PEACEW RK

S

UNITED STATES

INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Religious Contributions 

to Peacemaking 

When Religion Brings Peace, Not War

Edited by David R. Smock 
Library of Congress Control Number: 2005911325

Peaceworks No. 55. First published January 2006.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. 

They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200

Washington, DC 20036-3011

Phone: 202-457-1700

Fax: 202-429-6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org
Contents

Introduction 1

1. What Faith-Based Diplomacy Can Offer in Kashmir 5

	 Daniel Philpott and Brian Cox

2. Bringing Religious Leaders Together in Israel/Palestine 9

	 Canon Andrew White

3. Establishing the Premier Interfaith Organization in Iraq 13

	 Canon Andrew White

4. Mediating between Christians and Muslims in Plateau State, Nigeria 17

	 David R. Smock

5. Training Peacemakers: Religious Youth Leaders in Nigeria 21

	 Imam Muhammad Nurayn Ashafa and Pastor James Movel Wuye

6. Intrafaith and Interfaith Dialogue in Southern Sudan 25

	 Emmanuel LoWilla

7. Peacemaking through Interreligious Dialogue in Macedonia 29

	 Paul Mojzes

Conclusion 35

Notes 41

About the Contributors 44

About the Institute 45

Introduction

The post-September 11 world is seized with the dangers of religious extremism and conflict 

between religious communities, particularly between two or more of the Abrahamic faiths: 

Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. The threat of religious extremism is real and well documented.1

 The connection between religion and conflict is in the process of being thoroughly 

explored, however, to the extent that hyperbole and exaggeration are commonplace. In the 

popular mind, to discuss religion in the context of international affairs automatically raises the 

specter of religious-based conflict. The many other dimensions and impacts of religion tend 

to be downplayed or even neglected entirely. 

The contribution that religion can make to peacemaking—as the flip side of religious conflict—is only beginning to be explored and explicated. All three of the Abrahamic faiths contain strong warrants for peacemaking.2

 There are past cases of mediation and peacemaking 

by religious leaders and institutions. For example, the World Council of Churches and the All 

Africa Conference of Churches mediated the short-lived 1972 peace agreement in Sudan. In 

South Africa, various churches were at the vanguard of the struggle against apartheid and the 

peaceful transition. The most dramatic and most frequently cited case is the successful mediation the Rome-based Community of Sant’Egidio achieved to help end the civil war in 

Mozambique in 1992.3

Repeatedly citing these cases as the main points of reference distorts the reality of religious 

peacemaking. Most of the cases of religious or faith-based peacemaking are less dramatic in 

their outcomes. Also, religious peacemaking is becoming much more common, and the number of cases cited is growing at an increasing pace. 

The field of religious peacemaking is also maturing. With more sophisticated reflections of its 

growing experience, a body of knowledge is developing. I made an earlier attempt to reflect 

on this experience in the book I edited titled Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding

(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002). Some of the leading thinkers 

and practitioners in the field, including Marc Gopin, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, and David 

Steele, contributed chapters to that volume. The book contains an analysis of the keys of success in interfaith dialogue as a mechanism for resolving violent conflicts. It lifts up the unique 

elements of religious peacebuilding, with a particular focus on apology and forgiveness. It also 

emphasizes the importance of keeping issues of social justice front and center, so that religious peacebuilding does not merely make the participants feel better. 

There are a number of other important contributions to this literature.4 When communal 

identities, particularly religious identities, are key causal factors in violent conflict, traditional 

diplomacy may be of little value in seeking peace or conflict management. Douglas Johnston, 

president of the International Center on Religion and Diplomacy, has identified conditions in 

several conflict situations that lend themselves to faith-based intervention:

 
 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

n	 religion is a significant factor in the identity of one or both parts to the conflict;

n	 religious leaders on both sides of the dispute can be mobilized to facilitate peace;

n	 protracted struggles between two major religious traditions transcend national borders, 

as has been the case over time with Islam and Christianity; and/or

n	 forces of realpolitik have led to an extended paralysis of action.5

Johnston also identifies the attributes that religious leaders and institutions can offer in promoting peace and reconciliation, including: 

n	 credibility as a trusted institution; 

n	 a respected set of values; 

n	 moral warrants for opposing injustice on the part of governments; 

n	 unique leverage for promoting reconciliation among conflicting parties, including an ability 

to rehumanize situations that have become dehumanized over the course of protracted 

conflict; 

n	 a capability to mobilize community, nation, and international support for a peace process; 

n	 an ability to follow through locally in the wake of a political settlement; and

n	 a sense of calling that often inspires perseverance in the face of major, otherwise debilitating, obstacles.6

By way of example, African peacemaker Hizkias Assefa, emphasizes the commendable role of 

religious leaders as an asset in peacemaking. Such religious leaders are particularly effective in 

working together for peace when they are from different faith communities. When the faiths 

explore and practice common values, such as justice and compassion, in public life, religious 

leaders can be an inspiration to others. Gerrie ter Haar summarizes Assefa’s contention as: 

“Bringing the spiritual dimension into the peacemaking process can create 

access to the more deep-seated, affective base of the parties’ behavior, 

enabling them to examine critically their own attitudes and actions. People’s 

conflict behavior is often based on more emotional considerations and thus 

may not be changed simply by rational negotiation processes and subsequent agreements. Cognitive decisions and commitments, he argues, do not 

necessarily translate into feelings and actions.”7

Religious resources are contained in the four main elements of which religions consist. Haar 

identifies these elements as: religious ideas (content of belief), religious practices (ritual behavior), social organization (religious community), and religious—or spiritual—experiences. These 

dimensions can all be used in the service of peacemaking.8 Two critical elements in religious 

life that are centrally important to peacemaking are empathy and compassion, and the value 

of tapping into these attributes is readily apparent in effective religious peace­making.9

The development of studies and practice relating to the connection between religion, conflict, and peace is paralleled by United States Institute of Peace (USIP) program development 

on religious peacemaking. In 1990, USIP established a program on religion, ethics, and 
Introduction 

human rights led by David Little, now a professor at Harvard Divinity School. That program 

focused on compiling case studies on the sources and nature of religious conflict in such 

countries as Sudan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine. Several publications resulted 

from these case studies, including books on Sri Lanka and Ukraine regarding conflict between 

the faith communities. Overall, these studies viewed religion principally in terms of creating 

conflict. 

After David Little retired from USIP in 1999, the Institute decided to continue prioritizing religion in relation to international conflict and peace, but decided to shift the emphasis from 

religion as a source of conflict to peacemaking. This shift fully acknowledged the contribution 

of religion to conflict, but lifted up the peacemaking potential of religious leaders and institutions. Working with local institutional partners, USIP’s Religion and Peacemaking Program has 

collaborated in religious peacemaking in Nigeria, Sudan, Israel and Palestine, Iran, Saudi 

Arabia, Macedonia, and Indonesia. The emphasis is on peacemaking when two or more 

Abrahamic faiths are in conflict. In some cases, USIP’s efforts have focused on helping believers reinterpret their religious principles in ways that contribute to peaceful coexistence with 

adherents of other faiths.

This Peaceworks builds upon and goes well beyond the book, Interfaith Dialogue and

Peacebuilding, which presented general principles to guide effective interfaith dialogue as 

well as profiles of some of the leading organizations in the field. This report provides a series 

of case studies addressing specific religious conflicts through a variety of methodologies. 

Some of the cases describe dramatic successes, like the Inter Faith Mediation Center mediating 

peace between Christians and Muslims in some of the most strife-torn regions of Nigeria. 

Others tackle some of the most intractable conflicts in the world, such as the Alexandria 

process among Muslim, Jewish, and Christian leaders working to establish a religious peace 

track in Israel and Palestine. The analysis of the Iraqi Institute of Peace shows how the 

organization has grappled with the most critical issues currently facing a religiously fragmented 

Iraq. Not all the cases presented here describe dramatic success stories, but even the less 

decisive cases provide experiences and lessons that are instructive for future religious 

peacemaking in other places. 

All of these cases explore projects by organizations that have been USIP partners in religious 

peacemaking and have received USIP financial support. Two of the cases (Kashmir and Sudan) 

describe projects undertaken prior to the Institute providing financial assistance, but all the 

other projects have been collaborative efforts with USIP. Presenting these case studies 

describes some of the richest material on this topic and also illuminates the Institute’s involvement in this field. 

This is not an analysis about interfaith dialogue in the traditional sense of members of different faith communities meeting to simply tell their stories, share their religious convictions with 

each other, or seek common religious understanding. Rather, the cases presented here are 

stories of religious communities and leaders joining together to resolve religious conflicts that 

are at least partially rooted in religious conflict.
 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

Religion in many parts of the world is contributing to violent conflict, although exaggerated 

in many cases. This is well documented and broadly accepted. Usually disregarded, however, 

are opportunities to employ the assets of religious leaders and religious institutions to promote peace. Traditional diplomacy has been particularly remiss in its neglect of the religious 

approach to peacemaking. The cases described in the following sections illustrate the creative 

contributions that religion can make to peace in places like Israel/Palestine, Iraq, Macedonia, 

Nigeria, and Sudan. As these cases illustrate, religious approaches to peacemaking do not 

provide a panacea, but can complement secular peacemaking productively. This Peaceworks

is meant both to demonstrate the value of religious contributions to peacemaking, and to 

extract lessons about what is and is not effective. 

The following sections describe and analyze religious peacemaking in Kashmir, Israel/Palestine, 

Iraq, Nigeria, Sudan, and Macedonia. Though all employ religious approaches, these cases 

illustrate several methodologies. The Kashmir case uses interfaith dialogue. The Israel/Palestine 

project describes an effort to develop a religious track to peace as a complement to 

diplomatic/secular negotiations. The Iraq example describes the establishment and operation 

of the Iraqi Institute of Peace to promote interfaith comity in that strife-torn country. The 

Nigeria cases describe training religious leaders in peacemaking, and mediating between 

Muslims and Christians successfully in Plateau State to end bloody conflict. The Sudan case 

describes both religious peacemaking between two ethnic groups in Southern Sudan and a 

project to improve Christian/Muslim relations in Southern Sudan. Lastly, the Macedonia piece 

describes efforts to establish an interfaith council to promote peace among Macedonia’s faith 

and ethnic communities. 
What Faith-Based Diplomacy Can 

Offer in Kashmir 

by Daniel Philpott and Brian Cox

As faith-based intermediaries in a land that The Economist has called “the world’s most 

danger­ous neighborhood,” we were not encouraged when, at the start of one of our seminars on reconciliation, a participant rose to launch a volley of invective against his rival ethnic 

community. Our enraged orator was a Hindu Pandit, a member of an ethnic group that fled 

their homes fearing the attacks of Muslims shortly after violence broke out in the Kashmir 

Valley in 1989. They settled in squalid camps in Jammu, where Hindus are a majority. 

At the end of the three-and-a-half-day seminar, our attention was naturally piqued when the 

same man stood up again before the participants, but with a different message. He apologized to Muslims for his insensitivity to their suffering in the conflict, and forgave them for 

their violence against Hindus. What had elicited the change? The man had experienced telling 

his story to Muslims for the first time. The seminar allowed him to understand the complexity 

of social justice, and to come to terms with the historical wounds of his community, ultimately 

moving him to embrace apology and forgiveness. All this was accomplished in an atmosphere 

of religious ritual and reflection. We learned that Muslim members of the seminar leadership 

team had stayed up with him into the wee hours of the morning to hear about his suffering 

and to express remorse for the plight of the Pandits. Might the transformation of this Pandit’s 

heart bear an important resource for high-level peace negotiations? 

Over the past eighteen months, new possibilities for negotiating the end of the war in 

Kashmir have emerged. In February 2004, former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee 

and Pakistani President Pervez Musharaff committed their countries to comprehensive peace 

talks. Meanwhile, the Indian government has begun to talk with Kashmiri separatists. In 

recent months momentum has accelerated. In February 2005, the two states established a 

bus service across the Line of Control (LOC) that separates Indian- and Pakistani-controlled 

Kashmir, an important symbol of their willingness to negotiate. Now, they are stepping up the 

pace of their talks. Progress is essential: the conflict in Kashmir has taken the lives of somewhere between 30,000 and 80,000 people, and is the most likely source of a nuclear conflict 

in the world today. 

