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© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“Because the protection of 

civilians was at the very heart 

of the MINURCAT mandate, 

and insecurity continues to 

plague eastern Chad, the shift 

away from physical protection activities . . . will impact 

the day-to-day safety of 

refugees, IDPs and all civilians, and hinder the ability of 

humanitarian actors to deliver 

crucial aid to the area.”

October 22, 2010 

MINURCAT Withdrawal: The Risks to 

Civilian Protection and Humanitarian 

Assistance in Eastern Chad

Summary

•	 Chad hosts over 249,000 refugees from the Darfur conflict and 168,000 internally displaced 

persons who were relocated after instability caused by Chadian rebel groups.

•	 The U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad has been reduced to 1,900 as of 

October 15, 2010. It will withdraw completely by December 31, 2010. There are concerns 

about the capacity of the Chadian security forces to adequately protect the population.

•	 The government of Chad and the international community must work to ensure the security 

of the population and humanitarian workers.

Introduction

Chad hosts over 249,000 refugees from the Darfur region and the ongoing insecurity south of 

Abéché in eastern Chad has prevented roughly 168,000 internally displaced Chadians from returning home. While rebel incursions and cross-border violence has diminished, civilians in eastern 

Chad continue to be victims of chronic banditry and indiscriminate violence. Still, in January 2010, 

promising that it could ensure the safety of civilians within its borders, the government of Chad requested the withdrawal of the U.N.’s 3,300 peacekeepers. This peace brief discusses the challenges 

and accomplishments of the U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) 

and the concerns surrounding its impending withdrawal; it concludes with recommendations to 

ensure continued civilian protection.

Violence in eastern Chad that began in late 2005 as a result of cross-border militia attacks on 

Chadian civilians and ethnic tensions between local groups and Darfurian refugees prompted the 

deployment of a European Union Peacekeeping Force (EUFOR) in February 2008. EUFOR mandated 

the peacekeepers to protect civilians from violence and provide secure conditions for the delivery of 

humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In 2008, the MINURCAT 

followed EUFOR. MINURCAT was mandated to:

“...Help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of 

refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced 

persons and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern 

Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic and by creating favourable conditions for the 

reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas.”1

Erin A. Weir

E-mail: erinw@refugeesinternational.

org

peaceBrieF63
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

MINURCAT Withdrawl: The Risks to Civilian Protection and 

Humanitarian Assistance in Eastern Chad page 2 • PB 63 • October 22, 2010

As of April 2010, MINURCAT had deployed 3,300 soldiers throughout eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR). Despite the government of Chad’s claims that MINURCAT 

failed to fulfill its mandate,2 it provided general security to refugees and IDPs through its presence 

and patrols. MINURCAT civilian staff and U.N. Humanitarian staff were provided with armed escorts 

and logistical and evacuation support. Indeed, even the humanitarian community, which has often 

criticized the Mission, is concerned that the departure of U.N. peacekeepers will result in a serious 

deterioration of the overall security environment in eastern Chad.

Banditry: The Real Threat to Civilians

The government of Chad argues the security situation has improved as a result of the defeat and 

relative breakdown of Chadian rebel movements and the recent rapprochement with Sudan.3

But Chadian rebel attacks, while dangerous and chaotic, have not typically been targeted at 

civilians.4 Furthermore the militia attacks that were responsible for the internal displacement 

of roughly 180,000 Chadians in 2005 and 2006, have largely—if not entirely—abated. In fact, 

by 2007 the major threat to ordinary civilians and humanitarian staff was—and continues to 

be—banditry, impunity and a prevailing lack of law and order in eastern Chad.5 Improved ChadSudan relations and the weakening of Chadian rebel groups have not improved overall security 

conditions for civilians. 

Attacks by armed bandits represent a continuing threat. In many cases, bandits have targeted 

humanitarian aid operations; the U.N. has reported dozens of attacks each month on humanitarian operations, and reported more than 200 in 2009. These attacks include banditry, car jackings, 

burglaries, abductions, and other assaults on U.N. and humanitarian staff that have led to fatalities 

in some cases and a reduction of assistance in some areas.6 Refugees and Chadian IDPs are further 

harmed, when delivery of humanitarian aid is disrupted by armed attacks. 

