate concern 

to the US government. After key losses of territory by insurgents and the subsequent withdrawal of US troops, forces of the self-styled Islamic State have regrouped in Iraq and are developing safe havens in war-torn Syria, accompanied by 

the stepped-up use of social media for recruiting and propaganda purposes. 

The response of the United States and its key security partners should be coordinated not only across governments but across the agencies of a specific state. 

The US response, for example, should entail policy coordination of defense 

agencies, humanitarian aid provision, the development of effective communications strategies, a well-thought-out plan for the use of force, if needed, and 

advance planning of postconflict stabilization strategies.

Mounting an appropriate response requires first understanding the complex 

interlinkages among civil war, transnational terrorism, and weak governance. 

Conflicts in Mali, Chechnya, Syria, and other fragile states disrupted by civil war 

and facing actions from global terrorist networks suggest the different ways in 

which these factors may interact and the different paths to a solution, including 

bi- or trilateral negotiations that include extremist groups at the negotiations 

table. However, governments supporting weak states need not wait for critical 

events entailing loss of life to occur before offering multidimensional assistance.

Recognizing the conditions under which extremist threats emerge allows governments to take defensive and mitigating measures before a crisis takes shape. 

Patience and adopting a long view of regional developments greatly aid in 

assessing and responding to global jihadist threats; governments should not 

overpromise results or exaggerate threats.
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Civil war, transnational terrorism, and foreign military intervention have been studied separately but are rarely considered in combination. The connections between 

and among terrorism, civil war, and military intervention are complex, and the points 

of overlap do not fit neatly into simple causal models. Yet understanding how these 

issues interconnect matters to American and international security. Far-away violence 

and disorder can undermine the security of the American homeland.1

 Governments 

need an integrated approach to appraising the threat of violent jihadist extremism, 

one that takes into account complexity, contingency, and unintended consequences.

Such an integrated approach should help in explaining these phenomena in a few 

different ways. First, it helps explain the staying power of the jihadist call for a pan-Islamic identity to defend Muslims against Western aggression. Civil wars and third-party interventions in local conflicts are propaganda assets in modern information warfare 

and help justify transnational terrorism. Second, it reveals how civil war and state 

weakness create opportunities for nonstate actors to establish operational bases and 

A local militia member patrols the hills in Afghanistan's Nangarhar Province, where the Afghan branch of the Islamic State had its stronghold, on February 15, 2019. (Photo by Jim Huylebroek/New York Times)

Transnational

terrorism can be

seen as insurgency

on a global scale, a

violent campaign

aimed at influencing

a worldwide audience

and encouraging

followers through

the use of modern

communications

technology. 

Civil War, Transnational Terrorism, 

and Military Intervention
4 PEACEWORKS | NO. 158

acquire material resources, which makes them more 

threatening and may provoke third-party military intervention. Foreign military intervention can in turn precipitate both civil war and transnational terrorism. And 

third, it helps clarify the nexus of civil war and transnational terrorism: civil wars furnish openings for transnational terrorist networks to exploit local struggles, thus 

extending the global reach of violent jihadism.

The information surfaced by an integrated framework 

suggests two immediate follow-on questions. First, what 

is the likely outcome of a civil war in which extremists 

are players? Do the extremists win? Second, does foreign military intervention lead to the escalation of transnational terrorism? Since the events of September 11, 

2001, and the advent of the US-initiated “war on terrorism,” the United States has relied extensively on military 

DEFINITION OF TERMS

A few terms used in this report bear defining. Civil wars are considered to be violent intrastate conflicts that 

pit a government against nonstate challengers, whether the latter are separatists motivated by ethnic or 

minority nationalist grievances, revolutionaries aiming to displace ruling elites, transnational Salafi jihadist 

networks, or a mix. Civil wars often take the form of insurgencies that aim to mobilize the population against 

the government rather than conventional warfare in which armies engage each other.

Terrorism manifests in attacks against civilians and against highly symbolic and emotionally resonant targets, 

such as a mosque, a commuter railway, or a government building. Such attacks are intended to maximize 

shock. Transnational terrorism involves actions in which victims, perpetrators, and sites of violence represent different states and nationalities. Transnational terrorist attacks may be initiated by local actors against 

foreign targets in the geographic conflict space, or by radicalized local residents or transnational networks 

against targets outside the combat zone. These features of actor and location distinguish transnational terrorism from terrorism carried out by local parties within civil wars, which is not unusual.a

These various categories of civil war and terrorism are not exclusive: civil war insurgents can simultaneously 

be transnational terrorists.b

Military intervention by outside states or international institutions such as the African Union, the European 

Union, NATO, or the United Nations ranges from providing limited security and informational assistance to 

embattled local governments to full-scale military deployment and occupation by ground forces. In between 

are airstrikes, special operations, and the provision of weapons and matériel, training, and other forms of onthe-ground assistance by outside troops.

Notes

a. One of the first studies is Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War,” Journal of Ethics 8 (2004): 97–138. A recent review can 

be found in Jessica A. Stanton, “Terrorism, Civil War, and Insurgency,” in Oxford Handbook on Terrorism, ed. Erica Chenoweth, Andreas Gofas, 

Richard English, and Stathis Kalyvas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

b. Martha Crenshaw, “Transnational Jihadism & Civil Wars,” Daedalus 146, no. 4 (Fall 2017): 59–70.
USIP.ORG 5

force to defeat terrorism, but such a response often 

becomes part of the problem, not the solution. Having a 

clear path to answering these questions would benefit 

the United States and its security partners.

THE POWER OF EXTREMIST 

IDEOLOGY AND MESSAGING

The current threat of transnational terrorism, represented 

in the main today by jihadism, can be seen as insurgency 

on a global scale, a violent campaign aimed at influencing 

a worldwide audience and encouraging followers through 

the use of modern communications technology. The message is disseminated worldwide through the use of both 

conventional media and social media, which the Islamic 

State (IS) has proved particularly adept at exploiting.2 The 

Rand Corporation has identified recruitment as the major 

goal of carefully targeted information campaigns conducted by IS, which is a form of “political warfare” practiced 

by both states and nonstates. The term was coined at 

the outset of the Cold War to describe nonkinetic actions 

short of war, such as “gray-zone” or “hybrid” tactics. In political warfare, the information war may be as important as 

battlefield conflict is to conventional warfare. Even when 

states possess vastly superior military power, nonstate 

armed groups can succeed in the battle of ideas.3

The response of the United States to jihadist propaganda has tended to focus on how and to whom the 

message is transmitted. One key approach is to try to 

block or restrict access to communication platforms, 

which range from social media to encrypted channels 

such as Telegram. A second approach is to immunize or 

protect the recipients of the message to make them less 

susceptible to its appeal. Many initiatives designed to 

counter violent extremism are thus centered on preventing radicalization and enhancing societal resilience. 

There have also been attempts to construct competing 

counternarratives in what is recognized to be a battle of 

ideas, although these have not shown great success.

These measures are not unreasonable, but American 

counterterrorism and counterextremism policies must 

also take into account the facts underlying the narrative. 

Without powerful content based on contemporary reality, 

messages would not resonate so strongly with audiences. 

Efforts to rein in extremists’ use of the internet, limit online 

propaganda, and prevent individual radicalization risk overlooking the reality on which such propaganda is based.

Certainly control of messaging allows jihadists to 

interpret the facts in a way favorable to their cause, but 

even if distorted the interpretation cannot be delinked 

from what is happening on the ground. Groups like 

IS can draw on the images and rhetoric of battlefield 

conflict to arouse sympathy for their cause and try to 

establish legitimacy, mobilize popular support, recruit 

fighters and suicide bombers for local struggles, and inspire the residents of enemy territory to turn to “homegrown” terrorism. A military response to terrorism and 

insurgency, especially when undertaken by third-party 

countries intervening in local conflicts, can be even 

more fruitfully leveraged to sustain the ideological 

narrative and make it actual, credible, persuasive, and 

urgent.4

 The threat to identity, the messaging reinforces, can be defined as now, not in the distant future, and 

very real, not imagined. The “war” is not metaphorical. 

Framing the use of violent extremism as a way to uphold 

a pan-Islamist identity—which includes coming to the 

defense of Muslims worldwide and establishing systems 

of governance based on Islam—helps explain the staying power of ideas that provide immediate motivation 

for acting on beliefs. The 1980s civil war in Afghanistan 

not only gave al-Qaeda its start as an organization, it 

also helped launch the narrative of a religious obligation 

to come to the defense of a threatened Sunni Muslim 

community. This idea was initially propagated by the 

Palestinian cleric Abdullah Azzam, a mentor to Osama 

bin Laden. The emotional appeal to a shared identity—

which at the time was not opposed by the United States 

and its allies since it was directed against their Cold War 

adversary, the Soviet Union—carries a potent message 

of in-group versus out-group and of an encompassing 

community in which every Muslim can find a place.
6 PEACEWORKS | NO. 158

Subsequent civil wars in Bosnia and Chechnya in the 

1990s similarly reinforced the narrative of a pan-Islamist 

identity under attack that originated in Afghanistan. 

Jihadist propagandists used the same discourse and 

communication tactics to do so. An analysis by Cerwyn 

Moore and Paul Tumelty of the legacy of the wars in 

Chechnya stressed extremists’ early recognition of the 

importance of broadcasting images and communiqués 

from a war zone, well before such propaganda expertise 

emerged in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, and their influence on 

a new wave of fighters. Moore and Tumelty noted that 

although a small number of jihadi videos had been shot in 

Bosnia, the filming of military operations in Chechnya and 

their widespread dissemination on CDs and the Internet in the 

second half of the 1990s provided potent propaganda for a 

second generation of jihadis in Europe and the Middle East.5

The filming of operations was apparently insisted on 

by Emir Khattab, the nom de guerre of a Saudi-born 

jihadist who arrived in Chechnya from the battlefields of 

Afghanistan and Tajikistan after the Russo-Chechen war 

escalated in 1994 and 1995.

Extremist messaging also reinforces the call to action in 

support of a pan-Islamist identity by evoking sympathy 

for suffering, in conjunction with anger and outrage, 

especially if accounts stress Western inaction when 

Muslims are victims. For example, a statement by bin 

Laden in November 2001 emphasized the suffering of 

Muslims and indifference on the part of the international community, referring to Russian attacks in Chechnya 

and children slaughtered in the war in Bosnia when 

nominally under the protection of the United Nations.6

More recently, Sunnis worldwide were outraged by the 

international community’s decision to adopt a bystander role in the face of atrocities perpetrated by the 

regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria.7

EXTREMIST MESSAGING AND THE 

TRANSNATIONAL MOBILIZATION OF FIGHTERS

The jihadist narrative of defending a pan-Islamist 

identity against threats is also a motivating factor in 

the “foreign fighter” phenomenon—foreign volunteers 

traveling to civil war zones to engage in jihad.8 From 

the perspective of the holistic framework proposed in 

this report, civil wars are a necessary condition for the 

mobilization of foreign fighters. Veterans of civil wars 

are credible and persuasive recruiters into terrorist networks and are often featured in jihadist propaganda.9

The attraction of the conflict raging in Afghanistan in 

the 1980s for foreign fighters is well established, and 

some states, such as Saudi Arabia, were not displeased 

to encourage the departure of troublesome domestic 

extremists. Subsequent civil wars, especially those that 

drew the intervention of non-Muslim occupying forces, 

created opportunities for the engagement of successive generations of foreign volunteers from around 

the world. Two of the 9/11 hijackers were members of 

the “Mujahideen Battalion” in Bosnia—“the heart of 

Europe,” according to bin Laden—from 1992 to 1996. 

Notable jihadists Suraqah al-Andalusi (a Briton who 

was killed fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan in 

November 2001) and Omar Sheikh (who kidnapped 

and killed American journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in 

2002) were inspired by videos of the war in Bosnia.10 In 

turn, Suraqah al-Andalusi’s death inspired Mohammad 

Sidique Khan, one of the suicide bombers who killed 

fifty-six people on July 7, 2005, in central London. 

The 2011 civil war in Syria precipitated a dramatic escalation in the number of foreign fighters, who arrived in 

the tens of thousands from at least seventy countries 

(see figure 1). As the war winds down, the question 

of how to treat former fighters and their families has 

posed a major problem for their home states and for 

Extremist messaging also reinforces the call to action in support of a pan-Islamist identity by evoking 

sympathy for suffering, in conjunction with anger and outrage, especially if accounts stress Western 

inaction when Muslims are victims.
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Figure 1. Foreign Fighters in the Syrian and Iraqi Civil Wars

In the mid-2010s, Syria and Iraq were destinations for the potentially the largest mobilization of foreign fighters in 

modern history. Estimates range from 30,000 to as many as 42,000. In the estimate below, nearly a third of the 

approximately 30,000 fighters traveled to Syria and Iraq from the former Soviet Republics.a

Notes

a. Richard Barrett, "Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees," Soufan Center, October 2017.

b. Maria Galperin Donnelly, Thomas M. Sanderson, and Zack Fellman, “Case Studies in History: Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya,” Foreign Fighter 

Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Includes artwork by Lucky Creative/Shutterstock

444 from North America

8,717 from the former Soviet republics

7,054 from the Middle East

5,778 from Western Europe

5,356 from the Maghreb

1,568 from South and 

Southeast Asia

845 from the Balkans 

ESTIMATES OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN PAST CONFLICTSb

Soviet-Afghan War (1979–89) No consensus, but estimates range from 10,000 to 35,000

Bosnian War (1992–95) 500 to 5,000, with most estimates in the 1,000 to 2,000 range

First Chechen War (1994–96) 200 to 300

Second Chechen War (1999–2000) 700
8 PEACEWORKS | NO. 158

the international community. Are former volunteers 

likely to return to terrorism and extremism, or has their 

ideological commitment waned? Some veterans of the 

civil wars in Iraq and especially Syria have been implicated in attacks in France, Belgium, and Indonesia.11

Even if returning foreign fighters are genuinely repentant, will their home publics accept them? If they are not 

allowed to return, what will happen?

This problem is especially acute for weak states struggling 

to consolidate their own legitimacy and facing an internal 

extremist threat, such as Tunisia, the source of a disproportionately large number of fighters who made their way 

to Syria. How to treat former fighters, whether foreign or 

not, is also a critical issue in Iraq, where the punitive treatment meted out not only to captured IS members but also 

to their dependents is likely to provoke Sunni anger and 

increase support for IS, which has recouped significant 

strength in Iraq since the collapse of the caliphate and 

continues its worldwide recruitment efforts.12

As the above reference to the July 2005 London bombings indicates, civil wars abroad, especially when accompanied by foreign military intervention, also contribute 

to inspiring homegrown terrorism in the countries from 

which foreign fighters originate—attacks against and 

within the individual’s home country. Choosing to attack 

at home to exact punishment or obtain revenge is often 

a substitute for going abroad to fight.13

It has become more common for terrorism within 

Western countries to be fueled through online propaganda, leading to apparent “self-radicalization,” rather 

than being organized and directed by specific extremist 

groups.14 In 2003, the invasion and occupation of Iraq 

was a potent source of what could be called motivational spillover, and social psychologists have proposed 

that anger over Western foreign policies continues to 

drive radicalization and legitimize terrorist attacks in the 

West.15 Most plots and attacks in the United States since 

9/11 fall into the category of self-directed, homegrown 

terrorism, including the Boston Marathon bombings in 

2013, the San Bernardino shootings in 2015, and the 

Orlando nightclub shooting the following year.16

Though ideological or religious appeal does not by itself 

explain the threat of transnational terrorism or the flow 

of volunteers to fight in civil wars abroad, it does appear 

to be a necessary element. Indeed, the mobilization of 

sizable numbers of foreign fighters to travel to conflict 

zones often is organized through local social networks 

of like-minded individuals. Al-Qaeda records seized in 

Iraq showed that in 2006 and 2007 many of the volunteers from abroad belonged to tight-knit social groups 

and were signed up by the same recruiter.17 They might 

have gone to the same high school, belonged to the 

same sports club or gym, or shared friends and relatives. 

