Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1508-DR-1250 | April 28, 2016 Page 1 of 8 

### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLANT J. Michael Katz Goodman Katz & Scheele Highland, Indiana Adam J. Sedia Rubino Ruman Crosmer & Polen Dyer, Indiana A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLEE Debra Lynch Dubovich Levy & Dubovich Merrillville, Indiana Lynn F. Hammond Valparaiso, Indiana



### IN THE 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Gregory Reasons, A

ppellan t -Respondent,

v. 

### Joanne Reasons, A

ppelle e -Petitioner. April 28, 2016 Court of Appeals Case No. 45A03-1508-DR-1250 Appeal from the Lake Superior Court The Honorable Elizabeth F. Tavitas, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 45D03-1211-DR-927

Vaidik, Chief Judge.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1508-DR-1250 | April 28, 2016 Page 2 of 8 

# Case Summary

[1] Twenty-four days before the final hearin g in his divorce case, Gregory Reasons (“Husband”) was notified that his attorn ey would be moving to withdraw from representing him. Husband filed a mo tion to continue the final hearing, claiming that he needed more time to re tain a different attorney. The trial court denied the motion, and Husband appeals. Because Husband had sufficient time to find a new attorney if he so desire d, because the hearing had already been continued six times over the course of two years, and for the other reasons stated below, we conclude that the tria l court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Husband's motion. 

# Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 14, 2012, Susan Reasons (“Wife”) filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Husband. Husband was served a month later, but his attorney did not enter an appearance on his beha lf until April 2013. That August, Husband’s attorney asked that the matter be set for a final hearing, and the trial court scheduled the hearing for September 16, 2013. Because the couple’s only child was an adult, the hearing was to be limited to property issues.

[3] A few days before the hearing, for reason s not specified in the record, the court continued the matter until October 15, 2013. On October 10, 2013, Wife moved for a continuance for medical r easons. The trial court granted the motion and reset the hearing for February 11, 2014. The parties appeared inCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1508-DR-1250 | April 28, 2016 Page 3 of 8 court that day but jointly requested an additional continuance, and the trial court rescheduled the matter for June 23, 2014. Shortly before the new hearing date, the parties again made an agreed request for a continuance, and the hearing was set for September 4, 2014.

[4] On August 8, 2014, Husban d’s attorney filed a motion to continue, explaining that she would be in the middle of a murd er trial on the day set for hearing. The trial court granted the motion and set a new hearing date of October 21, 2014. Then, on October 15, 2014, Hu sband’s attorney requested another continuance because the murder tria l had been pushed back and again conflicted with the dissol ution hearing. The trial court reset the matter for January 13, 2015.

[5] On December 19, 2014, twenty-four da ys before the hearing, Husband was notified that his attorney wi shed to withdraw from the case. That same day, his attorney sent him a letter to the same effect. The letter stated, in part: Please be advised that due to our irretrievably broken attorney/client relationship, this le tter shall serve as notice that I intend to request permission fr om the Court to withdraw my representation of you in the ab ove-captioned matter within the next ten (10) days. If my withdrawal is granted, pl ease be advised that you must enter your appearance pro se, meaning you are representing yourself, or, secure the services of another attorney, whom you advised you have alre ady consulted. As a reminder, a Final Hearing is scheduled for Tuesday, January 13, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. Said Hearing will take place at the Lake Superior Court locatedCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1508-DR-1250 | April 28, 2016 Page 4 of 8 at 15 West 4 th Avenue, Gary, Indiana 46402. Your attendance will be required at said Hearin g, so please conduct yourself accordingly. Appellant’s App. p. 55.

[6] On December 23, 2014, Husband person ally filed a motion to continue, explaining that “[h]is a ttorney wishes to withdraw her representation” and asserting that he “does not have adequa te time to find legal representation before the current hearing scheduled for January 13 th , 2015.” Id. at 53. He also filed a CCS Entry Form that stated, “F iling motion of continuation due to defendant’s attorney leaving case.” Id. at 51.

[7] On January 2, 2015, Husband’s attorney filed her petition to withdraw, stating that Husband had been notified of her in tent and that he “has consulted with other counsel[.]” Id. at 54. She attached a copy of her December 19, 2014 letter to the petition. On January 6, 2015, the trial court wrote “Motion Denied” on the CCS Entry Form that Hu sband had filed along with his motion to continue. Id. at 51. However, no corresponding entry was made on the CCS, and Husband did not receive notice of the denial at any time before the final hearing. On January 12, 2015, one day before the hearing, the trial court granted Husband’s attorney’s petition to withdraw.

