I 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4178 

To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United States by ensuring 

the safety, security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 8, 2012 

Mr. TURNER of Ohio (for himself, Mr. BROOKS, Mr. LAMBORN, Mr. FRANKS

of Arizona, Mr. FORBES, Mr. FLEMING, Mr. REHBERG, and Mr. MILLER

of Florida) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 

each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United 

States by ensuring the safety, security, reliability, and 

credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘Maintaining the President’s Commitment to Our Nuclear 

6 Deterrent and National Security Act of 2012’’. 


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1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

2 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 

Sec. 3. Commitments for nuclear weapons stockpile modernization. 

Sec. 4. Limitation and report in the event of insufficient funding for modernization of nuclear weapons stockpile. 

Sec. 5. Progress of modernization. 

Sec. 6. Limitation on strategic delivery system reductions. 

Sec. 7. Prevention of asymmetry of nuclear weapon stockpile reductions. 

Sec. 8. Consideration of expansion of nuclear forces of other countries. 

Sec. 9. Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility and 

Uranium Processing Facility. 

Sec. 10. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United 

States. 

Sec. 11. Nonstrategic nuclear weapon reductions and extended deterrence policy. 

3 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

4 In this Act: 

5 (1) The term ‘‘congressional defense commit6 tees’’ has the meaning given that term in section 

7 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code. 

8 (2) The term ‘‘New START Treaty’’ means the 

9 Treaty between the United States of America and 

10 the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 

11 Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 

12 Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into 

13 force on February 5, 2011. 

14 SEC. 3. COMMITMENTS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCK15 PILE MODERNIZATION. 

16 Congress finds the following: 

17 (1) In 2008, then Secretary of Defense Robert 

18 Gates warned that ‘‘to be blunt, there is absolutely 


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1 no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and re2 duce the number of weapons in our stockpile without 

3 either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing 

4 a modernization program.’’. 

5 (2) Secretary Gates also warned in September 

6 2009 that modernization is a prerequisite to nuclear 

7 force reductions, stating that modernizing the nu8 clear capability of the United States is an ‘‘enabler 

9 of arms control and our ability to reduce the size of 

10 our nuclear stockpile. When we have more con11 fidence in the long-term viability of our weapons sys12 tems, then our ability to reduce the number of weap13 ons we must keep in the stockpile is enhanced.’’. 

14 (3) President Obama’s 2010 Nuclear Posture 

15 Review stated that— 

16 (A) ‘‘In order to sustain a safe, secure, 

17 and effective U.S. nuclear stockpile as long as 

18 nuclear weapons exist, the United States must 

19 possess a modern physical infrastructure—com20 prised of the national security laboratories and 

21 a complex of supporting facilities.’’; and 

22 (B) ‘‘[I]mplementation of the Stockpile 

23 Stewardship Program and the nuclear infra24 structure investments recommended in the NPR 

25 will allow the United States to shift away from 


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1 retaining large numbers of non-deployed war2 heads as a hedge against technical or geo3 political surprise, allowing major reductions in 

4 the nuclear stockpile. These investments are es5 sential to facilitating reductions while sus6 taining deterrence under New START and be7 yond.’’. 

8 (4) Section 1251 of the National Defense Au9 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 

10 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) required the President to 

11 submit a report to Congress on the plan for the nu12 clear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, 

13 and delivery platforms at the time a follow-on treaty 

14 to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was sub15 mitted by the President to the Senate. The Presi16 dent submitted such report in May 2010 and sub17 mitted updates in November 2010 and February 

18 2011. 

19 (5) Such section 1251 also contained a sense of 

20 Congress that ‘‘the enhanced safety, security, and 

21 reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, mod22 ernization of the nuclear weapons complex, and 

23 maintenance of nuclear delivery systems are key to 

24 enabling further reductions in the nuclear forces of 

25 the United States.’’. 


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1 (6) Forty-one Senators wrote to President 

2 Obama on December 15, 2009, stating, ‘‘we don’t 

3 believe further reductions can be in the national se4 curity interest of the U.S. in the absence of a sig5 nificant program to modernize our nuclear deter6 rent.’’. 

7 (7) Former Secretary of Defense and Secretary 

8 of Energy James Schlesinger stated, while testifying 

9 before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

10 Senate in April 2010, ‘‘I believe that it is immensely 

11 important for the Senate to ensure, what the Admin12 istration has stated as its intent, i.e., that there be 

13 a robust plan with a continuation of its support over 

14 the full 10 years, before it proceeds to ratify this 

15 START follow-on treaty.’’. 

16 (8) Former Secretary of State James Baker 

17 stated in testimony before the Committee on Foreign 

18 Relations of the Senate in May 2010 that ‘‘because 

19 our security is based upon the safety and reliability 

20 of our nuclear weapons, it is important that our 

21 Government budget enough money to guarantee that 

22 those weapons can carry out their mission.’’. 

23 (9) Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 

24 also stated in May 2010 while testifying before the 

25 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that 


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1 ‘‘as part of a number of recommendations, my col2 leagues, Bill Perry, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and 

3 I have called for significant investments in a re4 paired and modernized nuclear weapons infrastruc5 ture and added resources for the three national lab6 oratories.’’. 

7 (10) Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 

8 while testifying before the Committee on Armed 

9 Services of the Senate in June 2010, stated, ‘‘I see 

10 this treaty as a vehicle to finally be able to get what 

11 we need in the way of modernization that we have 

12 been unable to get otherwise. . . . We are essentially 

13 the only nuclear power in the world that is not car14 rying out these kinds of modernization programs.’’. 

15 (11) Secretary Gates further stated that ‘‘I’ve 

16 been up here for the last four springs trying to get 

17 money for this and this is the first time I think I’ve 

18 got a fair shot of actually getting money for our nu19 clear arsenal.’’. 

20 (12) The Directors of the national nuclear 

21 weapons laboratories wrote to the chairman and 

22 ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Rela23 tions of the Senate in December 2010 that ‘‘We are 

24 very pleased by the update to the Section 1251 Re25 port, as it would enable the laboratories to execute 


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1 our requirements for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable 

2 and effective stockpile under the Stockpile Steward3 ship and Management Plan. In particular, we are 

4 pleased because it clearly responds to many of the 

5 concerns that we and others have voiced in the past 

6 about potential future-year funding shortfalls, and it 

7 substantially reduces risks to the overall program. In 

8 summary, we believe that the proposed budgets pro9 vide adequate support to sustain the safety, security, 

10 reliability and effectiveness of America’s nuclear de11 terrent within the limit of 1,550 deployed strategic 

12 warheads established by the New START Treaty 

13 with adequate confidence and acceptable risk.’’. 