They volunteered together, not individually.

Civil wars abroad, especially when accompanied by foreign military intervention, also contribute to 

inspiring “homegrown” terrorism in the countries from which foreign fighters originate—attacks against 

and within the individual’s home country.
USIP.ORG 9

Territory, Resources, and 

Ideological Messaging

The material side to the interaction of civil war, terrorism, and intervention—namely, control of territory 

and resources—reinforces the ideological dimension 

and provides a powerful recruitment signal. Civil 

wars provide transnational terrorists an opportunity 

to establish bases for organizing and training, though 

holding territory has distinct disadvantages as well.18

War settings are also propitious for acquiring weapons, equipment, money, and recruits. When insurgents 

build these capacities, and especially if they use fixed 

bases to launch transnational campaigns, local states 

and foreign allies are more likely to perceive them as a 

serious threat, leading to government repression (in the 

case of relatively strong states) or third-party intervention (in the case of weak states with powerful patrons), 

or both. Such a response increases the propaganda 

value of the insurgents’ cause and can be used to 

attract new fighters.

Whether sanctuary is critical to transnational terrorism, 

and, if so, whether civil wars are propitious settings, are 

contested questions. The utility of safe havens and the 

most useful locations for them depend on the context. 

Moreover, having a base confers both costs and benefits on violent nonstate actors.

Possessing a territorial base of operations was clearly 

important to the emergence of a strong threat from 

al-Qaeda: the organization’s move to Afghanistan 

in 1996 was the beginning of a “golden age” for it.19

With a secure safe haven, the organization could plan 

without interference, build out its structure, operate 

extensive training camps, and implement a military 

education system for recruits. Al-Qaeda was able to 

gain a foothold and flourish in Afghanistan because 

the Taliban prevailed in the civil war that followed 

the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The 9/11 attacks on the 

United States led to an American and NATO military 

intervention and occupation that defeated the Taliban 

and drove al-Qaeda’s central command into Pakistan. 

The Afghan state proved unable to establish either 

security or good government, however, thus permitting 

the Taliban to regroup. The United States is attempting direct talks with the Taliban in an effort to end US 

involvement, but a key obstacle to settling the extended conflict is uncertainty over whether the Taliban can 

credibly commit to not providing a base for al-Qaeda or 

other terrorist groups. The issue is all the more critical 

because the Afghan state’s weakness and the growth 

of extremist groups in Pakistan allowed both al-Qaeda 

and, later, IS to operate in Afghanistan.20

This case also illustrates some of the liabilities of territorial bases. One is the simple fact that the adversary 

has a fixed address to home in on. There are concrete 

targets for the adversary to attack, including training 

camps, weapons caches, economic resources such as 

oil fields, and communications facilities. The militant organization must develop a defensive strategy, though 

staying on the offensive is usually considered the core 

strategy of successful guerrilla warfare or terrorism. If 

control of the civilian population is involved, the practical tasks of governing can be distracting and daunting. 

Social services must be supplied, taxes collected, and 

order maintained.
10 PEACEWORKS | NO. 158

The risks associated with a fixed base have mounted in 

the era of drone warfare. Since 2002, American drone 

strikes have increased appreciably in Pakistan, Yemen, 

Somalia, and Libya. As states expand their retaliatory 

capabilities, a territorial sanctuary guarantees even less 

safety, particularly for high-profile leaders. An illustrative case is that of Anwar Al Awlaki, the propagandist 

for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula who was killed 

in Yemen by an American drone strike in 2011. Where 

states are torn by civil war, considerations of sovereignty are not a strong impediment to robust transnational 

counterterrorism efforts. In the context of high threat perceptions, the United States has proved willing to violate 

sovereignty, undertaking a risky raid to kill bin Laden in 

Abbottabad, Pakistan, for example. So neither a territorial base in a civil war zone nor clandestine sanctuary in 

a relatively strong state can be counted on to provide 

complete security for violent nonstate actors.

The value of holding territory also diminishes if extremist groups can function without fixed bases. An analysis 

of al-Shabaab’s activities in Somalia, for example, found 

that losing territory did not slow the operational tempo 

of the group’s terrorist attacks (though, admittedly, 

Somalia was in such a state of collapse that militants 

had extraordinary freedom of movement).21 Conflict has 

racked Somalia since the late 1980s, starting with rebellion against the military dictatorship of General Siad 

Barre and descending into turmoil after its collapse. 

Al-Shabaab emerged from this chaotic environment 

in 2006 as an even more radical splinter group of its 

parent organization, the oppositionist Islamic Courts 

Union (ICU), which lost control of most of its territory 

after Ethiopia intervened on behalf of the secular government.22 The ICU itself was torn between focusing 

on establishing Islamic rule in Somalia and adopting a 

global jihadist agenda, and al-Shabaab subsequently 

Newly trained al-Shabaab fighters perform military exercises in the Lafofe area south of Mogadishu, Somalia, in February 2011. (Photo by Farah Abdi 

Warsameh/AP)
USIP.ORG 11

became an affiliate of al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab has since 

been fighting both the Somali government and the 

African Union–mandated peacekeeping force. It is frequently targeted by American drone strikes and raids.

But perhaps it is the existence of failed and failing 

states in general, not civil war per se, that permits violent challengers to establish territorial bases, and with 

them, to provide sanctuary for terrorist groups. Perhaps 

holding territory is not so much a liability as it is superfluous. Transnational terrorist networks may prefer ungoverned spaces within a fragile state to dangerously 

violent conditions. They may prefer to conspire quietly 

without attracting notice. Yet failed states contribute to 

both civil war and terrorism—that is, state weakness is 

one of the conditions for civil wars. Conversely, as the 

political scientist Bridget Coggins has shown, civil war 

may explain both state failure and terrorism. In other 

words, civil wars are the cause of both failed states and 

transnational terrorism.23

Ideological and material considerations can reinforce 

each other, as the example of the self-proclaimed IS 

caliphate shows. As a territorial project that encompassed significant portions of both Syria and Iraq and 

erased the boundary between the two states, the notional caliphate drew not only unprecedented numbers 

of fighters from around the world but also followers 

who wanted to live in the utopia on Earth that IS media 

projected. The caliphate made IS into a powerful rival 

to al-Qaeda in the Salafi jihadist universe and enabled 

its rapid global expansion through affiliates, or wilaya,

around the world—into Egypt and elsewhere in Africa, 

the Caucasus, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia. As IS 

became a conventional military power, it was able to 

point to its achievements and thus attract more recruits.

Predictably, the assets that made IS powerful also made 

it vulnerable. It was the establishment of territorial control—the caliphate—that catalyzed the formation of the 

international coalition to defeat IS. Substantial military 

intervention by multiple parties, including the United 

States, Russia, Iran, and Turkey, would not have occurred 

absent IS’s battlefield victories. All were united against 

IS even if divided between upholding the Assad regime 

in Syria and supporting the nonjihadist opposition. The 

conflicting interests of the countries in the coalition 

meant that once the threat from IS appeared to recede, 

the prospects for establishing regional stability that 

would prevent its resurgence were dim.

CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENTS 

AID THE SURVIVAL OF MILITARILY 

DEFEATED EXTREMIST GROUPS

The survival of IS after the territories it controlled were 

finally wrested back from it in 2019 underscores the 

difficulty of relying on military victory to defeat jihadist 

ambitions and prevent terrorism.24 Transnational extremist groups can survive by moving across borders. 

Algeria’s experience is instructive. 

In the 1990s, Algeria was torn apart by a destructive 

civil war after the electoral success of an Islamist political party that threatened the regime’s hold on power. 

Violence broke out in 1992 when the Algerian government canceled national elections that the opposition 

party Islamic Salvation Front was poised to win.25 By 

the end of the decade, Algeria had suppressed the 

rebellion through a mix of force and accommodation, 

aided by the excesses of the most radical Islamists, 

some of whom were veterans of jihad in Afghanistan. 

