1 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 8, 200 4 S es sio n
LUDMIL LA LAMBRI GHT , ET AL 

### . v. NATI ONAL UNIO N FIRE IN SU R A N C E C OM P A N Y OF P IT TS BU R GH , P EN N SY LV A N IA
Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Montgom ery C ounty No. 2001-01-0085 C arol Catalano, Chancellor

No. M2003- 02133-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Fe bruary 3, 2005

All parties soug ht de clar atory judgme nt a s to whether or not driver Micha el Geor g e Ebe rly was a n omnibus insured under the permissive user provisions of hi s employ er’ s policy of insuranc e at the time of the ac cident in issue. The Chanc ellor in non-jury trial found t hat Eberly had only eng ag ed in a “minor de viation” from e mploy er restrictions on his permissive use of the vehicle , and re quired N a t i o n a l U n i o n F i r e In s u r a n c e C o m p a n y t o p r o t e c tE b e r l y a s a n o m n i b u s i n s u r e d u n d e r t h e p o l i c y. We r e ve rs e the a c tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Reve rsed and Rem anded

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Robert Orr , Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, National Union F ire Insurance C o m p anyof Pitt sburg h, Pennsy lvania.

Pe te r M . O lson , Clar

ks vil le , T e nn e sse e , f

or the app e lle e s, Lud mil la L a mbrig ht andAn ton io L a mbrig ht.
C. Benton Patton, Nashvill e, Tennessee , for the a ppellee, U nited Service s Automobile Association.

F r a n k T h o m a s , N a s h v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l e e M i c h a e l G e o r g e E b e r l y.

J o h n T h o m a s F e e n e y, II I, N a s h v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l e e , P r o g r e s s i v e In s u r a n c e C o m p a n y.2 OP IN ION

N a ti o n a l U n io n F ir e I n s u r a n c e Co mp a n y f il e d a d e c la

r a to r y ju d g me n t a c ti o n, naming Ludmilla L ambrig ht and husband, Antonio L ambrig ht, an d M ic h a e l G e o r g eE b e rly

a s defe ndants and
s ee k i n g a d et er m i n at i o n o f wh et h er o r n o t M i ch ae l Ge o rge E b er l y wa s af fo rd ed i n s u ra n ce co v er age un de r the omn ibu s c laus e of the Natio na l U nio n p oli c y . T he L a mbrig hts a ns we re d a ndfi le d a c ro ss claim agai n s tt h ei r o wn u n i n s u re d m o t o ri s tca rr i er , Un i o n S er v ices Automobile Associa tion (USAA). They also joined Prog ressive I nsuranc e Company as a def endant since Prog ressive w as the insura nce car rier for Mi chae l Geor g e Ebe rly as to his private automobile. USAA answer ed. Prog ressive the n a ns we re d a nd c ro ss c la ime d a g a ins t Eb e rl y , se e kin g to a vo id i ts c ov e ra g e of Eb e rl y un de r h is p ri va te vehicle policy . National Union then voluntarily non-suited its declar atory judgme nt action, af

ter which the Eberly s instit uted their own decla ratory judgme nt a ction ag ainst National Un i o n and Eberly . Nation al Un i o n then filed its motion for summary judgme nt ag ainst the L ambrig hts and Eberly , an d o v er the next s ever al months USAA and Prog ressive r esponded to National Union’s motion for summary

judgme nt, with Progre ssive supporting the motion and USAA opposing the motion. The L ambrig hts then filed their opposition to the motion for summary judgme nt. Since the f i n a l j u d g m e n ti n t h e c a s e h e l d t h a t E b e r l y w a s a n o m n i b u s i n s u r e d u n d e r t h e N a t i o n a l U n i o n p o l i c y, the court likewise held that the L am b ri gh t s were not entitled to any relief ag ainst their uninsured motorist carrie r, USAA, a nd further held that Eber ly

had no cla im ag ainst Prog ressive as an insurer relative to his private vehicle

.
I n a rather unorthodox procedur e the tria l court, with the consent of all parties, c onverte d a schedule d hearing on a

moti o n fo r s u m m ar yjudgme nt into a non-jury trial on the merits. The contr o l l i n g fa cts in the ca se ar e all but undisputed. GTE Gove rnment Sy stems Corporation employ ed Micha el Geor g e Eberly in 1989 be cause of his skill and ex perie nce a s a ser vice tec hnician
c on c e rn ing ra dio a ndoth e r c ommun ic a tio ns e qu ipm e nt. On his emp lo y me nt a pp lic a tio n, Eb e rl y dis c los e d to GT E that he ha d tw o p ri or c on vic tio ns fo r d ri vin g un de r the inf lue nc e of a n in toxic a nt. H i s d u t i e s f

o r G T E i n v o l v e d p r o v i d i n g t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e A r m y a t F t

. C a m p b e l l , K e n t u c k y. B e g inn ing in 1 99 2, GT E p ro vid e d E be rl y wi th a c omp a ny -o wn e d v e hic le fo r E berly ’s us e in providing technica l support service to the U.S. Army

. Eb e rl y wa s permit te d pos se ssi on , co ntr ol an d use of a GT E co mpany ve hic le fr om tha t date in 1992 until he was involved in the accident in issue in this case whic h occur red January

15, 1999. Among Eberly ’s dut ies was to be “ on call” twe nty -four hours a day . Thus, Eberly was re quired a s a condition of his employ ment to drive his service vehicle to and from his home and plac e of w ork. GTE entr usted Eber ly

with all responsibilityfor the upkeep of the vehicle subject to reimburse ment by GTE of the cost of such maintena nce. G TE also imposed a policy limit ing E berly

from per sonal
us e of the ve hic le . G TE a lso ma int a ine d a po lic y pr oh ibi tin g the us e of a GT E ve hic le a t a ny tim e that the driver

had consume d or wa s consuming a lcohol.