Peace in Kashmir, however, will not come easily. Pakistan has long maintained that in 1947 

India illegally seized the part of Kashmir it now controls, and that Kashmiris are entitled to a 

plebiscite to determine whether all of Kashmir will accede to India or Pakistan. If Pakistan were 

to compromise on some of these claims, it would likely face the violent internal opposition of 

Muslim militant groups. For its part, the Indian government maintains that Kashmir is not a 

disputed territory; it is a legal state in the Indian federal union, one whose sovereign member1 
 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

ship requires no plebiscite. India views the LOC as a legitimate international border. India 

further insists that Pakistan must also cease supporting cross-border terrorism.

Most difficult of all are historical wounds. Muslim patriots nurture communal memories of 

thousands of martyrs who died for the cause of azad, or freedom, and of decades of rigged 

elections, denials of democracy, and human rights abuses at the hand of the Indian government. Kashmiris loyal to India also remember the thousand lives lost, many of them civilian, 

at the hands of Muslim militants.

Activists, analysts, and officials have proposed scores of schemes for a settlement, involving 

varying arrangements of borders, sovereignty, power-sharing institutions, and economic transfers. It is highly uncertain whether or not negotiation on these issues alone can overcome long 

memories and still distant positions. Even a comprehensive settlement may fail to endure, as 

Bosnia, Angola, Northern Ireland, and Israel all attest.

Something else is needed. What diplomats often overlook are resources for peace outside of 

official channels. For example, Dennis Ross, chief U.S. negotiator of the Israel/Palestine 1993 

Oslo Accords, commented in a speech in 1999: “[I]f there is one area that has been neglected 

but needs to be worked on between the Israelis and the Palestinians, it is the people-topeople component . . . Peace will not last if it is made only by the negotiators and the leaders.” Ross’s words apply in Kashmir as aptly as they do in Israel/Palestine.

Herein lies the importance of the transformed Hindu Pandit. Through a seminar rooted in 

religious faith, he experienced a change in heart and began to restore his relationships with 

Muslims. Repeated and integrated into a strategy for an entire country, this kind of initiative can 

be called faith-based diplomacy. If Ross is correct, then faith-based diplomacy, like other unofficial “track two” efforts, may well deserve the attention of official, “track one” diplomats.

Track two diplomacy—that which is practiced by actors outside of official “track one” channels—cannot replace the power and authority that government officials bring to negotiations. 

Yet actors who are unchained from official objectives and national interests can exercise a 

freedom that allows them to create initiatives for a lasting peace, often in unconventional and 

surprising ways. Faith-based actors will be particularly important in regions like South Asia, 

where religion is integral to culture and politics. Still, how might faith-based diplomacy—the 

experience of the Pandit and scores of others like him—specifically create “capital” for the 

peace process between India and Pakistan, particularly as it involves Kashmir? 

Faith-based diplomacy, in fact, can yield two kinds of assets. One is the transformation of the 

hearts of grassroots and civil society leaders. As Ross suggests, a sustainable settlement 

depends vitally on such leaders. Their choice to become either actively supportive, violently 

oppositional, or passively indifferent to a settlement may well determine whether it succeeds. 

The strategic role of civil society has indeed informed some of the great faith-inspired political 

movements of the twentieth century—the American civil rights movement, India’s colonial 

independence, and the movements that toppled authoritarian regimes in Poland, the 

Philippines, and elsewhere. Though their targets were structures of injustice rather than com-
What Faith-Based Diplomacy Can Offer in Kashmir 

munal conflict, their strategy is portable: impart to cadres a vision of justice rooted in faith 

that can motivate a political movement. 

In our work in Kashmir, civil society leaders have come to embrace a vision of reconciliation 

through a seminar in which they reflect on what their own faith traditions teach about subjects 

like conflict resolution, social justice, healing historical wounds, and forgiveness, and on the 

meaning of these teachings for themselves and their communities. Since September 2000, 

working on behalf of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, we have conducted 

eight of these seminars, involving more than 400 members of Kashmiri civil society on both 

sides of the LOC. The results have sometimes been dramatic, as in the case of the Pandit, and 

of a Muslim man who forgave militants eight years after they had killed his father and brother 

and had riddled his own body full of bullets. More common are simpler expressions of a willingness to embrace and promote reconciliation like these from a recent seminar: “Religion is 

often blamed for conflicts. This is a whole new concept. Reconciliation is in the religious texts. 

We can study that and bring reconciliation to this place. My heart has been changed.”

Such transformations alone, though, are not enough. Civil society leaders need support to 

connect and coordinate with each other. The networking of civil society leaders committed to 

a common cause is a second asset for peace that faith-based diplomacy begets. In his book, 

Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), political 

scientist Ashutosh Varshney demonstrates that in Indian cities where Hindus and Muslims are 

connected through civil society organizations, communal riots are much less likely to occur. A 

key tool in this networking is spiritually based friendships, ones created through conversations 

that reach beyond positions and arguments to the sharing of experiences of the loss of loved 

ones, property, homes, businesses, and careers. Rooted in mutual concern about spiritual 

welfare, such friendships create a level of trust that allows effective cooperation. 

In Kashmir, our seminars have created linkages across civil society organizations by giving rise 

to a core group of committed leaders and a network of cell groups that meet together for 

mutual encouragement in reconciliation. The resulting connections are sometimes surprising. 

At recent conferences in London and Geneva, leaders from both sides of the LOC who had 

never met before discovered a common commitment to faith-based reconciliation formed 

through their involvement in the seminars. We have also established spiritual friendships with 

various top political, religious, and military leaders.

Recommendations for the Kashmir Peace Process

How can these assets of transformation and connectivity be brought to bear on the Kashmir 

peace process? We propose an organic linkage between civil society initiatives and track one 

negotiations. It can be forged through creating two Kashmir Diplomacy Roundtables, one on 

each side of the LOC, that would connect faith-based diplomacy in civil society to the work 

of track one officials involved in the peace process. Roundtables can be fruitful in three key 

stages of a settlement: attainment, maintenance, and deepening. 
Roundtables would convene regularly—quarterly or semi-annually—and include diplomats 

from foreign ministries and related liaison offices, representatives from Kashmiri civil society, 

and nongovernmental organizations involved in faith-based diplomacy. To minimize the risk 

of participation, the roundtables could meet privately, away from media exposure, and on 

separate sides of the LOC. Over time, though, links between the roundtables could be forged 

across borders, creating a new dimension of support for the peace process. 

The story of the transformed Pandit suggests one way in which a roundtable contributes to a 

settlement and its sustenance. The return of the Pandits to their homes in the Kashmir Valley 

is one of several thorny problems in the negotiations. The Pandits’ need for security in the 

Valley, compensation for lost property, and reconciliation of the hostilities all stand in the way 

of an agreement, and will likely hamper its implementation. Over the past four years, several 

Muslim core group members have traveled to the Pandit settlement camps to meet with their 

leaders, speak at community meetings, hear the Pandits’ stories, apologize for their fate at 

the hands of Muslims, invite their return, and offer assistance in the transition. By and large, 

the Pandits have welcomed the visits, and have showed an increased willingness to return. 

Through the roundtable mechanism, official negotiators now might become linked with these 

track two efforts, gaining confidence that the Pandit issue can be resolved and discovering 

allies and expertise for this resolution. 

The Pandit issue, of course, is only one of many that divide India, Pakistan, and the several 

factions of Kashmiris. It does illustrate, however, how track two efforts informed and motivated by faith can be linked with track one efforts. Roundtables can create this link and make 

policymakers aware of civil society reconciliation initiatives, which can encourage them to lend 

their support to these initiatives and to cultivate the assent of civil society and grass roots 

leaders for an agreement. Several steps are recommended to create and to implement these 

roundtables: 

n	 Faith-based intermediaries should convene two concurrent Kashmir Diplomacy Roundtables 

respectively for participants in India and Pakistan.

n	 The purpose is to exchange ideas regarding the assets that faith-based civil society initiatives bring to negotiating and to sustaining a peace settlement.

n	 Faith-based intermediaries should meet quarterly or semi-annually.

n	 The roundtable goal should be to develop and to carry out concrete initiatives that are 

important to negotiating and to sustaining a peace and that require their cooperative 

efforts, such as the return of displaced Hindu Pandits to the Kashmir Valley. 

n	 After each of the two roundtable groups have gained experience working together, they 

should begin to meet with the other on both sides of the LOC to explore joint initiatives.

Multiplied over several issues and regions, the work of roundtables will bring crucial, but too 

often overlooked, assets of civil society leaders into the peace process, as well as the fresh, 

but underemployed, logic of reconciliation. Together, these amount to an innovative approach 

to resolve international conflicts.

 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking
Bringing Religious Leaders Together 

in Israel/Palestine

by Canon Andrew White

For years diplomats and politicians have sought ways to resolve the conflict between Arabs 

and Israelis—the children of Ishmael and Isaac. To some degree, this conflict has involved the 

people and land as with the covenant first revealed to the patriarch Abraham. Despite the 

duration of the conflict and the myriad of peace negotiations, including Oslo, Taba, Wye River, 

and Camp David, none of the negotiators have given serious attention to the religious dimensions of the conflict. References are facilely made to the “Holy Land” without truly acknowledging the religious elements. This is true both of the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators as 

well as the mediators, including the United States. 

Because the Middle East is one of the most religious regions of the world, religion’s connection to the Middle East conflict is inevitable. In fact, religion is playing an increasingly important role. Religious dimensions are critically important in such contentious issues as control of 

land, Jerusalem, and other holy places. 

As Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has said, “[To] Christians this is the Holy Land but to us as Jews 

this is the Promised Land.” It can be added that to Muslims this is waf (Islamic territory). Thus, 

this is no ordinary place to the three Abrahamic traditions. Complicating this is the fervent 

belief of millions of evangelical Christians around the world—particularly in the United 

States—that Jewish control of all of the Holy Land is required to fulfill Biblical prophecy. 

Rabbi Michael Melchior, minister for Jewish diaspora affairs in the Israeli Cabinet, has said that 

all previous peace plans lacked religious legitimization. Partly for this reason, key Jewish, 

Muslim, and Christian leaders from Israel and Palestine joined forces to promote a religious 

approach to peace. The effort commenced at the very beginning of the second Intifada in 

2000. These leaders, including a chief rabbi from Israel, the most important Palestinian sheikh, 

and the Latin patriarch in Jerusalem, gathered in Alexandria, Egypt in January 2002. The goal 

was to work out a joint commitment to promote peace, and to oppose violence and terror. 

The Alexandria Process

The meeting had the backing of both the president of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, 

and the prime minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon. It was chaired by the then archbishop of 

Canterbury, George Carey, and the grand imam of the Al-Azhar Islamic University, Sheikh 

Mohamed Sayed Tantawi. Negotiations continued around the clock to achieve agreement on 

the wording of the document. The Archbishop described his chairing of the meeting as the 

hardest task he had ever undertaken. At the end of the second day, all parties reached an 

2 
10 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

agreement and signed the Alexandria Declaration. For the first time, representatives of all the 

faith traditions in Israel and Palestine signed a declaration calling for a religiously sanctioned 

cease-fire and an end to both violence and demonization of the “other.”

Despite the fact that this was an historic document and an historic day, this was the beginning, not the end, of a complex process. This process has unfolded against the backdrop of 

increasing violence both Palestinian militants and the Israeli Defense Forces committed. Also, 

part of the declaration called for a permanent committee to implement the declaration. This 

committee has met monthly to move forward what became known as the Alexandria process. 

These meetings have continued despite the difficulties encountered in obtaining permits for 

the Palestinians to travel to Jerusalem for the meetings. One offshoot of this process was the 

central role that I played in the ultimately successful mediation that ended the siege of the 

Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. I was asked to become involved because of the religious 

dimension of the standoff at the church. 

A major hope for the Alexandria process is that it will serve as a religious track for the anticipated Middle East peace process. This track recognizes the need for the peace process to 

engage both religious and political leaders. It does not seek to replace the political process, 

but rather to complement it. The process is complex and has involved the establishment of 

various centers in both Israel and Palestine, which seek to make known the religious dimensions needed in peacemaking. For example, the Adam Center created in Jerusalem and parallel centers are being established in the West Bank and Gaza to promote interfaith peace. 

Together they will be known as the Israeli-Palestinian Institute of Peace. 

Despite the offer of funding from the government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the 

Alexandria process principals have not accepted funding from these local authorities. The 

United States Institute of Peace, the British and American governments, Coventry Cathedral, 

and the Church of Norway have funded the process. It has been very expensive to maintain. 