However, in 2006 the local Salafist Group for 

Preaching and Combat signed on to the global al-Qaeda franchise, renaming itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM). It is now at the center of a movement 

that has spread terrorism and insurgency across the 

Sahel region. Algeria’s problem was exported to other, 

more vulnerable spaces.

Regional spread was possible because of the weakness of neighboring states and the porousness of their 

borders, as well as the transnational reach of jihadist 

ideology (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, 

and Côte d’Ivoire are all affected)—a subject to which 
12 PEACEWORKS | NO. 158

this report will return. As AQIM moved into Mali, it allied 

with local ethnic and separatist rebels, who had long 

resisted the government in Bamako. Ironically, the new 

coalition was able to seize control of most of northern 

Mali in 2013, in part because an earlier peace settlement with local rebels had reduced the central government’s presence.26 Regime stability had been further 

undermined by a military coup.

The sharp escalation of the jihadist challenge to Mali 

provoked military intervention by France and the United 

Nations. However, terrorism persisted despite serious 

military losses inflicted on the jihadist coalition, and 

cross-border activities expanded. Shortly after France 

intervened, a branch of AQIM attacked the In Amenas 

gas plant in the southern desert of Algeria, killing 

thirty-eight civilians, most of them foreigners. Jihadist 

groups have attacked foreign targets not only in Mali 

(for example, a hotel frequented by tourists and foreign 

business interests in Bamako) but also in Niger (by IS 

in the Greater Sahara against American troops) and 

Burkina Faso (against the French embassy). In response 

to the deterioration of the regional security situation, the 

European Union launched the regional G5 Sahel task 

force. American engagement in Africa supported these 

missions, but the future of the US role is now in doubt.

An additional complication is that rear bases in Libya, 

made possible by the Libyan civil war, have aided both 

al-Qaeda and IS, despite American airstrikes targeting 

these areas.27 When pressed by French conventional 

forces in Mali in 2013, for example, units linked to AQIM 

were able to retreat across the border into Libya.

FUNDING AND WEAPONS

Weapons and money are critical resources for violent 

nonstate actors. Terrorism is cheap compared to other 

violent means, but there is still a need for money and 

weapons, especially if transnational terrorism and insurgency are combined strategies. Consequently, cutting 

off terrorist financing has been a key US counterterrorism policy objective.

Civil wars tend to release flows of small arms, ammunition, and equipment, especially if turmoil follows sudden state collapse (as in Iraq or Libya). Ample supplies 

of small arms from Libya fueled violence in Mali, for 

example. In civil war settings, third-party allies of either 

the government or the rebels also supply weapons, 

with limited control over their end use. In Syria, for 

example, arms destined for “democratic” rebels fell into 

the hands of extremist groups such as the Al-Nusra 

Front (which evolved later into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham).

Transnational networks can also be arms suppliers. 

Again, Syria is a case in point: one reason for the resilience of the jihadist groups was their fighting prowess 

based on experience gained in Iraq and their access 

to weapons supplies. Nonjihadist groups depended 

on them to fight Assad despite ideological quarrels.28

Similar considerations drove local residents to welcome jihadists in Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s. In 

effect, fighting a civil war creates a demand for resources, which transnational jihadist networks can supply.

Funding for transnational terrorism and local insurgencies also comes from criminal activities and from 

exploiting local populations through various forms of 

extortion. In civil war settings, regulation of the illicit 

economy is minimal. In North Africa, kidnapping for 

ransom has been extremely lucrative. In 2014, New 

York Times reporter Rukmini Callimachi estimated that 

al-Qaeda and its affiliates had taken in $135 million in 

ransom payments since 2008.29 Mokhtar Belmokhtar, at 

one time head of AQIM’s southern command and subsequently the leader of the breakaway faction that organized the deadly attack on the In Amenas gas plant, 

was known as “Mr. Marlboro” because of his aptitude 

for profitable cigarette smuggling. Narcotrafficking has 

advantaged jihadist and separatist rebels, as well as 

some of the governing elite. It fuels corruption, which 

discredits the state and feeds into the jihadist call to 

overturn illegitimate and unjust secular rule. 
USIP.ORG 13

Transnational Extremists 

and Local Conflicts

The existence of global terrorist networks can transform 

small, local conflicts through the provision of funding, 

arms, and fighters. Funding for groups associated with 

global Salafi jihadist networks—essentially a transnational terrorist organization, with world-scale, anti-Western 

objectives—comes from wealthy individuals around the 

world, especially the Gulf region; loyalty to the organization gives access to its financial resources. The influence 

of ideologues and financiers from global networks can 

shape the identity, allegiance, and practices of local militants and rebels. Not only do transnational actors intervene in local struggles, local rebels may also reach out 

to global organizations for support. The mutual attraction 

between local rebels and transnational jihadist networks 

is an important factor contributing to the spread of 

violent extremism.30 The conflicts in Chechnya and Mali 

aptly illustrate how well-financed transnational terrorist 

networks can incorporate local struggles and redefine 

the course and nature of the conflict.

In the beginning, in the early 1990s, the Chechen 

struggle was largely secessionist and nationalist. 

Independence was the main goal. As the Soviet Union 

fell apart, a republic was declared in 1991; in 1994, 

Russia invaded. What was at stake in the conflict then 

shifted from the defense of a national, Chechen identity 

to a defense of a Muslim identity. Accordingly, in 1996, 

Chechnya was declared to be an Islamic state, and 

foreign fighters flocked to the Caucasus. 

In 1999, Chechen and foreign militants invaded 

Dagestan, which they considered to be part of a 

Caucasus emirate; that invasion in turn led to a second 

Russo-Chechen war. The militants also organized heavily 

publicized, high-casualty terrorist attacks in Russian population centers, including Moscow in 2002 and Beslan in 

2004. After the events of 9/11, Russia began to characterize the war in Chechnya as part of the global war on 

terrorism, claiming to be defending Chechens against 

al-Qaeda and global Salafi jihadism. In 2002, American 

troops were deployed to Georgia, which was a staging 

ground for Chechen rebels and foreign fighters.

Analyzing the evolution of the Chechen resistance from 

a nationalist to a militant Islamist orientation during the 

1990s, the researcher Julie Wilhelmsen observed that 

“a key motivation behind adopting Political Islam and 

Radical Islam was clearly also that willingness to commit to these ideologies paid off in financial and human 

resources. . . . Money can buy ideas.”31 Finding themselves in a position of weakness and isolation after the 

brutal confrontation with Russia (which included the 

destruction of Chechnya’s capital city, Grozny, in 1994 

and 1995), Chechen leaders reached out to actors and 

organizations in the Middle East and Asia for resources and fighters. By welcoming, even soliciting, global 

Salafi jihadist assistance, the Chechen rebels only 

strengthened Russian resolve to crush the rebellion.32

Russia’s victory then motivated committed Chechen 

fighters to migrate to other conflicts abroad (they would 

become an important fighting force for jihadists in the 

Syrian civil war), thus further contributing to the diffusion of extremism.

The conflict in Mali and its diffusion into the Sahel 

region provides another example of how transnational 
14 PEACEWORKS | NO. 158

extremist networks can redefine local conflicts stemming from separatist or ethnic grievances. The terrorist 

organization AQIM expanded into Mali by co-opting 

local actors. This move led to a sharp escalation of the 

conflict between the state and local tribal and ethnic 

groups in the north that had long suffered neglect and 

resisted centralized control, resulting in international 

intervention.33 AQIM was at the center of the March 

2017 merger of jihadist and ethnic (Tuareg and Fulani) 

groups into a single organization known as the Group 

for the Support of Islam and Muslims, or Jama’a Nusrat 

ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin. Its nominal leader, Iyad Ag 

Ghali, is a Tuareg rebel, active since the 1980s, who 

has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS 

ON LOCAL GROUPS’ STRATEGIES

Another unsettled question is the extent to which transnational extremist influence extends to changing local 

fighters’ strategies and tactics. In particular, do jihadist 

outsiders import the idea of suicide attacks? History 

suggests that ideological affinity is not a necessary 

condition for diffusion of the practice, which can follow 

the logic of expediency rather than the logic of identity 

and martyrdom. The tactic of suicide missions spread 

from Shia militants (Hezbollah in Lebanon) to nationalists (the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, 

in Sri Lanka) to Palestinians (primarily Hamas and the 

Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but also secular groups) and 

to al-Qaeda, and on to IS. 

