UNITED STATES COMMISSION 

ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

REPORT ON 

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

MAY 2003
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

800 North Capitol Street, NW

Suite 790

Washington, DC 20002

202-523-3240

202-523-5020 (fax)

www.uscirf.gov
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

Felice D. Gaer

Chair

Michael K. Young

Vice Chair

Firuz Kazemzadeh

Richard D. Land

Bishop William F. Murphy

Leila Nadya Sadat

Nina Shea

The Honorable Charles R. Stith

The Honorable Shirin Tahir-Kheli*

Joseph R. Crapa

Executive Director

* Effective March 24, 2003, Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli was appointed Special Assistant to 

the President and Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations by 

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. This appointment necessitated Amb. Tahir-Kheli's 

resignation from the Commission.
STAFF OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

May 2003

Tad Stahnke, Deputy Director for Policy

David Dettoni, Deputy Director for Outreach

Christy Hines, Director of Government Affairs

Anne Johnson, Director of Communications

Carmelita Pratt, Director of Administration

Dwight N. Bashir, Policy Analyst

Patricia Carley, Senior Policy Analyst

Deborah DuCre, Receptionist

Scott Flipse, Policy Analyst

Allison B. Hollabaugh, Research Assistant

Susan Kemp, Communications Assistant

Caitlin Lacy, Intern

Jacqueline A. Mitchell, Executive Assistant

James W. Newton, Policy Analyst

Stephen R. Snow, Senior Policy Analyst

Eileen A. Sullivan, Deputy Director of Communications

John W. Tai, Policy Analyst
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Washington, DC, May 1, 2003

The PRESIDENT

The White House

 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s Report on Russia, prepared in 

compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

 FELICE D. GAER

Chair 

Enclosure

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Washington, DC, May 1, 2003

Hon. COLIN POWELL

Secretary of State

Department of State

 DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s Report on Russia, prepared in 

compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

FELICE D. GAER

Chair

Enclosure
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Washington, DC, May 1, 2003

Hon. DENNIS HASTERT

Speaker of the House

U.S. House of Representatives

 DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s Report on Russia, prepared in compliance 

with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et 

seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

FELICE D. GAER

Chair

Enclosure

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Washington, DC, May 1, 2003

Hon. TED STEVENS

President Pro Tempore

U.S. Senate

 DEAR MR. STEVENS: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s Report on Russia, prepared in compliance 

with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et 

seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

FELICE D. GAER

Chair 

Enclosure
1

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

A. Introduction

Since its founding in 1999, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has 

monitored and reported on the status of religious freedom in the Russian Federation. Russia has 

consistently drawn the attention of the Commission not because of the severity of the religious 

freedom violations there, but because of the fragility of human rights, including freedom of 

religion and belief, in the Russian Federation. Significant progress on the protection of human 

rights, including religious freedom, has been made in Russia in the last dozen years since the end 

of the Soviet Union. However, religious freedom problems in the 1990s drew ongoing attention, 

and several events in the past year affecting religious freedom have suggested attempts on the 

part of some in Russia to halt or even reverse the gains made thus far. Because democracy is still 

relatively new to the Russian government and its citizens, the country’s continued progress 

toward democratic reform based on rule of law and the protection of human rights, including 

religious freedom, remains uncertain. 

Clearly, the practice of religious freedom in Russia is freer than at any other time in its 

history, including during its pre-Soviet and Soviet past.1 Throughout the Soviet era especially, 

religious belief and practice of every variant were harshly repressed by the regime, as religious 

adherence was seen as a primary obstacle to the state’s determination to enforce allegiance to its 

all-encompassing Marxist-Leninist ideology. Thus, with regard to freedom of religion and other 

human rights, Russia under the Soviet regime was unequivocally not free. In comparison to the 

Soviet period, the current situation in Russia is dramatically improved.

Despite that improvement, restrictions on the universal human right to freedom of 

religion and belief continued in post-Soviet Russia. For example, federal laws governing 

freedom of association and religion contained language that effectively would have prevented 

many religious groups from registering and thus practicing freely. Regional governments 

frequently passed ordinances that resulted in discrimination against minority religious groups, 

and religious violence was widespread. What is more, foreign religious workers often 

experienced difficulty gaining entry or residence in Russia. At the same time, the Russian 

Orthodox Church began to seek preferential treatment from the state in a way that called into 

question the extent to which religious freedom would be guaranteed for all. Still, the Russian 

government responded to a number of these concerns in the late 1990s, Russian courts provided 

some protection against violations, and, in spite of the problems, progress was continuing. 

In the past year, however, events have occurred that have raised questions about Russia’s 

continued commitment to democratic reform and the protection of religious freedom. These 

events include: a recent conspicuous increase in the number of clergy and other religious workers 

denied visas or residency permits, even in cases of previous long-term residency in Russia; 

indications that one particular denomination, the Russian Orthodox Church, is more explicitly 

gaining influence as the favored church, resulting in various discriminatory practices against 

other religious groups; evidence of government meddling in the internal affairs of certain 

religious communities; the continued occurrence of anti-Semitic attacks; a recent increase in 

violence against Muslims; the persistent uncertainties in the legal situation, due in part to the 

seemingly vague procedures for amending the 1997 religion law and the tabling or passage of 
2

other laws related to religious practice; and the leaking in December 2002 of a troubling report 

attributed to numerous government officials that specifically lists four religions or religious 

groupings—Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, militant Islam, and new “foreign” sects—as 

threats to Russia’s national security. 

Most if not all of the religious freedom concerns the Commission has raised in the past, 

and those that have emerged more recently, appear to be directly related to the increasing 

influence of authoritarian, and perhaps even chauvinistic, strains within the Russian government. 

Thus, Russia’s progress toward democracy and the protection of human rights remains tenuous, 

for the country continues to be in danger of surrendering to, or becoming engulfed by, 

undemocratic forces, which believe that the state should control the development of religion and 

religious groups in Russia. More specifically, events in the past year indicate that an attempt is 

underway on the part of elements within the Russian government, aided or perhaps encouraged 

by the Russian Orthodox Church, to curb religious freedom further and bring the religious 

practice of Russian citizens under the closer control and tutelage of the state. In the face of this 

pressure, it is uncertain whether the Russian government can sustain its commitment to 

democracy and the protection of freedom of religion. 

The Commission believes that Russia’s importance in the community of nations 

necessitates persistent scrutiny of the Russian government’s policies affecting democratic reform 

and the protection of religious freedom and other human rights. What is more, Russia continues 

to be a crucial model for many countries throughout the world, including the other former Soviet 

republics attempting to come out from under the burdens of Soviet totalitarianism, and also other 

nations struggling to establish rule of law based democratic systems after a history of corruption 

and despotism. In this sense, Russia continues to be of crucial importance as “confirmation” that 

such transitions can happen—that democracy can be learned and built. In addition, Russia is 

becoming an increasingly vital partner for the United States, a key relationship that affords the 

United States important opportunities to promote the strengthening of human rights protections 

in Russia. And finally, and perhaps somewhat controversially, attention must be maintained in 

light of a number of recent developments in Russia that indicate the growing influence of forces 

in the government who are much less committed to democracy, thus imperiling Russia’s future 

democratic development. Clearly, now is not the time to reduce U.S. vigilance on democratic 

progress in Russia. 

1. Commission Visit to Russia

Because of the continuing reports that protection of religious freedom was deteriorating 

in Russia, the Commission undertook a mission to Russia in January 2003. The purpose of the 

mission was to examine the lingering, persistent religious freedom problems in Russia; to 

establish contacts with key Russian government officials, religious leaders, and human rights 

organizations that are engaged with religious freedom issues; to explore the degree to which the 

continuing (and emergent) religious freedom restrictions represent official policy, and whether 

they reflect the weakening of democratic protections; and to explain to our Russian interlocutors 

and other audiences the Commission’s work to promote religious freedom as enshrined in 

international human rights documents, and the significance of the American commitment to this 

vital freedom.
3

In addition to its seven-day visit in January 2003, the Commission has examined the 

situation in Russia throughout the past year. In March 2002, Commissioner Richard Land 

traveled to Russia to present a speech entitled “Religions, Politics, and Human Rights” to a 

conference at the Russian Academy of State Service. At that time, Commissioner Land and 

Commission staff met briefly with Russian government officials, religious leaders, and 

representatives of numerous Russian non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In May 2002, 

the Commission co-hosted with the Department of State and members of Congress a EuropeEurasia Religious Freedom Roundtable, at which representatives of numerous religious groups 

presented information on religious freedom conditions in various parts of Europe and Eurasia, 

including Russia. Throughout the past year, the Commission received private briefings from 

academic and other experts on Russia, met with key American officials, and interviewed 

representatives of religious groups from inside the country. In addition, Commission staff hosted 

a number of delegations of visitors from Russia to discuss further conditions for religious 

freedom there. 

The Commission also reported and issued recommendations on Russia in its annual 

reports of May 2000 and May 2001. In May 2000, in addition to issuing recommendations, the 

Commission released an extensive, supplementary staff report that provided a background to 

religious freedom issues there, examining the historical framework, the consequences of the 

Soviet period, the reforms of the Gorbachev era, more current conditions, and societal relations 

among Russia’s numerous religious communities, as well as several laws affecting religious 

freedom. In 2001, the Commission issued an update of the situation in Russia and reiterated its 

May 2000 recommendations on ways in which the promotion of religious freedom should remain 

an integral element of the U.S. relationship with Russia. 

B. Background

1. Demographic Information

The Russian Federation has a population of approximately 144 million. About 81 percent 

of the population is Russian, 4 percent Tatar, 3 percent Ukrainian, and 12 percent other 

nationalities, most of which, like the Tatars, are non-Slavic in language and ethnicity. Among 

that 12 percent are peoples who speak Turkic languages, languages related to Finnish, and 

speakers of Caucasian languages, among others. There are over 100 different ethnic groups in the 

Russian Federation.

According to the State Department, there are no reliable statistics that categorize the 

country’s population by religious denomination. Available information suggests that 

approximately half of the people of Russia refer to themselves as Russian Orthodox Christians.2 

The second largest religious group are Muslims, who, based on the population statistics of the 

ethnic groups that are traditionally Muslim, number from 12-20 million (approximately 10-12 

percent of the population). Traditionally Muslim nationalities include: Tatars, Bashkirs, 

Chuvash, Chechens, and other groups from the North Caucasus. The majority of Muslims in 

Russia are of the Sunni branch. The third largest group is thought to be Protestants, who are 

estimated to number two million; the largest single group is comprised of Baptists and other 

Evangelical Christians, though there are also other Christian groups such as the Seventh-Day 
4

Adventists, Lutherans, Methodists, various Pentecostal groups, Christian Scientists, members of 

the Church of Jesus-Christ of the Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), and others.