14 (13) President Obama pledged, in a December 

15 2010 letter to several Senators, ‘‘I recognize that 

16 nuclear modernization requires investment for the 

17 long-term. . . . That is my commitment to the Con18 gress—that my Administration will pursue these 

19 programs and capabilities for as long as I am Presi20 dent.’’. 

21 (14) Secretary Gates added in May 2011 that, 

22 ‘‘this modernization program was very carefully 

23 worked out between ourselves and the Department 

24 of Energy; and, frankly, where we came out on that 


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1 played a fairly significant role in the willingness of 

2 the Senate to ratify the New START agreement.’’. 

3 (15) The Administrator for Nuclear Security, 

4 Thomas D’Agostino, testified before Congress in No5 vember 2011 that, ‘‘it is critical to accept the link6 age between modernizing our current stockpile in 

7 order to achieve the policy objective of decreasing 

8 the number of weapons we have in our stockpile, 

9 while still ensuring that the deterrent is safe, secure, 

10 and effective.’’. 

11 SEC. 4. LIMITATION AND REPORT IN THE EVENT OF INSUF12 FICIENT FUNDING FOR MODERNIZATION OF 

13 NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE. 

14 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con15 gress that— 

16 (1) consistent with Condition 9 of the Resolu17 tion of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the 

18 New START Treaty of the Senate, agreed to on De19 cember 22, 2011, the United States is committed to 

20 ensuring the safety, security, reliability, and credi21 bility of its nuclear forces; and 

22 (2) the United States is committed to— 

23 (A) proceeding with a robust stockpile 

24 stewardship program and maintaining and mod25 ernizing nuclear weapons production capabilities 


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1 and capacities of the United States to ensure 

2 the safety, security, reliability, and credibility of 

3 the nuclear arsenal of the United States at the 

4 New START Treaty levels and meeting require5 ments for hedging against possible international 

6 developments or technical problems; 

7 (B) reinvigorating and sustaining the nu8 clear security laboratories of the United States 

9 and preserving the core nuclear weapons com10 petencies therein; and 

11 (C) providing the resources needed to 

12 achieve these objectives, at a minimum at the 

13 levels set forth in the President’s 10-year plan 

14 provided to Congress in November 2010 pursu15 ant to section 1251 of the National Defense 

16 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public 

17 Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549). 

18 (b) INSUFFICIENT FUNDING REPORT AND LIMITA19 TION.— 

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (2) of section 

21 1045(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act 

22 for Fiscal Year 2012 (50 U.S.C. 2523b) is amended 

23 to read as follows: 

24 ‘‘(2) INSUFFICIENT FUNDING.— 


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1 ‘‘(A) REPORT.—During each year in which 

2 the New START Treaty is in force, if the 

3 President determines that an appropriations 

4 Act is enacted that fails to meet the resource 

5 levels set forth in the November 2010 update to 

6 the plan referred to in section 1251 of the Na7 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

8 Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 

9 2549) or if at any time determines that more 

10 resources are required to carry out such plan 

11 than were estimated, the President shall submit 

12 to the appropriate congressional committees, 

13 within 60 days of making such a determination, 

14 a report detailing— 

15 ‘‘(i) a plan to remedy the resource 

16 shortfall; 

17 ‘‘(ii) if more resources are required to 

18 carry out the plan than were estimated— 

19 ‘‘(I) the proposed level of funding 

20 required; and 

21 ‘‘(II) an identification of the 

22 stockpile work, campaign, facility, 

23 site, asset, program, operation, activ24 ity, construction, or project for which 

25 additional funds are required; 


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1 ‘‘(iii) any effects caused by the short2 fall on the safety, security, reliability, or 

3 credibility of the nuclear forces of the 

4 United States; and 

5 ‘‘(iv) whether and why, in light of the 

6 shortfall, remaining a party to the New 

7 START Treaty is in the national interest 

8 of the United States. 

9 ‘‘(B) LIMITATION.—If the President sub10 mits a report under subparagraph (A), none of 

11 the funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or 

12 any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of 

13 Defense or the National Nuclear Security Ad14 ministration may be used to reduce the number 

15 of deployed nuclear warheads until— 

16 ‘‘(i) after the date on which such re17 port is submitted, the President certifies in 

18 writing to the appropriate congressional 

19 committees that the resource shortfall 

20 identified in such report has been ad21 dressed; and 

22 ‘‘(ii) a period of 120 days has elapsed 

23 following the date on which such certifi24 cation is made. 


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1 ‘‘(C) EXCEPTION.—The limitation in sub2 paragraph (B) shall not apply to— 

3 ‘‘(i) reductions made to ensure the 

4 safety, security, reliability, and credibility 

5 of the nuclear weapons stockpile and stra6 tegic delivery systems, including activities 

7 related to surveillance, assessment, certifi8 cation, testing, and maintenance of nuclear 

9 warheads and strategic delivery systems; or 

10 ‘‘(ii) nuclear warheads that are retired 

11 or awaiting dismantlement on the date of 

12 the report under subparagraph (A). 

13 ‘‘(D) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph: 

14 ‘‘(i) The term ‘appropriate congres15 sional committees’ means— 

16 ‘‘(I) the congressional defense 

17 committees; and 

18 ‘‘(II) the Committee on Foreign 

19 Relations of the Senate and the Com20 mittee on Foreign Affairs of the 

21 House of Representatives. 

22 ‘‘(ii) The term ‘New START Treaty’ 

23 means the Treaty between the United 

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1 tion and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 

2 Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and en3 tered into force on February 5, 2011.’’. 

4 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made 

5 by paragraph (1) shall take effect on October 1, 

6 2012. 

7 SEC. 5. PROGRESS OF MODERNIZATION. 

8 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

9 (1) In 2008, then Secretary of Defense Robert 

10 Gates warned that ‘‘to be blunt, there is absolutely 

11 no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and re12 duce the number of weapons in our stockpile without 

13 either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing 

14 a modernization program.’’. 