Suicide attacks are regarded as effective because 

they tend to cause more casualties, achieve ingress to 

heavily defended targets, and garner more publicity. 

And they do more: over a decade ago, the political 

scientist Robert Pape proposed that suicide missions 

are successful in driving out foreign occupiers of a 

different religion, so the reason for imitation may simply 

be that the tactic works, especially when rebels face 

foreign military intervention.34 In Chechnya, for example, suicide attacks became prominent only after the 

struggle came to be framed in Salafi jihadist terms, but 

radical tactics were not welcomed throughout the resistance, and suicide attacks may have been as much 

a response to indiscriminate Russian repression as an 

expression of ideological conviction.35

On the other hand, for some foreign fighters, the opportunity to die as a martyr is an important motive for 

joining civil wars abroad.36 Framing suicide attacks as 

meaningful symbolic acts of personal martyrdom has 

been important not just to jihadist propaganda but as 

ideological justification for attacks on civilians in other 

conflicts, including, quite prominently, that between 

Israel and Palestine. Being chosen as a suicide bomber 

conferred elite status within the LTTE. Thus, the value 

of suicide missions exceeds the utilitarian and expands 

into the symbolic-ideological realm.
USIP.ORG 15

Do Extremists Win Civil Wars?

Civil wars usually end with the military victory of one 

side or a negotiated settlement and peace agreement. Typically, local governments and their outside 

supporters exclude the possibility of negotiating with 

jihadist extremists, who are regarded as untrustworthy 

absolutists hostile to compromise. As noted earlier, 

Mali negotiated only with separatist groups in reaching the 2015 peace agreement. Jihadist organizations 

were excluded from the process despite calls by 

civil society leaders to include some of them. Yet the 

United States has entered into negotiations with the 

Taliban in Afghanistan, and Algeria offered amnesty to 

individual Islamist rebels in the 1990s civil war through 

a national reconciliation process. There have recently 

been calls to negotiate with al-Shabaab in Somalia 

and Boko Haram in Nigeria.37

If negotiated settlements are difficult to achieve, 

are extremists likely to win? Is extremist ideology an 

advantage? On these points, the findings are mixed. 

Monica Duffy Toft and Yuri Zhukov conclude that militant groups linked to transnational extremist causes 

and employing foreign fighters are less susceptible to 

government coercion because they do not depend 

on the local population for support and are not tied 

to local interests. They are indifferent to the effects 

of indiscriminate government repression of civilians; 

for them, the driver is not a battle for local hearts and 

minds but the purity of the global cause.38 The case of 

Chechnya indicates that the grafting of jihadism onto 

local conflicts causes organizational fragmentation 

due to disputes over goals and strategy, when rebel 

cohesion is important to winning. But Aisha Ahmad 

argues that transnational extremists are less prone to 

Malian soldiers patrol the town of Diabaly, in northern Mali, in January 2013. Malian and French forces had just taken control of the town from Islamist 

rebels. (Photo by Marco Gualazzini/New York Times)
16 PEACEWORKS | NO. 158

factionalism than local groups, which are commonly 

fractured by parochial interests, commitments, and 

allegiances.39 On the other hand, Mohammed Hafez 

terms jihadists “fratricidal” militants who lose civil wars 

because of their rigid and intolerant views and propensity for killing civilians, especially fellow Muslims 

condemned as apostate. They alienate supporters as a 

consequence.40 Pointing to jihadist losses in civil wars 

in Algeria, Iraq, and Syria, Hafez disagrees with Barbara 

Walter, who contends that extremists have an advantage over moderates in civil wars.41 She approaches the 

choice of ideology as a strategic decision, thus aligning 

herself with the view that local groups might sign on to 

global jihad for reasons of expediency. She concludes 

that because jihadists are more effective fighters and 

better able to assure followers that they will not be corrupt once in power, they are able to attract moderate 

as well as extremist support. People want to be on the 

winning side regardless of ideology. Yet Page Fortna 

reports that in general, groups that use terrorism in the 

course of fighting civil wars do not win.42

Are foreign fighters, who typically have adopted an 

extremist ideology, an asset or a liability on the battlefield for civil war rebels?43 Again, the answer is 

not straightforward.44 On the basis of interviews with 

foreign fighters in the Al-Nusra Front and IS in Syria, 

Vera Mironova summarizes their assets as possessing 

knowledge (including language and technical skills) 

and experience, having access to funds, being dedicated and loyal to the cause (at a minimum, they are 

unlikely to defect because they have nowhere to go), 

and propaganda value.45 Foreign fighters are most 

often the executioners in beheading videos, and local 

populations fear them in part because language barriers make it impossible to communicate (most foreign 

fighters do not speak Arabic). On the negative side, 

the language barrier is also an obstacle to combat 

effectiveness. Foreign fighters’ backgrounds are hard 

to screen, so they are often suspected of being spies. 

They may segregate themselves according to ethnic or 

national background, Uzbeks with Uzbeks, Tajiks with 

Tajiks, thus undermining unit cohesion. This compartmentalization also makes it hard for their superiors to 

control them and maintain discipline. They are less 

risk averse than local fighters, leading to disputes over 

strategy. In particular, foreign fighters are more likely 

to refuse even tactical compromise and to insist on 

fighting to the end. Thus, if jihadists are unlikely to win 

a war, the presence of foreign fighters might make civil 

wars longer and more intractable.46

The consequences of who wins extend beyond the 

short-term outcome of the war. Some scholars have 

argued that jihadists on the winning side turn to transnational attacks at home (as in the attacks in Paris in 

2015), but defeated foreign fighters do not, largely because few are left.47 The proposition is that rebel victory produces an excess of foreign fighters who want 

to continue the struggle. The return of foreign fighters 

to their home countries is a pressing international 

concern since the numbers are high, governments 

disagree as to a policy solution, and many countries 

are at risk. Veterans from either winning or losing 

conflicts also may move on to other wars: the winners 

in Afghanistan went to Chechnya and the losers in 

Chechnya went to Syria. Veterans are experienced at 

handling weapons and explosives and are persuasive 

recruiters; their expertise and authentic presentation are valued. If not exactly mercenaries, they are 

mobile, and can move from conflict to conflict as long 

as there are civil wars to fight in. There is no shortage 

of destinations, including Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Mali 

and the Sahel, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, the Philippines, 

Myanmar, South Sudan, and Sudan.

Veterans from either winning or losing conflicts also may move on to other wars: the winners in 

Afghanistan went to Chechnya and the losers in Chechnya went to Syria.
USIP.ORG 17

Third-Party Interventions and 

Transnational Terrorism

Most analysts agree that third-party intervention to 

restore order increases the risk of terrorism in the aggregate, particularly suicide attacks, although accounts 

typically ascribe different reasons or causal mechanisms.48 Researchers do not always distinguish between 

suicide attacks within the war zone (for example, against 

foreign occupying armies, since there is some evidence 

that hardening targets increases the number of suicide 

attacks in-theater) and transnational attacks outside the 

zone. In general, foreign occupation of Muslim lands 

gives extremists a powerful propaganda tool. Some 

studies find that only specific types of intervention are 

associated with postintervention terrorism—namely, those that are “political-strategic” in the sense of 

favoring one side or the other in a local conflict, aiming 

to replace an incumbent regime, or acquiring territory. 

Humanitarian interventions have not been found to 

trigger the same adverse reactions.49 Nevertheless, 

peacekeepers and humanitarian organizations are often 

targeted by extremists in the civil war battlefield space. 