This complex and significant peace process requires a lasting presence to achieve peace even 

when the situation seems most difficult.

The journey is still long, but those involved will not give up the struggle for peace. At a meeting in Europe, someone in the audience asked one of our leading Palestinian sheikhs, Tal El 

Sadr, what he was doing to promote religious peace. Sheikh Tal El took Rabbi Melchior’s hand 

and said, “Rabbi Melchior is my brother and we will walk this long and difficult road together 

until we find peace. My job is to pull up the thorns on the road and to plant flowers in their 

place.” Sheikh Tal El was one of the founders of Hamas, and now he is dedicated entirely to 

finding peace.

The belief that people can change is fundamental to any effort to promote peace. If people 

cannot change, then there is no point in this work. That is why we must not just talk to nice 

people; in most instances it is not the nice people who cause wars. Our challenge is to 
Bringing Religious Leaders Together in Israel/Palestine 11

engage with some of those who are responsible for the perpetuation of violence or, if not 

them, then those who can influence them. One such effort was a gathering we organized at 

Al-Azhar University in Egypt with twenty-five Palestinian religious leaders who did not previously have reputations as peacemakers. We were able to elicit their support for the Alexandria 

Declaration and the religious peace process. The process has entailed a continuous effort to 

expand the network of religious leaders supportive of the Alexandria Declaration and of religious peacemaking. 

“If there is no peace among religions there will be no peace amongst nations,” writes Hans 

Küng, president of the Global Ethic Foundation. The Alexandria process in Israel/Palestine has 

helped inspire similar efforts at religious peacemaking in both Nigeria and Iraq. Proclamations 

of religious peace modelled on the Alexandria Declaration have been signed in both Kaduna, 

Nigeria, and in postwar Iraq.

Commitment to Peace

Religious peacemaking in Israel/Palestine is arduous. It requires a long-term commitment. We 

spend time in the region each month just encouraging the different partners to stay involved. 

Palestinian delegates struggle to gain permits to enter Israel to attend key meetings.

We often face opposition to our efforts. The opposition comes from many different sources, 

not least from among religious leaders themselves. There is also political and diplomatic opposition. These opponents are often hostile because they feel threatened by our efforts to do 

what should be their work or what they have failed to do. Yet at other times, these same 

people have provided us immense support. 

The search for peace in the Middle East is a highly complex and difficult process. It is filled 

with joy and sadness. The religious dimensions of conflicts are growing internationally; therefore, the religious track to peace is more important than ever. It takes time, money, and an 

enduring commitment. A third party, trusted by all sides, is often an essential catalyst. As 

stated, it has not been possible to enjoy the support of all our partners in all situations. 

However, peace in the Middle East will come, but only when the religious and political leaders 

are willing to put aside their differences and to work together for lasting peace in a land 

where the very capital is called the City of Peace. Fortunately, the surge in recent optimism 

about the progress toward peace has also generated new appreciation for the importance of 

the religious track in peacemaking.

3

Establishing the Premier Interfaith 

Organization in Iraq

by Canon Andrew White

Despite the obvious problems involving Iraq’s ethnic and religious diversity, contacts with the 

British Foreign Office and the U.S. Department of State following the defeat of Saddam 

Hussein revealed that religion and religious peacemaking were not high on their agendas. At 

that stage, only the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and various private individuals saw 

the need for religious peacemaking in postwar Iraq. A letter from the British Foreign Office 

stated that the priority had to be resuming public water and electricity services. However, 

within days of receiving that letter, my office at the International Centre for Reconciliation at 

Coventry Cathedral received a message from the British government indicating that religious 

and tribal issues were impeding the resumption of basic public services.

Early on, the occupying forces decided that the Ministry of Religious Affairs, or Aw Qaf, was 

compromised, and thus would not be re-established within the Coalition Provisional Authority 

(CPA). This denied the CPA ready access to religious leaders, and it would take time to form 

these relationships. It was therefore fortunate that for the previous five years, I had been 

working closely with many of Iraq’s religious leaders. These relationships proved to be vitally 

important in our effort to promote religious reconciliation in the postwar period.

Particularly important was my relationship with the Ayatollah Hossain Al Sadr. Many pivotal 

meetings took place with him. Having been one of the persecuted Shia majority leaders, 

Ayatolla Al Sadr now had new prominence. In a meeting soon after the war, he identified the 

need for an institute of religious tolerance. The Alexandria Declaration experience in Israel and 

Palestine demonstrated that key Iraqi religious leaders should sign a similar sort of document 

to promote religious peace. In other countries, effective interfaith organizations already 

existed, which could benefit from outside support. In Iraq, however, no such organizations 

existed, and given the tense nature of relations among Iraq’s religious communities, it was 

imperative to establish such an organization. 

My colleagues and I spent many days visiting important religious leaders to gain their support 

for this initiative. Although most were very positive, many were also skeptical. Some, particularly Sunni leaders, concluded that I was an undercover agent for the Central Intelligence 

Agency trying to make them admit guilt for the developing insurgency. When they realized 

that I was a close friend of some of the prewar Sunni leaders, their attitudes began to change. 

It also became evident in this process that the Sunni minority were feeling increasingly marginalized. This led us to make it a key priority to encourage Sunni religious leaders to promote the 

restoration of Iraq, as well as reconciliation among the religious communities. Many Sunni 

religious leaders were afraid that if they were seen working with us, they would be targeted 

for violence. Sadly, this proved to be true. While we were working energetically to convince an 

 13
14 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

important Sunni leader to return to Iraq, the home of a fellow sheikh was bombed because he 

had been part of a delegation of Sunni leaders we took to meet CPA leaders.

Creating the Iraqi Institute of Peace

Work on the foundation document for religious reconciliation culminated in an event on 

February 23, 2004, at the Babylon Hotel in Baghdad funded by the British government. Chaired 

by Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie, a Shiite member of the Governing Council, the meeting attracted 

a wide array of religious and tribal leaders. Debate focused on how to ensure that Iraq not fall 

prey to deep sectarian divisions. The document was eventually signed and became known as 

the Baghdad Religious Accord. Those present pledged to establish a Centre for Dialogue 

Reconciliation and Peace. The meeting and document were only the beginning, however. 

Religious divisions deepened, principally between Sunni and Shiites. Sunni religious leaders 

felt threatened by the “debaathification” process, which they interpreted as targeting the 

Sunni leadership. A complex process of sustained interreligious dialogue followed. This was 

not the nice interfaith encounter often experienced in the West. It was, and continues to be, 

interreligious dialogue at the cutting edge. In Iraq, it is a matter of life or death. They do not 

meet to say nice things to each other in the safety of Western suburbia. In Iraq, dialogue is 

often painful; there are shouting and tears. In the end, however, greater understanding and 

a renewed commitment to the search for peace usually result.

Formed after the signing of the Baghdad Religious Accord, the Centre eventually became 

known as the Iraqi Institute of Peace (IIP) based in an impressive facility in Baghdad. Fadel 

al-Fatlawi became the first executive director and Mowaffak al-Rubaie is chair of the board of 

advisors. Even the selection of a site was problematic because each religious community 

wanted it located in their own area. To ensure security at the opening of the IIP, thirty-nine 

armed guards had to be present to protect the dignitaries. This was not the usual scenario 

for opening a center for peace, but this was Baghdad, one of the most dangerous cities in 

the world. 

IIP’s leaders established task forces to promote its basic objectives.

n	 The Women, Religion, and Democracy Task Force has addressed such questions as: 

How do women fit into the new Iraq? What is to be the role of religious women? What 

can be done to end domestic violence against women and the law that allows multiple 

wives?

n	 The Interreligious Dialogue Task Force seeks to create a new environment conducive to 

dialogue. Previously, there was an unnatural truce among religious communities based on 

mutual fear rather than understanding and respect. Little, if any, real dialogue or encounter 

occurred. 
Establishing the Premier Interfaith Organization in Iraq 15

Interreligious dialogue is still very difficult, but IIP promotes the idea that each community 

must view the religious other as they see themselves. Interim Prime Minister Allawi looked 

to IIP as the principal adviser to the interim government on interreligious matters. When 

the Sunnis threatened to boycott the elections in early 2005, IIP took the lead in trying to 

convince Sunni religious leaders to support participation in the elections. IIP organized a 

conference for 200 Western Region tribal leaders and Sunni clerics aimed at renouncing 

violence in the region. IIP has also provided forums for disaffected Sunnis to participate in 

Iraq’s constitution writing. IIP has engaged the rebellious militia of Muqtada al-Sadr, 

nephew of Ayatolla Hussein al-Sadr, in a process of dialogue at regular meetings in Sadr 

City. Out of these meetings IIP produced some of the ideas that led to the cessation of 

violence in Sadr City. After Christian churches were bombed, IIP convened Christian and 

Muslim leaders to strategize about how to reduce the violence.

n	 The Media Task Force addresses the politically and religiously divisive impact of the Iraqi 

press. This task force has sought to help the press understand the negative impact of much 

of its current reporting and the positive role that the media can play in promoting peace.

n	 The Youth and Young People Task Force aims to ensure that the generation approaching maturity adopts the message of tolerance, understanding, and peacemaking. A key 

challenge is helping religious leaders adopt a new approach toward young people. 

n	 The Conflict Resolution Task Force has been one of the most active by necessity. It has 

had to deal with the multiple components of the ongoing conflict, as well as work to obtain 

the release of the many hostages taken since April 2004. During 2004–2005, the task force 

succeeded in obtaining the release of several hostages, both Iraqi and foreign. However, 

many more hostages have been killed. This has been particularly hard on IIP’s staff as they 

feel they have failed in saving those hostages.

n	 The Human Rights and Religious Tolerance Task Force addresses past human rights 

abuses of the Saddam era and current violations of human rights. Although a number of 

organizations, including a Ministry for Human Rights, are addressing human rights, IIP’s 

special role is to focus on religion, particularly discrimination against particular religious 

communities and minorities. The task force aims to learn lessons from past abuses to prevent future reoccurrences. IIP has set up regional offices to address these concerns. 

IIP was thus primed to confront some of the most vexing issues facing contemporary Iraq. The 

attempt to create a peace respected by both religious and secular Iraqis has been a huge challenge. Winning the war was easy compared to gaining the peace. Iraq has shown that as 

many resources need to be invested into peacemaking as into waging the war, or even the 

work of postwar reconstruction. USIP and the British Foreign Office have provided very significant support to this endeavour in terms of funds and the provision of advice, logistical 

support, and training. However, sufficient resources for peacemaking have not been forthcoming. The work has just begun, and it may appear as if the battle is being lost, but the Iraqi 

colleagues at IIP will not give up until the peace is won.

4

Mediating Between Christians and 

Muslims in Plateau State, Nigeria

by David R. Smock

Tens of thousands of people have perished in Nigeria over the last five years due to violence 

between Christians and Muslims. The worst of the violence has occurred in Plateau State. The 

most recent Christian-Muslim conflict in Plateau State occurred in Yelwa-Nshar, in the 

Shendam local government area, where nearly 1,000 were killed in May 2004. When I visited 

Nigeria in November 2004, I witnessed several mass graves for Muslims and one for Christians, 

with each grave containing 100 bodies. The killings in Yelwa-Nshar provoked reprisals in both 

Kano State and Southeastern State. To subdue the unrest in Plateau State, 25,000 soldiers and 

security personnel were deployed. The administrator of Plateau State convened a peace conference that resulted in recommendations for resolving the conflicts, but the Muslim community rejected them. 

To characterize these conflicts as Christian versus Muslim is only partly accurate. Religious 

identities frequently overlap with identities of ethnic groups, local people (primarily Christian), 

and migrants (primarily Muslim). In Plateau State, Muslims tend to be better off economically 

than Christians, generating class conflict. Conflicts also arise over land ownership, cattle rearing, and political power. Even when religion is not the most basic cause of conflict, it is frequently used to incite either or both sides to mob violence. 

Although Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria are usually tense and too frequently violent, a 

local evangelical pastor and an imam have been forging peace in Yelwa-Nshar and other parts 

of Nigeria. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) offers advice and financial support, but 

theirs is truly an indigenous effort.