The State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report estimates the number of 

Jews left in Russia to be from 600,000 to 1 million, a population that has significantly declined 

in recent decades due to large-scale emigration (almost 200,000 in the last years of the 1990s 

alone).3 Similar in size are the Roman Catholics, who are thought to number approximately 

600,000.4 Buddhism is indigenous to three regions in Russia: Buryatia and Tuva, which are 

located on the border with historically Buddhist Mongolia, and Kalmykia, in the North Caucasus 

region. Buddhism is also practiced by some peoples of Siberia. There are also small numbers of 

religious groups that have long been present in Russia, such as the Old Believers and other 

Orthodox groups who do not accept the authority of the Patriarch, as well as groups relatively 

new to Russia, including the Salvation Army, the Society of Krishna Consciousness, and many 

others.

2. Historical Context

Before the past decade, religion and state had never been separate in Russia.5 Even 

during the Soviet period, when the two entities were officially declared to be separate, religious 

practice was never free from state and intelligence service interference and control. In prerevolutionary times, the predominant Russian Orthodox Church was an integral part of Tsarist 

rule and was, for all intents and purposes, subordinate to it. The power of the tsar over the 

Church was deepened in the early eighteenth century, when Tsar Peter the Great expanded and 

consolidated the Russian Empire. In the process of redefining the power of the tsar, Peter curbed 

the Russian Orthodox Church’s influence on political authority by abolishing the patriarchate in 

1721and establishing a government body called the Holy Synod, which was made up of bishops 

and secular officials, to administer and control the church.6 Until the time of the 1917 

Revolution, the Russian Orthodox Church acted as an arm of the state, including teaching the 

need for obedience to the political authorities. In return, tsarist rulers rarely interfered with 

Church doctrine and imposed limits on other religious communities in Russia, including 

Catholics, Protestants, and other groups.7 In sum, according to one scholar, “the Church 

diligently served the State, and the State protected the Church.”8 

The Soviet Communist regime established in 1917 was ruthlessly antagonistic to religion. 

All religious activity was actively persecuted, particularly in the first two decades of Soviet rule. 

Lead in the 1920s by the Communist Party group known as the “Union of Militant Atheists,” all 

people in the country were compelled to reject religious belief and embrace atheism. The Soviet 

regime killed or imprisoned Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, and other religious leaders and 

charged thousands if not millions of religious believers with political crimes and sent them to 

camps.9 In the 1920s alone, 28 Russian Orthodox bishops and more than 1,200 priests were 

executed. The Soviet government nationalized church and other religious property, closed most 

seminaries, medressehs, and other teaching institutions, and many churches, mosques, 

synagogues, temples, and other religious buildings were either closed, destroyed, or converted 

for other uses. Some houses of worship were used as warehouses; others were turned into state 

museums or “monuments to architecture.” Shrines containing relics were broken open and 

desecrated. The publication of nearly all religious material was prohibited.10 One author writes 
5

that “the almost total annihilation of organized religion in the 1930s is a well-known chapter of 

Soviet history.”11 

The Soviet regime’s determination to control and regulate all religious activity was 

codified in 1929 with the passage in the Russian Soviet Republic of the “Law on Religious 

Associations.” This law, which became the foundation of the very Soviet notion that the state is 

entitled to define the basic framework in which believers can practice their religion, delineated 

religious practice throughout the Soviet period and served as a model for similar laws in all the 

Soviet republics.12 The law set up numerous requirements that were barriers for any religious 

group seeking permission from the local authorities to carry out any number of religious 

activities. It also made illegal any form of religious education, literature, and persuasion, as well 

as the use of church monies for any charity or welfare work, and made all religious activities and 

rituals subject to restrictive regulations. Throughout the Soviet period, the state did not 

recognize any limitations on using the law to regulate the religious life of its citizenry.13

While there was some relaxation of the state’s persecution of religion during World War 

II in order to encourage greater popular support for the war effort, upon the war’s end, earlier 

levels of repression returned, though never to the extreme degree that occurred in the 1920s. Yet, 

even as certain facets of Soviet life were experiencing a period of relative relaxation, post-Stalin 

leader Nikita Khrushchev maintained and, after a time, increased the pressures on religious 

expression and practice. During the ensuing decades of Soviet rule, a small number of Russian 

Orthodox churches, mosques, synagogues, Buddhist temples, and a few Catholic and Protestant 

churches were permitted to function, though even these groups remained under state control and 

were subjected regularly to state infiltration and interference. The state also fully controlled the 

number and training of all clergy. According to one author, “the main legal method of 

combating religiosity in the population [was] strict regulation of the clergy.”14 In part because of 

government control and infiltration of these congregations by intelligence services, there soon 

emerged additional, “unofficial” Russian Orthodox, Muslim, Protestant, and other congregations 

that refused to cooperate with the state and were forced to operate underground and in secret, and 

with a considerable amount of fear. 

Throughout the Soviet period, anti-Semitism remained state sponsored and controlled, 

and Jews were regularly subject to government directed anti-Semitic campaigns, particularly in 

the late 1930s when Stalin began to exploit Russian nationalism for political purposes. The 

campaigns were not always overt, however, as the Soviet regime, proclaiming officially to 

oppose anti-Semitism, usually labeled these operations with “code words” that everyone 

understood to refer to Jews, such as “anti-cosmopolitanism” or “anti-Zionism.”15 In the early 

1950s under Stalin, Jews were accused of a plot to poison government officials in the so-called 

“doctors’ plot,” and it is thought that only Stalin’s death in 1953 prevented a mass deportation of 

Jews to camps.16 Jews were the only religious group whose internal passports, which were 

required to travel within the country or establish residence, included a label indicating their 

religion. From the late 1960s through the 1980s, a massive orchestrated official “anti-Zionist” 

campaign was promoted. Soviet media and officials actively spread the anti-Semitic ideas of the 

infamous Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the UN “Zionism is racism” resolution as tools to 

demonize Jews. As one scholar has summed up the era, Zionism “was equated with every 

conceivable evil.”17 The practical consequences of the campaign were discrimination against 

Jews in education, professional opportunities, and political participation, and other measures 
6

such as prohibiting the teaching of Hebrew. All this led Soviet Jews to seek to emigrate from the 

Soviet Union, and between 1968-1990, approximately 580,000 left the country.18 Popular antiSemitism was also roused by this campaign.

Even in the last years of the Soviet regime, religious activities of most kinds remained 

prohibited, including religious education, the distribution of religious literature, and virtually all 

charity work. Essential religious texts were deliberately made difficult to obtain. Almost all 

public manifestations of religious belief were proscribed by the state. Anyone who dared openly 

to declare himself a believer was not only aggressively discriminated against, but was effectively 

kept at the lowest rungs of society by being denied access to higher education, any kind of public 

participation or leadership, and anything but the most menial of jobs. Contacts with 

coreligionists abroad were also strictly controlled or prohibited altogether.

With the fall of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the independent Russian 

Federation in 1991, conditions for religious freedom significantly improved, building upon 

changes that had begun during the glasnost era in the waning years of the Soviet regime. In 

1993, Russia adopted a new constitution, which declared in Article 14 that “the Russian 

Federation is a secular state,” and that “no religion may be established as the state religion or a 

compulsory religion.” Moreover, according to the new Constitution, “Religious associations are 

separated from the state and are equal before the law.”19 The Russian government abandoned its 

official promulgation of atheism and embraced international norms with regard to religious 

freedom and other human rights. Beginning in the last remaining years of the Soviet period, 

significant numbers of religious leaders and other workers flowed in to Russia, representing 

groups long existent in the country but severely persecuted, as well as groups that were relatively 

new to Russia. Many arrived to help in the process of rebuilding of, and to provide spiritual 

leadership to, the many religious communities destroyed and/or corrupted by the Soviet regime.

However, within a few years of independence, undue limitations on religious freedom 

emerged in post-Soviet Russia, stemming primarily from the desire on the part of some to curb 

the activities of foreign missionaries and other groups considered new to the country.20 The 

Russian Orthodox Church in particular criticized the influx of new religious groups and the 

practices even of religious communities that had long had a presence in Russia, and 

representatives of the Orthodox Church helped to influence legal changes that in practice 

restricted the activities of certain religious groups. In 1997, the Russian government passed a 

new religion law containing highly burdensome registration requirements that impeded the 

ability of smaller and newer religious groups to gain registration and function fully. In the 

ensuing years, some of these problems were resolved through the Russian courts. However, the 

growing involvement of the Orthodox Church in the affairs of state became more pronounced, 

with, in effect, the restoration of the pre-Soviet relationship described above: government 

restrictions placed on the activities of numerous minority religious groups in exchange for 

Church support of government policies.

21

C. Outline of Religious Freedom Concerns

Despite the substantial progress that has been made on religious freedom protections in 

Russia in the past decade, this Commission has previously identified the many significant 
7

problems that remain.22 Some concerns are long-standing; more disturbingly, new ones have 

emerged—or intensified—only in the past year or two.

1. The “Zorin Report”

On December 5, 2002, the Russian newspaper Gazeta reported that it had obtained a copy 

of a draft report entitled “On the improvement of measures to counteract religious extremism in 

the Russia Federation,” a document purportedly being prepared within the Russian government. 

The report was allegedly co-authored by Minister for National Affairs Vladimir Zorin and 

Ahmad Kadyrov, head of the Chechen Administration, with the assistance of 33 other (unnamed) 

officials. The Gazeta article stated that the report was to be presented to a joint meeting of the 

State Council (an advisory body under President Putin), the Security Council (similar to the U.S. 

National Security Council), and the Council for Relations with Religious Organizations (a body 

that is under the Prime Minister).23

The most troubling aspect of the report is that it names several religious groups under the 

heading “estimation of national security threats concerning religious extremism.” The Roman 

Catholic Church is said to be “livening up its missionary work” on “traditionally Orthodox 

territories of the Russian Federation” and to have declared Russia to be a “church province,” 

both of which have led to an increase in tensions between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. 

Protestant groups are said to be pointedly using humanitarian aid as a means of enticing 

(especially young) people away from “the Russian state, national traditions, and culture.” South 

Korea and the United States are named as sources of financial support for these groups. Also, 

the report states that “representatives of foreign religious communities,” naming specifically the 

Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Unification Church, try to penetrate the army and law enforcement 

agencies in order to gain information and “spread the ideology of permissiveness and egoism.” 

Such groups are described as having a “disrespectful attitude toward traditional Russian

confessions.”24 

The primary focus of the 15-page statement is the threat to Russia posed by “radical 

Islamic trends.” According to the report, Islamic groups are working to “oppose the interests of 

Russia’s Muslims,” and to encourage the country’s Muslim population to leave the Russian 

Federation and establish a separate Islamic state or states. Such groups represent a “real threat to 

the national security of Russia,” the leaked document states, due to the “political radicalism, 

nationalism, and separatism that are all under the umbrella of the Islamic banner.” The report 

also refers to the threat posed by foreign Islamic emissaries who “try to form skilled reserves in 

Russia,” and the number of young Russian citizens who are currently studying in Islamic centers 

abroad. “The majority of Russians who study [abroad],” the report states, “return home to 

become mediators of extremism and radicalism.”25

The leaked report notes a number of positive steps that have been taken to oppose 

religious extremism in Russia. These include the passage of numerous laws, such as the 1997 

law on “Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” and the 2002 law on 

“Counteracting Extremist Activity” (see below). The report also makes several 

recommendations on this subject, including: the establishment by the President of consultative 

bodies on church-state relations that would bring together representatives of public and religious 

organizations in all federal districts; the creation of a working group on “ethno-confessional 
8

monitoring” and the early prevention of conflicts, which would include experts from the Security 

Council; the overcoming of “disunity and narrow national orientation” among the Muslim 

clergy; greater state support for “traditional religious organizations”; and the strengthening of the 

control of state bodies to ensure that the activities of religious organizations are in conformity 

with regulations and Russian law.

