alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### UNITED STATES COURTOF APPEAL S FOR THE SE VENTH CIRCUIT

Everett McKinle y Dirksen U nited St a tes C our thous e Ro om 2722 - 219 S
. Dearborn S treet Chic ago, Illin ois 60604 Office of th e Cle rk Phone : (312) 435-5850 www .ca7. usco urts. gov

ORDER May 12, 2014 Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Ju dge

No.: 13-3005 ADVANCED T ACTICAL O RDNANCE SYS TEMS, LLC, an Indi ana li mi ted liab i li ty company, do i ng business as PEP PERBALL TECH NOLOGIES , Plainti ff - Appellee

v. REAL ACTIO N PAINTBALL, INCORPORATED, et al., Defendan ts - Appellants Originati ng Case Information: Di stric t Co urt No : 1:12-cv-00296-J VB-RBC Nort hern Di stric t of Indiana, FortWayne Di vis i on Di stric t Judge Joseph S. Van Bokk elen Upon consi derat i on of the MOTION TO CO RRECT ERRO RS IN MAY 9, 2014 OPINION AND FINAL JUDGMENT , fi led on May 12, 2014, by counsel for the defendants, IT IS ORDERED that t he motion i s GRANTED , and the word "j udgment" i s replaced wi th "prelim i nary injunc tion" in the final sentenc e of the court 's opi ni on and the fi rst sentence of the court's j udgment, both dated M ay 9, 2014. The final sentenc e i n thi s court's opini on i s AMENDED to r ead: "We REMAND the case wi th i nstructi ons to vacate t he prelim inary j udgment and di smi ss the c omplai nt for lack o f personal jurisdi cti on." The fi rst sentence i n the court' s judgment i s AMENDED to r ead: "The case i s REMANDED wi th i nstructi ons to v acate the j udgment and di smi ss the complaint for lack o f personal jurisd i cti on." fo rm na me: c7_Order_ 3J (fo rm ID: 17 7 )
#### Rose Udofp, on Behalf of Herself as a Shareholder of Babcock and Wilcox Company, and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Respondent-Appellant, v George C. Zipf et al., Appellants-Respondents, et al., Defendants.

— Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered November 9, 1976, unanimously modified, on the law, to reverse that portion denying defendants-appellants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and to grant that motion to the extent of dismissing the complaint and severing the action as to them, and otherwise affirmed, without costs and without disbursements. This derivative stockholders’ action rests upon a claim by a stockholder that the directors improperly reduced the exercise price of certain extant stock options which had been granted to officers and employees. Acting in accordance with and by authority of the option plan itself, the directors properly exercised responsible business judgment to reduce the exercise price to the then market price, which was lower. To have done otherwise would have rendered the plan useless. The applicable New Jersey Business Corporation Act, similar to our section 717 of the Business Corporation Law, was not violated by this change, not of the plan, but of the price, as specifically authorized. Neither favoritism to any particular person nor detriment to the corporation was demonstrated. Concur — Murphy, P. J., Lupiano, Evans, Capozzoli and Markewich, JJ.
§ 38.252 Additional requirements for physical-delivery contracts. For physical-delivery contracts, the designated contract market must demonstrate that it: ( a ) Monitors a contract's terms and conditions as they relate to the underlying commodity market and to the convergence between the contract price and the price of the underlying commodity and show a good-faith effort to resolve conditions that are interfering with convergence; and
( b ) Monitors the supply of the commodity and its adequacy to satisfy the delivery requirements and make a good-faith effort to resolve conditions that threaten the adequacy of supplies or the delivery process.
#### Raymond Howell et al., Respondents, v. Walter Hughes et al., Appellants.

