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“Concrete good faith 

gestures from both the 

government and the guerrillas 

can provide leaders with the 

political cover they will need 

to engage with the other 

side, and can help set the 

stage for future talks.”

September 15, 2010 

Cautious Optimism for Peace 

in Colombia

Summary

•	 The new Colombian administration that took office in early August faces a unique set of 

peacemaking challenges and opportunities related to the country’s internal armed conflict.

•	 Following a spate of tensions with neighboring countries regarding the presence of illegal 

armed groups along Colombia’s border areas, newly-inaugurated President Juan Manuel Santos moved quickly to create new mechanisms with his neighbors to ensure that contentious 

regional issues are addressed before they reach the boiling point.

•	 In a surprising video released just before the president-elect was inaugurated, the top leader 

of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces-People’s Army (FARC-EP), called on Santos to 

enter a dialogue without preconditions, thereby opening a new window of opportunities to 

pursue peace. 

•	 President Santos responded that “the door to dialogue is not locked,” insisting however that 

the guerrillas must lay down their weapons and meet a series of other pre-conditions before 

talks could occur. Former mediators differ over whether such preconditions will pose an 

obstacle to talks. 

•	 In the final days of August, Brazil and Ecuador rejected a FARC-EP request for meeting with 

the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) to discuss a political solution to Colombia’s 

conflict. UNASUR leaders said they would not engage in mediating the conflict in the absence 

of an express invitation from the Colombian government. The Colombian government has 

rejected UNASUR mediation and underscored its preference to negotiate directly with the 

FARC-EP once the latter meets the government’s preconditions. 

•	 Concrete good faith efforts—both public and private—will be required from the government 

and the guerrillas to build confidence, address the legacy of distrust created by decades of 

violence and set the stage for future talks.

Introduction 

On August 7, 2010, Juan Manuel Santos, a defense minister under the outgoing administration of 

President Alvaro Uribe, was inaugurated as Colombia’s new president. Peace issues were largely 

absent from public debate during the presidential campaign, but unexpectedly surfaced in the 

final weeks of President Uribe’s incumbency.

Virginia M. Bouvier

E-mail: vbouvier@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.3884

peaceBrieF54
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Cautious Optimism for Peace in Colombia

page 2 • PB 54 • September 15, 2010

Regional Tensions Escalate

First, tensions in the region abruptly came to a head when Colombia brought a complaint against 

Venezuela at the Organization of American States (OAS). At a special session of the OAS Permanent 

Council on July 22, 2010, Colombian Ambassador to the OAS Luis Alfonso Hoyos charged that 

some 1,500 Colombian guerrillas were living in 75 camps across the border in Venezuela, that 

these groups are responsible for attacks in Venezuelan and Colombian territories, and that the 

Venezuelan government is failing to meet its international commitment to combat narcoterrorism. 

Venezuelan Ambassador to the OAS Roy Chaderton Matos dismissed the charges as untrue, and 

rejected Hoyos’s call for an international verification commission. That same afternoon, Venezuela’s 

President Hugo Chavez severed relations with Colombia, alerted his troops to go to the border, 

and called on Colombia to resolve the internal armed conflict that was spilling over its borders. 

Pressures between Andean countries have been mounting with periodic eruptions since 2008, 

when the Colombians bombed a guerrilla camp in Ecuador, killing FARC-EP leader Raul Reyes and 

two dozen others, and prompting Ecuador to break relations with Colombia. Last year’s bilateral 

military agreement between Colombia and the United States, which authorized U.S. access to 

numerous Colombian military bases as well as the U.S. to carry out “full spectrum military operations” in the hemisphere, added to the regional angst, and prompted Venezuela to break relations 

with Colombia in August 2009. 

The recent charges at the OAS prompted the hemisphere’s leaders to engage in intensive 

shuttle diplomacy with the outgoing and incoming Colombian administrations. Picking up on Venezuela’s lead, Latin American presidents and foreign ministers united in calling on the Colombian 

government and the guerrillas to seek a political solution to Colombia’s internal armed conflict. In 

the run-up to a meeting of the UNASUR foreign ministers on July 29, Venezuelan Foreign Minister 

Nicolas Maduro proposed a peace plan to end Colombia’s conflict, but it was rejected by the 

outgoing Colombian administration and never surfaced for broader consideration. 

President-elect Santos’s invitations to President Chavez and Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa to 

attend his inauguration on August 7th were important symbolic gestures of a desired rapprochement. Santos’s appointment of Maria Angela Holguin, a well-respected former ambassador to 

Venezuela, as his foreign minister underscored his interest in pursuing a less confrontational course 

in foreign affairs than his predecessor. Santos took advantage of his inaugural festivities to consult 

with hemispheric heads of state and to establish joint mechanisms for addressing border issues, including binational working groups on social and economic investment, security and infrastructure. 