On Janu ary

15 , 1 99 9, Eb e rl y wa s re turnin g fr om wo rk to his ho me on the or din ary ro a d r ou te that he c us tom ari ly

travel e d a ndwa s w ith in the tim e fr a me that he or din ari ly re turne d to his ho me from wor k. En route to his home, Eberly stopped at the Golde n Nug g et L oung e whe re he consumed3

fo ur c a ns of be e r o ve r a on e -h ou r pe ri od of tim e

. Th e loc a tio n of the lou ng e wa s o n th e ro a d r ou te customarily

trave led by Eberly from work to his home. After his stop at the Golden Nug g et L oung e, Eb e rl y re su me d h is c us tom ary

ro a d r ou te tow ardhis ho me . H e sto pp e d a t a Tex aco statio n to pu rc ha se g a so lin e wi th a c re dit c ard pr ov ide d by GT E. He the n re su me d his c us tom ary ro a d r ou te home, but befor e ar

riving at his home he struck the vehicle driven by Ludmilla L ambrig ht in the rea r. After the wreck, Eberly reg istered a .15 blood alcohol content in a breath alcohol test. He plea ded g uiltythere afte r to driving under the influence of an intox icant, re sulting in loss of driving privileg es and the ne cessity

of obtaining a re stricted drive rs license . At the t ime of t he wr eck on January 15, 1999, Eberly

was a war e of the GTE policy prohibiting ope ra t i o n o f t he compa ny vehicle a fter ing e sti ng a lc oh oli c be ve ra g e s. Following the ac cident, E b er l y t en d er ed h i s re s i gn at i o n t o h i s s u p er v i s o r, R i ch ar d Kluck, who fe lt that te rm inatio n o f e mpl oyme nt w a s n e c e ssa ry

. Re g ion a l Ma na g e r Coo pe r, ho we ve r, c ho se to
su sp e ndEb e rl y

fo r thr e e da y s a ndpo ssi bly wi thh olda

pa y raise rather t han to te rm inate his
e mpl oyme nt.

The trial c ourt, relying heavily on the employ er’ s post-acc ident decision to impose minimal dis c ipl ine up on Eb e rl y , d e te rm ine d th a t hi s c on du c t c on sti tut e d a “ min or de viation” from h is permissive user

and that such deviation did not disqualify him from ins uranc e covera g e under the omnibus c lause of his e mploy er’ s insurance policy . National Union F ire Insuranc e Company filed
a tim e ly app e a l.

The a s y et unre solved question of re sp on de at s up e rio r of t he employ er, GTE, for the a ctions of Michae l Georg e Eb er l y i s n o t befor e the c ourt in this declaratory judgme nt proce eding . That quest io n w il l b e r e s o lv e d in th e p ar a ll e l to r t c a s e p r e s e n tl y p e n d in g in th e Ci r c u it Court for Mo ntg ome ry

Cou nty , T enn e sse e , b e tw e e n L ud mil la L a mbrig ht andhu sb a nd , A nto nio L a mbrig ht, plaintiffs, and GTE and Mi chae l Geor g e Eberly , defe ndants. This case solely deals with whe ther or
n o tNa t i o n al Un i o n Fi re I n s u ra n ce C o m p an y m u s t ex t en d co v er age t o an d d ef en d M i ch ae l Ge o rge Eberly individuallyunder the “omnibus clau s e” o f i t s insurance policy issued to GTE as na med insured.

Devi at i o n fr o m h is route to his home from his place of work ha s litt le to do with Eberly ’s status as an omnibus i n s u re d under the policy . I t is his i ntox ication while driving his employ er’ s vehicle that is determinative. Eberly admits that at the time of the acc ident he had bee n long f amiliar wi th G TE ’s e xpre ss i ns truc tio ns pr oh ibi tin g pe rs on a l us e of the ve hicl e a ndits fu rthe r r ule prohibiting driving its vehicles af ter c onsuming a ny

alcohol.

We mus t re iterate that we a re not c oncerned with Eber ly ’s violation of the two policies prohibiting pe rsonal use of a compa ny

vehicle and operation of a compa ny vehicle a fter c onsumption of alc ohol as those policies re late to whether or not Eberly was driving the vehicle w ithin the scope of his e mpl oyme nt b y

GT E a ndwa s o n th e bu sin e ss o f h is e mpl oy er at th e tim e of the a c c ide nt. Those questions will be re solved in the tort action. We are dealing here solely with a determination of whether or not E berly is a n omnibus insure d under the permissive user clau s e o f t h e National4

Un i o n F i r e In s u ra n ce C o m p an y p o l i cy

. R es o l u t i o n o f t h i s i s s u e i s p er s o n al t o M i ch ae l Ge o rge Eberly and is not determinative of National Union’s obligation to provide cover ag e to i t s n amed insured, GTE, in the tort action.

