COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00382-CR

JAMES LILLY APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 4 OF DENTON COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. CR-2016-01012-D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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In a single issue, Appellant James Lilly contends that the trial court erred 

by denying his motion to suppress. Lilly argues that Officer Adam Frederick

lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop of Lilly’s truck. We will affirm.

As Officer Frederick patrolled Lewisville, Texas, at about 11:15 p.m. on 

August 9, 2015, he noticed a dark, older model truck with a hood scoop. 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

Believing that Lilly’s truck matched a BOLO2 alert issued for an older model, 

single-cab truck with a hood scoop that was associated with a recent burglary of 

a coin-operated machine, and noticing that Lilly’s truck was about five minutes 

away from the reported site of the burglary, Officer Frederick stopped Lilly’s 

truck. Officer Frederick testified at the suppression hearing that it was the hood 

scoop that drew his attention to Lilly’s truck; it was not a common feature, and 

the hood-scoop feature had been specifically mentioned in the BOLO alert for a 

dark, older model truck connected with the burglary. 

As Officer Frederick approached Lilly’s truck, Lilly exited it. Officer 

Frederick immediately noticed that Lilly was unsteady on his feet, used the truck 

for balance, and had watery eyes and dilated pupils. As Lilly handed his driver’s 

license to Officer Frederick, Officer Frederick smelled the odor of an alcoholic 

beverage. Based on these observations, Officer Frederick believed that Lilly

could be intoxicated. Officer Frederick detained Lilly for investigation of the 

offense of DWI, and Officer Frederick called a DWI Enforcement Unit to the 

scene. By this time, Officer Frederick had learned that Lilly’s truck was not the 

truck involved in the nearby burglary of the coin-operated machine. Ultimately, 

Officer Frederick arrested Lilly for the offense of DWI.

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a 

bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. 

 

2BOLO is an acronym for “be on the lookout.” 
3

Crim. App. 2007). In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our 

own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no 

pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 

S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000), modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 

S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Therefore, we give almost total deference to 

the trial court’s rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court’s 

determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and 

demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation 

of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 

195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 

644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact 

questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we 

review the trial court’s rulings on those questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d 

at 673; Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53. We are required to affirm a trial court’s

decision on a motion to suppress if it is correct under any theory of law applicable 

to the case, even if the trial court did not rely on that theory in making its ruling.

State v. Copeland, 501 S.W.3d 610, 612–13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) 

(citing Calloway v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)); Romero, 800 

S.W.2d at 543; Lewis v. State, 664 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 
4

A police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain a person if he has 

specific and articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those 

facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has

been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 

21–22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). Thus, if police possess a reasonable 

suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they 

encounter was involved in or is wanted for the commission of a past crime, an 

investigative detention of that person does not run afoul of the Fourth 

Amendment. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232–33, 105 S. Ct. 

675, 682 (1985) (holding that officer may detain suspect based upon police 

“wanted” bulletin to investigate); Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 

(Tex. Crim. App.) (explaining that reasonable suspicion to detain is determined 

based on cumulative information known to cooperating officers at the time of the

stop and citing Hensley), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 840 (2011); Isbell v. State, No. 

02-14-00124-CR, 2017 WL 3526339, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 17, 

2017, no pet. h.) (mem. op. on remand and on reh’g, not designated for 

publication) (holding that “[t]he State introduced evidence that Phillips attempted 

to stop the Jeep based on the Azle Police Department’s bulletin regarding the 

July 17 incident, which was a reasonable justification for the attempted stop”). 

Lilly asserts that Officer Frederick’s detention of him was unlawful because 

“[t]he officer’s actions amounted to a detention that was not based on reasonable 

suspicion.” But when Officer Frederick stopped Lilly’s truck, he did possess 
5

specific articulable facts (the BOLO alert) supporting a suspicion that because 

Lilly was driving a truck that was similar to the one described in the BOLO alert 

near the location where the burglary of a coin-operated machine had occurred, 

Lilly was or had been engaged in criminal activity, specifically, burglary of a coinoperated machine. See Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005); see also Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232–33, 105 S. Ct. at 682; Derichsweiler, 

348 S.W.3d at 914; Isbell, 2017 WL 3526339, at *6. We overrule Lilly’s sole 

issue complaining that Officer Frederick lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate 

the stop of Lilly’s truck.3

 

3Lilly does not assert that, after Officer Frederick stopped Lilly’s truck, 

Officer Frederick lacked reasonable suspicion to continue the detention to 

investigate the offense of DWI. Lilly’s sole issue is that Officer Frederick lacked 

suspicion to initiate the stop.
6

Having overruled Lilly’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.4

/s/ Sue Walker

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: September 28, 2017

 

4Because we hold that the trial court’s denial of Lilly’s motion to suppress 

was correct on the theory of law that Officer Frederick possessed reasonable 

suspicion to initiate the stop of Lilly’s truck, we need not address the State’s 

contention, adopted by the trial court in its conclusions of law, that Officer 

Frederick’s stop of Lilly was a consensual encounter. See Romero, 800 S.W.2d 

at 543 (requiring court of appeals to affirm trial court’s suppression ruling if it is 

correct under any theory); see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring appellate 

court to address only issues necessary to disposition of appeal).