Religious Peacemaking Negotiations

The story of Pastor James Wuye and Imam Mohammed Ashafa is itself a narrative of religious 

peacemaking. In 1992, they fought on opposite sides of a religious conflict. Wuye lost his right 

arm, and Ashafa lost his spiritual teacher and two cousins in a Muslim-Christian clash in Zongon 

Kataf. In 1995, they recognized that their two faiths both contain warrants for peace. They 

established the Inter Faith Mediation Centre, and committed themselves to work collaboratively 

to promote interfaith reconciliation. In 1999, they coauthored a book titled, The Pastor and the

Imam: Responding to Conflict (Lagos: Ibrash Publications, 1999), which describes their experiences and sets out the biblical and Koranic mandates for peace. Since then, they have helped 

bring religious peace to the troubled city of Kaduna. With USIP support, they have trained many 

religious youth leaders to be peacemakers, as described in the next section. 

 17
At the invitation of the administrator of Plateau State, in November 2004 Wuye and Ashafa 

carried their message and skills to Yelwa-Nshar. They gathered key leaders for five days of 

sharing and negotiation. This event was the first time the two communities were brought 

together for a face-to-face encounter. As facilitators, Wuye and Ashafa used a combination 

of preaching and conflict resolution techniques. The most remarkable feature of the process 

was the pastor’s frequent quotes of the Koran and imam’s references to the Bible. 

The atmosphere at the outset was tense and confrontational. By the end of the third day, 

however, the two sides agreed on the core issues that provoked the killing. On the fourth day, 

they addressed each of these issues. The first issue was the Christian complaint that Muslims, 

who migrated to the area from Northern Nigeria, failed to respect local traditions and leaders. 

To buttress their claim, the Christians leveled specific charges. 

The principal Muslim leader responded to these charges by agreeing that all of them were 

valid, and that the behavior of the Muslims was unacceptable. The Muslims then apologized 

to the Christians and sought their forgiveness. This unexpected response stunned the 

Christians. In turn, they asked the Muslims to forgive their unacceptable behavior. Tears 

flowed on both sides. 

On the final day, the two sides worked through all the remaining issues, either agreeing on a 

resolution or on a process to find a resolution ultimately acceptable to both sides. They 

drafted a peace affirmation, which was subsequently shared with the two communities. The 

participants prepared the following Peace Affirmation: 

In the name of God, the Almighty, Merciful and Compassionate, we the 

representatives of the Muslims and Christians of various ethnic nationalities 

in Shendam local government area of Plateau State who have gathered here 

pray for true peace in our community and declare our commitment to ending 

the violence and bloodshed that deny the right to life and dignity.

1. LEADERSHIP: We the representatives of this community hereby acknowledge the paramountcy and rulership of His Royal Highness the Long 

Goemai of Shendam. We condemn the use of derogatory names to the 

paramount ruler by anybody within the community.

We hereby resolve that His Royal Highness the Long Goemai of Shendam 

be addressed by his title and be acknowledged and respected as such. We 

acknowledge that lack of central leadership in Yelwa had contributed to 

the disharmony in Yelwa community. We resolve that the issue of chieftaincy of Yelwa be referred to Shendam traditional council for urgent 

steps to be taken, without prejudice to the accepted and approved 

method of the government.

2. RELIGION: We hereby affirm our belief and faith in the sanctity of all religious places of worship, whether it is a Mosque, a Church or a Shrine.

18 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking
Mediating between Christians and Muslims in Plateau State, Nigeria 19

We condemn in strong terms the desecration of all places of worship, killings in the name of God, and call on all to refrain from incitement and 

exhibition of religious sentiments and or the instigation of such sentiments 

for selfish ends.

We resolve to create an atmosphere where present and future generations 

will co-exist with mutual respect and trust in one another.

We pledge to educate our young ones to embrace the culture of respect 

for these values.

3. ETHNICITY: We acknowledge our ethnic and tribal diversity. We condemn 

in strong terms their negative application in our day-to-day life.

We resolve that our ethnic and tribal diversity should be a source of our 

unity, strength and also a source of our economic and social development.

4. PROVOCATION: We acknowledge the existence of the use of derogatory 

names toward each other in the past.

We condemn in strong terms the use of derogatory names to each other. 

We resolve to collectively respect and trust each other, and call upon all 

to refrain from this. We resolve to collectively respect and trust each other, 

and call upon all to refrain from the use of such derogatory names like 

‘Arna’, ‘Falak Muut’, Jaap nhaat Yelwa, Gampang, etc. as perceived to be 

derogatory by groups concerned or affected.

We resolve to refrain from the use of the media to cast aspersions and 

give incorrect and misleading information about our community. We call 

on the media to always cross check and balance information they publish 

in relation to our community.

5. INTIMIDATION: We acknowledge and condemn the unruly behavior of 

our youth due to high rate of illiteracy, unemployment and exploitation of 

the youth as thugs and hanger on by politicians. We call upon all stakeholders, i.e. religious, community and political leaders, to put hands on 

deck to reverse this trend.

We also resolve that the use of parallel markets in Yelwa-Nshar and the 

conversion of houses into market square in Yamini be referred to the local 

government council.

6. INJUSTICE: We acknowledge and condemn the conversion of residence 

and places of worship into markets and other uses. Having so observed 
20 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

we are appealing to the parties concerned to in the name of God vacate 

those places for their rightful owners.

7. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs)/MISSING PERSONS: We note 

with concern that some of our brothers and sisters are still at large having 

been displaced. We therefore appeal to the authorities to take adequate 

steps to ensure their return and necessary rehabilitation. We also resolve 

that a joint search committee be constituted between the local government council, the Shendam traditional council and the law enforcement 

agents for the search of the missing members of the community. 

8. GOVERNMENT ROLE ON EVEN DEVELOPMENT: In view of the prevailing 

circumstances existing in our community, i.e. the non-functioning government structures and organizations like NITEL, Ministry of Agriculture 

(M.O.A.), Plateau Agricultural Development Project (P.A.D.P.), Water Board, 

Electricity, Schools and Primary Health Care (P.H.C.), we passionately call 

on the government to resuscitate these institutions as they were prior to 

the crises in the community.

9. CONCLUSION: We resolve to work collectively with the security agencies 

to maintain law and order in our communities.

Celebrating Peace

On February 19, 2005, several thousand people celebrated the peace agreement, including 

many of those who had fled their homes the previous May and now felt sufficiently safe to 

return and resettle. The governor of Plateau State and many other dignitaries attended and 

declared their support for the peace settlement.

Only time will tell if this peace will hold, but the two sides amazed themselves at the reconciliation they achieved. The Yelwa-Nshar experience demonstrates that even the bloodiest 

religious conflicts in Nigeria can be addressed creatively. Moreover, progress would not have 

been achieved if the pastor and the imam had not combined both religious exhortations with 

well-tested conflict resolution techniques. The reconciliation process in Yelwa-Nshar instructively parallels the reconciliation the pastor and imam experienced ten years previously. 

Wuye and Ashafa subsequently turned their peacemaking attention to the city of Jos, capital 

of Plateau State, which has experienced comparable religious violence. After three days of 

interactions between representatives of the Christian and Muslim communities, a similar 

peace accord was reached and signed. With USIP support, they have also worked in the towns 

surrounding Yelwa-Nshar to train youth, women, and elders in religious peacemaking, and to 

resolve incipient conflict to avoid repeating the past violence in Yelwa-Nshar elsewhere.
Training Peacemakers: 

Religious Youth Leaders in Nigeria

by Imam Muhammad Nurayn Ashafa and Pastor James Movel Wuye

Over the last two decades, Nigeria has experienced a succession of ethnoreligious and sociopolitical crises that have resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and millions of dollars worth 

of property. Deep-rooted anger and hatred are widespread. These tend to be implanted by 

the elites, who in turn manipulate the most vulnerable within the Nigerian population, namely 

the youth, to engage in destructive acts. Economic deprivation and corrupt leadership have 

contributed to the violence. Militia groups using religious or ethnic slogans for recruitment 

and mobilization easily attract unemployed young people.

Alert to the early warning signs of a crisis that could have materialized during the 2003 election, the Inter Faith Mediation Centre swung into action to prevent this potential catastrophe. 

Empowered by a contract from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), a proactive strategy 

was developed to help young religious leaders confront and revise their stereotypes, phobias, 

misconceptions, and prejudices. As a result, nonviolent behavior, interdependency, and collaboration replaced their previous perspectives. 

The venue of Kaduna was carefully and strategically chosen because it is the nerve center of 

the North, a place where politicians experiment with political schemes. It is said that when 

Kaduna sneezes, the country catches a cold.

Participants were carefully selected from Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones. They hold positions 

of influence among their peers and have the capacity to escalate or de-escalate crisis situations within their constituencies. They are commanders in religious groupings. Also, both 

politicians and religious leaders respect them. It was imperative that we hold the program 

before the elections in order to reach the following goals:

n	 transform religious youth from being in the vanguard of violence to instruments of peace 

by exposing them to conflict resolution skills;

n	 increase understanding and improve relationships between Christian and Muslim youth 

nationwide;

n	 set up a network of peace advocates among religious youth and extend religious dialogue 

to the grassroots; and

n	 establish conflict monitoring and de-escalation structures in all six geopolitical zones.

Nigerians are known for their religious passion, which in some instances leads them to kill in 

God’s name. However, after thorough exposure to scriptural references in both the Bible and 

the Koran relating to religious mandates for peace, the participants unanimously condemned 

killing in the name of religion. 

5 21
22 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

The format of the workshop entailed two days of intrareligious dialogue, during which 

Christians and Muslims met separately. Topics discussed during the intrareligious sessions 

included: the concept of neighbor, the rights of nonbelievers in monolithic religious communities, respect of religious minorities, and their common beliefs and practices. 

Intrareligious Reorientation

Both the Christians and the Muslims participated in separate discussions. Pastor James 

Movel Wuye and Rev. Bitrus Dangiwa facilitated an intrareligious session for Christians. This 

intrareligious session enabled Christian participants to discuss issues freely, and to express 

their fears as well as their expectations about meeting with the Muslims. They feared that 

the Muslims would be insincere, and that there would be violent disagreements between 

the Christians and Muslims. The facilitators managed to allay these fears. Participants were 

encouraged to live by the dictates of their religious beliefs based on the fruits of the spirit 

(forgiveness, love, endurance, peace, and respect). Participants were also encouraged not 

to find fault with the Muslims, to listen carefully and empathetically, to dialogue, and to 

offer apologies for wrongs Christians committed. They were also urged to speak the truth 

in love. For their part, the Christian participants expressed their concerns about the Christian 

community in Nigeria. Among these were intolerance, ignorance, lack of true love, denominational differences, unfaithfulness, sectionalism, covetousness, domineering attitude by 

the rich, pride, hypocrisy, prayerlessness, influence of culture on religious practices, and lack 

of unity among Christians.

Similarly, the participants in the Muslim intrareligious sessions expressed fears that the 

Christians would distort the facts. They were also concerned there would be long arguments, 

confusion, and misunderstandings that would undermine the success of the workshop. Imam 

Muhammad Nurayn Ashafa and Imam Muhammad Sani Isah reassured the Muslim participants, and cited relevant Koranic verses to buttress their assertions. They explained the 

imperative of interfaith dialogue by quoting from the Koran. During this session, the Muslim 

participants expressed a number of issues of great concern especially to Nigerian Muslims, 

including ignorance about Islam among both Muslims and Christians, competition for leadership within Muslim communities, verdicts issued in Muslim courts without full understanding 

of sharia law, discord and animosity within the Muslim community, lack of obedience to the 

teachings of the Prophet, and illiteracy and poverty.

Interreligious Session

To initiate the interreligious session, the four facilitators—two Christian and two Muslim— 

introduced ice-breaking exercises, set ground rules for the discussion, and reached agreements on other issues, such as setting aside times for Muslim prayers, which has not always 

been settled amicably in Christian-Muslim dialogue. To help build community, the Christian 

and Muslim participants were moved from their separate hotels to a single hotel with adjacent 
Training Peacemakers: Religious Youth Leaders in Nigeria 23

rooms. This, however, had some participants fear the other group might attack them during 

the night. Participants had mixed expectations for the joint sessions—ranging from simplistic 

beliefs that all their differences would be settled to pessimism that nothing would be accomplished. Senior religious and government officials were invited to attend at key intervals as a 

strategy to consolidate progress and to set the stage for potential joint follow-up activities 

among the participants.

