PEACEW RKS

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Naji Abou-Khalil and Laurence Hargreaves

[ [

INSTITUTIONAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ACTORS
Cover photo: Group of Libyan recruits travelling for 

military training outside Libya, 2013. Photo by Al 

Motasem Bellah Dhawi. 

The views expressed in this report are those of the 

authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the 

views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 108. First published 2015.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-291-1

© 2015 by the United States Institute of Peace

About the Report

This report assesses the popular legitimacy of Libya’s current security providers and identifies their vectors of local, 

religious, and legal legitimacy to better understand Libyan 

needs in terms of delivery of security services. Derived 

from a partnership between the United States Institute 

of Peace and Altai Consulting to carry out multifaceted 

research on security and justice in postrevolution Libya, 

the report develops a quantitative and qualitative research 

approach for gathering security and justice perceptions. 

It is accompanied by a Special Report on the influence of 

Libyan television on the country’s security sector.

About the Authors

Naji Abou-Khalil, a consultant with Altai Consulting, 

specializes in security sector reform and governance 

projects. Based in Tripoli since 2012, he has developed 

an in-depth knowledge of the political, security, and 

religious landscapes in Libya. Naji is also a cofounder of 

the Paris-based think tank Noria. Laurence Hargreaves is 

Altai Consulting’s Africa director and has directed qualitative and quantitative studies in Libya on topics related to 

perceptions of security and religion.
PEACEWORKS • MAY 2015 • NO. 108

CONTENTS

Introduction ... 5

Security Sector Landscape ... 5

Security Situation ... 8

Institutional Security Actors ... 14

Auxiliary Security Actors ... 21

Informal Security Actors ... 27

Conclusions ... 29

Final Thoughts ... 31

Appendix A. Objectives, Methodology, and Sampling ... 32

Appendix B. Security Actors ... 39

Appendix C. District Charts ... 46

[Libya’s security landscape is becoming increasingly 

fragmented as the various players try to establish local and 

national legitimacy on the basis of tribal, territorial, and 

ideological credentials.]

USIP.ORG 3

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Summary

■ Libya’s security sector landscape is characterized by a myriad of security actors of differing 

political orientations and areas of geographic control and by the relatively minor role of 

prerevolutionary security institutions, such as the National Police and National Army.

■ The two key sector dimensions are the nature of the actors’ de jure command and control 

lines and religious-political orientations.

■ One of the main causes of the fragmentation within the sector is the struggle between 

those who support the substitution of institutional actors by Islamist-leaning revolutionary 

brigades and those who want to exclude them.

■ Libyans still seek state-sponsored security forces. Support for the National Police dropped 

to 19 percent in the summer of 2014, yet 52 percent support its being in charge of security 

provision.

■ Short-term security solutions have had little impact on citizen desires to see development 

of a modern and institutionalized police and army. Libyan Shield Forces and other postrevolutionary security actors are unpopular and considered by a small minority to be part 

of the National Army.

■ Four conclusions are clear: Libya’s security landscape has further fragmented in 2014, 

public confidence in the security situation has decreased, support for institutional actors 

remains strong, and auxiliary actors have become more visible.

USIP.ORG 5

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Introduction

Libya’s security landscape is becoming increasingly fragmented as the various players try to 

establish local and national legitimacy on the basis of tribal, territorial, and ideological credentials. The long-term absence and inefficiency of prerevolutionary institutional actors has 

contributed to the rise of competing postrevolutionary auxiliary security actors who have a de 

jure connection to the state but operate largely independent of state authority and who often 

harbor political ambitions and are working to build up their own constituencies.1 Similarly, the 

paralysis of the justice system in large parts of the country, notably due to the lack of adequate 

security conditions following numerous attacks against judiciary and judicial infrastructure, 

has led to a justice vacuum that is in turn leading to the emergence of nonstate and often 

sharia-based justice systems. If Libyan authorities do not reinforce their authority over security 

and justice stakeholders and deliver adequate security and justice services to their citizens, the 

fragmentation of these sectors will threaten not just Libya’s political transition but also the 

fundamental cohesion in Libyan society and customary governance that has largely held the 

country together since the 2011 revolution.

Security Sector Landscape

Libya’s security sector landscape is defined in part by the many security actors of differing 

postures, political and ideological orientations, legalities, reporting structures, and areas of 

geographic control. It is also defined by the relatively minor role the National Police and National Army play. Unlike in 2013, which demonstrated some success in developing a national 

security landscape, increased fragmentation of the sector over the course of 2014 appears to 

have contributed to the development of regional—more precisely, city-based—security sector 

landscapes. This report thus focuses on Tripoli and Benghazi.