All concur. (The judgment is for plaintiffs in an automobile and school bus negligence action. The order denies a motion for a new trial.) Present — Taylor, P. J., Love, Vaughan, Kimball and Piper, JJ.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1


                                 COMPURAD, INC.
                SCHEDULE REGARDING COMPUTATION OF LOSS PER SHARE
                                   (UNAUDITED)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                       THREE MONTHS ENDED                 NINE MONTHS ENDED
                                                          SEPTEMBER 30,                      SEPTEMBER 30,
                                                 -----------------------------       ------------------------------
                                                     1997              1996              1997               1996
                                                 -----------        ----------       -----------        -----------

<S>                                              <C>                <C>              <C>                <C>
Net income (loss)                                $  (420,191)       $   73,271       $(1,207,078)       $  (287,635)
                                                 ===========        ==========       ===========        ===========

Weighted average common shares outstanding         3,927,241         3,066,926         3,882,031          2,300,842

Common stock equivalents pursuant to
   SAB No. 83: Stock and options issued
   within one year of initial filing                      --                --                --            424,622

Common stock equivalents-dilutive options                 --           189,900                --                 --

Weighted average common shares and
   common share equivalents outstanding
   during the period                             -----------        ----------       -----------        -----------

                                                   3,927,241         3,256,826         3,882,031          2,725,464
                                                 ===========        ==========       ===========        ===========

Net income (loss) per common share               $     (0.11)       $     0.02       $     (0.31)       $     (0.11)
                                                 ===========        ==========       ===========        ===========
</TABLE>



                                                                              40
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED April 24, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-51019 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus BENJAMIN VALLE-PERCHES, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:06-CR-582-ALL

-------------------- Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Benjamin Valle-Perches (Valle-Perches) appeals his 87-month sentence for illegal reentry into the United States following removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He argues that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court failed to properly weigh the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and imposed a term of imprisonment greater than necessary to satisfy the sentencing goals set forth in § 3553(a).No. 06-51019 -2- The district court sentenced Valle-Perches within a properly calculated advisory guideline range. Such a sentence is given “great deference,” and we infer that the sentencing court considered all the factors for a fair sentence under § 3553(a).
See United States v. Mares , 402 F.3d 511, 519-20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S.Ct. 43 (2005). Therefore, we conclude that Valle-Perches has failed to show that his sentence was unreasonable. Valle-Perches argues, in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that the 87-month term of imprisonment imposed in his case violates due process because it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence allowed for the § 1326(a) offense charged in the indictment. He challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense that must be found by a jury. Valle-Perches’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although he contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi , we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez , 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S.Ct. 298 (2005). VallePerches properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed inNo. 06-51019 -3- light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.
AFFIRMED.
§ 37.1000 Core Principle 10—Recordkeeping and reporting. ( a ) *In general.* A swap execution facility shall: ( 1 ) Maintain records of all activities relating to the business of the facility, including a complete audit trail, in a form and manner acceptable to the Commission for a period of five years;
( 2 ) Report to the Commission, in a form and manner acceptable to the Commission, such information as the Commission determines to be necessary or appropriate for the Commission to perform the duties of the Commission under the Act; and
( 3 ) Keep any such records relating to swaps defined in section 1a(47)(A)(v) of the Act open to inspection and examination by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
( b ) *Requirements.* The Commission shall adopt data collection and reporting requirements for swap execution facilities that are comparable to corresponding requirements for derivatives clearing organizations and swap data repositories.
In re Vicente

ReyesAppellant/s

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

June 18, 2014

No. 04-14-00424-CR

IN RE Vicente REYES

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

ORDER

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

On June 13, 2014, relator filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus. With his petition,

relator also filed motions asking this court to take judicial notice of the record filed in his direct

appeal in Appeal No. 04-07-00203-CR, to suspend the rules of appellate procedure governing the

number of copies required for filing and the requisites for filed documents, and to allow relator

to proceed without advance payment of costs. Relator’s motions are GRANTED.

The court has considered relator’s petition and is of the opinion that relator is not entitled

to the relief sought. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 52.8(a). The court’s opinion will issue at a later date.

It is so ORDERED on June 18th, 2014.

_____________________________

Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 18th day of June, 2014.

_____________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2006CR6988, styled The State of Texas v. Vicente Reyes, pending in the

290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Melisa Skinner presiding.