Whil e both Moore v . Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 246 S.W .2d 960 (Tenn. 1952) and Te nn . F ar me rs Mu t. I ns . Co . v . W

itt , 857 S.W .2d 26 (Tenn. 19 9 3 ) co n ce rn insured status of drive rs who we re driving under the influence of alc ohol, neither of those case s involve the omnibus status of a person driving under the influence of an intoxi cant at a t ime when he had full knowledg e of his employ er’ s strict rules ag ainst persona l use of the vehicle or ag ainst use of the ve hicle af ter he had consume d
a lc oh ol.

Ca se s f ro m othe r j u ri s d i c t i o ns are e nli g hte nin g a ndso me wh a t di ve rs e . G e ne ra l A c c ide nt I ns
. Co. of America v. M

argerum, 544 A.2d 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) wa s a dec lara tory judgme nt action under f acts quite simil ar to the case at bar. Peter S. Hr icko owned a roof

ing c ompany

and employ ed Ira Ma rg erum, whom he considere d a depe ndable e mploy ee, a s a roof er.

I n mid-J anuary , with the onset of unfavor able winter weather, Hricko offe red a van to Marg erum with the following instru ct i o ns: that it be used solely for c ommuting betwee n home and wor

k, that Marg erum not drink and drive, and that the van not be
us e d f or pe rs on a l r e a so ns

. Margerum, 544 A.2d 512, 513.

On J anuary

22, 1982, Marg erum re quested pe rmission to l eave work e arly in order to attend his sist er’ s wedding . Hricko g rante d the re quest but specific ally instructed Mar g erum not to take the van to the re ception and not c onsume alcoholic be vera g e while driving the van. Marg erum followe d these in s tr

u c ti o n s u s in g o th e r me a n s o f tr a n s p o r tati o n u n ti l h e g o t h o me f r o m th e w e d d ing , then packe d his clothes and drove the van a bout seven miles towar d h i s fi an ce e’ s residenc e whe re he int e nd e d to sp e ndthe nig ht. Th e re sid ence of hi s f ia nc e e wa s o n th e sa me ro ute he wo uldtake to return to the r oofing company , but befor e he rea ched her residence he st ruck a nd killed a pede strian
wa lki ng a lon g the ro a d. At the tim e of

th e acci de nt M arg e ru m w a s in toxic a te d, ha vin g ste a dil y consumed a lcohol at t he wedding rec eption. He was subsequently char g ed and c onvicted of driving under the influence

. The trial c ourt held that Mar g erum wa s an omnibus insured unde r the policy and Ge nera l Acc iden t In s u r a n c e Co mp a n y ap p e a le d

. T h e s u p e r io r c o u r t o n ap p e a l h e ldth a t th e p h y sical deviation by Marg erum was not a substantial deviation from Hricko’s permission but reve rsed the jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt a s to drivi ng un de r the inf lue nc e . Sa id the c ou rt :

Nevert h el ess, t he court erre d in concluding that there was no substantial deviation from Hr ic k o ’ s p e r mi s s io n

. B y d r iv in g u n d e r

th e in f lu e n c e o f a lc o h o l, M ar g erum violated an e x press spec ific re striction on his use of the van. Hricko’ s reiter ation of the restric tion the day befor e the acc ident indicates that the restric tio n wa s not5

inconseque ntial. Since Marg erum violated a n express specific res tr ic ti on of Hric ko’s permission to use the van, his deviation in use from Hricko’s express permission was a substantial d eviation. As a result, Marg erum is not an insured unde r Ge nera l Acc ident’s policy

with Hricko.
Margerum, 544 A.2d at 514.

Three y ear s after Margerum wa s d eci ded , the U. S. Co urt of Ap pe a ls f

or the Th ir d Ci rc uit applied this rule in Hall v. W ilkerson, 926 Fe d. 2d 311 (Third Ct. 1991). The vig orous dissenting opinion o f Senior District J udg e F ullam was ac knowledg ed but re jected by the majority

in Ha ll, which held Margerum t o b e c o n tr o l l i n g

. S a i d t h e m a j o r i t y:

We a re no t in se ns iti ve to the po lic y c on c e rn s f

or c e fu lly e xpre sse d b y

the dis se nt. Howeve r, we ar e n o t fr ee in diver sitycase s to apply our own notion of policy , but
mus t pr e dic t th a t w hic h is lik e ly to be a c c e pte d by the Pe nn sy lvania

Sup re me Cou rt

. Th e dis se nt s ug g e sts th at th a t c ou rt wi ll n ot a c c e pt the ho ldi ng of the on ly Pennsy lvania Appellate Court to speak to the issue. We a re not c onvinced that the Sup e ri or Cou rt ’s Margerum decision is so far out of the mainstream of state law that it w ill be re

je c te d b y the Sup re me Cou rt

. Hall v. W ilkerson , 926 F.2d 311, 316 ( Third Cir. 1991).

I n a later case based on diversity jurisdiction, the U.S. D istrict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsy lvania ag ai n fo l l o we d Margerum in a c a se in w hic h a

drive r, in d ir e c t vi olatio n o f h is employ er’ s known rule ag ainst driving a vehicle whil e int ox icated, was denied omnibus covera g e. Tico Ins. Co. v. March , 155 Supp.2d 441 (E. D. Penn. 2001).

