U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

36–616 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

PIPELINE SAFETY: REVIEWING THE STATUS OF 

MANDATES AND EXAMINING ADDITIONAL SAFETY NEEDS 

(116–9) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, 

AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 2, 2019 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-transportation?path=/ 

browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/transportation 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon, Chair 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, 

District of Columbia 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York 

JARED HUFFMAN, California 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice Chair 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

GREG STANTON, Arizona 

DEBBIE MUCARSEL-POWELL, Florida 

LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas 

COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas 

SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas 

ABBY FINKENAUER, Iowa 

JESU ́ S G. ‘‘CHUY’’ GARCI ́A, Illinois 

ANTONIO DELGADO, New York 

CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire 

ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota 

HARLEY ROUDA, California 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana 

DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina 

MIKE BOST, Illinois 

RANDY K. WEBER, SR., Texas 

DOUG LAMALFA, California 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania 

PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JENNIFFER GONZA ́ LEZ-COLO ́ N, 

Puerto Rico 

TROY BALDERSON, Ohio 

ROSS SPANO, Florida 

PETE STAUBER, Minnesota 

CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois, Chair 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JESU ́ S G. ‘‘CHUY’’ GARCI ́A, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, 

District of Columbia 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas 

ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon (Ex Officio) 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

MIKE BOST, Illinois 

RANDY K. WEBER, SR., Texas 

DOUG LAMALFA, California 

LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania 

PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

TROY BALDERSON, Ohio 

ROSS SPANO, Florida 

PETE STAUBER, Minnesota 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vii 

STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hon. Daniel Lipinski, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, 

and Chair, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials: 

Opening statement ........................................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Hon. Eric A. ‘‘Rick’’ Crawford, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arkansas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, 

and Hazardous Materials: 

Opening statement ........................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 

Opening statement ........................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

WITNESSES 

MEMBER PANEL

Hon. Lori Trahan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Massachusetts: 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Hon. Seth Moulton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Massachusetts: 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

PANEL 1 

Hon. Howard ‘‘Skip’’ Elliott, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration: 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15 

Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Member, National Transportation Safety Board: 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

PANEL 2 

Carl Weimer, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust: 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 59 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 61 

Andrew J. Black, President and CEO, Association of Oil Pipe Lines: 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 77 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 79 

Fire Chief Dan Eggleston, EFO, CFO, CMO, President and Chairman of 

the Board, International Association of Fire Chiefs: 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 80 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 82 

Page

VI 

Richard B. Kuprewicz, President, Accufacts Inc.: 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 85 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 87 

Robin Rorick, Vice President of Midstream and Industry Operations, American Petroleum Institute: 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 90 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 91 

Elgie Holstein, Senior Director for Strategic Planning, Environmental Defense 

Fund: 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 97 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 98 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Letter of March 8, 2016, from Calvin L. Scovel III, Inspector General, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Submitted for the Record by Hon. DeFazio .. 115 

Statement of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, Submitted 

for the Record by Hon. Lipinski .......................................................................... 116 

Statement of the American Gas Association, Submitted for the Record by 

Hon. Lipinski ........................................................................................................ 116 

APPENDIX 

Questions from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio for Hon. Howard ‘‘Skip’’ Elliott ............. 117 

Question from Hon. Daniel Lipinski for Hon. Howard ‘‘Skip’’ Elliott ................. 118 

Questions from Hon. Lizzie Fletcher for Hon. Howard ‘‘Skip’’ Elliott ................. 119 

Questions from Hon. Mike Bost for Hon. Howard ‘‘Skip’’ Elliott ......................... 119 

Question from Hon. Stephen F. Lynch for Hon. Jennifer Homendy ................... 120 

Question from Hon. Mike Bost for Andrew J. Black ............................................ 120 

Question from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Fire Chief Dan Eggleston, 

EFO, CFO, CMO .................................................................................................. 121 

vii 

1There are an estimated 2,757,650 miles of pipelines under PHMSA’s jurisdiction, of which 

2,223,212 are for distribution of natural gas, 300,655 for transmission of natural gas, an estimated 18,380 for gathering of natural gas, and 215,628 for hazardous liquids. 

MARCH 29, 2019 

SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER 

TO: Members, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials 

FROM: Staff, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials 

RE: Subcommittee Hearing on ‘‘Pipeline Safety: Reviewing the Status of 

Mandates and Examining Additional Safety Needs’’ 

PURPOSE 

The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials will meet on 

Tuesday, April 2, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. in HVC 210, Capitol Visitor Center, to receive 

testimony related to ‘‘Pipeline Safety: Reviewing the Status of Mandates and Examining Additional Safety Needs.’’ The purpose of the hearing is to consider the status 

of safety rulemakings that Congress previously has mandated, as well as to examine 

the safety of the Nation’s gas and hazardous liquid pipelines and facilities and how 

to respond to gaps or needs that exist. The Subcommittee will receive testimony 

from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration; the National 

Transportation Safety Board; Accufacts, Inc.; the American Petroleum Institute; the 

Association of Oil Pipe Lines; the Environmental Defense Fund; the International 

Association of Fire Chiefs; and, the Pipeline Safety Trust. 

BACKGROUND 

About the Agency 

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) was created under the Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improvement Act 

of 2004 (P.L. 108-426) (‘‘2004 Act’’). Prior to enactment of the 2004 Act, the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Research and Special Programs Administration administered the DOT’s pipeline and hazardous materials safety programs. PHMSA’s 

mission is to protect people and the environment by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other hazardous materials that are essential to our daily lives. 

The 2004 Act established that PHMSA ‘‘shall consider the assignment and maintenance of safety as the highest priority . . . ’’ PHMSA is charged with the safe and 

secure movement of over one million daily shipments of hazardous materials by all 

modes of transportation. PHMSA oversees the nation’s 2.7 million miles 1 of gas and 

hazardous liquid pipelines, which account for the transportation of 65 percent of the 

energy commodities consumed in the United States. 

The first statute regulating pipeline safety was the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety 

Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-481), which Congress amended in 1976 (P.L. 94-477). Congress 

added hazardous liquid pipelines to the statute in the Pipeline Safety Act of 1970 

(P.L. 96-129). Subsequent bills included the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 

1988 (P.L. 100-561), the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-508), the Accountable 

Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-304), the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-355), the Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special 

Programs Improvement Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-426), the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement and Safety Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-468), the Pipelines Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-90), and the Protecting our 

Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-183). These 

authorizing Acts provide for Federal safety regulation of facilities used in the transVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN

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2Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 

Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission and Gathering Pipelines, PHMSA-2011-0023, April 

8, 2016. 3Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Safety of Gas Gathering Pipelines 

Presentation, Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee Meeting January 8-9, 2019 (Version 12/21/2019). 

https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/meetings/FilGet.mtg?fil=1029. 4 Id. 

5Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 

Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines, PHMSA-2010-0229, October 13, 2015. 6 Id. 

7PHMSA generally regulates LNG facilities if the facility either receives from or delivers to 

a pipeline regulated by PHMSA. See 49 CFR 193.2001. 8These facilities receive natural gas from gas transmission pipelines during warm months, liquefy the gas, and store the liquefied gas until cold weather when it is needed, and are located 

primarily in the Northeast. 9These facilities have storage and vaporization capabilities, but do not liquefy gas. Natural 

gas is often trucked to these facilities and stored until the energy is needed, at which time it 

is put into a gas pipeline. 

portation of gases and hazardous liquids by pipeline. The current authorization expires on September 30, 2019. 

Pipeline Safety Framework 

Safety regulations differ depending on the nature of the pipeline and the commodity that is moving through it. PHMSA’s regulations govern pipelines and facilities that transport natural gas (49 CFR 192) separately from those that transport 

hazardous liquid (49 CFR 195). Additionally, the pipelines and facilities used to 

transport natural gas and hazardous liquids vary in operating pressures, diameter 

size, intended purpose, and proximity to populated areas. These include: 

Distribution pipelines transport natural gas to commercial and residential 

end-users. Gas distribution pipelines tend to be smaller in diameter and 

operate at lower pressures. PHMSA estimates there are 2.23 million 

miles of gas distribution lines, much of which are intrastate pipelines. 

There are no hazardous liquid distribution pipelines. 

Transmission pipelines transport natural gas from treatment and processing facilities to bulk customers, storage facilities, and local gas distribution networks. Transmission pipelines can range in size from several 

inches to several feet in diameter and are designed to operate from relatively low pressures to high pressures. These lines can operate within 

a single State or span hundreds of miles, crossing one or more State 

lines. PHMSA estimates there are 300,655 miles of interstate and intrastate gas transmission lines. 

Gathering lines transport natural gas from the production site to a central collection point. Historically, gathering lines were built in lower populated areas, had smaller diameters than transmission lines, and operated at pressures and flow lower than transmission lines. However, as 

new gas development occurs around the country, producers are installing 

new gathering systems in higher populated areas and building larger diameter and higher pressure gathering lines.2 PHMSA currently regulates 

18,380 miles of gas gathering lines, which leaves an estimated 438,884 

miles of gas gathering lines unregulated.3 PHMSA does not maintain 

records on incidents involving these unregulated gathering lines, nor are 

the lines required to be regularly inspected, built to specified standards, 

or required to have emergency response plans in place. To address this 

safety risk, PHMSA has proposed regulations to collect information and 

set Federal minimum standards on certain gathering lines.4

Hazardous liquid pipelines transport liquid petroleum from sources of origin to refineries and chemical plants, and in some cases to storage facilities or distribution terminals. According to PHMSA, hazardous liquids 

traverse the United States through 215,628 miles of hazardous liquid 

pipelines, of which an estimated 4,000 miles 5 are gathering lines. Approximately 30,000-40,000 miles of onshore hazardous liquid gathering 

lines are unregulated.6

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities are used for converting, transporting, or storing LNG. There are several Federal agencies involved in 

the regulation of LNG.7 Historically, PHMSA has regulated peakshaving 

facilities 8 and satellite facilities 9 where LNG has been used to manage 

capacity during times of peak demand. PHMSA also regulates import terVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6969 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
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10LNG tanker ships are used to supply marine import terminals with LNG, where it is then 

transferred into large storage tanks to be withdrawn, vaporized, and supplied to gas transmission pipelines. 11Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Executive 

Office of the President. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId= 

201810&RIN=2137-AF45.7 12Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Report to Congress on the Office 

of Pipeline Safety’s FY 2017 Actual Staffing and FY 2018 Hiring Plan, September 5, 2018. 13See 49 CFR 190.205; this letter notifies the operator of alleged violations and directs them 

to correct the violation or be subject to additional enforcement action. 14See 49 CFR 190.207; these notices, commonly issued after routine inspections, incident investigations, and other activity, allege specific regulatory violations and propose remedial action 

or civil penalties. 15See 49 CFR 190.233; these orders are issued when a particular situation represents a serious hazard to life, property, or the environment and directs certain actions to be taken, up to 

and including shutdown of the pipeline system. 16Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration, Summary of Enforcement Activity—Nationwide. https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/enforce/EnfHome.html?nocache=2062. 

minals.10 However, market dynamics have changed such that there has 

been a rapid growth in export terminals. At these terminals, large quantities of natural gas are liquefied and stored for transport aboard specialized tanker ships for export markets. PHMSA has announced plans to 

fully update its LNG regulations to address these changes in the industry 

and to comply with a 2016 mandate from Congress.11 The agency is drafting a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 

PHMSA’s Pipeline Safety Oversight 

PHMSA’s pipeline safety functions include developing, issuing, and enforcing regulations for the safe transportation of natural gas (include liquefying natural gas) 

and hazardous liquids by pipeline. PHMSA sets Federal minimum safety standards. 

The agency’s regulatory programs are focused on the design, construction, operation, 

and maintenance or abandonment of pipeline facilities, and in the construction, operation, and maintenance of liquefied natural gas facilities. The agency only has jurisdiction over transportation-related facilities; it does not have jurisdiction over 

drilling or production facilities. 

PHMSA carries out its regulatory functions through its Office of Pipeline Safety 

(OPS), whose purpose is to carry out a national program to ensure the safe, reliable, 

and environmentally-sound operation of the nation’s natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline transportation system. 

PHMSA has long-experienced difficulty in recruiting and maintaining an inspection workforce capable of meeting PHMSA’s oversight needs, as PHMSA often competes against the regulated industry for personnel. Congress has previously increased the number of Federal pipeline safety inspectors and directed the Office of 

Inspector General to study PHMSA’s continued staffing needs and potential solutions. In Fiscal Year 2018, PHMSA received funding to support 308 OPS staff positions. As of September 2017, 292 of those positions were filled, of which 205 performed inspection and enforcement functions.12

PHMSA’s regulations also address the workforce to help ensure their actions 

maintain the safety of the Nation’s pipelines. For instance, PHMSA requires pipeline operators and their contractors to conduct drug and alcohol testing programs; 

however, some pipeline workers performing safety-sensitive functions on master 

meter systems and pipeline systems that transport only petroleum gas or petroleum 

gas/air mixtures are exempt from these programs. Pipeline operators based in Canada or Mexico who maintain and control hundreds of miles of pipelines in the 

United States are also exempt. In addition, PHMSA regulations require operators 

to develop and adopt qualification programs to ensure that those performing certain 

operations and maintenance tasks are qualified to do so. 

When violations of PHMSA’s regulations occur, the agency has several enforcement mechanisms it can use to require pipeline operators to regain compliance with 

the regulations. These tools include the issuance of a warning letter,13 a notice of 

probable violation,14 or a corrective action order.15 The agency may issue fines for 

non-compliance. In 2018, PHMSA initiated 199 enforcement cases 16 related to a 

range of violations, such as failure to comply with Operator Qualification programs, 

emergency response plans, and integrity management program regulations, among 

others. 

x 

17Statement for the Record, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2019. Referencing Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Intelligence Community (2019): ‘‘China has the ability to launch cyber attacks that cause localized, temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructure—such as disruption of a natural gas 

pipeline for days to weeks—in the United States.’’ https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/ 

2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf. 18Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Actions Needed to Address Significant Weaknesses in TSA’s Pipeline Security Program Management, GAO-19-48, December 2018. 19 49 U.S.C. § 60105. 20Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2019 State Program Certification 

Agreement Status (Appendix F). https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/working-phmsa/state-programs/ 

2019-appendix-f-state-program-certification-agreement-status-pdf. 21 Id. 22 49 U.S.C. § 60106(a). 23Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2019 State Program Certification 

Agreement Status (Appendix F). https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/working-phmsa/state-programs/ 

2019-appendix-f-state-program-certification-agreement-status-pdf. 

While PHMSA regulations are focused on safety, there are also concerns for pipeline cyber security vulnerabilities.17 PHMSA has signed an annex to its memorandum of understanding with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

that identifies TSA as the lead entity for pipeline security and PHMSA as responsible for administering a national program of safety in natural gas and hazardous 

liquid pipeline transportation, including identifying pipeline safety concerns and developing uniform safety standards. In a recent report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was critical of TSA’s efforts to protect these assets, identifying 

significant staffing limitations exist and that TSA is unable to ensure that its voluntary Pipeline Security Guidelines reflect the latest known standards and best 

practices.18

States’ Pipeline Safety Oversight 

PHMSA supports this regulatory work by authorizing States to assume certain aspects of pipeline safety for intrastate gas pipelines, hazardous liquid pipelines, and 

underground natural gas storage through certifications and agreements with 

PHMSA under 49 U.S.C. §§ 60105 and 60106(a). The agency also authorizes States 

with certifications to participate in the oversight of interstate pipeline transportation through agreements under 49 U.S.C. § 60106(b). 

To conduct inspection and enforcement of intrastate gas and hazardous liquid 

pipelines and facilities, each State must annually certify their pipeline safety program by demonstrating to the Secretary that it: has adopted, or is taking steps to 

adopt, the Federal standards; is enforcing each standard through inspections; and 

is encouraging and promoting the establishment of damage prevention programs. 

Each annual certification must include a report that contains: all accidents or incidents reported to the State over the prior 12 months involving a fatality, personal 

injury requiring hospitalization, or property damage or loss of more than $50,000, 

or any other accident the State considers significant, and a summary of the investigation by the State of the cause and circumstances surrounding the accident or 

incident. The report also must include the record maintenance, reporting, and inspection practices conducted by the State to enforce compliance with Federal safety 

standards, including the number of inspections of pipeline facilities the authority 

made during the prior 12 months.19

States with certified pipeline safety programs may impose additional standards 

for intrastate pipelines and facilities so long as they are compatible with the minimum Federal standards issued by PHMSA. Separate certification is necessary for 

gas and hazardous liquid safety programs. In calendar year 2019, 51 State agencies 20 have certified natural gas safety programs, and 15 States agencies 21 have 

certified hazardous liquid safety programs. If States did not participate in the pipeline safety or underground natural gas storage programs, the inspection and enforcement of these intrastate pipeline and underground natural gas storage facilities 

would be PHMSA’s responsibility. 

A State that does not satisfy the criteria for certification may enter into an agreement 22 to undertake certain aspects of the pipeline or underground natural gas 

safety program for intrastate pipeline facilities on behalf of PHMSA. While this 

agreement allows a State to perform inspections, probable violations are reported 

to PHMSA for enforcement action. In calendar year 2019, two state agencies have 

such natural gas agreements with PHMSA.23

The Secretary also is authorized to enter into an interstate agent agreement with 

a State with a certified pipeline safety program, allowing the State to participate 

xi 

24 49 U.S.C. § 60106(b). 25Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2019 State Program Certification 

Agreement Status (Appendix F). https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/working-phmsa/state-programs/ 

2019-appendix-f-state-program-certification-agreement-status-pdf. 26 Id. 27 In 2018, 40 serious incidents and 286 significant incidents occurred. Serious incidents are 

those that include a fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization. Significant incidents 

are those that include a fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization, $50,000 or more 

in total costs, highly volatile liquid releases of five barrels or more or other liquid release of 

50 barrels or more, or liquid releases resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion. 28Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trends. 

https://cms.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-20-year-trends 29 National Transportation Safety Board, Preliminary Report, Over-pressure of a Columbia 

Gas of Massachusetts Low-pressure Natural Gas Distribution System, Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, PLD18MR003, September 13, 2018. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/ 

AccidentReports/Reports/PLD18MR003-preliminary-report.pdf. 30Federal law and PHMSA’s regulations do not require review and approval of plans by a professional engineer. At the time of the incident, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had a professional engineer licensing exemption for public utilities. On December 31, 2018, the Governor 

Continued 

in the oversight of interstate pipeline transportation.24 For such an agreement, the 

Secretary must determine that: the agreement is consistent with the Federal inspection program and Federal safety policies; the State’s interstate participation would 

not adversely affect its intrastate oversight responsibilities; the State meets federal 

minimum One-Call standards and is carrying-out a program demonstrated to promote preparedness and risk prevention activities; and the actions planned under the 

agreement would not impede interstate commerce or impede safety. The agency historically has used interstate agent agreements to supplement its Federal inspector 

workforce. State pipeline safety and underground natural gas storage programs provide a local presence for protecting the public from pipeline and underground natural gas storage incidents. In calendar year 2019, eight State agencies 25 acted as 

certified interstate agents for natural gas pipelines, and five were certified interstate agents for hazardous liquid pipelines.26

To support these State efforts, PHMSA administers grants providing up to 80 percent of the total cost of the personnel, equipment, and activities reasonably required 

for a State to carry-out certified pipeline safety programs or an agreement. Subject 

to annual appropriations, the actual reimbursement rate depends upon the availability of appropriated funds and the performance of a State’s pipeline safety program. 

Pipeline Safety Incidents 

Despite this oversight, pipeline incidents resulting in injuries and fatalities continue to occur. In 2018 alone, PHMSA reported 633 pipeline incidents, more than 

half of which were designated as serious or significant.27 These incidents resulted 

in eight fatalities, 92 injuries, and nearly $1 billion in damage. From 1999-2018, 

PHMSA reported 11,992 pipeline incidents, which resulted in 317 deaths, 1,302 injuries, and more than $8.1 billion in damage. Incidents have increased nearly twofold from 1999 to 2018.28

Among last year’s fatal incidents was the over-pressurization event on September 

13, 2018, involving the Columbia Gas distribution system in Merrimack Valley, 

Massachusetts. High-pressure natural gas was released into the low-pressure gas 

distribution system, resulting in a series of explosions and fires that killed one person, sent 21 others, including two firefighters, to the hospital, and damaged 131 

structures in the city of Lawrence and the towns of Andover and North Andover. 

In its preliminary report, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reported that a contracted crew was performing a Columbia Gas-developed and -approved pipe replacement project at a nearby intersection, working on a tie-in project 

of a new plastic distribution main and the abandonment of a cast-iron distribution 

main.29 The Columbia Gas-designed plan did not consider that the cast-iron main 

to be abandoned had regulator sensing lines used to detect pressure in the system 

and to provide input to the regulators that control the system pressure. Once abandoned, the section containing the sensing lines began to lose pressure, causing the 

regulators to open further to increase pressure in the distribution system, eventually opening fully. While the Columbia Gas monitoring center in Columbus, Ohio 

received high-pressure alarms, it had no remote-control capability to close the 

valves; the valves were closed more than three hours after the first alarm. 

The NTSB identified that neither Massachusetts nor Columbia Gas had a policy 

to require a registered professional engineer to develop or review public utility engineering plans,30 and that the Commonwealth’s Meter and Regulation department 

xii 

of Massachusetts signed into law a requirement that all natural gas work that might pose a 

material risk to the public be reviewed and approved by a certified professional engineer. See 

Mass. Gen. L. c. 112 § 81R; Mass Gen. L. c. 164 § 148. 31 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation Report, Natural Gas Distribution System Project Development and Review (Urgent), adopted November 14, 2018. https:// 

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PSR1802.pdf. 32Management of Change is a central tenant of safety management systems and was incorporated into API’s Recommended Practice (RP) 1173 in July 2015. For more information, see 

https://pipelinesms.org/. 33 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation Report, Natural Gas Distribution System Project Development and Review (Urgent), adopted November 14, 2018. https:// 

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PSR1802.pdf. 34 National Transportation Safety Board Preliminary Report, February 23, 2018. https:// 

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PLD18FR002-preliminary.pdf. 35Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Pipeline Incidents (2017). https:// 

hip.phmsa.dot.gov/analyticsSOAP/saw.dll?Portalpages. 36 National Transportation Safety Board Preliminary Report, August 2, 2017. https:// 

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/DCA17MP007-prelim-report.aspx. 37Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Pipeline Incidents (2016). https:// 

hip.phmsa.dot.gov/analyticsSOAP/saw.dll?Portalpages. 38 National Transportation Safety Board Preliminary Report, February 6, 2019. https:// 

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PLD19MR001-Preliminary.pdf 

that has control of line information was not required to review the project.31 In response to this incident, the NTSB recommended that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts eliminate the professional engineer licensure exemption for public utility 

work and require a professional engineer’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. The NTSB recommended that Columbia Gas’s parent company, NiSource, Inc., 

revise the engineering plan and constructability review process to ensure all applicable departments review construction documents and that the documents be sealed 

by a professional engineer; ensure records and documentation of the natural gas 

systems are traceable, reliable, and complete; apply management of change processes to all changes to adequately identify system threats; 32 and develop and implement additional controls to mitigate risks.33

In a separate event taking place on August 9, 2018, a gas gathering line owned 

by Targa Pipeline Mid-Continent WestTex caused an explosion to a mobile home 

structure in rural Midland County, Texas. After the structure exploded, first responders attempted to put out the blaze, but it continued to relight. Targa employees were able to isolate the gathering line by closing the valves, after which the fire 

lost fuel and burned out. Targa’s third-party investigators determined that the coal 

tar coating and steel pipe wall had been compromised with a hole approximately 

3⁄8 inch by 5⁄8 inch and had been leaking for an undetermined length of time. Four 

people were injured and one later died. 

Another incident occurred on February 23, 2018. Over a series of two days, three 

homes in a neighborhood served by the same 2-inch wrapped steel Atmos Energy 

pipeline experienced gas-related events, including an explosion that killed a 12-year 

old child and injured the other four family members. The preliminary report from 

the NTSB noted that due to the nature and number of leaks discovered in the 

neighborhood, more than 300 residences were evacuated.34 The operator identified 

multiple leaks in the neighborhood and had performed various repair work prior to 

and during the days the three events occurred. NTSB investigators identified three 

sections of the pipe that failed a pressure test and noted that the pipe located behind the home that exploded was cracked. 

PHMSA’s data shows that in 2017, there were 648 incidents that resulted in 19 

fatalities and 34 injuries.35 The 2017 data includes the August 2, 2017, natural gas 

explosion that occurred at a school in Minneapolis, Minnesota that resulted in the 

death of two individuals.36 In 2016, there were 633 incidents that resulted in 16 fatalities and 87 injuries.37

Already in 2019, the NTSB has begun investigating a natural gas line strike and 

fire. On February 6, 2019, a third-party-contractor was excavating for fiber optic 

conduit installation in San Francisco, California when the contractor struck a Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) 2-inch natural gas main, releasing gas and igniting a 

fire.38 Fortunately, there were no injuries or fatalities, but about 100 people were 

evacuated and the fire burned for more than two hours until PG&E personnel could 

isolate and shut down the gas line, removing the fuel source. The NTSB noted in 

the preliminary report that the investigation will focus on the third-party contractor’s preparedness and qualifications to perform the excavation work and the execution of PG&E and local first responders’ emergency response plans. 

xiii 

39Leak detection systems protect the public and environment from consequences of a pipeline 

failure by automatically alerting the operator when a leak occurs. Pipeline operators are then 

able to take appropriate action to minimize the spill. There are different types of systems; some 

measure the product volume at the start of a segment and compare it with the volume at the 

end, while others are more complex and monitor operating conditions. Additionally, the efficacy 

of systems relies on the sensitivity capabilities so that small leaks can be detected. 40Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) is a defined term, meaning the maximum 

pressure at which a pipeline or segment of a pipeline may be operated under the regulations. 

For maximum operating pressure of gas pipelines see 49 CFR 192.3 and for hazardous liquid 

pipelines, see 49 CFR 195.406. 

Mandates to Improve Safety Remain Unmet 

In response to other incidents, Congress previously has sought to improve pipeline 

safety by mandating that PHMSA promulgate new regulations designed to help prevent incidents before they occur. Years later, many of those mandates remain 

unmet. 

For instance, in response to major pipeline incidents, including a massive 

Enbridge oil pipeline spill in Marshall, Michigan, and a fatal Pacific Gas & Electric 

natural gas explosion in San Bruno, California, in 2011 Congress enacted the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-90), which 

mandated several safety improvements, including: • Valves (PSA11 Sec. 4). PHMSA must require pipeline operators to install automatic and remote-controlled shut-off valves, or equivalent technology, on hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission pipeline facilities constructed or entirely replaced after a Final Rule implementing this mandate is issued; • Integrity Management Plans (PSA11 Sec. 5(a)-(f)). Requires pipeline operators 

to expand their integrity management program (pipeline inspection and repair 

program) beyond high-consequence areas (HCAs). HCAs include commercially 

navigable waterways, high population areas, other populated areas, and unusually sensitive areas; • Leak Detection (PSA11 Sec. 8(b)). Requires pipeline operators to install leak detection systems, where practicable, and requires PHMSA to establish performance standards for the capability of such systems to detect leaks; 39

• Offshore Liquid Gathering Lines (PSA11 Sec. 21(c)). Requires the Secretary to 

regulate offshore liquid gathering lines; and • Grandfathered Pipe (PSA11 Sec. 7(a)-(b)). Requires pipeline owners and operators to verify maximum allowable operating pressure,40 report exceedances of 

maximum allowable operating pressure, and requires PHMSA to issue regulations for conducting tests to confirm the material strength of previously untested natural gas transmission pipelines located in HCAs and operating at a pressure greater than 30 percent of specified minimum yield strength. 

PHMSA has not implemented these mandates. According to PHMSA, the agency 

currently has three ongoing rulemakings that cover these outstanding mandates 

from the 2011 Act: ‘‘Safety of On-Shore Hazardous Liquid Pipelines,’’ ‘‘Safety of Gas 

Transmission Pipelines,’’ and ‘‘Amendments to Parts 192 and 195 to Require Valve 

Installation and Minimum Rupture Detection Standards.’’ PHMSA’s most recent 

schedule projects that it will issue Final Rules on June 18, 2019 and July 2, 2019, 

and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on August 7, 2019, respectively, for those proceedings-multiple years past the deadline that Congress mandated. Moreover, the 

latter two rulemakings have been under review by the Office the Secretary (OST) 

since October and August of 2018, respectively. After seven months of review at the 

OST, the ‘‘Safety of On-Shore Hazardous Liquid Pipelines’’ rule was sent to the Office of Management and Budget on March 19, 2019. 

Then in 2016, Congress enacted the Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and 

Enhancing Safety (PIPES) Act of 2016, which required additional rulemakings and 

other safety mandates, including: • Natural Gas and Hazardous Liquid Integrity Management Reviews (PIPES Act 

Sec. 4 and 5). These sections require the GAO to report to Congress on how natural gas integrity management programs and the hazardous liquid pipeline facility integrity management programs have improved the safety of natural gas 

transmission and hazardous liquid pipeline facilities, respectively. GAO has not 

completed these two reports because PHMSA has not completed Final Rules required by the 2011 Act for the ‘‘Safety of Gas Transmission and Gathering 

Lines’’ or the ‘‘Safety of On-Shore Hazardous Liquid Pipelines.’’ • Technical Safety Standards Committees (PIPES Act Sec. 6(b)). Requires the Secretary to fill all vacancies on the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committees within 90 days of the date of enactment, and within 60 days of any future 

vacancies. Currently, there are two government representative vacancies created on 12/2016 and 8/2018 on the Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee, and 

xiv 

41 49 U.S.C. § 60102(b). 42The Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-304). 43PHMSA informally refers to the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee as the Gas 

Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC), and the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety 

Standards Committee as the Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee. 

one government representative vacancy created on 10/2018 on the Gas Pipeline 

Advisory Committee. 

• Underground Natural Gas Storage Facilities (PIPES Act Sec. 12(b)-(c)). Requires the Secretary to issue minimum safety standards for underground natural gas storage facilities while allowing States to go beyond Federal regulations for regulating intrastate facilities. This section also imposes a fee on operators of underground natural gas storage facilities to support the Federal underground natural gas storage safety program. The agency issued an Interim 

Final Rule on minimum safety standards for underground natural gas storage 

facilities in December 2016 and reopened the comment period in October 2017. 

PHMSA has not published a Final Rule. The rule is scheduled to be published 

on July 2, 2019. 

• Safety Data Sheets (PIPES Act Sec. 14). Requires hazardous liquid pipeline operators to provide on-scene coordinators and state and local emergency responders with safety data sheets within six hours of a hazardous liquid spill, providing more accurate information for pipeline emergencies. Operators are required to comply with this self-executing provision, and PHMSA plans to incorporate the provision into the ‘‘Safety of On-Shore Hazardous Liquid Pipelines’’ 

rulemaking, which was sent to the OMB on March 19, 2019. 

• Emergency Order Authority (PIPES Act Sec. 16). Authorizes the Secretary to impose certain emergency restrictions and safety measures on pipeline operators 

to address an imminent hazard resulting from a pipeline incident or unsafe 

practice. PHMSA published an Interim Final Rule on emergency orders in October 2016 but has not issued a Final Rule. The rule is scheduled to be published 

on April 22, 2019. 

• Response Plans (PIPES Act Sec. 18). Requires oil spill response plans to consider the impact of a discharge into or on navigable waters and adjoining shorelines, including those covered by ice, and to include in those response plans procedures and resources for responding to such discharge. PHMSA held a workshop in April 2016 to develop a ‘‘Good Practices’’ guide on how to complete oil 

spill response plans, but the guide is still going through internal clearance and 

has not been published. 

• High Consequence Areas (PIPES Act Sec. 19). Designates the Great Lakes, 

coastal beaches, and marine coastal waters as HCAs for purposes of ensuring 

pipelines in these areas are inspected and repaired. A public meeting was held 

in November 2017, but no Final Rule has been issued. The agency has only 

begun drafting an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and no publication 

date has been identified. 

Additionally, the PIPES Act of 2016 (Sec. 10) required the convening of a working 

group to consider the development of a voluntary information-sharing system to encourage collaborative efforts that improve inspection system feedback and information sharing. The purpose is to improve gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipeline facility integrity risk analysis. PHMSA’s Voluntary Information-Sharing System 

Working Group is preparing a report with recommendations. 

PHMSA’s rulemaking program must comply with the Administrative Procedure 

Act and applicable Executive Orders; however, unlike other regulatory agencies, 

PHMSA has additional statutory processes it must fulfill before finalizing a pipeline 

safety regulation.41 This process was put in place in 1996 42 and includes the requirement to perform a ‘‘risk assessment’’ of proposals under consideration, and to 

submit risk assessment information to the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards 

Committee and/or the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee.43 The Committee(s) then must evaluate the data and provide any recommended options to PHMSA. PHMSA must review the report from the Committee(s), must provide written response, and may revise the risk assessment and 

proposed standard before promulgating a Final Rule. Moreover, PHMSA must propose or issue standards ‘‘only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of 

the intended standard justify its costs,’’ except as otherwise required by statute. 

To address the status of the statutorily-mandated PHMSA rulemakings, Congress 

required in the Sec. 3 of the PIPES Act of 2016 the Secretary to publish updates 

on the agency website every 90 days, which includes a work plan for each regulation, timeline, staff allocations, resource constraints, and any other constraints deVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
xv 

laying the rulemaking process. PHMSA has published its rulemakings chart online, 

and this information has aided Congress in monitoring PHMSA’s progress. 

WITNESS LIST 

MEMBER PANEL

• The Honorable Lori Trahan, U.S. House of Representatives 

• The Honorable Seth Moulton, U.S. House of Representatives 

PANEL I

• The Honorable Howard ‘‘Skip’’ Elliott, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration 

• The Honorable Jennifer Homendy, Board Member, National Transportation 

Safety Board 

PANEL II

• Mr. Carl Weimer, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust 

• Mr. Andrew Black, President and CEO, Association of Oil Pipe Lines 

• Chief Dan Eggleston, EFO, CFO, CMO, President and Chairman of the Board, 

International Association of Fire Chiefs 

• Mr. Richard Kuprewicz, President, Accufacts, Inc. 

• Mr. Robin Rorick, Vice President of Midstream and Industry Operations, American Petroleum Institute 

• Mr. Elgie Holstein, Senior Director for Strategic Planning, Environmental Defense Fund 

(1) 

PIPELINE SAFETY: REVIEWING THE STATUS 

OF MANDATES AND EXAMINING ADDITIONAL SAFETY NEEDS 

TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Daniel Lipinski (Chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. The subcommittee will come to order. 

First, I want to start by asking unanimous consent that Members not on the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at today’s hearing and ask questions. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

I want to welcome everyone to the first hearing of the Railroads, 

Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee. It is an honor 

to be chairman of the subcommittee. It has been 8 years since I 

have held a gavel of a subcommittee. It is great to have this one. 

I want to welcome Ranking Member Rick Crawford and all of the 

new members of the subcommittee here. I look forward to working 

with Ranking Member Crawford and Members on both sides of the 

aisle, as well as staff, on the many issues that we have before the 

subcommittee, including pipeline safety reauthorization. We have a 

long tradition of bipartisanship, and I look forward to continuing 

that tradition here. 

This hearing is particularly important given the recent spate of 

pipeline incidents, both liquid and gas, that we have seen in recent 

years. Explosions and pipeline failures just in the past couple of 

years in Merrimack Valley, Dallas, Minneapolis, and locally here in 

Silver Spring have tragically killed many people and caused severe 

property damage. 

I want to acknowledge Congresswoman Lori Trahan and Congressman Seth Moulton, who will speak today about the 

Merrimack Valley tragedy and the impacts it has had on their constituents. 

From 1999 to 2018, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration, PHMSA, reported 11,992 pipeline incidents which 

resulted in 317 deaths, 1,302 injuries, and more than $8.1 billion 

in damages. Incidents increased nearly twofold from 1999 to 2018. 

2 

This shows that we still have much work to do to ensure the safety 

of our pipeline system, which must be our top priority. 

First and foremost, on the safety front, is the expeditious completion of outstanding rulemakings from the 2011 and 2016 pipeline 

safety reauthorizations. I do want to note the progress that 

PHMSA Administrator Elliott has made since the subcommittee’s 

June 2018 oversight hearing and the outstanding mandates from 

the 2011 and 2016 bills. 

But it remains unacceptable that critical rules like the hazardous 

liquids rule, gas transmission line rule, and the valve and rupture 

detection rule have not been implemented. PHMSA’s and USDOT’s 

inaction continue to place lives at risk, and that is completely unacceptable. They must do a better job getting the regulations completed expeditiously. 

Given the delay in completing these important rulemakings, we 

need to examine PHMSA’s rulemaking process to determine if 

there are obstacles to more swift promulgations of regulations, including the unique benefit-cost analysis that PHMSA is required to 

undertake as part of any rulemaking. 

I am pleased to welcome my good friend Jennifer Homendy here 

on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board. NTSB recently came out with their 2019 to 2020 ‘‘most wanted list’’ of safety improvements. I look forward to hearing from NTSB about pipeline safety issues on this list and ways that Congress can address 

those issues. 

Additionally, NTSB currently has 36 open pipeline safety recommendations. Twenty-four of those recommendations are to 

PHMSA. Three of the most-wanted recommendations to PHMSA 

are designated as ‘‘open—unacceptable response,’’ including finding 

cracks, defects in pipes. It is important that we move quickly to address NTSB’s recommendations, many of which have remained 

unaddressed for decades, and determine if there are any new safety 

regulations needed. 

We also need to continue to assess the workforce capacity of 

PHMSA and ensure that PHMSA is properly staffed. This assessment should not only examine whether PHMSA adequately retains 

and has enough expertise and experience among pipeline inspector 

staff, but also whether PHMSA has enough technical and regulatory staff as well. 

I look forward to hearing from the safety advocates on the second 

panel about the safety gaps they believe exist and need to be addressed. I also want to consider how industry can take proactive 

steps to work with communities and first responders to help prepare and train local emergency personnel in the case of emergencies. 

It is important to ensure that robust emergency management 

and information-sharing plans and procedures are in place should 

something go wrong, like it did in my district in Romeoville, Illinois, when a pipeline spilled more than 6,427 barrels of oil in 2010. 

Finally, I have heard concerns that some of PHMSA’s regulations 

are woefully outdated and inhibit industry innovation in new areas. 

Therefore, it is important to listen to industry stakeholders on 

some of the challenges they face. I look forward to considering reaVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
3 

sonable requests about how we can modernize our regulations 

while holding bad actors accountable and not compromise safety. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. And now I recognize the ranking member, Mr. Crawford, for an opening statement. 

[Mr. Lipinski’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Lipinski, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Illinois, and Chair, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials 

Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to the first hearing of the Railroads, 

Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee in the 116th Congress. This 

hearing is entitled: ‘‘Pipeline Safety: Reviewing the Status of Mandates and Examining Additional Safety Needs.’’ I specifically want to give a warm welcome to our 

ranking member, Rick Crawford, and the new members of the subcommittee. I look 

forward to working with Ranking Member Crawford, members on both sides of the 

aisle, as well as staff on the many issues we have before this subcommittee, including pipeline safety reauthorization. We have a long tradition of bipartisanship and 

I look forward to continuing that tradition. 

This hearing is particularly important given the recent spate of pipeline incidents, 

both liquid and gas, that we have seen in recent years. Explosions and pipeline failures just in the past couple of years in Merrimack Valley, Dallas, Minneapolis, and 

Silver Spring have tragically killed many people and caused severe property damage. 

I want to acknowledge Congresswoman Lori Trahan and Congressman Seth 

Moulton, who will speak today about the Merrimack Valley tragedy, and the impacts it has had on their constituents. 

From 1999 to 2018, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA) reported 11,992 pipeline incidents which resulted in 317 deaths, 1,302 injuries, and more than $8.1 billion in damages. Incidents increased nearly two-fold 

from 1999 to 2018. This shows that we still have much more work to do to ensure 

the safety of our pipeline system, which must be our top priority. 

First and foremost on the safety front is the expeditious completion of outstanding 

rulemakings from the 2011 and 2016 pipeline safety reauthorizations. I do want to 

note the progress that PHMSA and Administrator Elliott have made since this subcommittee’s June 2018 oversight hearing on the outstanding mandates from the 

2011 and 2016 bills. But it remains unacceptable that critical rules like the hazardous liquids rule, gas transmission line rule, and the valve and rupture detection 

rule, have not been implemented. PHMSA’s and USDOT’s inaction continue to place 

lives at risk and that is simply unacceptable. They must do a better job getting the 

regulations completed expeditiously. 

Given the delay in completing these important rulemakings, we need to examine 

PHMSA’s rulemaking process to determine if there are obstacles to more swift promulgations of regulations, including the unique benefit-cost analysis that PHMSA 

is required to undertake as part of any rulemaking. 

I am pleased to welcome my good friend Jennifer Homendy here on behalf of the 

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). NTSB recently came out with their 

2019–2020 Most Wanted list of safety improvements. I look forward to hearing from 

NTSB about pipeline safety issues on this list and ways Congress can address those 

issues. 

Additionally, NTSB currently has 36 open pipeline safety recommendations. 

Twenty-four of those open recommendations are to PHMSA. Three of the Most 

Wanted recommendations to PHMSA are designated as ‘‘Open—Unacceptable Response,’’ including finding crack defects in pipes. It’s important that we move quickly to address NTSB’s recommendations, many of which have remained unaddressed 

for decades, and determine if there are any new safety regulations needed. 

We also need to continue to assess the workforce capacity of PHMSA and ensure 

that PHMSA is properly staffed. This assessment should not only examine whether 

PHMSA adequately retains and has enough expertise and experience among pipeline inspector staff, but also whether PHMSA has enough technical and regulatory 

staff as well. 

I look forward to hearing from the safety advocates on the second panel about the 

safety gaps they believe exist and need to be addressed. I also want to consider how 

industry can take proactive steps to work with communities and first responders to 

help prepare and train local emergency personnel in the case of emergencies. It is 

4 

important to ensure that robust emergency management and information sharing 

plans and procedures are in place should something go wrong like it did in my district in Romeoville, Illinois, when a pipeline spilled more than 6,427 barrels of oil 

in 2010. 

Finally, I have heard concerns that some of PHMSA’s regulations are woefully 

outdated and inhibit industry innovation in new areas. Therefore, it is important 

to listen to industry stakeholders on some of the challenges they face and I look forward to considering reasonable requests about how we can modernize our regulations, while holding bad actors accountable and not compromise safety. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Crawford, for an opening statement. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. Thank you, Chairman Lipinski. As we begin our 

work to reauthorize the 2016 PIPES Act, I look forward to working 

with you and the members of this subcommittee to improve pipeline safety through a balanced regulatory approach. 

The United States has the largest network of energy pipelines in 

the world and supplies 65 percent of the energy we use every day. 

The oil and natural gas industry supports over 10.3 million jobs 

and 8 percent of the total U.S. economy. Continued industry investments will provide more high-paying jobs for a diversifying workforce. 

As the world’s leading energy exporter, the United States can 

continue to bolster our economy and our allies’ energy security by 

exporting our oil and natural gas. Just last week, I was proud to 

join 390 of my colleagues in passing H.R. 1616, the European Energy Security and Diversification Act, to facilitate the export of 

U.S. energy resources to Central and Eastern European countries. 

Every year, more than 2.6 million miles of pipelines safely deliver large volumes of natural gas and liquid petroleum products 

across the United States. A safe pipeline system is essential to relieve the burdens on other modes of our transportation network. 

Pipelines remain one of the safest and most cost-effective means 

to transport large quantities of our Nation’s energy products. And 

oversight of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, or PHMSA, safety programs is a top priority for this subcommittee in achieving our goal of zero pipeline incidents. 

The 2016 PIPES Act was bipartisan and made progress towards 

ensuring the safety of pipelines in the communities around them. 

The 2016 PIPES Act provided regulatory certainty for our citizens, 

the safety community, and the industry stakeholders. Today, we 

will hear from PHMSA about the progress to date as well as pending actions on the mandates from both the 2011 and 2016 legislation. 

While I appreciate the progress that has been made, there is still 

work to be done. The 2011 law included 42 congressional mandates, 

of which 34 are complete. The 2016 PIPES Act contained 19 mandates, 16 of which are complete. I especially look forward to hearing from the industry about its safety initiatives to ensure best 

practices for inspections, detecting leaks, and other important safety initiatives. 

In closing, let me thank our witnesses for coming today to discuss the issues concerning pipeline safety and how we can continue 

to improve pipeline safety. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Look forward to working with 

you. 

5 

[Mr. Crawford’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Eric A. ‘‘Rick’’ Crawford, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Arkansas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials 

Thank you, Chairman Lipinski. As we begin our work to reauthorize the 2016 

PIPES Act, I look forward to working with you and this subcommittee to improve 

pipeline safety through a balanced regulatory approach. 

The United States has the largest network of energy pipelines in the world and 

supplies 65 percent of the energy we use every day. The oil and natural gas industry 

supports over 10.3 million jobs and 8 percent of the total U.S. economy. Continued 

industry investments will provide more high-paying jobs for a diversifying workforce. 

As the world’s leading energy exporter, the United States can continue to bolster 

our economy and our allies’ energy security by exporting our oil and natural gas. 

Just last week, I was proud to join 390 of my colleagues in passing H.R. 1616, the 

European Energy Security and Diversification Act, to facilitate the export of U.S. 

energy resources to Central and Eastern European countries. 

Every year, more than 2.6 million miles of pipelines safely deliver large volumes 

of natural gas and liquid petroleum products across the United States. A safe pipeline system is essential to relieve the burdens on other modes of our transportation 

network. 

The United States is leading the world in production and refinement of oil and 

natural gas, and in the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. These emission reductions are due in large part to the increasing use of natural gas. Increased use of 

natural gas in the power generation sector has helped to reduce total CO2 emissions, and cleaner, more efficient fuels lead to reduced carbon emissions. Oil and 

natural gas are also essential to the production of solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and electric vehicles. The industry and its stakeholder partners, including 

university researchers and environmental groups, continue to help develop and deploy state-of-the-art technologies and practices to further reduce emissions. 

Pipelines remain one of the safest and most cost-effective means to transport 

large quantities of our Nation’s energy products, and oversight of the Pipeline and 

Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) safety programs is a top priority for this subcommittee in achieving our goal of zero pipeline incidents. 

Pipeline safety is a collaborative effort between industry, PHMSA, and State governments. We must continue to promote cooperation between regulators and stakeholders. We also must ensure that our balanced approach to safety regulations fosters innovation in technology and best practices to improve safety. 

The 2016 PIPES Act was bipartisan and made progress towards ensuring the 

safety of pipelines and the communities around them. The 2016 PIPES Act provided 

regulatory certainty for our citizens, the safety community, and industry stakeholders. 

Today we will hear from PHMSA about the progress to-date as well as pending 

actions on the mandates from both the 2011 and 2016 legislation. While I appreciate 

the progress that has been made, there is still work to be done. The 2011 law included 42 congressional mandates, of which 34 are complete. The 2016 PIPES Act 

contained 19 mandates, 15 of which are complete. 