FILE COPY
Jake:

On April 8th, 2015 Mr. Joseph Hexter, SAIC Project Control Analyst, assigned to the FAA 

Unmanned Aircraft Integration Office (AFS-80), contacted Mr. Andrew McCollough, head of 

Regulatory Services at SkyWard IO, Inc. Mr. Hexter stated he was in the process of reviewing 

the SkyWard petition for exemption and would like to advance the process; however, there 

were some areas where clarification would be appreciated. Mr. Hexter inquired about carriage 

of medicines as described in the SkyWard IO petition for exemption. Mr. McCollough confirmed 

that carriage of medicine was listed as an example of what could be carried by SkyWard UAS; 

though, this was not being considered in their business model. Mr. Hexter asked about 

SkyWard’s intent regarding aerial dispersal and Mr. McCollough stated SkyWard’s home office 

was in Oregon and the company envisioned flying multiple sUAS (instead of one large UAS like 

the RMAX helicopter) to spray grape vines at local vineyards. Mr. Hexter stated it was unlikely 

that SkyWard would receive authorization to do so under FMRA section 333, and recommended 

SkyWard review 14 CFR, part 137, Agricultural Operations. Lastly, Mr. Hexter inquired about use 

of First Person View (FPV), as its use was mentioned in one of the documents supplied. A 

constructive conversation followed covering FAA requirements for a visual observer and the 

need for line of sight operations without visual aids other than glasses.

Joseph Hexter / SAIC

Project Control Analyst - NextGen Initiatives Support Services Contract 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration Office (AFS-80)

Email: joseph.a-ctr.hexter@faa.gov

Direct: 202-267-4606

Cell: 301-514-7969
#### § 242.801 Applicable provisions.

A security-based swap execution facility shall comply with the requirements of §§ 242.800 through 242.835 and all other applicable Commission rules, including any related definitions and cross- referenced sections.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Alton Thomas Davis, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 9, 2010 

0830 

Order 

 

September 9, 2010 

141144 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 141144 

 COA: 295912 

Washtenaw CC: 05-001581-FC 

ROBERT LEE GREEN, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 5, 2010 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the requirement set forth in Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, (the Exchange
Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. §1350), Claes Glassell, the Chief Executive Officer of Cerus Corporation (the Company) and Kevin D. Green, the Chief Accounting Officer
of the Company, hereby certify that, to the best of their knowledge:

1. The Companys Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2010, and to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the Periodic Report), fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of
the Exchange Act, and

2. The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have set their hands
hereto as of the 13th day of August, 2010.



/s/ Claes GlassellClaes GlassellChief Executive Officer/s/ Kevin D. GreenKevin D. GreenVice President, Finance and Chief Accounting Officer
Editorial Note on Part 201
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 201 appear at 62 FR 38027, July 16, 1997.

§ 201.53 Final date for presentation of documents. ( a ) *Direct reimbursement.* Prescribed documents shall be presented to USAID by the borrower/grantee no later than the terminal date specified in the implementing document.
( b ) *Letter of commitment to a bank.* Prescribed documents shall be presented by the bank to USAID and shall cover: ( 1 ) Payments or negotiations made under letters of credit expiring no later than the expiration date stated in the letter of commitment, or
( 2 ) Payments to a supplier, the approved applicant, or, at the request of an approved applicant, to a person other than the supplier, made no later than such expiration date.
( c ) *Direct letter of commitment to supplier.* Documents prescribed for payment under a direct letter of commitment to a supplier shall be presented by the supplier to USAID no later than the expiration date stated therein. Such documents must evidence shipment no later than the terminal shipment date provided in the direct letter of commitment.
#### Wanda A. Galezowski et al., Respondents, v. Alexandre Bruno et al., Appellants.

Present — Peck, P. J., Dore, Callahan, Van Voorhis and Shientag, JJ.
#### Robert Leeponis et al., Respondents, v Garcy Corporation et al., Appellants.