The most important dimension to consider in assessing Libya’s security sector is the nature 

of de jure command and control lines. The actors studied typically report to either the Ministries of Interior or Defense or to the chief of staff or are mandated without reference to any 

Libyan authority.2 In reality, the command and control lines may be rather different (see appendix B). This report, however, uses the de jure lines as a starting point for analysis.

The next key dimension, closely linked to command and control, is religious-political 

orientation for which actors have been categorized in four ways:

§	 institutional—Gadhafi-era security institutions, such as the National Police and 

National Army, that generally aim to preserve the prerevolutionary security order

§	 conservative—conservative postrevolutionary security actors, notably brigades (including those from Zintan, Warshefana, Warfalla, and other prominent eastern tribes) 

affiliated with communities that have opposed the postrevolutionary order they perceive 

to be dominated by Misrata3

§	 Islamist—security actors that share a desire for a political Islam and accept the political 

process, often belonging to communities that backed the 2011 revolution, such as 

Misrata, Zawiya, and Gharyan

§	 jihadist—security actors claiming to wage jihad to establish Islamic sharia in Libya, 

commonly opposing the political process and democracy, often citing democracy as a 

Western innovation

The last three categories are referred to in this report as auxiliary security actors and contrasted with institutional security actors.

The paralysis of the justice 

system in large parts of 

the country has led to a 

justice vacuum that is in turn 

leading to the emergence of 

nonstate and often shariabased justice systems. 
6 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

Finally, groups have been classified by their posture—whether they are military-leaning 

(adopting a combative posture, often operating away from their home base), police-leaning 

(adopting a more security focused posture, often operating in areas around their home base), 

or mixed. Several groups, such as the Supreme Security Committee (SSC), played key roles in 

Libya’s security landscape in 2014 but have since—on paper at least—disbanded.4

Dynamics

One of the main causes of the fragmentation of Libya’s security sector is the struggle between supporters of integrating revolutionary brigades into institutional actors, supporters of 

substituting institutional actors with revolutionary brigades, and supporters of marginalizing 

Islamist-leaning revolutionary brigades.

Integration 

Shortly after the revolution, anxious to avoid a security vacuum similar to that in Iraq after 

the Iraqi Army was disbanded in 2003, internal and international actors advocated to preserve 

prerevolutionary, institutional security institutions, such as the National Police and National 

Army. Part of this strategy aimed to integrate revolutionary brigades that had fought against 

the Gadhafi regime into these prerevolutionary institutions. The defection of a large number 

of National Army units to the revolutionary forces during the revolution bolstered the case 

for integration.

Implementing the strategy has proved particularly challenging, however, because expectations about how Libya’s security sector should be shaped in the post-Gadhafi era differ dramatically. Divisions between the institutional and revolutionary camps started to appear as 

early as July 2011, following the assassination of the commander of the Special Forces, Abd Al 

Fatah Younis, likely by Islamist hard-liners who were distrustful of an army against which they 

had waged an insurgency in the 1990s.5

From the institutional perspective, it was hoped that the integration strategy would 

strengthen the vulnerable National Police and National Army. However, thus far it has had 

little impact other than aggravating the sense of marginalization felt by soldiers and policemen. 

The police, for example, expected the fall of Gadhafi’s regime to improve their conditions and 

have been disappointed by the lack of progress in this regard. From the revolutionary perspective, the integration strategy has been particularly difficult because revolutionaries have often 

been perceived as having little value and being Islamist. An Islamist figurehead interviewed in 

Benghazi in June 2014 argued that “the lack of political will from both political and military 

authorities has largely explained the failure of the integration strategy.” These statements were 

corroborated by a Benghazi local council leader, who confirmed a reluctance among local police commanders to task revolutionaries with policing activities in the weeks and months after 

the fall of the regime.6

The failure of the integration strategy has led to the emergence of two others that both aim 

to achieve ideological dominance over Libya’s security sector. The revolutionaries’ approach can 

be described as a substitution strategy—revolutionary actors for institutional security actors. 

The institutionalists’ approach can be described as an exclusion strategy—designed to exclude 

revolutionary elements from the sector.