I especially look forward to hearing from the industry about its safety initiatives 

to ensure best practices for inspections, detecting leaks, and other important safety 

initiatives. In closing, I thank our witnesses for coming today to discuss the issues 

concerning pipeline safety and how we can continue to improve pipeline safety. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Crawford. 

I now call on the chair of the full committee, Mr. DeFazio, for 

an opening statement. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, a small token to celebrate your—— 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. Can I open it now? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. You can even use it. It is functional. It is 

smaller than that one. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. So you are telling me—you gave away what is in 

here. 

6 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, I think you have been at some of the other 

hearings when I gave them to—— 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Not a big surprise. 

Brief remarks. I would echo concerns raised by both the chair 

and the ranking member. 

Last year, 8 people were killed, and 92 people were injured in 

633 pipeline incidents. We are going to hear from the Representative of the worst incident of the last year, the most serious one, in 

Merrimack Valley, where somehow high-pressure gas got into the 

low-pressure system, and that damaged 131 structures, destroyed 

5 homes, injured 21 people, and killed an 18-year-old. These things 

just shouldn’t happen. 

There are other ongoing investigations with the NTSB, and we 

always look forward to their advice in these matters. 

The Administrator is also here. I met with the Administrator recently to discuss progress on the rulemakings. It is simply unacceptable to have safety critical rules that were passed by Congress 

8 years ago lingering somewhere. Apparently, five have moved out 

of the agency, and they are somewhere in—I don’t know. OMB? 

The Secretary’s office? There are rumors that there is some sort of 

a ledger and the cost of regulations can’t exceed a certain amount. 

I am not sure what is holding them up. I don’t know what value 

the Secretary puts on their life, but when you lose that many people in a year, and we have safety critical rules, particularly leak 

detection and other things that are not yet accomplished, not yet 

promulgated, you have to question what is going on. We are not 

going to rest easy until we get this all done and we make the system safer across the country and prevent these sorts of incidents. 

We will be looking for ideas on additional, if necessary, 

rulemakings. We certainly want to look at ways that we can work 

with the industry in doing rulemaking. But it is ultimately a regulated industry, and the regulators must protect the public. I do not 

believe in self-regulation even with best practices. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my 

time. 

[Mr. DeFazio’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure 

Thank you, Chairman Lipinski and Ranking Member Crawford, for calling today’s 

hearing to consider the state of pipeline safety in the United States. 

Across the country, 2.7 million miles of pipelines transport hazardous liquid and 

natural gas from production and origin sites to refineries and chemical plants, storage facilities, and homes and businesses. These pipelines reach the furthest 

stretches of the country, making the integrity of the pipelines important to rural 

communities and dense cities alike. 

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration—the Federal agency 

charged with ensuring the safe, reliable, and environmentally sound operation of 

these pipeline systems—reported 633 pipeline incidents in 2018. Eight people were 

killed and 92 others were injured in last year’s incidents. One of the worst incidents 

in recent memory occurred in September in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts. 

When oversights led to highly pressurized gas entering the low-pressure gas distribution system servicing homes and businesses, multiple fires and explosions damVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
7 

aged 131 structures, destroyed 5 homes, injured 21 people, and killed an 18-yearold. 

The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating that incident along 

with seven others, such as the February 2019 incident in San Francisco where a 

third-party contractor struck a Pacific Gas & Electric Corporation natural gas main 

line, igniting a fire that burned for more than 2 hours until the operator could isolate and shut down the flow of gas. 

Surely, there is more that we can do to improve safety. Today’s hearing provides 

an opportunity to hear from a wide range of pipeline stakeholders about the safety 

risks that continue to elude us. 

There is one thing we don’t need any expert to tell us: safety mandates from the 

2011 and 2016 reauthorization bills still aren’t completed. 

In 2011, after devastating accidents in San Bruno, California, and Marshall, 

Michigan, Congress required PHMSA to improve the safety of hazardous liquid pipelines, to eliminate safety gaps in gas transmission pipelines, and to examine requirements to better detect leaks and shut off pipelines during disasters. These 

rules haven’t been finalized, 8 years later. Part of that is due to agency failures, 

and part of that may be due to burdensome statutory requirements that require 

PHMSA to prove, in every safety rule, that the benefits outweigh the costs. 

Additional mandates from the 2016 reauthorization bill, including regulations intended to prevent underground natural gas storage leaks like what happened in 

Aliso Canyon, remain unaccomplished. 

The Administrator is here today to tell us where these mandates stand. To his 

credit, and after much lambasting that occurred at our last oversight hearing, the 

Administrator will be able to talk about some progress on some of these mandated 

rulemakings. Yet, the rules are still not done. 

So, where are the safety rules? Some are sitting on the Secretary’s desk or are 

over at OMB. In the few months since this subcommittee’s last pipeline oversight 

hearing, PHMSA has moved five rulemakings out of the agency and to the Secretary’s Office or to OMB. I’m not sure what is taking so long to review a rule that 

PHMSA has completed—is it the President’s Executive orders on regulatory reform, 

or an arbitrary and nonsensical cap on the cost to industry of regulations imposed 

by the Secretary and OMB. 

I expect the Administrator to tell us his agency’s plans to finish these long-overdue mandates. Specifically, I want to know when they will finally be completed. I 

also expect to hear what tools or resources Congress can provide PHMSA or other 

hurdles we can tear down to ensure that future mandates don’t take 8 years to complete. 

Let me be clear: a near-decade of delay will not happen again. We will not sit 

here in 2027 asking when the mandates from 2019 will be finished. The public deserves better, and Congress demands better. 

So, I hope today’s hearing will be informative. I look forward to hearing from the 

NTSB, who will have plenty to share on the importance of the past mandates and 

ways to improve safety overall. And we have a range of safety experts, first responders, and industry on the second panel to help us identify how to keep our pipeline 

systems safe. If there are things we can fix, we’re going to fix them. 

Thank you, and I look forward to hearing the witnesses’ testimony. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. DeFazio. Thank you for the gavel. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. I will proudly display that in my office. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I ordered them online. They looked a little bigger 

than that. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Yeah, it is a little smaller than—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. You might use that one. Just put that one in your 

office somewhere. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Yeah, I will. Thank you. 

Before proceeding to our two witness panels, I would like to— 

let’s see, we have Congresswoman Lori Trahan. Congressman Seth 

Moulton may be here. But both of them are going to speak about 

the Merrimack Valley tragedy and its impact on their districts and 

constituents. 

I want to ask unanimous consent that our colleagues’ full statements be included in the record. 

8 

And, without objection, so ordered. 

And we will proceed with Representative Trahan. 

So welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. LORI TRAHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS; AND 

HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS 

FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Mrs. TRAHAN. Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for allowing me to testify 

today on an issue that has been weighing on so many hearts and 

minds in my district for the past 28 weeks, ever since a series of 

preventable errors triggered gas-fueled explosions across Lawrence, 

Andover, and North Andover, Massachusetts. The explosions destroyed homes and damaged businesses, caused multiple injuries, 

and took a young life. 

To briefly recap events, at 4 o’clock in the afternoon on Thursday, September 13, a cascade of explosions rocked over 130 homes 

and businesses, burning several to the ground. Terrified residents 

had no idea what was happening or why or when it would stop. 

While the National Transportation Safety Board won’t issue its 

final report and recommendations for several months, its interim 

report revealed shocking details that demand action. 

Columbia Gas of Massachusetts, a subsidiary of NiSource, was 

replacing gas pipelines in the area, and major errors were made 

throughout the process. 

One of the biggest was the mishandling of a gas pressure sensor 

line. This sensor signals to an automated system whether to adjust 

gas flow. However, when the new pipeline was installed, the sensor 

line remained in the old, abandoned pipeline. The lack of flow in 

the old line led the sensor to call for more and more gas in the new 

line. Across the country, people saw the consequence on the 

evening news. This should have never happened. 

In November, the Board recommended that Columbia Gas revamp its engineering review process to more securely plan for 

whatever public safety may be at risk. It recommended that company records be updated with critical details such as location of 

sensor lines, as industry standard practice calls for. 

The Board also recommended that the company implement a 

management-of-change process to identify and mitigate potential 

risks ahead of project work. 

Finally, the Board urged Massachusetts to repeal a law that exempted gas companies from securing the seal of a professionally licensed engineer on these projects. Indeed, it is my understanding 

that more than a dozen States have such exemptions in place 

today. To their credit, the Commonwealth’s Governor and legislature quickly acted to repeal this exemption. 

Furthermore, I am told that Columbia Gas is in contact with the 

Board to implement the industry recommendations. Nevertheless, 

I urge the committee to be bold by strengthening safety standards 

and mandating professional engineer reviews. 

Over the past 7 months, I have met with many victims of the 

Merrimack Valley gas explosions. I heard stories of courage and 

9 

commitment, nowhere more so than in Lawrence, a community 

known as the ‘‘City of Immigrants.’’ 

One local hero, Police Officer Ivan Soto, learned that his home 

was one of those on fire. But like so many first responders, once 

he knew his family was safe, Officer Soto returned to duty to help 

as many people as he could. 

Drs. Yeri Park and Chelsea Harris were graduate medical residents at Greater Lawrence Family Health Center. Neither is from 

Lawrence—Dr. Park is from Los Angeles, in fact—but they and 

their colleagues sprang into action to help victims and offer surge 

support, as the local hospital already had its hands full. 

But despite their heroic efforts, there is no replacing some of 

what was lost. Luis Suazo owns a bodega. He is one of many firstgeneration immigrants who started his own successful business in 

Lawrence. But he could lose it all. His regular customers are still 

financially strapped from the disaster. That is a feeling he is intimately familiar with himself. He is currently navigating an extended damage claims review process. Plus, quite frankly, many 

residents are just fearful that there may be more explosions, and 

so they stay indoors. That means less foot traffic and fewer customers in the Suazo market. 

Finally, Leonel Rondon. Leonel was a student celebrating his 

new driver’s license that day. Then, a home exploded, and debris 

from a chimney collapsed onto the car he was in, killing him. He 

was 18. His sister, Lucianny, testified at a Senate field hearing in 

Lawrence last November. She said, ‘‘We hope there will be justice 

for Leonel and for the community. Nobody should ever have to go 

through what my family has gone through ever again.’’ 

I invite any of the members of the committee to come to the 

Merrimack Valley and see the damage for yourself and also meet 

those who suffered losses as well as those who came to the rescue. 

Finally, I implore this committee to approve a strong reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act this year. I stand ready to work 

with you on legislation to prevent such a disaster from happening 

again. 

Thank you. Thank you for your time. 

[Mrs. Trahan’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Lori Trahan, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Massachusetts 

Chairman Lipinski and Ranking Member Crawford, thank you for allowing me to 

testify today on an issue that has been weighing on so many hearts and minds in 

my district for the past 28 weeks . . . 

. . . Ever since a series of preventable errors triggered gas-fueled explosions across 

Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover, Massachusetts. 

The explosions destroyed homes and damaged businesses, caused multiple injuries 

and took a young life. 

To briefly recap events: At four in the afternoon on Thursday, September 13th, 

a cascade of explosions rocked over 130 homes and businesses, burning several to 

the ground. 

Terrified residents had no idea what was happening or why or when it would 

stop. While the National Transportation Safety Board likely won’t issue its final report and recommendations for several more months, its interim report revealed 

shocking details that demand action. 

Columbia Gas of Massachusetts was replacing gas pipelines in the area; and 

major errors were made throughout the process. 

10 

One of the biggest was the mishandling of a gas pressure sensor line. This sensor 

signals to an automated system whether to adjust gas flow. 

However, when the new pipeline was installed, the sensor line remained in the 

old, abandoned pipeline. 

The lack of flow in the old line led the sensor to call for more and more gas in 

the new line. 

Across the country, people saw the consequences on the evening news. This should 

never have happened. 

In November, the Board recommended that Columbia Gas revamp its engineering 

review process to more securely plan for whenever public safety may be at risk. 

It recommended that company records be updated with critical details, such as 

the location of sensor lines—as industry standard practice calls for. 

The Board also recommended that the company implement a ‘‘management of 

change’’ process to identify and mitigate potential risks ahead of project-work. 

Finally, the Board urged Massachusetts to repeal a law that exempted gas companies from securing the seal of a professionally licensed engineer on these projects. 

Indeed, it is my understanding that more than a dozen States have such exemptions in place. 

To their credit, the Commonwealth’s Governor and legislature quickly acted to repeal the exemption. 

Furthermore, I’m told that Columbia Gas is in contact with the Board to implement the industry recommendations. 

Nevertheless, I urge the committee to be bold by strengthening safety standards 

and mandating professional engineer reviews. 

Over the past 7 months, I’ve met with many victims of the Merrimack Valley gas 

explosions. 

I heard stories of courage and commitment—nowhere more so than in Lawrence, 

a community known as the ‘‘City of Immigrants.’’ 

One local hero, Police Officer Ivan Soto, learned that his home was one of those 

on fire. Nevertheless, once he knew his family was safe, Officer Soto returned to 

duty to help as many people as he could. 

Doctors Yeri Park and Chelsea Harris were graduate medical residents at Greater 

Lawrence Family Health Center. 

Neither is from Lawrence. Dr. Park is from Los Angeles, in fact. 

But they and their colleagues sprang into action to help victims and offer surge 

support as the local hospital already had its hands full. 

But despite their heroics, there is no replacing some of what was lost. 

Luis Suazo owns a bodega. 

He is one of many first-generation immigrants who started his own successful 

business in Lawrence. 

But he could lose it all. 

His regular customers are still financially strapped from the disaster. 

That’s a feeling he is intimately familiar with himself; he’s currently navigating 

an extended damage claims review process. 

Plus, quite frankly, many residents are fearful that there may be more explosions, 

so they stay indoors. 

That means less foot traffic and fewer customers in the Suazo Market. 

Finally, Leonel Rondon. Leonel was a student celebrating his new driver’s license 

that day. 

Then, a house exploded, and a piece of chimney collapsed onto the car he was in, 

killing him. 

His sister, Lucianny, testified at a Senate field hearing in Lawrence last November. She said ‘‘we hope there will be justice for [Leonel] and the community. Nobody 

should ever have to go through what my family has gone through ever again.’’ 

I invite you to come to the Merrimack Valley: See the damage for yourself; meet 

those who suffered losses as well as those who came to the rescue. 

Finally, I implore this committee to approve a strong reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act this year. 

I stand ready to work with you on legislation to prevent such a disaster from happening again. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. I thank you, Mrs. Trahan. 

And we now have, right in the nick of time, Mr. Moulton. So we 

will give you a couple seconds there to—— 

Mr. MOULTON. Oh, no, no. We are ready to go. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. We will recognize you. 

11 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member 

Graves, Ranking Member Crawford, thank you all for inviting me 

here today. 

On the 13th of last September, workers for Columbia Gas replacing a system of 100-year-old cast-iron pipes failed to account for a 

pressure sensor. The lines were overpressurized and set off a series 

of disasters that brought carnage I thought I had left behind in 

Iraq to the Merrimack Valley. 

Witnesses described houses exploding. Just repeat that phrase: 

houses exploding. At one exploding house, a chimney landed on a 

car and crushed a young man inside it to death. The explosions and 

the fires that happened in the aftermath injured 23 people and in 

a second turned 30,000 folks in Merrimack Valley into temporary 

refugees. All told, 7,700 people couldn’t return to their homes, including 2,683 children, many for months. 

The story that day was one of devastation. It didn’t take long, 

however, to turn into a story of inspiration. Strangers took in 

neighbors. Red Cross workers, local leaders, and first responders 

banded together to help out. By the end of the first night, it seemed 

like everyone in the Merrimack Valley was pitching in to help us 

recover—everyone except the company that caused the explosion. 

Columbia Gas dawdled in the moments and days immediately 

after this tragedy. And when I asked their president why, during 

a Senate Commerce Committee field hearing, he assured me that 

public safety was one of the company’s core values. But shortly 

thereafter, we learned the truth from a courageous whistleblower 

who retired 3 months prior. 

Before the explosions, that employee, Mr. Bart Maderios, warned 

the general manager and another senior employee that staffing and 

oversight decisions made by Columbia Gas would create a situation 

in which they, and I quote, ‘‘didn’t have enough people to respond 

and provide safe, reliable natural gas.’’ 

But that wasn’t all. Columbia Gas had also reduced the number 

of staff monitoring gas pressure in the Merrimack Valley. The company stopped requiring technicians on site at construction projects 

to monitor gas distribution lines. And the National Transportation 

Safety Board found that the company used a field engineer who 

had, and I quote, ‘‘limited knowledge about the importance of regulator-sensing lines’’ to supervise the project. This oversight, or lack 

of oversight, caused workers to improperly bypass critical pipeline 

pressure-sensing lines, which led directly to the explosion. 

Last month, 10 families were still in temporary housing; small 

businesses faced the prospect of closing their doors because of the 

rate at which Columbia Gas paid their claims; and Columbia Gas 

has still not replaced appliances beyond merely patching them up 

as winter approached. 

In the 6 months since, Columbia Gas has put together a longterm recovery plan that focuses on bettering its emergency response and pipeline safety initiatives, but the damage wasn’t just 

to people and to homes. Peace of mind exploded that day as well. 

Now, parents have cause to think twice when they hear the click 

of a stovetop or the rumble of a hot water heater. They wonder if 

their house might blow up. 

12 

It is up to Congress to rebuild that peace of mind. As this committee considers the reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline 

Safety Act, we must improve safety protocols and oversight of operators like Columbia Gas. 

And the President needs to step up and work with Congress too. 

Let’s all work together to rebuild America’s aging infrastructure, 

like the century-old pipes running through the Merrimack Valley. 

Let’s eliminate professional engineer license exemptions for public utility work. Let’s make sure a professional engineer approves 

all public utility engineering drawings. 

Let’s hold State and Federal pipeline safety regulators accountable for sufficient staffing. Let’s explore the lack of oversight by the 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, which 

gave the Massachusetts system a rating of 97.4 out of 100 just 1 

month before the explosions. 

Let’s make the regulation of pipe replacement mandatory and 

rethink how the administration could be more efficient as it weighs 

costs and benefits for new regulations. Because no cost is greater 

than that of young men, of young Americans, like the young man 

who was killed, 18-year-old Leonel Rondon. 

Let’s do it for Merrimack. Let’s do it together. And let’s do it 

now. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

[Mr. Moulton’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Seth Moulton, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Massachusetts 

Thank you to Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Graves, 

and Ranking Member Crawford for inviting me to be here today. 

On the 13th of last September, workers for Columbia Gas replacing a system of 

100-year-old cast-iron pipes failed to account for a pressure sensor. The lines overpressurized, and set off a series of disasters that brought carnage I thought I left 

behind in Iraq to the Merrimack Valley. 

Witnesses described houses exploding in a deafening blink. At one exploding 

house, a chimney landed on a car and crushed a young man inside it to death. The 

explosion and the fires that happened in the aftermath injured 23 other people and 

in a second turned 30,000 people in the Merrimack Valley into temporary refugees. 

All told, 7,700 people couldn’t return to their homes—including 2,683 children— 

many for months. 

The story that day was one of devastation. 

It didn’t take long to turn to one of inspiration. 

Strangers took in neighbors. Red Cross workers, local leaders, and first responders banded together to help out. 

By the end of the first night, it seemed like everyone in Merrimack Valley was 

pitching in to help us recover. 

Everyone except the company that caused the explosion. 

Columbia Gas dawdled in the moments and days immediately after this tragedy. 

And when I asked their president why during a Senate Commerce Committee field 

hearing, he assured me that public safety was one of the company’s core values. 

Shortly thereafter, we learned the truth from a courageous whistleblower who retired 3 months prior. 

Before the explosions, that employee—Mr. Bart Maderios—warned the general 

manager and another senior employee that staffing and oversight decisions made 

by Columbia Gas would create a situation in which they, and I quote, ‘‘didn’t have 

enough people to respond and to provide a safe, reliable natural gas.’’ 

But that wasn’t all. 

Columbia Gas had also reduced the number of staff monitoring gas pressure in 

Merrimack Valley. 

The company had stopped requiring technicians on-site at construction projects to 

monitor gas distribution lines. 

13 

And the National Transportation Safety Board found that the company used a 

field engineer, who had, and I quote, ‘‘limited knowledge about the importance of 

regulator-sensing lines.’’ 

This oversight caused workers to improperly bypass critical pipeline pressuresensing lines which led to the explosion. 

Last month, 10 families were still in temporary housing, small businesses faced 

the prospect of closing their doors because of the rate at which Columbia Gas paid 

their claims, and Columbia Gas has still not replaced appliances beyond merely 

patching them up as winter approached. 

In the 6 months since, Columbia Gas has put together a long-term recovery plan 

that focuses on bettering its emergency response and pipeline safety initiatives. 

But the damage wasn’t just to people and homes. 

Peace of mind exploded that day too. 

Now parents have cause to think twice when they hear the click of the stove top 

or the rumble of a hot water heater—they wonder if their house might blow up. 

It’s up to Congress to rebuild that peace of mind. 

As this committee considers the reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, we must improve safety protocols and oversight of operators like Columbia 

Gas. 

And the President needs to step up and work with Congress too. Let’s all work 

together and rebuild America’s aging infrastructure like the century-old pipes running through the Merrimack Valley. 

Let’s eliminate professional engineer license exemptions for public utility work. 

And let’s make sure a professional engineer approves all public utility engineering 

drawings. 

Let’s hold State pipeline safety regulators accountable for sufficient staffing. 

And let’s explore the lack of oversight by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration, which gave the Massachusetts system a rating of 97.4 out 

of 100 just 1 month before the explosions. 

Let’s make the regulation of pipe replacement mandatory. 

And rethink how the Administration could be more efficient as it weighs costs and 

benefits for new regulations, because no cost is greater than the worth of the life 

of Americans—young men like 18-year-old Leonel Rondon, the young man who the 

chimney killed. 

Let’s do it for Merrimack. Let’s do it together. 

And let’s do it right now. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. I thank you, Mr. Moulton. 

And thank both of you for shining a bright light on what we need 

to keep in mind as we are working on reauthorizing the pipeline 

safety bill. Thank you both very much for your testimony. 

Mrs. TRAHAN. Thank you. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. We will now welcome our first panel of witnesses. 

As you get ready to come up here, the Honorable Howard ‘‘Skip’’ 

Elliott, the Administrator of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration, and the Honorable Jennifer Homendy, 

Board Member of the National Transportation Safety Board. 

I want to ask unanimous consent that our witnesses’ full statements be included in the record. 

And, without objection, so ordered. 

I thank our witnesses for being here today for this first panel. 

Since your written testimony has been made part of the record, the 

subcommittee requests that you limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes. 

And we will start with Mr. Elliott, and you are recognized for 5 

minutes. 

14 

TESTIMONY OF HON. HOWARD ‘‘SKIP’’ ELLIOTT, ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY 

ADMINISTRATION; AND HON. JENNIFER HOMENDY, MEMBER, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, 

Chairman Lipinski, and Ranking Member Crawford, and esteemed 

members of this subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify here today. I look forward to updating the subcommittee on 

the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s 

progress in closing open congressional mandates and executing our 

broader safety mission. 

Last summer, this subcommittee expressed its frustration loud 

and clear regarding the outstanding congressional mandates on 

pipeline and hazardous materials safety. We heard you, and we are 

working hard to ensure our Nation’s pipeline system remains safe 

while addressing the critical safety mandates received from Congress. 

Of the 12 remaining mandates from the 2011 and 2016 Pipeline 

Safety Acts—there were 61 in total—4 were tied to reports and 

other actions, and the remaining 8 are tied to in-progress rulemaking efforts. 

Those mandates from the 2011 act, those that have been opened 

the longest, are being addressed by three of PHMSA’s upcoming 

rulemakings for gas transmission pipelines, hazardous liquid pipelines, and rupture detection and valves. 

PHMSA continues to make progress on these rules, with the liquid pipeline safety rule having moved out of DOT for final review 

last month. PHMSA has also completed its work on the gas transmission pipeline final rule, and it is now undergoing internal administrative review. 

I understand that many of you and many of our stakeholders 

may feel like we are not moving fast enough on rulemakings. As 

a safety practitioner, I appreciate and I share those concerns. As 

PHMSA Administrator, it is my responsibility to prioritize and pursue those rulemakings that will provide the greatest safety impact 

and have the highest likelihood of preventing events that could 

negatively impact people and the environment. 

To that end, I refer the members of this subcommittee to my 

written testimony regarding the details of two important safety 

mandates, closed since we last convened, dealing with comprehensive oil spill response plans for railroads and the transport of lithium ion batteries by air. In addition, we issued a final rule to modernize technologies for plastic pipelines that we hope will further 

accelerate aging distribution gas line replacement. 

In addition to congressional mandates, many of PHMSA’s rules 

must also address recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board that relate to complex safety matters. Our 

rules also address recommendations from the U.S. Government Accountability Office and our own safety findings. Furthermore, we 

must make sure our regulations account for known safety issues, 

technological feasibility, and cost-effectiveness. 

PHMSA holds public meetings and workshops prior to 

rulemakings, using the information gathered to craft the most effective rules possible. Such collaboration well in advance of the 

15 

rulemaking process allows us to identify concerns and potential solutions to allocate our limited resources where they are needed the 

most. A lot of work goes on behind the scenes to get a rule ready 

for publication, and we are making positive movements towards 

completing our mandates. 

Safety is the highest priority for the U.S. Department of Transportation and for PHMSA, and we are continuing to work hard to 

publish the rules and reports that will complete our mandates. We 

are also committed to addressing safety issues on all fronts. 

I am pleased to say that, while making progress on mandates, 

PHMSA’s oversight role is continuing to have a positive impact on 

safety. Thanks to our integrity management requirements, pipeline 

operators have conducted over 90,000 repairs in high-consequence 

areas. 

Our field efforts are working too. Last year, PHMSA conducted 

over 12,000 days of inspections and investigations of pipeline systems. These field activities are helping to improve the safety, as 

evidenced in the number of reported pipeline incidents, which for 

2018 was below the 5-year average, even with PHMSA’s expanded 

regulatory oversight of underground natural gas storage facilities. 

Additionally, the same data shows that both pipeline-related fatalities and the net volume spilled from hazardous liquid pipelines 

was also below the 5-year average, down 33 percent and 21 percent 

respectively, although we know that even one pipeline-related casualty is one too many. 

These facts, while notable, do not give me reason to pause during 

our ongoing safety mission at PHMSA. And even though we use 

statistics to help us measure improvements in safety, it is the vivid 

reminder of incidents in places like Bellingham, Marshall, San 

Bruno, Aliso Canyon, and Merrimack Valley that serve as our motivation and commitment for working even harder to improve pipeline safety. 

Thank you again for inviting me to today’s hearing, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[Mr. Elliott’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Howard ‘‘Skip’’ Elliott, Administrator, Pipeline 

and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

I. INTRODUCTION

Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify today on the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) pipeline safety program. I appreciate this Committee’s strong support for strengthening 

pipeline safety across our country. 

Our nation’s infrastructure keeps this great nation moving and helps to raise the 

standard of living for all Americans. The natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines 

PHMSA regulates are an essential component of our national infrastructure, safely 

transporting the energy products that are essential to our daily lives. Like all DOT 

modes, PHMSA is guided by Secretary Chao’s four strategic goals of safety, infrastructure enhancements, innovation, and accountability. 

A. PHMSA’s Mission 

The mission of PHMSA is to protect people and the environment by advancing the 

safe transportation of energy products and other hazardous materials that are essential to our daily lives. The need for safe and reliable energy infrastructure is 

16 

growing. Our nation is experiencing an energy renaissance, propelled largely by innovative production technologies and global demand for U.S. energy. 

PHMSA’s pipeline safety program is responsible for the regulation and oversight 

of over 2.7 million miles of energy pipeline systems. The vision of the pipeline safety 

program is straightforward: update or develop new regulations, policies, and guidance; improve our oversight to hold pipeline operators accountable; find innovative 

solutions to promote safety; and accommodate and encourage research into new and 

promising technologies. Each of these goals ensure that pipeline infrastructure can 

continue to provide safe and reliable energy to our communities, homes, and businesses. 

After working for decades in the freight rail industry, a great deal of it leading 

efforts to improve public safety and incident response, I have learned that safety 

is the result of effective, smart regulations that hold industry accountable, and reduce costs, when possible. 

PHMSA’s safety goal is zero pipeline accidents and its oversight philosophy is 

based on three fundamental tenets: 

1. Establish minimum safety standards and take enforcement actions against operators not in compliance with these standards. 

2. Ensure operators understand and manage the risks associated with their pipelines, including taking actions to prevent pipeline accidents and minimizing the 

impact of any accidents that occur. 

3. Continually encourage and expect pipeline operators to improve their performance beyond minimum compliance with the regulations and continuously build 

a strong safety culture. 

II. PROGRESS ON MANDATES

When I spoke to this Subcommittee last year, I heard clearly from its members 

that finalizing outstanding Congressional mandates must be a top priority. PHMSA 

recognizes the concerns of this Subcommittee and is continuing to make progress 

on critical safety mandates. Since June 2018, PHMSA completed and submitted reports to Congress on the Nationwide Integrated Pipeline Safety Regulatory Database, as well as a report on the Study on Propane Gas Pipeline Facilities. Both reports were mandated in the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation 

Act of 2011. 

Over the past year, PHMSA prioritized the rules it thought it could move quickly 

such as those for lithium batteries, plastic pipelines, and oil spill response plans for 

trains carrying crude oil. These regulations are intended to advance public safety, 

while encouraging innovation and greater stakeholder awareness and collaboration. 

These key rulemakings are detailed below. 

Of the mandates from the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation 

Act of 2011, PHMSA has eight of 42 mandates remaining. Additionally, of the mandates from the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act 

of 2016, PHMSA has four of 19 mandates remaining. 

Together, of the 12 remaining mandates from the 2011 and 2016 Acts, four are 

tied to reports and other actions, and eight are tied to rulemaking efforts that 

PHMSA is continuing to make progress on under its established rulemaking process. 

As Administrator, I am committed to doing everything I can to complete all the 

remaining rulemakings that address Congressional directives related to pipeline 

safety. I believe completing these mandates will result in significant positive impacts to pipeline safety. 

Completing rulemakings takes time simply because it is an iterative process that 

is designed to encourage maximum participation by all stakeholders, thus ensuring 

comprehensive rules that protect the public and stand up to cost/benefit scrutiny. 

PHMSA holds public meetings and workshops prior to rulemakings, using the information gathered to craft the most effective rules possible. Such collaboration, well 

in advance of the rulemaking process, allows PHMSA to identify concerns and potential solutions to allocate its scarce resources where they are needed most. 

In addition to mandates, many of PHMSA’s rulemakings underway address important recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 

resulting from safety issues identified during accident investigations. PHMSA’s 

rules also address recommendations from the U.S. Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) and the DOT Inspector General (IG), and the agency’s own safety findings. 

PHMSA must make sure that its regulations account for known safety issues, technological feasibility, and cost effectiveness. 

In short, a lot of work goes on behind the scenes to get a rule ready for publication, and PHMSA is making positive movement towards completing the safety critVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
17 

1Per the DOT February 2019 Significant Rulemaking Report, the projected publication date 

for the final rule is 5/27/19. 2Per the DOT February 2019 Significant Rulemaking Report, the projected publication date 

for the final rule is 7/2/19. 3Per the DOT February 2019 Significant Rulemaking Report, the projected publication date 

for the NPRM is 8/7/19. 

ical mandates and addressing recommendations from Congress, the NTSB, GAO, 

and IG, as well as our own safety findings. 

A. Hazardous Liquid Rule 

PHMSA understands the importance of moving forward its long-awaited Safety of 

Hazardous Liquid Pipelines rulemaking, which was included in the 2011 Act. This 

rulemaking would amend the pipeline safety regulations to improve protection of 

the public, property, and the environment by closing regulatory gaps where appropriate. In addition, this rule is intended to ensure that operators are increasing the 

detection and remediation of unsafe conditions, and mitigating the adverse effects 

of hazardous liquid pipeline failures. This rule is one of PHMSA’s highest priorities 

and is on track to be completed and published in 2019.1

B. Gas Transmission Rule 

PHMSA is also making significant progress toward finalizing its gas transmission 

and gathering pipeline rulemaking efforts. This is intended to help close two very 

important open mandates related to the expansion of integrity management principles and requirements for operators to confirm the maximum allowable operating 

pressure of certain gas pipelines. These changes are expected to allow operators to 

assess more pipelines and better understand their systems’ conditions. 

When finalizing the ‘‘Safety of Gas Transmission and Gathering Pipelines’’ notice 

of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), the proposed rule was under review for nearly 2 

years. Delays were largely due to the proposed rule being too big and unwieldy to 

move through the administrative process. Accordingly, PHMSA made the strategic 

decision to split the initial proposed rule into smaller, more manageable rulemaking 

actions. The split will help PHMSA manage each individual rule more efficiently; 

and, most importantly, prioritize Congressional directives on gas pipelines. Additionally, while working to complete the Congressional mandates this rulemaking 

will address, PHMSA is also using its resources to incorporate and advance several 

recommendations from the NTSB and GAO as part of the rule. 

PHMSA’s goal is to publish the final rule addressing Congressional directives this 

year,2 and will continue working to ensure that the other rules follow closely behind. 

C. Valve and Rupture Detection Rule 

PHMSA is developing an NPRM to address leak and rupture detection.3 The 

Shutoff Valve and Rupture Detection rule will meet the goals of two Congressional 

directives. It proposes revisions to the pipeline safety regulations for newly constructed or entirely replaced natural gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines. In doing so, the rule is intended to improve rupture mitigation and shorten 

the time it takes to shut down a pipeline segment. The rule will also address recommendations from the NTSB and is expected to help reduce the serious consequences of large-volume releases of natural gas and hazardous liquids. 

PHMSA is proposing standards for operators to utilize rupture detection metrics 

for valve placement to improve incident response in populated or environmentally 

sensitive areas. Rupture response metrics would focus on mitigating large release 

events that have a greater potential consequence. This rulemaking is currently 

under comprehensive review at the Department and we are working to move it forward as expeditiously as possible. 

D. Plastic Gas Pipe Rule 

This rule, published in November 2018, updated pipeline safety regulations to 

allow for the modernization of plastic pipe material, design, and construction standards. This final rule also responds to plastic pipe installation and operational safety 

concerns identified by federal and state field inspectors. With this rule, new or replaced local gas distribution systems will be built and maintained with the most advanced pipeline technology, which is expected to greatly improve public safety for 

local communities. 

E. Hazardous Materials Transportation Directives from Congress 

PHMSA also regulates the safety of hazardous materials by all modes of transportation, including by highway, railroad, vessel, and airways. Although PHMSA’s two 

18 

program offices are authorized separately, we are one PHMSA. We share resources, 

knowledge, and most importantly, we share the same safety goals. 

On February 28, 2019, PHMSA, in coordination with the Federal Railroad Administration, issued a final rule that amends the Hazardous Materials Regulations requirements for comprehensive oil spill response plans and information sharing. This 

rule was requested by Congress in the fiscal year 2016 Consolidated Appropriations 

Act. The rulemaking sets safety standards for rail operator response to incidents involving crude oil transported by rail. 

Additionally, on March 6, 2019, PHMSA, in collaboration with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), published an interim final rule (IFR) for the safe transport of lithium batteries by aircraft. The IFR is first of PHMSA’s completed actions 

in addressing directives included in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. This IFR 

prohibits the transport of lithium ion cells or batteries as cargo on passenger aircraft. In addition, the IFR requires lithium ion cells and batteries to be shipped at 

not more than a 30 percent state of charge aboard cargo-only aircraft. The IFR is 

intended to strengthen safety for the traveling public by addressing the unique challenges lithium batteries pose in transportation. 

F. Regulatory Reform 

While PHMSA works to complete its regulatory agenda, the agency is also committed to improving the effectiveness of our regulatory program by conducting a 

comprehensive evaluation of current, in-progress, and planned regulations. 

PHMSA’s rulemaking efforts are driven by the belief, consistent with Executive 

Orders 13771, 13777, and 13783 and other legal authorities, that there should be 

no more regulations than necessary, and those regulations should be straightforward, clear, and designed to minimize burdens, consistent with safety. We also 

believe that public input is a critical part of the rulemaking process and have 

proactively sought public comments on our regulatory review and rulemaking efforts. PHMSA is using public input to decide on the best approach, consistent with 

our regulatory philosophy, to meeting the Department’s statutory obligations. 

PHMSA’s review will help to ensure that its regulations are right-sized—which 

can allow operators to put additional resources where they will have the maximum 

safety impact, such as greater investment in safety research and development and 

technology-based safety enhancements. 

As always, our focus is ultimately on safety performance. It is the responsibility 

of the oil and gas industry to understand and manage the risks of their systems. 

The current regulatory climate gives us all a unique opportunity to work together 

to optimize our regulations for safety. The pipeline industry should continue to invest in and accelerate their pipeline safety efforts and make substantive safety improvements best suited to their systems and without specific direction from regulations. 

III. OTHER ACTIONS

In addition to completing the important mandates given to it by the Congress, 

PHMSA continues to aggressively pursue its core safety mission through grants to 

states and communities, research and development initiatives, and additional safety 

programs. 

A. Support for States 

PHMSA’s state pipeline safety partners oversee more than 80 percent of the nation’s pipeline infrastructure—much of it gas distribution pipelines—through annual 

certification with PHMSA. 

An important part of these partnerships is that PHMSA stands ready to support 

states in times of crisis. In the wake of hurricanes Harvey, Florence, Irma, Maria, 

and Michael, PHMSA worked with impacted states and pipeline operators to remove 

obstacles that could delay safe and rapid recovery efforts. PHMSA coordinated and 

provided periodic updates to Federal partners during the response and recovery 

phases of each natural disaster to assist with the movement of hazardous materials 

and energy products. For pipelines, PHMSA issued emergency stays of enforcement 

for affected operators, temporarily halting its enforcement of compliance with operator qualification and pre-employment and random drug testing requirements to 

allow affected interstate gas and hazardous liquid pipeline operators to use personnel for urgent response and recovery activities. PHMSA also notified impacted 

state pipeline safety partners that PHMSA would not object to them issuing similar 

temporary waivers for affected intrastate pipeline operators, in the interest of 

prompt and efficient pipeline safety activities related to response and recovery efforts. Expediting pipeline repairs and restoration of service to those areas was our 

top priority. 

19 

4The State Base Grant is a formula grant that authorizes awards to state pipeline safety programs under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60107—State Pipeline Safety Grants. 5 All states except Alaska and Hawaii participate in PHMSA’s pipeline safety program. 

In addition, PHMSA provides help to facilitate investigation and recovery following major incidents. In the wake of the tragic September 13, 2018 natural gas 

accident involving Columbia Gas of Massachusetts, PHMSA quickly dispatched a 

team of inspectors to Massachusetts to provide technical assistance to the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (MA DPU) and the NTSB. 

PHMSA’s pipeline inspectors played an instrumental role in the investigation, 

helping to determine the cause of the incident, and explaining the mechanics of how 

such an accident could occur. The Governor of Massachusetts, the mayors of the 

three affected towns, the NTSB, the incident commander, our state partners in the 

MA DPU, and members of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency all 

expressed their appreciation of the help provided by PHMSA’s pipeline safety team 

and cited their professionalism, experience, and knowledge as being crucial to the 

success of the overall response to the incident. 

PHMSA also supports state programs by providing essential technical training. 

Our state-of-the-art Training and Qualifications (T&Q) program has full accreditation from the International Association for Continuing Education and Training 

(IACET). The T&Q Center trains an average of 900 state and federal inspectors annually, ensuring that all are current on updated regulations, technology, and best 

practices. 

PHMSA’s T&Q Center is committed to developing innovative ways to be more accessible and effective, including the exploration of long-distance proctored classes, 

curriculum improvements, and more efficient delivery to ensure relevancy. The T&Q 

Center is also working to develop an effective and efficient distance delivery system 

that does not sacrifice the high quality of PHMSA’s training curricula. PHMSA’s 

goal is to make it easier for state and federal inspectors to access the courses they 

need quickly and at a lower cost. 

B. Grants 

The financial support PHMSA provides to its state partners through grants is another vital part of its partnerships. In total, PHMSA provided over $63 million in 

grant funding in fiscal year 2018 for pipeline inspection, enforcement, and safety 

awareness activities. 

PHMSA’s State Base Grant program 4 reimburses a portion of each partner state’s 

program expenses. The grants partially cover the cost of any personnel, equipment, 

and activities reasonably required for the conduct of the pipeline safety program. 

Most importantly, PHMSA’s grants provide state programs a consistent source of 

funding to hire and maintain adequate pipeline safety inspectors. For fiscal year 

2018, PHMSA awarded $56 million to participating state programs.5 As the number 

of miles of pipeline infrastructure continues to grow and as the older pipes age, this 

grant program is critical to the oversight of the nation’s distribution pipeline systems. 

PHMSA’s Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) provide funding for technical assistance related to pipeline safety issues to local communities and non-profit organizations, where they make direct impacts to pipeline safety at the grassroots level. 

The TAGs can be used for engineering or other scientific analysis of pipeline safety 

issues and are also used to promote public participation in official proceedings. Since 

the program’s inception in 2009, PHMSA has awarded over $10 million for 200 individual technical assistance projects. PHMSA issued a Notice of Funding Opportunity for its fiscal year 2019 TAG grants in March and expects to award $1.5 million in grant funds to several recipients (up to $100,000 each) by September 2019. 

PHMSA’s 811 One Call Grant Program provides funding to state agencies for promoting damage prevention awareness, including changes with their state underground damage prevention laws, related compliance activities, training and public 

education. This grant program is for states that have a certification or agreement 

with PHMSA to perform pipeline safety inspections. Last year, PHMSA awarded 

$1.1 million across 31 state agencies to assist in these efforts. 

Finally, I am pleased to say that in 2018 PHMSA awarded its first ever round 

of Underground Natural Gas Storage Grants—first authorized in 2016—in support 

of states’ inspection and enforcement of underground natural gas storage facilities. 

The grants are used to reimburse up to 80 percent of the costs a state incurs for 

inspectors, equipment, and safety activities for the oversight of underground storage 

facilities. 

20 

6 As of March 28, 2019. 

C. Damage Prevention 

Excavation damage continues to be a leading cause of pipeline incidents. This 

year, PHMSA began issuing enforcement actions against excavators who damage 

pipelines in states that do not adequately enforce their own excavation damage prevention laws. PHMSA continues to support states with efforts to improve their own 

enforcement programs. PHMSA has seen marked improvements since 2016 in 14 

states that have changed from inadequate to adequate programs per the PIPES Act 

of 2006 and our regulatory criteria. PHMSA continues to work with the 13 remaining states with inadequate programs to bring all programs up to an adequate level. 

I would also like to thank all PHMSA stakeholders—especially the public—for the 

continued success of the national Call-Before-You-Dig number, 811. Over the past 

10 years, since 811 was established, pipeline incidents caused by excavation damage 

have fallen 40 percent. This decline would not have been possible without strong 

collaboration from all stakeholders. 

D. Advancing Domestic Energy 

In August 2018, PHMSA established a new Memorandum of Understanding 

(MOU) with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that eliminates unnecessary and duplicative regulatory reviews by both agencies when permitting new 

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) export facilities. Going forward, PHMSA will operate 

as the Federal Government’s LNG safety expert for Federal regulations covering the 

safety of LNG facilities and will be solely responsible for conducting the necessary 

safety analysis for new LNG facilities that may be permitted by FERC. 

PHMSA assesses each LNG facility application for FERC on a case-by-case basis 

to determine whether the application meets the minimum Federal Pipeline Safety 

Standards for the location of a new LNG facility. So far, PHMSA has issued eight 

Letters of Determination to FERC under the MOU.6 This agreement may help reduce the time it takes to obtain a new LNG export permit by as much as one year. 

E. Integrity Management 

PHMSA continues to require integrity management programs that ensure operators are adequately identifying and addressing the greatest risks. Under integrity 

management, operators are required to conduct integrity assessments of gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipeline systems in high consequence areas and apply 

lessons learned across their entire system. Thanks to integrity management, gas 

transmission and hazardous liquid pipeline operators have identified and conducted 

over 90,700 repairs in high consequence areas between 2004 and 2017. 

F. Research and Development 

PHMSA’s Research and Development (R&D) program supports new technology to 

further improve pipeline safety. The R&D program sponsors research on projects 

that can provide near-term solutions to improve safety, reduce environmental impacts, and enhance the reliability of the Nation’s pipeline transportation system. Since 2002, PHMSA has invested nearly $125 million dollars in 304 R&D projects 

and, in the past six months, two new technologies for methane leak detection and 

one to prevent excavation damage threats have been commercialized. Since the program’s inception, 31 patent applications and 31 new pipeline technologies have hit 

the market, including above-ground, radar-based pipeline mapping and a robotic 

nondestructive testing method for pipelines that cannot accommodate traditional inline inspection tools. 

PHMSA’s pipeline safety program also takes a far-reaching view with its Competitive Academic Agreement Program (CAAP), which funds academic research to provide tomorrow’s pipeline safety workforce with an early opportunity to contribute 

safety solutions. The CAAP program, launched in 2013, helps validate proof of concept for theories and theses that can be developed and further investigated. The program also serves to expose the next generation of engineers to pipeline challenges 

and solutions. In September 2018, PHMSA awarded more than $3.8 million to 11 

universities via the CAAP. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Safety remains the highest priority for the U.S. Department of Transportation 

and for PHMSA. The agency is continuing to work hard to publish the rules and 

reports that will close Congressional mandates, and is also committed to addressing 

safety matters on all fronts. 

As pipeline mileage across our country continues to grow, the need for strong 

pipeline safety standards and programs is ever more important. 

21 

Thank you again for inviting me to today’s hearing. I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Elliott. 

I now recognize Ms. Homendy. 

Ms. HOMENDY. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Lipinski, 

Ranking Member Crawford, Chairman DeFazio, and members of 

the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation Safety Board to testify today. 

The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress with investigating major transportation disasters, including 

pipelines. We determine the probable cause of accidents and issue 

safety recommendations aimed at preventing future tragedies and 

saving lives. 

Pipelines are one of the safest and most efficient modes of transportation, but when safety standards are inadequate or disregarded 

or when Federal or State agencies fail to conduct proper oversight, 

the consequences can be devastating. 

During this hearing, I will be asked about a number of NTSB investigations, so I want to take a moment to remind us why we are 

here. Lives were lost. Families will never be the same. So, on behalf of the NTSB, I want to once again extend our deepest condolences to those who lost loved ones or who have been impacted by 

pipeline tragedies. 

Now I want to thank each of you. Over the years, Congress has 

been a true partner in advancing many of the NTSB’s safety recommendations. Working together, we have saved lives. 

In 1998, we investigated a gas pipeline explosion and fire in Virginia. A family was spending their first night in their new home. 

Tragically, the wife was killed, and the husband and both children 

were injured. We determined that had an excess flow valve been 

installed on the line the accident would never have occurred. 

The NTSB had been recommending the installation of excess flow 

valves for nearly 30 years. In 2006, this committee took action and 

mandated their installation on new single-family residential lines. 

