The Honor able William O. Be rtelsman, United States Senior District J udg e for the Easter

n * District of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0754n.06 No. 09-4360 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
KA RENSHO EM AKER, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. E.I . D U PO N T D E N E M O U RS AND COMPANY, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE S O U T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

Be fore : SUTTON and GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg es; BE RTEL SMAN, District J udg e. * SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. Ka ren Shoemaker c halleng es the district cour t’s decision re

jecting her disability

discrimination claims as a matter of law. B eca

use she does not c halleng e the g rounds for de cision prese nted and r ejec ted below, b u t p re s ents only arguments never

raised be low, we
a ff ir m. I. Ka re n Su e Sho e make r b e g an w or kin g a t E .I . D uPo nt d e Ne mou rs & Co. in 1 99 2. I n h e r l a st po sit ion the re , s he wo rk e d o n a

n a sse mbl y

lin e that ma

nu fa c tur e d f

ilm
. I n 2001, doctors diag nosed Shoemake r’s mother w ith c an cer , and Shoemake r bec ame the primary car eg iver for

both of her parents. DuPont allowed Shoemaker to take leave under theNo. 09-4360

Shoemak er v. E.I . DuPont de Nemours &Co.

- 2 - Family and Medic al L eave Act (F ML A) to ca re f or her pare nts. See Pub. L . No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993). Three y e ar s la

te r , Sh o e ma

k e r ’ s mo th e r

p a s s e d aw ay . Sh o e ma

k e r to o k th e n e w s h ard. Doctors diag nosed her

with depre ssion and anxiety disorder a

nd presc ribed her m edication. DuPont ag ain allowed Shoema

ker to take FMLA leave
. Sho e ma k e r a ls o b e g anto s u f

f e r f r o m a s le e p d is o r d e r . Sh e h a d a t l e a s t o n e c ar

a c cident
cause d by falling aslee p at the whee l. She also beg an fa lling asle ep at wor k, which ca

used DuPont to place he r on probation in J une 2005. A pul monologist diag nosed S hoemake r with narc olepsy and pr e sc ri be d h e r m e dic a tio n f or the pr ob le m. I n Aug ust 2005, Shoemaker’ s fathe r passed awa y , afte r which Shoemake r’s de pression and anxiety worsene d. She soug ht tr eatment from a psy chiatrist and a mental hea lth counselor. DuPont allowed Shoemake r to take F ML A leave a third time. I n Jan ua ry 20 06 , Sh oe make r m e t w ithDu Pon t of fi c ia ls to c re a te a pla

n fo r he r to r e tur

n to work. The y

ag ree d that she would return to w ork on Fe bruar y 1, 2006, and that she w ould take on shortened shifts at first, then work up to a f ull schedule. The plan re quired Shoemake r to qualify for
eac h level of the line operator position aga in as well as to under g o traini n g fo r t h e chang es that
occur red w hile she wa s on leave . Shoemaker failed the first test, prompting DuPont to discharg e her in April 2006. Shoemaker

sued DuPont in state court, claiming violations of Ohio disabilit y discrimination law. DuPont remove d the ac tion to federa l court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U. S.C. § 1 33 2. Sho e maker ame nd e d h e r c omp la int , a dd ingc la ims un de r t he fe de ra l A me ri c ans wi thNo. 09-4360

Shoemak er v. E.I . DuPont de Nemours &Co.

- 3 - Disabilities Act (ADA ). See Pub. L
. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 331 (1990). Concluding that Shoemaker h a d n o t e stablished a pr im a fa c ie ca s e o f d i s ab i l i t y d i s cr i m i n at i o n , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt gra n t edDu Pont’s mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. II. As this case c omes to the court, both par ties assume that Ohio disability discrimination law par a ll e ls th e r e qu ir e me n ts o f th e A D A , an d w e h a v e e mb r a c e d th is a s s u mp ti o n f o r th e purpose of resolving this appeal. Se e Br e nn e ma n v. Me dCe ntral H e alt h S y s. , 366 F.3d 412, 418 ( 6th Cir. 2004). We g ive a fr e shloo k to the dis tr ic t court ’s su mma ry -j ud g me nt de c isi on , an d we dr aw a ll r e a so na ble fac tual infere nces in fa

vor of Shoemake r, the oppone nt of the motion. Id. at 417. I n the abse nce o f direc t evidence of discrimination, the burde n-shifting framework of McD onnell Douglas g overns a cla im of disability discrimination. Monette v . Elec. D ata Sys. Corp. , 90 F.3 d 11 73 , 1 18 4– 85 (6 th C ir . 1 99 6) ; see M cDonne ll Douglas Cor