The United Nations in particular is regarded as a tool 

of the West: jihadist groups struck UN headquarters in 

Baghdad in 2003 and Algiers in 2007.50

Out-of-theater terrorist retaliatory attacks against third 

parties intervening to restore order or to support an incumbent government are commonplace. For example, 

al-Shabaab has struck civilian targets to deadly effect 

in both Uganda and Kenya as retribution for military deployments in Somalia undertaken by the African Union 

peacekeeping force. The 2015 attack on a college in 

Garissa, Kenya (142 students killed), the 2013 attack on 

the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, and the 2010 

suicide bombing of a crowd watching the World Cup 

finals in Kampala, Uganda, are but three examples. The 

2004 commuter train bombings in Madrid (191 killed), 

carried out by Islamic militants based in Spain in retaliation for the country’s support for the US invasion of 

Iraq, were inspired by al-Qaeda. The list is long.

In addressing this question, it should be recalled that 

transnational terrorism can also trigger military intervention. The war on terrorism that followed the 9/11 attacks 

is the most consequential example, but an earlier 

instance is the Reagan administration’s strike against 

Libya in 1986 in retaliation for a bombing in Germany.

WHEN TERRORISM FOLLOWS 

THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION

When terrorism does follow intervention, what are its 

effects? Some scholars find that campaigns of terrorism 

undermine third-party resolve to stay the course in a 

civil war.51 Terrorism carried out against democracies 

seems especially likely to shake resolve.52 On the other 

hand, states might calculate that staying the course in 

the face of terrorist attacks helps build a reputation for 

resolve that may be useful in future conflicts. Rather 

than conceding, targeted states subscribing to this belief would then have an incentive to strike back, leading 

to a provocation-retaliation spiral. But even if terrorism 

does not successfully coerce third-party states into 

withdrawing from foreign interventions (since their participation may result from foreign policy commitments), 

nonstate actors may still believe that terrorism works, 

and act on that assumption.
18 PEACEWORKS | NO. 158

The history of Lebanon is relevant to understanding this 

dilemma. The Lebanese civil war, beginning in 1975, 

apparently played a role in Osama bin Laden’s thinking, as he later claimed that the vision of destroying 

the World Trade Center towers came to him when he 

viewed scenes of the destruction of Beirut by Israel—a 

disaster that America allowed and the world ignored.53

In addition, Hezbollah’s record is often cited as a case 

of successful terrorism in that it drove the United States 

out. The consensus has long been that the Reagan 

administration withdrew American peacekeepers from 

the multilateral effort to resolve the Lebanese civil war 

because of the bombing of the US Marine barracks 

in 1983—one of the first suicide attacks and among 

the most lethal, killing 241 service members. Recently 

declassified archives provide grounds to contest that 

interpretation, however.54 Rather than changing course, 

administration officials who advocated intervention from 

the beginning doubled down on their support as a result 

of the high casualty toll, while opponents of intervention 

similarly deepened their initial conviction that intervening was a mistake. In fact, it was the collapse of the 

Lebanese National Army in early 1984 that led to the 

withdrawal of American peacekeeping forces.

A related question is also the subject of debate. Why did 

the United States not retaliate for the 1983 bombing? On 

the twenty-fifth anniversary of the bombing, Robert C. 

McFarlane, President Reagan’s national security adviser, wrote that although the president approved a joint 

French-American air strike against Hezbollah bases, the 

secretary of defense aborted the mission.55 McFarlane 

regarded the withdrawal of the Marines as a tragic and 

costly policy defeat that emboldened al-Qaeda, whose 

leaders learned the lesson that terrorism will not be 

punished and that it works.

The bombing of the US Marine barracks by Hezbollah militants was widely believed to have caused the United States to withdraw US peacekeepers 

from Lebanon in 1983. (Photo by Bill Foley/AP)
USIP.ORG 19

Conclusion and Recommendations

The threat of transnational terrorism emanating from 

organizations such as IS and al-Qaeda cannot be managed without taking into consideration terrorism’s connections to civil war and military intervention. The United 

States must be concerned with turmoil in the rest of the 

world, even if national goals no longer include spreading 

democratic values or exercising global leadership.

Seeing the problem comprehensively requires adopting a long-term time horizon as well as considerable 

patience. A strategy should be developed in advance, 

based on an integrated framework, rather than as a 

reaction to immediate crises. Recognizing the conditions 

under which threats emerge allows governments to take 

defensive and mitigating measures before a crisis arises 

that demands (or seems to demand) military intervention.

The immediate terrorist threat may be a manifestation 

of deeply rooted conflicts that are triggered in the 

aftermath of military interventions. Employing force has 

its immediate advantages, but such a response risks 

prolonging rather than mitigating conflict as its consequences play out over time. Military force can destroy 

a terrorist base, remove key leaders, and disrupt 

operations in the short term, but it may increase local 

instability and motivate transnational terrorist attacks in 

the longer term. An added complication is that when 

foreign intervention intended to retaliate for terrorism 

or defend a threatened government precipitates more 

terrorism and internal disorder, the third party finds it 

hard to withdraw from its commitment because the 

local partner cannot provide security. IS is already 

regrouping in Syria and Iraq following the abrupt 

withdrawal of US troops in October 2019.56 The curtailment of stabilization aid and humanitarian assistance 

accelerates the chaotic effects of a power vacuum. US 

forces are already finding it imperative to strike IS targets in Iraq, and American troops have been deployed 

in Afghanistan since 2001.

These insights provide the basis for several recommendations to outside powers concerned about instability 

in critical parts of the world, as well as their own vulnerability to transnational terrorism. The term traditionally 

used for such countries to a foreign conflict that pitted a 

local government against insurgents or rebels was “third 

party,” but since the 1990s third parties that assist local 

partners are no longer safe, as civil war rebels and transnational terrorists are increasingly the same groups. The 

first line of defense is prevention—but if prevention fails, 

coercive responses have to be considered. There must 

also be advance planning for postconflict stabilization 

and political settlement in order to prevent recurrence. 

Work through partners. In most cases, third parties 

work through local partner governments to promote 

security and order. In weak states challenged by violent 

nonstate actors, preventive efforts mounted by foreign 

allies must go beyond military capacity building and 

providing advice on security sector reform to include 

promoting legitimate, accountable, and effective government institutions. The military defeat of an organization 

like IS will be short-lived if the conditions that produced 

its victories are not addressed. If poor governance is 

the cause of both civil war and violent extremism, or at 

least a permissive factor, then reducing inefficiency and 

corruption and increasing the state’s responsiveness to 

citizens should be central policy goals. In the Sahel, for 

example, it is by no means certain that current security 

assistance programs can build strong partner states 

capable of dealing with local discontent and preventing 

the cross-border spread of ideological extremism.57
20 PEACEWORKS | NO. 158

Engage in comprehensive and coordinated longterm planning. For concerned outside powers, such as 

the United States, wishing to mitigate or contain the development of violence and terrorism in distant regions, 

an appropriate response will almost certainly require 

different policy tools to be integrated across multiple 

government agencies, which requires the development 

of a comprehensive long-term strategy. Thus, effective 

third-party counterterrorism efforts are likely to involve 

a combination of homeland defense activities, strategic 

communication, the provision of security assistance to 

local partners, development assistance, postconflict 

stabilization efforts, and humanitarian aid. Such a coordinated effort must be largely civilian-led and based on 

the development of expertise about the local context. 

The conflicts that come to concern outside powers 

are highly complex, and there is no substitute for deep 

knowledge and familiarity with local conditions.

Coordinating the use of policy tools across agencies is 

difficult, but a multifaceted, well-thought-out response 

is imperative. Political pushback at home against 

engagement is to be expected, especially as demonstrating policy effectiveness in the short term will be 

difficult. Modest initiatives might seem much less 

compelling to a legislature or electorate than military 

responses, but smaller, more subtle measures could 

produce better results than a more dramatic deployment of force or the imposition of sanctions.58

Use military force as a last resort. The direct application of military force by outside armies in the service of 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts should 

be a last resort, and the circumstances under which it 

would be deployed should be defined well in advance 

of crisis. In fact, large-scale interventions involving 

large numbers of ground troops are rare, but the use of 

air power and special forces around the world has become increasingly common. Reliance on air power, especially drones, has led to a proliferation of American 

military bases, thus making the American presence 

highly visible and demonstrating the dependence of 

the partner state on foreign support. The issue of the 

effectiveness of drone strikes is especially contentious. 