In 2012, you expanded that requirement to multifamily residences 

and small commercial facilities. I am proud to say that in 2016 we 

closed that recommendation favorably, following PHMSA’s issuance 

of the final rule. 

Now we turn our attention to closing 36 open NTSB safety recommendations, 3 of which are designated as ‘‘open—unacceptable 

action.’’ Many of these are included in our ‘‘most wanted list’’ of 

transportation safety improvements. Some were addressed in the 

2011 and 2016 acts but haven’t been implemented. Yet tragedies 

continue to occur. 

Two significant NTSB recommendations urged the installation of 

automatic shutoff or remote control valves in high-consequence 

areas and addressed repeated failures of pipeline operators to detect ruptures and leaks and take appropriate action. 

In 2010, a gas transmission pipeline ruptured and ignited in San 

Bruno, California. It took the operator 95 minutes to stop the flow 

of gas and severely hindered emergency response operations. Tragically, eight people were killed and many more were injured. Thirty-eight homes were destroyed; seventy others were damaged. 

22 

That same year, a pipeline rupture occurred in Marshall, Michigan, and this committee investigated that accident. That rupture 

released nearly 1 million gallons of heavy crude oil in surrounding 

waterways and communities. It took the operators 17 hours to 

identify the rupture and shut down the line. 

And in 2015 we investigated a release of 4,000 gallons of gasoline 

from a pipeline in Centreville, Virginia. The operator didn’t detect 

the leak for 2 days—well after firefighters had contacted pipeline 

personnel, who assured them that there were no irregularities on 

the line. 

The fact is that most pipeline ruptures and leaks aren’t detected 

by pipeline operators; they are detected by the public and emergency responders. Research that was mandated by Congress in 

2011 shows that only 17 percent of releases are identified by control room operators. 

The NTSB has been studying the effects of delay in shutting 

down failed pipeline systems since 1970. We have issued recommendation after recommendation to address our concerns, and 

in 2011 Congress required their implementation. Yet they remain 

unaddressed. 

With respect to additional safety needs, briefly, PHMSA regulations require pipeline operators to accurately identify high-consequence areas, determine threats to their pipelines, continually 

evaluate those lines using appropriate inspection methods, and repair any defects identified. This is known as integrity management. 

We have investigated three accidents which raised significant 

concerns with how operators are implementing these programs. As 

a result, the NTSB has issued 28 recommendations to improve integrity management, 10 of which remain on our ‘‘most wanted list.’’ 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy 

to answer any questions. 

[Ms. Homendy’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Member, National 

Transportation Safety Board 

Good morning Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and Members of 

the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB) to testify today. 

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents 

and incidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of accidents and other transportation events 

and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, 

we conduct special transportation safety studies and coordinate the resources of the 

federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members who have been impacted by major transportation disasters. 

Our Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations investigates pipeline accidents involving the release of natural gas, hydrocarbon liquid, 

ammonia, or carbon dioxide in which there are fatalities or substantial property 

damage. Pipeline accident investigations focus on the cause of the release, the emergency response, and in the case of hydrocarbon pipelines, the actions taken to mitigate the spill. Based on these accident investigations, the NTSB issues safety recommendations to federal and state regulatory agencies, industry and safety standards organizations, pipeline operators, and emergency response organizations. 

23 

1 National Transportation Safety Board, 2019–2020 Most Wanted List: Ensure the Safe Shipment of Hazardous Materials—Pipeline. 2See Appendix for all open pipeline investigations. 

3Public Law 109-468 

4Public Law 112-90 

5 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation P-18-005. 

PIPELINE SAFETY IN THE UNITED STATES

More than 2.5 million miles of pipelines that crisscross the nation, delivering important resources, such as natural gas, oil, and other hazardous liquids, to consumers. Pipelines are integral to our economy, providing the fuel that powers our 

homes and industries.1

Pipelines are one of the safest and most efficient modes of transportation, but 

when their integrity is compromised, the consequences can be devastating, especially when safety standards are not observed or implemented. 

The NTSB has completed more than 120 investigations of hazardous liquid pipeline ruptures and natural gas pipeline explosions, since 1967, which have demonstrated the potential for loss of life and property damage. Additionally, NTSB has 

eight open pipeline investigations, including Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts, Silver Spring, Maryland, and Dallas, Texas, in which lives were lost, homes destroyed, 

and communities severely affected.2

In response to these accident investigations, the NTSB has issued more than 

1,300 recommendations to federal, state, and local agencies, and industry. More 

than 80 percent of these recommendations have been closed favorably, meaning they 

have been adopted by their recipients, mandated by Congress, or implemented 

through federal agency action, resulting in significant improvements in pipeline 

safety. 

For example, in 1998, the NTSB investigated a natural gas pipeline explosion and 

fire in the South Riding community of Loudon County, Virginia. A family consisting 

of a husband and wife and their two children were spending their first night in their 

new home at the time of the explosion. As a result of the accident, the wife was 

killed, the husband was seriously injured, and the two children received minor injuries. The NTSB found that had an excess flow valve been installed on the line, the 

accident would never have occurred. Excess flow valves automatically close and restrict gas flow when there is an excess flow of gas in the pipeline. The NTSB had 

been recommending the installation of excess flow valves for nearly 30 years. In 

2006, Congress enacted the Pipeline Inspection, Enforcement, and Protection Act 

which required the installation of excess flow valves on all new and replaced singlefamily residential service lines.3 In 2012, Congress enacted the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 which expanded that requirement 

to multi-family residences—including apartment buildings—and small commercial 

facilities.4 I am proud to say that the NTSB closed the South Riding recommendation on December 5, 2016, following issuance of a final rule. 

However, there are provisions in current law related to NTSB pipeline safety recommendations that have not been implemented, such as automatic or remote-control 

shutoff valves, and other recommendations that have not been acted upon. We continue to see accidents and incidents that remind us of the need to be ever-vigilant 

in improving safety. 

Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts 

On September 13, 2018, a series of explosions and fires occurred throughout the 

northeast region of the Merrimack Valley after high-pressure natural gas was released into a low-pressure distribution system, resulting in 1 fatality and injuring 

at least 21 individuals, including 2 firefighters. Seven other firefighters received 

minor injuries. The distribution system was owned and operated by Columbia Gas 

of Massachusetts, a subsidiary of NiSource, Inc. The system overpressure damaged 

131 structures, including at least 5 homes that were destroyed in the city of Lawrence and the towns of Andover and North Andover. Most of the damage was a result of structure fires ignited by gas-fueled appliances. 

While this investigation is ongoing, NTSB has issued five interim safety recommendations, including four which are classified as ‘‘urgent.’’ We only issue urgent 

recommendations when we determine that the course of action requires immediate 

attention to avoid imminent loss due to a similar accident. 

One recommendation calls upon the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate 

the existing professional licensure exemptions and require the seal of a professional 

engineer (PE) on all public utility engineering drawings.5 The NTSB believes that 

it is critical that an engineer with appropriate qualifications and experience review 

engineering plans for a gas company, if not develop them. Massachusetts’ exemption 

24 

6 An Act Further Providing for the Safety of the Commonwealth’s Natural Gas Infrastructure. 

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 339 (2018). 7 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendations: P-18-006, P-18-007, P-18- 

008, P-18-009. 8 National Transportation Safety Board, 2019–2020 Most Wanted List. 9See Appendix for all open pipeline safety recommendations. 

10 HCAs are defined by federal regulation and are areas where a release could have the most 

significant adverse consequences, including populated areas, areas with a number of structures, 

drinking water sources, and unusually sensitive areas. 11 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendations: P-11-011 

for the requirement of PE licensure to perform ‘‘industrial’’ and public utility work 

forecloses an opportunity to detect this design oversight. The seal of a PE should 

be required on all public utility engineering plans to reduce the likelihood of an accident. On December 31, 2018, Gov. Charlie Baker signed into law legislation requiring such; the Massachusetts Department of Public Utility is in the process of promulgating regulations.6

The four urgent safety recommendations were issued to NiSource: (1) revise the 

engineering and constructability review process to include all internal departments 

and require plans to be sealed by a PE prior to construction; (2) ensure that all natural gas systems records are complete and readily available; (3) incorporate risk assessments into project development; and, (4) while any modifications are being made 

to gas mains, actively monitor pressures and require personnel to be in place to immediately respond to any abnormal changes in the pipeline system. As this investigation progresses or following the Board’s adoption of the final report, the NTSB 

may issue additional safety recommendations to improve pipeline safety and prevent 

occurrence of a similar tragedy.7

MOST WANTED LIST OF TRANSPORTATION SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS

On February 4, 2019, we announced our Most Wanted List of Transportation 

Safety Improvements for 2019-2020.8 This list identifies 10 focus areas for transportation safety improvements based on safety issues identified through our investigations. Many of the issues on the Most Wanted List address multimodal challenges 

for improving safety, including alcohol and other drug impairment and fatigue. One 

issue area is specific to pipeline safety: Ensuring the Safe Shipment of Hazardous 

Materials. 

There are currently 36 open pipeline safety recommendations, 32 of which are on 

our Most Wanted List: 24 to the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA), 9 to industry, and 3 to state regulators.9 Three of the Most Wanted recommendations to PHMSA are designated as ‘‘Open—Unacceptable Response.’’ 

While the NTSB appreciates progress made by PHMSA on many of our recommendations, they cannot lose focus and must see all safety recommendations 

through to completion. 

Automatic Shutoff and Remote Control Valves 

One significant NTSB recommendation urges the use of automatic shutoff or remote control valves in high consequence areas (HCAs) based on an investigation in 

San Bruno, California.10

On September 9, 2010, a 30-inch-diameter segment of an intrastate natural gas 

transmission pipeline owned and operated by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company 

(PG&E) ruptured in a residential area in San Bruno. In the 95 minutes it took 

PG&E to stop the flow of natural gas, an estimated 47.6 million standard cubic feet 

of gas was released. The released natural gas ignited, resulting in a fire that destroyed 38 homes and damaged 70. Eight people were killed, many were injured, 

and many more were evacuated from the area. 

The NTSB found that the 95 minutes it took PG&E to stop the flow of gas was 

excessively long and contributed to the extent and severity of property damage and 

increased the life-threatening risks to the residents and emergency responders. Use 

of automatic shutoff or remote control valves would have significantly reduced the 

amount of time taken to stop the flow of gas and to isolate the rupture. 

The NTSB recommended that PHMSA amend Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 192.935(c) to directly require that automatic shutoff or remote control valves 

in high consequence areas and in class 3 and 4 locations be installed and spaced 

at intervals that consider the factors listed in that regulation.11 Current PHMSA 

regulations leave the decision of whether to install an automatic shutoff or remote 

control valve up to operators, based on their evaluation of certain factors. The NTSB 

believes the requirement should be mandatory. 

25 

12 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendations: P-11-010, P-11-014, P-11- 

015. 13 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation P-17-002. 

This was not the first time that the NTSB recommended the installation of automatic shutoff or remote control valves. Several near identical recommendations were 

issued in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s to the Office of Pipeline Safety of the 

Department of Transportation and the Research and Special Programs Administration, the predecessors of PHMSA, and the industry that were closed and designated 

as ‘‘Unacceptable Action’’ because of their failure to implement the recommendation. 

Three months after NTSB issued its San Bruno recommendations, Congress 

passed the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 

(2011 Act) requiring the use of automatic shutoff or remote control valves within 

two years. PHMSA has initiated but not completed the rulemaking process. 

PHMSA’s last communication with NTSB stated: ‘‘Publication of the proposed rule 

was initially expected to publish in spring 2017. Like many other issues before us, 

this is part of an ongoing regulatory review pursuant to the executive order issued 

by the President.’’ 

There are additional open recommendations from the San Bruno investigation to 

PHMSA that Congress addressed in the 2011 Act, including requirement (1) all operators of natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines equip their systems 

with tools to identify and pinpoint the location of leaks; (2) all gas transmission 

pipelines constructed before 1970 be subjected to a hydrostatic pressure testing; and 

(3) any manufacturing- and construction-related defects be tested by a 

postconstruction hydrostatic pressure test of at least 1.25 times the maximum allowable operating pressure.12 These recommendations remain on the NTSB’s Most 

Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements and should be implemented by 

PHMSA expeditiously. 

Leak Detection 

The NTSB has investigated a number of accidents where operators failed to detect 

a leak, significantly impacting response time. In San Bruno, control center staff had 

difficulties determining that there had been a pipeline break and quickly pinpointing its location. Accordingly, the NTSB recommended that PHMSA require 

that all operators of natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines equip their 

supervisory control and data acquisition systems with tools to assist in recognizing 

and pinpointing the location of leaks, including line breaks. The recommendation remains on the NTSB’s 2019-2020 Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements. 

The NTSB’s investigation of one of the largest inland oil spill in U.S. history 

found deficiencies in the operator’s detection of a leak which led to significant delays 

in stopping the flow of crude oil. On July 25, 2010, a segment of a 30-inch-diameter 

pipeline, owned and operated by Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) ruptured in a 

wetland in Marshall, Michigan. The rupture was not discovered or addressed until 

Enbridge was notified by an outside caller more than 17 hours later. The oil saturated the surrounding wetlands and flowed into the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River; the total release was estimated to be 843,444 gallons of crude oil. 

Local residents self-evacuated from their houses, and the environment was negatively affected. Costs exceeded $1.2 billion. About 320 people reported symptoms 

consistent with crude oil exposure. Fortunately, there were no fatalities. 

Similarly, the NTSB’s investigation of a pipeline release near Centreville, Virginia, on September 21, 2015, found significant deficiencies in the ability of Colonial 

Pipeline Company (Colonial) to detect a leak in their large diameter pipeline that 

transports gasoline and other refined petroleum liquids. The incident was initially 

reported by an employee of a restaurant in Centreville who called the Fairfax County 911 Center to report a gasoline odor. Colonial confirmed the pipeline leak two 

days later, after their inspectors and control room center personnel reported that 

there were no abnormalities on the pipeline and that all line pressures were normal. 

The leak occurred in an HCA. Fortunately, no fatalities or injuries resulted from 

the release. Colonial estimated that 4,000 gallons of gasoline were released from the 

pipe; flammable vapor in storm drains was as high as 100 percent of the lower explosive limit (potentially explosive in an ignition source is present). 

The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 included 

measures to improve leak detection capabilities; PHMSA has not yet implemented 

those measures. Leak detection remains on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List for Transportation Safety Improvements. The NTSB recommendation stemming from the Colonial Pipeline incident is designated as ‘‘Open—Unacceptable Response.’’ 13

26 

14 National Transportation Safety Board, Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation Pipeline 

Rupture Sissonville, West Virginia on December 11, 2012, Rpt. No. NTSB/PAR-14/01 (February 

19, 2014); Rupture of Florida Gas Transmission Pipeline and Release of Natural Gas Near Palm 

City, Florida, Accident Brief No. NTSB/PAB-13/01 (August 13, 2013); Pacific Gas and Electric 

Company Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Rupture and Fire San Bruno, California on September 9, 2010, Rpt. No. NTSB/PAR-11/01 (August 30, 2011). 15Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 192, Subpart O. 16 National Transportation Safety Board, Integrity Management of Gas Transmission Pipelines in High Consequence Areas, No. NTSB/SS-15/01 (January 27, 2015). 17 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendations: P-15-001 through -028, 

and P-11-007. 

Integrity Management Programs 

In the last eight years, the NTSB has completed three major gas transmission 

pipeline accident investigations in which deficiencies with the operators’ integrity 

management (IM) programs and PHMSA oversight were identified as a concern.14

These three accidents—located in Palm City, Florida; San Bruno, California; and 

Sissonville, West Virginia—resulted in 8 fatalities, more than 50 injuries, and 41 

homes destroyed, with many more damaged. As we have learned from these investigations, ensuring adequate IM programs and oversight of pipelines transporting 

natural gas and hazardous liquids remains critically important. 

Since 2004, PHMSA has required the operators of these pipelines to develop and 

implement IM programs to ensure the integrity of their pipelines in HCAs to reduce 

the risk of injuries and property damage from pipeline failures.15 An operator’s IM 

program is a management system designed and implemented to ensure the operator’s pipeline system is safe and reliable. It consists of multiple components, including procedures and processes for identifying HCAs, determining likely threats to the 

pipeline within the HCA, evaluating the physical integrity of the pipe within the 

HCA, and repairing or remediating any pipeline defects found. These procedures 

and processes are complex and interconnected. Effective implementation of an IM 

program relies on continual evaluation and data integration. The IM program is an 

ongoing program that PHMSA and state regulatory agencies periodically inspect to 

ensure operator compliance with regulatory requirements. 

In January 2015, the NTSB’s Safety Research Division conducted a safety study 

using the results from the completed investigations and additional research to identify weaknesses in the implementation of gas transmission pipeline IM programs in 

HCAs. The study, Integrity Management of Gas Transmission Pipelines in High 

Consequence Areas, found that, although PHMSA’s gas IM requirements have kept 

the rate of corrosion failures and material failures of pipe or welds low, no evidence 

exists to show that the overall occurrence of gas transmission pipeline incidents in 

HCA pipelines has declined.16 Rather, the study identified areas where improvements need to be made to further enhance the safety of gas transmission pipelines 

in HCAs. 

We recognize that IM programs are complex and require expert knowledge and 

integration of multiple technical disciplines including engineering, material science, 

geographic information systems, data management, probability and statistics, and 

risk management. This complexity requires pipeline operator personnel and federal 

and state pipeline inspectors to have a high level of practical knowledge and skill 

to adequately perform their functions. This complexity can make IM program development and implementation, and the evaluation of operators’ compliance with IM 

program requirements, difficult. The study illustrated the need to expand and improve PHMSA resources in guiding both operators and federal and state inspectors. 

The effectiveness of an IM program depends on many factors, including how well 

threats are identified and risks are estimated. This information guides the selection 

of integrity assessment methods that discover pipeline system defects that may need 

remediation. The study found that aspects of the operators’ threat identification and 

risk assessment processes require improvement. Further, the study found that of 

the four different integrity assessment methods (pressure test, direct assessment, 

in-line inspection, and other techniques), in-line inspection yields the highest permile discovery of pipe anomalies, and the use of direct assessment as the sole integrity assessment method has numerous limitations. Compared to their interstate 

counterparts, intrastate pipeline operators rely more on direct assessment and less 

on in-line inspection. 

As a result of the safety study, the NTSB issued 28 new recommendations. Of 

these, 22 were issued to PHMSA and 1 previous recommendation issued to PHMSA 

was reiterated.17 These include improvements to the training of state inspectors, the 

National Pipeline Mapping System, and the current process for identifying HCAs; 

requirements for in-line inspection of natural gas pipelines; and, eliminating the use 

27 

18 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation P-12-003. 19 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation P-14-001. 20 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation P-17-002. 

of direct assessment as the sole integrity assessment method for gas transmission 

pipelines. 

Nine of the recommendations to PHMSA resulting from the safety study are classified as closed with an acceptable action or reconsidered. The remaining 13 are 

open; 10 of them are listed on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements. The remaining six recommendations, issued to industry, are all 

classified as ‘‘Closed—Acceptable Action.’’ 

‘‘OPEN—UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE’’ RECOMMENDATIONS TO PHMSA

The NTSB would like to highlight three recommendations to PHMSA stemming 

from our investigations in Marshall, Michigan, Sissonville, West Virginia, and Centreville, Virginia that are designated as ‘‘Open—Unacceptable Response’’: P-12-3, P14-1, and P-17-2. All three of these recommendations are included in the NTSB’s 

Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements. 

P-12-3 recommended PHMSA revise existing federal regulations to clearly state: 

(1) when an engineering assessment of crack defects, including environmentally assisted cracks, must be performed; (2) the acceptable methods for performing these 

engineering assessments, including the assessment of cracks coinciding with corrosion with a safety factor that considers the uncertainties associated with sizing of 

crack defects; (3) criteria for determining when a probable crack defect in a pipeline 

segment must be excavated and time limits for completing those excavations; (4) 

pressure restriction limits for crack defects that are not excavated by the required 

date; and (5) acceptable methods for determining crack growth for any cracks allowed to remain in the pipe, including growth caused by fatigue, corrosion fatigue, 

or stress corrosion cracking as applicable.18

This recommendation was issued following an investigation of the Enbridge pipeline rupture in Marshall, Michigan, which found, that five years prior to the rupture, in 2005, Enbridge identified crack defects during an in-line inspection of the 

pipeline ranging up to 51.6 inches that were left unrepaired. 

While PHMSA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in October 

2015 to address our recommendation, the changes proposed to requirements for 

scheduling crack defect remediation only addressed indications of significant stress 

corrosion cracking (SCC). We reiterated that the recommendation refers to all forms 

of crack defects, not just SCC. By only addressing crack indications identified as 

SCC colonies, the proposed regulation does not limit or otherwise describe requirements for remediating other types of crack indications, including the indication associated with the crack that led to the rupture in Marshall, Michigan. 

P-14-1 recommended PHMSA revise existing federal regulations to add principal 

arterial roadways to the list of ‘‘identified sites’’ that establish an HCA.19

This recommendation was issued following an investigation into an explosion and 

subsequent fire from a 20-inch natural gas transmission pipeline in a sparsely populated area along Interstate 77 near Sissonville, West Virginia on December 11, 2012. 

About 76 million cubic feet of natural gas was released and burned. While there 

were no fatalities or serious injuries, three homes were destroyed. The Board determined the probable cause of the pipeline rupture was (1) external corrosion of the 

pipe wall due to deteriorated coating and ineffective cathodic protection and (2) the 

failure to detect the corrosion because the pipeline was not inspected or tested after 

1988. 

While PHMSA published an NPRM in April 2016 proposing an alternate approach 

by creating a ‘‘moderate consequence area (MCA)’’ that included a highway-size 

threshold. We disagreed with this proposal because it limited highway coverage to 

only four-lane configurations, which would exclude principal arterial roadways wider 

than four lanes. Although wider divided highways most likely coincide with the existing HCA criteria, we are concerned that some wider highways may not. While 

PHMSA has stated they are considering revising the definition, no formal action has 

been completed. 

P-17-2 recommended PHMSA require operators to either (a) repair all excavated 

dent defects, or (b) install a local leak detection system at each location where a 

dent is not repaired, continuously monitor for hydrocarbons, and promptly take corrective action to stop a detected leak.20

This recommendation was issued following the NTSB’s investigation into a release 

of the 2015 Colonial Pipeline release of about 4,000 gallons of gasoline in an HCA 

near Centreville, Virginia. As stated earlier, the leak was not identified by the pipeVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
28 

line operator, Colonial Pipeline Company, for two days after initial report of gasoline odor. The Board determined the probable cause of the release of gasoline from 

the pipeline was a through-wall corrosion fatigue crack that developed at a dent in 

the pipeline due to residual and operational stress and exposure to the underground 

environment. Contributing to the accident were PHMSA regulations that allowed 

the dent to remain in the pipeline. 

PHMSA regulations do not specifically require dents having depths less than six 

percent of the pipeline diameter to be repaired unless there is an indication of metal 

loss, cracking, or a stress riser, or unless the dent affects pipe curvature at a girth 

weld or a longitudinal seam weld. The dent at the leak location was about 1.6 percent of the outer pipe diameter and the upstream dent was 1.57 percent of the outer 

pipe diameter. Colonial did not repair either dent because they did not meet 

PHMSA’s repair criteria. During the investigation, Colonial reported to the NTSB 

that pipelines in Pelham, Alabama, Felixville, Louisiana, and Simpsonville, South 

Carolina also developed through wall-cracks in dented pipe. The depths of these 

dents were less than two percent of the pipe outer diameter. 

The NTSB recommended that PHMSA require operators to either (a) repair all 

excavated dent defects, or (b) install a local leak detection system at each location 

where a dent is not repaired, continuously monitor for hydrocarbons, and promptly 

take corrective action to stop a detected leak. The recommendation remains ‘‘Open— 

Unacceptable Response.’’ 

PHMSA has communicated that compliance with current regulations, improved 

operator guidance, focused inspections, and an advisory bulletin would address the 

safety risks of dent defects and would be more cost- and safety-efficient than requiring leak-detection systems. However, existing regulations, guidance, and bulletins 

are inadequate. Pipeline operators should be required to act on all excavated dent 

defects, but PHMSA proposed wording gives pipeline operators a choice about 

whether and how to act on defects. Installing a leak-detection system at each location where a dent is not repaired should be the pipeline operators’ only alternative 

when not repairing an excavated dent defect. 

CONCLUSION

Over the last 52 years, our investigations have found that safe operation of pipelines is a shared responsibility among operators, government oversight agencies, 

and local communities. 

Pipelines remain one of the safest and most efficient means of transporting vital 

commodities used to power homes, businesses, and vehicles in all modes of transportation. However, the consequences are tragic when there is insufficient safety planning and oversight. To that end, the NTSB urges expeditious implementation of all 

unimplemented safety recommendations issued to operators and government agencies—especially PHMSA. 

We recognize the progress that has been made; yet, there will always be room for 

improvement. The NTSB stands ready to work with the Subcommittee to continue 

improving the safety of our nation’s pipeline systems. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer your 

questions. 

APPENDIX TO NTSB BOARD MEMBER HOMENDY’S TESTIMONY CONCERNING PIPELINE

SAFETY

CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS

Silver Spring, Maryland 

On August 10, 2016, a Washington Gas natural gas pipeline ruptured, exploded, 

and destroyed a four-story apartment building in Silver Spring, Maryland, resulting 

in seven fatalities and injuries to 65 civilians and three emergency responders. Our 

investigation is ongoing and is looking into operations, survival factors, and regulatory oversight. The Board is scheduled to meet on April 23 to determine the probable cause of the rupture and explosion and issue any recommendations we believe 

will improve safety and prevent future tragedies, fatalities, and injuries. 

Tekamah, Nebraska 

On October 17, 2016, a Magellan pipeline ruptured and released 7,000 barrels of 

anhydrous ammonia, resulting in one fatality and evacuation of the area. 

29 

Helena, Alabama 

On October 31, 2016, a Colonial Pipeline gas pipeline ruptured and caused a fire 

after being struck by a track hoe during maintenance operations, resulting in one 

fatality and four injuries. 

Firestone, Colorado 

On April 17, 2017, a house exploded, resulting in two fatalities and two injuries. 

The uncapped end of an abandoned but still connected flow line from a natural gas 

well owned and operated by Anadarko Petroleum Company was discovered near the 

home’s foundation. 

Minneapolis, Minnesota 

On August 2, 2017, a building at the Minnehaha Academy North Campus was destroyed by a natural gas explosion, resulting in two fatalities and nine injuries. At 

the time of the explosion, two workers were installing new piping to support the relocation of gas meters from the basement of the building to the outside. Two new 

meters mounted on a wall were ready for the new piping to be connected. While 

workers were removing the existing piping, a full-flow natural gas line at pressure 

was opened. The workers were unable to mitigate the release of the gas and evacuated the area. 

A school maintenance worker heard and smelled the natural gas release and went 

to its source in the basement meter room where the workers had been. As he exited 

the basement, he made an announcement over his hand-held radio that there was 

gas in the building and to evacuate immediately. As he made his radio announcement, he ran up the stairs and searched for occupants. Less than one minute later, 

the building exploded. 

Dallas, Texas 

On February 23, 2018, a house exploded, resulting in the death of a 12-year-old 

juvenile and injuries to four family members, all of whom were asleep at the time 

of the explosion. In the 48 hours prior to the explosion, work crews from Atmos Energy were in the neighborhood investigating gas-related fires and two residences. 

More than 300 residences were subsequently evacuated due to the nature and number of natural gas pipeline leaks discovered in the residential neighborhood. 

Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts 

On September 13, 2018, a series of explosions and fires occurred throughout the 

northeast region of the Merrimack Valley after high-pressure natural gas was released into a low-pressure distribution system, resulting in one fatality and injuring 

at least 21 individuals, including two firefighters. Seven other firefighters received 

minor injuries. The distribution system was owned and operated by Columbia Gas 

of Massachusetts, a subsidiary of NiSource, Inc. The system overpressure damaged 

131 structures, including at least five homes that were destroyed in the city of Lawrence and the towns of Andover and North Andover. Most of the damage was a result of structure fires ignited by gas-fueled appliances. 

San Francisco, California 

On February 6, a Pacific Gas & Electric Corporation (PG&E) natural gas pipeline 

ruptured and caused a fire after being struck by a third-party contractor’s excavation equipment, while installing fiberoptic conduit. Fortunately, there were no injuries or fatalities; however, the natural gas service to 328 customers was curtailed 

temporarily, and about 100 people were evacuated. The NTSB’s investigative activity is focused on the third-party contractor’s preparedness and qualifications to perform the excavation work and the execution of PG&E and local fire and police department emergency response plans. Investigators are also reviewing and assessing 

applicable rules and standards of oversight agencies for effectiveness. 

All of these investigations are ongoing, and the NTSB has not determined the 

probable causes, issued findings, or drawn any conclusions. 

30 

Open Pipeline Recommendations (as of March 26th, 2019) 

Number Date Issued Overall Status 

Most 

Wanted 

List 

Safety Recommendation 

P-10-004 1/31/11 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X TO THE PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY: If you are unable to comply with Safety Recommendations P-10-2 (Urgent) and P-10-3 (Urgent) to accurately determine the maximum allowable operating pressure of Pacific Gas and Electric Company natural gas transmission lines in class 3 and 

class 4 locations and class 1 and class 2 high consequence 

areas that have not had a maximum allowable operating 

pressure established through prior hydrostatic testing, determine the maximum allowable operating pressure with a 

spike test followed by a hydrostatic pressure test. 

P-10-006 1/31/11 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X TO THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION: If such a 

document and records search cannot be satisfactorily completed, provide oversight to any spike and hydrostatic tests 

that Pacific Gas and Electric Company is required to perform 

according to Safety Recommendation (P-10-4). 

P-11-009 9/26/11 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

To PHMSA: Require operators of natural gas transmission 

and distribution pipelines and hazardous liquid pipelines to 

ensure that their control room operators immediately and directly notify the 911 emergency call center(s) for the communities and jurisdictions in which those pipelines are located 

when a possible rupture of any pipeline is indicated. 

P-11-010 9/26/11 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Require that all operators of natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines equip their supervisory 

control and data acquisition systems with tools to assist in 

recognizing and pinpointing the location of leaks, including 

line breaks; such tools could include a real-time leak detection system and appropriately spaced flow and pressure 

transmitters along covered transmission lines. 

P-11-011 9/26/11 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Amend Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 

192.935(c) to directly require that automatic shutoff valves 

or remote control valves in high consequence areas and in 

class 3 and 4 locations be installed and spaced at intervals 

that consider the factors listed in that regulation. 

P-11-014 9/26/11 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Amend Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 

192.619 to delete the grandfather clause and require that all 

gas transmission pipelines constructed before 1970 be subjected to a hydrostatic pressure test that incorporates a 

spike test. 

P-11-015 9/26/11 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Amend Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 

192 of the Federal pipeline safety regulations so that 

manufacturing- and construction-related defects can only be 

considered stable if a gas pipeline has been subjected to a 

postconstruction hydrostatic pressure test of at least 1.25 

times the maximum allowable operating pressure. 

P-11-023 9/26/11 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X TO THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION: Require 

the Pacific Gas and Electric Company to correct all deficiencies identified as a result of the San Bruno, California, 

accident investigation, as well as any additional deficiencies 

identified through the comprehensive audit recommended in 

Safety Recommendation P-11-22, and verify that all corrective actions are completed. 

31 

Open Pipeline Recommendations (as of March 26th, 2019)—Continued 

Number Date Issued Overall Status 

Most 

Wanted 

List 

Safety Recommendation 

P-12-003 7/25/12 OpenUnacceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 

195.452 to clearly state (1) when an engineering assessment 

of crack defects, including environmentally assisted cracks, 

must be performed; (2) the acceptable methods for performing these engineering assessments, including the assessment of cracks coinciding with corrosion with a safety 

factor that considers the uncertainties associated with sizing 

of crack defects; (3) criteria for determining when a probable 

crack defect in a pipeline segment must be excavated and 

time limits for completing those excavations; (4) pressure restriction limits for crack defects that are not excavated by 

the required date; and (5) acceptable methods for determining crack growth for any cracks allowed to remain in the 

pipe, including growth caused by fatigue, corrosion fatigue, 

or stress corrosion cracking as applicable. 

P-12-004 7/25/12 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 

195.452(h)(2), the ‘‘discovery of condition,’’ to require, in 

cases where a determination about pipeline threats has not 

been obtained within 180 days following the date of inspection, that pipeline operators notify the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and provide an expected date when adequate information will become available. 

P-14-001 3/5/14 OpenUnacceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Section 903, Subpart O, Gas Transmission Pipeline Integrity 

Management, to add principal arterial roadways including 

interstates, other freeways and expressways, and other principal arterial roadways as defined in the Federal Highway 

Administration’s Highway Functional Classification Concepts, 

Criteria and Procedures to the list of ‘‘identified sites’’ that 

establish a high consequence area. 

P-15-004 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Increase the positional accuracy of pipeline 

centerlines and pipeline attribute details relevant to safety in 

the National Pipeline Mapping System. 

P-15-005 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Revise the submission requirement to include 

high consequence area identification as an attribute data 

element to the National Pipeline Mapping System. 

P-15-010 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Update guidance for gas transmission pipeline 

operators and inspectors on the evaluation of interactive 

threats. This guidance should list all threat interactions that 

must be evaluated and acceptable methods to be used. 

P-15-011 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Develop and implement specific risk assessment 

training for inspectors in verifying the technical validity of 

risk assessments that operators use. 

P-15-012 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

To PHMSA: Evaluate the safety benefits of the four risk assessment approaches currently allowed by the gas integrity 

management regulations; determine whether they produce a 

comparable safety benefit; and disseminate the results of 

your evaluation to the pipeline industry, inspectors, and the 

public. 

32 

Open Pipeline Recommendations (as of March 26th, 2019)—Continued 

Number Date Issued Overall Status 

Most 

Wanted 

List 

Safety Recommendation 

P-15-013 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Update guidance for gas transmission pipeline 

operators and inspectors on critical components of risk assessment approaches. Include (1) methods for setting 

weighting factors, (2) factors that should be included in consequence of failure calculations, and (3) appropriate risk 

metrics and methods for aggregating risk along a pipeline. 

P-15-015 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Alternate 

Response 

To PHMSA: Revise Form F7100.1, Annual Report Form, to collect information about which methods of high consequence 

area identification and risk assessment approaches were 

used. 

P-15-016 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

To PHMSA: Revise Form F7100.2, Incident Report Form, (1) to 

collect information about both the results of previous assessments and previously identified threats for each pipeline 

segment involved in an incident and (2) to allow for the inclusion of multiple root causes when multiple threats 

interacted. 

P-15-017 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Develop a program to use the data collected in 

response to Safety Recommendations P-15-15 and P-15-16 

to evaluate the relationship between incident occurrences 

and (1) inappropriate elimination of threats, (2) interactive 

threats, and (3) risk assessment approaches used by the gas 

transmission pipeline operators. Disseminate the results of 

your evaluation to the pipeline industry, inspectors, and the 

public annually. 

P-15-018 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Require that all natural gas transmission pipelines be capable of being in-line inspected by either reconfiguring the pipeline to accommodate in line inspection 

tools or by the use of new technology that permits the inspection of previously uninspectable pipelines; priority should 

be given to the highest risk transmission pipelines that considers age, internal pressure, pipe diameter, and class location. (Safety Recommendation P-15-18 superseded Safety 

Recommendation P-11-17) 

P-15-020 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Identify all operational complications that limit 

the use of in-line inspection tools in piggable pipelines, develop methods to eliminate the operational complications, 

and require operators to use these methods to increase the 

use of in-line inspection tools. 

P-15-021 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Develop and implement a plan for eliminating the 

use of direct assessment as the sole integrity assessment 

method for gas transmission pipelines. 

P-15-022 2/10/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Develop and implement a plan for all segments 

of the pipeline industry to improve data integration for integrity management through the use of geographic information 

systems. 

P-15-034 6/29/15 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X TO CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.: 

Revise your plastic pipe fusion welding procedure to require 

cleaning of the surfaces to be welded with suitable solvents 

to remove all dirt, water, oil, paint, and other contaminants 

as recommended in ASTM F2620, Standard Practice for Heat 

Fusion Joining of Polyethylene Pipe and Fittings. 

33 

Open Pipeline Recommendations (as of March 26th, 2019)—Continued 

Number Date Issued Overall Status 

Most 

Wanted 

List 

Safety Recommendation 

P-17-001 6/15/17 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Work with pipeline trade and standards organizations to modify the pipeline dent acceptance criteria to account for all the factors that lead to pipe failures caused by 

dents, and promulgate regulations to require the new criteria 

be incorporated into integrity management programs. 

P-17-002 6/15/17 OpenUnacceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Require operators to either (a) repair all excavated dent defects, or (b) install a local leak detection system at each location where a dent is not repaired, continuously monitor for hydrocarbons, and promptly take corrective 

action to stop a detected leak. 

P-17-003 6/15/17 OpenAwait 

Response 

X TO THE COLONIAL PIPELINE COMPANY: Revise the dent excavation evaluation procedure to require either (a) the repair of 

all excavated dent defects, or (b) the installation of a local 

leak detection system at each location where a dent is not 

repaired, continuous monitoring for hydrocarbons, and 

prompt corrective action to stop a detected leak. 

P-17-004 6/15/17 OpenResponse 

Received 

TO THE ASSOCIATION OF OIL PIPE LINES AND THE AMERICAN 

PETROLEUM INSTITUTE: Communicate to your members the 

findings of this report on the susceptibility of dents to fatigue cracking even when the dent is acceptable under current criteria. 

P-18-001 6/25/18 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X To PHMSA: Work with state pipeline regulators to incorporate 

into their inspection programs, a review to ensure that gas 

distribution pipeline operators are using best practices recommended by the manufacturer in their distribution integrity 

management programs, including using the specified tools 

and methods, to correctly install PermaLock mechanical tapping tee assemblies. 

P-18-004 6/25/18 OpenAcceptable 

Alternate 

Response 

X TO HONEYWELL: Specify in your PermaLock mechanical tapping tee assembly installation instructions a not-to-exceed 

torque limit for Nylon bolts and have that value checked and 

adjusted with a torque wrench immediately after installation. 

P-18-005 11/15/18 OpenAwait 

Response 

X TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS: Eliminate the 

professional engineer licensure exemption for public utility 

work and require a professional engineer’s seal on public 

utility engineering drawings. 

P-18-006 11/15/18 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X TO NISOURCE: Revise the engineering plan and 

constructability review process across all of your subsidiaries 

to ensure that all applicable departments review construction 

documents for accuracy, completeness, and correctness, and 

that the documents or plans be sealed by a professional engineer prior to commencing work. (Urgent) 

P-18-007 11/15/18 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X TO NISOURCE: Review and ensure that all records and documentation of your natural gas systems are traceable, reliable, and complete. (Urgent) 

P-18-008 11/15/18 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X TO NISOURCE: Apply management of change process to all 

changes to adequately identify system threats that could result in a common mode failure. (Urgent) 

34 

Open Pipeline Recommendations (as of March 26th, 2019)—Continued 

Number Date Issued Overall Status 

Most 

Wanted 

List 

Safety Recommendation 

P-18-009 11/15/18 OpenAcceptable 

Response 

X TO NISOURCE: Develop and implement control procedures 

during modifications to gas mains to mitigate the risks identified during management of change operations. Gas main 

pressures should be continually monitored during these 

modifications and assets should be placed at critical locations to immediately shut down the system if abnormal operations are detected. (Urgent) 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you for your testimony. 

I will start by recognizing myself for 5 minutes for questions. I 

will start out with Administrator Elliott. 

You know, 8 years have now lapsed since Congress passed the 

2011 pipeline safety bill, and PHMSA still has not implemented required regulations like the hazardous liquid rule or gas transmission rule. I think we could all agree that taking 8-plus years 

to implement important safety regulations is a problem. 

I want to ask first, how is PHMSA reforming its regulatory process so that congressional mandates are implemented faster? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Chairman Lipinski, thank you for that question. 

I think we have done quite a bit since I last testified before this 

committee last June and heard quite clearly the dissatisfaction 

with the ability of PHMSA to move mandates, and we have done 

several things. 

First of all, we have really gone back and worked hard internally 

to make sure that we could complete developing the language for 

the rules that were still open. 

And I think the second thing that we have done is we have 

worked hard to streamline the rulemaking process at PHMSA. As 

you know, PHMSA is really two separate modes almost, one on 

pipeline and one on hazardous materials. And we found that there 

were some inefficiencies there that were not giving us the ability 

to staff our rulemaking process the way that would provide optimum results. And we have worked on that, so I think today we 

have a much better process internally for writing and pursuing not 

only mandates but all regulations that we are responsible for. 

I tell the team at PHMSA just about every day that we are responsible for making sure that the mandates that we have in front 

of us, that we can move as quickly and expeditiously as we can. 

I am pleased that we have been able to complete our work on the 

pipeline safety rule. We have completed our work on the gas pipeline safety rule as well. And we are hoping that those will become 

published in the not too distant future. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. What can Congress do to help PHMSA speed up 

the implementation of regulations? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Mr. Chairman, I think just your constant assistance in helping us understand the absolute urgency in moving 

these safety rules to conclusion. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. I want to ask, Ms. Homendy, what you would recommend. Do you have any comments on what PHMSA has done 

35 

and what you would recommend that PHMSA or Congress do to 

speed up the regulations? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Well, there is a lot that goes into rulemaking, and 

I have had a lot of great conversations with the Administrator and 

with PHMSA staff over the past several months and years, and it 

is frustrating. 

Part of the problem is there is no transparency in the rulemaking process. So we actually—we do have letters that go back 

and forth and communications between—and meetings as well—between NTSB and PHMSA, and a lot of the time the response is, 

‘‘Well, we are going to work on these recommendations and rulemaking,’’ but we actually don’t know where the rulemaking is. Is 

it in PHMSA? Is it in the Secretary’s office? Is it at OMB? So that 

is part of the problem, that we don’t know where the holdup is. 

But, you know, from our standpoint, you know, a lot of the NTSB 

recommendations that were included in the 2011 and 2016 acts are 

not new recommendations. We have issued them for a number of 

years, and there was no action. Fortunately, you took action, and 

it is frustrating that now we don’t have final rulemakings. 

And what concerns me most is having to go to an accident scene 

and meet with a loved one who has lost a family member and have 

to explain to them, you know, what we know about the accident 

and what the NTSB’s process is while our investigators know full 

well that something could have prevented that accident had it been 

implemented. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. 

I want to ask Mr. Elliott, do you intend to implement all of 

NTSB’s safety recommendations? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Mr. Chairman, we have currently 20 open NTSB 

recommendations. Ten of those are linked to rulemakings that we 

are working through, and as has been alluded to earlier, three of 

those are open and unacceptable. 

I would reiterate Member Homendy’s comments. I think we have 

a very strong working relationship with NTSB. Our staffs work 

regularly to help work through those recommendations and to find 

resolutions as quickly as possible. And at least at my time at 

PHMSA, I think we have made some significant strides not only in 

working more closely with the National Transportation Safety 

Board but in bringing some of those recommendations to successful 

conclusions. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Ms. Homendy, did you want to add anything else 

before I close? 

Ms. HOMENDY. I would just clarify that we have 24 open safety 

recommendations. 

And one thing that a lot of people do not know is that when we 

issue a safety recommendation there may be another way that 

PHMSA or the industry would like to address it and believe that 

they could address the safety issue identified, and they can propose 

an alternative. There have been recommendations that we have 

issued to PHMSA where they did provide an acceptable alternative 

and we were able to close that recommendation. 

So we are eager to work with them. They sent us a letter yesterday to clarify where they were on the various recommendations, 

and we look forward to continuing the discussion. 

36 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. My time has expired. 

I want to recognize Ranking Member Crawford for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just have one quick question for Administrator Elliott. How can 

the rulemaking process be improved to ensure that safety regulations are keeping up with technological advances? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Congressman, thank you for the question. 

I think that, you know, one of the criticisms that PHMSA often 

gets is the inability for our rulemaking process to stay current with 

trends in innovation and technology, especially those where there 

is emerging safety technology. 

We work hard to try and ensure through our special permitting 

process that we can bring a lot of this new, exploratory safety technology so that it can be tested and we can see whether or not it 

can actually be included into the process within the regulations. 

I do think there are probably some additional ways that we can 

look to include emerging technology, especially safety technology 

and innovation, and we continue to explore those ways to do that. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. Thank you, Mr. Elliott. 

Ms. Homendy, I want to ask a question about two of the Members that presented testimony earlier today. What is the status of 

the four urgent NTSB recommendations issued to NiSource in the 

wake of the Merrimack Valley incident? 

Ms. HOMENDY. That we issued for NiSource or for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts? I am sorry. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. NiSource. 

Ms. HOMENDY. For NiSource, they are continuing to implement 

our urgent recommendations, and we have communications from 

the company updating us on the status. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. OK. 

When the NTSB develops safety recommendations, is there consideration for who might ultimately bear the cost to implement 

that recommendation? 

Ms. HOMENDY. We do not consider cost. The NTSB’s mission is 

safety. The regulator’s role is to consider cost-benefit analysis when 

they are issuing regulations. But when it comes to the NTSB, our 

mission is safety and preventing future tragedies and saving lives. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. Thank you, ma’am. Appreciate it. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. I now recognize Chairman DeFazio for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Specifically, where are we on the leak detection rule, Mr. Administrator? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Chairman DeFazio, thank you for that question. 

I have made comment on our progress on the liquid and gas rule 

and the leak detection and automatic valve rule. We have completed our work with that, and it is currently undergoing internal 

review at DOT. We think we have adequately prepared the notice 

of proposed rulemaking, and we hope that we can publish that notice of proposed rulemaking in the near future. 

We recognize the importance of that rule. I think we realize that, 

while the liquid safety rule and the gas safety rule accommodate 

some of the concerns, that it really is the leak detection and the 

valve rule is the one that we really need to pursue now. 

37 

So, again, we have done our work on it and need to get the notice 

of proposed rulemaking out so we can then pursue that to a final 

rule. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So you have written an NPRM, a notice of proposed rulemaking, and submitted it to DOT. To whom? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, it goes through, you know, quite an iteration 

within DOT. There are a number of departments within the DOT 

that review all of our rulemaking. And that is the process that it 

is going through now. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But I thought the theory when Congress created 

PHMSA—which used to be in DOT proper within the Secretary’s 

office—that the idea was that you would have specific jurisdiction 

and a very particular body of knowledge. Who at DOT is more 

qualified than people at PHMSA to determine your NPRM? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, I would, Mr. Chairman, agree that there is 

a great amount of skill and talent at PHMSA when it comes to the 

pipeline rulemaking. But the process affords for others within the 

Department to look at that rulemaking from their lenses and their 

points of views to make sure that it conforms with their interests. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. ‘‘Their interests.’’ What are their interests? Are 

their interests in moving forward quickly with this critical rule? 