15 (2) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated 

16 that ‘‘the President has directed a review of post17 New START arms control objectives, to consider fu18 ture reductions in nuclear weapons. Several factors 

19 will influence the magnitude and pace of future re20 ductions in U.S. nuclear forces below New START 

21 levels’’, including— 

22 (A) ‘‘First, any future nuclear reductions 

23 must continue to strengthen deterrence of po24 tential regional adversaries, strategic stability 

25 vis-a`-vis Russia and China, and assurance of 


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1 our allies and partners. This will require an up2 dated assessment of deterrence requirements; 

3 further improvements in U.S., allied, and part4 ner non-nuclear capabilities; focused reductions 

5 in strategic and non-strategic weapons; and 

6 close consultations with allies and partners. The 

7 United States will continue to ensure that, in 

8 the calculations of any potential opponent, the 

9 perceived gains of attacking the United States 

10 or its allies and partners would be far out11 weighed by the unacceptable costs of the re12 sponse.’’; 

13 (B) ‘‘Second, implementation of the Stock14 pile Stewardship Program and the nuclear in15 frastructure investments recommended in the 

16 NPR will allow the United States to shift away 

17 from retaining large numbers of non-deployed 

18 warheads as a hedge against technical or geo19 political surprise, allowing major reductions in 

20 the nuclear stockpile. These investments are es21 sential to facilitating reductions while sus22 taining deterrence under New START and be23 yond.’’; and 

24 (C) ‘‘Third, Russia’s nuclear force will re25 main a significant factor in determining how 


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1 much and how fast we are prepared to reduce 

2 U.S. forces. Because of our improved relations, 

3 the need for strict numerical parity between the 

4 two countries is no longer as compelling as it 

5 was during the Cold War. But large disparities 

6 in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on 

7 both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, 

8 and may not be conducive to maintaining a sta9 ble, long-term strategic relationship, especially 

10 as nuclear forces are significantly reduced. 

11 Therefore, we will place importance on Russia 

12 joining us as we move to lower levels.’’. 

13 (3) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review also stat14 ed that the Administration would ‘‘conduct follow-on 

15 analysis to set goals for future nuclear reductions 

16 below the levels expected in New START, while 

17 strengthening deterrence of potential regional adver18 saries, strategic stability vis-a`-vis Russia and China, 

19 and assurance of our allies and partners.’’. 

20 (4) The Secretary of Defense has warned in 

21 testimony before the Committee on Armed Services 

22 of the House of Representatives regarding the se23 questration mechanism under section 251A of the 

24 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 

25 Act of 1985 that ‘‘if this sequester goes into effect 


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1 and it doubles the number of cuts, then it’ll truly 

2 devastate our national defense, because it will then 

3 require that we have to go at our force structure. 

4 We will have to hollow it out . . . [i]t will badly 

5 damage our capabilities for the future. . . . And if 

6 you have a smaller force, you’re not going to be able 

7 to be out there responding in as many areas as we 

8 do now.’’. 

9 (5) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review also stat10 ed that ‘‘by modernizing our aging nuclear facilities 

11 and investing in human capital, we can substantially 

12 reduce the number of nuclear weapons we retain as 

13 a hedge.’’. 

14 (6) The President requested the promised 

15 $7,600,000,000 for weapons activities of the Na16 tional Nuclear Security Administration in fiscal year 

17 2012 but signed an appropriations Act for fiscal 

18 year 2012 that provided only $7,233,997,000, a sub19 stantial reduction to only the second year of the ten20 year plan under section 1251 of the National De21 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub22 lic Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549). 

23 (7) The President requested only 

24 $7,577,341,000 for weapons activities of the Na25 tional Nuclear Security Administration in fiscal year 


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1 2013 while the President’s section 1251 plan prom2 ised $7,900,000,000. 

3 (8) The President’s section 1251 plan further 

4 promised to request $8,400,000,000 in fiscal year 

5 2014, $8,700,000,000 in fiscal year 2015, 

6 $8,900,000,000 in fiscal year 2016, at least 

7 $8,900,000,000 in fiscal year 2017, at least 

8 $9,200,000,000 in fiscal year 2018, at least 

9 $9,400,000,000 in fiscal year 2019, at least 

10 $9,400,000,000 in fiscal year 2020, and at least 

11 $9,500,000,000 in fiscal year 2021. 

12 (9) While the administration has not yet shared 

13 with Congress the terms of reference of the so-called 

14 Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study, or 

15 the Department of Defense’s instructions for that 

16 review, the only publicly available statements by the 

17 administration, including language from the Nuclear 

18 Posture Review, suggest the review was specifically 

19 instructed by the President and his senior political 

20 appointees to only consider reductions to the nuclear 

21 forces of the United States. 

22 (10) When asked at a hearing if the New 

23 START Treaty allowed the United States ‘‘to main24 tain a nuclear arsenal that is more than is needed 

25 to guarantee an adequate deterrent,’’ then ComVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:08 Mar 09, 2012 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H4178.IH H4178

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1 mander of the United States Strategic Command, 

2 General Kevin P. Chilton said, ‘‘I do not agree that 

3 it is more than is needed. I think the arsenal that 

4 we have is exactly what is needed today to provide 

5 the deterrent.’’. 

6 (b) NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY.—Section 

7 491 of title 10, United States Code, is amended— 

8 (1) by striking ‘‘On the date’’ and inserting 

9 ‘‘(a) REPORT.—On the date’’; 

10 (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the fol11 lowing new subsection (b): 

12 ‘‘(b) LIMITATION.—With respect to a new nuclear 

13 employment strategy described in a report submitted to 

14 Congress under subsection (a), none of the funds made 

15 available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter 

16 for the Department of Defense may be used to implement 

17 such strategy until a period of one year has elapsed fol18 lowing the date on which such report is submitted to Con19 gress.’’; and 

20 (3) in the heading, by striking ‘‘reports on’’. 

21 (c) LIMITATION.—During each of fiscal years 2012 

22 through 2021, none of the funds made available for each 

23 such fiscal year for the Department of Defense may be 

24 used to carry out the results of the decisions made pursu25 ant to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Implementation 


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1 Study until the date on which the President certifies to 

2 the congressional defense committees that— 

3 (1) the President has included the resources 

4 necessary to carry out the February 2011 update to 

5 the report required under section 1251 of the Na6 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

7 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) in the 

8 budget of the President submitted to Congress 

9 under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States 

10 Code, for such fiscal year; 

11 (2) the resources described in paragraph (1) 

12 have been provided to the President in an appropria13 tions Act; and 

14 (3) the sequestration mechanism under section 

15 251A of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Def16 icit Control Act of 1985 has been repealed or the se17 questration mechanism under such section for the 

18 security category has otherwise been terminated. 

19 SEC. 6. LIMITATION ON STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEM RE20 DUCTIONS. 

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

22 (1) The Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 said, 

23 with respect to modernizing the triad, ‘‘for planned 

24 reductions under New START, the United States 

25 should retain a smaller Triad of SLBMs, ICBMs, 


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1 and heavy bombers. Retaining all three Triad legs 

2 will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable 

3 cost, while hedging against potential technical prob4 lems or vulnerabilities.’’. 