The recommendations also include a number of amendments to the 1997 law on religion, 

such as holding central religious organizations responsible for any crimes committed by its local 

constituent churches; banning methods of “hypnotic influence”; and requiring children to have 

authorization from their parents to attend church (including the Russian Orthodox Church).

The “Zorin report,” whatever its authority as a legitimate document, is nevertheless a 

disturbing indication that at least some in the Russian government persist in viewing entire 

religious communities as “threats” to Russia. It is also an indication that such views are shaped, 

at least in part, by the Russian Orthodox Church. After the alleged report was leaked in Gazeta, 

Nationalities Minister Vladimir Zorin and his staff repeatedly attempted to diminish its 

controversial nature. In a follow-up article in Gazeta on December 9, in response to a question 

on why Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims should be considered a threat to national security, 

Minister Zorin stated that that was "an absurd theory." He added that "neither Islam nor the 

Catholic Church are a threat to security, of course." In a Moscow Times article from the same 

day, Zorin was quoted as saying that the draft report was written only “to analyze how 

confessions develop and expand in Russia.”26 

During its January 2003 visit to Russia, the Commission was repeatedly told by 

government officials that the document did not reflect Russian government policy.27 Minister of 

Nationalities Vladimir Zorin, perhaps the person most closely associated with the leaked report 

since it has come to bear his name, told the Commission delegation unequivocally that no ethnic 

or religious group will ever be labeled “extremist” without a determination being made 

according to proper legal and court procedures. Given how hard the government has worked to 

implement religious freedom in Russia, Zorin said, it is inconceivable that it would classify 

entire denominations as threats to national security without going through the proper legal 

channels. Moreover, there is an official Presidential Council that is comprised of representatives 

from all the religious groups mentioned in the so-called “Zorin report.” Thus, Zorin told the 

delegation, it is simply impossible that the four groups listed [in the report attributed to him] 

could be considered threats to Russia’s national security at the same time. Terrorism and 

extremism, Zorin concluded, do not stem from any one ethnicity or religion. 

This view was also stated by Aleksander Kudryavtsev, head of the Department of 

Religious and Public Organizations at the Ministry of Justice, who emphasized that the 

government has already outlined explicit criteria for determining when an organization can be 

labeled “extremist” and thus a threat to national security. These criteria are: a court decision, 

guided by criminal procedures and the law on extremism; a decision by the prosecutor’s office 

about the suspension of an organization’s activities, which the organization can appeal; or a 

decree from an international or other organization that has made this determination. 

Kudryavtsev was emphatic about the fact that the religious communities listed in the “Zorin 

report” will not be branded as extremist by the government. In fact, he stated, given that the 

ideas it contained are so contrary to Russian government policy, the so-called “Zorin report” 
9

simply does not exist. In the same way, Boris Tsepov, Director of the Department of 

International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

pointed out that the purported document clearly compromises the Russian government, which 

would never contradict itself in such a manner. 

Andrey Sebentsev, who is head of the Department for Interaction with the State Duma 

and Public Organizations, stated that the formulation of Russian policy on matters such as 

sources of threats to national security is still very much in progress. Anything written about the 

subject in this early stage therefore does not merit attention. Similarly, Viktor Zorkaltsev, who is 

a member of the State Duma and Chair of the Committee on Public Associations and Religious 

Organizations, stated that while it may be the case that some points of view were leaked 

prematurely to the press, that information clearly should not be taken seriously. 

While the many attestations that the “Zorin report” did not represent official policy were 

welcome clarifications, there are many continuing factors that suggest that its contents represent 

the views of at least some officials in the Russian government who have influence over the 

development or implementation of the state’s policies toward religion. These include: the 

expulsions of religious workers and clergy; expanded legal restrictions on newer religious 

communities; incidents of anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim violence which are not investigated or 

prosecuted; adoption and toleration of regional laws which run counter to federal protections; 

state support for a special place for the Russian Orthodox Church which would result in 

discrimination against other religious communities; and ongoing government interference in the 

selection of internal leadership of religious communities. Findings on these subjects, which the 

Commission examined on its visit to Russia, are discussed below.

2. Restrictions on Entry Visas to Religious Workers 

Since the beginning of 2002, a number of Catholic priests have been expelled from 

Russia, including priests who had lived in Russia for years. The increase in such expulsions 

occurred almost directly after the Vatican announced in February 2002 that the Catholic Church 

would form four dioceses in Russia, upgrading its four “apostolic administrations” to fullfledged dioceses. The most prominent expulsion was that of Bishop Jerzy Mazur, who had been 

living in Russia since the late 1990s, in April 2002 from the east-Siberian diocese.28 At the date 

of this printing, Bishop Mazur had still not been allowed back in the country. Four other 

foreign-born Catholic priests had their Russian visas revoked or not renewed in the past year, and 

two in the year before that.29 While it is the case that Catholic Bishop Clemens Pickel of Saratov 

received permanent residency status from Russian authorities in January 2003, the following 

month, the visa of another Polish Catholic priest was revoked. Fr. Bronislav Czaplicki, who had 

been working in Russia for ten years, was given two weeks to leave the country.30

According to a leader of Russia’s Roman Catholic Church, the policy of “one city, one 

bishop,” or the allowing of only one bishop—from the Russian Orthodox Church—in any city, 

has been in place for almost a decade. However, the notion was given attention and seriously 

enforced only in the past year, after the Vatican made its announcement about the creation of 

dioceses in Russia. Since then, he said, the Church has not been able to organize itself as it 

would like and several members of the clergy have been expelled from the country. 
10

A discernible escalation in expulsions or visa denials was noted in 1997, when the new 

religious law was being promulgated. According to the Keston Institute, the granting of visas for 

foreign religious workers was made even more problematic after a January 2000 security policy 

directive was approved by President Putin. That policy reportedly views “the counteraction of 

the negative influence of foreign religious organizations and missionaries” as critical to national 

security.31 In addition to the denials or revocations of visas for Catholic priests, there were 

reportedly 17 other cases during 2002 in which foreign religious workers were denied visas to 

enter or re-enter the country, including members of the Protestant Christian, Buddhist, and 

Muslim faiths. One Protestant group reported to the Commission that since November 1, 2002, 

all of its applications for one-year multi-entry visas for religious workers had been denied.32 In 

the case of many Protestant churches, indigenous members can often replace the denied foreign 

minister or worker. Roman Catholics, though, who require ordained clergy with up to six years 

of training, rely particularly heavily on foreign-ordained clergy, not least because of the 

destruction of seminaries and Church leadership during the Soviet era. (There is currently only 

one Catholic seminary operating in Russia, and there were none during the Soviet period.) 

Russia’s Buddhists are similarly affected, as Buddhists often regard only Tibetan or other foreign 

teachers as appropriately authoritative.33

During the visit to Russia, the Commission heard a variety of views from Russian 

government officials on this matter. For example, Oleg Mironov, the Human Rights 

Ombudsman, made clear that the denials of visas to Catholic priests and other religious workers 

are in almost every case a violation of Russian law. However, he said, matters of entry to and 

exit from the country have recently been transferred from the jurisdiction of the Russian Foreign 

Affairs Ministry to the Internal Affairs Ministry, which has little experience with this issue. On 

the other hand, Boris Tsepov from the Foreign Affairs Ministry suggested to the Commission 

that the decision to deny visas to those persons (such as the Catholic priests) must have occurred 

because the applicants themselves violated the relevant laws in some way, referring to the new 

laws on citizenship and on entry and exit. In a press article, Russian Foreign Minister Igor 

Ivanov later confirmed this view, stating that the priests had violated the new regulations on 

foreigners. He also stated that “the decisions [to expel the priests] were individual in nature; 

neither religion nor nationality played any role.”34 However, Tsepov stated, it is possible that the 

people in question were not expressly denied visas but are only experiencing a delay. 

3. Ongoing Legal Issues

As noted above, in 1997, the Russian government passed a new law on “Freedom of 

Conscience and Religious Associations.” This new law imposed onerous registration 

requirements that effectively created a hierarchy of religious communities, which generally left 

the newer and smaller religious communities with fewer rights and privileges than the more 

traditionally established religious groups. Since 1997, several court rulings have ameliorated 

some of the harsher registration requirements in the law that had threatened to result in the 

liquidation of a number of minority religious groups.35 Because of the law’s vague and 

sometimes contradictory language, the registration process is open to abuse on the part of 

government officials, especially at the local level. Several minority religious communities, most

notably the Jehovah’s Witnesses, still face legal challenges—and even threats to their 

existence—because of provisions of the 1997 law.36
11

A number of troubling amendments to the law have since been proposed. According to 

one report, the amendments call for significant government interference in a religious group’s 

internal dealings, as the Ministry of Justice would be given the right, “with foundation,” to 

request and receive information about the compliance of a group’s charter with its stated aims 

and activities. If a religious group were found to be involved in activity not in line with its 

charter, the group will be issued a warning. After two warnings have been issued and if the 

offending activity has not been curtailed, the authorities have the right to file for the liquidation 

of that organization.37

Other recently passed or proposed laws could also have a significant effect on religious 

freedom in Russia. On November 1, 2002, Russia passed the Foreigners’ Law, a new law on the 

legal status of foreigners, which has the potential of negatively affecting the situation for foreign 

religious workers. According to one description of this new law, an organization wishing to 

employ a foreign citizen must gain the permission of the internal affairs administration, which is 

another name for the police, who would consider the application together with the immigration 

service. The foreign person must also seek official permission to work in Russia, which would 

essentially be a second form of permission that is required. Permission will reportedly be 

granted based on a quota for that group that is determined by the Russian government.38 

Though it is as yet too soon to know the ramifications of the full implementation of this new law, 

observers have expressed alarm about the consequences for religious freedom if internal affairs 

authorities should have the power to establish quotas on how many priests or ministers may be 

invited into the country. At this stage, religious groups report widespread confusion about how 

to comply with the new law.