MINURCAT’s Military Protection and Judicial Reform Efforts

The diffused threat posed by small scale bandit attacks spread over eastern Chad’s wide expanse 

presented challenges to MINURCAT and EURFOR.7 Adapting to these conditions, MINURCAT 

military personnel (and EUFOR before them) mobilized day and night patrols to demonstrate their 

presence, and to deter both large and small scale attacks. The U.N. Mission also provides military 

escorts to humanitarian and civilian convoys, and, in the case of armed attacks, has established a 

heavy presence in population centers and cordons around refugee and IDP sites to repel attackers 

and stabilize the situation. Refugees and IDPs, as well as Chadian local authorities credit MINURCAT 

for improvements in security to humanitarian actors on the ground; they are concerned that 

MINURCAT’s departure will herald a return to former levels of insecurity.8

In addition to the military response, MINURCAT partnered with the government of Chad in 

2009 to create the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS), a specialized Chadian police to institute 

community policing programs within and around the refugee camps. Its officers were drawn from 

the ranks of the existing Chadian police and gendarmerie. In cooperation with other U.N. agencies, 

funds and programs, MINURCAT civilian police officers provided the DIS with additional training, 

mentoring and support. Unlike the U.N. peacekeepers, DIS officers have the authority to arrest 

perpetrators of violence and conduct investigations. 

When the DIS initially deployed, some of its officers were involved in serious incidents of 

misconduct. These included the murder of a civilian in Farchana in March 2009, the gross misuse 

of firearms,9 the striking of a refugee in Oure Cassoni, and the misuse and destruction of U.N. 

issued 4-by-4 vehicles.10 However, through intensive mentoring, ongoing on-the-job training, and 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

MINURCAT Withdrawl: The Risks to Civilian Protection and 

Humanitarian Assistance in Eastern Chad page 3 • PB 63 • October 22, 2010

persistent monitoring, the DIS has improved significantly and has become a critical part of the 

civilian protection effort.11

In addition to physical protection efforts, MINURCAT worked to rebuild the weak, dysfunctional 

justice system in eastern Chad, through its Judicial Advisory Unit (JAU). Since 2008, the JAU has 

supported DIS training on proper investigation techniques and reporting procedures, and on the 

appropriate relationship between the police, the judiciary, and other security actors. The JAU has 

also contributed to the training of judges as well as the rebuilding and refurbishment of courthouses, and has supported the first successful round of trials held by a mobile court designed to 

access remote areas of the east. 

Impact of MINURCAT’s Withdrawal

While MINURCAT has not been perfect, the reach and impact of U.N. peacekeepers’ presence and 

the relative skill and discipline of DIS officers have markedly improved. A recent Amnesty International report observed: “attacks on humanitarian workers and civilians, which reached alarming 

levels in the last months of 2009, have begun to decrease as MINURCAT soldiers have been able 

to carry out patrols in sensitive areas they were previously unable to patrol.”13 Even under the 

best-case scenario, described in the April 29 Report of the Secretary General,14 it is questionable 

if Chadian forces can “...provide the necessary security and protection for vulnerable groups and 

humanitarian workers.”15

On May 25, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1923, which called for a reduction of 

MINURCAT’s military forces from 3,300 to 1,900 (including 500 support staff) by October 15, 2010 

and complete withdrawl by December 31, 2010. Civilian staff—including those responsible for 

supporting judicial reforms—will likely remain in place until May 2011. Since May 27, 2010, MINURCAT has not had the mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence16—though 

it will continue to provide security and escorts for U.N. civilian staff until they are fully withdrawn. 

Because the protection of civilians was at the very heart of the MINURCAT mandate, and insecurity 

continues to plague eastern Chad, the shift away from physical protection activities—including 

deterrent activities such as patrols—will impact the day-to-day safety of refugees, IDPs and all 

civilians, and hinder the ability of humanitarian actors to deliver crucial aid to the area. 