Are their interests in delaying the rule so that expenses won’t be 

put upon the industry, and more people might die? What are their 

interests? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yeah, well, Mr. Chairman, I think their interests 

are the same as mine, and that is safety. And I don’t think there 

is any significant delay in moving this particular bill forward. I 

think it is just going through its normal review process. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well it is quite a number of years in the making. 

It is a proposed rulemaking, which means it still has to go out for 

public comment. 

Maybe the people at DOT could comment after you. It seems like 

an extra step here to me. The experts write the notice of proposed 

rulemaking; then people who don’t have the expertise are reviewing that rule. 

And how long has it been there? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, I mean, it has been with PHMSA for many 

years. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. No, how long has it been over at DOT? How long 

since you completed it? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. It has probably been within the last 90 days. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. When might we expect it out of there? Do they 

work under timelines, or do things just disappear over there and 

they come back when they come back? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Mr. Chairman, I can’t answer that question specifically, but I can assure you that I have regular dialogue with the 

staff at the Department on the importance of moving these mandates and will continue to pursue that. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. 

One other question. What is the current value of a human life? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. You can’t put a value on human life. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, I remember years ago hearing testimony 

when I was trying to get over-wing exit seats removed, and the regVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
38 

ulator actually had a very specific number that they put on the 

value of a human life to determine cost-benefit analysis. 

I am just curious, do you have such a rule as you do cost-benefit 

analysis? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we are required 

to do the cost-benefit analysis, but, again, going back to your original question, you can’t put a cost value on someone’s life. 

And at PHMSA, each and every day, we focus on ensuring the 

safety of energy products that move in the U.S. pipeline network. 

We don’t focus on anything else but trying to make the Nation’s 

pipeline system as safe as humanly possible. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But, at some point, you do apply some sort of analysis. So you say, this 30-inch pipeline, in order to put in leak detection, it is going to cost this much. What is the benefit side? How 

do you calculate the benefit? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, again, Mr. Chairman, I mean, all rules go 

through a cost-benefit analysis—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yeah, but I am just curious, what is the benefit? 

Do we look at past explosions, like San Bruno, and how much that 

cost, and then therefore that might be the leak detection benefit? 

How do we calculate that? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, I am not sure of the specifics of the calculation, and I am pleased to work with you to provide more detailed 

information on it. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yeah. 

Ms. Homendy—Mr. Chairman, if you would just indulge—do you 

have any idea how that is done, given your past work on the committee and expertise? 

Ms. HOMENDY. The last time I looked—and I agree with the Administrator, you can’t put a value on life. But the DOT uses $9 million per life, is the last time I looked at the figures that they utilized. 

On the benefit side, I do believe they look at the accidents that 

occurred, and they put a savings value on that. I am not sure how 

they develop it. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. All right. 

I would like a little more information, Mr. Administrator. That 

would be useful. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. 

The Chair will now recognize Mr. Bost for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BOST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Elliott, in terms of the pipeline security, a lot of attention 

has been focused on potential large-scale terrorist attacks on pipeline infrastructure. However, we also have noticed an uptick in 

small-scale attacks, predominantly intended to disrupt but not to 

totally destroy critical infrastructure. You know, this includes pipelines, utility transmission lines, fiberoptic cable, just to name a 

few. 

But, in your opinion, are current laws sufficient to deter actions 

that may disrupt pipeline operations? 

And a followup to that: What are some of the potential safety 

issues of seemingly minor acts that we see when vandalism occurs? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Congressman, thank you for that question. 

39 

PHMSA is primarily, as you know, a safety organization, but it 

is almost impossible in this day and age to separate safety from security. A safe operation is a secure operation, and, conversely, a secure pipeline system is one that is safe. 

We work very closely with the primary pipeline security organization, the Transportation Security Administration as well, more so 

on cyber-related issues with the Department of Energy. I do think 

that the coordination that we have with those primary security 

agencies is good. We help provide some technical experience to 

them about the Nation’s pipeline system, and they, in turn, help 

us better understand the current threats both to physical and 

cybersecurity. 

I do believe that there is a concern, especially with what our inspectors see on a day-to-day basis, of the potential impacts of attempts of vandalism of pipeline systems. There was one a few 

months ago, fortunately unsuccessful. And I do know that our inspectors, on their regular inspection opportunities, they talk regularly to the pipeline operators about the steps that they have in 

place to help mitigate any security concerns. 

Mr. BOST. So, then, if someone commits one of these acts—I 

mean, I know if it is a terrorist act and there is a lot of damage 

and everything like that. But what do we do and what kind of 

charges do we get to put on people to discourage it from happening 

in the future? 

Because I think sometimes there are certain groups and organizations that would prefer to do these things just to bring attention. 

Even though we are trying to be as safe as possible, they know if 

they mess it up that we will have problems as well. 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Right. Well, instances such as that, the operators 

will normally provide that data to local law enforcement authorities 

and even the FBI. 

And, recently, we have had inquiries with regards to whether or 

not we believe that the penalties that exist for, not so much kind 

of the terrorist types of attacks, but more the negative impacts to 

the pipeline system from demonstrators should be made more severe, and we have provided opinion on that. 

Mr. BOST. OK. Thank you. 

So what challenges is the PHMSA facing in collecting data to assess with the safety improvements and rulemaking? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Congressman, I think, actually, that the information and the data that we collect from operators to help us improve 

safety is adequate. I think the information that we get through the 

collection of information through their integrity management systems, I think the information that we receive through work that 

they do with some of their sophisticated in-line inspection helps us 

to formulate several things. It helps us to formulate the need for 

additional clarifications or rulemakings, but I think it also helps us 

better inform our inspectors. And it also informs us to focus on 

areas of greatest concern when we go out and inspect the regulated 

pipeline entity. 

Mr. BOST. So just one more question, because the concern I 

have—so when it takes this long to go through the rulemaking 

process, with technology changing as fast as it does, how in the 

world will we be able to keep up with modifying our rules and 

40 

changing the rules to keep up with the technology that actually 

makes it safe? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Right. Congressman, that is a valid concern, and it 

is one that we hear quite often from industry. Because, as we all 

know, the pace at which technology is improving is at a pretty 

rapid pace, and some of the safety technology and innovation is actually quite impressive. 

Today, our current vehicle for allowing that technology to come 

into play, typically, not as part of a regulation, is through some 

special permit processes that we have. At PHMSA, we are working 

hard to make sure that we minimize that amount of time, but we 

are also looking at the possibility of introducing some types of pilot 

projects that will also allow some of this new safety technology to 

come into play more quickly. 

The concern that we have is that at PHMSA we need to be absolutely sure that the technology works and will provide this kind of 

step change in safety. And in order to do that, we need to see it 

in actual application for a fair amount of time. But we are looking 

at ways to see how we can expedite that so that we can get the 

information we need then to allow it in general use. 

Mr. BOST. Thank you very much. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. I now recognize Mrs. Craig for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. CRAIG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On August 2, 2017, a building at the Minnehaha Academy in 

Minneapolis, Minnesota, was destroyed by a natural gas explosion. 

As a result, two Minnesotans were killed and nine were injured. 

Unfortunately, we still don’t have much information about this 

event. 

Ms. Homendy, I understand the NTSB’s investigation is ongoing, 

but can you provide any information about the Board’s processes 

and when we may be able to learn more about this fatal incident? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Thank you for the question. 

We are in the process of preparing our brief, which is our final 

report, and that should be out by the end of this fiscal year. 

Shortly before that, we will open the public docket to provide 

some information about the investigation that we have obtained. 

That then becomes publicly available. At that time, I am happy to 

come in and brief you and your staff to talk about what that information is. 

I did talk with our Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and Hazardous 

Materials Investigations to see what types of issues the investigators are looking at. And four groups were formed as part of the investigation to look at pipeline operations, human performance, survival factors, and the emergency response to the pipeline accident. 

In addition to that, materials; looking at testing of the pipeline; 

and investigators are also looking at subcontractor oversight and 

worker qualifications. 

As our process moves forward, we are happy to come in and brief 

you. 

Mrs. CRAIG. Thank you so much. 

Just following up on that, the NTSB has long recommended that 

the Department of Transportation, PHMSA, and PHMSA’s predecessor examine the need for leak detection on pipelines and issue 

41 

a regulation on this topic. Can you talk a little bit more about why 

this is important? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Leak detection is about response time. If you 

have a leak that you don’t discover for a substantial amount of 

time, you are going to end up with more damage, lives lost, people 

injured, and communities severely affected. 

If I look at some of the most recent incidents where we have investigated, you have PG&E, this latest one in San Francisco that 

I was at, 2 hours to shut down the pipeline, and 95 minutes, 2 

hours and 45 minutes at a previous one, and 9 hours before that. 

And the one we conducted in Centreville, the pipeline operator 

didn’t detect a leak for 2 full days and kept telling the emergency 

responders there wasn’t a problem on the pipeline. We need to detect leaks not only so that the operator can immediately respond 

but that so emergency responders can respond. 

And it is not just—you know, PHMSA does have performance 

standards that they issue in their regulations. But it is not just 

that these operators need to use leak detection systems—and it is 

not just one; it may be many—but they also have to have performance standards, PHMSA has to issue performance standards for 

leak detection. 

For example, Alaska requires that all crude oil pipelines be 

equipped with a leak detection system capable of promptly detecting a leak of no more than 1 percent of daily throughput. That is 

a performance standard that doesn’t exist in PHMSA regulations 

right now. 

And beyond just the leak detection systems themselves and the 

performance standards, you have to have proper training for personnel, good corporate policy, sort of a safety management system 

so you make sure everyone is properly trained and addresses the 

problem. 

Mrs. CRAIG. Just following up to that, Mr. Elliott, can you tell 

us what prevents you from having those performance standards in 

place? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. 

You know, a number of the items that you made specific reference to on leak detection, again, are included in the mandates 

that we are working to complete—the liquid rule as well as the 

rupture detection and valve rule. We at PHMSA are working to 

complete those and hope to have those out as final rules in the very 

near future, and we think that will address many of the issues that 

you make reference to. 

Mrs. CRAIG. Well, it can’t come soon enough for families in my 

State. 

Mr. ELLIOTT. I understand. 

Mrs. CRAIG. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Spano for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SPANO. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being here. Appreciate your testimony, Ms. 

Homendy, Mr. Elliott. 

Mr. Elliott, I have a couple questions for you, if I may. Much of 

what we do in terms of making policy, much of what agencies do 

in terms of their rulemaking decisions involves kind of a balancing 

of cost and benefits and interests and so forth. 

42 

I understand you engage in such an analysis in terms of your 

rulemaking. Can you tell us about that process, give us some understanding, some detail to help us appreciate exactly what are the 

factors you look at and how you make a determination in terms of 

those costs and benefits? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question. 

All the rulemakings that we deal with will go through a cost-benefit, a regulatory impact analysis, looking at a lot of different factors—basically, the past history of incidents and impacts, matching 

that against the projected cost of the implementation of the rule. 

I think it is important to identify that that is only one component 

of our rulemaking process. I mean, the cost-benefit analysis is 

something that we are required to do, but I really do think we 

focus more on the overall safety benefits that the rules will bring 

to the regulated community as well as the public. 

We understand that, you know, most of the mandates that we 

deal with have costs associated with them, and we recognize that 

that cost is something that needs to be incurred so that we can 

bring these safety regulations into play. 

Mr. SPANO. Thank you so much. 

Of the various rulemakings currently in progress, how many 

NTSB recommendations will be addressed? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, as Member Homendy corrected me, we have 

24 open NTSB recommendations, and of the 24, 10 of those recommendations will be addressed in rulemakings that we are currently working on. 

Mr. SPANO. Ten of the twenty-four. Thank you. 

And then one last question for you. What are the current policies 

in place at PHMSA to address rupture detection in pipelines? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. So, again, rupture detection is a topic that has been 

brought up several times here today, Congressman, and it is one 

that is very important to us. And I want to underscore what Member Homendy said, because rupture detection and leak detection 

really basically go to the ability to detect a problem and resolve it 

before it turns into something serious. 

But our rupture detection and automatic valve rule has, quite 

honestly, languished behind two rules that we put ahead of it, the 

liquid safety rule and the gas rule. And as has been mentioned before, we finished our work on the notice of proposed rulemaking. 

We do intend to get that out to the public for comment very quickly, and then we hope to expedite that to a final rule. 

Mr. SPANO. So, just to clarify, are there any policies in place with 

regard to rupture protection currently? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, certainly within our integrity management 

requirements and existing Federal rules there are some that deal 

with rupture detection programs, yes. 

Mr. SPANO. OK. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lynch for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank the witnesses as well. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, Chairman DeFazio as well, Ranking 

Member Graves, and Ranking Member Crawford. Pipeline safety is 

an incredibly important hearing. 

43 

And I want to associate myself with the remarks of Mrs. Trahan 

and Mr. Moulton, my colleagues from Massachusetts. And I certainly support their recommendations that we require licensed 

technicians and engineers on site and we have adequate supervisory staffing at all times—no waivers, no exceptions. 

My own situation in my district—I have a couple of situations, 

one in West Roxbury, Massachusetts. It is part of the city of Boston. We have a transfer from a low-pressure line, natural gas line, 

to a high-pressure. I think it was 5 to 10 PSI before; now it is 50. 

This is a thickly settled residential neighborhood. This particular 

gas pipeline, constructed by Spectra Energy, goes through a gravel 

quarry that is adjacent to this residential neighborhood. So they 

are side-by-side. And there is active blasting, there is active blasting going on in the quarry, next to the people’s homes, kids, 

schools. Very densely settled residential neighborhood. 

We tried mightily—the mayor, myself, elected officials—to get 

Spectra to move that pipeline out of the blasting zone and onto a 

major thoroughfare where it would not be proximate to residential 

homes. We went into court several times. 

The whole legal process here of trying to raise local safety concerns in the context of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, that system 

is impervious to local concerns. We have been in the court, and we 

lose every time—lack of standing. We can’t get into that process. 

The second situation I have is Weymouth, Massachusetts, another heavily settled, thickly settled, densely settled residential 

area. And I have a compressor station that they want to build 

there. It is already an area that is heavily impacted by industrial 

use. There are a couple of tank farms, things like that, right on the 

coast, but the residential neighborhood is right there. 

So how do we raise the safety concerns in the context of the Natural Gas Act of 1938? Because I have lost so many times in court 

already. I can’t even get into the process. We get bounced out all 

the time. 

And I am afraid that what has happened in Merrimack Valley 

is going to happen in one of my neighborhoods and we are going 

to have a massive loss of life because the area is much more concentrated with young children and residences. 

So, Mr. Elliott, if you want to take a crack at that, how do I protect my neighbors? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, Congressman, thank you very much for the 

question. 

And, you know, with regards to the compressor station at Weymouth, you may recall that approximately a month or so ago we 

had a conversation where—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Right. 

Mr. ELLIOTT [continuing]. You have asked for assistance on helping to set up a public meeting that will bring perhaps more points 

of view to bear. And as I responded to you, we are happy to work 

with you on that public meeting. That certainly is one way for us 

to help better understand the circumstances that are ongoing up 

there. 

You know, of the 2.7 million miles of pipeline that exist today in 

the United States, 80 percent of those are distribution pipeline systems such as you are talking about. 

44 

I do think we have an extremely good working relationship with 

our State partners. We continue to work to strengthen that. We 

continue to work to strengthen their ability to provide adequate 

oversight to State distribution networks—— 

Mr. LYNCH. That is fair enough. I don’t want to use all my time 

on this, but I am not having the same experience with FERC, OK? 

And, you know, that is a major problem, because that is the adversarial relationship we have here in trying to impact this. 

Ms. Homendy, would you like to take a crack at that, in terms 

of how we might raise the safety concerns of local neighborhoods? 

Ms. HOMENDY. I think I would agree with the Administrator. 

Public meetings are probably the best way you are going to be able 

to have—— 

Mr. LYNCH. We have had those, though, with FERC, and, you 

know, they just blow us off and do what they are going to do anyway. That is the problem here. So I appreciate the recommendation 

that we have more meetings, but I have to get some stuff done. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Stauber for 5 minutes. 

Mr. STAUBER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Administrator Elliott, a couple questions. 

How often do pipelines generally need to be replaced? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Congressman, thank you for the question. 

I don’t think there is a specific number of years that you can 

apply to that question. Operators, through a very rigorous integrity 

management system, are responsible for ensuring the usable life of 

their systems. 

And understand, as well, I think it is probably fair to say that 

there is quite a bit of difference when you talk about the different 

types of pipelines. Is it liquid? Is it gas? And is it transmission line, 

or is it a distribution system line? 

And as we have been talking about for many years, many of the 

Nation’s distribution lines, those that typically are still of cast iron 

or bare steel, provide some of the greatest concerns. We are happy 

that there are 21 States today that have basically done away with 

any old cast-iron distribution pipeline systems. 

But we are continuing to try and find new ways to incentivize 

the replacement of some of these aged distribution lines. We have 

just introduced a bill that will allow for new plastic types of pipes 

that we hope will kind of accelerate the replacement of distribution 

pipelines. 

But, again, going back to your basic question, it really is up to 

the individual operator to identify and maintain the absolute safety 

of their pipeline system. 

Now, having said that, we have, for a long time, acknowledged 

the importance of replacing aged pipeline, and we certainly underscore and support those operators that have replacement plans. 

Mr. STAUBER. And that leads to my next question. And do you 

think that pipelines need to be replaced once they start to corrode? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Again, I think there are a number of factors there, 

Congressman. I think as long as problems such as corrosion are detected early in the process and that an operator can go and resolve 

45 

that corrosion and do sufficient testing to ensure that the pipeline 

is not compromised, I think that pipeline can stay in service. 

I might also add that I think this is an area where we are seeing 

some of the advancements in technology, especially in in-line inspection, that do a much better job of identifying early corrosion before it turns into a problem. 

Mr. STAUBER. And I will say this. Enbridge line 3 runs through 

my district. The pipeline runs from Canada through my district in 

northern Minnesota to Superior, Wisconsin. 

Enbridge is currently moving forward with a replacement plan 

that will make line 3 even safer than it is right now. And I am 

going to go over some safety measures that Enbridge takes on its 

current pipelines and its future replacement. 

Do you think anticorrosion coatings are important for safety? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, I do. 

Mr. STAUBER. Do you think pressure testing is important for 

safety? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. I think depending on the nature of the pipeline and 

how it is used as part of an integrity management system, it can 

be a useful tool, yes. 

Mr. STAUBER. And do you think pipeline monitoring is important 

for safety? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Monitoring can take a number of different terms, 

but I think, again, as part of a company’s integrity management 

system, they need to make sure that they are monitoring the absolute health of that pipeline in such a way that they understand the 

safety of the pipeline at all times. 

Mr. STAUBER. And then do you think automatic shutoff valves 

are important for safety? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do believe that automatic shutoff valves are important. And I would hope that, as soon as we can continue to 

move through with some of these mandates that we will afford appropriate application of automatic shutoff valves, that we will see 

an even safer pipeline system in this country. 

Mr. STAUBER. Thank you. 

And I agree with the important safety measures and steps that 

Enbridge has been taking to make sure their pipeline remains safe. 

And I also agree with you that pipelines need to be replaced from 

time to time. You know, we can’t get wrapped up in political fights, 

whether they need to be replaced or not. 

And, you know, this project’s approval process with Enbridge replacement line 3 has been going on since 2014. They have all the 

necessary permits from North Dakota, and they have the unanimous approval from Minnesota’s Public Utilities Commission. The 

only thing holding the project up is State-level politics. 

And in the name of safety, I support this project and other important pipeline projects like this that are centered around safety. 

Mr. Chair, I yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. The Chair will now recognize for 5 minutes Mr. 

Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

And thank you for being here today. 

You know, I have sat in on a number of these hearings regarding 

pipeline safety. And Directors come and Directors go, and they alVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
46 

ways say the same thing: We have to insist on a higher level of 

safety. We must complete outstanding congressional mandates. 

Yet, from 1999 to 2018, nearly twofold increase in incidents, 

which demonstrates to me that there is some sort of a gap there, 

something is missing. How can we be insisting on all these safety 

factors and we still have increases and increases? What is the gap? 

What are we not doing? 

And I am really concerned because I come from an area in New 

Jersey, I think there is a pipe underneath every brick. I mean, it 

is very congested. There are a lot of old pipes. I don’t even think 

people know where some of these pipes go. And we are constantly 

having incidents where people keep breaking into the pipes and, 

you know, there is an incident. 

So, Director, how did we get a twofold increase? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question, 

and I absolutely appreciate your concern. And having spent many 

years working up in northern New Jersey, I understand your perspective with regards to pipeline. 

First of all, you have my assurance that, at least in my time as 

the Administrator at PHMSA, that I will do everything possible to 

make sure that the men and women at PHMSA work hard every 

day to improve pipeline safety. There is much more we can do, and 

every day we discover new opportunities for safety that we really 

work to try and pursue. 

I do believe that, through a series of regulations, through inspections and enforcement and continued use of technology and innovation to help drive safer pipelines, that we can close the gap that 

you talk about. 

Mr. SIRES. Are you insisting or are you making an effort or is 

somebody making an effort to identify where these pipes are? Because I think that there are a lot of pipes around that have been 

around a long time and I don’t even know if people know exactly 

where they are. 

And the other problem that we had, in the Edison issue that we 

had, 1994, the firemen would not go into the fire because they 

didn’t know what was there. So what have we done to make sure 

that the safety of the firemen is guaranteed when they show up at 

these incidents? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Yes, Congressman, that is a big problem. 

Right now, PHMSA has a National Pipeline Mapping System, 

and we have some recommendations for improving the National 

Pipeline Mapping System, including that they have to provide 

where high-consequence areas are—these are high-population 

areas and other areas—so emergency responders know where they 

are. 

There is also a problem on the identification, the accurate location of that pipeline. Right now, in the pipeline mapping system, 

it is give or take 500 feet. If you are a responder, that is a big deal. 

And so what responders need—and you are going to hear from 

the fire chief later today—is they need to know exactly where the 

pipeline is. They need to know what is in it. They need to know 

who the operator is. They need to have a relationship with that operator. 

47 

It is like me. I tell operators all the time, ‘‘If the first time you 

meet me is on the scene of an accident, it is not going to be a good 

day.’’ Firefighters need to work with operators and operators need 

to work with firefighters so they can adequately plan for a potential incident. 

They need to know not just what is in the pipeline but what the 

worst-case scenario discharge is going to be if there is an incident. 

They need proper training. They need equipment. And in order to 

get training, fire departments need to have funding to backfill that 

position so that people can go get that training. 

Mr. SIRES. We have so many communities in New Jersey. We 

have 561 communities, I think. And I think every community 

should know exactly what goes through their community so they 

can find it if there is an incident. And I don’t know if that is happening. 

Ms. HOMENDY. That is not a requirement. 

Mr. SIRES. What is not a requirement? 

Ms. HOMENDY. That communities are not informed—I mean, 

there is some pipeline education and an awareness program that 

is required under PHMSA regulations, and I am sure the Administrator can talk about that. And so some information does go out to 

the community about what is operating. But the specific information, like how much and what exactly, people won’t know that in 

real-time. But—— 

Mr. ELLIOTT. And, Congressman, if I may—and, again, I want to 

underscore Member Homendy’s concern. I mean, prior to coming to 

PHMSA, my 40 years in the railroad had a long history in your 

State of New Jersey of working with emergency responders to provide real-time information about the commodities that are moving 

through those 500-plus communities in northern New Jersey where 

railroads operate. And I think the same is true of what we need 

to do in the Nation’s pipeline community. I think it is a topic that 

we need to address more fully. 

But, certainly, anything that we can do to help ensure the safety 

of America’s emergency responders with regards to response to 

pipeline or other surface hazardous-material-type incidents, we 

need to be working on collaboratively to do that. 

Mr. SIRES. My time is up. Thank you very much. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. The Chair now recognizes for 5 minutes Mr. Pence. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Elliott and Ms. Homendy. 

Let me start out by saying that protecting life is priceless. I 

would like to ask a couple of questions kind of going off what Congressman Stauber was asking about the monitoring and things like 

that. 

Leak detection in pipelines have been around for a long time, 

both for economic and safety reasons. Has anything occurred in the 

systems, in specifically the monitoring system, that warrants faster 

upgrades? Is it age, material of, as you mentioned, the iron pipes, 

material deterioration or ground shifts, as was mentioned earlier? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, Congressman, at least from the perspective 

that I have, I think there has been some significant improvement 

in overall leak detection. 

48 

We know, historically, that small-leak incidents will continue to 

be—until technology avails itself, will always be something that 

will be more difficult to detect. But I think what I have seen, at 

least in my time at PHMSA, and understanding more some of the 

control room technology, is kind of this increase in technology that 

allows for a quick and prompt identification of more significant releases that will have more of a negative impact to the environment 

and to human life. And that is something that our inspectors review regularly. 

I think there is always more that can be done to improve leak 

detection capabilities, especially for those smaller leaks. And I 

think that it is important for us to pursue some of the mandates 

that Congress have given us in order to put some of those measures into place. 

Ms. HOMENDY. I would just add, more important than leak detection—because, certainly, you want to detect a leak when it occurs, 

even the small leaks, and there are different technologies, and it 

is not just using one technology, it is using many technologies and 

choosing the right one, but—is how you inspect your pipeline to ensure that there isn’t a leak. 

And there are different ways of inspecting pipelines. Pipeline operators use in-line inspection technologies like sensing technologies, 

using smart pigs. They use pressure testing like hydrostatic testing. Direct assessment is really where they get in and they excavate and look at a pipeline. And they use other technologies like 

fiberoptics. 

The one recommendation that the NTSB has for PHMSA to implement is prohibiting the use of direct assessment as the sole 

method of inspection. 

Because when you are excavating a pipeline and you are conducting direct assessment, you have already sensed there is a problem in that line, and you are excavating for that specific problem 

that you may have identified to try to look at it and maybe remediate it. 

But when you are using maybe in-line inspection or hydrostatic 

testing, which is a much more comprehensive way of testing, you 

are not just finding things that you are looking for, you are finding 

things that you are not looking for and you didn’t expect to find. 

And that is where you can take proactive measures to prevent a 

leak before it even occurs. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you. 

One other question. How will the recent MOU between PHMSA 

and FERC improve pipeline and facility safety while encouraging 

our energy security? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Congressman, thank you for the question. 

Understandably, there has been an increase in the number of applications for LNG facilities, especially, as we work to become more 

of an exporter of this energy product. 

PHMSA, last October, completed a memorandum of understanding with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to assist 

in their review of these applications. And the memorandum of understanding basically allows PHMSA to apply its safety review of 

all of these LNG applications and then, once a determination is 

made, send that determination over to FERC, the Federal Energy 

49 

Regulatory Commission, so that they can complete their application 

and permitting process. 

And we do believe, at least in our discussions with our colleagues 

at FERC, that this will significantly reduce the amount of time 

that it will take to approve an application for LNG facilities. And 

I think rightfully so, it gives PHMSA the ability to oversee a process that they are very good at with some of our very talented LNG 

experts, and that is the safety of these sites. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield my time. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Malinowski for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This issue really hits home in my district in New Jersey because 

we have a new natural gas pipeline that has been proposed to be 

built, the PennEast pipeline, which is supposed to begin in Pennsylvania, run through a rural part of my congressional district, 

chiefly through Hunterdon County, New Jersey. It is a pipeline 

that will run through people’s front yards and backyards, through 

farmland. 

I have never seen an issue, in my short time in politics, that is 

more unifying to members of my community. They are all against 

it, for a whole range of reasons—concerned about impact on the environment, a desire not to give up farmland and property in which 

they have invested years of their lives. 

But setting all of those issues aside, there is also the question 

of safety. I have stood on people’s front porches who have shown 

me pipeline route that will be running within feet of their homes. 

And given all of the accidents that have happened around the country, they are naturally concerned. 

I know we have covered some of this, but I just want to ask you, 

Ms. Homendy, given all of the safety recommendations that have 

not yet been fully implemented, what would you say if you were 

standing with me on the front porch of one of my constituents who 

is facing the potential of a pipeline running through their front 

yard or backyard, what would you say are the essential steps that 

would have to be taken by a company building a new pipeline so 

that you could join me in telling them that, setting aside all those 

other concerns, at the very least, their families will be safe? What 

would be your specific checklist? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Well, the checklist would obviously be that they 

have to comply with existing standards. But then we have a number of other ones that we have recommended: automatic shutoff 

valves, proper leak detection, proper inspection, repair of pipelines, 

and, frankly, strengthening the integrity management program. We 

have identified some significant issues with some recent pipeline 

accidents where pipeline operators’ integrity management program 

is not as sufficient as it should be. 

And integrity management is really how they conduct inspection, 

how they determine where their high-consequence areas are, how 

they determine their threats and the risk to the pipeline. If they 

just look at what has happened over the last couple years and not 

really much broadly, they may determine that it is a different 

threat. 

50 

But I am going to be honest with you. At the beginning of my 

testimony, I said pipelines are one of the safest modes of transportation, but you can’t guarantee there will never be an accident. And 

when an accident occurs, it can be tragic. The best we can do is 

continue to advocate for safer and safer systems. 

And while the NTSB does not have a role in the planning or the 

permitting of a new pipeline, we do urge adoption of our existing 

and future safety recommendations to ensure pipeline safety. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you. 

And in the case of a new pipeline—and, again, I understand that 

is not formally your role, but would your office be willing to work 

with ours to look at plans for a new pipeline and advise us as to 

whether they live up to the highest standards that you are recommending? 

Ms. HOMENDY. We are always willing to work with your office 

and provide information where we are able. I am happy to meet 

with you and meet with your staff as well. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you so much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Davis for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the witnesses. 

I will start with Mr. Elliott. 

Back in my district, I recently heard from a constituent regarding a shallow pipe buried under his farmland. Central Illinois has 

some of the best farmland in the country, so it is no surprise my 

constituent was concerned with his inability to farm the land above 

and surrounding the pipe. 

My question for you is, are there any gaps in current legislation 

regarding shallow pipes that we can address in the upcoming reauthorization? And, additionally, can we do anything to better the 

process by which landowners and pipe owners settle such disputes? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Congressman, thank you for the question. I will answer the second part of your question first. 

I do think one of the most important aspects of pipeline construction is the interaction that goes on between the landowner and the 

pipeline company to ensure that what is being installed is, first of 

all, being installed in a very safe fashion and allows certain appropriate uses of that land once the installation has been made. I 

think that is something that can always be addressed further with 

the pipeline operating companies. 

With regards to your first question, I am not specifically aware 

of the specifics of the depth of pipeline. But with regards to your 

comment about is that something that might be addressed in reauthorization, I am happy to work with your office on thoughts and 

ideas on that. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, great. Thank you very much for your time. 

And hello, Ms. Homendy. How are you? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Hello, sir. It is good to see you. 

Mr. DAVIS. You know, it is great to have you on that side of the 

table. 

Ms. HOMENDY. It is very different. 

51 

Mr. DAVIS. Oh, I am sure it is. I am sure it is. I mean, I hope 

you enjoy your new job. I didn’t know you would have to come back 

so soon and face Chairman DeFazio once again. 

Ms. HOMENDY. Well, if there was going to be a hearing that I 

was going to testify at, this would have been the one. Thank you 

so much. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I made sure I did not leave before I got a 

chance to question you today. 

Ms. HOMENDY. Oh, perfect. I hope it is an easy question. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, of course. Well, you know, as a former staffer 

myself, I can appreciate, you know, you going to that side and coming to face us once again. And we have a history together. It is 

great to have worked with you in your last capacity. And I know 

it is not easy working with Chairman DeFazio and Chairman Lipinski, but they are good people. 

So I wanted to ask you—— 

Mr. LIPINSKI. The gentleman’s time is up. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, my clock says something different, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. HOMENDY. No comment. 

Mr. DAVIS. You know, I didn’t have a specific question for you, 

so I texted a good friend of mine to get a question. And that was 

our former colleague, Mr. Capuano. And I know you are surprised 

that Mr. Capuano got back to me. 

So the question that he wanted me to ask you is, how much do 

you miss working with him? 

Ms. HOMENDY. I mostly miss the outfits he wore, specifically the 

short-sleeve shirts under the nice jackets. No, I mean, he was 

amazing. 

Mr. DAVIS. Lipinski has one on today. 

Ms. HOMENDY. He was fantastic to work with. And I very much 

miss him and his accent. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, yes, you both have accents. Yes, you do. He 

wanted me to wish you well and congratulate you. 

And I texted my wife, Shannon, who you know, and she wanted 

to offer her congratulations too. And we are very proud of you and 

look forward to working with you, Jen. 

Thanks for putting up with my first questions. Next time you are 

here, I am going to have some really detailed questions for you. 

Ms. HOMENDY. I am excited because I am testifying next Tuesday in front of your subcommittee, so I will anticipate those. 

Mr. DAVIS. Oh, I can’t wait. Hey, congratulations. We will see 

you then. 

I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. OK, Mr. Davis. I am going to have to look into the 

rules of what the chair can do about kicking members off of subcommittees. And I do have sleeves. 

I will now recognize Mrs. Fletcher for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. FLETCHER. Thank you, Chairman Lipinski. Thank you for 

holding this hearing, and to Ranking Member Crawford as well. 

And thank you to the witnesses for taking time to testify. 

This committee has talked a lot about what it means to build a 

modern infrastructure and what we need to do to have one for the 

next century. And many know that our Nation’s roads and bridges 

52 

are in dire need of investment and updating, but we also know that 

infrastructure isn’t just roads and bridges and that pipelines make 

the modern world we live in possible. 

If you live in my district, in Houston, you live near a pipeline. 

And that is true across the country. And pipelines are really unseen infrastructure, but they stretch from coast to coast and especially to the gulf coast, where I live. 

There are 2.6 million miles of paved roads in the United States, 

and there are more than 2.5 million miles of pipeline in the United 

States. And people, when I talk to them, are surprised to hear that, 

but it is true. It is just as important. And I think that the emphasis on addressing our pipeline needs in this hearing and on this 

committee is incredibly important. 

Thanks to the recent energy renaissance in shale extraction, our 

domestic outlook has shifted dramatically. And as we just heard a 

little bit about the MOU, facilities originally designed to import 

liquified natural gas are now massive export facilities, and U.S. 

producers are expected to dominate the market. 

These radical changes have occurred throughout the industry, 

but the rules and regulations have not kept pace, and we need 

them to. I look forward to hearing both from administration officials today and from industry and safety advocates on the opportunity for improvements to our current system. 

And my questions for this portion of the hearing are really directed to Administrator Elliott. We often hear about how PHMSA 

needs more pipeline inspectors on staff, but I am curious about the 

staffing needs for technical and rulemaking staff. 

So my first question is, has a shortage in staffing among technical staff and those involved in the rulemaking process contributed to PHMSA’s slowness in issuing the rules prescribed by congressional mandate that date back to 2011? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. 

When I first became Administrator in October of 2017, you are 

correct, we were facing a pretty significant staffing issue. I am 

pleased to say that we have made some significant headway in 

staffing of our technical staff, not only the technical staff, both on 

the pipeline and hazmat side. 

And sometimes when we talk about PHMSA we forget about the 

surface hazmat side, that we have some highly capable people that 

deal with the reactive materials and explosives and radioactive 

components and pressure vessels. So there is a great amount of 

technology on that side of the equation as well. 

But we have made some significant strides in helping to close the 

gap of bringing on, especially on the pipeline side, good-quality 

technical folks. As you know, we are in competition, especially in 

your district, of trying to bring on good-quality engineers that we 

can turn into some of the best pipeline inspectors in this country. 

But I think we, through some direct hiring capabilities we have, 

through broadening our outreach to a wider array of colleges and 

universities, I think we are closing that gap. 

But I will tell you that I do think that the talent that we are 

bringing on bring with them some great technical foundation. I 

think perhaps what concerns me most is that we, like many businesses and many other Federal agencies, we are seeing a signifiVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
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cant amount of our highly skilled, experienced staff reaching that 

retirement eligibility age. And we are really working hard to try 

and do the best we can to create a transfer of knowledge of that 

information before it goes out the door. 

So, on the technical side, I think we have identified not only how 

to maintain our staffing but also to do as good a job as we can to 

make sure that we transfer that technical knowledge. 

On the rulemaking side, I will tell you this, my impression, that 

I think we have a highly skilled staff on the rulemaking side. We 

have made some changes in our rulemaking staff that makes it a 

little bit more nimble and agile to kind of allow us to put resources 

to both, either the pipeline or the hazmat side of the rulemaking, 

depending where the surge is at the time. 

But I think between the technical staff, the subject-matter experts that provide input into the rulemaking, I think the staff of 

economists that we have that do the analysis, and then I think the 

group of attorneys that also do that legal review that is required, 

are all top-shelf, and I am really proud of the work that they do. 

I think one of the first things I saw at PHMSA was how could 

we make that rulemaking group be more efficient and effective. 

Again, we try to now work as quickly as we can on our rulemaking 

process to make sure that we complete our work and then before 

we pass it off to others that have to review it as well. 

Mrs. FLETCHER. I see that my time has expired, so thank you 

very much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mrs. Fletcher. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. I will now recognize Mr. Allred for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ALLRED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the witnesses for being here today. I want to 

welcome you, and I look forward to hearing your thoughts on how 

we can enhance safety in our Nation’s pipeline network. 

As a Texan—I represent Dallas—I am proud to be serving on 

this subcommittee, as I understand the importance of the oil and 

gas industry to our State’s economy. And the energy industry employs thousands of Texans, and across the State we are doing a lot 

to power this country and also to make us an exporter now as well. 

And I also understand the great importance of ensuring the safe 

operation of pipelines and pipeline facilities. We have talked a lot 

about that today, of course. Last year, there were several troubling 

pipeline incidents in Texas, including one in Dallas, just outside of 

my district. 

Ms. Homendy, I understand the NTSB is currently investigating 

a February 2018 natural gas explosion in Dallas, right outside my 

district, that killed a 12-year-old girl and injured four others. According to the NTSB’s preliminary report, more than 300 residences were evacuated due to a number of gas pipeline leaks in 

that neighborhood. 

Can you walk me through what the investigation has found so 

far and provide a timeline for when the NTSB will issue a final report on the investigation? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Sure. And I just want to extend our deepest condolences to that family who, sadly, lost a 12-year-old and the reVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
54 

maining four members were injured. As a mother of an 11-year-old, 

I can’t imagine the pain and what they are experiencing. 

But as you mentioned, the accident occurred on February 23, 

2018. Our preliminary report was issued on March 23. It is still 

under investigation. 

Odor reports and activity by Atmos in the neighborhood indicated that leaks were first detected almost 2 months prior to the 

explosion. Atmos was performing work on pipelines just prior to 

the incident. 

While on scene, NTSB investigators identified three sections of 

pipe which failed a pressure test. One was behind the residence 

where the explosion occurred, and it had a circumferential crack in 

the pipe. 

Atmos has claimed in some recent articles that the rupture was 

due to heavy rain and soil composition. So the NTSB contracted 

with the Army Corps of Engineers to take soil samples and conduct 

geological testing. We did that in San Bruno, as well, to rule out 

seismic activity. The report on that from the Army Corps of Engineers is due on April 30. 

We intend to open the public docket on this incident at the end 

of June and issue a report shortly thereafter. In general, we are 

looking at pipeline operations, the adequacy of Atmos’s integrity 

management program, human performance, their safety management system if they had one, and the adequacy of emergency response. 

Mr. ALLRED. Well, thank you. And, you know, my wife and I just 

had a baby as well, and, you know, I can’t imagine being in your 

home and having that happen and losing a child like that. 

There has been a lot of talk today about PHMSA’s 

unimplemented safety provisions. And I am interested if there are 

any specific provisions that you think would have prevented or reduced the likelihood of this particular incident. 

Ms. HOMENDY. It is a great question. It is one that I can’t answer 

yet because the investigation is still ongoing. But I can tell you 

that our staff at the NTSB—I have only been there 71⁄2 months, 

but I have worked with the NTSB for many, many years, which is 

why I wanted to go there. The staff is incredible. 

So I will tell you that if there is a recommendation that needs 

to be issued to ensure safety and address what occurred in Dallas, 

it will be issued. 

Mr. ALLRED. Well, thank you so much. And I appreciate your 

comments. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Payne for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this timely hearing as well. 

Let’s see. Mr. Elliott, my question has to do with what we are 

doing to protect critical safety gaps. And my issue is around water 

pipelines. 

I am from New Jersey. It seems like the committee is dominated 

by New Jerseyans. I am from New Jersey as well, from the city of 

Newark. And we have a reservoir system up in the western part 

of the State, which is pretty interesting because most of the water 

55 

is moved by gravity, as opposed to pumping stations, because of 

proximity in the mountains. 

And so I am just very concerned about the safety of those pipelines coming such a great distance. And I am concerned about that 

because of my representation there in Newark. So, you know, given 

my district’s reliance on, you know, this infrastructure, this pipeline, I want to make sure that it is safe and protected. 

So what are you doing around water infrastructure in terms of 

safety? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question. 

Having been a resident of New Jersey for 13 years, I know exactly 

the infrastructure that you are talking about. 

You know, PHMSA does not have oversight over water pipeline 

systems, but, certainly, where multiple pipelines come into close 

proximity, there is always a concern for safety. 

But to perhaps address on the more broader question about what 

are we doing to enhance safety, I think from the point of view, at 

least, from the State of New Jersey, several things I can talk to. 

You know, first of all, with regards to PHMSA oversight of transmission lines in the State, we have an office in Trenton, and the 

inspection staff there is responsible for working with transmission 

pipeline operators in the State to inspect any new construction but 

also to oversee maintenance and operations of their pipeline systems to ensure the safety and the integrity. 

Of course, in New Jersey, as I had mentioned earlier, 80 percent 

of the Nation’s pipeline is part of a distribution network that is, for 

all intents and purposes, overseen by State regulators. We do have 

a responsibility there too. And while most State pipeline offices do 

a very good job of overseeing intrastate pipeline, we do have a responsibility to work with them to make sure that the work that 

they do helps comply with at least the minimum Federal standards 

that we put into place. 

So it is kind of a tag-team approach between what PHMSA can 

do with transmission lines and the State oversight on some of the 

distribution networks. Our intent is to make sure that all operators, whether or not it is a distribution system or a transmission 

line, comply with the regulations and ensure the safety of their operations for the good people of New Jersey. 

Mr. PAYNE. OK. Well, thank you. And I apologize for trying to 

give you responsibility of that area as well. So thank you, though. 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, as long as it doesn’t come with more mandates that I would get in trouble for. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. The Chair will now recognize Mr. DeSaulnier for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Elliott, I want to ask you about changes to PHMSA after the 

2010 San Bruno explosion in northern California. I appreciate you 

coming into the office and meeting with me given the number of 

hazardous material sites in my district in northern California. 

But when this incident happened, the incident lasted for 95 minutes. NTSB came back and said that that was a contributing factor 

to the fact that 70 homes were lost and 8 people’s lives were lost. 

56 

It is a continuing concern. Certainly, we have our own unique seismic issues we have to deal with in California. 

But I wanted you to give the committee an update as to implementation of the direction from Congress after that incident in 

terms of automatic valves and remote control shutoffs. 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, Congressman, thank you for your time the 

other day, and I was quite interested to learn more about the district and some of the challenges you face there. 

You know, it was September of 2010 when San Bruno occurred, 

and I believe there were eight fatalities. And terrible tragedies like 

that should not occur under any circumstances. 

Earlier today, I spoke of, based on questions that I heard from 

members of the subcommittee, about progress in our rupture detection and automatic valve rule, which, quite frankly, has languished 

behind several of the other pipeline rules that we had been working on, one on pipeline liquid safety and one on gas safety. 

A lot of what you are talking about from the incident at San 

Bruno we hope to resolve with the rupture detection and automatic 

valve rule that is in the notice-of-proposed-rulemaking stage. We 

hope to have that out for public comment very shortly. And then, 

once we can see the responses back from that, we hope to move 

that to a final rule. 

We know we have some work to do there. We know that the 

specter of the incident in San Bruno is still something that we talk 

about quite often at PHMSA and our need to do more to make sure 

that we never have a repeat of an incident like that. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. I appreciate that. 

And coming from a district that has the largest geographic and 

population density of hazardous material sites, as I explained to 

you, with four refineries in an urbanized area, it is not unlike 

Philadelphia or these urbanized areas where, generally, we do a 

very good job. But all it takes is that one incident. And, certainly, 

for the people affected, you can’t explain our inability to provide 

these kind of remedies. 

For NTSB, have there been other incidents, Ms. Homendy? And 

I am sorry I wasn’t hear for Mr. Davis’s dialogue. And I will be 

happy to text Mr. Capuano if you would like. But could you give 

us any information, have there been other incidents where these 

type of remote control valves or automatic shutoffs would have 

helped in incidents since the San Bruno one? 

Ms. HOMENDY. There have been many incidents where they 

would have. I mean, we have, in general, an issue with pipelines 

being shut down promptly once an incident occurs and, actually, 

the operator knowing about the problem. 

With PG&E, we had an incident not too long ago where, you 

know, it was 2 hours to shut down the pipeline. And this one, it 

was 95 minutes. And we did find that it severely hindered emergency response operations because of the lack of shutoff valves and 

also a lack of appropriate training for pipeline personnel, who had 

gone and didn’t know how to deal with the manual valves. 

But, in other instances, you have prior PG&E incidents where it 

took them 2 hours and 45 minutes to shut it down, or 9 hours, or 

you had a Centreville, Virginia, incident which was 2 hours. And 

57 

then, certainly, in the Enbridge pipeline incident in Marshall, 

Michigan, that was 17 hours. 

So I think the history on pipeline accidents is we need to be able 

to detect a leak properly and then to shut down the pipeline. And, 

you know, automatic and remote shutoff valves sort of take the 

human out of the equation. 

I will say the recent Merrimack Valley incident, where you had 

manual valves—and while Columbia Gas was able to shut down 

the regulator station within 3 hours, they were not able to turn off 

the gas for 3 hours. So that also contributes to significant issues. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. It would be helpful for me and, I assume, the 

committee, any kind of updates you could provide on a timeline. 

Because it is certainly urgent for those of us who live in these 

areas with urban areas and the high concentration of pipelines. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. The Chair will now recognize the vice chair of the 

full committee, Mr. Carbajal, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Administrator Elliott, thank you for coming before our committee 

to discuss pipeline safety. 

This is a particularly important issue for my constituents on the 

central coast of California. From the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill 

to the 2015 Plains All American Pipeline oil spill at Refugio Beach, 

we have seen the damage oil spills inflict on our communities and 

local economies. 

In 2011, the House worked in a bipartisan way to pass the Pipeline Safety Act. This law, which passed the House unanimously, directed PHMSA to update and strengthen key pipeline safety standards. Today, 8 years after the enactment of the Pipeline Safety Act 

of 2011, rulemakings related to leak detection and emergency shutoff valves are still not finalized. 

While it is my understanding that a notice of proposed rulemaking is finally on the way later this summer, this was after an 

8-year delay and after much advocacy. Clearly unacceptable. 

And I know your service just started in 2017, but you become the 

spokesperson to address these issues today. So let me ask you, why 

has this taken so long? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question. 

And I share your concerns about the length of time that it has 

taken to move these rules through. And I appreciate your comment 

about my adoption of things that might have happened or didn’t 

get done prior to my time coming on as Administrator. 