Two reported decisions from sister jurisdictions are dire ctly in point as to the issues involved in the case at bar

. See W

arner Trucking, Inc. v . Carolina C as. Ins. Co. , 686 N.E.2d 102 (Ind.1997) and Barfield v. Royal Ins. Co. of Ame rica , 492 S.E.2d 688 (Ga. App. 1997)

.
Warne r T ru c kin g inv olv e d a c ar/ truc k c oll isi on wi th the fo llo wi ng fa c ts:

Th e plaint if

fs-app e lle e s, Carl a ndShe ri Ha ll, we re inj ur e d w he n th e ir
au t o m o b i l e c o l l i d ed wi t h a t ru ck owne d by the def en d an t -a p p el l an tW ar n erT ru ck i n g, I nc., and driven by

its employ ee, Ca

rl Manuel. The Halls broug ht an ac tion for da ma g e s a g a ins t Warn e r T ru c kin g a ndits drive r. Th e Ha lls a lle g e d v ic ari ou s li ab i l i ty ag ainst the trucking company on gro u n d s t hat the drive r wa s working within the
sc o p e o f h i s e m p l o y m e n tw h e n t h e a c c i d e n to c c u rr e d

. W ar n e r T ru c k i n g ’ s l i ab i l i ty insurance car

rier, Ca rolina Casualty

I nsuranc e Company , broug ht a sepa rate action for de cl aratory

judgme nt to establish that it had no obligation under its insurance contra ct with Warner Tr

ucking to defe nd or provide c overa g e for the claims see king to impose personal liability upon the employ ee- driver.6

W arner Trucking Co., 686 N.E.2d at 104.
Making the critical distinction betwee n responde at s uperior liability of Warner fo r the a c ts of the drive r Manue l on the one hand, and the statu s o f M an u el as an omnibus insured under the policy on the other ha nd, the Supreme Court of Indiana he ld:
Contrary to Warner Trucking ’s arg ument, the exis tence of a rule prohibiting behavior is not solel ydeterminative. An employ er is vica riously liable for the wrong ful ac ts of employ ees c ommitt ed within the scope of employ ment . Stropes by Taylor v. Heritage House Chi ldrens Center of Shelbyv ille, Inc ., 547 N.E2d 244, 247 (I nd. 1989). The c ritical inquiry is not whether an employ ee violates his employ er’ s rules, but whethe r the e m p l o y ee is in the ser vice of the employ er. Eve n though an e mpl oy e e vio la te s th e e mpl oy e r’ s rule s, or de rs , or in stru c tio ns , o r e ng a g e s in expressly forbidden a ctions, an employ er may be held acc ountable for the wrong ful act if th e em p l o y ee w as ac ting within the scope of employ ment. See E agle Motor Lines, Inc. v. G alloway , 4 26 N. E. 2d 13 22 , 132 5 n. 3 (Ind . Ct. App . 1 98 1) ; Mock v. Polley , 1 16 I nd . A pp . 5 80 , 5 86 -8 7, 66 N. E. 2d78 , 8 1 ( 19 46 ); The Pittsburgh, Cin c inn ati an d S t. L ou is R y . Co . v . Ki rk , 102 I nd. 399, 402, 1N.E. 849, 852 (1885)

. Acts done “ on the employ ee’ s own initiative, with no intention to perform it as part of or incide nt to the service for whic h he is employ ed” are not “in the servic e of the employ er” and ar e thus outside the s cope of employ ment. Stropes , 547 N.E.2d at 247 (citations omitted). Howe ver, an employ ee’ s wrong ful ac t may still fall within the
sc op e of his e mpl oyme nt i f “ his pu rp os e wa s, to an a pp re c ia ble e xten t, t o f

urthe r h is
e mpl oy e r’ s bu sin e ss, e ve n if the a c t wa s pr e do min a ntl y mot ivate d by a n in te nti on to be ne fi t th e e mpl oy e e him se lf” or if the e mpl oy e e ’s a c t “ orig inate d in a c tiv iti e s so closely associate d with the employ ment rela tionship as t o fall within its scope.” Id

. Warner T rucking’s vicarious liabilityfor the a cts of its driver the ref ore doe s not depend upon the driver’ s permission to drive, but rather upon the re lationship of the driver’ s activities to the business of Warner Trucking

.
W arner Trucking Co., Inc., 686 N.E.2d at 105.

The Indiana Supr em e C o urt then addr essed Car olina Casualty ’s motion for summary jud g me nt a s to the drive r, Ma nu e l, u nd e r the omn ibu s c laus e of its po lic y . Sa id the c ou rt :

I n it s d e c laratory

jud g ment act ion , Ca

ro lin a Ca su a lty do e s n ot q ue sti on its
c on tr a c tua l ob lig a tio n to pr ov ide c ov e ra g e fo r Wa rn e r T ru c kin g , b ut seeks to establish that its insurance policy provides no cove rag e f

o r l iabilitythat may

be persona lly

imposed upon the driver of t he Warne r Truc king ve hicle involved in the
acc ident. Carolina C asualty contends that its summary judgme nt motion s hould have been g rante d beca

use the policy

provides no cove rag e for the per sonal liabilityof
e mpl oy e e s d ri vin g a

c omp a ny ve hic le w i t

h o u t p e rm i ssi on . Ca

ro lin a Ca su a lty ’s c la im of no cover ag e is based not upon the i ssue of scope of employ ment, but rather

upon7

its c on te nti on that th e e mpl oy e e dr ov e c on tr ary to Wa rn er Tru c kin g ’s e xpre ss r ule d en y i n g p er m i s s i o n t o d ri v er s wh o h ad b ee n d ri n k i n g.

. . . . The mate rials desig nated f or considerat i o n in the summary judgme nt proce eding i n cl u ded Warne r Truc king’ s previously noted rule tha t “no driver was a llo we d to drivea

c ompa ny

ve hic le if

the drive r h a d c on su me d a ny a lc oh oli c b ev er age t h at d ay , re gar d l es s o f qu an t i t y co n s u m ed

. ” . . . T h e Ha l l s d o n o tch al l en ge the evidenc e that the driver wa s seen co n s u ming a lcohol and they desig nate no
e vid e nti ary mate ri a ls c ha lle ng ing the e xiste nc e , n a tur e , o r c on te nt o f the ru le pr oh ibi tin g drivi ng a ft e r c on su mpt ion of a lc oh ol. No r d o the y raise a ny iss ue a s to whether Warner T rucking actua lly communicated this r ule to its driver or whe ther the rule was consistently enfor ced. I n response to Carolina Casualty ’s claim that the rule e x pressly

restric ted the g rant of pe rmission, the Halls only point to the fa ct that Warner T rucking had provide d its driver with his own s et of key s to the truck, that he ha d a n e arl y

de liv e ry sc he du le d for June 15 , tha t the c omp a ny ha d p ro vid e d c a sh to purcha se fue l, and that drivers reg ularly filled their t anks wit h fuel before making their run.

Whil e t h ese matters may

be re levant to whethe r the e mploy ee a cted within the
sc op e of the e mpl oyme nt, the y are ins uf fi c ie nt t o c on tr a dic t th e de sig nate d mate ri a ls which esta

blish that the W arne r Truc king driver’s use of t h e compa ny truck wa s restric ted in the first instance – when he beg an to use the c ompany truck a fter consuming alcohol. As rec og nized in Gonterman , im pli e d p e rm iss ion is i na de qu a te
as a matter of law t o o v ercome Warner Trucking ’s express restric tion upon permission in the first instance. Gonterman , 637 N.E.2d at 814. Thus, be cause there is no issue of fac t reg arding the driver ’s violation of the compa ny rule re st ri cting permission, the Halls’ claim of implied permission fails. There is no ge nuine issue of ma te ri a l f

a c t a s to the app lic a tio n o f s e c tio n ( D) (2 ) d e fi nin g “ wh o is ins ur e d” in the Caro lin a

Casu alty ins ur a nc e po lic y . T hedrive r i s n ot an in su re d u nd e r this provision.

W arner Trucking, Inc

. , 686 N.E.2d at 106-7 ( footnotes omitted).

The c ourt then af

firmed the denial of

Warner T rucking ’s motion for summary judgme nt as to respondeat superior a nd rema nded the c ase to the trial court with instruc tions to g rant the summary judgme nt motion of Carolina Casualty under the omnibus clause of the policy

.T he B a rfield ca s e f r om G eorg i a wa s i s s ued O ct ob er 1, 199 7, wh i l e t he W arner Tr ucki ng , Inc. , opi n i on 1 f r om I n di an a wa s i s s u ed O ct ober 7, 1997.
8 The same issues wer e befor e the Court of Appea ls of Geor g ia in Ba rfi e ld, e t al . v . R oy al I ns
. Co. of America , et al., 492 S.E.2d 688 (Ga

. App. 1997). This was a de clar atory judgme nt action 1 br ou g ht b y

Roy a l I ns uran c e Compa ny a ndits na me d in su re d, Sin g le Sou rc e Roo fi ng Cor p. , to determine their liabilityfor damag es arising fr om an automobile ac cident involving Sing le Source ’s
e mpl oy e e , A nd re w F ish e r, wh o w a s a na me d de fe nd a nt in the c a se . T he oth e r n a me d d e fe nd a nts in the ca s e we re B illyBa

rfield a nd other oc cupants of f our vehic les, these oc cupants ha ving be en injured in an automobile wre ck with a Single Source vehicle driven by Andre w Fishe r. The driver, Fisher , had express instructions not to drive the vehic le af ter d ri nking. T he trial c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt to Sing le Source under responde at superior and to Roy al under the permissive
us e r p ro vis ion s o f the omn ibu s c laus e in the po lic y . B a se d u po n r e a so nin g ve ry c los e ly pa ra lle l to the rea soning in W

arner Trucking , the C ourt of Appeals of Georg ia held that summary judgme nt was improperly

g rante d as to r espondeat supe rior. As to the omnibus clause of the policy and re ly ing
on Gene ral Acc ident Ins. C o. of America v. Margerum , 544 A. 2d 512 (Penn. Super. Ct. 1988), the Geor g ia Court held:

“Permissive use” clause s such as t h e one in Roy al’s policy are valid, even wh e re the na me d in su re d c a n li mit the sc op e of

the pe rm iss ion thr ou g h in str uc tio ns , rules, or r eg ulations. See M assachusetts Bay. Ins. Co. v. W ooten , 215 Ga. App. 386, 387(1), 450 S.E.2d 857 (1994) . On seve ral oc casions, this Court has held that whe re a drive r uses a

vehicle w ith p er m i s s i o n , but violates the scope of the permission g rante d by

eng ag ing in a ctivity

the named insure d has expressly forbidden, the driver is not an “i n s u red” under the permissive use c lause of a policy such as Roy al’s for any collision occurring during the driver’ s unauthorized use. See, e.g ., W ooten , 215 Ga . App . at 387 -3 88 , 4 50 S.E .2 d 8 57 ; Selec t Ins. Co. v. Register , 192 Ga. App. 145, 147, 384 S.E.2d 238 (1989).

B othW ooten andRe gis te r involved drivers who used the insured ve hicle for
a p u r p os e fo rb i dden by

the owner . Her e, althoug h Fisher used the truc k in an unauthorized manner

by driving it while under the influence of alcohol, we find the
ratio na le of the prior c a se s app lic able

. “ [T]he re is an abs e nc e of pe rm iss ion wi thi n the meaning of the policy if the vehic le is being driven at a t ime or a pla ce or for a purpose no t au thorized by the insured.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Register , 192 Ga. App. at 147, 384 S.E.2d 238. The test of permission under the provision at hand is a n objective one, and does not involve the question of whethe r Fisher “re asonably

believed” he had pe rmission to drive the truck. See Hurst v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. , 266 Ga. 712, 713(1), 470 S.E.2d 659 (1996). B eca use the
unco n tr a d ic te d e v id e n c e s h o w s Si n g le So u r c e to ld F is h e r h e c o u ld n o t d rive the
ve hic le wh e n h e wa s d ri nking , h is u se of th e veh ic le a t a tim e he wa s a dmi tte dly under the influence of alc ohol was unauthorized and non- permissive.9

Barfield v. Royal Ins. Co. of Ame rica , 492 S.E.2d 688, 690-91(Ga . App. 1997).

Th e Cou rt

of Ap pe a ls o f M iss ou ri too k a po sit ion dir e c tly c on tr ary to the ru le s se t f

orth i n Margerum , W

arner Trucking , and Ba rfi e ld , holding unde r Missouri law:
Rely ing on Sullivan and Lewellen , we find the omnibus clause in Employ er’ s policy extended cover age t o Hy man for this ac cident despite his violation of Employ er’ s rule ag ainst drinking a lcohol while driving the van.

I n rea ching this conclusion, we have not ig nored case s cited by United from oth e r j uris dic tio ns wh ic h h oldthat a n e mpl oy e e wh o u se s h is e mpl oy e r’ s v e hic le whi l e u n der the influence of alc ohol, in violation of an express specific r estriction ag ainst such use, substantially deviates f rom the orig inal use, and, thus, the employ ee is not insured under t h e employ er’ s policy

. See, e .g., Gene ral Accident I ns. Co. of Am. v. M argerum , 375 Pa . Supe r. 36 1, 54 4 A.2 d 512 (1 98 8) ; W arner Trucking, Inc ., v. Carolina Cas ., 68 6 N .E .2 d 1 02 (Ind . 1 99 7) ; Barfield v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. , 492 S.E.2d 688 (Ga. App. 1997) . When there is no controlling authority from Missouri courts, we may look to judicial decisions of sister states for assistance in discovering expres s i o n s o f public policy

. Eye rman v. Me rcantile Trust C o. , 524 S.W .2d 210, 217[9] (Mo. App. 1975). Ea rlier in this opinion, we did rely on fore ign a uthority for g uidance . Howeve r, opi nions of courts of other sta tes, eve n on simil ar f acts, do not have c ontrolling e ffe ct. Tripl ett v. Shafer , 300 S.W .2 d 528, 530 (Mo. App. 1957). “Like wit nesses, foreig n authority should be weighe d and not counted.” Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Stall ings , 5 2 3 S. W. 2 d 5 3 9 , 5 4 5 [6 ] ( M o

. A p p

. 1 9 7 5 )

. This court adop t s t h e views expressed in Sullivan and Lewellen rathe r tha n th os e state d in Margerum , W

arner Trucking , and Ba rfi e ld

. We do so i n th e be lie f that Sullivan and Lewellen ar e i n h ar m o n y wi t h M i s s o u ri ’s p u b l i c p o l i cyco n ce rn i n g l i ab i l i t y co v er age for ne g lige nt motor vehicle ope rators. See H alpin v. Am. Family M

ut. Ins. Co. , 823 S.W .2d 479, 482[4] (Mo. B anc 1992)

. United Fire and Cas. Co. v. Tharp, 46 S.W .3d 99, 107-8 (Mo. App. 2001)

. Whil e ther e is a certain parallelism betwee n responde at superior under a g ency

principles and pe rm iss ive us e r u nd e r o mni bu s in su ranc e c laus e s, the la w a s to e a c h is se para te anddis tin c t. Te nn e sse e la w a s to the sc op e of pe rm iss ive us e r un de r a n o mni bu s c laus e is c on sid e re d at le ng th in Estate of Adkins v. W

hite Consolidat ed Ind., I

nc ., et al., 788 S.W .2d 815 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). Subsequent ca ses have considera bly narr owed the scope of “the liberal initial permission or hell or high w ater

rule . . .” See E

state of Adkins , 288 S.W .2d at 817(quoting Couch, G., Couch on I nsuranc e 2d, § 45:464 at 845- 46 (1981 and Supp. 1988) (footnotes omitted) This rule enunc iated by our Supreme Court in Stovall v. New Y ork Inde mn. Co., 8 S.W .2d 473 (Tenn. 1928) provided that when the ow ner’ s permission was g rante d initiallywhat happe ned t h er eafter wa s immaterial for omnibus clause purpose s.10 I f . . . the automobile covere d by the policy

i s d el i v er ed t o another

for use , with the perm i s s i o n o f the owne r or insure d, his subsequent use of it is with the permission of the insured, w ithin the meaning of the poli cy , reg ardle ss of whethe r the automobile is driven to a place or for a purpose not within the contemplation of the insured whe n he parted with possession.