[8] Husband appeared for the hearing the ne xt day without counsel. When the court informed him that his motion to co ntinue had been denied, he reiterated his request, explaining that he had spok en to some attorney s and had been toldCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1508-DR-1250 | April 28, 2016 Page 5 of 8 that “there was no way they could proper ly present a case in that amount of time.” Tr. p. 2. The trial court asked Wife’s attorney what her position was, and she said that the hear ing should go forward as scheduled because there had already been many continuances, incl uding the two recently requested by Husband’s attorney, and because the disp ute was limited to property division and did not involve children. The trial court decided to proceed with the hearing, noting that “this matter has been pending for quite some time” and that “[Husband] has been granted several Motions to Continue.” Id. at 4. Husband continued to press for additi onal time, and the court again asked Wife’s attorney what her position was. Wife’s attorney said, “I attempted to have a conversation with him regarding this continuance and he was very obstreperous and I had to say, th ank you very much and goodbye.” Id. at 6. Having heard that, the court reaffirmed its decision that the hearing would proceed as scheduled.

[9] The trial court issued its decree of disso lution on April 21, 2015. Husband, believing that the trial court’s ultimate division of property would have been different if the final hearing had b een continued, now appeals.


# Discussion and Decision

[10] Husband contends that twen ty-four days was not enough time for him to retain replacement counsel, that the trial co urt therefore should have granted his motion to continue the fina l hearing, and that we shou ld vacate the decree ofCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1508-DR-1250 | April 28, 2016 Page 6 of 8 dissolution and remand this matter for a new final hearing. 1 Whether to grant or deny a motion to continue a trial is a decision that our trial rules specifically leave to the discretion of the trial court. Ind. Trial Rule 53.5. Accordingly, we will reverse such a ruling only if we fi nd that the trial co urt has abused that discretion, that is, reache d a conclusion that is cl early against the logic and effect of the facts or the reasonable and probable deductions which may be drawn therefrom. Hess v. Hess , 679 N.E.2d 153, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Applying this deferential st andard of review, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Husband’s motion.

[11] Several facts weigh in favor of the trial court’s decisi on. First, when Husband filed his motion, the case had been pend ing for more than two years, in part because Husband did not have his attorn ey enter an appearance until four months after he was served. Second , the final hearing had already been continued six times, including twice on motions by Husban d’s attorney and twice on agreed motions. Third, ab sent extraordinary circumstances not present here, twenty-four da ys is enough time to retain a new attorney and prepare for a straightforward, one-hour property-division hear ing. Fourth, the December 19, 2014 letter written by Hu sband’s former attorney, which was attached to her petition to withdraw , indicated that Husband had already “consulted” with other counsel. Fifth , Husband did not identify any of the other attorneys with whom he spoke, th e dates on which he spoke with them,

1 Husband does not appeal the trial court’s decision to grant his attorney’s petition to withdraw.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1508-DR-1250 | April 28, 2016 Page 7 of 8 or the dates on which they allegedly refused to represent him without a continuance. Sixth, Wife’s attorney to ld the trial court that she had attempted to discuss the need for a continuance wi th Husband and that Husband had been “very obstreperous.” Under these circ umstances, the trial court acted well within its discretion when it denied Husband’s request to postpone the final hearing for a seventh time.

[12] Husband relies on Hess , where we held that a trial co urt abused its discretion by denying a continuance after the husband’s attorney wi thdrew just five days before a dissolution hearing. 679 N.E.2d at 154-55. 2 We found it significant that “the denial of the continuance de prived Husband of counsel at the most crucial stage in the proceedings, th e dissolution hearing itself.” Id. at 155. In this case, Husband was also without counsel at the fi nal hearing, but we find that the difference between five days an d twenty-four days is substantial enough to distinguish the two cases. In addition, the dissolution in Hess involved a child-custody determination, whereas this dissolution was limited to the division of property. Finall y, nothing in the record in Hess showed that the husband “could foresee that counsel would withdraw at such a late hour.” Id. Here, on the other hand, we know that Husband had already consulted with other counsel when his atto rney wrote to him that sh e intended to withdraw.

2 We said “four days,” but the hearing was set for March 13, and the attorney withdrew on March 8. Hess , 679 N.E.2d at 154.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1508-DR-1250 | April 28, 2016 Page 8 of 8 [13] Husband also makes much of the fact that he was not notified until the day of the final hearing that his motion to cont inue had been denied. He would have us hold that, absent notice of the deni al, he was entitled to assume that his motion had been or would be granted. He cites no authority in support of this proposition, and we are aware of none. To the contrary, all parties to litigation, represented or not, should plan to proc eed as scheduled unle ss specifically told otherwise.

[14] Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Mathias, J., concur.