The techniques the facilitators employed included stating positive and negative sentiments 

about the other faith group, discussing misconceptions and stereotypes, and identifying steps 

for a productive, ongoing dialogue. The Christians said that Muslims respect and honor their 

Muslim culture, have a sense of unity, are prayer conscious, have impressive foresight, and are 

generous. On the negative side, Christians said that Muslims are self-centered, very aggressive, lazy, and sycophantic. Muslims said that Christians cooperate effectively with each other, 

have foresight, and are well organized, industrious, and economically enterprising. Their 

negative views on Christians included the view that Christians have a deep hatred of Muslims 

and blackmail them deliberately. They also felt that Christians are programmed to take the 

opposite view of Islam on issues, and they are uncompromising.

The facilitators then addressed the participants’ common misconceptions and stereotypes of 

each other. Both groups were surprised and pleased to hear the other side saying positive 

things about them, along with the negatives. This exercise generated intense interaction 

between the two faith groups, preparing them for open and intimate dialogue. As the dialogue progressed the participants identified several conditions for successful dialogue, both in 

this setting and more generally in Nigeria.

n	 Both parties should strive to learn the basic tenets of each other’s faith.

n	 They should be sensitive to each other, approach inflammatory issues with care, and 

respect each other’s religious values.

n	 A nationwide interfaith center should regularly assess issues that divide the religious communities and monitor incipient conflict.

Muslim-Christian Joint Communiqué

At the conclusion of the five-day interfaith workshop, the participants issued the following 

joint communiqué:

1. We identified causes of Nigeria’s religious conflicts as: lack of tolerance and respect for 

each other’s faith and practices, ignorance, failure to forgive, lack of understanding, lack 

of dialogue, rumor mongering, godlessness, lack of patience and restraint.

2. Resolve that in handling conflicts, both Christian and Muslims need to pray for one another, 

exercise patience and restraint, respect each other’s faiths and holy books, be willing to 

forgive and pursue peace, be honest and sincere and transparent with each other.
24 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

3. Recommend that a central interfaith body be established with branches in states, local 

government areas (LGAs) and wards to monitor and evaluate interfaith dialogue in 

Nigeria.

4. Resolve to see and love each other, unconditionally as brothers and sisters, showing goodwill at all times.

5. Resolve to educate and enlighten our respective adherents, especially at the grassroots, 

about the true tenets of the other’s faith.

6. Recommend that Muslims and Christians freely continue to preach and propagate their 

respective religions as enshrined in the Nigerian constitution.

7. Recommend that we shun religious bigotry in politics.

8. Resolve to cultivate a culture of nonaggression at all times.

9. Resolve to promote equity, fairness and justice even at the expense of our respective 

communities.

10. Call on the media to avoid biased and inciting journalism and to be objective and truthful 

in their reporting particularly as it relates to matters of religion.

11. Recommend that an interfaith media monitoring unit be established. 

12. Recommend that guidelines for interfaith dialogue be published and circulated.

13. Resolve to avoid using aggressive and abusive language [as well as] avoid finding fault and 

being confrontational.

14. Enforce basic human rights and redress of wrongs through compensation.

15. Resolve to ensure a peaceful and successful civilian-to-civilian transition come April 2003, 

for the survival of our nascent democracy in Nigeria.

16. Muslim and Christian youth resolved to cooperate with the government to checkmate and 

expose perpetrators of violence in the name of our faiths for punishment according to the 

due process of law.

17. Express concern about the failure of security services to make prompt and decisive 

responses to early warning signals of violent religious eruptions.

Some believe that the dialogue among Nigeria’s youth also helped tremendously in reducing 

violence during and after the April 2003 elections. The number of people affected by this 

workshop far surpassed those who participated directly. For example, one participant has 

subsequently influenced a network of thousands of followers. The workshop will have an 

impact on those who are followers of these youth leaders. After returning home, some of the 

participants established interfaith centers in their regions of residence, and other efforts have 

been made to promote interfaith peace. 

The presence of members of the press and the resultant publicity in both the electronic and 

print media also broadened and extended the impact. Furthermore, the reduction of hostilities in most of the conflict prone states following the workshop indicates that the entire 

program was a big success. Moreover, the renewed government involvement and support for 

various interfaith initiatives in some Nigerian states is another positive outcome.
Intrafaith and Interfaith Dialogue 

in Southern Sudan

by Emmanuel LoWilla

Religious peacemaking has been notably successful in southern Sudan. Religious leaders took 

the lead in building interethnic peace among the Christians and the animists, who adhere to 

traditional faiths. More recently, Christian and Muslim leaders have worked to achieve reconciliation between Christians and Muslims living in southern Sudan. 

Civil war set the Sudan afire in 1955, cooled between 1972 and 1983 after the Addis Ababa 

peace agreement (mediated by the World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference 

of Churches), and reignited again in 1983. A peace agreement was finally signed in January 

2005. This lengthy war has generally been interpreted as a conflict between the dominant, 

more developed Arabized Islamic North against the less developed, predominant Christian 

and animist African South. This is an over simplification, however. It is more accurate to say 

that the division lies between northern Muslims and southern Christian and traditional believers. This still disregards other sources of division and tension over access to resources, such as 

land and oil.

Though religion is not the sole or even principal source of division between the North and 

South, religion has nevertheless been used to perpetuate the war, particularly by northern 

government leaders. This has generated considerable mistrust between Sudan’s Christians 

and Muslims. The religious issue became especially prominent after September 1983 when 

President Numeiry abruptly decreed the enactment of sharia as state law without any regard 

to Sudan’s non-Muslims. 

Islam and Christianity have historically coexisted peacefully in Sudan. In the sixth century, 

three major Christian kingdoms existed in Sudan, Makurra, Nobatia, and Alwa. After Arabs 

brought Islam to Sudan in the year 641, Christians and Muslims signed treaties and lived 

peacefully together. It was during only more recent history that sharp divisions and conflict 

developed. 

Given the religious dimension to the conflict and the way religion has been exploited to 

divide Sudan’s population, it has become essential for people of different faiths to come 

together to speak openly about their desires, concerns, and hopes for peace and justice in 

Sudan. The efforts of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) with its partner organization, Reconcile, to facilitate interfaith dialogue should be viewed against the backdrop of 

their earlier efforts to promote reconciliation among peoples in the South through the 

people-to-people peace process.

6 25
26 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

In 1991, at the height of their military success, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army 

(SPLM/A) experienced a split within its leadership. The two factions were SPLM/A mainstream, based in Torit and led by Dr. John Garang de Mabior, a Dinka, and SPLM/A–United, 

based in Nasir and led by Dr. Riak Machar, a Nuer. This split resulted in fighting between the 

two armed factions, as well as seven years of conflict between Nuer and Dinka populations. 

The perpetrators raped women, abducted children, and stole cattle. 

In 1998, NSCC brought together Nuer and Dinka tribal leaders in Lokichoggio, Kenya. The 

topic for discussion was “Why do we fight each other?” To help end the internecine fighting 

among southerners, the tribal leaders recommended a larger and more representative gathering, including women and youth. The follow-up meeting was held in Wunlit as a conference 

in 1999. The Wunlit conference ended the bloody conflict between Dinka and Nuer. Some of 

the abducted children and looted cattle were returned, and some of the forced marriages 

were dissolved. This conference provided the participants an opportunity to share their pains 

and joys, and to resolve the issues that divided them. Various approaches were employed, 

including modern mediation techniques and traditional confidence-building measures. For 

instance, before the conference, traditional leaders visited each other’s villages to become 

acquainted. During these visits they washed each other’s feet and carried each other on their 

shoulders in order to convey humility and a willingness to reach out to the other side.

During the conference, the facilitators engaged in religious exhortation. Moreover, participants read from the Bible, particularly passages dealing with reconciliation, forgiveness, and 

peace. At the conclusion of the conference, traditional rituals were performed. Participants 

slaughtered a white bull whose blood signified in both Dinka and Nuer traditions that an 

agreement had been sealed. Anyone who broke the covenant would be cursed by the bull’s 

blood. With few exceptions, the agreements reached at Wunlit have been honored.

Due to the success of the Wunlit conference and subsequent efforts to promote reconciliation 

among southerners, the NSCC gained confidence in its peacemaking methodology. NSCC 

concluded that through using its three techniques of conflict resolution, traditional rites, and 

appeal to religious conviction, reconciliation can be achieved. The NSCC then decided to promote interfaith reconciliation between Christians and Muslims in anticipation of the end of 

the civil war between the North and South. The New Sudan Islamic Council (NSIC), representing Muslims in the South and other marginalized areas, initiated this project, and invited the 

NSCC to host a meeting for Christians and Muslims living in SPLA-controlled areas. After 

extended debate, NSCC’s member churches recognized that Muslims needed to be accepted 

as full partners in southern Sudan and other marginalized areas. Dialogue was recognized as 

a means to promote reconciliation. The NSCC viewed this project as supporting the peace 

negotiators working to bring agreement between North and South. In the Sudanese context, 

religious leaders and institutions can help achieve a sustained peace.

During the three-day interfaith conference in July 2004, the NSCC realized that interfaith 

dialogue can reduce ignorance about the religious beliefs and traditions of the other side. 

Through greater mutual understanding, we can learn to live peacefully with each other and 
Intrafaith and Interfaith Dialogue in Southern Sudan 27

to resolve our differences nonviolently. Moreover, when new tensions arise, we can return to 

dialogue. When Christian and Muslim leaders interact with each other, their followers can 

learn how to interact creatively and nonviolently as well. 

Conference Agreement and Recommendations for Peace

By the end of the meeting, the participants agreed on several key points, namely the 

following.

n	 Pursuit of justice and peace for Sudanese people requires affirming interfaith spirit and 

cooperation, as well as building understanding and respect for diversity towards a shared 

vision of harmony and peace for Sudanese people.

n	 Common space is needed for both Christians and Muslims in southern Sudan and other 

marginalized areas to work together on their common and religiously inspired desires for 

peace, greater understanding, and reconciliation within Sudan. 

n	 Dialogue requires not mere tolerance, but acceptance and mutual respect of others’ unique 

way of life.

n	 Unifying through diversity and working together for peace and justice in Sudanese society 

is of paramount importance.

The participants recommended that (1) an interfaith platform be established to strengthen 

relationships and to build confidence among religious leaders in southern Sudan and other 

marginalized areas, and (2) capacity building in peacemaking skills should be organized for 

religious leaders at all levels. They also recognized their need to organize a Christian-Muslim 

dialogue throughout the country, especially between southern Christians and northern 

Muslims. These interfaith efforts can help normalize relations in a peaceful Sudan so that 

mutual trust and confidence between the religious communities can grow. 

Conference Lessons Learned

Several important lessons emerged during the discussions. The exchange was cordial in large 

part because all the participants were African, including the Muslims. The Arab-African divide 

that differentiates so many Christians and Muslims in Sudan was not a factor. When racial 

differences reinforce religious differences and the racial factor is introduced, the level of 

suspicion and hostility increases significantly. Many participants, particularly Christians from 

the North, asserted that because of racial prejudice, Arab Muslims are unwilling to reconcile 

with Christians. Although they may convey the appearance of openness to change, this is only 

a tactical maneuver. Christians contended the Muslims revert to their belief in their own superiority when their position is stronger. Illumination of the racial factor occurred in part because 

Muslims and Christians from Uganda, all of whom are African, participated in the conference. 

As the racial factor is not present in Uganda, interfaith relations are much warmer than in 

Sudan. The following are additional outcomes of the conference. 
28 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

n	 The participants identified values that the two faiths share, which can contribute to unity 

and peace. The values emphasized neighborly coexistence, justice, family, peace, and 

respect for the other. 

n	 Both religious groups expressed great concern about foreign religious organizations 

attempting to convert new adherents. Both conservative Muslim and Christian organizations use humanitarian assistance as a cover for their efforts to convert. Participants concluded that the government should regulate such international religious organizations. 

Their activities should be confined to humanitarian assistance. Proselytizing should be 

reserved to Sudanese religious organizations. 

n	 It became evident that the two sponsoring organizations, the New Sudan Council of 

Churches and the New Sudan Islamic Council, did not have the same institutional capacity. 

NSCC has a longer history and a much stronger institutional base. In turn, it tended to 

dominate the discussion. There was an acknowledgment that NSIC needed help to build 

itself into a stronger institution so that these two organizations are effective partners in the 

future. To do so, NSCC subsequently has worked with NSIC. 