FARC-EP Head Calls for Dialogue

In the flurry of politicking surrounding the border tensions and the presidential inauguration, the 

FARC-EP released a 36-minute video in late July in which the FARC-EP’s top leader, Guillermo Leon 

Saenz (aka Alfonso Cano), called on President-elect Santos to engage in a dialogue for a political 

solution to Colombia’s internal armed conflict. Few seemed to notice the proverbial white flag 

being waved, and many felt that Cano’s call for dialogue was self-serving. In the final weeks of 

President Uribe’s administration, government forces had killed a dozen members of Cano’s inner 

security ring, and seemed to be closing in on Cano. Cano’s video, like the “proof of life” videos 

released periodically by the FARC-EP, confirmed that he was still alive, and that “the confrontation 

continues.”1

In the video, Cano laid out a five-point agenda for his proposed dialogue that included the 

U.S.-Colombia military base agreement, human rights and international humanitarian law, agrarian 
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Cautious Optimism for Peace in Colombia

page 3 • PB 54 • September 15, 2010

reforms, economic reforms and political reforms. He dropped the two main sticking points from 

past overtures—the creation of a demilitarized zone and a prisoner exchange. Cano’s call to discuss 

human rights and international humanitarian law is new and noteworthy, and could open productive avenues for substantive agreements. 

The FARC-EP’s remaining agenda items, particularly agrarian reform, are already on the new 

administration’s docket. President Santos on September 2 launched a land reform bill, which 

he called “the best program for peace.” Indeed, Colombia is in desperate need of economic and 

political reforms, with one of the most highly skewed income distribution rates in the world, high 

unemployment and nearly half of its population living below the poverty level. 

Finally, the military base agreement with the United States, another of the proposed issues 

for discussion with the FARC-EP, may become a moot point given a recent finding by Colombia’s 

Constitutional Court that the accord is unconstitutional in the absence of congressional approval. 

Indications are that the bilateral base agreement may die a natural death.

The New Administration Responds

The administration’s public response to Cano’s call for dialogue has been measured. In his inaugural address, President Santos announced that “the door to dialogue is not locked,” but reiterated 

that the war would continue to be prosecuted at full throttle as long as illegal armed groups 

engage in “kidnapping, narcotrafficking, extortion, and intimidation,” and as long as they “continue 

to commit terrorist acts, ... don’t return the forcibly recruited child-soldiers, and ...continue to 

mine and contaminate the Colombian countryside.” 

In an interview, Vice President-elect Angelino Garzon told the author that for talks to happen, 

the FARC-EP must first agree to release all kidnap victims and child soldiers, end the practice of 

kidnapping, end all acts of terrorism including the use of landmines, and express a clear public 

commitment to reaching an agreement. 

An editorial on the FARC-EP Web site notes that the government’s demand that they demobilize 

and give up their struggle ignores their invitation for dialogue, and offers them nothing in return. 

In late August, the FARC-EP moved to seek additional interlocutors. On August 23, the FARC-EP 

Secretariat solicited a meeting to bring their case before UNASUR. A week later, Ecuador, as protempore chair of UNASUR, and Brazil rejected the FARC-EP invitation, and made it clear that they 

would not mediate without the express invitation of the Colombian government. The Colombian 

government has made clear its preferences to negotiate directly with the FARC-EP—without 

intermediaries—once the insurgents meet the government’s preconditions.

Challenges Ahead 

Author interviews with former mediators explored the prospects for dialogue and the challenges 

ahead. Issues of timing, style, and clarity are key in establishing the conditions for dialogue, some 

mediators suggested. Before talks can occur, measures must be taken to build confidence, to 

discuss and establish preconditions for further steps, to consider mechanisms for implementation 

and verification, and to develop the political will needed to end the conflict. Right now, trust 

for such agreements does not exist between the government and the guerrillas, and it may be 

unrealistic to expect any agreement before any dialogue begins. The government’s preconditions 

themselves are rather extensive, and change slightly with each iteration. Implementation and 

accountability are unspecified. Finally, the general nature of the conditions leaves plenty of room 

for spoilers to derail the process before it begins. 
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Cautious Optimism for Peace in Colombia

page 4 • PB 54 • September 15, 2010

The government’s preconditions could be a deal breaker. Former negotiator Jose Noe Rios—a 

long-time labor negotiator and former undersecretary of labor who was involved in successful 

peace talks with many of Colombia’s guerrilla groups—met with Cano dozens of times, and lived 

with the FARC-EP leader and his family when he served as a peace commissioner some 20 years 

ago. Noe is persuaded that the FARC-EP today are seeking a dignified way out of the conflict, but 

he believes that establishing preconditions poses an insurmountable obstacle to peace. “The 

conditions need to be put out on the negotiating table, not in the newspaper,” Noe told the author. 