In July 2002, the Duma passed a law “On Counteracting Religious Extremism,” which 

has drawn criticism from a variety of religious and human rights groups. One key concern about 

the law is its definition of extremism: “the propaganda of exclusivity, superiority, or inferiority 

of citizens on account of their attitude toward religion,” a definition that would include persons 

from many religions who believe in the exclusive truth of their faith. Though the law has since 

been employed to curb the activities of violent skinhead groups, there are concerns that some its 

more vague provisions could easily be used against minority religious groups, particularly those 

that are new to Russia.39

Legislation still in draft form includes a “Law on Traditional Religions,” which was 

proposed in February 2002, though its current status remains unclear. This law would grant 

benefits, at varying levels, to the Russian Orthodox Church and three other religious 

communities deemed “traditional” to Russia: Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism. According to one 

report on the proposed law, a “traditional religious organization” is understood to have been 

active in Russia for no fewer than 50 years, have no fewer than 100,000 adherents, and have 

been “an inalienable part of the historical, spiritual, and cultural heritage of the peoples of 

Russia.”40 Unlike other religious groups, these “traditional” religious communities would be 

granted wide-ranging opportunities for work in education, media and various social services, and 

would be assisted by the state in establishing their own schools and charities. Although granting 

these types of privileges to particular long-established religious groups is relatively common in 

Western Europe, passage of such a law at the present time in Russia may further entrench the 

notion, especially at the local levels, that discrimination or other abuses against smaller religious 

minorities is permissible. 
12

4. Continued Incidents of Anti-Semitism 

Despite statements by President Putin decrying anti-Semitism and various government 

actions against extremist groups, violence against Jews in Russia continues. In May 2002, an 

anti-Semitic sign saying “Death to the Yids” and booby-trapped with explosives exploded, 

injuring a woman who tried to remove it. The following month, another anti-Semitic sign made 

to look similarly booby-trapped appeared outside Moscow, though it was found not to contain a 

bomb, and copycat signs appeared in other cities also.41 In June and July, seven similar signs 

appeared on roads, and by the end of the year, there were a total of 15 incidents of real or fake 

exploding signs throughout Russia.42 Pipe bombs with anti-Semitic slogans attached remain 

common, and synagogues and Jewish cemeteries continue to be desecrated.43 

During the Commission’s visit to Russia, one Jewish leader stated that there is no longer 

official government anti-Semitism in Russia today. However, he continued, there is persistent 

government inaction in the face of attacks by others. What is more, “street anti-Semitism” is 

flourishing, including vandalism and attacks on synagogues or individual Jews. In recent years, 

this person said, publications from fascist groups have flooded into Russia and the government, 

especially at the lower levels, has done little to counter it. Though it is perhaps an ironic 

consequence, it seems that at the same time that the practice of the Jewish religion is more free 

than ever before in Russian history, Jews now increasingly live in fear for their lives and 

property because of continuing attacks by extremist groups. These groups act, for the most part, 

with impunity, especially in the regions. According to one expert, “regional authorities as a 

general rule ignore the activities of dangerous hate groups that aim violent rhetoric and actions 

against minority groups,” preferring instead to dismiss the incidents as “hooliganism.”44

Anti-Semitism is sometimes blatant on Russia’s political scene. In September 2002, the 

Russian government registered the National Sovereign Party as a political party, a party that at its 

founding conference has called for a battle against “fascist religious Jews” and “the criminal 

Jewish occupation.”45 Also called the “National Great Power Party of Russia,” the party was 

reportedly examined by the Justice Ministry, which found no legal reason to deny its registration 

application, and it became the first openly extremist party to be granted registration in Russia.46 

In February 2003, Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of Russia's Communist Party and National 

Patriotic Union, delivered what observers described as his most openly anti-Semitic statement in 

years. In a speech at an All-Russia seminar of the chiefs of the party's regional election camps 

held outside Moscow, Zyuganov claimed that “there has been a glaring ethnic bias in the 

makeup” of governing bodies, suggesting that Jews occupy a large number of positions in 

executive and financial departments and are key figures in the media, creating “ethnic 

intolerance” in the government.47 

Anti-Semitic literature is also widespread and there is little effort on the part of the 

authorities to bring charges against groups that produce it, even where it clearly violates the law.

What is more, an atmosphere of intolerance against such minorities, including Jews and 

Muslims, is being left largely unchallenged. According to one report, anti-Semitism is also “rife 

among many, often self-appointed, Muslim clerics and elements of the Russian Orthodox 

Church.”48 The Commission heard from Jewish leaders that there are still provinces, especially 

around Moscow, where the local Russian Orthodox Church publishes virulently anti-Semitic 

material. According to the publication of one Russian human rights group, “anti-Semitic 
13

literature is readily sold in Orthodox churches and sometimes even with the local bishop’s 

consent.”49 

5. Recent Increase in Violence Against Muslims

In recent years, there has been a marked increase in attacks against Muslim or Muslimappearing persons in Russia. As in the case of attacks on Jews, skinhead groups are frequently 

the perpetrators, but police generally do not make adequate efforts to investigate or prosecute 

these crimes. Most of the perpetrators remain “unidentified and unpunished.”50 Moreover, since 

the takeover of the Moscow theater by gunmen demanding the withdrawal of Russian forces 

from Chechnya in October 2002, Muslims in general as well as the Islamic religion have been 

the subjects of harsh diatribes in the Russian media, even in more mainstream publications, 

referring to all Muslims as “the enemy.” Though Muslims are the second largest religious group 

in Russia, many now report living in fear of attack or other forms of discrimination.51 

a. The conflict in Chechnya

The conflict between Russian government troops and Chechen fighters in Chechnya is 

thought to be a significant source fueling anti-Muslim sentiment throughout Russia. The 

Chechens, who are traditionally Muslim and speak a Caucasian language wholly unrelated to 

Russian, fiercely resisted incorporation into the Russian Empire in the 19th century. The 

Chechens also opposed absorption into the Soviet Union, and in 1944, the entire Chechen 

population was deported by Stalin to Central Asia. In the course of the forced transfer, almost 

half of the Chechen people died. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, only former Soviet 

republics existing along the border of the Soviet Union gained independence; Chechnya, as an 

autonomous republic within the Russian Federation, was not therefore granted sovereignty. 

In 1991, the Chechen Republic declared itself independent from the Russian Federation. 

In 1994, the Russian government sent troops to Chechnya, and the ensuing conflict between 

government troops and independence fighters lasted two years and resulted in the deaths of 

thousands and the displacement of hundreds of thousands. In 1999, after bombs placed in 

several Moscow apartment buildings killing hundreds were blamed on Chechen separatist 

fighters, the Russian government again sent troops to Chechnya. The second conflict continues 

still.52 During both periods of conflict, the Russian government has been rigorously criticized by 

domestic and international human rights groups, as well as many western governments, for 

perpetrating severe human rights abuses against the civilian population in Chechyna. According 

to Amnesty International, “the conflict in Chechnya has been characterized by widespread and 

credible reports that Russian forces have been responsible for violations of international human 

rights and humanitarian law, including ‘disappearances,’ extrajudicial executions, and torture, 

including rape.”53 Chechen forces are also reported to have violated international humanitarian 

law by carrying out dozens of assassinations of civilian members of the generally pro-Moscow 

administration and being responsible for the kidnappings of civilians.54

b. Effects on anti-Muslim violence

Though people from traditionally Muslim regions of the Russian Federation and the 

former Soviet Union have been subjected in the past to violent racist attacks by extremist groups 
14

because of their generally darker appearance, the outbreak of the conflict in Chechnya has 

resulted in an increase in such attacks throughout Russia. Moreover, the conflict has contributed 

to the development of an atmosphere of hatred against all Muslims, and a sense on the part of 

some that Muslims can be attacked with impunity. 

The situation intensified first after the Moscow apartment bombings in 1999 and then in 

the wake of the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, after which the Russian 

government proclaimed that its conflict in Chechnya was also part of the global campaign 

against terrorism. According to one author, “even before the start of the Chechen war and 

terrorist attacks on Moscow, dislike of Caucasian and other Muslims was widespread. But the 

Chechen war and its fallout have magnified such feelings and led to their translation into actual 

attacks.”55 Similarly, the State Department notes that “discriminatory attitudes [became] 

stronger since the outset of the conflict in the predominantly Muslim region of Chechnya and 

since the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings, for which the mayor and others quickly blamed 

Chechen separatists.”56 Several reports indicate that any Muslim or person from the Caucasus is 

open to being branded an “extremist” and subject to violence as a result.57 Thus, while the 

conflict in Chechnya did not begin as a religious freedom issue, the ongoing strife has had an 

effect on the religious freedom of Muslims in Russia.

Moscow’s chief mufti told the Commission that media attacks on Islam and Muslims, 

even in such mainstream newspapers as Izvestiya, have increased markedly in the past year. 

Largely because of the conflict in Chechnya, some Russian politicians also regularly attack Islam 

and brand all Muslim believers as extremists, he said. An appeal was made to the Russian 

government to speak out against such media attacks, and as a result, President Putin made 

several public statements declaring that Islam as a religion is not responsible for terrorist attacks 

and noting the importance of distinguishing between criminal terrorist violence and religion. 

Yet, even after the President’s words, the mufti said, the media did not stop their campaign 

against Muslims and no more was heard from the government on the matter.

Another Muslim leader described to the Commission the way in which the conflict in 

Chechnya affects all Muslims in Russia, as all Muslims are viewed suspiciously as potential 

terrorists, especially anyone who is more than nominally Muslim. Like the Jewish leader, this 

mufti noted the difference between the situation today and that during Soviet times; in the Soviet 

era, there were fewer mosques, he said, but “at least back then people did not enter the mosques 

with clubs.” In Moscow the previous fall, he witnessed clashes at a market in Moscow in which 

dozens of skinheads declared they wanted to kill people who “looked Muslim.”58 

The leader of one human rights group told the Commission that the situation is 

particularly bad in Chechnya itself, where mosques are routinely defiled, cemeteries destroyed, 

and holy tombs thrown open. As a result, this person said, the youth there are being easily 

recruited into extremist Muslim groups. Certain newspapers, he continued, even in the 

mainstream, routinely print anti-Muslim articles, not in response to an order from above, but as a 

result of an anti-Muslim atmosphere that is tolerated and left uncontested. Another human rights 

activist agreed, noting that Chechens throughout Russia are the most persecuted group in the 

country, because all are seen as “terrorists.”
15

6. Persistent Non-Conformity of Regional Laws with Russian Federation Federal 

Laws and the Russian Constitution. 

According to the State Department, religious minorities continue to encounter the greatest 

difficulties at the regional and municipal levels. In the past decade, many of Russia’s regional 

governments have passed laws and decrees directly aimed at restricting the activities of minority 

religious groups. The federal government has acknowledged that these local laws contradict the 

Russian Constitution and has made some effort to correct this situation, insisting that some 

localities rescind legislation that is not in compliance with federal laws. Yet, many examples of 

religious freedom violations at the local level persist.59 It is at this level that Muslim groups, 

particularly in those regions where they are in the minority, Roman Catholics, Protestant and 

other Christian groups, and others continue to be denied registration, permits to build houses of 

worship, and the right to rent space to gather, and it is often the case that such denials are in 

opposition to federal laws on these matters. According to the State Department, “the vagueness 

of the law and regulations, the contradictions between federal and local law, and the varying 

interpretations provide regional officials with a pretext for restricting the activities of religious 

minorities.”60 Minority religious groups have been able to reverse some violations in local 

courts, but the vast majority of violations have gone unchecked. 