From the institutional 

perspective, it was hoped 

that the integration strategy 

would strengthen the 

vulnerable National Police 

and National Army. Thus far 

it has had little impact other 

than aggravating the sense 

of marginalization felt by 

soldiers and policemen. 
USIP.ORG 7

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Substitution

Since the early stages of the transition, several initiatives were undertaken to promote new security actors to operate in parallel with institutional actors, arguably with the long-term objective 

of replacing them. Revolutionaries and Islamists in particular supported these initiatives, which 

culminated in the creation of the SSC and the Libya Shield Forces (LSF). If the establishment 

of these new security actors was motivated by the necessity to fill the security vacuum, it also answered the desire of some political figures to build wholesale a new army and a new police force. 

Abderrezak Al Aradi, a leading Muslim Brotherhood figure in Tripoli who openly promoted 

the idea of a substitution strategy, was one of the main founders of the SSC.7 Deputy Minister 

of Defense Khaled Al Sharif, a former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) commander, 

designed the National Guard as a reservoir of recruits for a new national army.

Likewise, the first postrevolutionary Army chief of staff, Youssef Al Manqush, pursued 

the substitution strategy when creating the LSF, which was conceived as a substitute to the 

National Army. However, the opposition of National Army officers to the substitution approach and the divisions within the revolutionary camp between Islamists and conservatives 

meant that the plan had to be downgraded and the LSF given a temporary mandate while the 

National Army was reformed. However, with regard to the LSF, the substitution strategy has 

achieved some of its long-term objectives in that the LSF now claims to be the National Army 

and have a monopoly over the legal use of force.

Exclusion Strategy

The Youness assassination in July 2011 was a pivotal moment in the fight for the control of 

the Libyan security sector.8

 From then on, disagreements between Islamist- and institutionalleaning actors regarding the command of the security apparatus in Libya became increasingly 

violent. Initiatives to promote new or parallel security actors were perceived as attempts by 

the institutionalists to take over the security sector in Libya, and opponents described the 

SSC, LSF, and National Guard as “the Islamist camp’s military wings.” 9 This has led to retired 

Libyan Army General Khalifa Haftar’s exclusion strategy.10

Those in favor of the exclusion approach are mostly eastern-based National Police and 

National Army officers who worked under the former regime and feel unfairly treated even 

though they joined the revolution.11 Conservative security actors (such as the Zintani brigades) 

and tribes that made up the Gadhafi regime’s social base (such as the Warshefana, the Gadhadfa, and certain components of the Warfalla) are also supporters of the strategy in that they 

share Haftar’s negative perception of Islamist or revolutionary groups. Although the General 

National Congress (GNC) considers Haftar an outlaw, and despite the explicit objection of 

Army Chief of Staff Jadallah Al Obeidi, some army officers and army units, including the 

special forces, the navy, and the air force, openly joined Haftar’s camp when he announced 

the start of his Operation Dignity campaign against presumed Islamist terrorist groups. As a 

former LIFG member noted, “Haftar’s latest fighting has brought the different Islamist groups 

together. They’re now facing the same enemy despite the fact that in many cases they do not 

share the same ideas.” Despite making little progress on the military front, Haftar has built 

up his popular legitimacy thanks to a simplistic anti-Islamist discourse accusing the Muslim 

Brotherhood of being an externally funded terrorist movement.
8 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

Security Situation

Perceptions of the security situation in Libya are deteriorating steadily, with 58 percent reporting security to be “rather good” or “very good” in their area in summer 2014 versus 67 percent 

in summer 2013.

However, though this deterioration remains modest at the national level, it has been substantial in certain cities. In Tripoli, for example, 27 percent of residents believe that security is 

“rather bad” or “very bad” compared with 15 percent in 2013. Even more negative tendencies 

can be seen in Benghazi and Sabha districts. Whereas 20 percent of the population in Benghazi 

assessed security as being “very bad” in 2013, 48 percent did in 2014 (a result surpassed only by 

52 percent in Darnah). In Sabha, the percentage of the population ranking security as “very bad” 

has almost doubled over the last year, from 27 percent to 49 percent (see figure 1).