p. v. Gre en , 4 1 1 U
. S. 792, 802–04 (1973). That familiar framew ork works as follows: The plainti ff must first establish a prima fac ie case of discrimination. Mo ne tte , 90 F.3d at 1186. I f she satisfies that obligation, the burden shifts to the employ er to of fer a “le g itimate, nondiscriminatory ” re ason for its action. Id. at 1179, 1186. I f t he employ er doe s so, the burden shifts bac k to the plaintiff to establish that the employ er’ s proff ere d rea son is merely

a pre text for unlaw ful discrimination. Id. at 1186–87. As to t he fi rs t r e qu ir e me nt, Sho e make r b e ars the burd e n o f s ho wi ngthat sh e is a pe rs on wi th a disability
. Id. at 1185–86. That c an be done in one of three way s: (1) by showing that she has a

n impairment that substantially limit s her in one or more major life ac tiviti es (a ctually disabled), ( 2) by showing that she has a rec ord of suc h an impairment (r ecor d of a disability ) or (3) by showing thatNo. 09-4360

Shoemak er v. E.I . DuPont de Nemours &Co.

- 4 - sh e is r e g ard e d b y her emp loy e r a s h a vin g su c h a n im pa ir me nt ( re g ard e d a s d isa

ble d) . 4 2 U .S. C. § 12102(1); Kiphart v. Saturn Corp. , 251 F.3d 573, 582 ( 6th Cir. 2001). I n respondingto the motion for summary judgme nt in the district court, Shoemake r ar g ued only that she was actua lly disabled and that she was reg arde d as disabled. The dis t ri ct co urt
c on sid e re d th e se tw o a

rgume nts , a

nd it r e je c te d e a c h o f t

he m. On appe al Shoemaker

claims only

that she has a rec ord of disability and make s no mention of t he ar g uments she ra ised in the district court. Unluckily for Shoemake r, DuPont noticed, pointing out that Shoemaker pr esents the “ rec ord of disabili t y ” t h eory “[f]or the first time . . . on appea l.” DuPont Br. at 20. Du Pon t is c or

re c t. Sho e make r fo rf

e ite d he r “ re c or d of dis a

bil ity” argume nt by fa ili ng to r a ise it below. See B a r n er v. Pilkington N. Am., Inc. , 399 F.3d 745, 749 ( 6th Cir. 2005). And she has abandone d the arg uments she m ade before the di strict court by failing to raise them he re. See D oe v. Salvation Army in U.S. , 531 F.3d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 2008). Shoemaker is re prese nted by counsel befor e this court, just as she wa s in the dist ri ct cour t, leaving us no handhold for c onstruing he r arguments broadly , as we sometimes do when it comes to pro se litigants. Cf. Es te llev . G am ble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 ( 1976). Even the most g ener ous rea ding of her br iefs re veals no a rg uments challeng ing the re asoning of the district cour t decision. No t on ly has S hoe make r f

a ile d to c ha lle ng e the g ro un ds fo r d e c isi on be low , b ut h e r c la im is m e ri tle ss t o b oo t. E ve n if we g ra nt f or the sake of argume nt the po ssi bil ity that Sh oe make r c ou ld meet the de finition of disabilit y , DuPont offer ed a le g itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son for Sho em ak er ’s di schar g e—name ly , that Shoemaker failed a test she ag ree d to take as pa rt of herNo. 09-4360

Shoemak er v. E.I . DuPont de Nemours &Co.

- 5 - return- to-work plan. Shoemaker offer s no plausible theory of pretext
. Her centr al ar g ument is that Du Pon t g a ve he r o ne c ha

nc e to p a ss t

he te st, wh ile the c omp any g a ve oth e r w or ke rs thr e e c ha

nc e s. B ut, a s Sh oe make r a c kn ow le dg e d d ur ingor a l argume nt, those worke rs too k th e te st t o g e t a pr omo t i o n , n o ta s p ar

to f ana g r e e d

- u

p o nr e t u r n - t o - w o r k p l an . B e c a

u s e S h o e m a k e r

an d t h o se worke rs wer e not similarly situated and be cause she off ers no other plausible theory by which a jur y
c ou ld s ay tha t Du Pon t’ s name d no nd isc ri min a tor y re a so n fo r t

he dis c ha rg e wa s p re te xtua l, h e r c la im fa ils on the me ri ts a s w e ll. III
. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.