Sto v all , 8 S.W .2d at 477.

Th e su pr e me c ou rt re tr e a te d f ro m Sto v all

in Hubbard v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. , 240 S.W .2d 245 (Tenn. 1951). Repetition of the ana ly sis of case s subsequent to Sto v all such as a ppear s in Es tat e of A dk ins is unn e c e ssa ry to a de c isi on in thi s ca se

. I t is e no ug h to say that Sto v all a ndits prog eny apply only to case s where the initial p er m i s s i v e u s er is broa d and unre stricted. Said the court in Adkins :

I n Moore v . Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 193 Tenn. (29 B eele r) 519, 246 S.W.2d 960 (1952), t he Supreme Court ag ain clarified the pe rmission rules in Hu bb ar d , Sto v all , and an unreporte d case , Romines v. The P referred Ac cident Ins. Co. , decide d November

26, 1932. Acc ording to the Mo ore Court, Hu bb ar d and Ro mi ne s held:
[W ]here on e h as o n l y limit ed permission of the owner to use the car in a specified area for a limited time a n d p a r t i cular purpose and does not ha ve g ener al discre tion as to the use of the car , then the cove rag e of the omnibus clause is not extended to his use of the car any place or for a pu rp o s e not consente d to nor rea sonably contemplated by

the owner in g iving the initi al permission.

193 Tenn. at 522, 246 S.W .2d at 961 (e mphasis added)

.
I n Mo ore , the employ ee truck driver had his employ er’ s limi ted permission to personally

use the truc k afte r hours to move furniture within the city of Na shville. I nstead, he went on an e ntirely differ ent and independe nt missi on to Murfre esboro, drank w hiskey

with a friend, and was involved in an acc ident. The c ourt found that the employ ee w as not ac ting with the pe rmission of the named insure d and ther efor e there was no c overa g e under the policy . The Hubbard, Romines , and Sto v all case s “turn upon the distinction of g ener al custody and limited permission.” Id

. Shortlyafte r the Mo ore decision was announce d, the S ix th Circuit Court of Appea ls addresse d the same issue in B ra nch v. U .S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. , 198 F.2d 1 0 0 7 , 1 0 1 1 ( 6 Ci r

. 1 9 5 2 )

. T h e c o u r t n o te d th a t T e n n e s s e e h a d a d o p te d the th liberal initial permission rule in Sto v all in 1928, but t h at the Cal dwe ll , Romines , Hu bb ar d , and Mo ore case s limi t the broad r ule as stated in Sto v all . The Branch court stated:11 I n o ur op ini on , th e c on tr oll ing ru le of la w i n T e nn e sse e , a s it p re s en t l y exis ts, is as ex presse d in the case of M o o r e v
. L i b e rty Mutual Ins. Co. , supra, its latest ruli ng on the question, which dra ws the dis tin c tio n be tw e e n g e ne ra l cus tod y of a nd lim ite d p e rm iss ion to use the insured automobile, reje cting the earlier r ule announc ed in the Sto v all case that liabilityexis ts wher e the orig inal possession of the
c ar w a s wi th the pe rm iss ion of the ow ne r, re g ard le ss o f i ts unauthorized and una nticipated use the rea fter.

198 F.2d at 1011.
Estate of Adkins v. W

hite Consol. Ind ., e t al

. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

Te nn e sse e c a se s in vo lvi ng us e of a lc oh ol poi nt cl e arl y in t he dir e c tio n o f the ru le s se t f orth in W arner and Ba rfi e ld . Cl os e st b y a na log y is M o o r e v
. Li b e r ty Mut. Ins. Co. , 246 S.W .2d 960 (Tenn. 1952). Howeve r, t he court in the Mo ore case did not specific ally addre ss any issue about the
us e of a lc oh ol n or do e s the op ini on sh ow a ny sp e c if ic ru le of the e mpl oy e r ab ou t th e us e of a lc oh ol.

I n Te nn
. Fa rm e rs Mu t. In s. Co. v . W itt , 857 S.W .2d 26 (Tenn. 1993) , a policy of insuranc e wa s is su e d to Ron a ld Witt, wh o wa s, in fa c t, the drive r of the a uto mob ile a t th e tim e of the a c c ide nt. Whil e Witt and a fellow e mploy ee, Robe rt Michalski, wer e on the business of the ir employ er, Michalski lease d an automobil e from a Hertz renta l ag ency

. At the t ime of t he accident, Witt was driving the automobile with the permi s s i o n o f Michalski and w as driving under the influence of alcohol. This vehicle qualified as “ a non-ow ned auto” under the Tenne ssee F arme rs Mutual policy i s s u ed t o W i t t

. T h e p o s i t i o n o f T en n es s ee Fa rm er s M u t u al i s a b i tp u z z l i n g:

Te nn e sse e F arm e rs Mu tua l con te nd s th a t th e op e ratio n o f the ve hic le wh ile under the influence of alc o h o l was not use of the vehicle “ within the scope of the
co n s en to f t h e ow n er ” as re q u i re d b y t h e i n s u ra n ce co n tra ct an d , t h er ef o re , co v er age was ex cluded. I t implicitl y acknow ledg es t hat t he poli cy extended cover ag e to t he lease d vehicle a s “a non- owned auto” while oper ated by Wit t, except when W itt was under the influence of al co h o l

. I ts arg ument appar ently is that covera g e ce ased at such time as the insured became under the influence of alc ohol because he the n no longe r had the owner ’s conse nt to operate the re ntal car

.
W itt, 857 S.W .2d 26 at 29.
Holding that Wi tt’s p ermiss ion to drive the automobile wa s g ener al and without limitation, t he supreme c ourt found that he w as cove red unde r his own policy of insuranc e.