7. Unofficial State Support for the Russian Orthodox Church Resulting in 

Discrimination Against Other Religious Communities 

There is sustained concern that the Russian Orthodox Church enjoys a favored status 

among many Russian government officials, a situation that sometimes results in restrictions on 

other religious communities. Particularly on the local level, evidence suggests that the Orthodox 

Church has a very close relationship with officials and other state bodies. For example, there are 

frequent reports that minority religious communities must secure permission from the local 

Orthodox Church before being allowed to build a house of worship. Though government 

officials claim to be doing everything possible to aid in the building of churches and other 

religious buildings, adherents of minority faiths in Russia, including Catholics, Protestants, 

Muslims, and others, report that government officials instead often create barriers, and do so 

increasingly “at the behest of the Orthodox Church.”61 

The Law Against Extremist Activity passed in July 2002 provides a legal basis for the 

government’s collaboration with “religious entities” as a counterweight to the activities of 

extremist groups in Russia. In practical terms, “religious entities” refers to the Russian Orthodox 

Church. According to one report, this “church-state alliance means in practice that the Orthodox 

Church establishes the line that secular authorities take in their evaluation of this or that 

denomination.”62 The Moscow Patriarchate’s Missionary Department reportedly widely 

disseminated information on religious organizations, information that was then used to form the 

“blacklists” found in a reference book for the staff of the Prosecutor’s Office on the activities of 

religious organizations.63

During the visit to Russia, one NGO leader stated that in some cases, law enforcement 

agencies typically see the Orthodox Church as an ally and will use the Church as an “expert 

witness” in court cases against minority religious groups. In return, the Orthodox Church gains 

“protection” from the local law enforcement organs, with the result that other religious groups 
16

find it difficult to gain permission to build churches or rent meeting halls. The Moscow 

Patriarchate’s Missionary Department handbook, the source of the “blacklists” found in a 

reference book used by the Prosecutor’s Office, was mentioned above. In addition, these 

blacklists are apparently also to be found in a Ministry of Education letter to schools and colleges 

on the activities of “non-traditional organizations,” and in an instruction booklet from the mayor 

of at least one city “listing religious organizations with which the city government should not 

cooperate.”64

This favored position for the Orthodox Church, particularly at the local level, sometimes 

results in discriminatory practices against other religious communities, even communities that 

are not new to Russia. For example, the Commission delegation was told by a Muslim leader 

that in one of the regions around Moscow, the local authorities have issued a decree requiring 

Muslim groups to gain permission from the local Russian Orthodox Church in order to build a 

mosque. There is a full list of requirements that must be satisfied before a house of worship can 

be built, including such items as satisfying building codes, sanitation requirements, and others, 

but one of the prerequisites is permission from the Orthodox Church. In other parts of Russia, 

this Muslim leader said, such as the cities of Sergiev Posad’ and Murmansk, it is similarly made 

difficult for Muslims to build mosques through the imposition of often arbitrary rules that 

effectively deny them permission. Occasionally, he said, Muslims are denied the right to buy a 

plot of land or build a mosque, often in response to pressure on the authorities from the local 

Orthodox Church. 

The Catholic Church and Protestant groups frequently face similar problems. One 

religious leader told the Commission that some local officials in the Orthodox Church have said 

that their church is the official religion and that other religions are “guests” in Russia. A 

representative of the Catholic Church described how, in several cities, the Russian Orthodox 

Church pointedly works to prevent the Catholic Church from getting church property returned or 

from building a new church. In the case of the town of Pskov, where the Catholic Church sought 

the return of some Church property, the Orthodox Church sent a letter to President Putin asking 

him to deny permission for the return of the church, and permission was subsequently denied. 

Approval was finally granted instead to build a new church, this person said, but only after 

lengthy negotiations about the building’s height and other factors. Representatives of several 

Protestant groups also described to the Commission the way in which their members must seek 

permission from local Orthodox priests to organize an event in that city or to rent worship space. 

The situation is similarly difficult for Orthodox churches that do not accept the authority of the 

current Orthodox Patriarch.

In addition, the Russian Orthodox Church appears to be implementing a course on the 

Orthodox religion in the Russian state school curriculum. According to the State Department’s 

religious freedom report, “the Russian Orthodox Church has made special arrangements with 

government agencies to conduct religious education and to provide spiritual counseling.” 

Education Minister Vladimir Filipov sent “the Foundations of Orthodox Culture” as a new 

curriculum prototype to Russian regional education departments on October 22, 2002. The 

course was written by senior members of the Russian Orthodox clergy.65 The Orthodox Church 

defends the course, claiming that it will not teach the Orthodox religion but only “Orthodox 

culture.”66 A representative of the Russian Orthodox Church explained to the Commission that 

there is a great need for such a course in Russian schools, because the old Soviet-style, atheist-
17

based education is still in place. Another part of the problem stems from the fact that unlike in 

the United States, there are very few private schools in Russia, he said, so all families must rely 

on that Soviet style public education.

However, as part of that “culture,” the text for the course reportedly contains grossly antiSemitic material and also accuses non-Orthodox religions in Russia of “not always behaving 

nobly in the traditionally Orthodox state.”67 One human rights leader told the Commission that 

an obligatory course in Orthodox catechism is already being taught in schools. This could split 

Russian society, he said, as the course apparently contains instructions on such topics as heresies, 

schisms, and other “unacceptable” religious practices. Education Minister Filipov later stated 

that the new course would be optional and “not religious in nature.”68 There appears to be a 

division within the Russian government on the need for such a course, however, as Alexei Volin, 

the government’s deputy chief of staff was reported as stating that Russia, as a multiconfessional country, should not authorize the teaching of any religion in public schools.69

 

8. Continued Government Interference in the Internal Affairs of Religious 

Communities 

Echoing Soviet practices, the current Russian government continues to engage in or 

tolerate official interference in the internal affairs of various religious communities in Russia. 

Perhaps the most notorious example was President Putin’s actions in 2001 that effectively threw 

Russian government weight behind one chief rabbi in Moscow over another, reportedly because 

one was aligned with a media magnate out of favor with Putin. Russian government support for 

one Jewish leader over the other was reportedly “blatant,” as one rabbi was publicly replaced by 

the other as a member of the Putin’s Council for Cooperation with Religious Organizations.70

Another case of Russian government interference into the internal affairs of religious 

groups occurred in early 2002, when Russian government officials publicly opposed the Roman 

Catholic Church’s canonical decision to change its four apostolic administrations to dioceses. 

Shortly after the Vatican announcement, several Catholic priests were expelled from the country. 

The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement “calling on the Vatican to refrain from such a 

move,” and pointedly asked the Catholic Church first to settle the issue, which is essentially an 

internal matter for the Roman Catholic Church, with the Russian Orthodox Church.71

D. Recommendations

The existence of the “Zorin report” suggests that the authoritarian viewpoint is 

reasserting itself in Russia’s religious policy. This, in turn, indicates that the continuing and 

intensifying problems outlined above represent a real threat to religious freedom and not merely 

a theoretical one. In 1997, the Russian government passed a law on religion that was 

problematic for religious freedom; the problems in the law have only been mitigated by the 

moderate policies of the central government and the implementation of a number of favorable 

court decisions. The Russian government must continue to take an active role in protecting 

religious minorities in Russia from violations by local and regional officials, as well as from 

violent attacks by extremist groups. 
18

During the Commission’s trip to Russia, it became apparent to the delegation that senior 

Russian officials do care about their international image on the question of protecting human 

rights. Their handling of their religious freedom problems will, in the end, serve as an important 

benchmark for progress in this regard. Given the persistent problems outlined above, Russia’s 

full commitment to human rights, including religious freedom, is unclear. This is precisely why 

democracy remains fragile in Russia. 

The United States must therefore continue vigilantly to monitor the democratic reform 

process in Russia at this important moment. The U.S. government should continue to work with 

the Russians to oppose authoritarian influences that threaten democracy, and also work actively 

to promote reform, oppose religious intolerance, and support those who work on behalf of 

religious freedom and other human rights in Russia.

I. Raise Concern about the Growing Influence of Undemocratic Forces on Russian 

Government Policies

1. Recognizing the Russian government’s duty to protect its citizens from 

terrorist acts and violence, the U.S. government should make clear its 

concern to the Russian government that efforts to combat terrorism should 

not be used as an unrestrained justification to restrict the rights, including 

religious freedom, of members of Russia's religious minorities.

2. Though welcoming the assurances from Russian government officials that 

the so-called “Zorin report” does not reflect government policy, the U.S. 

government should continue to press the Russian government to ensure that 

the views expressed in the leaked report are not adopted as Russian 

government policy.

Notwithstanding the genuine threat posed by terrorist and extremist groups, government 

actions to counter terrorism and extremism should not be an excuse to restrict disproportionately 

the rights of members of minority religious communities in contravention of international human 

rights norms. There have been terrorist attacks in Russia in recent years; however, these attacks 

should not justify measures targeting religious groups that do not directly address legitimate 

security concerns.

In the “Zorin Report,” Catholics, Protestants, and others have been grouped together with 

Islamic extremists and collectively labeled as threats to Russia’s national security. The 

Commission delegation to Russia expressed its alarm about the contents of the leaked report at 

every meeting with Russian government officials and NGOs. In response, the delegation heard a 

variety of explanations about the report and its significance for Russian policy. All of the 

government officials the Commission met with downplayed the document, and several even 

denied its existence or described it as a provocation or fabrication. At the same time, many if not 

most of the religious groups and human rights NGOs felt that the report represented a concrete 

point of view among many in the Russian government and that its contents warranted genuine 

concern. 
19

Whatever the truth about the nature and background of the leaked report, clearly the 

notions expressed in the document point to the existence of such views among at least some 

officials in the Russian government, which in turn justifies some concern about the future of 

democracy in Russia. Indeed, representatives of virtually all of the human rights groups and 

other NGOs told the Commission that whoever is responsible for the so-called “Zorin report” 

represents a strong and worrisome influence within the Russian government and the report itself 

suggests that intolerant forces remain influential in Russian government circles.

It is therefore vital that the U.S. government engage Russia at every possible level on this 

matter to ensure that the views expressed in it do not become government policy or enshrined in 

Russian law. At the very least, such views are in direct violation of the Russian Constitution, 

which states that “all religions are equal before the law.” As noted above, the Commission 

received assurances from many high-ranking government officials that the contents of the “Zorin 

report” were not and would not become government policy. The Russian government should 

persistently be held to those assurances. The U.S. government should remain highly vigilant on 

this matter, for it is potentially a harbinger for Russia that affects far more than the protection of 

religious freedom. 

II. Oppose Attempts to Rollback Religious Freedom

3. While recognizing the historic role of the Russian Orthodox Church in 

Russian society, the U.S. government should urge the Russian government to 

ensure that any special role for the Orthodox Church or any other religious 

community does not result in violations of the rights of or discrimination 

against members of other religious groups.