5 (2) The Senate stated in Declaration 13 of the 

6 Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of 

7 the New START Treaty that ‘‘In accordance with 

8 paragraph 1 of Article V of the New START Trea9 ty, which states that, ‘Subject to the provisions of 

10 this Treaty, modernization and replacement of stra11 tegic offensive arms may be carried out,’ it is the 

12 sense of the Senate that United States deterrence 

13 and flexibility is assured by a robust triad of stra14 tegic delivery vehicles. To this end, the United 

15 States is committed to accomplishing the moderniza16 tion and replacement of its strategic nuclear delivery 

17 vehicles, and to ensuring the continued flexibility of 

18 United States conventional and nuclear delivery sys19 tems.’’. 

20 (3) The Senate required the President, prior to 

21 the entry into force of the New START Treaty, to 

22 certify to the Senate that the President intended to 

23 modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear 

24 delivery systems. 


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1 (4) The President made this certification in a 

2 message to the Senate on February 2, 2011, in 

3 which the President stated, ‘‘I intend to (a) mod4 ernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear deliv5 ery systems: a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise 

6 missile, an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered ballistic 

7 missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM; and (b) 

8 maintain the United States rocket motor industrial 

9 base.’’. 

10 (b) LIMITATION.— 

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—Part I of subtitle A of title 

12 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at 

13 the end the following new chapter: 

14 ‘‘CHAPTER 24—NUCLEAR POSTURE 

‘‘Sec. 

‘‘491. Strategic delivery system reductions. 

15 ‘‘§ 491. Strategic delivery system reductions 

16 ‘‘(a) ANNUAL CERTIFICATION.—Beginning fiscal 

17 year 2013, the President shall annually certify in writing 

18 to the congressional defense committees whether plans to 

19 modernize or replace strategic delivery systems are fully 

20 resourced and being executed at a level equal to or more 

21 than the levels set forth in the November 2010 update 

22 to the plan referred to in section 1251 of the National 

23 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public 


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1 Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549), including plans regard2 ing— 

3 ‘‘(1) a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise 

4 missile; 

5 ‘‘(2) an intercontinental ballistic missile; 

6 ‘‘(3) a submarine-launched ballistic missile; 

7 ‘‘(4) a ballistic missile submarine; and 

8 ‘‘(5) maintaining— 

9 ‘‘(A) the nuclear command and control sys10 tem; and 

11 ‘‘(B) the rocket motor industrial base of 

12 the United States. 

13 ‘‘(b) LIMITATION.—If the President certifies under 

14 subsection (a) that plans to modernize or replace strategic 

15 delivery systems are not fully resourced or being executed, 

16 none of the funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or 

17 any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense 

18 may be used to reduce, convert, or eliminate strategic de19 livery systems, whether deployed or nondeployed, pursuant 

20 to the New START Treaty or otherwise until a period of 

21 120 days has elapsed following the date on which such 

22 certification is made. 

23 ‘‘(c) EXCEPTION.—The limitation in subsection (b) 

24 shall not apply to— 


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1 ‘‘(1) reductions made to ensure the safety, secu2 rity, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear weap3 ons stockpile and strategic delivery systems, includ4 ing activities related to surveillance, assessment, cer5 tification, testing, and maintenance of nuclear war6 heads and delivery systems; or 

7 ‘‘(2) strategic delivery systems that are retired 

8 or awaiting dismantlement on the date of the certifi9 cation under subsection (a). 

10 ‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

11 ‘‘(1) The term ‘New START Treaty’ means the 

12 Treaty between the United States of America and 

13 the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 

14 Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 

15 Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into 

16 force on February 5, 2011. 

17 ‘‘(2) The term ‘strategic delivery system’ means 

18 a delivery platform for nuclear weapons.’’. 

19 (2) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.— 

20 (A) TABLE OF CHAPTERS.—The table of 

21 chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 

22 10, United States Code, and at the beginning 

23 of part I of such subtitle, are each amended by 

24 inserting after the item relating to chapter 23 

25 the following new item: 

‘‘24. Nuclear posture ......................................................................... 491’’. 


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1 (B) CHAPTER 23.—Chapter 23 of title 10, 

2 United States Code, is amended as follows: 

3 (i) Section 490a is transferred to 

4 chapter 24, inserted after section 491, and 

5 redesignated as section 492. 

6 (ii) Section 491, as amended by sec7 tion 5(b), is transferred to chapter 24, in8 serted after section 492, and redesignated 

9 as section 493. 

10 (iii) The table of sections at the begin11 ning of such chapter is amended by strik12 ing the items relating to sections 490a and 

13 491. 

14 (C) CHAPTER 24.—The table of sections at 

15 the beginning of chapter 24 of title 10, United 

16 States Code, as added by paragraph (1), is 

17 amended by inserting after the item relating to 

18 section 491 the following: 

‘‘492. Biennial assessment and report on the delivery platforms for nuclear 

weapons and the nuclear command and control system. 

‘‘493. Nuclear employment strategy of the United States: modification of strategy.’’. 

19 (3) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 

20 1041(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act 

21 for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 

22 1574) is amended by striking ‘‘section 490a of title 

23 10, United States Code, as added by subsection 


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1 (a),’’ and inserting ‘‘section 492 of title 10, United 

2 States Code,’’. 

3 SEC. 7. PREVENTION OF ASYMMETRY OF NUCLEAR WEAP4 ON STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS. 

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

6 (1) Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

7 warned in 2008 that, ‘‘There is no way to ignore ef8 forts by rogue states such as North Korea and Iran 

9 to develop and deploy nuclear weapons or Russian or 

10 Chinese strategic modernization programs. To be 

11 sure, we do not consider Russia or China as adver12 saries, but we cannot ignore these developments and 

13 the implications they have for our national secu14 rity.’’. 

15 (2) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated 

16 that, ‘‘large disparities in nuclear capabilities could 

17 raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies 

18 and partners, and may not be conducive to main19 taining a stable, long-term strategic relationship, es20 pecially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced.’’. 

21 (3) The Senate stated in the Resolution of Ad22 vice and Consent to Ratification of the New START 

23 Treaty that, ‘‘It is the sense of the Senate that, in 

24 conducting the reductions mandated by the New 

25 START Treaty, the President should regulate reducVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:08 Mar 09, 2012 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H4178.IH H4178

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1 tions in United States strategic offensive arms so 

2 that the number of accountable strategic offensive 

3 arms under the New START Treaty possessed by 

4 the Russian Federation in no case exceeds the com5 parable number of accountable strategic offensive 

6 arms possessed by the United States to such an ex7 tent that a strategic imbalance endangers the na8 tional security interests of the United States.’’. 