I think there are several factors that came into play. With the 

determination after this subcommittee—when I testified before this 

subcommittee last June, I had to go back and make some decisions 

about what rules do we want to focus on first. And while I think 

we have an extremely capable rulemaking staff, it still has limited 

resources. And I honestly think they are working the best they can. 

But I went back and I focused on the rules with that team that 

I thought would have the greatest impact to safety the quickest. 

And the two that we really focused on dealt with surface hazmat 

transportation issues—one dealing with response to major rail incidents, should they occur, with petroleum crude oil; and the other 

58 

with the safety of lithium ion batteries, removing cargo-type lithium ion batteries from passenger commercial airlines. 

And once that work was done, then we really did turn our attention back to these important pipeline mandates. And kind of the 

order that they came in was the safety of liquid pipeline rule, 

which we have completed our work and it is now at OMB, and we 

are hoping that we have a quick turnaround there. 

And then the second and perhaps the one that is more responsive 

to you was the gas rule, which had been identified as the mega 

rule, and ultimately what we did to help streamline that was to 

break it into three parts. And the most important part, the part 

that contains the mandates that were brought forward by Congress, are the ones that we have now completed our work on, and 

that is also going through internal review. 

We do know we have work to do on—— 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. I am going to stop you there because 

I have a few more questions. 

Have any of the administration’s Executive orders caused any 

further delays on the implementation of safety rules? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not believe so. You know, we focus on moving 

forward safety rules each and every day. 

And I think a good example of a nonmandate safety rule that we 

just recently published as a final rule is the plastic pipe rules. We 

were looking for ways within PHMSA to help us incentivize replacement of the aging distribution pipe network. And we thought 

this was one where new technology in plastic pipe construction 

would allow us to do that. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. 

And, lastly, what are some of the ways that we can reform the 

PHMSA process to ensure we do not have these lengthy delays in 

the future? 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, Congressman, I mentioned earlier, I have 

worked hard at PHMSA to make sure that our portion of the rulemaking process is as good as it can be, that when we have a rule 

that we are moving, because it is one we have identified is necessary for improving pipeline or hazardous material safety or it is 

a mandate from Congress, that we work as quickly as possible to 

complete our portion of that rulemaking. 

We have done that through several ways: kind of just building 

an additional sense of urgency in our rulemaking process; and the 

second part, as I had mentioned earlier, kind of creating a more 

streamlined internal pipeline and hazardous material rulemaking 

process that allows us basically to utilize existing staff to the fullest potential to make sure that we are moving those rules that 

have the greatest impact. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. 

Mr. Chair, I yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. 

I want to thank Administrator Elliott and Member Homendy for 

their testimony today. There will be followup questions, I am sure, 

from this hearing, and we will be calling on you further as we move 

forward with this pipeline safety reauthorization bill. 

So thank you very much for your testimony today. 

Mr. ELLIOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

59 

Ms. HOMENDY. Thank you. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. And I will call up the second panel. 

I would like to welcome now our next panel of witnesses: Mr. 

Carl Weimer, executive director of the Pipeline Safety Trust; Mr. 

Andrew Black, president and CEO of the Association of Oil Pipe 

Lines; Fire Chief Dan Eggleston, EFO, CFO, CMO, president and 

chairman of the board, International Association of Fire Chiefs; Mr. 

Richard Kuprewicz, president of Accufacts Inc.; Mr. Robin Rorick, 

vice president of midstream and industry operations, American Petroleum Institute; and Mr. Elgie Holstein, senior director for strategic planning, Environmental Defense Fund. 

Thank you for being here today. I look forward to your testimony. 

I ask unanimous consent that our witnesses’ full statements be 

included in the record. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

And as with the previous panel, since your written testimony has 

been made part of the record, the subcommittee will request that 

you limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes. 

So we will begin with Mr. Weimer. You are recognized. 

TESTIMONY OF CARL WEIMER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST; ANDREW J. BLACK, PRESIDENT AND 

CEO, ASSOCIATION OF OIL PIPE LINES; FIRE CHIEF DAN 

EGGLESTON, EFO, CFO, CMO, PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN 

OF THE BOARD, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE 

CHIEFS; RICHARD B. KUPREWICZ, PRESIDENT, ACCUFACTS 

INC.; ROBIN RORICK, VICE PRESIDENT OF MIDSTREAM AND 

INDUSTRY OPERATIONS, AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE; AND ELGIE HOLSTEIN, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND 

Mr. WEIMER. Good afternoon, Chairman Lipinski and members 

of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to speak about pipeline safety today. 

Before we get into various pipeline safety issues, let me give you 

a brief overview of where we stand today regarding the safety of 

pipelines in this country. 

While everyone testifying today supports the goal of zero incidents, we still have a long way to go to reach that goal. According 

to PHMSA data, since the PIPES Act was signed, less than 3 years 

ago, there have been over 1,700 reportable pipeline failures. Of 

those failures, nearly 800 are considered significant incidents 

under PHMSA’s definitions, and the number of significant incidents has been increasing over the past decade. 

For the past 15 years, the emphasis in reducing pipeline incidents has been focused on performance-based integrity management programs. Unfortunately, it would appear that these integrity 

management programs have not yet lived up to their promise, as 

significant incident rates within high-consequence areas continue 

to climb for hazardous liquid and gas transmission pipelines. 

The pipeline safety system that Congress has created plays a 

part in PHMSA’s inability to get things done. One of the large barriers to getting better regulations in place is the cost-versus-benefit 

analysis that Congress has uniquely created for only PHMSA. With 

a large pipeline system, where the probability of a failure is low 

60 

but the consequence can be huge, it is nearly impossible to pass 

regulations under the current cost-benefit rules. 

If you are really interested in longstanding issues, such as effective leak detection, automated shutoff valves, and the regulation of 

over 400,000 miles of unregulated gathering lines, then the costbenefit language in the statute needs to be fixed. 

PHMSA’s penalty authority provided by Congress results in civil 

penalties that are economically insignificant to many operators and 

are much smaller than those imposed by some States. The wording 

in the statute for criminal penalties also does not align with the 

better wording for PHMSA’s hazmat operations and creates a very 

high bar to prove. We have provided suggested changes to the statute that can give PHMSA more flexibility in penalty assessment 

and the ability to bring criminal charges on companies in the rare 

cases where that is warranted. 

As currently written by Congress, the pipeline safety statutes do 

not prohibit the release of gas or hazardous liquid from a pipeline. 

Under current PHMSA rules and as determined by recent court 

rulings, an operator can cause a significant incident without necessarily having violated a safety regulation. In other words, under 

PHMSA’s rules, an operator has to have a plan for operating and 

testing their pipeline, but they don’t necessarily have to have a 

plan that works. To close that loophole, we ask that you add language to make clear that the intent of a statute is to avoid releases 

of gas and hazardous liquids. 

In the PIPES Act, Congress asked the GAO to produce important 

reports on the integrity management program for both natural gas 

and hazardous liquid pipelines after the new rules PHMSA has 

been working on since 2010 are published. Since those rules have 

yet to be published, it may be delayed further. These important reports are not yet due. 

The current integrity management rules have been in place for 

over a decade, are well-understood, and NTSB has done a study on 

its effectiveness. So we ask that Congress direct GAO to produce 

these important reports as soon as possible instead of waiting for 

the proposed rules. 

Congress should also ignore industry calls for a relaxation of 

class location rules because integrity management is in place until 

these GAO reports are done and the number of incidents under integrity management shows a downward trend. 

Also in the PIPES Act, Congress directed PHMSA to make it 

clear that the Great Lakes, coastal beaches, and marine coastal waters are considered unusually sensitive areas. This mandate is yet 

to be accomplished. The need to do this came as a surprise to us 

since, clearly, these areas are unusually sensitive. We were also 

surprised to learn that PHMSA does not currently have a way to 

define and map all such areas. 

Congress should ask GAO to do a study of whether PHMSA’s 

definitions and identification of such areas, along with commercially navigable waterways, are consistent with other environmental regulations and whether PHMSA currently has GIS data 

layers that allow the agency and industry to know where such 

boundaries are and uses this data to ensure pipeline operators are 

accurately identifying these areas. 

61 

Congress should also mandate that such areas be made public so 

State and local governments, along with the public, can ensure that 

PHMSA and pipeline companies are correctly designating such important areas. 

I see my time is about up, so I want to thank you again for inviting me to testify today. And I am glad to answer any questions and 

work with the committee as you move forward on reauthorization. 

[Mr. Weimer’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Carl Weimer, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety 

Trust 

Good morning Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and members of 

the committee. Thank you for inviting me to speak today on the important subject 

of pipeline safety. My name is Carl Weimer and I am the Executive Director of the 

Pipeline Safety Trust. 

The Pipeline Safety Trust came into being after a pipeline disaster nearly twenty 

years ago—the 1999 Olympic Pipeline tragedy in Bellingham, Washington that left 

three young people dead, wiped out every living thing in a beautiful salmon stream, 

and caused millions of dollars of economic disruption. While prosecuting that incident the U.S. Justice Department was so aghast at the way the pipeline company 

had operated and maintained its pipeline, and equally aghast at the lack of oversight from federal regulators, that they asked the federal courts to set aside money 

from the settlement of that case to create the Pipeline Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog organization over both the industry and the regulators. 

After the Bellingham tragedy our community, from the local level to our congressional delegation, all joined in the effort to ensure that a tragedy like that would 

‘‘never happen again, anywhere.’’ Unfortunately many tragedies have occurred since 

then, some of them worse than Bellingham, and after each tragedy the people in 

those affected communities try to find a way to ensure it will ‘‘never happen again, 

anywhere.’’ So here I am again today, nearly twenty years after my first testimony, 

representing all those communities and all those people searching for a way to prevent tragedies so they never happen again. We hope you will continue to work together in a bipartisan way to help us finally accomplish this. 

Today I would like to focus my testimony on: 

• An overview of the safety of the current pipeline system in this country 

• Needed Improvements to the Statutes that Cover Pipeline Safety 

• Remove redundant and excessive Cost-Benefit Requirements Under 49 USC 

§ 60102 

• Civil and Criminal Penalties under § 60122 and § 60123 

• Need for Mandamus Clause under § 60121 

• Clarify that reportable unintended releases are prohibited under § 60118 

• Ensure PHMSA follows the intent of reporting under §60102 

• Clarify and increase authorized appropriations under § 60125 

• Other Still Needed Improvements 

• Require minimum standards for over 435,000 miles of natural gas gathering 

lines 

• Performance standards for hazardous liquid leak detection, and gas transmission rupture detection 

• Requirements for automated remote shut-off valve placement and performance requirements on transmission pipelines. 

• Pipeline Segments that cross rivers are not sufficiently protected by existing 

rules 

• Address shortcomings in the way PHMSA defines and addresses Unusually 

Sensitive Areas for hazardous liquid pipelines 

• Reduction in Methane Emissions from Gas Pipelines 

• Hopeful Initiatives in the Works 

• Safety Management Systems 

• Voluntary Information Sharing System for Pipelines 

Overview of the Safety of the Current Pipeline System 

Before we get too far into various pipeline safety programs I want to provide information regarding how well the current system is providing for safety. While everyone testifying today supports the goal of zero incidents, we still have a long way 

62 

1 https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-20-year-trends 

to go to reach that goal. According to data provided by the pipeline industry to 

PHMSA, in just the years since the President signed the PIPES ACT of 2016, there 

have been over 1700 reportable pipeline incidents. Of those incidents over 775 are 

considered Significant Incidents under PHMSA’s definitions. That amounts to an average of over 20 significant pipeline failures every month since PHMSA’s pipeline 

safety program was last reauthorized. Even more concerning than the raw number 

of failures is that while we have all been saying the goal is zero incidents the number of significant incidents including all types of pipelines has been increasing over 

the past decade according to PHMSA data (See graph), with the majority of that 

increase attributable to hazardous liquid pipelines. 

Also of concern is that for gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines over 

65 percent of the significant failures in the past decade are from causes the operators ought to have control over such as corrosion, incorrect operations, equipment 

failures, and problems with the materials they use and the welds they make. The 

pie charts below, generated from PHMSA data 1, demonstrate this problem. 

Over the past fifteen years much of the emphasis in reducing pipeline incidents 

has been focused on Integrity Management efforts in High Consequence Areas. The 

theory behind Integrity Management programs makes perfect sense—focus efforts 

in those areas where the most harm to people and the environment may occur, work 

hard to identify the risks in those areas, put into place programs to test for and 


P:\Hearings\116\RR\4-2-2019_36616\weim01.eps P:\Hearings\116\RR\4-2-2019_36616\weim02.eps
63 

mitigate those risks, and implement a continuous improvement program to drive 

down the number of failures. 

Unfortunately, for hazardous liquid pipelines and gas transmission pipelines it 

would appear that these integrity management programs have not yet lived up to 

their promise as incident rates within High Consequence Areas continue to climb. 


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64 

2 Hazardous Liquid Integrity Management Performance Measures—https://www. 

phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/hazardous-liquid-integrity-management/hl-im-performance-measures 

Gas Transmission Integrity Management Performance Measures—https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/ 

pipeline/gas-transmission-integrity-management/gt-im-performance-measures 3PHMSA Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee Meeting Pre-briefing, December 20, 2018— 

https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/meetings/FilGet.mtg?fil=1028 4http://www.napsr.org/SiteAssets/NAPSR-Resolutions-Open/201002%20Gas%20gathering 

%20line%20class%201%20Resolution.pdf 

These two graphs, generated from PHMSA’s Integrity Management Data 2, demonstrate this concern with current integrity management programs. Some in the industry argue that older, prescriptive class location rules can now be relaxed because 

of the implementation of integrity management, but as the graphs above show it 

is too early to go to a more performance-based integrity management system until 

the industry can prove that integrity management works as it should. 

Cost-Benefit Requirements Under 49 USC § 60102 

The years since 2010 found us too often examining the failures that led to major 

pipeline incidents: Marshall, Michigan; San Bruno, California; Allentown, Pennsylvania; Sissonville, West Virginia; Harlem, New York; Mayflower, Arkansas; two 

spills into the Yellowstone River, oil flowing into the ocean off Santa Barbara, and 

too many more. Against that backdrop of incidents and Congressional directives, 

NTSB and GAO recommendations, these years also provided a perfect example of 

a broken regulatory process that left PHMSA incapable of producing a single major 

new safety rule. There are many reasons the process is not working but chief among 

them is the unique and onerous cost-benefit requirements that PHMSA finds itself 

saddled with. 

In 1996, a concerted Congressional effort was made to insert cost-benefit analysis 

requirements into rulemaking requirements under a whole host of environmental 

protection and health statutes, presumably as a way to reduce regulatory burden 

and codify the requirements for regulatory cost benefit analyses put in place by 

Presidents Reagan and Clinton in Executive Orders. Those Congressional efforts ultimately fell short of wide spread success because so many members of Congress realized how such measures in the statute would provide a well funded industry a 

strong litigation hook that would make it too easy to successfully challenge new regulations and nearly impossible to adequately protect people’s health and safety. The 

1996 reauthorization of the pipeline safety program, based solely on timing, represents the only health and safety or environmental protection statute where such 

an explicit directive to an administrative agency to base regulation of risk on a costbenefit test was actually inserted into statute. 

PHMSA rulemaking is therefore subject to two sets of cost-benefit requirements— 

one under the Pipeline Safety Act and one under the Executive Order that requires 

an economic analysis of every major rule reviewed by OMB before being published 

as a proposed rule and subject to comment. We urge you to put PHMSA’s rulemaking on an even playing field with all other agencies by amending 49 USC § 

60102 to eliminate references to the risk assessment/cost-benefit analysis in 

§60102(b)(2)(D) and (E); §60102(b)(3), (4), (5) and (6). PHMSA would remain subject 

to the requirements of the Executive Orders requiring a cost benefit analysis of 

major rules proposed by any agency, and the requirements for transparency in rulemaking provided by the existing statute and procedures. 

A clear example of problems excessive cost benefit analysis can cause can be seen 

in the lack of regulation of rural natural gas gathering lines. According to a recent 

briefing from PHMSA 3 to the Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee they estimate that 

there are over 438,000 miles of such gathering lines in the country falling outside 

of any federal or state pipeline safety regulation. Many of these lines are the same 

size and pressure as transmission pipelines, so pose the same risk. The regulation 

of these lines has been one of our top priorities for years now, and it is now one 

of the state regulators’ top priorities also. In 2010 the state regulators passed a resolution 4 that says in part: 

WHEREAS: In the newer gas gathering systems, it is not uncommon to find rural gas gathering pipelines up to 30′′ in diameter 

and operating at a MAOP of 1480 psi. 

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED: That NAPSR urge PHMSA 

to modify 49 CFR Sections 192.8 and 192.9 to establish regulatory 

requirements for gathering lines in Class 1 areas: 

65 

5 Joint Position Paper, API & GPA Midstream Assoc.—https://www.regulations.gov/ 

document?D=PHMSA-2016-0136-0045 

Since these 438,000 miles of pipelines are completely unregulated no one collects 

any information about their location, construction, size, pressure, risks, failure incidents, etc. Since no regulator collects any information it is nearly impossible for 

PHMSA to pass regulations because how can they quantify the required costs or 

benefits? In a recent position paper on gathering lines 5 the industry claimed that 

if PHMSA moved forward with a relatively weak gathering line rule it would cost 

the industry 28 billion dollars. PHMSA finds itself in a no win situation based on 

cost benefit requirements that effectively make it impossible to move forward on 

needed rules without first going through years of costly information collection, 

(which will also be opposed by industry), to be able to complete a cost benefit analysis. How, under this cost-benefit requirement in the statute can PHMSA, knowing 

full well that the industry will challenge any such regulation, construct a rule that 

protects people from a known risk? 

Proposed fix for this problem—remove highlighted language 

§ 60102. Purpose and general authority 

(b) PRACTICABILITY AND SAFETY NEEDS STANDARDS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—A standard prescribed under subsection (a) shall be— 

(A) practicable; and 

(B) designed to meet the need for— 

(i) gas pipeline safety, or safely transporting hazardous liquids, as appropriate; and 

(ii) protecting the environment. 

(2) FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION.—When prescribing any standard under 

this section or section 60101(b), 60103, 60108, 60109, 60110, or 60113, the 

Secretary shall consider— 

(A) relevant available— 

(i) gas pipeline safety information; 

(ii) hazardous liquid pipeline safety information; and 

(iii) environmental information; 

(B) the appropriateness of the standard for the particular type of pipeline 

transportation or facility; 

(C) the reasonableness of the standard; 

(D) based on a risk assessment, the reasonably identifiable or estimated ben- efits expected to result from implementation or compliance with the

standard;

(E) based on a risk assessment, the reasonably identifiable or estimated costs

expected to result from implementation or compliance with the standard;

(F) comments and information received from the public; and 

(G) the comments and recommendations of the Technical Pipeline Safety 

Standards Committee, the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety 

Standards Committee, or both, as appropriate. 

(3) RISK ASSESSMENT.—In conducting a risk assessment referred to in subparagraphs (D) and (E) of paragraph (2), the Secretary shall—

(A) identify the regulatory and nonregulatory options that the Secretary considered in prescribing a proposed standard;

(B) identify the costs and benefits associated with the proposed standard;

(C) include—

(i) an explanation of the reasons for the selection of the proposed standard

in lieu of the other options identified; and

(ii) with respect to each of those other options, a brief explanation of the

reasons that the Secretary did not select the option; and

(D) identify technical data or other information upon which the risk assessment information and proposed standard is based.

(4) REVIEW.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall—

(i) submit any risk assessment information prepared under paragraph (3)

of this subsection to the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee,

the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee,

or both, as appropriate; and

(ii) make that risk assessment information available to the general public.

(B) PEER REVIEW PANELS.—The committees referred to in subparagraph

(A) shall serve as peer review panels to review risk assessment information prepared under this section. Not later than 90 days after receiving

66 

risk assessment information for review pursuant to subparagraph (A),

each committee that receives that risk assessment information shall prepare and submit to the Secretary a report that includes—

(i) an evaluation of the merit of the data and methods used; and

(ii) any recommended options relating to that risk assessment information

and the associated standard that the committee determines to be appropriate.

(C) REVIEW BY SECRETARY.—Not later than 90 days after receiving a report submitted by a committee under subparagraph (B), the Secretary—

(i) shall review the report;

(ii) shall provide a written response to the committee that is the author of

the report concerning all significant peer review comments and recommended alternatives contained in the report; and

(iii) may revise the risk assessment and the proposed standard before promulgating the final standard.

(5) SECRETARIAL DECISIONMAKING.—Except where otherwise required by

statute, the Secretary shall propose or issue a standard under this Chapter

1 only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended

standard justify its costs.

(6) EXCEPTIONS FROM APPLICATION.—The requirements of subparagraphs

(D) and (E) of paragraph (2) do not apply when—

(A) the standard is the product of a negotiated rulemaking, or other rulemaking including the adoption of industry standards that receives no significant adverse comment within 60 days of notice in the Federal Register;

(B) based on a recommendation (in which three-fourths of the members voting concur) by the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee, the

Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee, or

both, as applicable, the Secretary waives the requirements; or

(C) the Secretary finds, pursuant to section 553(b)(3)(B) of title 5, United

States Code, that notice and public procedure are not required.

(7) REPORT.—Not later than March 31, 2000, the Secretary shall transmit to 

the Congress a report that— 

(A) describes the implementation of the risk assessment requirements of this 

section, including the extent to which those requirements have affected 

regulatory decisionmaking and pipeline safety; and 

(B) includes any recommendations that the Secretary determines would make 

the risk assessment process conducted pursuant to the requirements 

under this chapter a more effective means of assessing the benefits and 

costs associated with alternative regulatory and nonregulatory options in 

prescribing standards under the Federal pipeline safety regulatory program under this chapter. 

§ 60115. Technical safety standards committees 

(a) ORGANIZATION.—The Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee and 

the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee are committees in the Department of Transportation. The committees referred to in the preceding sentence shall serve as peer review committees for carrying out this chapter. 

Peer reviews conducted by the committees shall be treated for purposes of all Federal laws relating to risk assessment and peer review (including laws that take effect after the date of the enactment of the Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996) as meeting any peer review requirements of such laws.

(b) COMPOSITION AND APPOINTMENT 

(3) The members of each committee are appointed as follows: 

(C) Two of the individuals selected for each committee under paragraph 

(3)(C) of this subsection must have education, background, or experience 

in environmental protection or public safety. At least 1 of the individuals At least 1 of the individuals

selected for each committee under paragraph (3)(C) shall have education,

background, or experience in risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis.

At least one individual selected for each committee under paragraph 

(3)(C) may not have a financial interest in the pipeline, petroleum, or natural gas industries. 

(c) COMMITTEE REPORTS ON PROPOSED STANDARDS. 

(1) The Secretary shall give to— 

(A) the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee each standard proposed under this chapter for transporting gas and for gas pipeline facilities including the risk assessment information including the risk assessment information and other analyses supporting each proposed standard; and 

67 

6 https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/enforce/CivilPenaltylopidl0.html?nocache= 

9634#lTPl1ltabl3 (from 11/29/2018). 7 PHMSA, All Reported Incident Trends, (from 11/29/2018). 

(B) the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee 

each standard proposed under this chapter for transporting hazardous 

liquid and for hazardous liquid pipeline facilities including the risk as including the risk as- sessment information and other analyses supporting each proposed standard. 

(2) Not later than 90 days after receiving the proposed standard and supporting 

analyses, the appropriate committee shall prepare and submit to the Secretary a report on the technical feasibility, reasonableness, cost-effective cost-effective- ness, and practicability of the proposed standard and include in the report 

recommended actions. The Secretary shall publish each report, including 

any recommended actions and minority views. The report if timely made is 

part of the proceeding for prescribing the standard. The Secretary is not 

bound by the conclusions of the committee. However, if the Secretary rejects 

the conclusions of the committee, the Secretary shall publish the reasons. 

(3) The Secretary may prescribe a standard after the end of the 90-day period. 

Civil and Criminal Penalties under § 60122 and § 60123 

The concern: PHMSA’s penalty authority, and the agency’s implementation of 

that authority, results in civil penalties that are economically insignificant to operators, are significantly smaller than those imposed by some states, and are disproportionate to the harm inflicted by pipeline failures. The ‘‘hearings’’ referenced in the 

statute regarding fines are normally secret, closed door affairs where no record of 

what has occurred is available to the public, even though often proposed fines are 

dramatically reduced after those hearings. 

Background: From 2002 through 2018, the total amount of penalties collected 

by PHMSA in completed civil penalty cases (from violations discovered in inspections or following incidents) is just over $56 million dollars combined.6 In that same 

timeframe, the nearly eleven thousand reported pipeline incidents killed 249 people, 

injured 1041 and caused property damage approaching $8 billion dollars.7 Congress 

increased PHMSA’s civil penalty authority in the 2011 reauthorization up to a cap 

of $200,000 per violation and $2 million dollars for a related series of violations. In 

spite of that increase, there has not been a corresponding increase in penalties proposed or collected, suggesting that PHMSA remains reluctant to impose penalties. 

In fact, some dramatic incidents, like the failure and explosion of a NiSource natural gas pipeline in Sissonville, WV (caused by corrosion) that destroyed a home and 

a section of Interstate highway, have resulted in no civil penalties at all. 

Some states, notably California, have dramatically increased their use of civil penalties in the last decade, levying large fines like the one levied against PG&E following the San Bruno tragedy. The state regulator fined the utility $1.6 billion dollars for violations related to the 2010 failure in San Bruno and has since fined the 

utility additional millions relating to subsequent recordkeeping, reporting and other 

violations. These large fines are possible because the California, and other state 

statutes, do not have a limit on penalties for a related series of violations. Each day 

in violation is subject to another penalty. 

Fortunately it is very rare that a pipeline operator violates the regulations in a 

way that would be considered criminal. Our organization, the Pipeline Safety Trust, 

was born from one of those rare incidents where an operator’s actions were proven 

to be so reckless as to kill members of the public and do uncounted environmental 

harm. In that case the U.S. Justice Department under President Bush did an outstanding job prosecuting that case, fining the company, and actually getting jail 

time for company employees. There have only been a handful of other incidents 

caused by such reckless behavior from pipeline companies since that case nearly 20 

years ago, but it is important not to create barriers that make it difficult to hold 

companies accountable when they knowingly or recklessly ignore the laws meant to 

keep people safe. The current statute that applies to pipeline safety—Title 49 USC 

§ 60123. Criminal Penalties—sets an unusually high bar for holding companies accountable for criminal behavior. We ask that you align the pipeline safety rules 

under PHMSA with the PHMSA rules for transportation of hazardous materials and 

change §60123 to adopt the ‘‘willfully or recklessly’’ language from the Hazmat statute in Title 49 USC § 5124. Criminal Penalties. 

While PHMSA maintains considerable discretion over when and how much to fine 

a pipeline company, Congress should at least remove the barriers to adequate enforcement so the agency has the ability to send a message to a company when need 

68 

8 City and County of San Francisco v United States Department of Transportation, 

https://www.transportation.gov/administrations/office-general-counsel/city-and-county-sanfrancisco-v-dot 

be. Congress should also make sure the hearing process where final fines are determined is open to the public, that notice is provided, and that associated non-security-sensitive information is also publicly available. 

Recommendations: Eliminate the cap on civil penalties for ‘‘a related series of 

violations,’’ make the hearings public, amend the penalty amount for LNG facilities 

to a commensurate level with pipelines, and change the language for the standard 

for criminal penalties to align with the hazardous materials rules. Direct the Secretary to amend the agency’s regulations accordingly within 180 days. 

Proposed Language to fix this problem 

§ 60122. Civil penalties 

(a) GENERAL PENALTIES.— 

(1) A person that the Secretary of Transportation decides, after written notice 

and an opportunity for a hearingø for which public notice and access 

must be given¿, has violated section 60114(b), 60114(d), or 60118(a) of this 

title or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this chapter is liable 

to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not more than 

$200,000 for each violation. A separate violation occurs for each day the violation continues. The maximum civil penalty under this paragraph for a re The maximum civil penalty under this paragraph for a re- lated series of violations is $2,000,000.

(2) A person violating a standard or order under section 60103 or 60111 of this 

title is liable to the Government for a civil penalty of not more than 

ø$200,000¿ $50,000 for each violation. A penalty under this paragraph may 

be imposed in addition to penalties imposed under paragraph (1) of this subsection. 

§ 60123. Criminal penalties 

(a) GENERAL PENALTY.—A person knowinglyø,¿ and willfullyø, or recklessly¿ 

violating section 60114(b), 60118(a), or 60128 of this title or a regulation prescribed 

or order issued under this chapter shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned for not 

more than 5 years, or both. 

The Need for a Mandamus Clause Under § 60121 

Goal: Amend the federal Pipeline Safety Act to include a provision allowing actions for mandamus against the agency for failing to fulfill non-discretionary duties 

under the Act. 

Background: In 2015, the City of San Francisco, after witnessing the terrible 

nearby tragedy in San Bruno, felt so strongly that PHMSA was failing to uphold 

the statutory requirements and Congressional mandates under the Pipeline Safety 

Act that they went to court to force PHMSA to do so. The Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals, without addressing the merits of the case, dismissed the case with an opinion holding that the Pipeline Safety Act does not provide the basis of a mandamus 

action to force PHMSA to carry out a duty under the Act.8 The court relied, in part, 

on the absence of any explicit mandamus remedy in the Actions By Private Persons 

provision (49 USC 60121). 

Recommendation: We believe that local and state governments, and others, 

should be able to ask the courts to carry out what Congress has required of it in 

the statutes. This is a common protection in many other laws. We urge Congress 

to include the following language in this year’s reauthorization to close this loophole. 

Section 60121 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 

the following: 

‘‘(e) MANDAMUS.—A person may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United States to compel the Secretary 

to perform a nondiscretionary duty under this chapter that the 

Secretary has failed to perform.’’ 

The Need to Ensure that Unintended Releases are Prohibited Under § 

60118 

Background: As currently written the pipeline safety statutes do not expressly 

prohibit the release of gas or hazardous liquid from a pipeline. That is, as the Fifth 

Circuit found in a review of the PHMSA enforcement action following the 2013 spill 

from the ExxonMobil Pegasus pipeline in Mayflower, Arkansas, an operator can 

69 

9Leading Indicators—SRCR and IM Notifications https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-andstatistics/pipeline/leading-indicators-srcr-and-im-notifications 

cause a reportable incident, or even a significant incident, without necessarily having violated a safety regulation. Because of the performance-based nature of many 

of the PHMSA rules it is possible for a pipeline operator to have a plan of operations, or an integrity management plan, that meets all of PHMSA’s requirements, 

but still allows releases to happen. In other words under PHMSA rules an operator 

has to have a plan, but they don’t necessarily have to have a plan that works to 

prevent releases. To close that loophole, we propose that language be added to require operators to avoid releases of gas or hazardous liquids in quantities that 

would make them reportable incidents under PHMSA regulations. We propose that 

this prohibition be inserted into 49 USC §60118, the general compliance and waiver 

section of the statutes. This section is subject to enforcement by PHMSA under 

§60122 or by the Attorney General under §60120. PHMSA would still maintain their 

discretion of how to deal with such releases, but this additional language would 

make it clear that the intent of the statute is to prohibit releases. This also aligns 

with all the major pipeline industry association’s goal of ‘‘zero’’ incidents, and since 

so many of the PHMSA regulations have moved toward performance based requirements it would provide a good incentive to make sure performance means no releases. 

Proposal: Amend §60118. Compliance and waivers by adding at the end of 

(a) General Requirements the following 

(5) not release gas or hazardous liquid from a pipeline facility in 

a quantity that would require the reporting of an incident or accident under regulations prescribed under this chapter. 

Ensuring PHMSA Follows the Intent of Reporting Under §60102 

The existing statute on safety-related conditions reporting is found at 49 USC 

§60102(h) and requires the Secretary to promulgate rules requiring the reporting by 

an operator of any ‘‘condition that is a hazard to life, property, or the environment’’, 

and ‘‘safety related condition that causes or has caused a significant change or restriction in the operation of a pipeline facility.’’ Reports are to be received within 

5 working days after the operator establishes that such a condition exists. 

PHMSA refers to these reports as the leading indicators it collects, as compared 

to incident reports, which are lagging indicators of safety. Collecting information 

about hazardous conditions that could cause incidents allows the agency to examine 

those conditions, determine their frequency and degree of risk, and perhaps to preemptively issue advisories or regulations to prevent recurring hazardous conditions 

from becoming a spate of pipeline facility failures. The agency describes them this 

way, acknowledging that the exemptions included in the implementing regulations 

reduce the value of these reports as a performance measure: 

‘‘Leading indicators are precursors that may lead to an accident or injury. They 

can be used to monitor the effectiveness of integrity programs and safety management systems before accidents, damages, or failures happen. As leading indicators focus on enhancing performance and reducing the probability of serious 

accidents, they can compensate for any shortcomings of lagging performance indicators. . . . PHMSA regulations require operators to submit reports for certain 

conditions before a leak has actually occurred. However, the regulations include 

numerous exemptions from reporting. These exemptions reduce the value of 

SRCR as a performance measure.’’ 9

The regulations, found at 49 CFR part 192.23 and 195.55, rather than requiring 

reporting of the conditions the statute broadly describes as hazards to life, property 

or the environment, as well as safety related conditions that restrict the operation 

of a facility, instead identify a limited number of specific (although ill-defined) types 

of conditions that must be reported and then provides several exemptions from the 

requirement to report even that limited subset of conditions. For example, wholly 

exempted from reporting requirements are hazardous conditions that exist more 

than 200 meters from a building intended for human occupancy or outdoor place of 

assembly and those that are repaired or otherwise corrected before the report is due 

(5 days), as well as abnormal loading or movement of a pipeline from environmental 

or seismic causes unless the movement ‘‘impairs the serviceability of a pipeline.’’ 

70 

It is important to remember that the point of making reports of hazardous conditions that don’t cause incidents is to allow the regulator to learn about their frequency and degree of risk so it can proactively respond to identified risks. The exemptions to reporting requirements prevent these reports from being useful to 

PHMSA for that purpose. A hazardous condition might happen to a pipeline in any 

location. Exempting reports of those conditions by their proximity to occupied buildings or if it is repaired before the report is due eliminates the usefulness of these 

reports in identifying either the frequency or the degree of hazard. If these reports 

are to be useful as leading indicators of safety risks, the reporting requirement must 

be consistent with, and as broad as the statutory language and Congress’ original 

intent. 

Proposal: Amend 49 USC §60102 (h) Safety Condition Reports by adding at 

the end the following section 

(3) Regulations prescribed by the Secretary under this section 

shall not exempt any conditions from reporting requirements if 

such an exemption would reduce or eliminate the value of these 

reports as leading indicators of safety or environmental hazards. 

The Secretary shall make the content of these reports available 

to the public on the agency website. 

Clarify and Increase Appropriations Under § 60125 

State operated pipeline safety programs under agreements with PHMSA oversee 

over 80 percent of the pipeline mileage in the country. Under the Pipeline Safety 

Act PHMSA has the authority to reimburse states for up to 80 percent of the costs 

associated with this oversight, yet as the chart here shows PHMSA often falls well 

below this level putting state programs in a bind to do more with less, which does 

not often work out well when safety is concerned. Because of this reimbursement 

rate gap states also often pay their inspectors less than what PHMSA pays inspectors, which is less than what the pipeline industry pays its similar employees. This 

has led to a well-understood situation throughout the country where states train inspectors, that then leave the state to work for PHMSA or the industry. PHMSA has 

a similar problem with its own engineer inspectors being recruited by the pipeline 

industry who can pay more, thus leaving the state and federal regulators with the 

least trained workforce to oversee this country’s pipeline safety. 

This situation needs to be cured by ensuring that both state and federal inspectors can be hired at more competitive wage rates, and by Congress making sure adeVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN

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71 

10https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/news/69271/reports-congress09262018.pdf 11PHMSA GPAC Presentation—Slide 14—https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/ 

files/docs/standards-rulemaking/pipeline/70276/gas-gathering-lines-gpac-meeting-jan-8-9-2019- 

presentation-version-12-21-2019.pdf 12 NAPSR Resolution 2010-2-AC2 http://nebula.wsimg.com/215b293abe58ff21d6d2ad867ae 

864a3?AccessKeyId=8C483A6DA79FB79FC7FA&disposition=0&alloworigin=1 

quate funding is authorized and appropriated to cover these costs. Congress also 

needs to ensure that PHMSA is charging user fees as authorized in 49 USC §60301 

at sufficient rates to cover these increased costs, along with all other pipeline functions of PHMSA. 

In September 2018 the Secretary delivered to Congress a Nationwide Integrated 

Pipeline Safety Regulatory Database Feasibility Study.10 In that study, wisely required by Congress in the 2016 Act, PHMSA pointed out that state programs are 

not required to provide PHMSA with comparable inspection and enforcement information even though PHMSA is paying states up to 80 percent of their costs for 

these functions. The lack of comparable data makes it impossible for PHMSA, Congress, or the public to know how state pipeline safety programs are performing, and 

more importantly to know how pipeline companies within those states are performing under the varying state regulatory regimes. As PHMSA points out in the 

study by requiring and collecting this information from states PHMSA could: 

• ‘‘incentivize pipeline operators regulated by States to improve safety and avoid 

enforcement actions,’’ 

• ‘‘allow PHMSA to analyze the most frequently violated aspects of pipeline safety 

regulations,’’ 

• provide ‘‘regulators, both PHMSA and State, with knowledge of previous inspection and enforcement actions for a pipeline operator, regardless of the regulator 

conducting the inspection.’’ 

For these reason we hope that Congress will authorize funding for PHMSA and 

the States to get this important information sharing exchange started. While in the 

study PHMSA painted a picture of the need for years to implement such a system, 

in reality there is no reason this could not be phased in over time with at least the 

basic information collected immediately about which companies are being inspected 

by each state and for what, and what types of enforcement actions are being taken 

against pipeline companies in each state and for violated what rules. This would not 

be a heavy lift, and would give PHMSA, Congress, and the public some idea of how 

well the States and more importantly pipeline companies operating within the 

states, are doing regarding pipeline safety. We are somewhat astounded to learn 

that PHMSA does not already have this information in exchange for funding state 

programs. 

Require Minimum Standards for over 435,000 Miles of Natural Gas 

Gathering Lines 

PHMSA estimates there are over 435,000 miles of unregulated onshore gathering 

lines.11 While these gas gathering lines are the same size and pressures as regulated gas transmission lines, and thereby have the same risk, they are not covered 

at all under PHMSA’s regulations. In PHMSA’s 2016 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking the agency proposed to begin regulating all rural (10 or fewer buildings intended for human occupancy nearby) gathering lines 8 inches or larger with some 

very basic regulations to start ensuring they are safe while collecting information 

about where they are actually located and what incidents they are causing. The 

PHMSA proposed regulations are actually less than what PHMSA already requires 

of offshore gathering lines, so in fact fish in the Gulf of Mexico are currently better 

protected than people living in rural areas of states such as Pennsylvania, West Virginia, or Texas. The PHMSA proposal for regulating these gathering lines is also 

considerable weaker than what the state pipeline safety programs asked for in 2010 

when they passed a resolution 12 asking that PHMSA regulate these gathering line 

similarly to the way gas transmission lines are regulated. Unfortunately, the gathering pipeline industry howled, gnashed their teeth, and as we mentioned above 

threatened to use the cost-benefit requirements of the statute to kill the entire large 

natural gas rule that PHMSA has been working on since 2011. In response to the 

tantrum the gathering line industry threw, PHMSA ignored their state regulatory 

partners, ignored the threat to the public that live near rural gathering lines, and 

carved the gathering line part of the rule into it’s own separate rule, and has since 

recommended at this point to leave out the majority of gathering lines from the rule 

altogether. They then gave the industry time to develop an industry designed recVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
72 

ommended practice (standard), that both PHMSA and the industry hopes will be incorporated into PHMSA’s rule as the new gathering regulation. 

Contrary to the industry, there is of course good reason to extend better safety 

requirements to the hundreds of thousands of miles of currently unregulated gathering lines. Below are pictures of what a 10-inch gathering line did to a home near 

Midland, Texas last year and of the three-year-old girl who died in that pipeline 

failure. The exact cause of that failure is still unknown, (no one is investigating because it is unregulated), but clearly a 10-inch gathering pipeline about 20 feet from 

this home posed a risk. The common sense rules that PHMSA had included in their 

original proposal like corrosion control, damage prevention, public awareness, and 

leak surveys may help to prevent another tragedy like this, but under both 

PHMSA’s and the industry’s current proposal for these types of lines this pipeline 

would remain completely unregulated. 

While API continues to push forward to create an industry designed recommended 

practice for PHMSA to incorporate as the gathering line rule, that effort is fraught 

with many fairness, completeness, and process issues. Last summer the state regulators (NAPSR) withdrew from that entire process writing in part: 

‘‘There are multiple reasons for withdrawal; however the primary reason 

is that NAPSR declines to endorse or to give any appearance of endorsement of the API Onshore Gas Gathering Line RP. . . . In addition, it appears that efforts to produce the RP draft had begun, without any notifications to the industry, the public, or to State or Federal regulators, some 

time before NAPSR and other outside stakeholders were invited to participate. These efforts infringe upon the process for fair and unbiased development of standards or other practice documents that are produced for 

industry and sometimes regulatory guidance.’’ 

This is clearly a situation that could be improved by removal of the cost-benefits 

requirements that we talked about earlier to allow PHMSA to move forward on the 

rules they think are necessary, instead of the rules the industry will agree to. It 

is time to end this standoff on over 435,000 miles of risky gathering lines, and the 

easiest way to move forward on this issue immediately is for Congress to make clear 

in the statute that you want these rural lines regulated to some degree, which 

would then give PHMSA the ability and flexibility to do what they think is necessary. One way this could be accomplished is by changing the language in the statute as follows: 

§ 60101. Definitions 

(a) GENERAL.—In this chapter—— 

(21) ‘‘transporting gas’’—— 

(A) means—— 

(i) the gathering, transmission, or distribution of gas by pipeline, or the 

storage of gas, in interstate or foreign commerce; and 

(ii) the movement of gas through regulated gathering linesø, which shall 

include all onshore gathering lines operating above 20% SMYS.¿;

but

(B) does not include gathering gas (except through regulated gathering lines)

in a rural area outside a populated area designated by the Secretary as

a nonrural area.1


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73 

13Leak Detection Study—DTPH56-11-D-000001 https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot. 

gov/files/docs/technical-resources/pipeline/16691/leak-detection-study.pdf 14See 49 CFR 195.452(i)(3). 15See 18 AAC 75.055(a)(1). 16See WAC 480-75-300 

Needed Performance Standard for Hazardous Liquid Leak Detection, and 

Gas Transmission Rupture Detection. 

In the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Congress asked the Secretary to provide a report within one year on the technical limitations of current leak detection systems, the practicability of developing standards 

for the capabilities of leak detection systems, and the costs and benefits of requiring 

pipeline operators to use such systems. PHMSA completed an in-depth study of leak 

detection systems in December of 2013.13 That study found that for hazardous liquid 

pipelines: 

• ‘‘The pipeline controller/control room identified a release occurred around 17 

percent of the time.’’ 

• Emergency responders or a member of the public were currently the most likely 

means of discovering a pipeline release. 

• ‘‘There is no technical reason why several different leak detection methods cannot be implemented at the same time. In fact, a basic engineering robustness 

principle calls for at least two methods that rely on entirely separate physical 

principles.’’ 

• ‘‘External sensors have the potential to deliver sensitivity and time to detection 

far ahead of any internal system.’’ 

In 2010 PHMSA issued an ANPRM for hazardous liquid pipelines that asked in 

part whether PHMSA should ‘‘establish and/or adopt standards and procedures for 

minimum leak detection requirements for all pipelines.’’ Nearly eight and a half 

years after the close of the comment period on that ANPRM the proposed rule has 

still not been issued. Again, the slowness of the rulemaking process seems at odds 

with the public proclamations of concern and action. 

In its hazardous liquid transmission pipeline integrity management rule, PHMSA 

requires that operators have a means to detect leaks, but there are no performance 

standards for such a system.14 This is in contrast to the State of Alaska, for example, which requires that all crude oil transmission pipelines have a leak detection 

system capable of promptly detecting a leak of no more than 1 percent of daily 

throughput 15, or the State or Washington that requires intrastate hazardous liquid 

pipelines have ‘‘leak detection systems must be capable of detecting an eight percent 

of maximum flow leak within fifteen minutes or less.’’ 16 PHMSA listed in the integrity management rule various criteria for operators to consider when selecting such 

a device. Again, such an approach is virtually unenforceable and not protective of 

important environmental assets such as rivers and lakes including those not considered High Consequence Areas. 

The Enbridge spill in Michigan and the Chevron pipeline release near Salt Lake 

City, both nearly nine years ago, are examples of what can go wrong when a pipeline with a leak detection system has no performance standards for operations. In 

both those incidents the pipelines had leak detection systems as required by regulations, but neither system was capable of detecting and halting significant spills. 

We ask that Congress direct PHMSA to issue performance standards for leak detection systems used by hazardous liquid pipeline operators by a date certain to prevent damage from future pipeline releases. Such standards need to clearly determine the size of leak the system is capable of detecting, and the time required for 

the system to issue an alarm in the event that a leak of that size should occur. 

Requirements for Automated Remote Shut-off Valve Placement and 

Performance on Transmission Pipelines. 

Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines—Two decades ago Congress was debating 

a requirement for remote or automatic shutoff valves on natural gas pipelines in the 

wake of the Edison, NJ accident and the two and a half hours it took to shut off 

the flow of gas that fed the fireball due to the lack of a remotely controlled shut 

off valve. After the 2010 San Bruno tragedy where it took the pipeline operator over 

an hour and a half to drive to and close a manual valve the NTSB recommended 

that PHMSA ‘‘Amend Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 192.935(c) to directly require that automatic shutoff valves or remote control valves in high consequence 

areas and in class 3 and 4 locations be installed and spaced at intervals that consider the factors listed in that regulation.’’ 

74 

17http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pvlobjlcache/pvlobjlidl2C1A725B08C5F72F305689E9430 

53A96232AB200/filename/Final%20ValvelStudy.pdf 18See 49 USC 60102(j)(1). 19See 49 USC 60102(j)(2). 20See 49 CFR 195.452(i)(4). 

In the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 Congress asked the Secretary to consider within two years appropriate regulations to 

require the use of automatic or remote-controlled shut-off valves, or equivalent technology, on new or replaced pipelines. PHMSA did contract with Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory for a study of such valves. That study 17 concluded that ‘‘installing ASVs 

and RCVs in pipelines can be an effective strategy for mitigating potential consequences of unintended releases because decreasing the total volume of the release 

reduces overall impacts on the public and to the environment.’’ 

In 2010 PHMSA issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) 

for hazardous liquid pipelines, and then in 2011 PHMSA issued an ANPRM for gas 

transmission pipelines. Both ANPRMs made it clear that some change to the requirements for automatic or remote-controlled valves was being considered. Many 

stakeholder groups invested a significant amount of time responding to these 

ANPRMs. Unfortunately, years later, information regarding how PHMSA will deal 

with this issue in a future rulemaking has not been made available. The slowness 

of the rulemaking process regarding automatic and remote-controlled shut-off valves 

seems at odds with the public proclamations of concern and action. 