Magdala Velazquez, a member of the National Peace Council who participated in peace 

negotiations with the FARC-EP under former President Andres Pastrana, was more optimistic. 

“New horizons for peace are opening up. This is a new era—and the [Santos] team can propose 

opportunities for peace,” she said in an interview. Acknowledging that the negotiating table is an 

important tool for peace and for war, Velazquez observed, “That is where the war is won.” 

Senator Piedad Cordoba, who has facilitated the FARC-EP’s unilateral releases of more than a 

dozen hostages in the past two years, is also optimistic that a long-sought opening is at hand, 

in part due to the ongoing confidence-building efforts of the civil society initiative, Colombianos y Colombianas por la Paz, which has been engaging the FARC-EP and the smaller National 

Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas in an “epistolary exchange” for the last two years to humanize 

the war. 

“What we are seeing from Cano now is not ‘spontaneous generation,’” Cordoba told the author. 

“The FARC have made a decision to throw themselves into a peace process,” she said. One of her 

advisers noted, “There is a process underway and we are right in the middle of it.” 

A New Opportunity for Peace?

FARC-EP leaders have repeatedly signaled their interest—both through their statements and the 

unilateral releases of hostages—in coming to the peace table, all the while continuing to engage 

in a seemingly interminable war. Late last year, the Secretariat of the FARC-EP joined forces with 

the Central Command of ELN and underscored their hopes that a “political solution might be able 

to stop the war, find peace and make possible the construction of a New Colombia that includes us 

in the definition of its destiny.” 

Ongoing violence makes it difficult for Colombia’s political leaders to embrace the offer of 

dialogue. Colombia remains deeply divided between those who favor a negotiated solution and 

those who favor a military solution. The failed peace talks at Caguan under President Andres 

Pastrana (1998-2002) bolstered support for subsequent military approaches and in effect discredited political solutions. For the past eight years, it has been difficult to discuss or even consider 

peace—much less negotiating with insurgents—without prompting intimidation and persecution. The new Interior Minister’s recent promise, as stated in Semana on August 17, 2010, that the 

government will not return to the practice of calling the opposition “terrorists” is a step in the right 

direction, and may open possibilities for beginning to talk about peace.

Vice President-elect Garzon said in an interview that Caguan showed that dialogue could not 

take place “in the middle of conflict or in a demilitarized zone (despeje).” Accordingly, President 

Santos has publicly rejected naming a High Commissioner for Peace until the guerrillas lay down 

their arms, and has moved to curtail the legal faculties for establishing demilitarized zones in 

which peace talks with illegal armed groups can take place. 

There is an opportunity now to forge a new path, but process is key. Currently, there are no 

agreements for a ceasefire; there is simply an offer to talk. Preconditions may well be established as 

part of the process, but setting so many major conditions before getting to the table may preclude 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Cautious Optimism for Peace in Colombia

page 5 • PB 54 • September 15, 2010

the possibility of dialogue. On the other hand, they may also serve as part of a political strategy 

designed to put pressure on the guerrillas.

It will take bold leadership from the new Colombian administration to open channels of 

communication, to build confidence to speak about peace, to acknowledge the errors of the past, 

and to create mechanisms for addressing the issues that gave rise to and perpetuate violence 

in Colombia. It will take bold leadership from the guerrillas to seek change through nonviolent 

avenues and to recognize the profound wounds that they have inflicted on Colombian society. 

Concrete good faith gestures from both the government and the guerrillas can provide leaders 

with the political cover they will need to engage with the other side, and can help set the stage for 

future talks. 

Peace today will nonetheless need to involve more than an accord between armed actors. It 

will take considerable effort to persuade a skeptical public of the potential short- and long-term 

benefits of dialogue. Civil society leaders, who have long been searching for a path to peace, should 

ensure that the dialogue is well-informed by the broader peace agenda. The international community can assist by taking these inchoate efforts for peace seriously, continuing to protect and 

defend human rights workers, and by encouraging the new Santos administration to do the same. 

The U.S. government can reevaluate how its policies and resources might better promote a peaceful 

resolution to the conflict in Colombia. For now, a window has been opened, a new administration is 

at the helm, and talking about peace in Colombia appears to be possible once again. 

Endnote

1. “‘Conversemos’ le dice ‘Cano’ al Nuevo Gobierno.” El Tiempo, July 31, 2010.

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About This Brief

This brief was authored by 

Dr. Virginia M. Bouvier, senior 

program officer in the Center for 

Mediation and Conflict Resolution 

at USIP and author of “Colombia: 

Building Peace in a Time of War.” 

It is based on interviews she 

conducted during a visit to 

Colombia from July 28 through 

August 7, 2010.