9 (4) At a hearing before the Committee on 

10 Armed Services of the House of Representatives in 

11 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said, with 

12 respect to unilateral nuclear reductions by the 

13 United States, ‘‘I don’t think we ought to do that 

14 unilaterally—we ought to do that on the basis of ne15 gotiations with the Russians and others to make 

16 sure we are all walking the same path.’’. 

17 (b) CERTIFICATION.—Section 1045 of the National 

18 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (50 

19 U.S.C. 2523b) is amended by adding at the end the fol20 lowing new subsection: 

21 ‘‘(d) PREVENTION OF ASYMMETRY IN REDUC22 TIONS.— 

23 ‘‘(1) CERTIFICATION.—During any year in 

24 which the President recommends to reduce the num25 ber of nuclear weapons in the active and inactive 


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1 stockpiles of the United States by a number that is 

2 greater than one percent of the number of nuclear 

3 weapons in such stockpiles, the President shall cer4 tify in writing to the congressional defense commit5 tees whether such reductions will cause the number 

6 of nuclear weapons in such stockpiles to be fewer 

7 than the number of nuclear weapons in the active 

8 and inactive stockpiles of the Russian Federation. 

9 ‘‘(2) LIMITATION.—If the President certifies 

10 under paragraph (1) that the recommended number 

11 of nuclear weapons in the active and inactive stock12 piles of the United States is fewer than the number 

13 of nuclear weapons in the active and inactive stock14 piles of the Russian Federation, none of the funds 

15 made available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year 

16 thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Na17 tional Nuclear Security Administration may be used 

18 to carry out any reduction to such stockpiles of the 

19 United States until— 

20 ‘‘(A) after the date on which such certifi21 cation is made, the President transmits to the 

22 congressional defense committees a report by 

23 the Commander of the United States Strategic 

24 Command, without change, detailing whether 

25 the recommended reduction would create a straVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:08 Mar 09, 2012 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H4178.IH H4178

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1 tegic imbalance between the total nuclear forces 

2 of the United States and the total nuclear 

3 forces of the Russian Federation; and 

4 ‘‘(B) a period of 180 days has elapsed fol5 lowing the date on which such report is trans6 mitted. 

7 ‘‘(3) EXCEPTION.—The limitation in paragraph 

8 (2) shall not apply to— 

9 ‘‘(A) reductions made to ensure the safety, 

10 security, reliability, and credibility of the nu11 clear weapons stockpile and strategic delivery 

12 systems, including activities related to surveil13 lance, assessment, certification, testing, and 

14 maintenance of nuclear warheads and strategic 

15 delivery systems; or 

16 ‘‘(B) nuclear warheads that are retired or 

17 awaiting dismantlement on the date of the cer18 tification under paragraph (1).’’. 

19 SEC. 8. CONSIDERATION OF EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR 

20 FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES. 

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

22 (1) The Resolution of Advice and Consent to 

23 Ratification of the New START Treaty of the Sen24 ate said, ‘‘It is the sense of the Senate that if, dur25 ing the time the New START Treaty remains in 


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1 force, the President determines that there has been 

2 an expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country 

3 not party to the New START Treaty so as to jeop4 ardize the supreme interests of the United States, 

5 then the President should consult on an urgent basis 

6 with the Senate to determine whether adherence to 

7 the New START Treaty remains in the national in8 terest of the United States.’’. 

9 (2) In 2011, experts testified before the Com10 mittee on Armed Services of the House of Rep11 resentatives that— 

12 (A) ‘‘Russia is modernizing every leg of its 

13 nuclear triad with new, more advanced sys14 tems’’, including new ballistic missile sub15 marines, new heavy intercontinental ballistic 

16 missiles carrying up to 15 warheads each, new 

17 shorter range ballistic missiles, and new low18 yield warheads; and 

19 (B) ‘‘China is steadily increasing the num20 bers and capabilities of the ballistic missiles it 

21 deploys and is upgrading older ICBMs to 

22 newer, more advanced systems. China also ap23 pears to be actively working to develop a sub24 marine-based nuclear deterrent force, something 

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1 partment of Defense report says that this net2 work of tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilo3 meters and is used to transport nuclear weap4 ons and forces.’’. 

5 (b) REPORT AND CERTIFICATION.— 

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 24 of title 10, 

7 United States Code, as added by section 6(b)(1), is 

8 amended by adding at the end the following new sec9 tion: 

10 ‘‘§ 494. Consideration of expansion of nuclear forces 

11 of other countries 

12 ‘‘(a) REPORT AND CERTIFICATION.—During any 

13 year in which the President recommends any reductions 

14 in the nuclear forces of the United States, none of the 

15 funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal 

16 year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Na17 tional Nuclear Security Administration may be used for 

18 such recommended reduction until the date on which— 

19 ‘‘(1) the President transmits to the congres20 sional defense committees a report detailing, for 

21 each country with nuclear weapons— 

22 ‘‘(A) the number of each type of nuclear 

23 weapons possessed by such country; 

24 ‘‘(B) the modernization plans for such 

25 weapons of such country; 


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1 ‘‘(C) the production capacity of nuclear 

2 warheads and strategic delivery systems (as de3 fined in section 491(c) of this title) of such 

4 country; and 

5 ‘‘(D) the nuclear doctrine of such country; 

6 and 

7 ‘‘(2) the Commander of the United States Stra8 tegic Command certifies to the congressional defense 

9 committees whether such recommended reductions in 

10 the nuclear forces of the United States will— 

11 ‘‘(A) impair the ability of the United 

12 States to address— 

13 ‘‘(i) unplanned strategic or geo14 political events; or 

15 ‘‘(ii) technical challenge; or 

16 ‘‘(B) degrade the deterrence or assurance 

17 provided by the United States to friends and al18 lies of the United States. 

19 ‘‘(b) FORM.—The reports required by subsection 

20 (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 

21 include a classified annex.’’. 

22 (2) The table of sections at the beginning of 

23 chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, is 

24 amended by inserting after the item relating to sec25 tion 493 the following: 

‘‘494. Consideration of expansion of nuclear forces of other countries.’’. 


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1 SEC. 9. CHEMISTRY AND METALLURGY RESEARCH RE2 PLACEMENT NUCLEAR FACILITY AND URA3 NIUM PROCESSING FACILITY. 