Conclusion

Religion touches upon the deepest levels of identity. It can mobilize people for war, but also 

for lasting peace. Mohammed Abu-Nimer,10 professor at American University, views spirituality as the most powerful feature of interfaith engagement because it can change deeply 

embedded attitudes and beliefs. Through this new information, minds can be changed. 

Interfaith exchanges facilitate developing safe and trusting relationships, and can change 

emotions as well. Working together on concrete tasks can reinforce positive attitudinal 

change. Change of head and heart reinforces reconciliation, a process that brings healing to 

wounded spirits. This uplifts people to realize their potential, and in turn, it contributes toward 

nation building, which Sudan needs now more than ever.
Peacemaking through Interreligious 

Dialogue in Macedonia

by Paul Mojzes

Macedonia has a critical need for institutional arrangements that permit greater interreligious 

dialogue and collaboration to address the tensions that plague Macedonia’s fragmented 

society. Throughout the centuries, religious differences tended to be seen to cause conflict in 

the Balkans despite the population being religiously intermingled. During times of reduced 

conflict, religiously diverse people lived next to each other, but not with each other. As ethnoreligious groups gained or lost ascendancy, those in power sought to control the other 

groups, especially those whom they considered to have been culprits in previous oppressions. 

This led to increased conflict, which culminated during the two Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913 

when mutual genocides were the order of the day in the southeastern part of the Balkan 

Peninsula.11

The Tito regime’s religious policy treated all religious groups fairly equally, namely equally 

controlled and oppressed. From the late 1950s onward, the government favored the autonomy 

of the Macedonian Orthodox from the Serbian Orthodox Church in order to strengthen the 

sense of Slavic Macedonian statehood and loyalty to Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia disintegrated 

in the 1990s, amidst a conflagration that sometimes took genocidal dimensions, Macedonia 

was the only former federal state that extricated itself without violence. The Macedonians 

were jubilant at obtaining independence—peacefully. Some considered Macedonia as a 

model of successful coexistence of diverse inhabitants.

Macedonia’s interfaith relations, however, were not as good as they seemed. Both external 

and internal developments seriously undermined this apparent tranquility. The 1998–99 

Kosovo crisis posed an external threat to Macedonia. As the conflict between the Kosovar 

Albanians and Serbs worsened, so did its impact on the relationship between the Slavic majority Macedonians (65 percent of the population) and the sizeable ethnic Albanian minority 

(25–30 percent). The ethnic Albanians naturally sided with their compatriots in Kosovo, of 

whom many were blood or clan related. The Macedonian Slavs, however, viewed the Albanian 

uprising a threat to their own independent statehood, as they feared an attempt to create a 

“greater Albania.” The government of Macedonia still permitted North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) troops to use Macedonia as a staging ground for entry into Kosovo 

during the NATO attack against Serbia, and it permitted entry to hundreds of thousands 

Kosovar Albanian refugees during this 78-day war. Many Macedonians, however, were not 

sympathetic to either decision, and while they cooperated with the humanitarian support, 

they demonstrated against the access given to NATO forces.

7 29
30 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

The radical change in Kosovo severely discombobulated Macedonia. Even when most 

Albanians returned to Kosovo, many stayed permanently in Macedonia. The border between 

Macedonia and Kosovo was porous, and armed groups from Kosovo crossed back and forth 

easily. The successful bid for Albanian control of Kosovo increased the appetite for a similar 

autonomy in Macedonia, with the more militant groups actually engaging in military action 

against police and the ill-equipped and poorly trained Macedonian army. Once the country 

was facing a civil war, there was an increase of UN peacekeepers. 

Internally, the conflict between Macedonians and Albanians increased. Macedonians felt that 

they had given the Albanians all the minority rights due to them, especially in their terms of 

Macedonia being a state of Macedonian people. The two Albanian ethnic parties and some 

even more radical elements among Albanians of Macedonia sought to change the constitutional system to make Macedonia a pluralist country of equal rights, claiming that the 

Macedonians subjugated them. These efforts brought them EU and U.S. mediation, but many 

Macedonians saw this as a transparent effort to partition Macedonia like Serbia. By 2002, the 

country was in an uproar with many wondering if it could survive and stop its neighbors, who 

had ancient claims against them, from partitioning their country. The situation in the country 

became very polarized. Violence flared, some of it with explicitly religious overtones, such as 

with the destruction of both Orthodox and Islamic places of worship. Lives were lost, and 

even the capital of the country, Skopje, was threatened with terrorist attacks. By the summer 

of 2001, the city looked like a military camp, and the question was whether the crisis would 

escalate into a full-fledged civil war or eventually de-escalate the confrontation.

Tensions did escalate, and President Boris Trajkovski sought to engage the religious communities of the country to assist in peacemaking, rather than contribute to the tensions. Being an 

Evangelical Methodist, as a part of the United Methodists in Europe, President Trajkovski had 

heard about interreligious dialogue during his previous trips abroad, and he thought introducing this approach would help diminish the tensions.

Trajkovski contacted the author asking if the International Scholars’ Jewish-Christian-Muslim 

Trialogues would convene a meeting in Skopje. He knew the practice of interreligious dialogue 

was unknown in Macedonia, but he thought it may prove to be practically useful as one of 

the steps in preventing a civil war. The representatives of the major religious communities of 

Macedonia were in contact with one another, but only in the form of “protocol ecumenism,” 

such as showing personal courtesies at special occasions despite mutual suspicions and barely 

covered intolerance. No real dialogue or cooperation took place.

The World Council for Religions and Peace (WCRP), headquartered in New York, had become 

active in the Balkans during the wars of the 1990s. They were able to facilitate closer cooperation between the religious leaders in communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. 

They also sensed the ominous threat in Macedonia; thus, they attempted to generate interest 

in creating an interreligious council among the religious community leaders of Macedonia.12

One of the steps they undertook was to bring from Sarajevo members of the Interreligious 

Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to promote the idea. However, Macedonian reli-
Peacemaking through Interreligious Dialogue in Macedonia 31

gious leaders shied away from this process, as some felt it seemed too public and too rapid. 

Nevertheless, WCRP maintained contact with all the religious leaders through a Balkan field 

representative.

The Council of European Churches undertook the next step, also with Trajkovski’s prodding. 

Representatives of the five religious communities were invited to Geneva in May 2001. Under 

the thoughtful leadership of Archbishop Anastasios (Yanoulatos) of Tirana, Albania, they 

signed a Joint Communiqué in which they called for peaceful settlement of the conflict and 

for free access to drinking water, interestingly. That may appear to be a strange ingredient in 

such a document, but the Albanian terrorists specifically had threatened to poison the Skopje 

drinking water supply; hence making this an important concern.

Earlier that spring, President Trajkovski visited the United States and had been invited to make 

a presentation at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). At that meeting, he urged USIP 

to assist in promoting interreligious dialogue as a means of peacebuilding in Macedonia. He 

identified Paul Mojzes and the Institute for Interreligious, Intercultural Dialogue (IIID) as facilitators of such a process. Paul Mojzes and Leonard Swidler took two exploratory trips to Skopje 

in 2001 to explore the significance and feasibility of this process. Each time, they met with 

President Trajkovski and the heads of the five religious communities, which resulted in a USIPfunded contract to assist this process. Other donors provided additional funds, most significantly a matching grant by the Fund for an Open Society, which made it possible to proceed.

Since the collapse of socialism and the establishment of an independent Republic of 

Macedonia, religion had become an increasingly important social factor. This was particularly 

true of the two major religious communities. Slavic Macedonians regarded the Orthodox 

Church as a symbol of their nationhood, which they saw threatened by Albanian insurrectionists. The Albanian population was predominantly Muslim and frequently expressed itself by 

means of Islamic traditions.

Religious leaders of the other three communities, Jewish, Catholic, and Methodist, were willing to be buffers between these two major communities in conflict. It was one way for them 

to assert their own social relevance despite being small minorities. All religious leaders shared 

the cultural characteristic of being cautious about consenting to formally enter into anything 

more than casual contacts. None ruled out dialogue, but found frequent reasons to postpone 

meetings. At the separate meetings with us, they willingly shared their grievances about the 

others. However, they were not eager to do so face-to-face and had difficulties agreeing on 

whose turf joint meetings were to be held.

Our approach was that, as outsiders, we (IIID) were not going to be patronizing or tell them 

what to do, but we could model the interreligious possibilities. We did so by almost always 

bringing to Macedonia team members who corresponded to the same make-up as the five 

Macedonian religious groups, and beginning with a “big bang,” namely organizing a major 

international Jewish-Christian-Muslim Trialogue conference in continuity with previous conferences organized by the Interreligious Annual Scholarly Trialogues (ISAT) and IIID.13 The hope 
32 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

was that the presence of very distinguished international scholars and religious leaders would 

stimulate participation by Macedonian religious leaders and scholars. We also encouraged 

them to propose a topic for the conference and to organize a preparatory committee.

The conference took place in Skopje, May 10–14, 2002. The Macedonian Preparatory Com­mittee suggested the topic “Confidence Building among Churches and Religious Com­munities in 

Macedonia Through Interreligious Dialogue.” The participants included over 40 international 

scholars from many countries, 50 Macedonian participants, and about 100 observers. At the 

festive, first session, President Trajkovski and five communities’ religious leaders greeted the 

participants, and did the same at the closing session. Most of the sessions took place at a 

hotel, but two sessions took place spontaneously at the Orthodox Theological School and the 

School of Islamic Sciences. Significant negotiations occurred when the head of the Macedonian 

Orthodox Church, Archbishop Stefan, and the head of the Islamic Community, Reis-ul-Ulema 

Arif Emini, both accepted three suggestions the conference participants offered:

1) a Council for Interreligious Cooperation should be established and consist of representatives of the five religious communities; 

2) the heads of the religious communities, especially the Archbishop and the Reis, should 

meet several times per year to deal with issues affecting the well-being of their communities; and 

3) the two religious schools should conduct lecture exchanges to teach about each other’s 

communities. 

The conference issued a joint communiqué and convened a large press conference, which the 

media noted. 

Subsequently, the major papers delivered at this significant conference were published in 

English in Philadelphia and in Macedonian and Albanian in Skopje.14 IIID has pledged itself to 

continue to promote the process that it helped begin. For that purpose, IIID subsequently 

visited Macedonia five times in November 2002, August 2003, October 2004, and May and 

October 2005.15 The trip in August of 2003 was connected with a large international conference titled, “Dialogue of Civilizations,” held in Ohrid, Macedonia. President Trajkovski organized the conference in cooperation with the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 

Organization, at which eight heads of state,16 many international dignitaries, as well as culture 

and religion representatives participated. The participants stressed the significance of the 

dialogical approach for the security and progress in southeast central Europe that had recently 

been the place of bloody wars.

During the other three trips, smaller groups of international scholars (Jewish, Orthodox, 

Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim) conducted numerous meetings. They convened separate and 

joint meetings with representatives of the religious communities, lectures at the Orthodox and 

Islamic faculties for fairly large groups of students and faculty, as well as meetings with the 

new President of Macedonia, Branko Crvenkovski,17 who, on his own part convened a meeting 

of all religious leaders of Macedonia in Ohrid in order to encourage them to meet regularly. 
Peacemaking through Interreligious Dialogue in Macedonia 33

The May 2002 trip realized all three of the conference recommendations that Archbishop 

Stefan and Reis-ul-Ulema Emini accepted. Archbishop Stefan and Reis-ul-Ulema Emini convened meetings which they expanded in October 2004, another in the spring of 2005 to 

include their close collaborators and President Crvenkovski. There is a realistic expectation that 

these meetings will continue. Meetings of the Council for Interreligious Cooperation are taking 

place sporadically. Considerable progress has been made with student exchanges regarding 

lecturers and visits between their theological schools and places of worship (Orthodox and 

Islamic).18

The two deans of the theological schools, Dr. Jovan Takovski from the Orthodox Theological 

School and Dr. Ismail Bardhi from the School for Islamic Sciences, made some joint appearances on television and radio, and lectured at each other’s institutions. The two theological 

schools received funding to promote their interactions, particularly from the Danish and 

Norwegian Church Aid organizations.19 As outcomes of this aid, the Orthodox and Muslim 

professors provided students with joint lectures to promote interreligious dialogue as well as 

conferences with religious scholars from Norway (in Kotor, May 2004) and Denmark (in 

Skopje, September 2004).20 This aid also funded an interreligious information office with a 

small library, centrally located in Skopje and briefly in operation since July 2004.21 Training in 

accounting and office skills for employees of the five religious communities and a summer 

interreligious youth camp have also taken place. As mentioned, prominent international scholars, mostly from the United States, who traveled to Skopje on behalf of IIID, contributed challenging lectures at the two schools as well as in other cultural centers and the media. Other 

scholars, such as David Steele of the Conflict Management Group, continued to work for 

peace in Macedonia. In order to provide exposure to an international Jewish-Christian-Muslim 

trialogue devoted to confidence building, the Orthodox and Muslim representatives to the 

Council for Interreligious Cooperation, Ratomir Grozdanoski and Ismail Bardhi, participated in 

a scholars conference in Philadelphia in March 2005, and presented papers on religious contributions to peacemaking in Macedonia.22

The Council of Interreligious Cooperation, however, is making slow progress. Except for the 

Macedonian Orthodox Church, initially all of the churches and religious communities formally 

sent a letter to each other assigning their official consent and naming their representative to 

the Council. The Macedonian Orthodox Church did not do so formally, but, informally, the 

Secretary of the Holy Synod, Professor Ratomir Grozdanoski, attended all of the meetings and 

was formally named as the representative. There is an impression that the conflict between 

the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church over Macedonian assertion of autocephaly seems to divert church’s attention away from other issues. The Macedonian 

Orthodox Church was also embittered that the negotiations to end the insurrection made that 

church equal to other religious communities in the Constitution—a departure from its privileged status in the previous constitution. This may be another reason why the Macedonian 

Orthodox Church is less inclined to cooperate. 