Figure 1. How would you evaluate security in your area?*

These results reflect the notable changes in security conditions in Sabha and Benghazi districts between 2013 and 2014. Both districts have seen repeated clashes for control of key assets 

and lucrative legal and illegal economic activities: Clashes for the port in Benghazi between LSF 

Shield and units operating under Khalifa Haftar in June 2014 left several wounded or dead.12

Interestingly, districts that are ethnically homogenous and have no sharp internal political 

divides appear to be much safer than their heterogeneous counterparts, and perceptions of security are clearly more positive than they were. In Misrata, which appears singularly safe compared with other major Libyan cities, perceptions are very positive and improving—with 69 

percent considering the security situation to be very good in 2014, versus 46 percent in 2013.13

Based on these perceptions, Misrata is Libya’s safest large city by a substantial margin, 

bettered only by Hun city in Jufra district at 81 percent. Outside big urban agglomerations, 

security perceptions tend to be substantially better. In districts such as Jufra, Marj, Al Butnan, 

and Al Jabal Al Akhdar, more than 50 percent of the population perceive security as very good 

(see appendix C).

0

20

40

60

80

100

Tripoli Misrata Benghazi Sabha Libya 2014 Libya 2013

■ Very good ■ Rather good ■ Neutral ■ Rather bad ■ Very bad ■ Don’t know ■ No answer

34% 36%

8% 11%

69%

25%

31%

16%

8%

19%

18% 18%

8%

4% 1% 1%

33%

13%

10%

49%

10%

21%

7%

13%

22%

17%

14%

14% 12%

11%

15%

48%

Note: 2,256 people surveyed.
USIP.ORG 9

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Focus on Tripoli

Whereas perceptions of security in Tripoli district were relatively positive in the summer of 

2013 ( just 15 percent of the population considered the situation very bad or rather bad), levels 

of dissatisfaction almost doubled, to 27 percent, by summer 2014. This change is likely related 

to the relatively high number of fatal clashes between rival armed groups that occurred in 

certain parts of the city over the last year. However, perceptions of security vary significantly 

within Tripoli depending on the urban sector (see figure 2).

Figure 2. How would you evaluate security in your area? 

Residents from areas that have been through several rounds of clashes feel less secure. 

Among respondents interviewed in the South Tripoli zone—including Abu Salim, Salaheddine, Al Hadba, Al Dreibi (Hay Sana’i), Airport Road, and Qasr Ben Ghashir—34 percent 

consider their local security to be rather bad or very bad, making it Tripoli’s most unsafe zone.14

That South Tripoli residents should report the worst security situation is not surprising given 

the demarcation line between Zintani groups on one side and Islamist-affiliated and revolutionary armed groups on the other that runs through the area. No fewer than seven rounds of 

fighting have occurred in these neighborhoods since June 2013. In many cases, districts in the 

Abu Salim and South Tripoli zone are populated by tribal groups that migrated from Tarhuna, 

Bani Walid, or southern areas; have been traditionally loyal to the former regime; and to date 

have generally rejected the authority of revolutionary groups in charge of policing and security 

tasks. Since the toppling of the Gadhafi regime, postrevolutionary Islamist groups, such as the 

Ghnewa SSC unit or the Salah Bakri’s Support Branch in Salaheddine, have been in charge of 

policing tasks in the Abu Salim and Salaheddine areas and reportedly have been involved in arbitrary arrests and instances of torture.15 Hence, when the Al Qa’qa’ Brigade, a Zintani-affiliated 

group, attacked Ghnewa’s headquarters in Abu Salim in June 2013, local armed elements joined 

the assailants to expel the SSC unit from their area. This breakdown in security often occurs 

when the population and superimposed local policing forces are not politically aligned.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

■ Very good ■ Rather good ■ Neutral ■ Rather bad ■ Very bad

29%

25%

16%

20%

10%

49%

Tajura

+ Eastern

Suburbs

13%

41%

19%

26%

Andalus

+ West 

Tripoli

Janzour

+ Western 

Suburbs

Old City

+ Central

Tripoli

25%

26%

24%

15%

10%

26%

40%

12%

18%

4%

40%

26%

7%

12%

15%

Suq

Al Jum’a

Abu

Salim +

South Tripoli

Tripoli

2014

Tripoli

2013

18%

27%

20%

25%

9%

25%

31%

16%

19%

8%

37%

34%

15%

8%

7%

2%

Note: 384 people surveyed.
10 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

It is instructive to compare Suq Al Jum’a zone in Tripoli with West and South Tripoli. 