Making the process by which targets are selected 

more transparent would be a step toward greater accountability and legitimacy. It is also imperative to avoid 

civilian casualties, not only because of their possible 

effects on host country public opinion but also to maintain domestic public support.

Include all relevant groups in negotiations to end 

the conflict. Jihadist groups may rarely be capable of 

winning a decisive victory in a civil war. But they can 

keep fighting long enough and hard enough to sustain 

a stalemate that becomes intolerably costly, especially 

if it prevents a third party from withdrawing from an unpopular military commitment that increases the risk of 

being targeted by terrorist attacks at home. Negotiating 

with extremists may therefore be a viable option for 

conflict resolution but must be carefully tailored to the 

situation, based on extensive local knowledge, with 

due consideration of which parties should be at the 

negotiating table. 

Mali’s experience suggests a bilateral model, at least 

formally, arranged between the local government and 

its challengers. However, excluding the jihadist-linked 

factions made the settlement less effective. Another 

model, derived from Afghanistan, is a bilateral-trilateral 

mix, with the third party negotiating with the challenger 

in the first stage, in the hope that the second stage 

may involve direct talks between the local government and opposition forces. In practice, the distinction 

between bilateral and trilateral talks is blurred: France 

exerts substantial influence over Mali and objected to 

including groups linked to al-Qaeda in the negotiations. 

The settlement of Algeria’s civil war in the 2000s 

presents an alternative bilateral model, in which military 

defeat was combined with reconciliation measures, 

particularly amnesties for individual fighters rather 

than bargaining with the opposition as a collective 

entity. The granting of amnesty can be tailored to the 
USIP.ORG 21

seriousness of the crimes an individual has committed. 

However, ending the war in Algeria did not prevent 

regional spillover or shield Algeria from occasional, 

highly destructive terrorist attacks launched from across 

the border. The conflict spread to Algeria’s neighbors. 

The outcome in Algeria suggests that in negotiating a 

possible solution for Afghanistan, it is essential to consider the regional context, especially since Pakistan’s 

position is critical to resolving the conflict. Pakistan has 

been a major ally of the Taliban since its inception and 

regards any settlement in Afghanistan as vital to its 

security interests. In addition, it is not clear that the US 

government has planned for a contingency in which 

the Taliban continue to refuse to talk to an increasingly 

weak Afghan government. This uncertainty about future 

power sharing points to the need for a comprehensive 

long-term strategy based on a framework that links civil 

war, transnational terrorism, and military intervention.

Still, there are limits to what can be done to reduce 

the risk of transnational terrorism. Only slow, incremental progress toward this goal can be expected. 

Governments should neither exaggerate the threat 

nor overpromise results. Some strategic goals are too 

ambitious to be achievable, and the quick eradication 

of violent jihadism worldwide is one of them.

Following attacks by Boko Haram beginning in 2015, more than 130,000 people attempted to flee the violence along Nigeria's National Route 1 road. 

(Photo by Adam Ferguson/New York Times)
22 PEACEWORKS | NO. 158

Notes

1. Martha Crenshaw, “Why America? The Globalization of Civil War,” Current History 100 (December 2001): 425–32.

2. Anne-Marie Slaughter and Asha C. Castleberry, “ISIS Regroup and Move Frontier of War to the Digital Realm,” Irish Examiner, 

September 30, 2019, www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/views/analysis/isis-regroup-and-move-frontier-of-war-to-the-digital

-realm-953761.html.

3. Linda Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 

2018). The report compares the capabilities of Russia, Iran, and the Islamic State (IS).

4. Although I disagree with Stewart Patrick’s observation that war-torn states are not hospitable environments for transnational 

terrorist networks, I agree that the most important benefits they confer are probably symbolic. See Stewart Patrick, “Civil Wars & 

Transnational Threats: Mapping the Terrain, Assessing the Links,” Daedalus 146, no. 4 (Fall 2017): 45–58.

5. Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment,” Studies in Conflict & 

Terrorism 31, no. 5 (2008): 417.

6. Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden (London: Verso, 2005), 136.

7. Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare, 204.

8. Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” International Security 35, no. 

3 (Winter 2010/11): 53–94.

9. Laurence Bindner. “Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives against France,” ICCT Policy Brief, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 

February 23, 2018, www.icct.nl/publication/jihadists-grievance-narratives-against-france.

10. Faisal Devji, “Media and Martyrdom,” chap. 4 in Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 2005).

11. The number of veterans from Syria involved in terrorist attacks outside the region is certainly a small minority of returned foreign 

fighters (see United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, “The Challenge of Returning 

and Relocating Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Research Perspectives,” March 2018, www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2018/04

/CTED-Trends-Report-March-2018.pdf). They have not posed a threat to US domestic security. However, in May 2019, 

Indonesian authorities foiled a bomb plot and arrested seven IS sympathizers who had been in Syria (Hannah Beech and 

Muktita Suhartono, “Indonesia Says It Foiled Plot to Detonate Bombs via Wi-Fi,” New York Times, May 17, 2019, www.nytimes.com

/2019/05/17/world/asia/indonesia-bomb-plot-wifi.html).

12. Michael Weiss, “ISIS: Resilient, Adaptable, Decentralized,” New York Review of Books, May 16, 2019, www.nybooks.com/daily

/2019/05/16/isis-resilient-adaptable-decentralized.

13. Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and 

Foreign Fighting,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 1–15.

14. See Petter Nesser, “Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on 

Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): 323–42.

15. Clark McCauley, “Explaining Homegrown Western Jihadists: The Importance of Western Foreign Policy,” International Journal of 

Conflict and Violence 12 (2018). My own discussions with young activists in Europe confirm this view.

16. Martha Crenshaw and Gary LaFree, Countering Terrorism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017).

17. Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, “Al Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records,” Harmony Project, 

Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, January 2, 2007, https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaidas-foreign-fighters-in

-iraq-a-first-look-at-the-sinjar-records, 2007. The report’s summary notes that “many of the foreign fighters entering Iraq arrived 

with a group from their hometown, suggesting that al-Qa’ida’s recruiters try to attract groups of friends simultaneously.”

18. See Victor Asal, Luis de la Calle, Michael Findley, and Joseph Young, “Killing Civilians or Holding Territory? How to Think about 

Terrorism,” International Studies Review 14, no. 3 (2012): 475–97.

19. Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 

2010), 108–9.
USIP.ORG 23

20. For example, the Pakistani Taliban was responsible for directing the 2010 unsuccessful attempt to detonate a bomb in Times 

Square and for the 2009 attack on a CIA outpost in Khost, Afghanistan, which killed seven people.

21. James L. Regens, Nick Mould, Christopher M. Sartorius, and Jonathan O’Dell, “Effect of Foreign Military Intervention and Controlled 

Territory on the Operational Tempo of al-Shabaab Attacks,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 9, nos. 1–3 (2016): 95–107.

22. See the detailed profile of Al-Shabaab on the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation’s Mapping 

Militants Project website: “Al Shabaab,” mappingmilitants.cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/profiles/al-shabaab.

23. Bridget L. Coggins, “Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999–2008),” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, 

no. 3 (2015): 460.

24. Iraqi forces retook Falluja in 2016. Both Mosul and the capital of the caliphate, Raqqa, fell in 2017, and IS’s final stronghold in 

Baghuz collapsed in early 2019.

25. Recent mass protests against the Algerian regime, dominated since independence in 1962 by the military and entrenched economic elites, have reminded observers of the painful consequences of stifling peaceful dissent in 1992.

26. Alex Thurston, “Political Settlements with Jihadists in Algeria and the Sahel,” West African Papers no. 18, OECD, October 2018, 

www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/0780622a-en.pdf.

27. The first American attack against al-Qaeda occurred in March 2018. Declan Walsh and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Strikes Qaeda Target in 

Southern Libya, Expanding Shadow War There,” New York Times, March 25, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/03/25/world

/middleeast/us-bombs-qaeda-libya.html. See also Eric Schmitt, “Under Trump, U.S. Launched 8 Airstrikes against ISIS in Libya. It 

Disclosed 4,” New York Times, March 8, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/world/africa/us-airstrikes-isis-libya.html.

28. Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (London: Hurst, 2015).

29. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” New York Times, July 29, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014

/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html.

30. See the Stanford University Mapping Militants Project’s combined organizational charts/timelines outlining the evolution of 

al-Qaeda and IS affiliates (https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/content/mapping-militants).

31. Julie Wilhelmsen, “When Separatists Become Islamists: The Case of Chechnya,” FFI/Rapport-2004/00445, Norwegian Defence 

Research Establishment, February 2004, 25, http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2004/00445.pdf. Wilhelmsen also concludes that 

the conflict in Chechnya was one of the factors that drove Russia and the West apart and blocked the adoption of democratic 

norms and procedures in Russia, as security concerns became paramount.

32. Global Islamism also divided the rebels, as some leaders continued to oppose the introduction of extreme jihadism, wanting 

only independence from Russia and preferring more moderate versions of Islam.

33. Jean-Pierre Filiu, “The Local and Global Jihad of Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghrib,” Middle East Journal 63, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 

213–26. See also Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy 

Response (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2013).

34. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005).

35. Kristin M. Bakke, “Help Wanted? The Mixed Record of Foreign Fighters in Domestic Insurgencies,” International Security 38, no. 

4 (Spring 2014): 150–87. Bakke distinguishes clearly between the effects of transnational networks on framing and on tactics.

36. In 2007, over half of the foreign volunteers entering Iraq sought suicide missions, whereas by 2013–14 only 12 percent of the 

more than four thousand volunteers whose records were made available to the press selected martyrdom operations as opposed to simply fighting or contributing. See Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler, “The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: 

An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trail,” Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, 

April 2016, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1013551.pdf. The records were made available by NBC News. This detail demonstrates the importance of the existence of the territorial caliphate in determining the choices of volunteers from abroad.

37. For example, see Akinola Olojo, “Time to Consider Negotiating with al-Shabaab in Somalia?,” Institute for Security Studies, June 

2019, www.issafrica.org/iss-today/time-to-consider-negotiating-with-al-shabaab-in-somalia; Jacob Zenn, “Confronting Jihadist 

Factions in Nigeria: An Antidote to Defeatism,” War on the Rocks, July 17, 2019 www.warontherocks.com/2019/07/confronting

-jihadist-factions-in-nigeria-an-antidote-to-defeatism. Also see Alex Thurston’s 2018 analysis of past negotiation efforts in the 

Sahel region (“Political Settlements with Jihadists”).

38. Monica D. Toft and Yuri M. Zhukov, “Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and Counterinsurgency in Russia’s North 

Caucasus,” American Political Science Review 109, no. 2 (2015): 222–38.

39. Aisha Ahmad, “Going Global: Islamist Competition in Contemporary Civil Wars,” Security Studies 25, no. 2 (2016): 353–84.

40. Mohammed Hafez, “Fratricidal Jihadists: Why Islamists Keep Losing Their Civil Wars,” Middle East Policy 25, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 86–99.
24 PEACEWORKS | NO. 158

41. Barbara F. Walter, “The Extremist’s Advantage in Civil Wars,” International Security 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 7–39.

42. Page Fortna, “Do Terrorists Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes,” International Organization 69 (2015): 519–56.

43. Bakke, “Help Wanted?”; Ben Rich and Dara Conduit, “The Impact of Jihadist Foreign Fighters on Indigenous Secular-Nationalist 

Causes: Contrasting Chechnya and Syria,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 2 (2014): 113–31.

44. As Bakke (“Help Wanted?”) and Rich and Conduit (“The Impact of Jihadist Foreign Fighters”) note with regard to Chechyna.

45. Vera Mironova, From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists: Human Resources of Non-State Armed Groups (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 2019).

46. Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Jihadi Rebels in Civil War,” Daedalus 146, no. 4 (Fall 2017): 36–47.

47. Alex Braithwaite and Tiffany S. Chu, “Civil Conflicts Abroad, Foreign Fighters, and Terrorism at Home,” Journal of Conflict 

Resolution 62, no. 8 (2018): 1636–60. Their statistical analysis covers the period 1970–2006, so it does not account for the rise 

of IS and civil war in Syria.

48. For example, see Seung-Whan Choi and James A. Piazza, “Foreign Military Interventions and Suicide Attacks,” Journal of 

Conflict Resolution 61, no. 2 (2017): 271–97; Simon Collard-Wexler, Costantino Pischedda, and Michael Smith, “Do Foreign 

Occupations Cause Suicide Attacks?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 4 (2014): 625–57.

49. James A. Piazza and Seung-Whan Choi, “International Military Interventions and Transnational Terrorist Backlash: Research 

Note,” International Studies Quarterly 62 (2018): 686–95.

50. This is not to say that states and their foreign sponsors are not also responsible for attacks on humanitarian organizations, hospitals, aid workers, and so forth.

51. Christopher Linebarger, Andrew J. Enterline, and Steven R. Liebel, “Shaken or Stirred? Terrorism and Third-Party State Resolve in 

Civil War Interventions,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2017, 1–22.

52. Linebarger, Enterline, and Liebel, “Shaken or Stirred?” The historical trajectory of intervention in Lebanon also shows how what is 

intended as a neutral peacekeeping effort is perceived differently by local parties and can quickly evolve into a combat mission.

53. Lawrence, Messages to the World, 238–40. Faisal Devji observes that bin Laden did not personally witness the events of the 

war; the images were transmitted via mass media—there was what he calls “collective witnessing” (“Media and Martyrdom,” 97).

54. Alexandra T. Evans and A. Bradley Potter, “When Do Leaders Change Course? Theories of Success and the American 

Withdrawal from Beirut, 1983–1984,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 2 (February 2019).

55. Robert C. McFarlane, “From Beirut to 9/11,” New York Times, October 23, 2008 www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/opinion/23

mcfarlane.html.

56. Glenn A. Fine, Steve A. Linick, and Ann Calvaresi Barr, "Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States 

Congress, April 1, 2019–June 30, 2019," joint report from the US Department of Defense, US Department of State, and US 

Agency for International Development, August 6, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Aug/09/2002169448/-1/-1/1/Q3FY2019

_LEADIG_OIR_REPORT.PDF.

57. Stephen Tankel, With Us and Against Us: How America’s Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2018). Tankel points to serious preference divergences between the United States and its local partners. The 

threat of extremism does not always seem as serious to the latter as to the former. In fact, an extremist threat can be useful for 

local elites trying to maintain their hold on power while drawing on the resources of the patron state.

58. Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro, Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).
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Making Peace Possible

NO. 158 | February 2020

Transnational terrorism poses a threat to all countries but is of immediate concern to 

the United States and its key security partners. Recognizing the conditions under which 

extremist threats emerge will allow governments to take defensive and mitigating measures 

before a crisis takes shape. Based on an extensive review of the recent literature, this report 

argues that mounting an appropriate response to transnational terrorism will first require 

an understanding of the complex interlinkages among civil war, transnational terrorism, and 

weak governance. Conflicts in Mali, Chechnya, Syria, and other fragile states disrupted by 

civil war and facing actions from global terrorist networks suggest the different ways in 

which these factors may interact and the different paths to a solution.

• The Intersection of Investment and Conflict in Myanmar by Priscilla Clapp 

(Special Report, February 2020)

• A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula by Frank Aum, Jacob Stokes, Patricia 

M. Kim, Atman M. Trivedi, Rachel Vandenbrink, Jennifer Staats, and Joseph Y. Yun 

(Peaceworks, February 2020)

• Afghan Women’s Views on Violent Extremism and Aspirations to a Peacemaking 

Role by Haseeb Humayoon and Mustafa Basij-Rasikh (Peaceworks, February 2020)

• Understanding Pakistan’s Deradicalization Programming by Arsla Jawaid 

(Special Report, January 2020)

• The Challenges for Social Movements in Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe by Gladys 

Kudzaishe Hlatywayo and Charles Mangongera (Special Report, January 2020)

OTHER USIP PUBLICATIONS