The other religious communities also lack sufficient initiative to work together. Individually, the 

representatives of religious communities accepted to work with each other with the support 
34 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

of additional USIP funding, but the pace of their collaboration was distinctly slower than outsiders may wish. However, a marked change occurred in 2005 when the members of the 

Council for Interreligious Cooperation started working together in earnest due to grasping 

that it is in their enlightened self-interest. As the government proposed a draft law on religious communities the Council worked intensively to critique the law. It gave them selfconfidence, earned them praise from their religious superiors, and more respectful attention 

by the government. This may be a turning point toward greater mutual cooperation. In the 

meantime, Macedonia has backed off from the verge of civil war, mostly due to the political 

leadership of the late President Trajkovski, his successor President Crvenkovski, and the 

Macedonian Parliament, as well as with the help of diplomatic representatives of the international community, especially the United States and the European Union. One can only hope 

that the slow pace of cooperation will suffice to keep up with the potential volatile relationships between Macedonians and Albanians. 
Conclusion

The preceding sections provide seven cases from six different countries spanning the Middle 

East, Africa, the Balkans, and Asia. Each conflict situation and each intervention had its unique 

characteristics, determined by history, culture, societal structure, as well as the particular orientations of the religious peacemakers.

Despite these significant differences, some overarching lessons can be drawn. These lessons 

are not necessarily generalizations applicable to all the cases, but they apply to two or more 

of the cases. These lessons are worth exploring and highlighting because of their likely relevance to other conflict situations, particularly religiously based conflict.

Generally, these cases do not tell stories of dramatically successful peacemaking—

with the exception of the Yelwa-Nshar case in Nigeria. Many of the projects are still in 

process and may ultimately lead to conflict resolution. Like most religious peacemaking, however, these projects make modest contributions to peace while not changing the course of 

history. As all other kinds of peacemaking, those initiating faith-based peacemaking should 

approach their tasks with modest expectations, particularly in situations of intractable conflict. This leaves open the possibility that there may be a dramatic contribution to peace, but 

this should not be the measure of whether the project is worthwhile. Improving relations 

among significant segments of religious communities in conflict is certainly a worthy goal, 

even when this does not end violent conflict.

All these cases demonstrate that without credible local partners, no international 

actor has a chance of making much of a contribution to conflict resolution. This is 

certainly the case in Nigeria and Sudan. In such cases as Kashmir, Israel/Palestine, Iraq, and 

Macedonia, a major purpose of the international intervention has been to facilitate the 

creation of a local partner that can sustain the process and give it local roots. If there is no 

pre-existing local partner, the purpose of international intervention should focus on helping 

create such a partner.

A corollary of this lesson is the recognition that no cookie-cutter approach will 

work. Local institutions must provide guidance on the most effective methodologies. As I 

watched Pastor Wuye and Imam Ashafa successfully mediate the bloody conflict in YelwaNshar, I marveled at how they successfully integrated and modified Western conflict resolution methodology with religious exhortation and local custom. Similarly, the Wunlit peace 

process in Sudan used local traditions very effectively. Nevertheless, some conditions can

favor transferring particular methodological tools from one location to another. For example, 

the Alexandria Declaration for Israel/Palestine served as a model for the Kaduna Declaration 

to promote religious peace in Kaduna, Nigeria. The Interreligious Council in Bosnia served as 

a model for the creation of a Council for Interreligious Cooperation in Macedonia. 

 35
36 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

It is critical to link faith-based peacemaking to secular and political processes and 

authorities. Faith-based peacemaking independent of this cross-sector collaboration almost 

never creates peace. Even in the most dramatic case of faith-based peacemaking, that of 

Sant’Egidio in Mozambique, the religious peacemakers only succeed by engaging the United 

Nations and the governments of Italy and the United States as partners. The Alexandria 

process is poised to serve as a parallel religious peace process for the Arab-Israeli conflict, 

recognizing that political leaders will direct the principal negotiations. The peace agreement 

mediated by the Inter Faith Mediation Center in Yelwa-Nshar had to be coordinated with the 

governor of Plateau State who had to sanction the agreement reached. The same holds in 

Kashmir, Iraq, Sudan, and Macedonia. The Wunlit process may have been an exception to this, 

but only because there was no existing, effective government structures in southern Sudan at 

the time.

Given the necessity of a faith-based/secular partnership, peacemaking can be particularly effective when some key persons hold both secular and religious authority.

Rabbi Michael Melchior is both a prominent rabbi (formerly chief Rabbi of Denmark) and a 

member of the Israeli Cabinet, the Knesset. He was deputy foreign minister in the Israeli government at the time of the Alexandria Declaration. He effectively utilized both his religious 

and secular roles to orchestrate the Alexandria process. Similarly Sheikh Tal El Sadr was both 

a member of the cabinet of the Palestinian Authority and one of the most prominent religious 

leaders in Palestine. He was instrumental in obtaining Yasser Arafat’s support for the 

Alexandria process. The Iraqi Institute of Peace has a governing board that combines both 

religious and secular authorities. The late President Boris Trajkovski of Macedonia, who initiated the interfaith work described in the Macedonia chapter, was a devout Methodist, recognized both for his religious commitment and his political skills and authority.

Faith-based institutions can engage in some of the most pressing conflict issues.

Participants in the Alexandria process are primed to play an indispensable role in an ArabIsraeli peace process if secular authorities initiate such a process. The Iraqi Institute of Peace’s 

(IIP) combination of religious and secular authority continues to help legitimate its engagement with some of Iraq’s toughest and most sensitive transitional issues. When Sunnis 

planned to boycott the elections in early 2005, IIP reached out to religious and tribal authorities in the Sunni community to encourage greater electoral participation. It also helped bring 

Sunni leadership into the constitution-writing process. 

The Iraq case points out the nervousness of Western governments to engage with religious 

institutions and faith-based peacemaking. The cases presented here, however, demonstrate 

the close interrelationship between secular and religious institutions, and between secular and 

religious peacemaking. This suggests that Western governments need to be more open

and more sophisticated in their interactions with religious institutions in countries 

where religion is a significant source of conflict.

Several of the cases reveal international actors’ salutary contributions in facilitating faithbased peacemaking. The Sudan case, however, highlights a reality that is probably true for 
Conclusion 37

many other countries: international religious institutions can exacerbate conflict.

When foreign religious organizations engage in aggressive proselytizing in religiously polarized countries, they can do serious damage. This is true of both Christian and Muslim organizations. The participants in the Sudan interfaith dialogue advocated that proselytizing should 

be reserved to local religious organizations, and international religious organizations should 

be confined to providing humanitarian assistance.

All of these cases illuminate how complications arise when religious divisions overlap with and reinforce ethnic or racial divisions. This holds for Kashmir, Israel/Palestine, 

Nigeria, Sudan, and Macedonia. As salient in the Sudan experience, Muslim-Christian relations 

can be much smoother in other countries, such as Uganda. This is partly because racial tensions underlie much of the conflict between Christians and Muslims in Sudan; whereas, no 

racial distinctions exist between Muslims and Christians in Uganda. In addition to racial/ethnic 

factors, economic disparities also exacerbate religious differences. Overall, issues confronted 

in religious peacemaking are diverse and complicated.

Sometimes it is more productive for religious leaders to consider emotionally divisive

issues than for them to be debated in secular/political contexts. This is particularly true 

in contexts where governmental and religious authorities overlap. When two communities 

share a faith commitment, even when the commitment is to different faiths, issues can be 

discussed that might be off limits in secular/political debate. We see evidence of this in some 

of the cases described.

In some situations, it is more productive to begin dialogical peacemaking by working with faith communities separately prior to bringing them together. In both 

Kashmir and Nigeria, emotions ran too high and the edges were still too sharp to bring the 

two communities together from the outset. Working with a single community separately at 

the beginning can prepare its members for more productive dialogue, as opposed to pushing 

them together without adequate preparation. The sections on Kashmir and Nigeria describe 

the effective techniques of breaking down the fears, misconceptions, and stereotypes that the 

respective groups perceive about each other.

Religious communities are not monoliths and should not be treated as if they are.

Both the Alexandria process and the Macedonian case illustrate the danger of sharp divisions 

opening up within particular faith communities. Frictions within the leadership of the respective Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities in Israel/Palestine interfered with interfaith 

collaboration in the Alexandria process. Divisions within the Macedonian Orthodox hierarchy 

and among Macedonian Muslim leaders slowed progress toward creating a Macedonia 

Council for Interreligious Cooperation, even though the divisions had nothing to do with the 

proposed Council.

Faith-based peacemaking can often be enhanced through the selective use of religious texts and religious exhortation. Remarkably in the Yelwa-Nshar case, the imam and 

the pastor moved freely between the Koran and the Bible, with the imam often quoting the 
38 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

Bible along with the Koran and the pastor quoting the Koran along with the Bible. Their comfort and conversance with the texts of both traditions generated an atmosphere of interreligious tolerance that impressed the participants. The Sudan case also illustrates the central 

role that scripture can play in the peacemaking dialogue. Although greater use could have 

been made of religious rituals than is evident in these cases, the Wunlit experience in Sudan 

effectively utilized both Christian and traditional rituals. Enemies washed each other’s feet and 

a white bull was slaughtered.

The religious environment created by faith-based peacemaking can be conducive to 

expressions of apology, repentance, and forgiveness. This is probably the most distinctive feature of religious peacemaking. Such personal expressions are much less likely to occur 

in secular than in religious contexts, where repentance and forgiveness are explicitly valued. 

All of the cases illustrate this. In the Yelwa-Nshar case, the apology and repentance by the 

leader of the Muslim community constituted a transforming moment in the mediation. As a 

dramatic gesture, it resembled the often-cited trip of Egyptian Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem. 

Such gestures are very powerful, but occur only rarely in peacemaking processes.

Time spent identifying values and virtues that are shared across religious lines can 

contribute to effective peacemaking. Both the case of training youth leaders in Nigeria 

and the interfaith project in Sudan demonstrate the efficacy of this type of personal sharing. 

It was an important revelation to both Christian and Muslim participants in Nigeria to recognize that many values are shared by their two faiths, particularly values that can contribute 

to peacemaking.

All three Abrahamic traditions share a vision of social justice rooted in their faiths 

and theologies. Openness to hearing and responding to the suffering of those on the other 

side should result. This was a powerful force in Kashmir, Alexandria, the Iraqi Institute of 

Peace, and both Nigeria cases.

Effective interfaith collaboration among leaders offers a powerful model for emulation. The fact that the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rabbi Melchoir, and Sheikh Tantawi of 

Al-Azhar Islamic University partnered so effectively in convening the Alexandria meeting 

helped nudge the Israeli and Palestinian participants toward interfaith concord. Pastor Wuye 

and Imam Ashafa collaborate so impressively with each other they serve as a model for interfaith amity to those with whom they work. The initial meeting in Skopje brought together 

forty Jewish, Christian, and Muslims scholars from various parts of the world to work with 

their Macedonian counterparts. The international participants demonstrated to the 

Macedonians what is possible in terms of interfaith partnership.