Hazardous Liquid Pipelines—For liquid pipelines the foot dragging is even 

worse. In 1992, 1996, 2002, and 2006, Congress required OPS to ‘‘survey and assess 

the effectiveness of emergency flow restricting devices (including remote controlled 

valves . . . } to minimize product releases’’ 18 with the first such requirement having 

a deadline in 1994 (24 years ago!). Following this analysis, Congress required OPS 

to ‘‘prescribe regulations on the circumstances under which an operator of a hazardous liquid pipeline facility must use an emergency flow restricting device.’’ 19

OPS/PHMSA never issued a formal analysis on emergency flow restricting device 

(EFRD) effectiveness. Instead, in its hazardous liquid pipeline integrity management rule 20, OPS rejected the comments of the NTSB, the US Environmental Protection Agency, the Lower Colorado River Authority, the City of Austin, and the Environmental Defense Fund and chose to leave EFRD decisions up to pipeline operators after listing in the rule various criteria for operators to consider. Such an approach to EFRD use does not appear to meet Congressional intent, partly because 

the approach is essentially unenforceable and not protective of important environmental assets such as rivers and lakes including those not considered High Consequence Areas. 

Congress needs to reiterate its previous mandates to PHMSA on EFRD use on 

liquid pipelines and ensure they are followed to mitigate the extent of future pipeline releases. 

Pipeline Segments that Cross Rivers are Not Sufficiently Protected by 

Existing Rules 

In July 2011, the ExxonMobil Silvertip Pipeline ruptured where it crosses the Yellowstone River near Laurel, Montana. The investigation into the cause of the failure 

revealed that the pipeline had been undermined by sustained floodwaters scouring 

the riverbed and exposing the pipeline, resulting in its failure along what had become an unsupported span submerged in the river. The rupture resulted in the release of more than 63,000 gallons of crude oil into the Yellowstone River, and approximately $135 million dollars in property damage. 

In the 2011 reauthorization act, Congress asked the Secretary to study hazardous 

liquid pipeline incidents at crossings of inland bodies of water with a width of at 

least 100 feet to determine if the depth of cover over the buried pipelines was a factor in any accidental release of hazardous liquids. If the Secretary’s study found 

that depth of cover was ‘‘a contributing factor,’’ then a review of the existing regulations and development of legislative recommendations was required. 

The existing regulations require that newly constructed pipelines that cross inland water bodies with a width of at least 100 feet between high water marks be 

buried at least 48 inches beneath the riverbed. There is no requirement for maintaining any particular depth of cover. PHMSA concluded after its study that it required no additional legislative authority to address risks of hazardous liquid pipeline failures at major river crossings. We agree. While we feel there were major 

shortcomings in the study produced by PHMSA, and we believe that significant 

changes are necessary to the existing regulatory requirements for pipelines crossing 

75 

water bodies, we concur that PHMSA possesses adequate authority to improve the 

regulations. Whether such a rulemaking might ever be undertaken or could make 

it through the substantial bottleneck that the rulemakings underway since 2010 and 

2011 have encountered are separate questions. 

The river crossing study produced by PHMSA did succeed in highlighting several 

major issues with the existing rule and its implementation: • PHMSA has no data set, geographic or otherwise, that identifies the 100 foot 

wide crossings that are subject to the four foot depth of cover rule at the time 

of construction, making enforcement of the rule dependent on having a PHMSA 

inspector on site at the time of construction at every crossing where the rule 

might apply. 

• Rivers are dynamic systems, as the Silvertip failure graphically illustrates. The 

existing rule only applies at the time of construction, but does not require an 

operator to maintain four feet of cover over the lifetime of the pipeline. 

• Many river systems narrower than 100 feet can dramatically scour their beds, 

putting perhaps thousands of other pipelines at risk of exposure and failure. 

The existing rule does not cover those crossings. 

• The integrity management rules and their implementation and enforcement are 

not a sufficient substitute for an adequate rule prescribing operators’ ongoing 

depth of cover obligations at all crossings. The Silvertip system underwent an 

integrity management inspection from PHMSA less than a month before its failure, yet there is no indication that the vulnerability of the line and the inadequacy of the operations plans were identified. Moreover, the IM rules apply to 

only 42 percent of liquid lines in the country. There may be many crossings that 

do not fall within the narrow definition of an ‘‘unusually sensitive area’’ and 

where IM rules would therefore not apply. 

Proposal: Direct the Secretary to acquire and maintain a geographic data set capable of identifying pipelines crossing water bodies with a width of at least 100 feet 

between high water marks, and where the pipeline segment is within or could affect 

a high consequence area. Direct the Secretary to inventory the conditions of these 

crossings, determining the current depth of cover and the adequacy of each operator’s assessment of the risk to a pipeline from flooding, erosion, riverbed scour, bed 

load movement or slope instability, and to incorporate the findings from that inventory in a report to Congress, together with a regulatory proposal to better protect 

pipelines (both liquid and gas) at water body crossings and high consequence areas 

from potential failures. 

Address Shortcomings in the Way PHMSA Defines and Addresses High 

Consequence Areas for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines 

The Integrity Management rules for hazardous liquid pipelines apply only to those 

41 percent of HL lines that ‘‘could affect’’ a high consequence area if the line fails. 

There are two areas where we believe the agency has overly narrowly defined areas 

that should be subject to these rules: areas described by Congress as those crossing 

waters ‘‘where a substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists,’’ and those 

‘‘unusually sensitive to environmental damage.’’ 

When Congress delegated the identification of those unusually sensitive high consequence areas to the Secretary of Transportation in 49 USC §60109, it was with 

this direction: 

(b) AREAS TO BE INCLUDED AS UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE 

(1) locations near pipeline rights-of-way that are critical to drinking water, including intake locations for community water systems and critical sole 

source aquifer protection areas; and 

(2) locations near pipeline rights-of-way that have been identified as critical 

wetlands, riverine or estuarine systems, national parks, wilderness areas, 

wildlife preservation areas or refuges, wild and scenic rivers, or critical 

habitat areas for threatened and endangered species. 

Unfortunately, in the adoption of the definitions for Unusually Sensitive Areas 

(USAs) the agency defined them much more narrowly than by using Congress’s list. 

Instead, the agency developed a set of definitions for ‘‘ecological resource areas’’ that 

relies on little known, arcane non-governmental designations and completely excludes areas that Congress clearly expected would be included. For example, National Parks and designated wilderness areas are not necessarily USAs. National 

Wildlife refuges are not necessarily USAs. Wild and Scenic Rivers are not necessarily USAs. It is not even clear that critical habitat for threatened and endangered species designated under the Endangered Species Act is automatically a USA. 

Instead, to be a USA, an area must be, for example, a Ramsar site designated under 

The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl 

76 

Habitat, or otherwise defined by a ranking system developed by the Natural Heritage Programs, or the Nature Conservancy’s Global Conservations Status Rank, or 

a Western Hemisphere Shorebird Reserve Network. 

Once these very narrow definitions were adopted, PHMSA was to identify these 

areas and make those designations available to operators so they could identify 

which segments of their pipelines could affect these areas in a rupture. PHMSA has 

not updated these definitions, nor has it kept up with the geographic designation 

of these areas over the years since they were first identified. That means they have 

no way of inspecting operator compliance with HCA identification or operator assessment of risks to the environment in the case of a rupture. 

The public is prevented from seeing PHMSA’s efforts to map these USAs, so we 

have no way of knowing whether they have mapped even these very narrowly defined areas correctly. 

The Pipeline Safety Trust asked for an expansion of these areas and therefore the 

number of pipelines covered by the integrity management rules when PHMSA asked 

for input on changing the Hazardous Liquid safety rules in 2010. That rule, finalized in 2016 under the Obama Administration, was withdrawn and has yet to be 

re-issued, so we have no way of knowing whether any changes will be made in that 

rule, assuming it is again finalized and released. 

The issue with identification of commercially navigable waters, administratively 

defined to include ‘‘a waterway where a substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists’’ is not one of definition, because those are the exact words Congress directed the agency to use. Rather it is in the implementation of that definition, where 

PHMSA uses a definition of commercial navigation that limits its application to 

major shipping routes for freighters, excluding commercial fisheries, charter boats, 

tribal commercial or subsistence fisheries, or any other small scale commercial use. 

This results in a nonsensical designation of small strips of coastal waters, large rivers and harbors being identified as HCAs, rather than the entire body of water. 

Proposal 

Require GAO do a study of whether PHMSA’s definitions and identification of various Unusually Sensitive Areas (USAs) and commercially navigable waterways for 

Hazardous Liquid pipelines are consistent with other environmental regulations, are 

sufficiently inclusive to meet the original intent of Congress, and whether PHMSA 

currently has and maintains GIS data layers that allow the agency and the industry 

to know where such HCA boundaries are, and whether PHMSA uses this GIS data 

to ensure pipeline operators are accurately identifying HCAs and the risks to them 

from the potential failure of a pipeline. This would most likely have identified the 

problem with the majority of the Great Lakes being left out of HCA definitions. Congress took action to mandate the designation of the Great Lakes as HCAs in the 

last reauthorization, but the agency has yet to issue implementing regulations for 

that designation. 

Congress should also mandate that HCA designations be made public on the National Pipeline Mapping System so state and local governments, and the public can 

ensure that PHMSA and pipeline companies are correctly designating such important areas. 

Methane Emissions from Pipelines— 

It is well understood that natural gas pipelines of all types leak, and that during 

repairs large quantities of gas is vented into the atmosphere. This is allowed under 

the current regulations, because up until recently the value of the gas was thought 

to be insignificant, and the effects of the methane being released was not understood. Over the past decade many studies, from a variety of sources, have shown 

that the amount of gas lost through ongoing leaks costs consumers hundreds of millions of dollars, and that the methane in those leaks has a much more dramatic effect on climate change than carbon dioxide. Unfortunately PHMSA has paid little 

attention to these issues, has no clear emission reporting requirements, and their 

own incident reporting thresholds (no report required until 3 million cubic feet of 

gas released) exempts many large releases from even being reported. 

For those reasons it is essential that Congress requires PHMSA to do the following: 

• Require companies to use the best technology available to capture natural gas 

when making pipeline repairs. 

• Require companies to use the best technology to look for leaks 

• Require companies to adequately invest in replacement and repair programs for 

known types of leaky pipelines. 

77 

21The American Gas Association, Natural Gas: The Facts https://www.aga.org/globalassets/ 

2019-natural-gas-factsts-updated.pdf 22https://pipelinesms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/API-RP-1173-Pipeline-SafetyManagement-Systems.pdf 

• Change the reporting requirements for gas incidents to a more realistic level 

to track how much is actually being released. We would suggest changing the 

reporting threshold from 3 million cubic feet to 50,000 cubic feet (50,000 cubic 

feet is equivalent to the average monthly use in 9–10 homes 21). 

Hopeful Initiatives in the Works 

Safety Management Systems (SMS)—In 2015, based on a recommendation 

from the NTSB after nearly a million gallons of oil was spilled into the Kalamazoo 

River in Michigan, the pipeline industry created a recommended practice (API 

RP1173) 22 to help pipeline companies implement a continuous improvement Safety 

Management System. This promising voluntary effort ought to help companies reduce the number of incidents and near misses they have, and help create a stronger 

safety culture within companies so safety really is the first priority, not just a slogan. We have already seen some companies embrace this fully, and for those companies the change is real. So we support this effort, and believe it can have lasting 

impacts, but only if companies embrace it, which is always the rub with voluntary 

practices. We were surprised after the recent tragedy in Massachusetts to hear how 

many of the gas companies in that state had not yet moved forward on SMS, and 

only did so after a tragedy and the strong urging of the state regulator. We think 

it is still too early to have to make SMS a required regulation, but Congress should 

certainly ask the industry to show proof that companies are adopting this voluntarily, and what the measurable outcomes are. If the rate of adoption and implementation is too slow then PHMSA or Congress may need to step in with regulatory 

requirements, or enforcement incentives, to ensure that all companies embrace this 

valuable system, and not just the companies who do truly put safety first. 

Voluntary Information Sharing (VIS)—For the past two years PHMSA has 

been working with the Voluntary Information Sharing Working Group to produce 

a report for the Secretary outlining the benefits of setting up a Voluntary Information Sharing system for pipeline safety similar to what the FAA has for airline safety. The Pipeline Safety Trust supports the creation of a Pipeline Safety VIS, but the 

draft report we saw lacked many important details about initial and ongoing costs, 

how and who will pay for this system, how and who information would be shared 

with, how the program’s effectiveness will be assessed, and how the important participation by non-regulatory, non-industry participants will be guaranteed. For these 

reasons we hope you will seek greater clarity on the above questions before moving 

forward with complete authorization for such a VIS. One option might be to provide 

PHMSA with the authority and the funding to create the multi-stakeholder VIS Executive Committee as envisioned in the report, and then task that group to flesh 

out the details to Congress’ satisfaction before greater funding is provided. 

I thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony today, and as always 

I am available to answer any additional questions you might have and to work with 

you further as the reauthorization of the national pipeline safety program continues. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Weimer. 

Now, Mr. Black, you are recognized. 

Mr. BLACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member. 

I am Andy Black, president and CEO of the Association of Oil 

Pipe Lines. AOPL represents the owners and operators of liquid 

pipelines transporting crude oil; refined products like gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, and home heating oil; and industrial products like 

propane and ethane. We have over 55 member companies transporting over 21 billion barrels of crude oil and petroleum products 

annually over a 215,000-mile network of pipelines. 

Pipelines are the safest way to deliver the energy Americans use 

and need every day. And no other mode of transportation is as safe 

for the American people or the environment as pipelines. And pipelines are getting safer. Over the last 5 years, pipeline operators 

have reduced the number of pipeline incidents impacting people 

78 

and the environment by 20 percent. This is Government data, publicly available from PHMSA. 

PHMSA data also shows pipeline incidents caused by incorrect 

operation impacting people and the environment are down 38 percent over the last 5 years. And pipeline incidents caused by corrosion, cracking, or weld failure impacting people and the environment are down 35 percent over that period. 

The pipeline industry and AOPL member companies work hard 

to improve pipeline safety. We are transparent about where we are 

doing well and where we can do better. 

The statistics I shared come from the performance report we develop jointly each year with the American Petroleum Institute analyzing pipeline safety data. We use this analysis to guide our pipeline safety programs, focusing on key safety issues. Through this 

safety effort, the pipeline industry has addressed key safety recommendations from Congress, the NTSB, PHMSA, and issues identified through analysis of pipeline safety data. 

Recent safety accomplishments include developing new best practices for finding and fixing cracking in pipelines, managing leak detection programs, responding to pipeline emergencies, and applying 

safety management systems to pipelines. Industry also just released an updated best practice for inspecting and performing 

maintenance on pipelines utilizing the latest inspection technologies and analytical techniques. 

Harnessing technology to advance pipeline safety is a theme we 

are pursuing across industry and we urge Congress to adopt as 

well. For example, high-tech tools can now scan pipelines like an 

MRI or an ultrasound at the doctor’s office. Pipeline operators have 

the opportunity to find more issues early, perform preventative 

maintenance, and keep pipelines operating safely. 

The problem is, Federal regulations can’t keep pace with fastmoving technology innovations. Outdated PHMSA regulations 

sometimes conflict with the latest knowledge and techniques. 

Congress can do more to allow PHMSA and pipeline operators to 

improve safety by harnessing technology and innovations, such as: 

creating a pilot program to test pipeline safety technologies and approaches, as the Administrator alluded to earlier; authorizing a voluntary information-sharing program, encouraging joint stakeholder 

problem-solving; requiring regular PHMSA and stakeholder review 

of pipeline safety research and development advances; and encouraging voluntary discovery, disclosure, correction, and prevention of 

pipeline safety violations. 

Next, protecting pipeline safety and the environment from attacks on pipelines is a top reauthorization priority for AOPL. Pipelines are the safest way to deliver the energy we use every day. 

However, pipelines are industrial facilities we must respect to keep 

them operating safely. 

Recent attacks on pipelines, either by turning valves in ways 

that threaten ruptures or shooting guns directly at pipelines or 

blowtorching holes in pipelines, are dangerous. Members of the 

public, surrounding communities, and the environment could easily 

be put in danger by attacks on pipeline facilities that could result 

in a spill or an explosion. 

79 

Congress should deter future attacks against pipeline facilities 

by closing loopholes in the scope of criminal liability placed in Federal pipeline safety laws by previous Congresses on a bipartisan 

basis. 

AOPL also recommends improving PHMSA programs and regulations by easing hiring and retention of PHMSA inspectors, improving due process and enforcement proceedings, tailoring requirements to pipeline operating status, adjusting incident reporting requirements for inflation, and incorporating the latest best practices 

on inspection repair and tank maintenance. 

I look forward to answering any of your questions on these proposals or improving pipeline safety performance record or the actions the pipeline industry is taking to improve pipeline safety further. Thank you again for the opportunity for us to testify. 

[Mr. Black’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Andrew J. Black, President and CEO, Association of 

Oil Pipe Lines 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

inviting me here today to testify on pipeline safety. My name is Andy Black and 

I am President and CEO of the Association of Oil Pipe Lines (AOPL). AOPL represents liquids pipeline owners and operators transporting crude oil, petroleum 

products, like gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and home heating oil, and industrial products, like propane and ethane. We have over 50 member companies which deliver 

over 21 billion barrels of crude oil and petroleum products annually over a 215,000 

mile network of pipelines. AOPL members transport more than 97 percent of interstate barrel-miles. 

Pipelines are the safest way to deliver the liquid energy we all need and use every 

day. Pipelines deliver crude oil and petroleum products to their destination safely 

99.999 percent of the time. No other mode of transportation is as safe for the American people or the environment as pipelines. 

Pipelines are getting safer. Over the last 5 years, pipeline operators have reduced 

the number of liquids pipeline incidents impacting people or the environment by 20 

percent. This is government data publicly available from the U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). PHMSA data also shows pipeline 

incidents impacting people or the environment caused by incorrect operation are 

down 38 percent over the last 5 years, and pipeline incidents impacting people or 

the environment caused by corrosion, cracking or weld failures are down 35 percent 

over the last 5 years. 

The pipeline industry and AOPL member companies work hard to improve pipeline safety. We are transparent about where we are doing well and where we can 

do better. The statistics I just shared come from the performance report we develop 

jointly each year with the American Petroleum Institute analyzing pipeline safety 

data. We use this analysis to guide our industry-wide safety programs focusing on 

key pipeline safety issues. 

Through this strategic effort the pipeline industry has addressed key safety recommendations from Congress, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, 

PHMSA and issues identified through analysis of pipeline safety data. Recent safety 

accomplishments include developing new best practices for finding and fixing cracking in pipelines, managing leak detection programs, responding to pipeline emergencies and applying safety management systems to pipelines. Industry has also 

just released an updated best practice for inspecting and performing maintenance 

on pipelines utilizing the latest inspection technologies and analytical techniques. 

Harnessing technology to advance pipeline safety is a theme we are pursuing 

across industry and recommend Congress adopt as well. For example, hi-tech tools 

can now scan pipelines like an MRI or ultrasound at the doctor’s office. Pipeline operators have the opportunity to find issues early, perform maintenance and keep 

pipelines operating safely. The problem is federal regulations can’t keep pace with 

fast-moving technology innovations. In fact, outdated PHMSA regulations sometimes conflict with the latest knowledge and techniques. 

Congress can do more to allow PHMSA and pipeline operators to improve safety 

by pilot testing innovations and learn from shared pipeline safety insights. 

80 

AOPL proposals for Congress to harness technology and innovation to improve 

pipeline safety include: • creating a pilot program to test cutting edge pipeline safety technologies and 

newly developed best practices • authorizing a Voluntary Information Sharing program encouraging joint stakeholder problem solving • requiring regular PHMSA and stakeholder review of pipeline safety research 

and development advances • encouraging voluntary discovery, disclosure, correction and prevention of pipeline safety violations 

A top reauthorization priority for AOPL is protecting public safety and the environment from attacks on pipelines. Pipelines are the safest way to deliver the energy American families and consumers use every day. However, pipelines are industrial facilities we must respect to keep them operating safely. Recent attacks on 

pipeline, either by turning valves in ways that threaten ruptures or shooting guns 

or blowtorching holes into pipelines are dangerous. Members of the public, surrounding communities and the environment are put in danger by attacks on pipeline 

facilities that could easily result in a spill or explosion. Congress should deter future 

attacks against pipeline facilities by closing loopholes in the scope and criminal liability placed in current federal pipeline safety law by previous Congresses on a bipartisan basis. 

AOPL also recommends Congress improve PHMSA programs and regulations by: 

• helping PHMSA hire and retain expert pipeline inspectors • improving due process in PHMSA enforcement proceedings • tailoring pipeline requirements to operating status • adjusting PHMSA incident reporting requirements for inflation • incorporating the latest best practices on inspections, repair and tank maintenance AOPL believes there is a great amount of work that Congress can do to improve 

pipeline safety on a non-partisan or bi-partisan basis as has been custom in prior 

reauthorization bills. Several of AOPL’s proposals would specifically engage stakeholders from all ends of the political spectrum in the joint effort of pipeline safety. 

The VIS program is supported by labor unions, environmental groups, pipeline safety advocates, PHMSA and pipeline operators. Further attention to R&D would come 

in a forum which includes environmental groups, pipeline safety advocates, federal 

and state regulators and industry. Our proposal to help PHMSA hire and retain 

pipeline inspectors would be paid for by industry itself through user fees. All of 

these proposals are designed to improve pipeline safety. 

Again, thank you for inviting me here today. I look forward to answering any of 

your questions on these proposals, our pipeline safety performance record, or the actions the pipeline industry is taking to improve pipeline safety. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Black. 

I now recognize Chief Eggleston for 5 minutes. 

Chief EGGLESTON. Good afternoon, Chairman Lipinski and Congressman Balderson and members of the subcommittee. I am Dan 

Eggleston, president and chairman of the board of the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the fire chief for Albemarle 

County, Virginia, Department of Fire and Rescue. Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify at today’s hearing on pipeline safety. 

The U.S. transports approximately two-thirds of its domestic energy supplies on more than 2.7 million miles of pipeline. In our 

opinion, the use of pipelines is one of the safest ways to transport 

hazardous materials across the Nation. 

However, when accidents occur, local emergency responders must 

be prepared, trained, and equipped to respond. During a pipeline 

incident, the local fire department will be required to stabilize the 

incident, notify the community, and, if necessary, evacuate affected 

homes and businesses, extinguish any resulting fires, and prevent 

the loss of life and property. 

An effective response requires pipeline operators, local fire departments, and other State and local officials to work together. 

This cooperation cannot start on the day of the incident. It requires 

81 

the public and the private sector to train and plan, exercise, and 

equip themselves well before the event. 

As the committee examines the reauthorization of pipeline safety 

programs at the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, the IAFC recommends the committee consider the following three actions: 

First, promote coordination between local authorities and pipeline operators. 

Local emergency planning committees are designed to bring together industry officials, local emergency responders, and other affected stakeholders to plan and exercise for potential pipeline and 

hazardous material incidents. Currently, there are over 3,000 

known LEPCs around the Nation. However, it is unclear how many 

of these LEPCs are active. 

The IAFC is using a grant from the PHMSA Community Safety—Emergency Planning, Response, and Outreach program to bolster LEPCs. We are bringing first responders, emergency managers, and pipeline operators together to coordinate emergency response plans. 

Also, we are educating citizens about where pipelines are located 

in their communities and what steps they should take in case of 

an incident. The IAFC will use its work to develop best practices 

for LEPCs to prepare for pipeline and other hazardous material incidents. 

We ask that you authorize and fund PHMSA’s Community Safety 

Grant. We also ask that you continue to authorize and fund the 

$1.5 million for PHMSA’s Pipeline Safety Information Grant. This 

program can serve as a useful tool for helping fire departments 

learn about pipelines in their jurisdictions and prepare for any incidents. 

The number-two recommendation is to support training and exercise programs that bring stakeholders together. 

Pipeline operators and local emergency responders should develop emergency response plans well ahead of time. They should 

also meet regularly and exercise them throughout the year, not just 

once. The IAFC is working with pipeline operators, such as TransCanada, to help communities develop pipeline annexes to their 

emergency operations plans. We use a whole community approach 

to bring together pipeline operators, emergency responders, and 

community leaders. In some cases, we have hosted public townhall 

meetings. We then follow up with table-top exercises to test these 

plans and revise them as necessary. 

Training is also extremely important. At the moment, 60 percent 

of fire departments providing hazmat response have not formally 

trained all of their personnel. The IAFC has developed resources 

like the Rural Guide for Rail and Pipeline Incident Response and 

the Rail Emergency and Pipeline Incident Information Visor Cards 

to help fire departments train and respond to an incident. 

We also have developed online training in cooperation with the 

National Association of State Fire Marshals. This online training 

is especially important for those departments such as volunteer departments in rural areas. The IAFC recommends that local fire 

chiefs reach out to pipeline operators and take advantage of training opportunities that pipeline operators may provide. 

82 

And the third and final recommendation is to support funding for 

equipment and staffing for local fire departments. 

Fire departments, especially in rural areas, may not have the 

equipment needed to respond to a complex incident like a pipeline 

rupture. The Assistance to Firefighters Grant program provides 

matching funds for local fire departments to purchase the necessary equipment for pipeline incidents and other hazards. The 

SAFER Grant program provides matching grants for both hiring 

firefighters and recruiting volunteers to help fire departments staff 

the necessary staff in communities bordering pipelines. 

We appreciate the continued support from Congress that is 

shown in these programs and ask you to fund these at $405 million 

each in fiscal year 2020. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify at today’s hearing. 

Pipeline leaks and ruptures are very complex incidents. They require planning, training, and having the right tools and equipment 

in place to save lives and property. America’s fire chiefs look forward to working with the community and the committee to reauthorize the pipeline safety programs. 

I look forward to answering any questions that you may have. 

Thank you. 

[Chief Eggleston’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Fire Chief Dan Eggleston, EFO, CFO, CMO, President and Chairman of the Board, International Association of Fire Chiefs 

Good morning, Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee. I am Dan Eggleston, President and Chairman of the 

Board of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), and fire chief of the 

Albemarle County, Virginia, Department of Fire Rescue. I appreciate the opportunity to testify at today’s hearing on pipeline safety: the review of existing mandates and the examination of additional safety needs. 

The IAFC represents the leadership of over 1.1 million firefighters and emergency 

responders. IAFC members are the world’s leading experts in firefighting, emergency medical services, terrorism response, hazardous materials (hazmat) incidents, 

wildland fire suppression, natural disasters, search and rescue, and public-safety 

policy. Since 1873, the IAFC has provided a forum for its members to exchange 

ideas, develop best practices, participate in executive training and discover diverse 

products and services available to first responders. 

THE FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICE COMMUNITY

America’s fire and emergency services are the only organized group of American 

citizens that is locally-situated, staffed, trained, and equipped to respond to all types 

of emergencies. There are approximately 1.1 million men and women in the fire and 

emergency service—approximately 300,000 career firefighters and 800,000 volunteer 

firefighters—serving in over 30,000 fire departments around the nation. They are 

trained to respond to all hazards ranging from earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes 

and floods to acts of terrorism, hazardous materials incidents, technical rescues, 

fires and medical emergencies. 

The fire service protects America’s critical infrastructure—the electrical grid, 

interstate highways, railroads, pipelines, petroleum and chemical facilities—and is, 

in fact, even considered part of the critical infrastructure. The fire service protects 

federal buildings, including military installations, and interstate commerce. No passenger airliner takes off from a runway or train leaves a station that is not protected by a fire department. 

PIPELINE SAFETY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE

The United States transports approximately two-thirds of its domestic energy supplies in more than 2.7 million miles of pipelines. This system includes gathering 

pipelines that collect natural gas from wells and ship it to production areas; transVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
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1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008 Nationwide Survey of Local Emergency Planning Committees, 4. 2 Ibid. 

mission pipelines that transport liquids across the nation; and distribution and service pipelines that transport hazardous materials from transmission lines to residential, commercial and industrial customers. Overall, the use of pipelines is one of the 

safest ways to transport hazardous materials across the nation. 

However, accidents do occur, and local first responders need to be prepared and 

trained to respond. During a pipeline rupture or leak, the local fire department will 

be required to stabilize the situation; notify and evacuate the community (if necessary); extinguish any resulting fires; and prevent life and property loss. It is important that the pipeline operators, local fire departments, and other appropriate 

state and local officials cooperate and quickly resolve the incident. This cooperation 

cannot start on the day of the incident. The public and private sectors must work 

together ahead of time to plan, train, exercise and equip themselves to respond to 

a potential incident. 

PLANNING

It is important that all local authorities, including the local fire department leadership, work with regional pipeline operators to prepare for a rupture or leak. The 

pipeline operator must develop an emergency response plan that addresses the potential hazards that may occur and how to respond to these incidents in an effective 

manner. The local fire department will have to identify where pipelines are in their 

community and familiarize themselves with the possible risks of the hazardous materials carried by the pipelines. The fire department also will have to preplan how 

it will respond to an incident, including by working with emergency managers and 

local law enforcement about how to carry out an evacuation order; working with 

local hospitals and public health officials in case of a mass casualty incident; and 

local elected officials and the news media to ensure that the appropriate messaging 

is given to the public. A public-private partnership is critical to ensuring that a response goes smoothly in case of a pipeline incident. 

Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC) are designed to bring industry officials, local emergency responders, and other affected stakeholders together to plan 

and exercise for potential pipeline incidents. LEPCs were created as part of the 

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (P.L. 99-499) as part of a 

national framework to plan for chemical accidents. LEPCs are supposed to identify 

chemical hazards in their communities, develop emergency response plans, and 

maintain a community focus on chemical safety, risk reduction, and accident prevention. 

According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), there are more 

than 3,000 known LEPCs around the nation.1 Unfortunately, it is not clear how 

many of these LEPCs are active and carrying out their missions. When the EPA 

surveyed the LEPCs in 2008, it sent out 2,357 surveys and received 939 responses, 

an approximately 40 percent return rate.2 One of the IAFC’s missions is to work 

with community LEPCs and local pipeline operators to make sure that communities 

are prepared in case of a pipeline emergencies. 

The IAFC is using a Community Safety-Emergency Planning Response and Outreach (CS-EPRO) grant from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) to bolster LEPCs and help them prepare for incidents in their 

communities. The CS-EPRO grant is designed to prepare communities for hazardous 

materials incidents, including those involving pipelines, and focuses particularly on 

rural areas. The local fire department, local emergency planners and LEPC will play 

a leading role in this effort. 

The CS-EPRO grant will help local first responders, emergency planners and 

LEPCs learn about the hazardous materials in their jurisdictions and communicate 

with industry to coordinate response plans. This will ultimately allow local leaders 

to better communicate information about these hazards to the public. The effort also 

will educate citizens living in rural communities about nearby pipelines, rail lines 

and facilities. In addition, it will help local citizens prepare to take action in the 

case of a pipeline incident, including what to do in case of an evacuation order. The 

IAFC intends to use these grants to develop best practices that other LEPCs can 

use to prepare their communities for pipeline and other hazardous materials incidents. 

The IAFC also is working with the American Petroleum Institute (API) to update 

its recommended practice for Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators 

(API Recommended Practice 1162). We have found that the pipeline industry, espeVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
84 

3 National Fire Protection Association, Fourth Needs Assessment of The U.S. Fire Service, viii. 

cially the operators of major transmission lines are proactive in conducting outreach 

to local communities to help them learn about the risks relating to their pipelines. 

Many companies will provide training for fire departments that have transmission 

pipelines in their jurisdictions. The IAFC recommends that fire chiefs reach out to 

the pipeline operators in their jurisdictions to identify local pipelines, learn about 

the risks involved with them, and utilize ‘‘train the trainer’’ and other educational 

programs that the pipeline operators provide. 

TRAINING/EXERCISES

Once pipeline response plans are developed, they cannot just be left on a shelf. 

The local pipeline operators, local fire departments, emergency planners, and other 

LEPC members must engage in regular exercises to prepare for a possible incident. 

Training and exercises identify weaknesses in plans and help communities revise 

them. More importantly, they bring the emergency response officials together ahead 

of time to coordinate operations before an actual incident. Pipeline response operations can be complicated and it is important that all of the participants have met 

before the day of the disaster. 

According to the National Fire Protection Association, 60 percent of fire departments provide hazmat response, but have not formally trained their personnel for 

these operations.3 The IAFC has developed the following resources to help fire departments train and respond to pipeline incidents: • The Rural Guide for Rail and the Pipeline Incident Guide offer guidance on 

working with key players to create or revise emergency response plans for rail 

and pipeline emergencies. • The Rail Emergency and Pipeline Incident Information Visor Cards provide a 

place to record important information during pipeline incidents. 

The IAFC also worked with the National Association of State Fire Marshals to 

develop online training to help local fire departments familiarize themselves with 

the basics of pipeline emergency response. Online training is especially important 

for rural volunteer fire departments, which may not be able to send personnel to 

in-person training that is out of the region. 

In addition, the IAFC is cooperating with TransCanada to help communities prepare for pipeline incidents. We have worked with jurisdictions to develop a pipeline 

annex to their emergency operations plans. This planning uses a whole communityapproach to bring together the pipeline operators, first responders and other community leaders. In some cases, we have hosted town hall meetings to better inform 

the public about the location of a pipeline and the potential effects of an incident. 

After six months have passed, we return to the communities to conduct tabletop exercises that allow communities to test their plans and improve their preparedness 

for an actual incident. Overall, we have implemented this program in 16 communities since the program started in 2015. 

EQUIPMENT

Fire departments need to make sure that they are equipped to handle a pipeline 

incident. However, they must make sure that they purchase equipment consistent 

with their emergency operations plan. In many jurisdictions, a fire department may 

be focused on mitigating the risk of a pipeline incident, like treating casualties or 

putting out resulting structure fires. They may be able to rely upon a regional 

hazmat response team, the pipeline operator’s emergency response team or a neighboring metropolitan fire department to resolve the actual leak or rupture. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) program and the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) grant 

program provide matching grants for equipment, training and staffing to help local 

fire departments prepare for incidents like pipeline ruptures. 

CONCLUSION

I thank you for the opportunity to testify at today’s hearing on pipeline safety. 

As the committee examines reauthorizing the pipeline safety programs at PHMSA, 

the IAFC recommends that the committee consider the following actions: 

1.) Promote coordination between local authorities and pipeline operators. Local coordination is key to preventing pipeline incidents and having 

successful responses in the cases of incidents. Local fire chiefs should work 

with the pipeline operators to identify where pipelines are and what risks they 

entail. The fire department should access both online and in-person training 

85 

that is provided by the pipeline operator. LEPCs provide tools for bringing the 

whole community together to prepare for a pipeline or other hazmat incident. 

Unfortunately, we do not have a clear picture of how many LEPCs are functioning effectively or how many need help. 

We ask that Congress appropriate funding for the Pipeline Safety Information 

Grants to Communities, so that they might serve as a useful tool for re-energizing LEPCs. The IAFC recommends removing the prohibition on non-profit 

groups, because a community non-profit group might be used to administer a 

LEPC and there are some volunteer fire departments across the country that 

are classified as non-profit organizations. 

2.) Support training and exercise programs that bring stakeholders together. It is important that the local officials and the pipeline operators do 

not meet for the first time at the incident scene. They must develop emergency 

response plans ahead of time and share information on how they will operate 

in an emergency. Also, local officials and pipeline operators must meet and exercise these plans on an annual basis. These plans are not just bureaucratic 

documents; they set out important lifesaving operations in a moment of crisis. 

PHMSA’s Community Safety grants provide an incentive for public and private stakeholders to meet, develop emergency response plans and exercise 

them. The IAFC also supports both public and private efforts to develop online 

and in-person training for fire departments to prepare for pipeline incidents. 

We also ask that Congress appropriate funding for these programs in Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2020. 

3.) Support funding for equipment and training for local fire departments. Fire departments, especially in rural jurisdictions, may not have the 

equipment or training to respond to a complex incident like a pipeline rupture. 

Federal programs, like the AFG and SAFER program, provide matching 

grants to help local jurisdictions prepare for all hazards, including pipeline incidents. We appreciate Congress funding these programs at $350 million each 

in FY 2019, and ask that you increase funding for the programs to $405 million for each program in FY 2020. 

The IAFC looks forward to working with the subcommittee as it reauthorizes 

PHMSA’s pipeline safety programs. On behalf of America’s fire chiefs, I thank you 

for hosting today’s hearing and examining issues to ensure the safety of the nation’s 

pipeline infrastructure. I look forward to answering any questions that you may 

have. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Chief. 

Next, I will recognize for 5 minutes Mr. Kuprewicz. 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. Thank you for the opportunity to comment 

today. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Make sure your microphone is on. 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. I am president of Accufacts Incorporated, based 

in Redmond, Washington. 

I have authored numerous papers on pipeline safety, with the 

most recent a March 22, 2019, paper for West Whiteland Township, 

Pennsylvania, identifying possible intrastate transmission pipeline 

safety regulations for that State. My provided CV should easily 

demonstrate my qualifications to testify today on additional pipeline safety needs. 

Since my time is limited, I will focus on six major regulatory 

issues that I believe should be addressed by Congress in any 

PHMSA reauthorization effort. 

Item 1: Congress should eliminate the unique requirement that 

PHMSA show that, for any proposed new safety regulations, the 

safety benefits outweigh the cost. Pipeline events are usually lowprobability, very high-consequence events that are not adequately 

or appropriately captured using cost-benefit analysis. 

Recent pipeline failures have demonstrated how quickly the consequences of pipeline failure can easily exceed multiple billions, 

86 

with a ‘‘B,’’ of dollars. Much-needed improvements in pipeline safety regulation are being delayed or prevented by this unique requirement, and Congress should remove this obstructive approach 

from PHMSA’s safety rulemaking obligation. 

Major item 2: Additional liquid and gas transmission integrity 

management regulation improvements are needed. Initial performance-based pipeline safety regulations for transmission pipelines 

promulgated in the early 2000s, known as TIMP 1, are not working 

as intended. My experience investigating too many recent liquid 

and gas pipeline ruptures indicates that TIMP 1 needs serious improvement. 

After a considerable number of years of effort, PHMSA developed 

suggested transmission integrity management improvements, often 

identified as TIMP 2, for transmission pipelines, both liquid and 

gas. These suggested improved regulations have been stalled for 

the last couple of years. 

Major item 3: Current area classification regulations for gas 

transmission pipeline safety regulations should not be changed or 

weakened. Given the current weakness and incomplete state of 

TIMP regulations, I cannot recommend nor suggest weakening current safety factors established by existing area classification regulations for gas transmission pipelines. 

Major item 4: Gas gathering minimum pipeline safety regulation 

needs serious improvement. Recent gathering pipeline rupture failures clearly demonstrate that minimum Federal pipeline safety 

regulations are clearly not working in this area and improvements 

are warranted. 

I recommend the regulatory efforts in this area focus on three 

issues: simplifying the definition of ‘‘gas gathering’’; two, requiring 

all gathering lines to meet minimum standards meant to protect 

the public; three, follow similar integrity management processes related to TIMP 2 PHMSA-developed improvements. 

Gas gathering pipeline rupture failure dynamics and actual impact areas are the same as that of gas transmission pipelines. The 

public should thus also be made aware of gas gathering infrastructure in their area, protected by basic, commonsense standards, 

such as one-call mapping requirements, integrity management, 

and, yes, emergency response, that already apply to similar risk 

transmission pipelines. 

Major item 5: Release detection regulation should focus on two 

efforts—one, remote rapid rupture release identification; and, two, 

leak releases which require different technical approaches than 

that for ruptures. Remote release detection is a reasonable idea 

and should be advanced by new, prudent pipeline safety regulations that encourage the application and development of such efforts. 

And, lastly, major item 6: Regulations for the placement of remote-operated main line valving for liquid and gas pipelines are 

badly needed. Valves play an important safety role in the event of 

pipeline rupture. It is time to incorporate clear requirements for 

such valving into pipeline safety regulations. 

Thank you for your time today, and I look forward to being of 

some assistance to the committee in the future. Thank you. 

[Mr. Kuprewicz’s prepared statement follows:] 

87 

1 Richard B. Kuprewicz, ‘‘Pipeline Safety Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

Liquid Pipeline Integrity Management (‘‘IM’’), Docket No. PHMSA-2010-229 (‘‘NPRM’’),’’ January 7, 2016, and ‘‘Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Pipeline Safety: Safety of 

Gas Transmission and Gathering Pipelines, Docket No. PHMSA-2011-0023 (‘‘NPRM’’),’’ July 7, 

2016. 

f 

Prepared Statement of Richard B. Kuprewicz, President, Accufacts Inc. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment today. My name is Richard B. 

Kuprewicz and I am president of Accufacts Inc., a consulting firm based at 8151 

164th Avenue, NE, Redmond, WA 98052. I specialize in all aspects of hydrocarbonbased pipelines. I have over forty-five years of investigative experience and am a 

chemical engineer with additional skills in process safety management, developed 

from many years of operational and engineering experience. I have consulted for 

various local, state, and federal agencies, NGOs, the public, and pipeline industry 

members on pipeline regulation, operation, and design, with particular emphasis on 

operation in unusually sensitive areas of high population density or environmental 

sensitivity. 

I have authored numerous papers on pipeline safety with the most recent a March 

22, 2019 paper for West Whiteland Township, PA identifying possible liquid intrastate transmission pipeline safety regulations for that state. That recent paper takes 

on special significance as it relates to a series of highly volatile liquid transmission 

pipelines called Mariner East, designed to move liquid ethane, propane, and butane 

across the state, through many highly populated and sensitive areas. My provided 

CV should easily demonstrate my qualification to testify today on additional pipeline safety needs. 

Since my time is limited today, I will focus on six major pipeline regulatory issues 

that I believe should be addressed by Congress in any PHMSA reauthorization effort: 

1) Congress should eliminate the unique requirement that PHMSA show that for any 

proposed new pipeline safety regulation the safety benefits outweigh the costs. 

Pipeline events are usually low probability, very high consequence events that are 

not adequately or appropriately captured using cost/benefit analysis. I have observed that such an unwarranted hurdle requirement seriously delays the implementation of many important and prudent pipeline safety regulations. Recent pipeline failures have demonstrated how quickly the consequence of pipeline failure can 

easily exceed multiple billions of dollars. Much needed improvements in pipeline 

safety regulation are being delayed or prevented, and Congress should remove this 

obstructive approach from PHMSA’s safety rulemaking obligations. 

2) Additional Liquid and Gas Transmission Integrity Management Regulation improvements are needed. 

Initial performance-based transmission pipeline safety regulations for liquid and 

gas transmission pipelines promulgated in the early 2000’s (known as TIMP 1) are 

not working as intended. My experience investigating too many recent liquid and 

gas pipeline ruptures in high consequence areas, indicates that TIMP 1 for liquid 

or gas transmission pipelines needs serious improvement. After a considerable number of years of effort, PHMSA developed, along with industry, state regulators, and 

various public parties, suggested transmission integrity management improvements 

often identified as TIMP 2 for liquid and gas transmission pipelines. These suggested improved regulations have been stalled for the last couple of years. Integrity 

management safety approaches are just not that complicated. In 2016, I provided 

written public comments on the TIMP 2 PHMSA proposed rules, part of the larger 

rule makings on hazardous liquid and gas transmission pipelines that started back 

in 2010 and 2011.1

I see the need for more prescriptive minimum pipeline safety regulations in several important TIMP regulatory areas as follows: 

a. the general location of HCAs should be conveyed to the public, 

b. require improved threat and anomaly reporting performance metrics to assist 

in transparency and to monitor TIMP performance and effectiveness, 

c. clarify in regulation the current strengths and weakness of the four allowed assessment methods codified in regulation for pipeline threats, which consists of: 

i. internal inspection tool or tools (usually ILI), 

ii. pressure test (i.e., hydrotesting), 

iii. external corrosion direct assessment for liquid, direct assessment for external, internal, or stress corrosion cracking for gas pipelines, 

88 

iv. other technology that can provide an equivalent understanding of the condition. 

d. add ‘‘shall’’ wording to establish minimum management of change (‘‘MOC’’) 

process requirements, an important component of TIMP. 

Given too many pipeline ruptures where the operator claimed failure to know 

their pipeline was in a high consequence area (‘‘HCA’’), regulators and the public 

clearly have a right to know and verify what an operator is identifying as an HCA 

(they really aren’t that difficult to determine and are not secret). If this important 

first step in TIMP isn’t correct, there are most likely other shortcomings in a company’s TIMP approach. 

PHMSA also needs to take advantage of new software technology to require that 

operators report the location of important required anomalies needing mitigation, 

using pipeline mapping technology that can quickly help to identify pipeline systemic threats, well before they go to rupture failure, a primary object of TIMP. 

The broad misinformation by many in the industry (either due to lack of experience or intentional deception) concerning the strengths and weaknesses of each of 

the four assessment methods listed in TIMP regulations needs to be addressed by 

identifying the assessment method’s ability to handle the wide spectrum of threats 

that may be on a pipeline segment. No one assessment method can handle the wide 

spectrum of threats that might be on a pipeline segment. For example, I have investigated too many transmission pipeline ruptures that occurred following ILI inspections, that on further investigation are proving to be downright embarrassing to the 

pipeline operators as well as disastrous and expensive. 

Recent pipeline tragedies have also clearly confirmed that too many pipeline organizations are failing to incorporate important checks and balances to assure any 

change in process or equipment has been prudently engineered and evaluated before 

becoming operational. Management of Change (MOC) prescriptive steps should be 

added into law driven by the use of a ‘‘shall’’ requirement. MOC should not rely on 

industry practices or creative interpretation of such practices. 

Note that I am not advising abandoning all performance-based approaches. For 

example, the distribution integrity management program (or ‘‘DIMP’’) regulations 

require the reporting of important performance metrics that assist independent 

analysis and transparency for regulators and the public. DIMP reporting is vastly 

superior to current TIMP 1 regulation reporting requirements in assisting in performance measurement and monitoring. Many gas distribution companies and some 

state regulators have recognized the benefits of DIMP tracking utilizing newer advanced leak mapping technology which exceeds annual reporting requirements to 

PHMSA and to states that are not utilizing such software tools in data analysis that 

improves regulatory efficiency. While not required in federal pipeline safety regulation, advanced software leak mapping technology is definitely helping analyze and 

identify possible distribution pipeline systemic integrity hot spots, or threats, that 

need more timely attention. PHMSA need to advance TIMP by requiring such mapping by anomaly type and condition. 

3) Current area classification regulations for gas transmission pipeline safety regulations should not be changed or weakened. 

Given the current weaknesses and incomplete state of TIMP regulations, demonstrated by the pipeline ruptures in HCAS under TIMP 1, I cannot recommend nor 

suggest weakening current safety factors established by existing area classification 

regulations for gas transmission pipelines. Suggestions to weaken or remove area 

classification requirements have wisely met with much resistance from the public 

and state regulators. I advise that no change be make in area classification regulations until: 

a. new TIMP 2 regulations have been properly incorporated into regulation, 

b. these new regulations take effect, and 

c. such new regulations demonstrate a track record that they are working, which 

will take some time. 

Weakening of gas area classification rules and their associated required additional 

safety margins is imprudent and premature, especially given the current failings associated with TIMP 1 regulations. 

4) Gas gathering minimum pipeline safety regulation needs serious improvement. 

Given the rapid growth in gas gathering pipeline mileage across America from 

shale gas development, and recent gathering pipeline rupture failures, minimum 

federal pipeline regulations are clearly not working in this area, and improvements 

are warranted. I recommend that regulatory efforts focus on: 

a. simplifying and clarifying the definition of a gas gathering pipeline, and 

89 

b. requiring all gathering lines to meet minimum standards meant to protect the 

public such as One Call participation, line markers, operational and emergency 

response plans, hazardous leak repairs, incident investigation, etc. 

c. following similar integrity management processes related to TIMP 2 PHMSA 

developed improvements. 

Gas gathering pipeline rupture failure dynamics and actual impact areas are the 

same as that of gas transmission pipelines. The public should thus also be made 

aware of gas gathering infrastructure in their area, protected by basic common 

sense standards that already apply to similar risk transmission pipelines, and inclusion of Integrity management (IM) efforts to avoid rupture. 

5) Release detection regulation should focus on two efforts: (1) remote rapid rupture 

release identification, and (2) leak releases which require different technical approaches than that for ruptures. 

I have observed that probably no other subject has generated more confusion, 

frustration, and concern across all parties, than the subject of remote release detection for pipelines. Remote release detection is a reasonable idea and it is going to 

take some effort as it is a severe technical challenge in many systems to make such 

systems reliable. Development of such technology, whether for rupture or leak detection, is advanced by prudent pipeline safety regulations that encourage the application and development of such efforts. Such regulation is similar to efforts encouraging initial pipeline ILI use and advancement, which started some forty years ago. 

Because of factors such as pipeline inventory and thermodynamics, pressure drop 

is not a timely nor reliable method of release detection in an operating pipeline, 

even for pipeline ruptures, the high rate releases from large pipeline openings 

caused by pipe fracture mechanics. I thus recommend in the area of release detection that regulation focus on two approaches: (1) rapid remote detection and alarm 

for pipeline ruptures based on properly determined transient flow dynamics, and (2) 

on leak detection for lower rate releases that also are not going to be captured by 

pressure loss. Leaks may not be as dangerous as ruptures, but nevertheless can be 

dangerous or damaging to the environment. PHMSA needs to pursue the different 

technical approaches needed for the remote identification of ruptures and leaks. 

6) Regulations for the placement of remote operated mainline valving for liquid and 

gas pipelines are badly needed. 

Many parties fail to understand the complications associated with developing regulations for mainline valving on pipelines. I recommend that mainline valve regulation advancements focus on both timely action and response for both liquid and gas 

pipelines, as such valves play an important safety role in the event of pipeline rupture. 

CONCLUSIONS

Congress needs to remove the unique cost/benefit analysis hurdle imposed on 

PHMSA preventing this agency from quickly promulgating sound pipeline safety 

regulation. PHMSA also needs to advance the TIMP 2 regulations in which years 

of technical effort, analysis, and discussion have already been invested. TIMP 2 regulatory changes represent reasonable compromise that will improve the performance 

and effectiveness of pipeline safety regulations for both transmission and gas gathering. The test for such possible regulations will lie in whether proposed rulemaking 

in these areas remains simple and easy to understand, as well as enforceable. We 

are talking in most cases about steel tubes, so technically, safety rulemaking should 

also be fairly simple and concise. If the regulations are becoming too long or complex, I highly recommend that the regulatory effort needs to be reevaluated as other 

agendas may be afoot. TIMP safety process are just not that complicated. 

Let’s also not lose sight of the fact that PHMSA has done good work in other technical areas, such as the research related to crack threat assessments from vintage 

Low Frequency Electric Resistance Welded, or LF-ERW pipe. PHMSA’s research efforts in vintage ERW crack research and assessment helped to publicly identify 

proper assessment/engineering approaches that should be used to avoid pipeline 

rupture from this category of threats with a long history of failure as ruptures. 

PHMSA’s efforts in this area have helped spread the word on what, until this research effort was completed, was a pipeline risk clearly understood by only a handful of subject matter experts in this pipeline field. 

PHMSA’s promulgation of DIMP regulations is an excellent example of marrying 

prescriptive with performance metrics. that have improved distribution pipeline 

safety. Advancements in computer software mapping/reporting technology not readably available during original passage of DIMP regulation, now permit efficiency in 

evaluating pipeline systems in an attempt to improve pipeline safety via certain gas 

90 

leak performance measures. Such mapping approaches are now at the level where 

it should be included in TIMP 2 as well as DIMP pipeline safety regulations. 

Thank you for your time today. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Kuprewicz. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rorick for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RORICK. Thank you, Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member 

Crawford, and members of the subcommittee, for having API here 

today to speak about our industry’s proactive efforts in pipeline 

safety and our priorities for pipeline safety reauthorization. 

My name is Robin Rorick, and I serve as the vice president for 

midstream and industry operations at the American Petroleum Institute, the trade association of more than 620 members representing all segments of the oil and natural gas industry. In my 

role, I am responsible for issues related to the gathering, processing, storage, and transportation of oil and natural gas and their 

products. 

Pipelines remain one of the safest ways to deliver energy we use 

every day. However, to reach our industry’s goal of zero incidents 

and ensure consumer access to clean, abundant, and affordable energy, it is imperative that the regulatory environment and the 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration be positioned to meet current and future pipeline safety challenges. 

Although we recognize and appreciate PHMSA’s efforts to implement past congressional mandates, more work needs to be done to 

institute practical and performance-based regulations for pipelines 

and LNG facilities. 

Thus, as Congress considers the reauthorization of PHMSA and 

other safety programs, we encourage strong consideration of industry priorities that will maximize our investment in people, technology, and safety culture to effectively advance safety. 

Right now, the United States leads the world in the production 

of oil and natural gas and, at the same time, is the global leader 

in the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, which are at their 

lowest levels in 25 years. In the past decade, we have transitioned 

from an era of energy scarcity and dependence to one of energy 

abundance and security. 

This energy renaissance has helped create greater job opportunities for American workers, bolster U.S. manufacturing, strengthen 

our economy, and enhance our national security interests. And it 

has helped U.S. families save on their energy bills. In the last decade, U.S. healthcare spending grew by over 70 percent and education spending increased over 50 percent while household energy 

spending declined by 10 percent. 

Pipelines are critical to ensuring that consumers keep feeling the 

benefits of our Nation’s vast energy resources, and they are one of 

the most efficient ways to safely deliver the energy that Americans 

use every day. 

It is estimated that increased investment in our Nation’s energy 

infrastructure, including pipelines, is a $1 trillion proposition that 

could support 1 million jobs per year through 2035 and add up to 

$100 billion to our GDP annually. 

Protecting the public and the environment is the top priority for 

pipeline and LNG operators and a central component to the design, 

construction, operation, and maintenance of energy infrastructure. 

91 

Ultimately, the development of a comprehensive safety system 

must continue to be the product of a shared commitment from our 

regulator, industry, and other stakeholders. Together, we can effectively focus on appropriate prevention and response practices 

through an application of regulations, leading industry practices, 

the use of technology, and alignment on research priorities. 

At the direction of Congress, PHMSA has been working on the 

development of several significant safety regulations for oil and 

natural gas pipelines. API and its members appreciate the emphasis PHMSA has placed on addressing congressional mandates and 

NTSB recommendations through these rulemakings. 

Based on the robust, transparent, and balanced Pipeline Advisory Committee process that these regulations underwent, we support the publication of the final gas transmission and hazardous 

liquid rule, the last of which was recently submitted to OMB. 

However, for other remaining significant safety rulemakings, including repair criteria for oil pipelines, class locations for gas pipelines, and LNG facilities safety, we would ask that PHMSA not lose 

sight of the importance of a holistic, performance-based regulatory 

approach that maximizes the industry’s ability to use the latest advances in new technologies and engineering techniques to manage 

safety risks. 

As an industry, we are committed to safety in all of our operations and consider regulations a base from which to build. API 

continues to develop and revise critical standards following the accreditation process of the American National Standards Institute, 

or ANSI. 

One in particular, API Recommended Practice 1173 on pipeline 

safety management systems, is critical in providing a foundational 

framework for managing complex operations. Through strong commitment and aggressive implementation of this voluntary program, 

RP 1173 has helped many of our pipeline operators effectively manage risk, promote best practices, continuously improve safety and 

performance, and build a strong organizational safety culture. 

Let me close by once more emphasizing that the oil and natural 

gas industry is committed to promoting safety in all of its operations while it strives to ensure that American families and businesses can safely and efficiently access affordable and reliable energy. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, 

and I am happy to answer any questions that you may have. 

[Mr. Rorick’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Robin Rorick, Vice President of Midstream and 

Industry Operations, American Petroleum Institute 

Good morning Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and Members of 

the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak today about our industry’s proactive efforts in pipeline safety and our priorities for Pipeline Safety Reauthorization. Pipelines remain one of the safest ways to deliver the energy we use 

every day. However, to maintain this strong safety record and ensure consumer access to clean, abundant, and affordable energy, it is imperative that the regulatory 

environment and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA) address current and future safety challenges. We recognize and appreciate 

PHMSA’s efforts to implement past Congressional mandates, but more work needs 

to be done to institute practical and performance-based regulations. Thus, as ConVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
92 

1https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/ 

2 U.S. DOE, Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review March 2019. 

3https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon/ 

4 U.S. DOE, Energy Information Administration, Weekly U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil 

5 U.S. DOE, Energy Information Administration, Weekly Petroleum Status Report 

6 U.S. DOE, Energy Information Administration, U.S. Natural Gas Marketed Production 

(monthly) 7 ICF, ‘‘U.S. Oil and Gas Infrastructure Investment Through 2035’’ (2017) 

gress considers the reauthorization of PHMSA and other safety programs, we encourage strong consideration of industry priorities that will maximize our investment in people, technology, and safety culture to effectively advance pipeline safety. 

The American Petroleum Institute (API) is the only national trade association representing all facets of the oil and natural gas industry, which supports 10.3 million 

jobs and 8 percent of the U.S. economy. API’s more than 625 members include large 

integrated companies, as well as exploration and production, refining, marketing, 

pipeline, and marine businesses and service and supply firms. As Vice President of 

API Midstream and Industry Operations, I am responsible for all energy infrastructure issues, including those related to the gathering, processing, storage, and transportation of oil and natural gas. 

ENERGY SECURITY

The United States leads the world in the production of oil and natural gas 1 and, 

at the same time, is the global leader in the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, 

which are at their lowest levels in a generation.2 Additionally, carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation have declined 26 percent since 2005 and are near 

their lowest levels in 30 years; more than 60 percent of the decrease in power generation-related CO2 emissions since 2005 was due to fuel switching to natural gas.3

In the past decade, we have transitioned from an era of energy scarcity and dependence to one of energy abundance and security. In 2008, the U.S. was producing only 

five million barrels per day of oil. As of this month, the U.S. is producing a record 

12 million barrels per day 4, more than doubling production. The Permian Basin in 

West Texas is a perfect example of this growth in production, pumping out over four 

million barrels of oil and natural gas liquids per day—quadruple its production from 

just eight years ago. Along with this growth in production, there’s been a corresponding growth in U.S. crude and petroleum product exports, which reached a 

record high of nine million barrels per day in November.5 A similar transformation 

has occurred in natural gas production, which has grown by over 50 percent since 

2008.6 This energy renaissance has helped U.S. families save on their energy bills, 

created greater job opportunities for American workers, bolstered U.S. manufacturing, strengthened our economy, and helped to enhance our national security interests abroad. While in the last decade healthcare and education spending has increased by over 70 and 50 percent, respectively, household energy spending in 

America has declined by 10 percent. 

The benefits of the oil and natural gas we produce here in the U.S. also provide 

benefits far beyond our borders. None of this would be possible were it not for the 

midstream sector of our industry, which ensures that we can get oil and natural 

gas from the areas where they are produced to where they are processed, refined 

and ultimately used. Our energy infrastructure is a critical component of the oil and 

natural gas supply chain, consisting of terminals, underground and above ground 

storage facilities, pipelines, railcars, trucks, ships, and marine vessels. Ensuring we 

have a robust energy infrastructure system that keeps pace with growing production 

and demand is essential to helping provide American families and businesses with 

reliable access to affordable energy. A 2017 study found that the U.S. will need up 

to $1.3 trillion in energy infrastructure investment through 2035. This investment, 

on average, will annually support up to 1 million jobs and add up to $100 billion 

to GDP.7 Whether it is powering our nation’s electricity grid, delivering natural gas 

to heat homes during harsh winters, or providing emergency fuel for first responders during natural disasters, this investment will ensure that these critical fuels are 

delivered when and where they are needed most. 

COMMITMENT TO PIPELINE SAFETY

Industry’s commitment to safe operations is evident by the strong safety record 

of the pipeline system that delivers oil, natural gas and petroleum products. Protecting the public and the environment is the top priority for pipeline operators and 

a central component to pipeline design, construction and maintenance. Ultimately, 

the development of a comprehensive pipeline safety system is the product of a 

shared commitment from key entities in the stakeholder community. The first eleVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
93 

ment involves the federal and state governments, which provide the safety regulations for the industry. Next is the contribution of the industry trade associations 

that, with the help of other stakeholders, help to develop industry guidance, recommendations and best practices. The third key entity are individual companies, 

who make the commitment to develop and implement effective safety programs. 

While each of these functions are critically important to advancing safety in the 

pipeline industry, the true effectiveness of the pipeline safety program exists because these three functions complement one another through the coordination and 

collaboration of all three of these entities. 

API, our allied oil and natural gas trades, and members are fully committed to 

maintaining the highest standards and establishing a strong foundation with the 

public by continually striving for improvement through enhanced safety operations. 

And while greater than 99 percent of oil, natural gas and their products reach their 

destination without incident, pipeline companies are striving to address the remaining fraction of a percent to reach our shared industry-wide goal of zero incidents. 

The industry’s ability to continually advance the safety of oil and natural gas pipeline operations is based on three critical elements: (1) people, (2) technology and (3) 

safety culture. Each of these is intertwined with the others to create a comprehensive and cohesive safety program. Education and training are constantly provided 

to industry employees to ensure they can operate the latest and greatest technologies. Similarly, employees are committed to developing a culture of safety that 

is continually assessed and improved. This three-pronged approach is designed first 

and foremost to prevent an incident from ever happening, but also ensures that the 

industry is prepared for any incident and can effectively respond in the rare instance that an incident occurs. 

Although API and its members appreciate the emphasis PHMSA has placed recently on addressing mandates and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 

recommendations, we strongly encourage PHMSA to act in a timely manner and not 

lose sight of the importance of a holistic, performance-based regulatory approach 

that maximizes the industry’s ability to use the latest advances in new technologies 

and techniques to manage pipeline safety risk. To that end, API and its members 

strongly supported the collaborative approach to review and finalize regulations 

through the Advisory Committee process and encourages PHMSA to publish the 

transmission proposals as voted on by the Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) 

and Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committees (LPAC) and expeditiously carry out a 

similar review process for a class location and repair criteria rulemaking. The Advisory Committee process is a transparent and balanced forum that has demonstrated 

the ability to build consensus around complex regulatory issues, including the pending gas and liquid transmission pipeline safety regulations. This forum will also be 

an ideal forum for the gathering lines discussions that are scheduled to begin later 

this year. Recently, several organizations that participated in the GPAC meetings 

sent a letter to Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao to express our support for 

quickly publishing a final gas transmission rule to address outstanding congressional mandates. The signatories included multiple industry associations as well as 

public safety advocacy groups. Such consensus would not have been possible prior 

to the GPAC discussions. 

THE IMPORTANCE OF API PIPELINE STANDARDS

Safety is a core value of the oil and natural gas industry. Our operators are committed to enhancing the safety of our workers and protecting the community and 

environment. At API, we establish industry standards and disseminate best practices across the industry to ensure the highest level of safety and achieve our collective goal of operating with zero incidents. Since 1924, API has been the leader in 

developing voluntary, consensus-based, internationally recognized, industry standards that promote safety and reliability. Our standards program is accredited by the 

American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the same organization that accredits 

similar programs at several national laboratories. In creating these industry consensus standards and recommended practices (RPs), API partners with the best and 

brightest technical experts from government, academia, and industry. This work 

supports the fulfillment of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act 

(NTTAA), which mandates that federal agencies use technical standards developed 

and adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, as opposed to using government-unique standards. Currently, API has more than 600 standards that are used 

globally by oil and natural gas operators. Here in the U.S., these standards are referenced more than 650 times in federal regulations, covering multiple government 

agencies, including PHMSA. Additionally, API’s standards are the most widely cited 

petroleum industry standards by state regulators, with 240 API standards cited over 

94 

8OGP Report No. 426, Regulators’ Use of Standards, March 2010 

4,130 times in state-based regulations. Finally, API’s standards are also the most 

widely cited standards by international regulators in the 14 major producing regions.8

Despite the current lack of certainty in the regulatory process, the industry is not 

standing idly by. API continues to develop and revise critical standards and recommended practices for prevention, mitigation, and response activities to address 

pipeline safety. Specifically, API has developed a number of standards to address 

pipeline safety in close coordination with subject matter experts from government, 

academia and industry. API RP 1173, Pipeline Safety Management Systems, provides the framework for managing complex operations with safety as the top priority. It provides operators with established guidelines to manage risk, promote best 

practices, continuously improve safety performance and build a strong organizational safety culture from the leader of a company all the way to an individual 

working in the field Safety culture must be organically strengthened from within 

an organization, which is why a voluntary regime is so important for the industry’s 

implementation of SMS. As U.S. production continues to grow and pipeline capacity 

does as well to keep pace, operators are motivated to develop a management system 

that ensures new pipelines are built to the appropriate specifications, keeping safety 

a priority. API RP 1177, Steel Pipeline Construction Quality Management Systems, 

outlines the steps needed for constructing safe steel pipelines, from purchasing the 

correct material to completing the right inspections prior to initiating operation. 

While pipeline operators are taking significant steps to meet the goal of zero incidents, they must have a comprehensive mitigation strategy to reduce the impact 

should a release occur. Developed with industry, regulator and broader stakeholder 

input, API RP 1175, Pipeline Leak Detection—Program Management, outlines how 

to use multiple leak detection tools—such as aerial overflights, ground patrols, and 

computational pipeline monitoring—to create a robust and holistic program to identify a leak as soon as it occurs. In addition, the RP encourages senior leaders within 

companies to enforce a leak detection culture that promotes safety. Properly trained 

employees will also aid in mitigating incidents. Pipeline operator qualifications (OQ) 

ensure companies properly prepare their personnel to perform high-risk duties, and 

continuous testing to verify the skills of qualified employees is a critical effort of 

operators. API has also developed RP 1161, Pipeline Operator Qualification, to give 

operators direction on ensuring those individuals performing high-risk tasks are appropriately trained and competent. 

Should an incident occur, pipeline operators are ready to respond. Through coordinated emergency response programs with federal, state and local first responders 

and agencies, operators ensure timely, seamless and effective responses. API RP 

1174, Onshore Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Emergency Preparedness and Response, 

completed by operators, regulators, and first responders, seeks to improve emergency response capabilities by providing a management system framework for operators to ensure they are prepared to respond to any event in a coordinated way with 

both our government and first responder partners in an efficient manner. These RPs 

are just a few of the available documents developed in collaboration with federal 

and state regulators, academics and interested stakeholders, which through effective 

implementation and training will help improve safety across the industry. 

PIPELINE SAFETY REAUTHORIZATION PRIORITIES

As stated earlier, to improve upon our strong safety record and reach our goal of 

zero pipeline incidents, it is imperative that the regulatory environment and 

PHMSA be positioned to meet current and future safety challenges. As such, there 

are three priority areas where PHMSA reauthorization can support the shared objective of industry and the regulating agency in advancing pipeline safety. 

Recognizing the Importance of Innovation and Technology 

Within the current Administration, DOT and PHMSA have expressed a renewed 

interest in innovation and technology. The leadership of both organizations continue 

to place a great deal of importance on the use of inspection technology as a ‘‘transformative’’ tool to advance the oil and natural gas pipeline industry’s safety performance and address remaining pipeline incidents. Thus it is imperative that PHMSA’s 

regulations do not hamper an operator’s ability to address potential problems 

through the application of the most innovative technology, critical engineering assessment processes and fit-for-purpose repair criteria based on data and sound engineering principles. Specifically, operators are required to conduct timely assessments of pipeline integrity, and that may often be done effectively and efficiently 

95 

with a new technology. However, companies may have a hesitation to do so, given 

the burdensome approval process in the use of alternative safety technology. Establishing clear parameters and deadlines associated with PHMSA’s review, notification, and approvals of alternative technology will help provide more certainty in the 

process and allow operators to utilize the latest cutting-edge technologies to further 

pipeline safety. 

With this in mind, 50-year old regulations that only allow for new technologies 

to be used one rulemaking at a time must be updated. While those regulations reflected the technology and best thinking available at the time of adoption, they have 

not kept pace with advances in pipeline safety technology and modern engineering 

practices. To PHMSA’s credit, over the last couple of decades, they have attempted 

to pursue performance-based regulations versus prescriptive ones—in other words, 

an approach that focuses on the desired outcomes (in this case, fewer incidents) 

rather than prescriptive processes or procedures (i.e., operators must inspect their 

pipe so many times every few years). This is compliant with direction provided by 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to give preference to performancebased standards. A performance-based regulatory model allows operators to utilize 

the latest advances in inspection and detection technologies as soon as it is practicable to focus on the desired outcome of fewer incidents. For instance, PHMSA 

issued Integrity Management (IM) regulations that provide operators with the ability to use different in-line inspection (ILI) tools that are better at detecting a defect 

in specific types of pipe. 

In addition, PHMSA should be commended for considering updates to the class 

location change regulations. With today’s processes and technologies, pipeline safety 

can be managed effectively through data-driven inspection and maintenance, instead of the arbitrary pipe replacements required by the current class location 

change regulations. These unnecessary replacement projects can disrupt natural gas 

service and require the release of up to 800 million standard cubic feet of natural 

gas every year, which is equivalent to the annual natural gas use of over 12,000 

homes. And each year the class location change regulations divert hundreds of millions of dollars towards replacing less than 75 miles of pipe. There are much more 

productive ways to expend these substantial resources. For example, for the same 

cost of replacing 75 miles of pipe, we could instead assess 25,000 miles with in-line 

inspection tools that truly pose a risk of impacting people or the environment. 

Modernizing PHMSA and Regulations 

As PHMSA and the energy industry together continue to drive toward our shared 

goal of zero pipeline incidents, a modernized regulator with the necessary tools, 

well-trained staff, and streamlined programs can bring needed certainty and consistency into the regulatory and oversight process. While the oil and natural gas industry continues to work proactively, through our standards development process and 

collaboration with regulators and other stakeholders, to achieve our goal of zero incidents, there are additional regulatory reforms that we believe will help to further 

enhance pipeline safety. 

A performance-based approach recognizes that there is great variability throughout the industry and that a one-size-fits-all approach could prevent the development 

of more company or operations specific engineering assessment options that most effectively manage and advance safety. For example, currently 49 Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR) Part 193 safety regulations for liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities does not provide a risk-based alternative for establishing important maintenance programs. The regulations were originally written decades ago to capture 

siting, design, construction, operation and maintenance for small-scale peak shaving 

type facilities. The current regulation is not sufficiently scalable or flexible to address a broader spectrum of operations including large-scale export facilities. This 

could result in unnecessary, costly and overly burdensome prescriptive requirements 

that do not enhance safety on these facilities. PHMSA should consider risk-based/ 

process safety management options in Part 193 rulemaking that allows operators 

to prioritize critical resources to take a risk-informed integrity management approach for inspection and corrosion control at LNG facilities. 

There are other areas where outdated regulations also drive inefficiencies and resource allocation to less impactful safety priorities. For example, in current regulations, pipeline operators are required to report pipeline incidents if they meet certain conditions, including a clean-up cost of $50,000 or higher. However, PHMSA 

set this threshold in 1984 and has not updated it for inflation since. As such, incident reporting based on the current day costs would allow pipeline operators to better utilize and allocate resources, toward more significant incidents. Keeping pace, 

Congress should require PHMSA to adjust its incident reporting dollar threshold for 

inflation. 

96 

Additionally, there are more than 650 API standards referenced in Federal regulation. As these standards are improved through the American National Standards 

Institute (ANSI)-accredited process at a minimum of every 5 years, Federal regulations often are unable to be updated in a timely manner to reflect these important 

leading practices within the industry. Currently, approximately 50 percent of the instances where PHMSA cites API standards are not referencing the most recent 

version of those standards. As API standards are updated or new ones are developed, PHMSA should execute a more timely and frequent review process that can 

use the existing rulemaking processes to incorporate by reference the latest edition 

or the first edition of appropriate standards. 

Our industry continues to place a great deal of emphasis and resources on research and development. Specifically, improvements to pipeline integrity inspection 

capabilities are a strategic objective that have driven our industry to invest in furthering in-line inspection tool detection, ultimately preventing incidents from occurring. For example, API is facilitating a more dynamic and interactive process between pipeline operators and technology vendors to ensure there is a unified approach to addressing challenges and maintaining the focus on achieving safer pipelines. As such, industry stands willing to explore opportunities to further strengthen 

collaboration with PHMSA on research and development, collectively shaping a 

longer-term strategy that drives innovation, informs regulations, and ultimately improves pipeline safety performance. 

Lastly, the oil and natural gas industry strives to have well trained and qualified 

PHMSA pipeline inspectors to help bring certainty and consistency to the inspection 

and enforcement of federal pipeline safety regulations. However, pipeline inspectors 

frequently come into PHMSA with limited pipeline safety experience, and those that 

already have or gain experience often depart the agency to pursue more lucrative 

opportunities. As such, similar to other agency hiring authority for specialty positions, the ability to compensate pipeline inspectors at market rates through 

PHMSA’s use of Schedule A employees with streamlined hiring and flexible pay levels would enhance PHMSA’s ability to attract and retain expert pipeline inspectors. 

Protecting Pipelines, People and Environment 

Pipelines are one of the safest ways to deliver the energy American families and 

consumers use every day. However, recent illegal attacks on oil and natural gas infrastructure have pointed out the need for increased awareness of pipeline infrastructure, the impacts of damage to it, and the importance of enforcement against 

perpetrators of such attacks. Illegal disruptions to critical infrastructure can have 

impacts on local populations, the environment and the economy. While we respect 

the first amendment right to free speech and peaceful protest, an individual that 

criminally trespasses onto private property to then endanger their own life, the life 

of others and the environment is conducting an act that goes beyond the right provided by the first amendment. 

For the safety of the people and the environment, Congress should do more to prevent threats to critical infrastructure like oil and natural gas pipelines by strengthening the breadth of protections around pipelines and facilities and expanding the 

scope of actions under criminal provision. 

Our members recognize that the industry is a target for both criminals and nation 

states who are working to steal intellectual property, disrupt operations and undermine our economy. They take the threats very seriously and continue to prioritize 

the protection of their assets from both physical and cyber-attacks. Companies in 

the oil and natural gas industry have made and continue to make considerable investments in defending their networks, bolstering their cyber security defenses, and 

participating in organizations and partnerships where they can share and receive 

threat information. Specifically, up to the board level, they are making important 

investments in time, people and resources to defend themselves, so they can continue to deliver the products Americans rely on every day. While threats continue 

to evolve, so do industry’s defenses, by working with government partners, including 

TSA, DHS, FBI and others to understand the threat. We believe the industry’s 

record of delivering products safely and efficiently 99 percent of the time is indicative of the actions our members take to protect themselves in the face of very real 

and serious threats. 

CONCULSION

Safety of the public and the environment is our industry’s top priority, and collaboration with PHMSA, DHS, and other government agencies only strengthens our 

ability to transport our products across America with the fewest possible number 

of incidents. We are committed to promoting safety in all of our operations, helping 

to ensure that American families and businesses can efficiently access affordable 

97 

and reliable energy. Again, thank you the opportunity to appear before you today, 

and I am happy to answer any questions that you may have. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Rorick. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Holstein for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HOLSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will focus my remarks on PHMSA’s regulation of the transportation and storage part of the natural gas industry. Because natural gas, which, as you know, is mostly methane, that leaks from 

pipelines not only creates dangerous conditions for people and communities, it also contributes to and accelerates climate change. 

Methane is some 84 times more powerful than carbon dioxide 

over the first 20 years following its release. And the atmospheric 

damage that it causes, which includes the amounts accumulating 

in the atmosphere, combine to cause 25 percent of the global warming that we are experiencing today. Atmospheric concentrations of 

methane have increased 164 percent over the past 250 years, which 

is a direct result of human activities. 

Therefore, decisions made now about methane emissions will 

have a major impact on the rate at which the climate changes over 

the lifetimes of many Americans living now and spanning the next 

several generations. 

Methane also negatively affects human health. When it is released, other chemicals are often released as well, including cancercausing benzene and also ozone, which contributes to smog formation. 

The good news is that detecting methane emissions from oil and 

gas operations, including pipelines and storage facilities, is both 

feasible and highly cost-effective. It is also getting better with 

every passing year. 

For example, the Environmental Defense Fund worked with 

Google Earth with their street mapping cars, and we have been 

able to map gas leaks, including relatively small ones, from distribution pipelines in 12 cities around the United States. 

Another example, Picarro, Incorporated, which is a leading vendor of natural gas leak detection equipment, did a major project recently with Public Service Electric and Gas in New Jersey, which 

I might note is also my home State, and found that the accuracy 

of its mobile methane emissions detection systems is some 1,000 

times greater than that of legacy systems. It is able to detect methane at the scale of one part per billion. These kinds of high-sensitivity, advanced leak detection systems are mounted on vehicles 

and on aircraft, including drones, and can quickly locate gas leaks 

and help quantify them. 

In another study, ICF International concluded that methane 

emissions from the North American oil and gas sector could be cut 

by over 40 percent using equipment already on the market at a 

cost of less than one penny per 1,000 cubic feet of gas produced annually. 

Moreover, that study found that the value of gas not emitted into 

the atmosphere as a result of detection and mitigation measures 

amounted to well over $1⁄2 billion a year. 

Accordingly, we believe that PHMSA must move in the direction 

of more reliable and comprehensive inspections of pipelines to ensure that those kinds of modern, advanced leak detection systems 

98 

are implemented throughout the gas transportation and storage 

supply chain. 

Now, looking ahead—and I want to say a couple of words about 

gas gathering lines—we see that there are over 300,000 miles of 

new onshore gas gathering lines that are expected to be built over 

the next 20 years. That is on top of the 435,000 miles of gas gathering lines already in place. 

The technology to prevent gas leaks from those thousands of 

miles of gathering lines and to find and fix them quickly when they 

do happen is here. It is cost-effective, it is good for the environment, and it has the potential to save enormous amounts of natural gas that otherwise would be wasted. 

First, however, PHMSA must learn where those gathering lines 

actually are. Accordingly, Congress should ensure that PHMSA requires gathering line operators to participate in the National Pipeline Mapping System. Communities and first responders across 

America need to know where those lines are. 

Two or three quick things in terms of additional congressional 

actions we believe are needed. 

We think there is no longer any reason, if there ever were one, 

to shield poor performers from the consequences of their decisions 

and actions. So we think that one of the things that should happen 

is the elimination of the current cap on civil penalties. 

Second, Congress should remove the exemptions from PHMSA’s 

requirements for safety-related condition reporting. 

And finally and very importantly—and I have not heard it mentioned today—is the budget. None of the recommendations you will 

hear today will matter in the long run unless Congress rejects the 

administration’s PHMSA budget proposals. The President’s budget 

request for fiscal year 2020 includes a funding cut of almost 10 percent for pipeline safety as well as additional staffing reductions at 

PHMSA. PHMSA must have the resources necessary this year and 

beyond to do its work if these conversations about its responsibilities and programs are to have any meaning. 

Thank you so much for the opportunity to testify. 

[Mr. Holstein’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Elgie Holstein, Senior Director for Strategic 

Planning, Environmental Defense Fund 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you today to discuss the safety and oversight of the nation’s pipeline system. 

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) is an international environmental advocacy 

organization with a million-and-a-half members. Placing a strong emphasis on our 

core strengths of science and economics, we are dedicated to finding innovative approaches to solving some of the most difficult national and international environmental challenges. Whenever possible, we collaborate with private-sector partners, 

state and federal leaders, academic institutions and other environmental organizations interested in maximizing incentives for market-based solutions to environmental problems. 

We recognize that the oil and gas sector is a key contributor to our nation’s energy mix, but with that role comes the responsibility to minimize harmful impacts 

to our communities and to the environment. With the continuing increases in recoverable U.S. oil and gas reserves, it is more important than ever that both the industry and the government commit to a cleaner and more sustainable energy future. 

Recognizing and addressing the causes and effects of methane emissions from the 

oil and gas sector is one important step in fulfilling that commitment. 

99 

1 Assessment of Methane Emissions from the U.S. Oil and Gas Supply Chain, R.A. Alvarez 

et al., Science, October 9, 2018 

In thinking about the role and performance of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) of the Department of Transportation, it is important to emphasize that environmental protection is among the core responsibilities of the agency. We fully understand and support the view that PHMSA has a 

critical role to play in protecting public health and safety. However, we also believe 

that environmental protection is closely aligned with that mission—in fact, that it 

is inextricably linked to it—and that the agency needs to be more responsive and 

more proactive in addressing both safety and environmental matters. 

I will focus my remarks on PHMSA’s regulation of the natural gas industry, because natural gas (methane) leaks from pipelines not only create dangerous conditions for people and communities, they also contribute to and accelerate climate 

change. Scientists around the world—and even in the Trump Administration—are 

telling us that we must act quickly to avert the worst consequences of humancaused climate change. 

We believe that PHMSA already has sufficient authority to play a more ambitious 

role with respect to the environment. However, we also believe that Congress needs 

to be more explicit in defining the terms of the agency’s environmental mission. In 

addition, Congressional action seems overdue to address the agency’s repeated failures to meet congressionally defined deadlines for acting on statutory mandates, as 

well as the excessive time it seems to take in launching—and completing—major 

regulatory initiatives. 

THE HARM FROM METHANE EMISSIONS

One of the most serious issues within PHMSA’s jurisdiction is the issue of methane emissions from the nation’s extensive natural gas transportation and storage infrastructure. 

As you know, natural gas is playing a growing role in America, notably with respect to the continuing market-based preference for gas over coal in the generation 

of electricity. At the same time, methane—the primary component of natural gas— 

has an especially pernicious effect on the environment when it escapes or is released 

into the atmosphere. Methane emissions accelerate climate change, and they undermine the climate benefits of switching from coal-fired electricity generation to natural gas-fired generation. 

The scientific understanding of the extent of methane pollution and its effects has 

been growing steadily. EDF has contributed to that knowledge base by engaging 

with 100 partnering organizations, including 40 research partners from industry 

and academia, in numerous scientific studies that have helped to better identify the 

extent and sources of methane emissions in the oil and gas sector.1 That work has 

been driven by our dual concern for the environment and for public health. 

Across our economy, emissions from the oil and gas sector as a whole represent 

about a third of total U.S. methane emissions, the largest of all industrial U.S. 

sources, according to EPA. They are equivalent to the carbon pollution from more 

than 250 coal plants over 20 years. Natural gas systems alone are the second largest source of methane. 

The nature of methane’s damage to the environment is now clearly understood. 

In terms of the climate damage it does, methane is some 84 times more potent than 

carbon dioxide over the first couple of decades following its release. While CO2 represents a continuing, long-term threat in the form of accumulated, long-lived and 

rising atmospheric concentrations, methane drives near-term climate effects. 

Methane’s potency, and the amounts making their way into the atmosphere, combine to cause approximately 25 percent of the global warming we are experiencing 

right now. 

The global warming impact of those emissions reflects both methane’s potency 

and the fact that atmospheric concentrations of methane have increased 164 percent 

over the past 250 years—a direct result of human activities. 

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change—the distinguished international 

scientific group that is tracking climate change worldwide—has concluded that more 

than half of the warming in the next couple of decades due to current emissions 

will be from short-lived climate pollutants such as methane. 

Therefore, decisions made now about methane emissions will have a major impact 

on the rate at which the climate changes over the lifetimes of many Americans living now and spanning the next several generations. (For more details about the 

science underlying concerns about methane and other short-lived climate ‘‘forcers,’’ 

please see the attached article from Science magazine.) 

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2 EDF, Google Use Special Street View Cars TO Map and Measure Leaks from Pittsburgh 

Natural Gas System. https://www.edf.org/media/edf-google-use-special-street-view-cars-map-andmeasure-leaks-pittsburgh-natural-gas-system 3M.J. Bradley and Associates, ‘‘Pipeline Blowdown Emission and Mitigation Options,’’ June 

2016. http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/files/2016/07/PHMSA-Blowdown-Analysis-FINAL.pdf 4Picarro, Inc., https://www.picarro.com/ 

Methane emissions have impacts beyond the realm of climate change, extending 

to threats to human health. When methane is released, other chemicals such as benzene and volatile organic compounds—which contribute to ground-level ozone 

(smog)—are often released as well. So, it makes sense—and we believe it is essential—to address the threats from both CO2 and methane, as the Science article discusses. 

PHMSA’S AUTHORITY TO ACT

PHMSA is expressly empowered to consider, and to design regulations to mitigate, 

risks to the environment—including methane emissions from gas pipelines. The 

Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 amended the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 

to expand DOT’s responsibilities to include environmental protection in addition to 

safety. Specific amendments delegate responsibility to the Office of Pipeline Safety 

for, among other things: 

(1) Requiring pipeline operators to submit reports on any condition that is a hazard to the environment; 

(2) Considering whether an operator’s inspection and maintenance plan is sufficiently protective of the environment; and 

(3) Promulgating minimum safety standards for pipelines and facilities that are 

designed to protect the environment. 

According to EPA’s latest greenhouse gas inventory, leaks and routine operations 

in the transmission and storage (T&S) component of the gas supply chain lead to 

1.3 million metric tons of methane emitted per year. The problem is clearly serious 

enough to merit additional action by PHMSA and by Congress. 

DETECTING METHANE EMISSIONS

Our assertion that PHMSA should do more to reduce methane emissions from energy infrastructure within its jurisdiction should be seen in light of the fact that 

the cost-effectiveness of methane detection equipment and services—especially for 

oil and gas operations—has been improving steadily. 

For example, Environmental Defense Fund, working with Google Earth 

Outreach’s Street View mapping cars, has been able to map gas leaks from distribution pipelines in 12 cities around the United States.2

In 2016 EDF and the Pipeline Safety Trust wanted to understand the potential 

impacts on methane emissions from PHMSA-proposed new gas pipeline safety rules. 

Specifically, we commissioned an independent analysis by M.J. Bradley and Associates to assess the methane emissions associated with pipeline ‘‘blowdowns.’’ (A blowdown is a release of pipeline gas into the atmosphere so that maintenance, testing 

or other activities can occur.) The analysis also examined the mitigation methods 

available to reduce such emissions.3

The study found that while additional blowdowns potentially required by the rule 

could result in significant additional methane emissions, fifty to ninety percent of 

the methane emissions attributable to maintenance activity conducted to comply 

with the proposed rule could be cost-effectively mitigated using currently available 

methods, depending on the mitigation measure selected and the parameters of the 

blowdown. 

M.J. Bradley analyzed five currently available mitigation measures: in-line compression, low pressure diversion, mobile compression, flaring, and stopples. All five 

mitigation methods investigated resulted in negative net cost as well as high costeffectiveness values when saved gas value and the social benefits (such as climate 

impacts) of methane mitigation were considered. 

Another example: In a recent report on mobile emissions detection work done for 

Public Service Electric and Gas in New Jersey, Picarro Inc.—a leading vendor of 

natural gas leak detection equipment—reported that the accuracy of its mobile 

methane emissions detection systems is some 1000 times greater than that of legacy 

systems. It is able to detect methane at the scale of one part per billion.4

These kinds of high-sensitivity, advanced leak detection systems are mounted on 

vehicles and aircraft (including drones) and are increasingly used by companies anxious to assure the public and regulators that they are doing their part to detect and 

101 

5 ‘‘Summary of Methane Emission Reduction Opportunities Across North American Oil and 

Natural Gas Industries.’’ May 2016. https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/north-american-executive-summarylenglish.pdf 

fix pipeline leaks, protect public health and safety, save money for their customers, 

and reduce adverse impacts on the climate. 

In 2016, EDF released a summary analysis, prepared by the consulting firm, ICF, 

Inc., of three previous reports examining the cost-effectiveness of a variety of methane emissions abatement technologies, including leak detection and repair programs. The report concluded that methane emissions from the North American oil 

and gas sector could be cut by over 40 percent using equipment already available 

on the market at that time, at a cost of less than 1 penny per thousand cubic feet 

of gas produced.5

Moreover, the value of natural gas savings gas amounted to well over a half-billion dollars a year. (The study noted that additional, health-related benefits would 

accrue from pollution reductions associated with methane abatement, but those benefits were not included in the cost-benefit calculations—meaning the remarkable 

cost-benefit conclusion were very conservative.) 

We believe that PHMSA’s traditional focus on Integrity Management Systems 

limited to high-consequence areas is ill-suited to address the problem of methane 

emissions and climate change, since gas leaking from anywhere in the gas supply 

chain does serious harm to the atmosphere and worsens near-term global warming. 

(It also undermines the environmental advantage that gas industry representatives 

point to in their electricity market competition with coal.) Accordingly, we believe 

that PHMSA must move in the direction of more reliable and comprehensive inspections of pipelines to ensure that advanced leak detection and repair protocols are 

implemented for gas pipelines everywhere. 

GAS GATHERING LINES

With the ongoing national boom in natural gas development, the system of onshore gas gathering lines has also increased, and it is likely to continue to expand 

with thousands of miles of new lines carrying gas under high pressure. Based on 

information from the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), over 

300,000 miles of new onshore gas gathering lines are likely to be constructed over 

the next 20 years. 

As discussed above, the cost-effectiveness and rapidly improving accuracy of leak 

detection and repair equipment reinforce the argument for extending advanced leak 

detection to the nation’s more than 435,000 miles of gas gathering lines. The technology is here; it is cost-effective, and it has the potential to save enormous amounts 

of natural gas that otherwise would be wasted. 

First, however, PHMSA must learn where those lines actually are. 

The time has come for Congress to direct the agency, working with the states, to 

develop an inventory of gathering lines. That inventory must include not only location, but size, operating pressures, and other data relevant to safe and environmentally sound performance. 

The lack of that information not only deprives regulators and the public of important information, it also makes it that much harder for PHMSA to justify major new 

rules. This is particularly true given the cost-benefit requirements that Congress 

has imposed on the agency, a hurdle made harder to clear by the absence of comprehensive information about gathering lines. 

Accordingly, Congress should ensure that PHMSA requires gathering line operators to participate in the National Pipeline Mapping System. 

EDF also supports the expansion of reporting requirements to include gas gathering pipelines. Annual, incident and safety-related reporting requirements are essential for reasonable management and data-based regulation of this growing pipeline segment. 

Onshore gas gathering pipelines are currently exempt from reporting requirements, and most states with delegated authority to conduct inspections on intrastate gathering lines have not developed regulations to provide meaningful oversight 

to fill this gap. 

Without data and oversight of these gathering lines, assessing and managing the 

safety risks associated with larger, higher-pressure gathering lines is impossible. To 

remedy this problem, GAO recommended that PHMSA collect data on federally unregulated gas gathering lines, to allow the Agency to quantitatively assess safety 

risks, and evaluate the sufficiency of regulation. 

EDF concurs with this recommendation, and is pleased to see it reflected, at least 

in part, in the proposed rules for certain gas gathering lines. Specifically, EDF supVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
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ports PHMSA’s proposal to repeal the exemption for reporting requirements for operators of onshore gas gathering lines, which would require gas gathering line operators to submit annual, incident and safety-related reports, and other important 

data already required for other types of pipelines. 

As noted above, gas gathering lines should be included in the National Pipeline 

Mapping System to provide consistent, accessible information about the ownership 

and location of the rapidly expanding gathering infrastructure. 

The type of data submitted under the National Pipeline Mapping System requirements are precisely the type of data PHMSA needs to evaluate the efficacy of current regulatory thresholds. The location and information regarding gas gathering 

lines will—as with similar information for transmission lines—assist with emergency response, regulatory management, compliance, and analysis. Future riskbased regulations, such as an expansion of the rules applicable to gas gathering 

pipelines and installation of automated control valves, may be improved with data 

submitted under the National Pipeline Mapping system requirements. 

EDF also supports PHMSA’s proposed clarification of the gathering line definition, which would avoid inadvertently excluding certain gathering lines from regulation. 

ADDITIONAL NEEDED CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS

Additional steps Congress should take to improve pipeline safety and reduce 

methane emissions include the elimination of the current cap on civil penalties. 

There is no longer any reason, if there ever were one, to shield poor performers from 

the consequences of their decisions and actions. 

Congress should also remove the exemptions from PHMSA’s requirements for 

safety-related condition reporting. That reporting is intended to identify conditions 

that could lead to future incidents, and the reports are considered by the agency 

to be important indicators of safety system effectiveness. However, PHMSA permits 

several exemptions from such reporting, undermining their usefulness as early indicators of potential problems. In the unfolding era of ‘‘big data’’ they also reduce the 

potential value of the reports as a predictive tool that might otherwise save lives 

and protect property and the environment. 

Budget: None of these recommendations will matter in the long run, however, unless Congress rejects the administration’s PHMSA budget proposals for next year. 

The President’s budget request for FY2020 includes a funding cut of almost 10 percent for pipeline safety, as well as staffing reductions, at PHMSA. If, as the saying 

goes, ‘‘budget is policy,’’ Congress must show its determination to safeguard the public and the environment by rejecting that ill-conceived budget proposal. PHMSA 

must have the resources necessary to do its work if these conversations about its 

responsibilities and programs are to have any meaning. 

CONCLUSION

Natural gas is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, an important part of 

our nation’s energy mix. The natural gas revolution in America can make a positive 

contribution to a cleaner environment, but only if gas development is based on reasonable rules to ensure that its more damaging impacts are limited. 

As we manage our nation’s bounty of oil and gas, it is important to get the rules 

right. Doing so will not only help minimize adverse environmental impacts, it is an 

essential ingredient in building public trust and confidence in the ability and commitment of the government and the industry to reducing negative impacts on public 

health, safety and the environment. Congress can ensure that PHMSA will play an 

expanded role in delivering on that commitment. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I welcome any questions you 

may have. 

ATTACHMENT: SCIENCE MAGAZINE ARTICLE

[The article is available online: J.K. Shoemaker et al., ‘‘What Role for Short-lived 

Climate Pollutants in Mitigation Policy?’’ Science magazine, Dec. 13, 2013, http:// 

centromariomolina.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Molina-et-al.-Science-What-Rolefor-Short-Lived-Climate-Pollutants-in-Mitigation-Policy-2013.pdf.] 

Mr. LIPINSKI. I would like to thank all the witnesses for your testimonies. 

We will now move on to Member questions. I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

103 

PHMSA’s regulatory requirements are unique among regulatory 

agencies. I want to ask Mr. Weimer and Mr. Kuprewicz, what are 

the safety implications of PHMSA having to undergo a cost-benefit 

analysis where it must have quantifiable benefits that exceed cost 

before being able to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking? And 

why do you recommend Congress eliminate this unique requirement for PHMSA? 

Mr. Weimer, if you can go first? 

Mr. WEIMER. Sure. Thank you for the question. 

We recognize the cost-benefits in the statute as being unique. I 

think PHMSA, pipeline safety side, is one of the few agencies that 

has such a thing. We don’t disagree that cost-benefit is an important thing to look at during regulations, but it is required of all 

regulators as part of OMB and through Executive orders. But since 

it is in the statute, it gives the industry a unique legal hook to 

argue with the regulations. 

And the way that works is—I think somebody earlier today 

asked what the value of human life is. And when you do the costbenefit analysis that PHMSA uses, they use a figure of about $9 

million or $10 million as the benefit of a human life. So if you have 

a tragedy like San Bruno that kills eight people and you go 

through a cost-benefit to look at installing new valves on a pipeline 

and you say that over the course of 10 years you are going to prevent 10 lives from being lost, that would be worth about $100 million. 

At the same time, if you look at what the cost would be for the 

industry to put a valve on every mile of pipeline that it might be 

required, like based on the NTSB recommendations, it may be that 

those valves—and I am just making numbers up—cost $1 million 

apiece, and you might have to put 400 of them nationwide, so that 

is worth $400 million. So the cost of implementing automated 

valves way outweighs the benefit of the human lives you are going 

to save. 

Now, that was a very basic overview, and it is much more complex, but that is the way the statute works, in that industry can 

go to court then and argue that the statute wasn’t based on costbenefit because it is in the statute. You can’t argue that just at 

OMB, where it does make sense to weigh those things. So that is 

why we think it should be removed. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Kuprewicz, do you want to add anything to 

that? 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. Yes. I would add that, in my 20 years of kind 

of watching the development and promulgation of pipeline safety 

regulations in the fields, I have seen PHMSA’s frustration in trying 

to push development of some very good ideas. And the cost-benefit 

process slows the whole thing down, and then it gets lost, you 

know, in bureaucratic procedures on many things. 

And so my comment earlier about—I used to think $1 billion was 

a lot of money, in terms of some of these tragedies. And you have 

heard just a few that I have investigated today in more detail. The 

analysis is all wrong. The nature of the failures are such that costbenefit does not set itself up. Its primary objective, from where I 

stand, is to deregulate. So let’s call it what it is. 

104 

Now, it is up to Congress to decide how they want to deal with 

that. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. That is a very interesting point you raise about actually measuring the benefits. That is something we are going to 

have to look at closely here. 

I want to move on to Chief Eggleston. What can Congress do to 

improve the information-sharing between pipeline operators and 

local communities’ emergency responders so that you have the type 

of information that you need? 

Chief EGGLESTON. Well, we truly believe that that point of contact is best handled through the LEPCs, that they throughout the 

Nation have been proven to help share information across localities 

in terms of hazards in their areas. So continuing to help fund the 

grant programs that support the LEPCs, we think, is the best way 

to go forward. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. I know when I mentioned in my opening statement 

that in Romeoville, in my district, there was a leak. The story is 

that the leak was detected, and someone had to go walk along the 

pipeline to get any information on whose pipeline this was to even 

know who to contact. It would be much better if that information 

was available, along with other information. 

I want to quickly ask, in the short amount of time, a quick question of Mr. Holstein. You talked about, and I had read about 

Google going around with their mapping finding the leaks. What 

happened with that information? Was it actually used to fix leaks? 

Mr. HOLSTEIN. We posted that information, Mr. Chairman, on 

our website, and so anyone can see it today. And we specifically encouraged local citizens in those communities, places like Boston 

and Indianapolis and eight other cities around the country, encouraged people to discuss that amount of leakage. In many older cities, 

in particular, we found there was a great deal of leakage. 

However, we were careful to say that we were not challenging 

the classification system that is used by PHMSA and by gas distribution utilities in terms of the decisions they make about how 

quickly to respond, how urgently to respond to different types of 

leaks. After all, a big leak out in a field is less of a safety threat 

than a small leak in a small apartment. 

So mostly what we were trying to demonstrate is that new technologies exist to do very accurate and very inexpensive and also 

very rapid surveys of, in that case, streets in major cities. But the 

same kinds of technologies can be deployed elsewhere. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. My time has expired. 

I now will recognize Mr. Balderson for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BALDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My first question to the panel—good afternoon, and thank you all 

for being here today—is for Mr. Black. 

Mr. Black, thank you for testifying before the subcommittee 

today regarding pipeline safety. 

I think we all can agree that PHMSA regulations shouldn’t prevent an operator from applying the best available technology and 

inspection tools to conduct assessments and address potential problems. 

If PHMSA was to develop a pilot program that allows companies 

to test and use new pipeline technologies and offer exemptions 

105 

from agency regulations, how could we do so responsibly and ensure the expectations meet adequate safety levels? 

Mr. BLACK. Thank you, Congressman. 

PHMSA has authority in motor carrier statute to issue pilot programs, and we recommend that here for pipeline safety so that we 

can harness the benefits of new technologies, just like you are saying. 

Advances in pipeline inspection technologies and in analytical 

techniques have really increased recently, and they have outpaced 

PHMSA regulation. With the pilot program, PHMSA could test 

technologies and approaches that they believe would have an 

equivalent level of safety that could gain real-world experience and 

data that they could use then to have more confidence moving forward on regulations. 

We believe safety would be improved by using these latest technologies on when to inspect, when to perform maintenance on pipelines, and to use the benefits of improving technology. 

Mr. BALDERSON. Thank you for that answer. 

A followup with that: Can you provide any examples of innovative technologies that can be used to promote pipeline safety operations to outdated PHMSA regulations? 

Mr. BLACK. Pipelines are inspected by in-line inspection or diagnostic robots. You hear us refer to them often as smart pigs. They 

travel inside a pipeline, using technologies like MRI or an 

ultrasound at the doctor’s office. They collect terabytes of data. 

They give us more information than we have ever had before about 

smaller and smaller features. With that information, we can 

prioritize risks and get out there and perform preventive maintenance to address an issue before it becomes a problem. 

Outdated PHMSA regulations might suggest a schedule and a 

prioritization of risks different than modern know-how and engineering principles would tell us. So with a pilot program, PHMSA 

can put these ideas to use, gather information, and then, if they 

are proven beneficial, apply those across Federal regulations to 

benefit safety across the entire industry. 

Mr. BALDERSON. OK. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Rorick, also thank you for being here today. My next question is, how can the pipeline industry and API member companies 

work with PHMSA to ensure the agency is able to retain qualified 

and expert pipeline inspectors? 

Mr. RORICK. Thank you for the question, Congressman. 

It is one of our core items, as we discuss pipeline authorization, 

to make sure that PHMSA, as the regulator, is properly resourced 

to fulfill its mission but then also has properly trained individuals 

with the expertise needed to provide the proper oversight for our 

industry. 

Certainly, they have run into challenges with both attracting 

good talent and then training them. And then when they have 

trained talent, they often lose them, those trained personnel, actually back to industry. 

So I think it is important for Congress to work very closely with 

the agency to ensure that they are taking full advantage of the 

Government programs that allow them to provide compensatory 

106 

pay to their folks and look at other innovative ways to try to attract their employees to stay at the agencies. 

Mr. BALDERSON. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back my remaining time. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Fletcher for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. FLETCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to all of the witnesses this morning for your testimony 

and for your written testimony, which I have reviewed. 

I want to follow up on a couple of the things that we have talked 

about here. And one thing—I just want to follow up on Mr. Black’s 

testimony but open this to anyone who wants to comment on it, 

hearing about the pilot program and some of these ideas. 

Are there enough avenues and resources at PHMSA for the agency to consider this data that the new technology can provide and 

the potential safety benefits that would arise from it? 

That is for anybody to answer. 

Mr. BLACK. I think there are enough resources for PHMSA to use 

this. 

PHMSA has a practice of reviewing best practices put out by the 

ANSI-accredited process that Mr. Rorick of API mentioned. There 

is a new recommended practice on inspecting and repairing pipelines that provides specific proposals for PHMSA to look at that. 

We have encouraged PHMSA to review those, consider incorporating them into Federal regulations. 

The Administrator, I was encouraged to hear, acknowledged that 

the special permit process is a way for PHMSA to adopt that on 

a company-specific basis. We encourage them to do that writ large 

so that we can more quickly let the American public and the environment benefit from safety. 

And if not incorporating by Federal regulations or the special 

permit process, we think the pilot program would let PHMSA, with 

the resources that it has, use these new technologies and techniques. 

Mrs. FLETCHER. Thank you. 

I want to switch gears a little bit and ask, with my remaining 

time, about regulations relating to LNG. 

So, as everyone here knows, the U.S. LNG industry has dramatically changed over the past decade. Where many facilities were 

originally planned as import facilities, the U.S. is now on the verge 

of becoming a net exporter of oil and gas. So the industry has 

changed. The regulations governing them haven’t really kept pace. 

That is something I raised earlier. 

For anyone on the panel, what reforms and regulations are necessary for the LNG export facilities so that the U.S. facilities can 

continue to be competitive in the global marketplace but that adequate safety standards are in place here? 

Mr. HOLSTEIN. Congresswoman, you are exactly right. Just in the 

last week, two new formerly import facilities have started down the 

process, according to the announcement of their owners, into export 

facilities on the gulf coast. So that is adding two more. 

What we need to keep in mind are two things, very quickly. One 

is the enormous amount of natural gas that will over time flow to 

107 

those facilities and the vast areas across America from which that 

gas will come. 

And that is why I talked about the hundreds of thousands of 

gathering lines that are insufficiently overseen by PHMSA now and 

need to have much more comprehensive leak detection and repair 

protocols. But we must begin by mapping them so we know where 

the heck they are. 

The second thing is, with respect to storage facilities—and LNG 

facilities do entail lots of storage facilities—we need two things. We 

need a comprehensive rule from PHMSA governing storage facilities. And you may remember the terrible Aliso Canyon disaster in 

California a couple of years ago. And, secondly, before then, States 

that have their own implemented storage facility regulatory program should be able to carry those programs out with respect to 

storage facilities within their borders. Right now, they are not free 

to do that with regard to all facilities, particularly interstate storage facilities. 

Mrs. FLETCHER. OK. That is helpful. 

Yes? 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. I would just build off of—something that moves 

at minus-260 degrees Fahrenheit commands much respect. So your 

line of questioning is very appropriate; you know, where does 

PHMSA end on its resource allocation here? Because the last thing 

I want to do is put these gentlemen in a situation they can’t win. 

And so we need to have some focus on that effort in the near future, given the number of new facilities. 

Mrs. FLETCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. Rorick, do you have a comment on that? 

Mr. RORICK. Well, just a quick comment, Congresswoman. 

PHMSA is in the process of looking at some safety regulations 

for LNG facilities. And I think it is important—I think you stated 

it correctly, and Mr. Holstein added as well—the growth that is 

going to come from continued export is going to continue. 

So it is important that, as PHMSA looks at developing these regulations, that they take a risk-based approach to this and that they 

also consider the process safety management systems in accordance 

with that as well. 

Mrs. FLETCHER. Thank you. 

I will yield back the remainder of my time. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. 

The Chair will now recognize Mr. Babin for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all, expert witnesses, for coming here and testifying and giving us your experiences. I want to thank you all for 

helping us transport liquid energy in the safest manner possible. 

I am sure a number of you have heard about the fire which was 

down in my district. I represent the 36th District in Texas, in Deer 

Park, Texas. I have more petrochemical refining facilities than any 

other place in the land. This was at a terminal facility a few weeks 

ago that caught the attention of the national news. And I was actually down in Houston in the district at the time, had the opportunity to go see this facility. 

This dangerous fire, which impacted thousands of lives, highlights the need for us to do a better job to secure and protect these 

108 

hazardous materials. Every one of us and, truly, the entire country 

is dependent on this industry’s acute attention to the safe transportation of energy products and other hazardous materials, as they 

are essential to our daily lives and our commerce. 

Mr. Black, if you don’t mind, I have a question. Could you please 

cite specific accidents and spills in the past, what you have learned 

from them, and how the regulatory environment and technology of 

today would prevent that same accident from happening again? I 

think it is vital that we in this industry try to do as much introspection so that we don’t repeat history. 

Mr. BLACK. The liquid pipeline industry has a long tradition and 

a comprehensive practice of trying to learn from incidents. I was 

sorry to hear about the one on the coast. My understanding is that 

was caused by fire? 

Mr. BABIN. Yes. 

Mr. BLACK. I was pleased to hear that wasn’t caused by a problem with the integrity of the tank. But when there are lessons to 

be learned from that, either from the operator or from Government 

regulators, we’re going to be ready to share those within industry 

to try to prevent anything like that from happening. 

There are significant pipeline incidents where we have looked at 

recommendations from NTSB, the safety reports, industry sharing. 

And we have adopted recommended practices on finding and fixing 

cracking in pipelines, improving leak detection programs, improving emergency response. We are ready to do that. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BABIN. OK. You are welcome. 

And, then, could you share a little bit more with the subcommittee about what pipeline operators are doing to improve their 

pipeline safety? And, additionally, how are you working to incorporate the best practices which were recommended by the NTSB? 

Mr. BLACK. Well, NTSB, after the Marshall, Michigan, incident 

in 2010, issued a series of recommendations the industry has met. 

One was to adopt safety management systems, and we have issued 

API Recommended Practice 1173. The response, the NTSB said, exceeded expectations, and that is a ‘‘hosanna’’ that they don’t give 

often. 

Other cases that we have done from Marshall was, there was 

issues needed to be—improvements in finding and fixing cracks in 

pipelines. And that was Recommended Practice 1176. We found 

that safety data needed to be integrated more from different types 

of inspections—Technical Report 1178. 

Leak detection programs were found at fault in the Marshall incident, so the entire industry has learned through that, through 

the adoption of API Recommended Practice 1175, so that there is 

now more constant monitoring of pipelines by trained control room 

operators. 

NTSB made a recommendation out of a Centreville, Virginia, incident recently where we found that there was cracking associated 

with a dent. And industry is now working on Technical Report 

1183 on managing those cracks. 

These are a couple of examples of specific ways operators are 

learning from incidents, trying to improve upon that, and then 

109 

share industrywide, implementing improvements throughout all 

companies to try to avoid incidents. 

Mr. BABIN. Very good. I appreciate that very much. 

And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Babin. 

I will now recognize Mr. Payne for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Chief Eggleston, in my other responsibilities on Capitol 

Hill, I am on the Committee on Homeland Security and the chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery. And so I spend a lot of my time trying to make sure 

that you and your colleagues have the training and the safety 

equipment and the things to respond to these emergencies and be 

prepared well in advance of them. And so, you know, I take a lot 

of pride in that as well. 

Let me ask you, in your testimony you note that it wasn’t clear 

how many LEPCs are active in carrying out their missions. Correct 

me if I am wrong, but there seems to be a disconnect between 

LEPCs, local pipeline operators, and other external stakeholders. 

What happened, and why does this disconnect exist? And what can 

be done to fix the disconnect? 

You know, it is critical that the LEPCs are up and effectively 

running. 

Chief EGGLESTON. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the question and 

appreciate your service with the Committee on Homeland Security 

as well. 

I am not sure why some LEPCs are dysfunctional or don’t exist. 

I can speak from my own experience in the Charlottesville/Albemarle area that we have a very active LEPC. And it is mainly driven by the community’s demand for transparency and information 

and my responsibility to ensure that our citizens are protected. So 

that is my main driver. I reach out and connect with industry, and 

they are grateful to meet with me and discuss the hazards in my 

community. 

So I think it takes a will of both the locality as well as industry 

to meet and form the LEPC. That is basically who it is made of. 

So it is responsibilities on both sides. 

I will tell you that I have previously worked in a community that 

had strong industry, and we had 100, complete transparency working with industry, had one of the strongest LEPCs that I remember 

being associated with. And we had a number of hazardous material 

incidents in those industries, and they went very smooth because 

of the communication and information-sharing that happened. 

And when I look at the hazards across our country related to 

pipeline, it really starts off with partnerships with the operators 

and information. Because when we send our firefighters out the 

door to respond to an incident with this kind of magnitude, we 

need to arm them with as much information as we can. Because 

I don’t want to send them into an incident blindly, because it is not 

fair to the citizens and not fair to my firefighters. 

Mr. PAYNE. Absolutely. 

Chief EGGLESTON. Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Absolutely. So you think it becomes an issue around 

the community sometimes—— 

110 

Chief EGGLESTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PAYNE [continuing]. In terms of how important this interaction is? 

Chief EGGLESTON. It is. I think it also comes down to funding. 

Some rural communities cannot afford to properly fund their 

LEPCs. So I think that is where the IFC is working with PHMSA 

to help fund adequately some of those LEPCs that serve the rural 

areas but tend to have hazards related to the pipelines that run 

through them. 

So, in some cases, it is community activity; in a lot of cases, it 

comes down to funding. 

Mr. PAYNE. OK. Thank you. 

In your testimony, you mentioned that your organization is using 

your Community Safety—Emergency Planning, Response, and Outreach Grant to help LEPCs prepare for incidents in their communities. 

I am interested in learning exactly how you are making sure that 

the community LEPCs are prepared to respond to pipeline emergencies. Can you describe some of the programs you have with the 

LEPC to ensure that preparedness? 

Chief EGGLESTON. Certainly. We have created some products and 

training in cooperation with one company, TransCanada, here to 

provide training to local responders in the LEPC. There is a number of other training products that we have had developed as well 

that I would be more than happy to send to you after the fact. 

Mr. PAYNE. OK. Thank you very much. 

And I will yield back the balance of my 1 second. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Perry for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

Mr. Black, when individual companies in the individual States 

install gathering lines, they have to permit them, they have to locate them. The local municipality, the State regulatory agencies 

know where they are, know who installed them. Is that generally 

correct? Or do we have no idea where all of these gathering lines 

are? 

Mr. BLACK. I can speak to liquid gathering—— 

Mr. PERRY. Sure. 

Mr. BLACK [continuing]. Where there is more knowledge with 

States. I think some States are different, but in those States that 

have production and have for a long time, there are robust regulations in place. PHMSA also regulates certain liquid gathering 

above certain inches diameter. I believe there is great awareness, 

but I can’t speak to each State. 

Mr. PERRY. I mean, is there any reason to believe that the company itself, with a significant investment and a significant liability, 

doesn’t have a great stake in making sure that they are placed 

safely, that they are maintained correctly, and that their whereabouts is known and documented? And aren’t they also required to 

do those things by the individual States? 

I mean, the point is that I think the States do a pretty darn good 

job, and the implication that the States can’t handle this seems to 

111 

be, to me—I mean, I come from Pennsylvania. We do a lot of this 

stuff here, and I think we do it pretty well. 

Mr. BLACK. Well, I am much more familiar with the transmission 

pipelines—— 

Mr. PERRY. Sure. 

Mr. BLACK [continuing]. That we represent. I understand what 

you said to be the case. I think you are right. 

Mr. PERRY. PHMSA covers the Nation’s over 21⁄2 million miles of 

gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, accounting for the transport of 

65 percent of the energy consumed domestically. 

Given all the concerns raised about their track record of delays 

in promulgating congressionally mandated safety regulations, what 

is the overall safety record of the liquids pipelines, as a general 

rule? Do you know? 

Mr. BLACK. We have not been waiting for PHMSA to adopt regulations for us to continue improving safety. We got a broad series 

of strategic plan initiatives that pay off. In the last 5 years, incidents impacting people and the environment—consensus metrics 

we all worked on after an NTSB recommendation—are down 20 

percent over the last 5 years. Pipeline safety continues to improve. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. Over the same period, about how much has 

the industry seen growth both in terms of pipeline, mileage, and 

barrels delivered? Because you are talking about being down 20 

percent. What is the growth at the same period of time? 

Mr. BLACK. Yeah, you are right, Congressman. We have had considerable growth because of the great resource our country has 

through shale production. 

Liquid pipeline miles have—let’s see—crude and products delivered have increased 44 percent per year. Crude oil delivered has 

increased 37 percent. Total mileage has increased 12 percent. 

Now, I gave you those stats of a 20-percent decrease in incidents 

impacting people and the environment. That is not normalized to 

adopt the growth. That is raw numbers—— 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. BLACK [continuing]. That are decreasing at the same time 

pipelines are increasing—— 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. BLACK [continuing]. Miles and barrels delivered. 

Mr. PERRY. Yeah. So it is really a good news story, quite honestly, without Federal intervention or with Federal intervention, 

which generally is impeding the industry because we are asking 

you to wait, but you are not waiting in terms of safety, and we appreciate that. 

Can you elaborate on industry efforts to improve safety across 

the pipeline infrastructure? 

Mr. BLACK. Oh, there is a strategic plan that we have where we 

analyze the safety data to address the issues that are more problematic. Our goal is zero incidents, and we work towards those. 

The most recent example is an industrywide best practice on inspecting and repairing pipelines, API Recommended Practice 1160, 

that would adopt the latest technologies and techniques. We hope 

PHMSA will incorporate those or Congress will authorize a pilot 

program so that PHMSA can test those and then use them in all 

regulations. 

112 

Mr. PERRY. All right. I have a couple other questions for you, 

which I may submit for the record. 

In the remaining 50 seconds, I want to ask Mr. Rorick for his 

thoughts on the gathering lines. 

Mr. RORICK. With regards to, Congressman—so the commitment 

from the industry with regards to gathering lines for safety? Is 

that—— 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. RORICK [continuing]. What you are referring to? 

Mr. PERRY. Yes, the conversation I was having with Mr. Black 

about documenting their location, safety, and whether it should 

occur at the State or Federal level, and the fact that the States, 

in my opinion, being from Pennsylvania, we do it pretty well, I 

think. So—— 

Mr. RORICK. Yes, sir. And I think a couple of key things to remember. First and foremost is that gathering lines in high-consequence areas are already regulated. What we are currently working on with PHMSA and what PHMSA is working on is some regulation for gathering lines right now. And we are in agreement with 

the discussions that are taking place right now, which is looking 

at a diameter size of 12.75 for regulation. 

So there is a lot of work that is being done, there is a lot of 

knowledge, but there is also a lot of work that continues to be done 

on the issue. 

Mr. PERRY. I appreciate your time and yield back. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. 

All right. At the risk of more trouble here, I am going to open 

up for a second round of questions. Don’t worry, it will be short. 

So I recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

I just want to ask a quick question of Mr. Weimer. 

What does the record show in terms of the safety of pipelines in 

recent history? What data do we have? Are pipelines getting more 

safe or less safe? 

Mr. WEIMER. Well, there is a lot of different data out there, and 

you have heard different parts of it today, and it really depends on 

which piece of it you are looking at. As I said, I was looking at 

overall data. And since the PIPES Act was signed in 2016, there 

have been 1,700 reportable failures on pipelines, and almost 800 of 

those were significant incidents under PHMSA’s definitions. 

If you look at integrity management, how well it is working, and 

you go onto PHMSA’s website and look, large spills on hazardous 

liquid pipelines have been increasing over the last decade, and 

large releases and ruptures on gas transmission pipelines have 

been increasing. 

So, you know, we could spend the rest of the afternoon probably 

cutting and pasting data and coming up with our own stuff, but if 

you look at the overarching data on PHMSA’s website, you will see 

that some of the major types of pipelines, the incidents are increasing. 

And for gas gathering lines that have been mentioned, the 

400,000 miles of unregulated ones, we don’t know because they are 

unregulated and no one even keeps track of that. But there have 

been some significant incidents on those just in the past year, like, 

in our written testimony, we point out the one that killed the 10- 

113 

year-old child in Texas on a pipeline that was 10 inches in diameter, which is smaller than what API is recommending now for gas 

gathering lines. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. 

With that, I will yield back. 

And, Mr. Balderson, do you have any further questions? 

Mr. BALDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t, no. Thank you. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. OK. 

And Mr. Payne is gone, so that wraps it up. 

I thank all of our witnesses for your testimony today. It is extremely important as we look at the pipeline safety reauthorization 

bill. Thank you for your testimony and your time, and you are dismissed. 

I want to ask unanimous consent that the record for today’s 

hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in 

writing and ask unanimous consent that the record remain open 

for 15 days for any additional comment and information submitted 

by Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today’s 

hearing. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

If no other Members have anything to add, the subcommittee 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(115) 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Letter of March 8, 2016, from Calvin L. Scovel III, Inspector General, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Submitted for the Record by Hon. DeFazio 

MARCH 8, 2016. 

Hon. MICHAEL E. CAPUANO

Ranking Member 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and 

Hazardous Materials, Washington, DC 20015-2017 

DEAR RANKING MEMBER CAPUANO: 

This is in response to your letter to the Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of Inspector General (OIG) dated February 26, 2016, requesting our input on 

ways to enhance the implementation and oversight of DOT’s Pipeline Safety Program. We greatly appreciate your concern for the enforcement of criminal pipeline 

safety laws. While the regulatory enforcement of pipeline safety is handled by the 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and State regulators, without effective criminal enforcement as well there is a danger that pipeline 

operators may treat the administrative enforcement of fines as nothing more than 

the cost of doing business. Unfortunately, although there have been thousands of 

pipeline incidents over the past twenty years, it has not been possible to bring a 

significant number of pipeline safety prosecutions under Title 49 U.S.C. Section 

60123(a) which sets forth the criminal penalty for violation of pipeline safety laws, 

regulations and orders. 

A significant obstacle to bringing more successful prosecutions is the language of 

section 60123(a) itself, which requires that the violation be committed ‘‘knowingly 

and willfully.’’ A requirement of willfulness is fairly unusual in criminal statutes 

and is generally reserved for violations such as tax evasion where ordinary citizens 

are faced with complying with a complex set of rules. This is markedly different 

from the pipeline industry which is characterized by sophisticated entities with professional legal and regulatory affairs staff. The willful standard has led to numerous 

pipeline safety cases being declined for prosecution by the U.S. Department of Justice. More significantly, there are many cases that PHMSA does not refer to OIG 

for criminal investigation because PHMSA concludes there is insufficient evidence 

to establish a willful violation. 

We have had far more success prosecuting cases under Title 49 U.S.C. Section 

5124, which establishes the penalty for violating hazardous materials transportation 

laws and regulations, than under section 60123(a). Prosecution under section 5124 

originally required a showing of willfulness, but the standard was changed in 2005 

to penalize reckless violations as well. In the past five years alone, we have brought 

Federal charges under section 5124 against 24 individuals and companies. By contrast, Federal charges under section 60123(a) have only been brought four times 

since 1996. 

We believe that section 60123(a) should be amended by changing ‘‘knowingly and 

willfully’’ to ‘‘recklessly’’ to mirror section 5124. Persons and businesses shipping 

hazmat are required to know the rules even though in many instances they may 

only ship hazmat on an occasional basis and may never interact with PHMSA. For 

pipeline operators, the safe operation of pipelines is an integral part of their operations and they have frequent contact with regulators. We note that this would not 

result in criminal liability for companies that are making good faith efforts to comply with pipeline safety regulations. As defined in section 5124, a person acts recklessly when the person displays a deliberate indifference or conscious disregard to 

the consequences of their conduct. 

Another obstacle to successful prosecution of criminal pipeline safety violations is 

that the employees of pipeline operators and other persons with knowledge of violaVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
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1P.L. 114–94 (December 4, 2015) 

tions rarely come forward. Potential whistleblowers often believe that if they come 

forward they will be unable to find future employment in the industry. Although 

statutes exist to protect whistleblowers, this has not been enough to encourage insiders to come forward. It is unfortunately the case that DOT may not become 

aware of pipeline safety violations until a natural gas pipeline explodes or a liquid 

pipeline leaks significant amounts of oil or gasoline. We believe that a whistleblower 

incentive provision, such as the one recently enacted by the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act,1 would greatly enhance DOT’s ability to identify safety violations and take appropriate action before a pipeline rupture or explosion occurs. 

If you have any questions or wish to speak to us further regarding this matter, 

please do not hesitate to contact me at (202) 366–1959 or Nathan Richmond, Director and Counsel for Congressional and External Affairs, at (202) 493–0422. 

Sincerely, 

CALVIN L. SCOVEL III 

Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation 

f 

Statement of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, Submitted 

for the Record by Hon. Lipinski 

[The statement is retained in the committee files and is available at: https:// 

www.ingaa.org/Filings/14956/36379.aspx.] 

f 

Statement of the American Gas Association, Submitted for the Record by 

Hon. Lipinski 

[The statement, including a report entitled ‘‘Leading Practices to Reduce the Possibility of a Natural Gas Over-Pressurization Event,’’ is retained in the committee 

files. The report is available at: https://www.aga.org/contentassets/ 

1e4dac45c7e94177a033844a6a90a109/leading-practices-to-prevent-over-pressurization-final.pdf.] 

(117) 

1 ‘‘These terms (i.e. ‘‘VSL’’ or, less precisely, the ‘‘value of life’’) refer to the measurement of 

willingness to pay for reductions in only small risks of premature death. They have no application to an identifiable individual or to very large reductions in individual risks. They do not suggest that any individual’s life can be expressed in monetary terms’’. Page 29, Circular A-4, 2003. 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-for-agencies/circulars/ 2https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/revised-departmental-guidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-in-economic-analysis 3The prior DOT OST guidance identified $9.4 million as the VSL to be used for DOT analyses 

using a base year of 2013: https://www.transportation.gov/resources/2015-revised-value-of-a-statistical-life-guidance 

APPENDIX

QUESTIONS FROM HON. PETER A. DEFAZIO FOR HON. HOWARD ‘‘SKIP’’ ELLIOTT

Section 8 of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 

requires pipeline operators to install leak detection systems, where practicable, and 

requires PHMSA to establish performance standards for the capability of such systems to detect leaks. When asked about the status of this mandate, you indicated 

that PHMSA sent the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to the Department 

of Transportation for review ‘‘probably . . . within the last 90 days.’’ 

Question 1. As of the date of the hearing, how many days had the NPRM addressing leak detection been under review by the Office of the Secretary (OST)? What 

date did PHMSA send the NPRM to the OST? 

ANSWER. PHMSA initially sent the Amendments to Parts 192 and 195 to require 

Valve installation and Minimum Rupture Detection Standards NPRM to OST on 

August 27, 2018. Between that date and the hearing date of April 2, 2019, 219 days 

elapsed, during which a collaborative review process has been taking place. 

Question 2. When considering a rulemaking, what is the value, including the dollar amount, that PHMSA assigns to a human life? When was this assessment last 

adjusted or updated? 

ANSWER. Consistent with other regulatory agencies at the U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), PHMSA does not ‘‘assign a value to a human life’’ or place 

a value on individual lives, but instead uses the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) 1

measurement when monetizing the reductions in fatality risk that would result from 

a proposed regulation. Following the latest DOT guidance on valuing the reduction 

in fatalities and injuries by regulations, PHMSA has been using $9.6 million as the 

last updated VSL in its regulatory impact analyses assessing the benefits of preventing fatalities.2 The last update on VSL guidance was issued on August 8, 2016 

using a base year of 2015.3

Question 3. Please provide information to each of the questions below relating to 

how PHMSA calculates the benefits in a cost benefit analysis of potential regulatory 

proposals: 

a. How does PHMSA determine and calculate the benefits associated with a potential provision in a notice of proposed rulemaking or a final rule? 

ANSWER. In determining the benefits of a potential provision in a rulemaking, 

PHMSA follows Circular A-4, the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 

guidance on the development of regulatory analysis, as well as Executive 

Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory Planning and Review’’. 

b. Identify what PHMSA considers to be benefits, the value that PHMSA assigns 

to each of those benefits, and when those values were last adjusted. For example, does the agency consider factors such as lives saved, injuries prevented, 

property damage avoided, economic opportunity loss prevented, and environmental harms reduced or prevented as benefits? 

ANSWER. PHMSA primarily develops rulemakings to improve safety, which is 

considered a benefit. The benefit of improved safety is usually measured by esVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00133 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
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4 ‘‘Table 3: Relative Disutility Factors by Injury Severity Level (MAIS) For Use with 3% or 

7% Discount Rate’’, page 10, Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life 

(VSL) in U.S. Department of Transportation Analyses—2016 (MAIS 1-Minor: 0.003 of VSL, 

MAIS 2-Moderate: 0.047 of VSL, MAIS 3-Serious: 0.105 of VSL, or $1.01 million, MAIS 4- 

Severe: 0.266 of VSL, MAIS 5-Critical: 0.593 of VSL, MAIS 6-Unsurvivable: 1.000 of VSL). 

timating the potential reduction or mitigation of future incidents, and may include estimating the reduction in fatality risk. In addition to saved lives, 

PHMSA attempts to identify, quantify and monetize the impact on preventable 

injuries, avoidable property and environmental damages, and preventable economic losses that could be attributed to its proposed safety provisions. 

As discussed previously, PHMSA uses DOT’s latest $9.6 million VSL estimate 

for each life a proposed rule could potentially save. DOT’s 2016 guidance also 

includes a table of relative values of preventing injuries of varied severity as 

a fraction of the VSL.4 To monetize other preventable impacts, including property or environmental damage, PHMSA uses a variety of sources such as accident and incident data submitted to PHMSA, reports from law enforcement 

agencies or investigative boards, and insurance claim data, if available. 

c. In determining benefits, does PHMSA include the prevention or mitigation of 

past accidents? If so, how is this calculated? 

ANSWER. PHMSA’s rulemakings are directed at reducing or mitigating future 

incidents. However, in measuring this future improvement in safety, PHMSA 

will often attempt to assess whether a rulemaking would have prevented or 

mitigated relevant past accidents in determining the benefits of a proposed 

provision if we can establish a causal relationship between accidents and the 

provision. The key question we ask is this: if the provision was in place prior 

to a past accident, would the regulation prevent the accidents or would it have 

mitigated its consequences? Once we answer it satisfactorily, then we can determine the effectiveness of the provision and calculate how many lives would 

have been saved, which injuries, property or environmental damages would 

have been prevented, assuming they may continue to occur in the absence of 

the rule. 

d. Please explain how human lives are factored into this analysis. 

ANSWER. PHMSA’s benefit analyses are driven by risk reduction assessments 

for each proposed rule. If we can determine that a new PHMSA rule would 

reduce fatality risks, then the evaluation of these benefits, measured in number of lives saved, will be the key part of our benefit analysis. For example, 

if we can show that one new pipeline safety requirement would save two lives 

each year after its implementation, we can estimate annual undiscounted benefits of this provision at $19.2 million ($9.6 million x 2) using DOT’s 2016 VSL 

value. 

QUESTION FROM HON. DANIEL LIPINSKI FOR HON. HOWARD ‘‘SKIP’’ ELLIOTT

You stated that the issue of providing emergency responders with information about 

commodities moving through the communities they serve is ‘‘a topic that we need 

to address more fully.’’ 

Question 4. Please explain what you meant by this response and what the agency 

can do to meet these needs. 

ANSWER. Access to information about commodities moving through communities 

by pipeline assists emergency responders when responding to an incident. Pipeline 

operators maintain information about what types of commodities they transport and 

make it available to PHMSA and other agencies, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Department of Energy (DOE). In accordance 

with the PIPES Act of 2016, Safety Data Sheets containing detailed information on 

the commodity transported by a pipeline are required by law to be provided to emergency responders within six hours following a spill incident (Pub. L. 114-183, Sec. 

14). Operators have indicated that this time is needed to determine a specific product given batching in multiproduct pipelines. PHMSA understands that the American Petroleum Institute and the Association of Oil Pipe Lines have made their 

members aware of this requirement and PHMSA has briefed the National Response 

Team as well. Although section 14 of the PIPES Act requiring Safety Data Sheets 

is self-executing and no rulemaking was required to implement it, PHMSA is considering rulemaking to place a conforming rule in title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, 

to help broaden awareness. Finally, PHMSA has advanced other opportunities to 

strengthen contacts between emergency responders and operators including public 

awareness programs and PHMSA provides emergency responders with access to apVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
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propriate response resources including response planning exercises and response 

training resources. 

QUESTIONS FROM HON. LIZZIE FLETCHER FOR HON. HOWARD ‘‘SKIP’’ ELLIOTT

Question 5. Has a shortage in staffing among technical staff and those involved 

in the rulemaking process contributed to PHMSA’s slowness in issuing rules proscribed by congressional mandate that date back to 2011? 

ANSWER. Completing rulemakings takes time simply because it is an iterative 

process that is designed to encourage maximum participation by all stakeholders, 

thus ensuring comprehensive rules that protect the public and stand up to cost/benefit scrutiny. Collaboration with stakeholders allows PHMSA to identify concerns 

and potential solutions so we can allocate our existing resources where they are 

needed most. 

Question 6. Do you feel that PHMSA would function more efficiently when it came 

to rulemaking with increased staffing? 

ANSWER. As noted in the Administrator’s testimony, completing rulemakings 

takes time simply because it is an iterative process that is designed to encourage 

maximum participation by all stakeholders, thus ensuring comprehensive rules that 

protect the public and stand up to cost/benefit scrutiny. Collaboration with stakeholders allows PHMSA to identify concerns and potential solutions so we can allocate our existing resources where they are needed most. 

Question 7. Has the agency made use of all the available authorities that would 

help PHMSA compete against the private industry to hire and retain talented Federal workers? 

ANSWER. Yes, PHMSA has used several innovative hiring techniques including: 

recruiting under titles that tend to attract larger candidate pools; increased outreach to colleges and universities; placing veterans, that with added training can 

become qualified inspectors faster; and leveraging direct hiring authority. Under my 

direction, the agency has prioritized filling all open inspector vacancies. Our directhire authority allows PHMSA to quickly employ qualified candidates, fill any existing staffing gaps and automatically transform the sometimes time consuming government hiring process to a more efficient form of recruiting. Direct-hire authority 

also provides PHMSA the opportunity to reach highly qualified candidates with no 

other means to earn a federal position. PHMSA has been successful in its efforts 

to hire and retain qualified inspection engineers and currently has 200 pipeline inspection and enforcement personnel currently on board and is in the process of hiring an additional 14. 

QUESTIONS FROM HON. MIKE BOST FOR HON. HOWARD ‘‘SKIP’’ ELLIOTT

Question 8. Some operator safety information is treated as confidential, which 

means it cannot be shared with other operators. What utility could an agency-sponsored voluntary information sharing program that distributes non-attributable safety information provide the agency, partners, industry and other stakeholders in improving pipeline safety? Could such program supplement existing safety efforts? 

Could it in certain circumstance help the agency achieve its safety objectives without the need for formal rulemaking? 

ANSWER. Sharing incident data through such a program would assist in furthering 

PHMSA’s safety goals. In December 2016, PHMSA established a Voluntary Information-Sharing System Working Group (VIS WG), which was charged with studying 

information-sharing systems for the pipeline industry and providing recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation on the necessity of a sharing system, ways 

to encourage the exchange of information, and best practices for the protection of 

proprietary and security-sensitive information. 

The VIS WG plans to submit its recommendation report to the Secretary in the 

near future. The VIS WG established seven subcommittees to help develop recommendations in these areas: Best Practices; Regulatory, Funding & Legal; Governance Structure; Competency, Awareness, and Training; Process for Sharing Information; Technology; and Research and Development. 

Question 9. Do you believe that current criminal penalties codified at 49 U.S.C. 

§ 60123 are sufficient to deter criminal acts that fall short of current legal interpretations related to damaging or destroying a facility, but may nonetheless put human 

life, property or the environment at risk? 

ANSWER. While the current criminal penalties codified at 49 U.S.C. § 60123 are 

generally sufficient to deter people from damaging or destroying an operational 

pipeline facility, their applicability to the act of disrupting the construction of a 

120 

pipeline is unclear. As a result, the current statute may not sufficiently deter this 

type of act. 

QUESTION FROM HON. STEPHEN F. LYNCH FOR HON. JENNIFER HOMENDY

Question 1. Ms. Homendy, when exactly do you anticipate the NTSB issue the 

final report for the Merrimack Valley Explosion incident? Would the committee be 

able to receive a copy of that report? 

ANSWER. Congressman Lynch, our goal is to complete the Merrimack Valley investigation this September, before the one-year anniversary. We will provide you and 

the Committee a copy of the final report once it is adopted by the Board. Additionally, at that time, we would be glad to brief you on our findings. 

QUESTION FROM HON. MIKE BOST FOR ANDREW J. BLACK

Question 1. Do you believe that current criminal penalties codified at 49 U.S.C. 

§ 60123 are sufficient to deter criminal acts that fall short of current legal interpretations related to damaging or destroying a facility, but may nonetheless put human 

life, property or the environment at risk? 

ANSWER. Current criminal penalties codified at 49 U.S.C. § 60123 do not protect 

human life, property or the environment from criminal acts against interstate pipeline facilities. Current federal law contains loopholes that assailants are exploiting 

to escape accountability for dangerous attacks on pipelines. AOPL urges Congress 

deter future attacks against pipeline facilities by closing loopholes in the scope of 

criminal liability in current federal pipeline safety law. 

In October 2016, anti-pipeline activists staged simultaneous attacks on 5 crude oil 

pipelines in 4 states along the U.S.-Canada border. Assailants targeted valve stations maintained by pipeline operators to stop the flow of product through the pipeline when necessary to conduct maintenance or isolate a pipeline segment during 

an emergency. 

After breaking the chains and locks on perimeter fencing, assailants entered the 

facility grounds and turned valves shutting off the flow of pipelines that together 

had a delivery capacity of 2.8 million barrels of crude oil a day, or around 15 percent 

of daily U.S. consumption. In some cases, the assailants by telephone notified the 

pipeline operators of their actions, who shut down the pipeline flow from their control centers as a safety precaution. In 2017, assailants again targeted for attack the 

same pipeline facility attacked in 2016 in Washington State. In 2019, assailants attacked another pipeline in northern Minnesota. 

Other assailants admitted using acetylene torches to pierce holes in a major pipeline under construction in Iowa and South Dakota, threatening a release if the pipeline went into service without repairs. 

After the 2016 attacks, Carl Weimer, Executive Director of the Pipeline Safety 

Trust, the preeminent public advocacy group for pipeline safety, said, 

‘‘[w]hile we certainly understand the activists concerns with the lack of 

speed to address climate change we think that illegally closing valves is 

a dangerous stunt that really does little to address these people’s concerns. The Pipeline Safety Trust was founded in part because a valve 

closed unexpectedly causing a pressure surge that ruptured a pipeline 

killing three young men. Closing valves on major pipelines can have unexpected consequences endangering people and the environment. We do 

not support this type of action, and think it is dangerous.’’ 

Public safety is threatened during attacks on pipelines, even if only closing a pipeline valve, because improper closure of pipeline valves can cause a pressure surge 

from the mass and momentum of the liquid traveling through the pipeline, potentially resulting in a rupture and release. 

While no releases resulted from the 2016, 2017 or 2019 pipeline valve attacks, the 

U.S. Government Accountability Office confirmed the risk of rupture from improper 

valve operation in a Congressionally mandated 2013 report. Pipeline operators have 

documented 9 pipeline incidents from conditions similar to an improper valve closure, one resulting in an 1,100 barrel diesel fuel release and another resulting in 

a nearly 4,000 barrel natural gas liquids release. A crude oil pipeline release of this 

magnitude could cause serious harm to the assailants, harm members and property 

of the surrounding public and harm the environment. 

Current Federal statute at 49 USC § 60123 prohibiting damaging or destroying 

interstate pipeline infrastructure does not address changing tactics that are nonetheless dangerous to the assailants, public safety and the environment. Under 

§ 60123, the guilty conduct making the action illegal must include ‘‘damaging’’ or 

‘‘destroying’’ the interstate pipeline facility. These terms are commonly defined reVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:10 Jun 13, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 P:\HEARINGS\116\RR\4-2-20~1\TRANSC~1\36616.TXT JEAN
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spectively as causing physical harm to something in such a way as to impair its 

value, usefulness, or normal function and damaging something so badly that it cannot be repaired. 

Several of the recent attacks against interstate pipelines neither damaged nor destroyed the facilities. The valve turnings, while a dangerous threat to the assailants, 

public and environment, did not damage or destroy the valves. Several more recent 

attacks, which did cause physical damage to pipelines, occurred at locations where 

the pipeline was still under construction and not yet operating as an interstate pipeline. State legislatures are acting to close gaps in their statutes protecting pipelines 

and infrastructure. States are extending criminal penalties to tampering with, impeding or inhibiting the operation of pipeline infrastructure. Congress should plug 

the same loopholes in federal law. 

AOPL does not recommend any limits on free speech or the right to protest peacefully. Similarly, AOPL does not seek an extension of criminal penalties beyond the 

assailants and their specific dangerous activities to other organizations or causes. 

AOPL recommends Congress update federal law at 49 USC § 60123 to: 

1. criminalize interfering with the operations of interstate pipeline facilities 

2. criminalize attacks on interstate pipelines under construction 

QUESTION FROM HON. DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. FOR FIRE CHIEF DAN EGGLESTON, 

EFO, CFO, CMO 

I understand the IAFC prepares programs to assist LEPCs in strengthening their 

pipeline incident preparedness efforts. 

Question 1. Please describe some of those programs, including how they were developed and their benefits to the LEPCs and impacted communities. 

ANSWER. The IAFC performs training of communities to help them prepare for potential pipeline incidents in coordination with both commercial partners and the 

U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). 

Since 2013, the IAFC has partnered with TransCanada to provide preparedness 

for pipeline emergency training to local communities. This training consists of a 

presentation; town hall meeting; review and preparation of an emergency plan; and 

table-top exercise. The second element, the Regional Town Hall meeting, is comprised of an open dialogue about pipeline emergency response, which includes discussions about: 

• accessing information in the National Pipeline Mapping System; 

• formulating a pre-plan response checklist; 

• identifying emergency responder priorities; 

• communicating community needs; 

• identifying hazardous materials and transportation methods; 

• and buttressing response preparation and capability. 

Our other programs are funded by the Community Safety Grant, first authorized 

in 2015 by the FAST Act (PL 114-94) and administered by PHMSA. The IAFC’s 

Community Safety-Emergency Planning, Response and Outreach (CS-EPRO) program provides responder training and preparedness for hazardous materials incident response. This grant enables us to provide training and resources to LEPCs 

that improves their emergency planning and response expertise. The programs supported by the Community Safety Grant can be applied to any type of hazardous material transportation, including rail, pipeline and vehicle transportation. The IAFC 

supports the reauthorization of this grant when its authorization expires in 2020. 

The IAFC also advocates for the inclusion of non-profits as eligible entities for the 

Technical Assistance Grants administered by PHMSA. As the only pipeline-specific 

grants administered by PHMSA, the TAG offer significant opportunities for nonprofit organizations like ours to conduct pipeline safety-oriented training for local 

responders and LEPCs. 

The IAFC looks forward to working with the Committee and Subcommittee to improve the safety of the nation’s pipeline system and promote first responder preparedness and training to reduce the impact of pipeline incidents when they occur. 

Æ