MINURCAT’s departure will also deprive the JAU and other U.N. humanitarian agencies of critical 

military escorts they depend on to deliver or monitor their programs, particularly in remote, 

volatile areas of the country. Moreover, the DIS, which has improved in discipline and effectiveness, 

will lose all supervision and mentoring once the U.N. civilian staff withdraws. They will also lose 

the critical technical and logistical support of the U.N. Mission, and it is doubtful whether the DIS 

will have the capacity or the discipline to carry on with their crucial refugee and humanitarian 

protection tasks. Worryingly, the Chadian security forces have not demonstrated the ability or the 

willingness to fulfill MINURCAT’s role. Indeed, in the past, members of the Chadian military forces, 

as well as police and gendarmerie, have been implicated in bandit attacks, car jackings, the violent 

attack of humanitarian staff,17 and—on occasion—raids on humanitarian compounds.18

Next Steps to Ensure Civilian Protection

In light of MINURCAT’s impending withdrawal, it is imperative to ensure that the government of 

Chad implements the protection promises that it has made. First, the government of Chad, in 

partnership with the U.N. and international donors must elaborate a comprehensive and proactive 

security strategy addressing the particular protection needs of refugees, IDPs, humanitarian actors, 

and local communities. The plan must account for cross-border and rebel related violence, and 
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the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

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202.429.4725

About This Brief

This peace brief describes the 

security challenges facing eastern 

Chad and the pending withdrawal 

of the United Nations Mission 

in the Central African Republic 

and Chad. Erin Weir is a Senior 

Advocate for Peacekeeping at 

Refugees International. This 

Peace Brief is part of a series on 

Chad, originally presented at a 

conference organized by USIP and 

the International Peace Institute 

on May 20, 2010. USIP Senior 

Research Associate Dorina Bekoe 

wrote the first Peace Brief of this 

series, “Stabilizing Chad: Security, 

Governance and Development 

Challenges.” 

the region’s widespread banditry. The strategy should also further the consolidation and enhancements of the gains made in judicial reform. Secondly, the government of Chad must ensure that 

humanitarian actors are not forced to pay fees to individual police, gendarmerie, or military commanders responsible for their security. Chadian authorities must quickly and decisively discipline 

any security personnel who demand payment (financial or material) from humanitarian actors in 

return for their protection. Finally, to credibly demonstrate that its forces can adequately protect 

civilians, the government of Chad needs to make a clear, concerted effort to eliminate impunity 

and improve the overall command and control of its security forces. 

Endnotes

1. U.N. Security Council. S/RES/1778, September 25, 2007.

2. Louis Charbonneau. “U.N.: Peacekeeping Force Has Not Been a Failure.” Reuters, February 9, 

2010. http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN0913707720100209

3. U.N. Security Council. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the 

Central African Republic and Chad.” S/2010/217, paragraph 88, April 29, 2010.

4. Refugees International. “Chad: Strengthen U.N. Mission for Lasting Security.” July 24, 2008.

5. Ibid.

6. Human Rights Watch. “Letter to the U.N. Security Council on Consequences of MINURCAT 

Withdrawal from Chad.” February 16, 2010.

7. Refugees International. “The Last Line of Defence: How Peacekeepers Can Better Protect 

Civilians.” February 2010, pp. 4-6.

8. Human Rights Watch, February 16, 2010.

9. U.N. Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the 

Central Africa Republic and Chad.” S/2009/359, paragraph 33, July 14, 2009.

10. Refugees International interviews with refugees, humanitarian actors and U.N. officials in 

eastern Chad and New York City, 2009–2010.

11. U.N. Security Council, S/2010/217, paragraphs 16-18.

12. Ibid., paragraph 11.

13. Amnesty International. “Darfuri refugees exposed to increased attacks if U.N. withdraws from 

Chad.” February 11, 2010.

14. S/2010/217 (2010).

15. Ibid, paragraph 51.

16. Operative section: paragraph 57; and U.N. News Center, “Security Council Extends U.N. Force 

for Two Weeks as Talks on Troop Cuts in Chad Continue.” May 12, 2010. http://www.un.org/apps/ 

news/story.asp?NewsID=34680&Cr=minurcat&Cr1=

17. Refugees International. “Chad: Strengthen U.N. Mission for Lasting Security.”

18. ANT forces conducted raids on two MSF compounds in 2008; Human Rights Watch. “The Risk 

of Return: Repatriating the Displaced in the Context of Conflict in eastern Chad.” June 2009, p. 24.

MINURCAT Withdrawl: The Risks to Civilian Protection and 

Humanitarian Assistance in Eastern Chad page 4 • PB 63 • October 22, 2010