Her e, Witt’s permission as an “authorized driver” to use the vehicle w ithout limit ation as t o time, place , and purpose constitutes ge nera l custody of the ve hicle. At the tim e of

los s, Witt w a s a n auth orize d o pe rator . H is o pe ratio n o f the ve hic leA t t he t i m e o f t he accident T C A § 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 8 pro vi d ed t hat (. 1 0 % ) wei ght of b l o o d al co ho l creat ed t he 2
pr es u mpt i on

. T h e s t at u t e wa s a men ded by Cha pt er 855 of t h e Publ i c Act s of

2002 t o r edu ce t h e we i g h t of a l coh ol l evel t o (. 0 8 % ).
12 wh ile un de r the i nfl uen ce o f a lc oh ol d id n ot v iol a te a ny pr ov isi on of

the le a se c on tr a c t r e g ard ing tim e , p la c e , o r pur po se of us e . N or didthe c ir c ums ta nc e s o f h is operation of the vehicle , while under the influenc e of a lcohol, convert the g ener al
c us tod y ba ilm e nt i nto on e of lim ite d pe rm iss ion

. He sti ll h a d th e ow ne r’ s c on se nt t o operate the vehic le, thoug h he did not have pe rmission to operate it while under the influence of alc ohol.

W itt, 857 S.W .2d 26, 31. The W itt case sheds very

littl e lig ht on permissive user under the omnibus clause of an insura nce policy

.
I n this case, Ebe rly

was we ll awar e for

many y ear s of his employ er’ s pol i cies prohibiting pe rs on a l us e of its ve hic le a nd sp e c if ic a lly pr oh ibi tin g a ny on e to dri ve a c omp a ny ve hic le a t a ny

tim e a ft e r c on sumi ng a lc oh ol. Drivi ng ho me fr om w or k h e sto pp e d a ndc on su me d e no ug h a lc oh ol t o reg ister a .15 on the i ntox imeter. He then re -ente red the company vehicle, dr ove to a se rvice station, filled the truck with g asoline and proce eded on toward his home. The collision occurr ed bef ore he could re ach home . He doe s not deny that he dra nk alcohol bef o re re s u m i n g h is journey home. Whil e he de nies that he was under the influence of alcohol, he pleaded guilty to driving unde r the influence

. We believe t h at t h e poli cy most in conformity

with exi sting Te nnessee law and the more sound policy

is to follow Margerum , W arner and Barfield in holding that driving under the influence of an intoxi cant, in and of itself, in violation of ex press rule s of the employ er is fatal to the driver’ s status as a pe rmissive user unde r the omnibus clause of an insura nce policy

. Under the Margerum , W

arner and B a r f i e ld an aly sis, tim e, plac e and pur pose in the use of the vehicle have little re levanc e. I f Eber ly , wi th permission to drive the vehicle to his home, had driven in a stra ight r oute from wor k to h o m e an d , without deviating f rom that route, ha d taken alcoholic be vera ges fr o m the g love compartment of the truck and consumed them e n route, time, pla c e a nd pu rp os e re ma ine d with in the sc op e of his pe rm iss ive us e . Wh a t e xce e ds the sc op e of his permissive use f

or omnibus insured purposes is his consumption of al cohol i n violation of the limit ations imposed upon him by his e mploy er. This is not to say that the “zero toler ance ” policy of the e mploy er r

ule automatica lly

controls the issue. The logic al result of such a holding would be that the driver

stopping for holy communion en route to his home would lose his omnibus i nsured status . The e mpl oy e r ru le re la tiv e to the us e of a lc oh ol i s su bje c t to the sa me “ min or de viatio n” ru le
a s is app lic able to p e rs on a l us e of the ve hic le in vio la tio n of a n e mpl oy e r r ule . In th is c a se , E be rl y consumed alcohol to the extent that his blood alcohol leve l was one a nd one-ha lf times the statutory le ve l c re a tin g pr e su mpt ive imp a ir me nt. 2 Whe the r o r n ot N a tio na l U nio n F ir e I ns ur a nc e Com pa nymus t a ns we r t o th e plaint if fs in damag es for

the conduc t of Eber ly

must wait the determination in the tort ca se of r espondeat superior issues. The only

issue in this ca se is w hether or not Eber ly is an omnibus insured under the National13

Un ion po lic y

un de r i ts pe rm iss ive us e r p ro vis ion s. Hi s v olu nta ry int oxic a tio n in vio la tio n o f h is
e mpl oy e r’ s rule s d isq ua lif ie s h im f ro m su c h s ta tus

. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is reve rsed a nd judgme nt will be en t er ed in favor of the National Union F ire Insuranc e Company

. The case is rema nded for such further proc eeding s as may be ne c e ssa

ry . Co sts of

the app e a l are a sse sse d to Lud mil la L a mbrig ht andAn ton io L a mbrig ht.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM B. CAIN, J UDGE