Some 40 percent of Suq Al Jum’a residents feel very safe versus only 18 percent and 13 percent, 

respectively, in South and West Tripoli. This strong perception of security in Suq Al Jum’a 

is well founded. First, despite a relatively heterogeneous tribal composition, residents have a 

strong sense of local identity and only minor internal political divides. Second, the zone has 

two powerful and cooperative brigades, Al Nawassi (a former SSC unit that includes a special 

deterrence force) and the Suq Al Jum’a Martyrs, which are de facto in charge of policing the 

neighborhood and have strong military capabilities that deter outside interference. Finally, the 

local brigades benefit from both religious and revolutionary credentials—the heads of both 

brigades style themselves as sheikhs, and Suq Al Jum’a was one of the first areas in Tripoli to 

join the revolution.

Causes of Worry

In general, the level of threat Libyans reported increased dramatically from 2013 to 2014. Activities that involve movement outside their neighborhoods are the most worrying—traveling 

by car between cities in particular (56 percent very worried), followed by movements at night in 

their areas (41 percent). Paired interviews in Tripoli revealed an increasing fear of night movements to the extent that people were changing their traditional routines to be at home before 

dark. Intercity movement in fact ranks as significantly more worrying than night movement 

(see figure 3).

Figure 3. How worried are you when traveling between cities?

Political Tensions

In areas with strong political identities, such as Misrata or Suq Al Jum’a, the population is more 

subject to politically related concerns. Relatedly, 58 percent of Misratans, who feel very safe 

within Misrata, feel highly insecure when outside it (for full district detail, see appendix C). 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

■ Not at all ■ Not Very ■ Neutral ■ Very ■ Rather ■ Don’t know ■ No answer

15%

8%

3%

56%

17%

49%

By car 

between cities

Local

area at night

27%

12%

4%

41%

17%

5%

17%

25%

Daily

activities

Through

airports

Crossing

borders

24%

4%

14%

13%

33%

14%

3%

8%

7%

16%

47%

12%

2%

14%

1%

35%

12%

Note: 2,256 people surveyed.
USIP.ORG 11

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

This change is a significant increase from the 46 percent in summer 2013. Although these fears 

can be partially explained by repeated criminal attacks, such as carjacking, they are also based 

on considerations related to political affiliation. For example, paired interviews conducted in 

Misrata revealed numerous cases of political attacks on Misratan truck drivers when driving 

outside Misrata: “Truck drivers are an important component of the city’s economic activity and 

have a powerful syndicate. They have been victims of attacks in certain localities, we think for 

political reasons.”

Similarly, even though inhabitants of Suq Al Jum’a have better perceptions of security in 

their area and in conducting daily activities than their counterparts elsewhere in the capital, 39 

percent are very worried about travel through Tripoli Airport, which is under the control of a 

Zintani brigade, which is at the opposite end of the political spectrum. However, this is only 

slightly more than the 36 percent who report to be very worried when they pass through the 

airport, showing a broad concern over the repercussions of the airport being under control of 

political factions other than their own (see figure 4).16

Figure 4. How worried are you about traveling through the airport?

The capital’s neighborhoods are increasingly perceived as divided along political and ideological lines. A senior tribesman from the Warfalla tribe compared Tripoli with Beirut during 

the Lebanese civil war, when the city was divided into western and eastern sectors.17 Although 

this parallel is probably exaggerated, the reported proliferation of unidentified checkpoints, 

especially at night, is indeed reminiscent of that conflict. Interview respondents from Tripoli, 

especially females, reported worries about nighttime checkpoints. As a female student said, 

A month ago my mother and I were driving home in Al Siyahiya neighborhood when we 

were asked to pull over by bearded gunmen running a checkpoint in Tariq Al Shat, who 

ordered us not to drive at night alone without a male presence. We don’t drive to that part 

of the city at night anymore.

0

20

40

60

80

100

■ Not at all ■ Not Very ■ Neutral ■ Very ■ Rather ■ Don’t know ■ No answer

15%

3%

6%

14%

33%

Tajura

+ Eastern 

Suburbs

13%

Andalus +

Western 

Tripoli

Janzour +

Western 

Suburbs

Old City +

Central 

Tripoli

Suq 

Al Jum’a

Abu Salim

+ South 

Tripoli

 Tripoli

28%

8%

23%

4%

11%

36%

17%

6%

27%

4%

12%

28%

24%

9%

17%

9%

1%

35%

23%

5%

2%

6%

12%

9%

39%

17%

16%

12%

9%

3%

41%

23%

12%

10%

15%

6%

36%

22%

12%

1%

Note: 384 people surveyed.
12 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

Crime

Checkpoints and harassment are not the only explanation for the notable deterioration in perceptions of security. Fear of crime, always a determinant factor, has increased dramatically since 

2013. Compared with summer 2013, concerns about a range of crimes, such as carjacking, 

kidnapping, and house burglary, have increased considerably. Interview respondents in Hay Al 

Andalus confirmed this trend and reported the presence of gangs and bandits in the neighborhood released by Gadhafi before Tripoli was liberated. In addition, small groups of young men, 

usually affiliated to armed groups, have reportedly squatted in villas abandoned by pro-Gadhafi 

families, notably in the neighborhoods of Gharghour, Hay Al Andalus, and Gurji. Originally 

from cities such as Misrata, Nalut, and Zintan, these young and armed men fill a military role 

and are usually affiliated with armed groups in their hometowns. Empowered by this position, 

and outside of any form of social or family control, some of these young men are reportedly 

involved in criminal activities, a trend that increased after they stopped receiving salaries.18

Examining the fear of kidnapping in greater depth is worthwhile because it shows that the 

fear of crime more generally is on the rise in Libya. For example, 56 percent of respondents 

reported to be very worried about kidnapping in 2014, in comparison with 33 percent in 2013. 

Several high-profile cases of political kidnapping were well publicized in 2014. Among others, 

the sons of the minister of defense and the head of Al Saeqa Special Forces were kidnapped in 

Tripoli and Benghazi, respectively. GNC member Suleiman Zueibi was kidnapped at a Tripoli 

checkpoint run by a group from Zintan. Many criminal kidnappings, usually targeting young 

women and wealthy individuals, were also reported. Interviews with ordinary Libyans revealed 

that most cases are dealt with through private channels, and victims’ families avoid referring to 

the National Police for fear of retaliation.

Populations in Tripoli and Sabha are more worried about kidnapping than respondents 

from other parts of the country, with 74 percent and 65 percent, respectively, very worried, 

which is even higher than the 60 percent in Benghazi, where the population expressed the 

strongest overall perceptions of insecurity. Within Tripoli, wealthy zones such as West Tripoli 

and Central Tripoli appear to be more exposed to criminality, and residents there are significantly more worried about kidnapping (83 percent and 79 percent) than in other areas, such as 

Suq Al Jum’a (70 percent). This is likely because Central Tripoli and West Tripoli have more 

businesses, both international and diplomatic premises, and a wealthier population. Indeed, 

residential West Tripoli saw a number of kidnappings over the past year, including two South 

Korean diplomats in January (see figure 5).19

However, the rate of kidnappings reported in the survey has not statistically changed in the 

last year: The number of Libyans who said they or a member of their close family had been 

kidnapped was 4 percent in 2013 and 5 percent in 2014. Tripoli respondents reported similar 

numbers. In one sense, this is reassuring because it suggests that the crime level overall has been 

stable despite the political turmoil, the fragmentation of the security sector, and the paralysis 

of the justice system in certain parts of the country. Other crimes, such as theft from illegal 

checkpoints, have also not changed since 2014. The static results also highlight how rumors in 

Libya elevate fear of crime above the level commensurate with actual crime rates.

56 percent of respondents 

reported to be very worried 

about kidnapping in 2014, 

in comparison with 33 

percent in 2013. 
USIP.ORG 13

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Perceived Causes 

An understanding of what is driving these perceptions of insecurity and the extremely high 

levels of concern over certain scenarios can be better understood by examining table 1. The 

table shows that political considerations are perceived as main causes of insecurity, notably the 

absence or lack of National Police and presence of militia or undisciplined brigades rather than 

societal causes, such as drugs addicts and dealers.

Figure 5. How worried are you that you or a family member might be kidnapped?

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

■ Not at all ■ Not Very ■ Neutral ■ Very ■ Rather ■ Don’t know ■ No answer

3%

3%

15%

74%

Tripoli 

2014

Tripoli 

2013

Misrata Benghazi Sabha Libya

2014

Libya

2013

5%

9%

9%

34%

28%

14%

21%

3%

40%

20% 12%

19%

1%

60%

6%

1%

8%

18%

3%

65%

4%

9%

20%

57%

11%

8%

8%

22%

28%

33%

1%

18%

1%

1% 2%

2%

1%

3%

1%

Table 1. What are the main sources of insecurity in your area?