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

5 (1) Administrator for Nuclear Security Thomas 

6 D’Agostino testified before the Committee on Armed 

7 Services of the House of Representatives in Feb8 ruary 2008 that ‘‘Infrastructure improvements are a 

9 major part of the complex transformation plan that 

10 we have, and we’ve made important progress, but we 

11 have a lot more to do. Some major facilities that we 

12 have date back to World War II and cannot readily 

13 meet today’s safety and security requirements. Let 

14 me give you just two quick examples, if I could. A 

15 sufficient capability to work with plutonium is an es16 sential part of a national security enterprise and is 

17 required for as long as we retain a nuclear deter18 rent, and most likely even longer. Currently, we have 

19 a very small production capacity at Los Alamos, 

20 about 10 pits per year, at our TA–55 area. Our 

21 building at Los Alamos, the Chemistry and Metal22 lurgy Research Facility, is well over 50 years old 

23 and is insufficient to support the national security 

24 requirements for the stockpile and for future na25 tional security mission areas. So, whether we con26 tinue on our existing path or move towards a reVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:08 Mar 09, 2012 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H4178.IH H4178

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1 placement modern warhead-type stockpile, we still 

2 need the capacity to produce about 50 to 80 pits per 

3 year, which is less than one-tenth of our Cold War 

4 level, as well as the ability to carry out pit surveil5 lance, which is an essential part of maintaining our 

6 stockpile.’’. 

7 (2) Then Commander of the United States 

8 Strategic Command General Kevin P. Chilton also 

9 testified in February 2008 that ‘‘When you have a 

10 responsive complex that has the capacity to flex to 

11 production as you may need it or adjust your de12 ployed force posture in the future, should you need 

13 it—in other words, if we go to a lower number, you 

14 need to be certain that you can come back up, 

15 should the strategic environment change, and you 

16 can’t necessarily without that flexible or responsive 

17 infrastructure behind it, and that’s probably one of 

18 my great concerns. And then how you posture both 

19 the portion of your stockpile that you hold in reserve 

20 and your confidence in the weapons that you have 

21 deployed is very much a function of modernizing, in 

22 my view, the weapons systems that we have available 

23 today, which are, as the secretary described, of Cold 

24 War legacy design, and the associated issues with 

25 them.’’. 


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1 (3) The Congressional Commission on the Stra2 tegic Posture of the United States reported in May 

3 2009, with respect to the timing of the replacement 

4 of the nuclear weapons infrastructure of the United 

5 States, that ‘‘This raises an obvious question about 

6 whether these two replacement programs might pro7 ceed in sequence rather than concurrently. There are 

8 strong arguments for moving forward concurrently. 

9 Existing facilities are genuinely decrepit and are 

10 maintained in a safe and secure manner only at high 

11 cost. Moreover, the improved production capabilities 

12 they promise are integral to the program of refur13 bishment and modernization described in the pre14 ceding chapter. If funding can be found for both, 

15 this would best serve the national interest in main16 taining a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of weap17 ons in the most effective and efficient manner.’’. 

18 (4) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states— 

19 (A) ‘‘The National Nuclear Security Ad20 ministration (NNSA), in close coordination with 

21 DoD, will provide a new stockpile stewardship 

22 and management plan to Congress within 90 

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1 ture is restored and modernized, it will allow 

2 the United States to begin to shift away from 

3 retaining large numbers of non-deployed war4 heads as a technical hedge, allowing additional 

5 reductions in the U.S. stockpile of non-deployed 

6 nuclear weapons over time.’’; 

7 (B) ‘‘In order to sustain a safe, secure, 

8 and effective U.S. nuclear stockpile as long as 

9 nuclear weapons exist, the United States must 

10 possess a modern physical infrastructure—com11 prised of the national security laboratories and 

12 a complex of supporting facilities.’’; 

13 (C) ‘‘Funding the Chemistry and Metal14 lurgy Research Replacement Project at Los Al15 amos National Laboratory to replace the exist16 ing 50-year old Chemistry and Metallurgy Re17 search facility in 2021.’’; 

18 (D) ‘‘Developing a new Uranium Proc19 essing Facility at the Y–12 Plant in Oak Ridge, 

20 Tennessee to come on line for production oper21 ations in 2021.’’; 

22 (E) ‘‘Without an ability to produce ura23 nium components, any plan to sustain the 

24 stockpile, as well as support for our Navy nu25 clear propulsion, will come to a halt. This would 


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1 have a significant impact, not just on the weap2 ons program, but in dealing with nuclear dan3 gers of many kinds.’’; and 

4 (F) ‘‘The non-deployed stockpile currently 

5 includes more warheads than required for the 

6 above purposes, due to the limited capacity of 

7 the National Nuclear Security Administration 

8 (NNSA) complex to conduct LEPs for deployed 

9 weapons in a timely manner. Progress in restor10 ing NNSA’s production infrastructure will allow 

11 these excess warheads to be retired along with 

12 other stockpile reductions planned over the next 

13 decade.’’. 

14 (5) In the memorandum of agreement between 

15 the Department of Defense and the Department of 

16 Energy concerning the modernization of the nuclear 

17 weapon stockpile of the United States dated May 3, 

18 2010, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and 

19 Secretary of Energy Steven Chu agreed that ‘‘DOE 

20 Agrees to . . . increase pit production capacity . . . 

21 plan and program to ramp up to a minimum of 50– 

22 80 PPY in 2022.’’. 

23 (6) The plan required under section 1251 of the 

24 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

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1 mitted by the President states that the Chemistry 

2 and Metallurgy Research Replacement building and 

3 the Uranium Processing Facility will complete con4 struction by 2021 and will achieve full operational 

5 functionality by 2024. 

6 (7) The Senate required that, prior to the entry 

7 into force of the New START Treaty, the President 

8 certifies to the Senate that the President intends 

9 to— 

10 (A) accelerate to the extent possible the 

11 design and engineering phase of the Chemistry 

12 and Metallurgy Research Replacement building 

13 and the Uranium Processing Facility; and 

14 (B) request full funding, including on a 

15 multiyear basis as appropriate, for the Chem16 istry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

17 building and the Uranium Processing Facility 

18 upon completion of the design and engineering 

19 phase for such facilities. 

20 (8) The President did request full funding for 

21 such facilities on February 2, 2011, when the Presi22 dent stated, ‘‘I intend to (a) accelerate, to the extent 

23 possible, the design and engineering phase of the 

24 Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

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1 cility (UPF); and (b) request full funding, including 

2 on a multi-year basis as appropriate, for the CMRR 

3 building and the UPF upon completion of the design 

4 and engineering phase for such facilities.’’. 

5 (b) LIMITATION.—Section 1045 of the National De6 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (50 U.S.C. 