The Commission heard from a number of different sources in Russia that elements within 

the Russian Orthodox Church are attempting, and have already succeeded to some extent, to 

institute a state-sanctioned, favored position for itself that would, as a consequence, continue to 

result in discrimination against other religious communities. The leader of one NGO focused on 

religious liberty noted that some of the religious freedom violations in Russia stem from the 

country’s Soviet experience, which left a number of Russian elites with the notion that there 

must be one, unifying ideology for the country. Many are turning to the Orthodox Church to 

provide that ideology.72 Thus, he stated, Orthodox leaders throughout Russia are sometimes 

perceived by Russian officials, especially at the local level, as political “commissars” responsible 

for promoting an official ideology and for keeping people “in line” with that ideology. 

The Commission acknowledges the special role that the Russian Orthodox Church has 

played in Russian history and culture. It is true that in some countries, one religious community 

enjoys the status of “state church.” This is permitted under international standards on the right 

to freedom of religion or belief. However, the establishment of a state church or favored 

religious group is problematic for religious freedom when, as a consequence, there is the 

discriminatory or unjust treatment of members of other religious groups. As an authoritative UN 

interpretation of this matter has pointed out, 

the fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is established as 

official or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, 
20

shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the 

[International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], including articles 18 and 

27 [addressing freedom of religion and minority rights] nor in any discrimination 

against adherents of other religions or non-believers.73

The U.S. government should urge the Russian government not to fashion either an 

official or de facto position for one religious community if the consequence is the violation of the 

freedom of religion of other persons or religious groups in Russia.

4.a. The U.S. government should continue to urge the Russian government 

to cease the practice of unfairly denying entry visas or residency permits to 

foreign clergy and other religious workers and thereby to uphold the 

freedom of all religious communities to organize themselves according to 

their own tenets. 

4.b. The U.S. government should also encourage the Russian government to 

cease other forms of interference in the internal affairs of religious 

communities. 

Because of Russia’s repressive past, several religious communities have no choice but to 

rely on foreign clergy and other religious workers to minister to their adherents. Of the 33 clergy 

members or religious workers who have had their visas denied or been expelled from Russia 

since 1998, 19 such denials occurred in 2002. Among those denied visas or expelled were 

Catholics, Mormons, Buddhists, and Evangelical Protestants.

The UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination 

Based on Religion or Belief states that the right to religious freedom includes the right “to train, 

appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and 

standards of any religion or belief.”74 The 1989 CSCE Vienna document reiterates that right and 

affirms also that participating states will respect the right of religious communities to “organize 

themselves according to their own hierarchical and institutional structure.”75 

It is understandable that any government should have control over the process of entry 

and exit across its borders, and the right to prevent persons from entering the country with the 

purpose of fostering violence in the name of religion. Nevertheless, entry visas and residency 

permits should not be used as means to harass any religious community or thwart its efforts to 

organize itself as it would wish. The freedom to manifest religion in community with others in 

the case of Russia’s minority religions includes the right to call upon the services of coreligionists abroad. Limitations on foreign religious workers can be made only on the basis of 

the permissible exceptions outlined in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, including that which is “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 

morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” However, the Russian government 

has presented no evidence that these foreign clergy or other religious workers represent a threat; 

indeed, in some cases, the persons in question have been living in Russia for over 10 years. 

Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that it is merely a coincidence that the expulsions of and visa 

denials to Catholic priests occurred not long after the Vatican announced its intention to 

restructure its church organization in Russia.
21

It is not the role of the Russian government to determine who should lead religious 

communities, either by expelling religious workers or championing one religious faction over 

another within any one religious community. The U.S. government should make clear its 

concerns about the denials and expulsions and strongly urge the Russian government to respect 

the right of members of religious communities to select, appoint, and replace their personnel in 

accordance with their respective requirements and without interference from the government. 

The U.S. government should urge the government of Russia to respect these rights, to which it 

has agreed to adhere, with regard to all religious communities in Russia.

5. The U.S. Government should urge the government of Russia to monitor 

the actions of regional and local officials who interfere with the right to 

freedom of religion or belief, and to take steps to bring local laws and 

regulations on religious activities into conformity with the Russian 

Constitution and international human rights standards.

The U.S. government should urge the Russian federal authorities to monitor local 

officials effectively and, if appropriate, to investigate and punish officials whose actions are in 

violation of the Russian Constitution and international human rights standards. In addition, 

Russian officials reportedly have stated that many regional and local laws and decrees 

concerning religious activities violate the Russian Constitution. The U.S. government should 

urge the government of Russia to act, consistent with its constitutional system, to bring such laws 

into conformity with the Russian Constitution and international human rights standards.76

While it is the case that the Russian government has made significant progress in tackling 

this problem, much more needs to be done. As noted above, it is at the local level that most 

religious freedom violations in Russia occur.

III. Protect Religious Minorities in Russia Against Violent Attacks and Intolerance

6. The U.S. government should persistently urge the Russian government to 

take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish acts of anti-Semitism, 

including to condemn anti-Semitic acts, to pursue and prosecute the 

perpetrators of violent incidents of anti-Semitism, and, while vigorously 

protecting freedom of expression, to counteract anti-Semitic rhetoric and 

other organized anti-Semitic activities.

Attacks against the lives and property of members of the Jewish community continue in 

Russia. While these violent incidents are not being instigated directly by the Russian 

government, there is still little effort made on the part of law enforcement authorities to catch the 

perpetrators and hold them to account. According to one Jewish leader with whom the 

delegation met, higher level regional officials may make some attempt to respond to anti-Semitic 

attacks, but it is more than likely that the average local policeman will not. Russian human

rights groups report that when Jewish property is attacked, the police do not detain the persons, 

even when they are known, and close the investigation under the claim that there is no evidence 

of guilt.77
22

The U.S. government should also make clear its explicit concern that the prevalence of 

anti-Semitic publications, not all of it disseminated by extremist hate groups, is helping to fuel an 

atmosphere in which certain groups believe they can physically attack Jewish persons and 

property with impunity. The Russian government has gone on record deploring certain attacks 

on Jews. While fully supporting the right to freedom of speech and expression, the U.S. 

government should urge the Russian government also to condemn anti-Semitic publications from 

every source, including from other religious communities in Russia. The Russian government 

should also be strongly encouraged to insist that regional and other local authorities pursue those 

responsible for these acts and bring them to account before the courts.

7.a. The U.S. government should make clear its concern to the Russian 

government that hostile rhetoric against Muslims and the Islamic faith is 

fueling an atmosphere in which perpetrators believe they can attack Muslim 

or Muslim-appearing persons with impunity. While vigorously protecting 

freedom of expression, firm words and actions from the government of 

Russia are required to counteract this belief.

7.b. The U.S. government should also ensure that the humanitarian and 

human rights crisis in Chechnya remains a key issue in its bilateral relations 

with Russia. 

7.c. The U.S. government should urge the Russian government to end, and 

prosecute acts of, torture, arbitrary detention, rape, and other abuses by 

members of the military in Chechnya and to accept a site visit to Chechnya 

from the UN Special Rapporteurs on Torture, Extrajudicial Executions, and 

Violence Against Women.

The U.S. government should urge Russia to protect members of the Muslim community 

from religion-based violence and other attacks, investigate these incidents, and hold perpetrators 

to account. While fully supporting the right to freedom of speech and expression, the U.S. 

government should make clear its concern that the widespread media attacks on Muslims, 

particularly as a result of the conflict in Chechnya, are creating an atmosphere in which certain 

groups believe they can perpetrate violent attacks on Muslim persons and property without 

concern of prosecution. The U.S. government should urge the Russian government to speak out 

in ways that make clear its lack of support for such hostile rhetoric against any religious 

minority.

In May 2000, the Commission noted that the Russian government’s handling of the 

humanitarian crisis in Chechnya should be an important consideration in U.S. government policy 

toward Russia. The Commission also stated that the U.S. government should deplore any efforts 

on the part of the Russian government to use intolerance against Muslims as a mechanism to fuel 

public support for its offensive in Chechnya, or the offensive in Chechnya as a justification to 

violate the religious freedom of Muslims in Russia.

The Commission urges the U.S. government to continue to express concern about the 

reported human rights abuses perpetrated in Chechnya. The U.S. government should also 

strongly encourage the Russian government to accept a site visit to Chechnya from the UN 
23

Special Rapporteurs on Torture, Extrajudicial Executions, and Violence Against Women to 

examine the human rights abuses allegedly committed by both Russian troops and Chechen 

fighters in Chechnya.

IV. Continue U.S. Vigilance on the Progress of Democratic Reform and Protections for 

Human Rights in Russia

8. If the Jackson-Vanik amendment is repealed with respect to Russia, the 

U.S. Congress should make certain that some other mechanism is in place to 

monitor the status of religious freedom and other human rights in Russia 

and report to Congress. In addition, the Smith Amendment should be 

reinstated by the Congress and maintained as U.S. law.

The Jackson-Vanik amendment, attached to a bill on Most-Favored Nation (MFN) trade 

status for the then-Soviet Union, is today largely viewed as one of the more successful 

congressional initiatives in the fight for human rights in that country. As mentioned above, Jews 

in the Soviet Union faced harsh state-sponsored discrimination that intensified in the late 1960s. 

The active discrimination drove many Jews to attempt to emigrate, but the Soviet government 

generally made emigration extremely difficult. In the early 1970s, the regime began to levy high 

fees on those desiring to leave, a policy that mainly targeted Jews hoping to escape 

discrimination in their own country (as described above). 

Passed by Congress in December 1974 and made into law in January 1975, the JacksonVanik amendment contained a key provision making MFN status contingent on reports from the 

President to Congress verifying the relevant country’s compliance with free emigration 

requirements. Despite Moscow’s fierce opposition to the amendment, which it considered 

“interference in its internal affairs,” the total emigration of Jews rose dramatically after its 

passage. Even after the fall of the Soviet Union, the waiver provision remained a feature of the 

Russian-American trade relationship.78

In recent years, the U.S. Administration and several members of Congress have made 

clear their intention to seek the repeal of Jackson-Vanik. Since emigration barriers from Russia 

have largely disappeared and Russia has made significant progress on other human rights 

protections, many argue that the time has come for permanent normal trade relations between the 

United States and Russia to be established.79 In March 2003, Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee Chairman Richard Lugar introduced legislation to grant Russia permanent normal 

trade relations and to end the annual human rights review for that country.80 In the same month, 

Congressman Charles Rangel also introduced a bill to grant normal trade relations with Russia. 

The Rangel bill, which was introduced in the Senate by Senator Max Baucus, would also require 

the U.S. government to continue monitoring Russia’s compliance with human rights standards, 

including through an annual assessment by the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom on whether Russia is adequately protecting religious freedom.81

In light of the Jackson-Vanik amendment’s importance to the Jewish community in the 

former Soviet Union and the relative progress made since the fall of the Soviet Union, Jewish 

groups inside Russia have been strongly vocal in support of its repeal. Indeed, both chief rabbis 
24

in Moscow expressed to the Commission their strong belief that the amendment was no longer 

warranted.