In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for breach of contract, defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated October 13, 1977, which (1) granted plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order and (2) denied defendants’ cross motion to dismiss the causes of action asserted in the complaint and to compel answers to interrogatories. Order modified by deleting so much thereof as (1) strikes Interrogatories Nos. 9a, 9b, 12a, and 12b and (2) provides that the cross motion is denied in all respects and by substituting therefor a provision that the cross motion is granted only to the extent that plaintiffs are directed to comply with Interrogatories Nos. 9a, 9b, 12a and 12b. As so modified, order *1041affirmed, without costs or disbursements. The time within which plaintiffs must respond to the interrogatories above described is extended until 20 days after entry of the order to be made hereon. Plaintiffs’ first and third causes of action sufficiently allege the elements of a cause of action for breach of contract and therefore may not be dismissed. However, it was an improvident exercise of discretion to strike those interrogatories which requested an itemization of actual damages and supporting documents (see *Canocchioli v Ruppert,*9 AD2d 765). Although a request for a monetary breakdown of the damages claimed is improper in a demand for a bill of particulars where only general damages are claimed *(Brugman v County of Nassau,*41 AD2d 653), the scope of interrogatories is defined by CPLR 3131 to encompass the liberal disclosure requirement of CPLR 3101 (see *Allen v Crowell-Collier Pub. Co.,.*21 NY2d 403). Hopkins, J. P., Suozzi, Margett and Hawkins, JJ., concur.
220 A.2d 233.

#### Elizabeth Mustapha *vs.*Patton-MacGuyer Company.

JUNE 14, 1966.

Present: Roberts, C. J., Paolino, Powers and Joslin, JJ.

*61Per Curiam.

This is an employee’s petition for specific compensation benefits under G. L. 1956, §28-33-19, as amended. The cause is here on the respondent’s appeal from a final decree of the full commission affirming a decree entered by the trial commissioner granting the petitioner’s prayer for additional specific compensation payments covering the loss by severance of one half of the third phalange of each of the four fingers of her right hand, the preliminary agreement having described the nature and location of her injury as “Traumatic amputation of first two digits of index, middle, ring and little finger.”

The pertinent facts are discussed in *Mustapha*v. *Patton-MacGuyer Co.,*100 R. I. 493, 217 A.2d 240, which involved an identical petition and where we held that “The ends of justice would be best served if the cause were remanded to the commission to permit a determination of the percentage of loss of use of the hand and on that basis to establish the number of weeks of specific compensation to which she would be entitled, credit being allowed for the specific compensation already paid for the loss by severance of the fingers of the same hand.”

Our decision in that case has mooted the question presented here since it has been established that petitioner has sustained a loss of use of her right hand. The commission’s determination of percentage of loss will dispose of this entire issue.

The respondent’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the decree appealed from is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the workmen’s compensation commission for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

*62
      *George C. Berk,*for petitioner.

*Worrell and Hodge, Eldridge H. Henning, Jr.,*for respondent.
#### § 1423.30 Compliance with decisions and orders of the Board.

When remedial action is ordered, the respondent shall report to the appropriate Regional Director within a specified period that the required remedial action has been effected. When the General Counsel finds that the required remedial action has not been effected, the General Counsel shall take such action as may be appropriate, including referral to the Board for enforcement.
#### § 37.703 Monitoring for financial soundness.

A swap execution facility shall monitor its members to ensure that they continue to qualify as eligible contract participants as defined in section 1a(18) of the Act.
#### § 1429.9 Amicus curiae.

Upon petition of an interested person, a copy of which petition shall be served on the parties, and as the Board deems appropriate, the Board may grant permission for the presentation of written and/or oral argument at any stage of the proceedings by an amicus curiae and the parties shall be notified of such action by the Board.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vincente ORTIZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-10386.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 12, 2007.*

Filed March 21, 2007.

Richard J. Suzuki Fax, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Evo A. Deconcini, U.S. Courthouse, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

*639James S. Park, Esq., Park Law Office, PLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: KOZINSKI, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Vincente Ortiz appeals from the 52-month sentence imposed following his jury conviction of illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Ortiz contends that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence by failing to consider all of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Because the record reflects that the district court properly weighed and considered the various factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we conclude that Ortiz’s sentence was reasonable. *See United States v. Mix,*457 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A district court is not required to refer to each factor listed in § 3553(a).”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### § 19.10 Types of annuities to members.
(April 7, 1977)

#### Rosenbluth & Wolen, Respondent, v Marshall P. Safir et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on October 1, 1976, unanimously affirmed for the reasons stated by Wallach, J., at Trial Term. Respondent shall recover of appellants $60 costs and disbursements of this appeal. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Lupiano, Capozzoli and Lane, JJ.