7 2523b) is further amended by adding at the end the fol8 lowing new subsection: 

9 ‘‘(e) CMRR AND UPF.— 

10 ‘‘(1) ANNUAL CERTIFICATION.—Beginning fis11 cal year 2013, the President shall annually certify in 

12 writing to the congressional defense committees 

13 whether— 

14 ‘‘(A) the construction of both the Chem15 istry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

16 building and the Uranium Processing Facility 

17 will be completed by not later than 2021; and 

18 ‘‘(B) both facilities will be fully operational 

19 by not later than 2024. 

20 ‘‘(2) LIMITATION.—If the President certifies 

21 under paragraph (1) that the Chemistry and Metal22 lurgy Research Replacement building and the Ura23 nium Processing Facility will be completed by later 

24 than 2021 or be fully operational by later than 

25 2024, none of the funds made available for fiscal 


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1 year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Na2 tional Nuclear Security Administration may be used 

3 to reduce the nondeployed nuclear warheads in the 

4 nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States until 

5 a period of 120 days has elapsed following the date 

6 of such certification. 

7 ‘‘(3) EXCEPTION.—The limitation in paragraph 

8 (2) shall not apply to— 

9 ‘‘(A) reductions made to ensure the safety, 

10 security, reliability, and credibility of the nu11 clear weapons stockpile and delivery systems, 

12 including activities related to surveillance, as13 sessment, certification, testing, and mainte14 nance of nuclear warheads and strategic deliv15 ery systems; or 

16 ‘‘(B) nuclear warheads that are retired or 

17 awaiting dismantlement on the date of the cer18 tification under paragraph (1). 

19 ‘‘(4) TERMINATION.—The requirement in para20 graph (1) shall terminate on the date on which the 

21 President certifies in writing to the congressional de22 fense committees that the Chemistry and Metallurgy 

23 Research Replacement building and the Uranium 

24 Processing Facility are both fully operational.’’. 


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1 SEC. 10. NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON INTERCONTINENTAL 

2 BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE UNITED STATES. 

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that reducing the number of nuclear warheads con5 tained on each intercontinental ballistic missile of the 

6 United States does not promote strategic stability if at 

7 the same time other nuclear weapons states, including the 

8 Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, 

9 are rapidly increasing the warhead-loading of their land10 based missile forces. 

11 (b) LIMITATION.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 24 of title 10, 

13 United States Code, as added by section 6(b)(1), is 

14 amended by adding at the end the following new sec15 tion: 

16 ‘‘§ 495. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental bal17 listic missiles of the United States 

18 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—During any year in which the 

19 President proposes to reduce the number of nuclear war20 heads contained on an intercontinental ballistic missile of 

21 the United States, none of the funds made available for 

22 fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the De23 partment of Defense or the National Nuclear Security Ad24 ministration may be used for such proposed reduction if 

25 the reduction results in such missile having only a single 

26 nuclear warhead unless the President certifies in writing 


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1 to the congressional defense committees that the Russian 

2 Federation and the People’s Republic of China are both 

3 also carrying out a similar reduction. 

4 ‘‘(b) EXCEPTION.—The limitation in subsection (a) 

5 shall not apply to reductions made to ensure the safety, 

6 security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear weapons 

7 stockpile and delivery systems, including activities related 

8 to surveillance, assessment, certification, testing, and 

9 maintenance of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery 

10 systems.’’. 

11 (2) The table of sections at the beginning of 

12 chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, is 

13 amended by inserting after the item relating to sec14 tion 494 the following: 

‘‘495. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United 

States.’’. 

15 SEC. 11. NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON REDUCTIONS 

16 AND EXTENDED DETERRENCE POLICY. 

17 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

18 (1) The NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 en19 dorsed the continued role of nuclear weapons in the 

20 security of the NATO alliance, stating— 

21 (A) ‘‘The supreme guarantee of the secu22 rity of the Allies is provided by the strategic nu23 clear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of 

24 the United States; the independent strategic 


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1 nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and 

2 France, which have a deterrent role of their 

3 own, contribute to the overall deterrence and 

4 security of the Allies.’’; 

5 (B) ‘‘We will ensure that NATO has the 

6 full range of capabilities necessary to deter and 

7 defend against any threat to the safety and se8 curity of our populations. Therefore, we will 

9 . . . maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear 

10 and conventional forces’’; and 

11 (C) ‘‘[NATO will] ensure the broadest pos12 sible participation of Allies in collective defence 

13 planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing 

14 of nuclear forces, and in command, control and 

15 consultation arrangements.’’. 

16 (2) However, the 2010 Strategic Concept also 

17 walked away from the decades-long policy encap18 sulated by the 1999 Strategic Concept that said, 

19 ‘‘The presence of United States conventional and 

20 nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the secu21 rity of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that 

22 of North America.’’. 

23 (3) Former Secretary of Defense William Perry 

24 said in March 2011 testimony before the Sub25 committee on Strategic Forces of the Committee on 


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1 Armed Services of the House of Representatives that 

2 ‘‘the reason we have nuclear weapons in Europe in 

3 the first place, is not because the rest of our weap4 ons are not capable of deterrence, but because, dur5 ing the Cold War at least, our allies in Europe felt 

6 more assured when we had nuclear weapons in Eu7 rope. That is why they were deployed there in the 

8 first place. Today the issue is a little different. The 

9 issue is the Russians in the meantime have built a 

10 large number of nuclear weapons, and we keep our 

11 nuclear weapons there as somewhat of a political le12 verage for dealing with an ultimate treaty in which 

13 we may get Russia and the United States to elimi14 nate tactical nuclear weapons. My own view is it 

15 would be desirable if both the United States and 

16 Russia would eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, but 

17 I see it as very difficult to arrive at that conclusion 

18 if we were to simply eliminate all of our tactical nu19 clear weapons unilaterally.’’. 

20 (4) During testimony before the Subcommittee 

21 on Strategic Forces of the Committee on Armed 

22 Services of the House of Representatives in July 

23 2011— 

24 (A) former Department of Defense official 

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1 lieve that those weapons need to be there, we 

2 need to make sure that we provide that secu3 rity.’’; and 

4 (B) former Department of Defense official 

5 Mort Halperin stated, ‘‘I do not think we 

6 should be willing to trade our withdrawal of our 

7 nuclear weapons from Europe for some reduc8 tion, even a substantial reduction, in Russian 

9 tactical nuclear weapons because if it is . . . 

10 that the credibility of the American nuclear de11 terrent for our NATO allies depends on the 

12 presence of nuclear weapons in Europe, that 

13 will not change if the Russians cut their tactical 

14 nuclear arsenal by two thirds, or even eliminate 

15 it because they will still have their strategic 

16 weapons, which, while they can’t have inter17 mediate range missiles, they can find a way to 

18 target them on the NATO countries.’’. 

