UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ MARKEITH D. TUCKER, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA, Defendants - Appellees.

––––––––––––––––––– –––––––––––––––– MARKEITH D. TUCKER, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA; CARMELITA REEDER SHINN, Court Clerk OKWD; TIMOTHY D. DEGIUSTI, US District Judge, OKWD Defendants - Appellees. No. 20-7003 (D.C. No. 6:19- CV-00247-RAW) (E.D. Okla.)

No. 20-7004 (D.C. No. 6:19- CV-00295-RAW) (E.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________

* This order and judgment is not bi nding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 19, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 Before PHILLIPS , MURPHY , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Plaintiff-Appellant Markeith D. Tucker, proceeding pro se 1 and in forma pauperis , appeals from two orders en tered in separate cases by the same judge in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. In both orde rs, the district cour t sua sponte dismissed with prejudice Tucker’s two co mplaints, finding that they ar e frivolous, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and seek relief from defendants who are immune from liability. Exercising jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. At Tucker’s request, the district court authorized Tucker to commence his lawsuits without paying the concomitant fees. But, because Tucker proceeds in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), his compla ints are subject to that statute’s screening requirement. Section 1915(e)(2)(B) requires that th e district court dismiss a case at any time if “the action . . . is frivolous or malicious[,] . . . fail s to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,] or . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” When a “frivolousness determination turns on an issue of law,” as here, we review de novo. Fogle v. Pierson , 435 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Conkle v. Potter , 352 F.3d 1333, 1335 n.4 (10th Cir. 2003)). We also review de novo the court’s determin ation that the complain ts fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and pursue defendants en titled to immunity.

1 Because of Tucker’s pro se status, we liberally construe his filings but stop short of serving as his advocate or crafting arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta , 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Ledbetter v. City of Topeka , 318 F.3d 1183, 1187–88 (10th Cir. 2003); Ogden v. San Juan Cty. , 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994)).3 See Syrus v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n , No. 19-6096, 2019 WL 7938555, at *2 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (citing Kay v. Bemis , 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007); Snell v. Tunnell , 920 F.2d 673, 675 ( 10th Cir. 1990)). A complaint is frivolous under § 1915 when “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). And to comply with pleading standards, the complaint must pr ovide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plau sible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Neither of Tucker’s comp laints passes these tests. The complaint in the firs t case states in full: I have file[d] multiple Civil Lawsu its with UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF Oklaho ma for further Racial Profiling, Discriminating towards me as Plaintiff and for Officials to do a wid[e] Pattern and Practice as well as Depriv ation of Rights Under Color of Law. No. 20-7003 R. at 3. Based on internet printouts attached to his complaint and his appellate brief, it appears Tucker is attempting to sue under 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 14141) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–242. Su ch claims lack a basis in the law because these statutes do not afford Tucker a private right of action. Section 12601 affords enforcement only to the Attorney General. See 34 U.S.C. § 12601(b) (“Whenever the Attorney Gene ral has reasonable cause to be lieve that a violation of paragraph [(a)] has occurred, the Attorney Ge neral, for or in the name of the United States, may in a civil action obtain approp riate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.”). Secti ons 241 and 242 are criminal statutes that do not provide for private ci vil causes of action. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D. , 410 U.S.4 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecu tion of another.”); Henry v. Albuquerque Police Dep’t , 49 F. App’x 272, 273 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (recognizing that it is “settled law” that §§ 241 and 242, “like ot her such statutes, do not provi de for a private civil cause of action” (citations omitted)). Thus, with no “arguable claim for relief” this complaint is frivolous and fa ils to state a claim, as th e district court correctly concluded. McKinney v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs. , 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted). The district court also concluded the co mplaint in the second case is frivolous and fails to state a claim. This second complaint, while a little meatier, simply piggybacks the first (filed a m onth before). As “background, ” Tucker asserts that he “was Discriminated on by Social Security , ‘SWOSU’ and State Courts along with Courts where I filed my Civil Class Action Lawsuits Complaints.” No. 20-7004 R. at 4. He purports to make three claims: (1) “I filed my Civil Suit complaints just for
U.S. DIST. COURT WESTERN DIST. OKLA to conduct a Conspiracy Against my Rights; Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241”; (2) “T he[y] violated Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242-Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law and did a bad Pattern and Practice under Title 42, U.S.C. Section 14141”; and (3 ) “I was lead [sic] on by Courts as they where [sic] going to subside dispute, just to be ignorant a further violated.” Id. Thus, this second complaint premises its claims on the same statut es as the first, meaning it is also frivolous and fails to state a claim because these statutes do not afford Tucker a private right of action.5 Finally, the district court also correctly determined that Tucker sued immune defendants in both cases. Tucker attempts to sue federal courts, naming the “United States District Court Western District of Oklahoma” in both complaints and the “United States Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit” in the first complaint. No. 20- 7003 R. at 3; No. 20-7004 R. at 3. Tucker is thus a ttempting to sue the federal government. But the federal government ha s sovereign immunity. And, “[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Fe deral Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer , 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (citati on omitted). No waiver exists here, so these Defendant s are immune from suit. 2 We accordingly affirm the dist rict court’s or ders dismissing 3 the complaints as

2 In his second complaint, though not in his caption, Tucker lists a court clerk and a district judge in the Western Distri ct of Oklahoma as defendants but does not explain what they did to harm him. W ithout knowing why Tucker is suing these Defendants, we cannot as sess whether they are entitled to immunity.

3 The district court dismissed both comp laints with prejudice. We agree this was appropriate because both complaints fa il to state a claim and granting Tucker leave to amend either would be futile. See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp. , 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A dismissal with pr ejudice is appropriate where a complaint fails to st ate a claim under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) and granting leave to amend would be futile.” (citation omitted)); Curley v. Perry , 246 F.3d 1278, 1282–83 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that “the st andard for dismissal for failure to state a claim is essentially the same under” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and Rule 12(b)(6) and affirming dismissal with prejudice under both when no amendment could cure the complaint’s de fect (citations omitted)).6 frivolous, failing to state a cl aim, and seeking relief from immune defendants. We deny Tucker’s motion to compel as moot.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge