NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-3398

___________

GEORGE E. JOHNSON, JR.,

Appellant

v.

JONATHAN P. RARDIN, ESQ.; SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 

TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; JOE CASEY, in their individual was well as their 

official capacity as state actors; ELLIS I. MEDOWAY, ESQ., in their individual as well 

as their official capacity as state actors; JEFFREY LANDOSKY, ESQ.; UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA & CLERK #2; HOWARD A. ROSENTHAL, ESQ., in their 

individual and official capacity as state actors; ARCHER & GREINER, P.C.; GARY D. 

FRY, ESQ., in their individual and official capacity as state actors

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-05542)

District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 8, 2015

Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 23, 2015)

___________

OPINION*

___________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

PER CURIAM

Pro se Appellant George E. Johnson, Jr., appeals from a District Court order 

denying his motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3). We will 

affirm.

In September 2013, Johnson filed a complaint in the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, primarily alleging that the Southeastern 

Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) and its attorney committed fraud while 

defending a lawsuit brought by Johnson in state court. The District Court sua sponte 

dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that Johnson’s claims were 

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Johnson filed a notice of appeal, but we 

dismissed his appeal for failure to prosecute. See C.A. No. 13-4374 (order entered June 

27, 2014).

Meanwhile, Johnson continued to seek relief in the District Court, requesting 

reconsideration and leave to file amended complaints.1 The District Court denied those 

motions by order entered February 18, 2014. Johnson filed a “Motion to Vacate the 

Order of Feb. 18, 2014,” which the District Court denied on June 2, 2014. 

 

1

In particular, Johnson filed a “Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint” (Dist. 

Ct. Doc. No. 5), a “Motion for Reconsideration/And Amendment to the Motion for Leave 

to File Amended Complaint of 10/09/13” (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 6), a “Motion to Strike 

Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration” (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 14), 

and a “Petition and Motion for Relief from Judgment” (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 17).
3

On June 20, 2014, Johnson filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(3). In the motion, 

Johnson sought relief from the order denying his motion to vacate. He vaguely asserted 

fraud and misrepresentation, alleging that “the books are being cooked,” that there was a 

“conspiracy to disenfranchise” him, and that the defendants committed “professional 

malpractice.” By order entered July 21, 2014, the District Court denied the motion, 

holding that Johnson “alleges no facts to support a finding of such egregious conduct. 

Rather, his claim rests on a mix of insinuation and misunderstanding of the electronic 

docket entries in his case.” 

Johnson appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 

review the denial of a motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) for abuse of discretion. See

Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

The District Court did not abuse its discretion here. To prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) 

motion, the moving party must establish that the adverse party engaged in fraud or other 

misconduct, and that this misconduct prevented the moving party from fully and fairly 

presenting his case. See Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1983). 

Johnson failed to provide evidence or argument demonstrating that the orders entered 

against him were the product of fraud by the defendants. We note that it was the RookerFeldman doctrine, rather than any fraud, real or imaginary, that determined the outcome 

of his complaint. Moreover, his assertion that “fraud upon the court is found in the 

docket entries” is unfounded. For instance, Johnson claimed “a fix was in” because the 
4

docket indicates that the action arose under 28 U.S.C. § 1981 (rather than § 1983) and 

that no jury was demanded (when he did seek trial by “jury from the outset”). Johnson 

also found suspicious the fact that the defendants entered their appearance “on the very 

same day as the filing of their response in opposition to [his] motion for reconsideration” 

and “before [he] had filed his notice of appeal.” He also believed that fraud exists 

because the June 2, 2014, order “appears to have been something that would have been 

written by the clerk” and Johnson “knows of no responsible judge that would enter an 

order of this nature.” These allegations are insufficient to support relief under Rule 

60(b)(3). Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s 

Rule 60(b)(3) motion. 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.2

 

2

Johnson’s renewed motion for appointment of counsel and his motion for oral argument 

are denied. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993). The United States’ motion to 

summarily affirm and to stay the briefing schedule is denied.