19 (5) Section 1237(b) of the National Defense 

20 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 

21 112–81) expressed the sense of Congress that— 

22 (A) the commitment of the United States 

23 to extended deterrence in Europe and the nu24 clear alliance of NATO is an important compo25 nent of ensuring and linking the national secuVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:08 Mar 09, 2012 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H4178.IH H4178

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1 rity of the United States and its European al2 lies; 

3 (B) the nuclear forces of the United States 

4 are a key component of the NATO nuclear alli5 ance; and 

6 (C) the presence of the nuclear weapons of 

7 the United States in Europe—combined with 

8 NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements 

9 under which non-nuclear members participate 

10 in nuclear planning and possess specially con11 figured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear 

12 weapons—provides reassurance to NATO allies 

13 who feel exposed to regional threats. 

14 (b) LIMITATION.—Chapter 24 of title 10, United 

15 States Code, as added by section 6(b)(1), is amended by 

16 adding at the end the following new section: 

17 ‘‘§ 496. Limitation on reduction, consolidation, or 

18 withdrawal of nuclear forces based in Eu19 rope 

20 ‘‘(a) POLICY ON NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAP21 ONS.—It is the policy of the United States— 

22 ‘‘(1) to pursue negotiations with the Russian 

23 Federation aimed at the reduction of Russian de24 ployed and nondeployed, nonstrategic nuclear forces; 


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1 ‘‘(2) that nonstrategic nuclear weapons should 

2 be considered when weighing the balance of the nu3 clear forces of the United States and the Russian 

4 Federation; 

5 ‘‘(3) that any geographical relocation or storage 

6 of nonstrategic nuclear weapons by the Russian Fed7 eration does not constitute a reduction or elimi8 nation of such weapons; 

9 ‘‘(4) the vast advantage of the Russian Federa10 tion in nonstrategic nuclear weapons constitutes a 

11 threat to the United States and its allies and a 

12 growing asymmetry in Western Europe; and 

13 ‘‘(5) the forward-deployed nuclear forces of the 

14 United States are an important contributor to the 

15 assurance of the allies of the United States and con16 stitute a check on proliferation and a tool in dealing 

17 with neighboring states hostile to NATO. 

18 ‘‘(b) POLICY ON EXTENDED DETERRENCE COMMIT19 MENT TO EUROPE.—It is the policy of the United States 

20 that— 

21 ‘‘(1) it maintain its commitment to extended 

22 deterrence, specifically the nuclear alliance of the 

23 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as an impor24 tant component of ensuring and linking the national 


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1 security interests of the United States and the secu2 rity of its European allies; 

3 ‘‘(2) forward-deployed nuclear forces of the 

4 United States shall remain based in Europe in sup5 port of the nuclear policy and posture of NATO; 

6 ‘‘(3) the presence of nuclear weapons of the 

7 United States in Europe—combined with NATO’s 

8 unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which 

9 non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning 

10 and possess specially configured aircraft capable of 

11 delivering nuclear weapons—contributes to the cohe12 sion of NATO and provides reassurance to allies and 

13 partners who feel exposed to regional threats; and 

14 ‘‘(4) only the President and Congress can ar15 ticulate when and how the United States will employ 

16 the nuclear forces of the United States and no mul17 tilateral organization, not even NATO, can articu18 late a declaratory policy concerning the use of nu19 clear weapons that binds the United States. 

20 ‘‘(c) LIMITATION ON REDUCTION, CONSOLIDATION, 

21 OR WITHDRAWAL OF NUCLEAR FORCES BASED IN EU22 ROPE.—In light of the policy expressed in subsections (a) 

23 and (b), none of the funds made available for fiscal year 

24 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of 

25 Defense may be used to effect or implement the reduction, 


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1 consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear forces of the 

2 United States that are based in Europe unless— 

3 ‘‘(1) the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal 

4 of such nuclear forces is requested by the govern5 ment of the host nation in the manner provided in 

6 the agreement between the United States and the 

7 host nation regarding the forces; 

8 ‘‘(2) the President certifies that— 

9 ‘‘(A) NATO member states have consid10 ered the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal 

11 in the High Level Group; 

12 ‘‘(B) NATO has decided to support such 

13 reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal; 

14 ‘‘(C) the remaining nuclear forces of the 

15 United States that are based in Europe after 

16 such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal 

17 would provide a commensurate or better level of 

18 assurance and credibility as before such reduc19 tion, consolidation, or withdrawal; and 

20 ‘‘(D) there has been reciprocal action by 

21 the Russian Federation, not including the Rus22 sian Federation relocating nuclear forces from 

23 one location to another; or 


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•HR 4178 IH

1 ‘‘(3) the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal 

2 of such nuclear forces is specifically authorized by 

3 an Act of Congress. 

4 ‘‘(d) NOTIFICATION.—Upon any decision to reduce, 

5 consolidate, or withdraw the nuclear forces of the United 

6 States that are based in Europe, the President shall sub7 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a notifi8 cation containing— 

9 ‘‘(1) the certification required by paragraph (2) 

10 of subsection (c) if such reduction, consolidation, or 

11 withdrawal is based upon such paragraph; 

12 ‘‘(2) justification for such reduction, consolida13 tion, or withdrawal; and 

14 ‘‘(3) an assessment of how NATO member 

15 states, in light of such reduction, consolidation, or 

16 withdrawal, assess the credibility of the deterrence 

17 capability of the United States in support of its com18 mitments undertaken pursuant to article 5 of the 

19 North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington, Dis20 trict of Columbia, on April 4, 1949, and entered into 

21 force on August 24, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 

22 1964). 

23 ‘‘(e) NOTICE AND WAIT REQUIREMENT.—The Presi24 dent may not commence a reduction, consolidation, or 

25 withdrawal of the nuclear forces of the United States that 


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•HR 4178 IH

1 are based in Europe for which the certification required 

2 by subsection (c)(2) is made until the expiration of a 180- 

3 day period beginning on the date on which the President 

4 submits the notification under subsection (d) containing 

5 the certification. 

6 ‘‘(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.— 

7 In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional com8 mittees’ means— 

9 ‘‘(1) the Committees on Armed Services of the 

10 House of Representatives and the Senate; and 

11 ‘‘(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

12 House of Representatives and the Committee on 

13 Foreign Relations of the Senate.’’. 

14 (c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 

15 at the beginning of chapter 24 of title 10, United States 

16 Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to 

17 section 495 the following: 

‘‘496. Limitation on reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear forces 

based in Europe.’’. 

Æ 


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