Survey Response Tripoli Misrata Benghazi Sabha Libya

 2014 2013

Militia or undisciplined brigades 14 12 13 13 12 10

Drug or alcohol addicts and dealers 10 9 4 6 7 14

Armed individuals or proliferation of arms 26 21 19 22 23 23

Religious fanatics 7 7 12 2 6 2

Unemployed youth 3 4 2 1 3 1

Absence or lack of police 25 19 28 29 28 28

Former regime elements 3 3 1 2 2 2

Tribalism 2 2 2 11 2 2

No answer 1 3 – – 2 1

Don’t know 2 13 2 1 4 4

Lack of social cohesion 3 1 2 4 2 0

Illegal migrations or smuggling activities – – 1 2 1 0

Government policies 7 6 12 7 8 13

Foreign intervention – – 1 – – –

Note: 2,256 people surveyed.

Note: Responses in percentages. 2,256 people surveyed.
14 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

Perceptions across most districts are strongly homogeneous about the causes of instability: a 

lack of police (28 percent), armed individuals (23 percent), militias (12 percent), drug addicts 

and dealers (7 percent), and religious fanatics (6 percent). In Darnah, an acute lack of institutional security actors is visible, with 42 percent of respondents pointing to the lack of police as 

driving insecurity. In both Darnah and Benghazi, some 12 percent identify religious fanatics, 

which correlates with the rise in jihadist movements in these cities. In Sabha, tribal clashes are 

people’s fourth largest worry (11 percent), more than in other cities where it gathers no more 

than 2 percent.

Overall, perceptions of security have substantially worsened in Libya since 2013. The deterioration appears to be primarily related to heightened intercommunity political tensions, but 

also to a rising fear of crime within big cities, especially in neighborhoods where police actors 

are absent. The presence or absence of policing actors, institutional or otherwise, strongly influences perceptions of the population.

Institutional Security Actors

One of the key results of the 2013 survey was that most Libyans supported institutional security actors over competing informal actors who emerged during the revolution and immediately 

after. This support was moderated, however, by the general perception of institutional actors as 

ineffective and lacking in integrity. The 2014 survey aims to revisit levels of support for the National Police over the past year; its goal is to track and qualify any notable changes. In addition, 

the 2014 survey includes a new component specifically assessing perceptions of the National 

Army due to its increased involvement in shaping the Libyan security sector.

National Police

In 2013, the National Police were recognized as the most active local security provider—32 

percent of respondents reporting that it was in charge of security in their area. In 2014, only 19 

percent did so (see table 2), making it the second most popular provider after the community.

The decreasing popularity of the police has done nothing to improve perceptions of other 

security stakeholders, such as the SSC and the LSF, both of which have seen sharp decreases 

in popularity since 2013. At the same time, local brigades have benefited from the security 

vacuum: The number of Libyans reporting their existence increased substantially, from 3 percent to 12 percent. These results highlight a security vacuum across Libya, a few districts—such 

as Misrata—excepted. Overall, 49 percent of Libyans believe that either no one (28 percent) or 

the community itself (21 percent) is in charge of security. This key finding shows a significant 

degradation since 2013, where “no one” and “we do” accounted for only 24 percent of the total. 

This security vacuum leaves room for the growth of criminal networks and new policing actors 

espousing jihadist ideologies.

Local realities are often more nuanced. In Misrata, considered Libya’s most secure major city, perceptions of the National Police have remained largely unchanged, with 28 percent 

of the city’s inhabitants considering it the most dominant security actor and only 13 percent saying that no one is in charge. This is partly because the dichotomy between pre- and 

postrevolutionary security actors that underlies much of the tension in other cities does not exist 

in Misrata and because of Misrata’s more advanced integration of revolutionary elements into 

institutional actors.20 As a Misratan revolutionary figure within the new local council explained, 

“The thuwwar of Misrata are the police, and the police are the thuwwar of Misrata.”21

49 percent of Libyans 

believe that either no 

one (28 percent) or the 

community itself (21 percent) 

is in charge of security. 
USIP.ORG 15

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Table 2. Who is in charge of security in your area?