While the focus of this work has been on interfaith peacebuilding, faith-based 

peacemaking can also be undertaken within a single faith community. In the Wunlit 

process in Sudan, the NSCC orchestrated a peace process between the two largest ethnic 

communities in southern Sudan. The fact that a majority of the participants were Christian 

gave the NSCC particular credibility as a peacemaking agent. 
Conclusion 39

Finally, the most successful faith-based peacemaking occurs when the religious communities in dialogue approach parity in terms of institutional strength. The Alexandria 

process in Israel/Palestine and the interfaith dialogue between NSCC and the New Sudan 

Islamic Council demonstrate the handicap imposed on interfaith dialogue when one of the 

communities is much better resourced and organized than the other. 

The cases included in this volume have both demonstrated the power of faith-based peacemaking and revealed ways in which it can be made more effective. This work is certainly not 

the last word on this topic, but hopefully it has advanced our knowledge of the existing 

resources and future possibilities as we augment our understanding of religious peacemaking 

processes. 

Notes

1. See Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion:

The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 

2003); Christopher Catherwood, Why the Nations Rage: Killing in the Name of God

(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), Oliver McTernan, Violence in God’s Name: Religion

in an Age of Conflict (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2003); Charles Kimball, When Religion

Becomes Evil: Five Warning Signs (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), Mark Juergensmeyer, 

The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: University 

of California Press, 1993), R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion,

Violence, and Reconciliation (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

2. See Douglas Johnston, Trumping Realpolitik: Faith-Based Diplomacy (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2003).

3. See Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique’s War: The Role of Mediation and Good

Offices (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1994). For other cases, see Appleby and 

Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds., Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

4.See Marc Gopin, Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions,

Violence and Peacemaking (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Holy War, Holy

Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2002), Cynthia Sampson and John Paul Lederach, From the Ground Up: Mennonite

Contributions to International Peacebuilding (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 

and Harold Coward and Gordon S. Smith, eds., Religion and Peacebuilding (Albany: State 

University of New York Press, 2004).

5.Douglas Johnston, “The Religious Dimension,” Unpublished paper, n.d., p. 3, based 

upon Johnston, ed. Trumping Realpolitik:Faith-based Diplomacy (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2003).

6.Ibid., p. 4.

7. Gerrie ter Haar, “Religion: Source of Conflict or Resource for Peace?” p. 22 in Gerrie 

ter Haar and James J. Busuttil, editors, Bridge or Barrier: Religions, Violence, and Visions for

Peace (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2004).

8.Ibid., p. 29.

9.Marc Gopin, “World Religions, Violence, and Myths of Peace in International 

Relations” in Haar and Busuttil, Bridge or Barrier: Religions, Violence, and Visions for Peace

(Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2004).

10. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, “The Miracles of Transformation through Interfaith Dialogue: 

Are You a Believer?” in David R. Smock (editor), Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding (U.S. 

Institute of Peace Press, 2002), pp. 15–32. 

 41
42 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking

11. While the term “genocide” was not yet invented the Carnegie Endowment Inquiry 

Report clearly describes countless instances of massacres, most of which were, however, 

not religiously but ethnically based as the nations of the Balkans were attempting to create 

ethnically pure areas so that they could claim them for holding sway over a territory. See 

The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New

Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George F. Kennan (Washington, DC: 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, c. 1993). 

12. The five “historic” religious communities were the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the 

Islamic Community, the Catholic Church, the Evangelical-Methodist Church, and the Jewish 

Community. There are other “free church” communities in Macedonia like the Pentecostals 

and Baptists but they are not included in this process for various internal reasons.

13. ISAT began in the United States in the 1980s followed by conferences in Graz 

(Austria), Jerusalem, and Jakarta (Indonesia).

14. The English version was Interreligious Dialogue Toward Reconciliation in Macedonia

and Bosnia (Philadelphia, PA: Ecumenical Press, 2003) and concurrently as a special number 

of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies, Vol. XXXIX, Nos. 1–2 (Winter-Spring 2002). The title 

of the book in Macedonia was Gradenje doverba pomegu crkvite i verskite zaedici vo

Makedonia preku dialog /Ndertimi i besimit perms dialogut ndermjet kishave dhe bashkesive

fetare ne Maquedoni (Skopje: Ecumenical Press, 2004). Both books were edited by Paul 

Mojzes and Leonard Swidler.

15. The visit was October 11–16, 2004. The team was created to reflect the 

denominational membership of the Council: Dr. Leonard Swidler, Temple University, PA 

(Roman Catholic), Rev. Peter Baktis, U.S. Army Chaplain residing in South Carolina (Eastern 

Orthodox), Dr. Mahmut Aydin, Ondokuz Mayis University, Turkey (Muslim), Dr. Reuven 

Firestone, Hebrew Union College, Los Angeles (Jewish), Dr. James Payton, Redeemer 

College University, Canada (Reformed), and Dr. Paul Mojzes, Rosemont College, PA (United 

Methodist). In May 2005 Reuven Firestone worked with faculty and students of the two 

theological schools and interviewed numerous religious leaders. Mojzes and Swidler held 

meetings in October 2005.

16.Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia (SerbiaMontenegro), and Macedonia.

17. President Trajkovski having tragically died in an airplane crash in March 2004.

18. Reports about these events can be found in the four issues of the “Bulletin for 

Interreligious Cooperation” which has been published in 2004 both Albanian and 

Macedonian languages, published under the auspices of the Macedonian Center for 

International Cooperation.

19. Channeled through the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, an NGO. 

Among the concrete results were the publications of attractive interreligious calendars, 

address books with a variety of data on 23 officially registered religious communities.

20. Prof. Aco Girevski, for instance, delivered a paper, “Pastoral View on Christianity and 

Islam.” Some participants pointed out that religion can be manipulated for the escalation 

of conflicts but that religious leaders can exert political influence upon the people and 
therefore various models of interreligious dialogue need to be explored. See Mile A. Risteski, 

“Potrebna e sorabotka megu verskite zaednici [Cooperation is needed between religious 

communities] in Formula 1 in http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/pecati.as?VestD=37126.

21. This office and library were short-lived and have since been closed.

22.At a session entitled “At a Fork in the Road: Prevention or Disaster” Prof. Grozdanoski’s 

presented a paper, “Faith: Source of Peace or Cause for Unrest” while Prof. Bardhi’s paper 

was entitled, “Dialogue is the Only Way to Prevent Disaster.”

Notes 43
About the Contributors

Imam Muhammad Nurayn Ashafa is codirector of the Inter Faith Mediation Centre in Kaduna, 

Nigeria and coauthor of The Pastor and the Imam: Responding to Conflict (1999) with Pastor 

James Movel Wuye.

Brian Cox is senior vice president and Kashmir project leader of the International Center for 

Religion and Diplomacy in Washington, D.C., www.icrd.org.

Emmanuel LoWilla is executive director of Reconcile in Kampala, Uganda, an organization 

affiliated with the New Sudan Council of Churches.

Paul Mojzes is professor and former dean at Rosemont College in Pennsylvania.

Pastor James Movel Wuye is codirector of the Inter Faith Mediation Centre in Kaduna, Nigeria 

and coauthor of The Pastor and the Imam: Responding to Conflict (1999) with Imam 

Muhammad Nurayn Ashafa.

Daniel Philpott is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and the Joan 

B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, and is chair 

of the Task Force on Faith-based Diplomacy at the Council on Faith and International Affairs, 

www.cfia.org.

David R. Smock is the director of the United States Institute of Peace Religion and Peacemaking 

Initiative. Previously he served as director of the Institute’s Grant Program and coordinator of 

Africa activities. He is editor of Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding (2002).

44 Religious Contributions to Peacemaking
About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent nonpartisan national institution established and 

funded by Congress. Our mission is to help prevent, manage, and resolve violent conflicts by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by our direct involvement in peacebuilding 

efforts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, 

including research grants, fellowships, professional training, education programs from high school 

through graduate school, conferences and workshops, library services, and publications. The Institute’s 

Board of Directors is appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. 

María Otero (Vice Chair), President, ACCION International, Boston, Mass. 

Betty F. Bumpers, Founder and former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C. 

Holly J. Burkhalter, Director of U.S. Policy, Physicians for Human Rights, Washington, D.C. 

Chester A. Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service, 

Georgetown University 

Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. 

Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. 

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University 

Mora l. McLean, President, Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y. 

Barbara W. Snelling, former State Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt.

Members ex officio

Michael M. Dunn, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University

Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

About the Institute 45

Other Titles in the Peaceworks Series

n	 Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program: A Practicable, Verifiable Plan of

Action, by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein

n	 Downward Spiral: HIV/AIDS, State Capacity, and Political Conflict in Zimbabwe,

by Andrew T. Price-Smith and John L. Daly (No. 53, July 2004)

n	 Biosecurity: Limiting Terrorist Access to Deadly Pathogens, by Jonathan B. Tucker (No. 52, 

November 2003) 

n	 Healing the Holy Land: Interreligious Peacebuilding in Israel/Palestine, by Yehezkel Landau 

(No. 51, August 2003) 

n	 Boundary Disputes in Latin America, by Jorge I. Domínguez with David Mares, Manuel 

Orozco, David Scott Palmer, Francisco Rojas Aravena, and Andrés Serbin (No. 50, August 

2003)

n	 The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for

Postwar Iraq, by Ray Salvatore Jennings (No. 49, May 2003)

n	 The Palestinian Reform Agenda, by Nathan Brown (No. 48, December 2002)

n	 The Israeli Military and Israel’s Palestinian Policy: From Oslo to the Al Aqsa Intifada,

by Yoram Peri (No. 47, November 2002)

n	 The Chaplain’s Evolving Role in Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations, by Captain 

Paul McLaughlin (No. 46, September 2002) 

n	 The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, by C. A. J. Coady (No. 45, July 2002) 

n	 Democratic Values, Political Structures, and Alternative Politics in Greater China,

by David Zweig (No. 44, June 2002) 

n	 Training for Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations: Advancing Best Practices,

by Robert M. Schoenhaus (No. 43, April 2002) 

n	 The Role of International Financial Institutions in International Humanitarian Law,

by Laurie R. Blank (No. 42, January 2002) 

n	 Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Projects,

edited by Deepa M. Ollapally (No. 41, September 2001) 

n	 Passing the Baton: Challenges of Statecraft for the New Administration, with remarks 

by Samuel R. Berger and Condoleezza Rice (No. 40, May 2001) 

n	 From Revolutionary Internationalism to Conservative Nationalism: The Chinese Military’s

Discourse on National Security and Identity in the Post-Mao Era, by Nan Li (No. 39, 

May 2001) 

n	 El Salvador: Implementation of the Peace Accords, edited by Margarita S. Studemeister 

(No. 38, January 2001) 

n	 The News Media and Peace Processes: The Middle East and Northern Ireland,

by Gadi Wolfsfeld (No. 37, January 2001) 

n	 Conflict Management Training: Advancing Best Practices, by Robert M. Schoenhaus 

(No. 36, January 2001) 

n	 Coercive Prevention: Normative, Political, and Policy Dilemmas, by Bruce W. Jentleson 

(No. 35, October 2000) 

n	 Women in War and Peace: Grassroots Peacebuilding, by Donna Ramsey Marshall (No. 34, 

August 2000) 
Of Related Interest

A number of other publications from the United States Institute of Peace examine issues 

related to interreligious dialogue.

Recent Institute reports include:

n	 Teaching about the Religious Other (Special Report 143, July 2005)

n What Works? Evaluating Interfaith Dialogue Programs (Special Report 123, July 2004)

n	 Healing the Holy Land: Interreligious Peacebuilding in Israel/Palestine, by Yehezkel Landau 

(Peaceworks, August 2003)

n	 The Chaplain’s Evolving Role in Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations, by Paul 

McLaughlin (Peaceworks, July 2002)

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write to: United States Institute of 

Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; call: 202.429.3832, 

fax: 202.429.6063, or e-mail: usip_requests@usip.org.

Recent books from USIP Press include:

n	 Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding, by David R. Smock (2002)

n	 Religious Perspectives on War: Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Attitudes toward Force

(Revised Edition), by David R. Smock (2002)

n	 Perspectives on Pacifism: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Views, by David R. Smock (1995)

For book sales and order information, call 800.868.8064 (U.S. toll-free only) or 

703.661.1590 or fax 703.661.1501.

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