Other Members of Congress and some human rights organizations, however, have 

expressed concern that the amendment not be repealed without establishing some other 

mechanism to monitor religious freedom and other human rights in Russia. In a written 

statement for Congress on whether to “graduate” Russia from the trade strictures of the JacksonVanik, one human rights activist noted it would be possible to “support graduating Russia from 

Jackson-Vanik, but only if a bilateral institutionalized mechanism is established to assure 

periodic review of Russia’s status and efforts to reform its human rights and civil society, 

including concrete steps to combat anti-Semitism, xenophobia and manifestations of 

terrorism.”82 

In 1997, the U.S. Congress enacted an amendment, now known as the Smith 

Amendment, to the foreign assistance appropriations act that would ban foreign assistance to the 

Russian government unless the U.S. President “determines and certifies in writing” to the 

Congress that 

the Government of the Russian Federation has implemented no statute, executive 

order, regulation or similar government action that would discriminate, or would 

have as its principal effect discrimination, against religious groups or religious 

communities in the Russian Federation in violation of accepted international 

agreements on human rights and religious freedoms to which the Russian 

Federation is a party.

The FY 2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act was included in the Omnibus 

Appropriations Act signed by President Bush on February 20, 2003 and did not include the 

Smith Amendment, language that had been included in the Foreign Operations Appropriations 

Acts each year since 1997.

The Commission believes that the Smith Amendment is a valuable tool for promoting 

religious freedom in Russia. The Commission thus urges the Congress to reinstate the 

amendment this year and every year until it becomes clear that democracy is firmly rooted in 

Russia. It is particularly important at a time when certain recent events indicate a larger trend in 

the wrong direction. If and when it is reinstated, the Smith Amendment should be invoked if the 

Russian federal government continues its practice of interfering with religious communities 

through the denial of entry visas or residency permits.

Given the relatively young and still tenuous nature of Russian democracy, and in view of 

the backward steps that have been taken in the past year, the Commission recommends that if 

Jackson-Vanik is repealed, some mechanism be in its place to ensure that continued 

advancement on human rights protection in Russia remains a prominent part of U.S.-Russia 

relations. While the Smith Amendment is one such mechanism, it does not address all human 

rights concerns. Russia is too influential a country at too critical a moment to abolish 

congressionally mandated monitoring of the country’s progress on democratic reform. The U.S. 

Congress should therefore ensure that some form of legislation remains in place that registers 

continued U.S. concern for human rights, including religious freedom, in Russia and establishes 
25

a mechanism to assess human rights protections in accordance with Russia’s international 

commitments. In addition, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom could play 

a key role in that review process.

9. The U.S. government should raise religious freedom and other human 

rights violations in multilateral fora, including the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe and the UN. The U.S. government should also 

continue, on a bilateral basis, to encourage the government of Russia to agree 

to the request of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

to visit Russia.

The future of democracy and the protection of human rights, including religious freedom, 

in Russia is of concern not only to the United States. As Russia is an important power in Europe, 

European governments should be encouraged to raise religious freedom and other human rights 

concerns with the Russian government also. The U.S. government should strongly urge the other 

western democracies to make plain to the Russians the importance of human rights protections in 

the development of a stable democracy, and as a model for the countries of Eastern Europe, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia.

As a member of the OSCE, Russia has committed itself to uphold the principles outlined 

in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents. As much progress as has been made, 

democracy has not been fully and irrevocably established in Russia. The U.S. government, 

through the OSCE, should continue to press Russia to adhere to its OSCE commitments, and 

urge other countries also to raise these important issues. In addition, the U.S. government should 

encourage European governments regularly to raise religious freedom and other human rights 

concerns with the Russian government, particularly in the Council of Europe. As noted above, 

now is not the time for the United States to reduce its vigilance on these matters.

In May 2000, the Commission recommended that the U.S. government urge the Russian 

government to agree to the requested visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief. As of the time of this writing, the Russian government was still “considering” the 

request.83 The U.S. government, which has agreed to a site visit by the Special Rapporteur, 

should strongly urge the Russian government to accept such a visit also.

V. Support Those Who Advance Democracy, Religious Freedom, and Other Human 

Rights in Russia

10. The U.S. government should use every possible means to engage and 

support the genuine democrats in the Russian government at the federal and 

local levels. The U.S. government should also ensure that U.S. aid programs 

are not being used to support the activities in Russia of authoritarian-minded 

officials.

Though sometimes forgotten, the democratic reform movement has a long history in 

Russia.84 Generally speaking, throughout much of the history of Russia’s past two centuries, 

there has been an ongoing rivalry between democratic and reform minded government officials 

and intellectuals and those who have tended to look inward, mistrust outsiders, and assert the 
26

need for strong authoritarian rule. It could be said that the rivalry or competition between these 

two currents continues to play out in Russia today. It is important that U.S. government policy 

not proceed on the supposition that either of these tendencies is more “typically” Russian, for 

both have been significant in Russia’s development and both continue to exist in Russia.

The U.S. government should identify the genuine democrats among Russian government 

officials and make vigorous efforts to support them. The long-standing democratic current in 

Russia should not be neglected, nor should the less-democratically minded among Russian 

officials be viewed as somehow more “traditional” to Russia. 

The U.S. government should also be careful to ensure that U.S. assistance is not going to 

aid the activities in Russia of government officials and other leaders who have shown hostility to 

democratic practices and the promotion of human rights protections. The U.S. government 

maintains numerous assistance programs in Russia, many of them administered by the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), including local governance programs and 

others that fund and support political, business, and other leaders. While it is important to 

engage Russian government officials of every stripe at the government-to-government level, it is 

essential that U.S. government assistance not go to support or advance the activities or careers of 

persons who do not support the development of genuine democracy and human rights, including 

religious freedom, in Russia.

11. The U.S. government should advance human rights, including religious 

freedom, in Russia by continuing to provide assistance, as appropriate, to 

non-governmental organizations, public interest groups, journalists, and 

academic institutions, and expand programs aimed at encouraging religious 

tolerance and supporting international standards on freedom of religion and 

other human rights. The U.S. government should also continue to promote 

exchanges between Russian judges, lawyers, and legal rights organizations 

with their counterparts in the United States.

The United States has been engaged in supporting democratic development in Russia 

since the fall of the Soviet Union. In 2002, USAID financed numerous such activities, including 

programs focused on NGO development, human rights monitoring, political party development, 

the strengthening of local government, the promotion of independent media, civic education, the

rule of law, and Internet training, among other programs. As part of its Open World Program 

based at the Library of Congress, the U.S. government also administers programs in which U.S. 

federal and state judges host Russian judges in cities throughout the United States. While in the 

United States, the Russian judges have observed court proceedings, received briefings on court 

administration, case management, and other topics, toured courthouses and correctional facilities, 

and attended law school classes.

85

In May 2000, the Commission noted that Russian religious leaders in particular may 

benefit from travel in the United States. Such exchanges would expose them to American 

political and religious leaders involved in the protection and promotion of religious freedom and 

to inter-religious dialogue and other activities in the United States. At that time, the Commission 

recommended that the U.S. government should promote contacts with leaders of the Russian 
27

Orthodox Church and members of other religious communities in Russia who may benefit from 

traveling to the United States and meeting with American political and religious leaders. 

In addition to the USAID programs, in October 2002, Congress passed into law the 

Russia Democracy Act. The purposes of the Act, which authorizes $51.5 million in funding, are 

(1) to strengthen and advance institutions of democratic government and of free 

and independent media, and to sustain the development of civil society in the 

Russian Federation based on religious and ethnic tolerance, internationally 

recognized human rights, and international recognized rule of law; and

(2) to focus U.S. foreign assistance programs on using local expertise and to give 

local organizations a greater role in designing and implementing such programs, 

while maintaining appropriate oversight and monitoring. 

The Act also states that it should be U.S. policy to “engage the government of the 

Russian Federation and Russian society in order to strengthen democratic reform and 

institutions, and to promote transparency and good governance in all aspects of society, 

including fair and honest business practices, accessible and open legal systems, freedom of 

religion, and respect for human rights.”86

The Commission commends the Congress for the passage of the Russia Democracy Act, 

an important piece of legislation that will do much to advance the cause of democracy and 

human rights protection in Russia. The USAID programs for Russia are also valuable and 

should be continued. The U.S. government should especially continue to support, in ways that 

do not compromise their independence or integrity, those public interest organizations in Russia 

that help defend minority religious communities in court. 

However, USAID should develop programs that aim more specifically at advancing 

protection for religious freedom in Russian society. Religious freedom is a fundamental human 

right, and deeply connected to all other freedom; governments that do not protect the right to 

religious freedom are unlikely to protect other human rights. This aspect of democracy 

promotion is currently underserved in USAID’s democratization programs in Russia. What is 

more, as the Commission remarked in May 2000, many religious groups, in particular small and 

indigenous Russian communities in the smaller localities, do not have the resources to obtain 

adequate legal representation to challenge state action and defend their rights in court. Public 

interest organizations for these purposes do exist in Russia, but their effectiveness is limited due 

to a lack of resources. 

Promoting religious tolerance is an essential element of protecting religious freedom, and 

it is especially important in those countries, such as Russia, where societal intolerance is a 

significant source of religious freedom violations. 
28

 

1

 The exception of the period between February-November 1917 is noted.

2

 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2002: Russia

(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13958pf.htm, accessed December 19, 2002).

3

 2002 International Religious Freedom Report (Internet).

4

 This information comes from various press reports, including Judith Ingram, “Russian 

Orthodox Patriarch Meets Envoy,” Associated Press, February 20, 2003.

5

 For a thorough analysis of the history of the relationship between religion and state in Russia, 

see U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Staff Memorandum for the Chairman: 

Religious Freedom in Sudan, China, and Russia, May 1, 2000 Annual Report, 113-120.

6

 Library of Congress, “Federal Research Division Studies: Russia” 

(http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/rutoc.html, accessed February 22, 2003).

7

 Firuz Kazemzadeh, “Reflections on Church and State in Russian History,” in Witte and 

Bourdeaux, eds., Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: the New War for Souls, Orbis Books: 

Maryknoll, NY, 237-238.

8

 Ibid., 227

9

 According to one source, under Stalin, Buddhists suffered more than any other community. All 

religious buildings in the Kalmyk and Tuvan regions were destroyed or closed, and most 

monasteries were closed. Before World War II, not one lama, or Buddhist teacher, remained. 

See http://wrc.lingnet.org/russno.htm, accessed March 7, 2003.

10 Library of Congress, “Federal Research Division Studies: Russia” (Internet).

11 Albert Boiter, “Law and Religion in the Soviet Union,” American Journal of Comparative 

Law, vol. 35, no. 1, Winter 1987, 111.

12 Philip Walters, “The Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet State,” The Annals of the 

American Academy of Political and Social Science, January 1986, 137-138.

13 Albert Boiter, “Law and Religion in the Soviet Union,”109.

14 Ibid., 121.

15 Theodor Prager, “Hazards of Idealism,” in Stalinism, G.R. Urban, ed., Wildwood House, 1982, 

78.

16 Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, and Religious Persecution in 

Russia’s Regions, 1998-1999, December 1999, 19.
29

 

17 William Korey, "Glasnost and Anti-Semitism," The American Jewish Committee, 1991, 8 and 

passim.

18 Over 200,000 of those 580,000 emigrated in 1990. Figures supplied by the Hebrew 

Immigration Aide Society and the National Council for Soviet Jews.

19 The Russian Constitution can be found on the website of Russia’s embassy to the United 

States: http://www.russianembassry.org.

20 Religious Liberty: the Legal Framework in Selected OSCE Countries, Prepared by the Law 

Library, Library of Congress, at the Request of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, May 2000, 107.

21 For an analysis of these developments, see Ibid, 122-127.

22 For an in-depth outline of religious freedom problems in Russia throughout the 1990s, see U.S. 

Commission on International Religious Freedom, Staff Memorandum for the Chairman: 

Religious Freedom in Sudan, China, and Russia, May 1, 2000.

23 Nadezhda Kevorkova, “Ideology of Permissiveness and Egoism,” Gazeta, December 5, 2002 

(available in English at 

http://www.gzt.ru/rubricator.gzt?rubric=english&id=28550000000004178, accessed February 

24, 2003). The report itself was published on December 5 and 6, 2002 

(http://www.gzt.ru/rubricator.gzt?rubric=english&id=28550000000004192 and 

http://www.gzt.ru/rubricator.gzt?rubric=english&id=28550000000004244, respectively).

24 Nadezhda Kevorkova, “Ideology of Permissiveness and Egoism” (Internet).

25 Ibid.

26 Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Are Catholics and Protestants a Threat to National Security?” 

Keston News Service, December 11, 2002; Oksana Yablokova, “Catholics on a List of Security 

Threats,” Moscow Times, December 9, 2002.

27 Throughout this section, the views of Russian government officials, religious leaders, and 

representatives of NGOs in Russia were obtained through personal meetings and interviews 

carried out during the Commission’s visit to Russia in January 2003.

28 Lawrence Uzzell, “Russians and Catholics,” First Things, October 1, 2002.

29 Jim Heintz, “New Russia Vatican Envoy Eyes Relations,” Associated Press, January 11, 2003. 

See also Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Previously Unpublicised Case Brings Number of Expelled 

Catholics to Seven,” Keston News Service, September 7, 2002.

30 Several news reports reported that Church officials were not viewing this incident as a case of 

harassment, however, but more of a technical problem associated with the new law on entry and 
30

 

exit. See “Roman Catholic Must Leave Russia,” Associated Press, February 24, 2003; and Frank 

Brown, “Polish Priest Denied Visa Renewal in Russia, Asked to Leave Country,” Catholic News 

Service, February 24, 2003.

31 Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Escalation in Missionary Explusions,” Keston News Service, 

October 25, 2002.

32 Information from the Association of Christian Churches in Russia, “Union of Christians.”

33 Ibid.

34 “Russian Foreign Minister on Expulsion of Catholic Priests,” Interfax, February 10, 2003.

35 See Tatyana Titova, “Russia: Jesuits Finally Receive Re-Registration,” Keston News Service, 

September 18, 2000; Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Landmark Constitutional Court Decision 

Vindicates Salvation Army,” Keston News Service, March 4, 2002; and “Church of Scientology 

Wins Ruling,” Associated Press, May 2, 2002.

36 Details of the contents of this law and the problems it engendered can be found in U.S. 

Commission on International Religious Freedom, Staff Memorandum for the Chairman: 

Religious Freedom in Sudan, China, and Russia, May 1, 2000, 121-135. See also Religious 

Liberty: the Legal Framework in Selected OSCE Countries, 107-119.

37 Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Work in Progress on Draft Amendments to 1997 Law Leaked,” 

Keston News Service, October 28, 2003.

38 Tatyana Titova, “Russia: How Will Foreigners’ Law Affect Religious Workers?” Keston 

News Service, December 9, 2002.

39 Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, “Russian Authorities Begin to Apply Anti-Extremism 

Law,” Bigotry Monitor, vol. 2, no. 31, August 9, 2002. Also Geraldine Fagan and Tatyana 

Titova, “Russia: Diverse Opposition to Measures Outlawing ‘Religious Extremism,’” Keston 

News Service, July 17, 2002.

40 Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Draft Law on ‘Traditional Religious Organizations,’” Keston News 

Service, February 5, 2002.

41 “Anti-Semitic Sign Found in Moscow,” Associated Press, June 13, 2002.

42 Alexander Axelrod, Anti-Semitism in Russia 2002, Anti-Defamation League, Moscow.

43 See 2002 International Religious Freedom Report (Internet). 

44 Micah Naftalin, “The Changing Face of Antisemitism in Modern-Day Russia,” The Forward, 

December 27, 2002.

45 “Russian Government Defends Registration of Party Accused of Anti-Semitism,” Agence 
31

 

France Presse, October 23, 2002.

46 Alexander Axelrod, Anti-Semitism in Russia 2002. This report also notes that the party’s 

registration “caused an uproar in the Russian media.”

47 UCSJ: Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union, Bigotry Monitor, vol. 3, no. 6, 

February 7, 2003. For more information see also U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe, Briefing on Intolerance in Contemporary Russia, October 15, 2002.

48 Micah Naftalin, “The Changing Face of Antisemitism in Modern-Day Russia.” 

49 Moscow Helsinki Group, Nationalism, Xenophobia, and Intolerance in Contemporary Russia, 

T. Lokshina, ed., 2002, 236.

50 Human Rights Center “Memorial” (Russia), Compliance of the Russian Federation with the 

Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, an NGO Report to the UN 

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in collaboration with the Russian NGOs 

Network Against Racism, December 2002.

51 Susan Glasser, “Russia’s Muslims Become Targets,” Washington Post, December 23, 2002.

52 See Amnesty International, Justice for Everybody: Human Rights in the Russian Federation

(http://www.amnesty.org/russia/russia.html, accessed April 2, 2003).

53 Amnesty International, “Chechnya—Human Rights Under Attack,” in Justice for Everybody: 

Human Rights in the Russian Federation (http://www.amnesty.org/russia/chechnya.html, 

accessed April 2, 2003). For more information on accusations of abuses in the Chechen conflict, 

see Human Rights Watch, “Into Harm’s Way: Forced Return of Displaced People to Chechnya,” 

January 2003 (http://hrw.org/reports/2003/russia0103, accessed April 2, 2003). Russian human 

rights groups, such as the Moscow Helsinki Group (http://www.ihf-hr.org/rushc.htm) also report 

on the conflict.

54 Human Rights Watch, “Russian Federation/Chechnya,” Briefing to the 59th Session of the UN 

Commission on Human Rights, February 27, 2003 (http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/chechnya.htm, 

accessed April 3, 2003).

55 Shireen T. Hunter, “Evolution of Russia’s Post-Soviet Identity and Cultural Landscape: the 

Impact of the Islamic Factor,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Briefing Notes on 

Islam, Society, and Politics, December 2002, 13.

56 2002 International Religious Freedom Report (Internet). 

57 Ibid. See also Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2003: Russian 

Federation, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/europe11.html, accessed February 20, 2003.

58 This particular Muslim leader was reported later to have claimed that the September 11 
32

 

terrorist attacks were perpetrated by Israel and the United States, since only those two countries 

can be said to have “benefited” from the attacks. See Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, Bigotry 

Monitor, February 21, 2003. Other Muslim leaders have similarly troubling views, including 

one chief mufti who was reported to have called for a “holy war” against the United States 

because of the war in Iraq. Rival Russian Muslim leaders condemned those views, however, and 

Russia’s regional authorities warned the mufti calling for holy war that he was potentially 

breaking Russian law by making such pronouncements. See “Russia May Prosecute Islamic 

Leader,” Associated Press, April 3, 2004.

59 2002 International Religious Freedom Report (Internet). 

60 Ibid.

61 Steven Lee Myers, “New Russian Cathedral Stymied by Interfaith Rift,” New York Times, 

September 10, 2002.

62 Mikhail Zherebyatev, “Religious Freedom and the War on Extremism,” Russia and Eurasia 

Review, vol. 1, no. 6, August 13, 2002, 4.

63 Ibid.

64 Mikhail Zherebyatev, “Religious Freedom and the War on Extremism.” See also Moscow 

Helsinki Group, Nationalism, Xenophobia, and Intolerance in Contemporary Russia, 162.

65 Nick Holdsworth, “Minister Gives Blessing to Orthodox Re Course,” Times Educational 

Supplement, December 20, 2002.

66 “Moscow Church Official Assails State Approach to School Programs,” Interfax News 

Agency News Bulletin, November 18, 2002.

67 “Russian Court Legalizes Textbook Critical of Jews,” Associated Press, March 27, 2003. The 

text states that Jews forced Pontius Pilate to crucify Jesus because “they thought only about 

power over other peoples and earthly wealth.”

68 “Russian Education Minister Tries to Ease Fears Over New Plan to Teach Religion,” Agence 

France Presse, November 25, 2002.

69 Ibid.

70 Keston News Service Special Report, April 18, 2001. See also “Kremlin Changes Rabbis,” 

RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 57, March 22, 2001.

71 2002 International Religious Freedom Report (Internet). 

72 In the past year, several Russian government officials have been quoted on the need to 

establish “spiritual security” in Russia, or of promoting the country’s “spiritual integrity.” See 
33

 

Moscow Helsinki Group, Nationalism, Xenophobia, and Intolerance in Contemporary Russia, 

161.

73 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 (48) (art. 18), U.N. Doc 

CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.4 (1993), ¶ 9.

74 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on 

Religion or Belief, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55, November 25, 1981.

75 Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of 

the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Adopted in Vienna, January 17, 1989.

76 This is a reiteration of a recommendation made by the Commission in May 2000. See Report 

of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 1, 2000, 51.

77 Human Rights Center “Memorial” (Russia), Compliance of the Russian Federation with the 

Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.

78 For an extensive background on this legislation, see William Korey, “Jackson-Vanik: Its 

Origin and Impact as Russia Nears ‘Graduation,’” The Harriman Review, November 2002.

79 “Anti-Russian Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Go Soon,” RIA Novosti, February 19, 2003; 

“Democrats Float Plan to End Russia Trade Restrictions,” Reuters, January 17, 2003.

80 The bill is S. 580.

81 Congressman Rangel’s bill is H.R. 1224; in the Senate, it is S. 624. H.R. 1224 is co-sponsored 

by Representatives Benjamin Cardin, Sander Levin, and Joseph Pitts.

82 Micah Naftalin, House Ways and Means Committee, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 

Trade, April 11, 2002.

83 See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/66, ¶ 89-90.

84 The most prominent figures in Russian history in this regard include such persons as Vissarion 

Belinksy, Aleksander Herzen, and Mikhail Bakunin, all of whom lived in the 19th century. For a 

longer discussion of these and other Russian “westernizers,” see Nicholas Riasanovsky, A 

History of Russia, Oxford University Press, 1977, 403-406.

85 Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, U.S. Government 

Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, FY 2002 Annual Report, U.S. Department 

of State, April 2003, 127-128, 132-133.

86 H.R. 2121, found at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c107:./~107K8D4ZF, accessed 

February 11, 2003.