No one 2014 28%

No one 2013 12%

Community 2014 21%

Community 2013 12%

National Police 2014 19%

National Police 2013 32%

Local brigade 2014 12%

Local brigade 2013 3%

National Army 8%

Local military council 3%

Don’t know 2%

Supreme Security Committee 2014 2%

Supreme Security Committee 2013 5%

Libya Shield Forces 2014 1%

Libya Shield Forces 2013 3%

Government 1%

Ansar Al Sharia 1%

Al Saeqa forces 1%

Khalifa Haftar 0%

Militias 0%

Border Guards unit 0%

Preventive security apparatus 0%

Although the community self-policing model shows some signs of success, it may well be 

contributing to increased fragmentation of the security sector. Table 2 shows the huge diversity 

of security actors operating in Libya. This diversity is also seen at local levels, which may be 

because security actors operate according to a logic of territorial control and rarely go beyond 

their territory.22 For example, when the Special Deterrence Force (SDF)—also known as the 

Al Nawassi Brigade—which has a reputation for efficiency, operates outside its home territory, 

it suffers from a lack of local legitimacy that has led to deadly clashes with groups in Fashloum, 

Abu Salim, and Garagsha.

Despite their decreasing role on the national level, a majority of Libyans continue to support the National Police, much as they did in summer 2013. It appears that short-term solutions, such as the SSC or the LSF, that have emerged as a response to the postrevolutionary 

security vacuum have had little impact on Libyans’ desires to see the development of a modern 

and institutionalized national police and army. Table 3 confirms this trend, showing 52 percent 

of Libyans wishing to see the National Police in charge of security provision.

As table 3 also shows, community self-policing increased from 4 percent to 9 percent, most 

responses being concentrated in cities characterized by tribal predominance, such as Sirte (21 

percent) and Bani Walid (19 percent). Both cities’ notables were loyal to the former regime and 

have conflicting relations with the new authorities in Tripoli and are thus reluctant to accept 

police forces reporting to a centralized authority. A member of the Social Council of Bani 

Walid—the city’s highest political authority—interviewed in 2013 and in 2014, confirmed 

that a certain number of guarantees must accompany the return of institutional actors in the 

Note: 2,256 people surveyed.

Short-term solutions, such 

as the SSC or the LSF, that 

have emerged as a response 

to the postrevolutionary 

security vacuum have 

had little impact on 

Libyans’ desires to see the 

development of a modern 

and institutionalized national 

police and army.
16 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

city. The population, he explained, “don’t want a force that will be in charge of arresting our 

children”—referring to the detainees from Bani Walid held in Misratan prisons without trial, 

a situation the government has done little to address.23

Another noticeable development since 2013 is the increase in Libyans who believe that 

the National Army should be in charge of local security, from 18 percent to 28 percent. This 

strengthening desire for military presence at a local level reflects growing despair at Libya’s 

worsening security situation and helps explain the 56 percent who support Khalifa Haftar’s 

military campaign in Benghazi.

Visibility

A strong positive correlation certainly exists between the visibility of the National Police and 

perceptions of their effectiveness. The correlation between the perceptions of visibility of the 

Traffic Police and of the National Police is also very strong.24 Specifically, better deployment of 

the Traffic Police, a less political unit and hence less provocative for competing armed groups, 

could contribute to increasing the perceptions of the efficiency of the National Police in general.

The visibility of the National Police decreased between 2013 and 2014, from 54 percent to 

41 percent. In line with 2013 results, male respondents (47 percent) reported seeing the National Police more often than their female counterparts did (35 percent), little surprise given 

that the conservative nature of Libyan society means that males are more inclined to conduct 

activities outside the home. Misrata is once again an exception when compared with other 

Libyan cities: the National Police there seeing little change in visibility (63 percent in 2013 and 

64 percent in 2014). This is a strong contrast with most other Libyan cities, especially Benghazi, where the National Police are half as visible as they were in 2013 (see figure 6).

Table 3. Who should be in charge of security in your area?

National Police 2014 52%

National Police 2013 62%

National Army 2014 28%

National Army 2013 18%

Community 2014 9%

Community 2013 4%

God 3%

Local military council 2%

Supreme Security Committee 2014 1%

Supreme Security Committee 2013 1%

Libya Shield Forces 1%

Local brigade 2014 1%

Local brigade 2013 0%

Preventive Security Apparatus 0%

Al Saeqa Forces 0%

Border Guards Units 0%

No one 0%

Internal Security Appartus 0%

Don’t know 3%

Note: 2,256 people surveyed.
USIP.ORG 17

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

In spring 2013, Minister of Interior Ashour Shuwail triggered a wave of enthusiasm within 

the ranks of the police as he boosted the police’s media profile and asserted his will to reform 

the service and tackle the proliferation of armed groups. Given the reduction in police visibility 

since 2013, the effect of improving police visibility in this manner appears to have been short 

lived. This may be explained in part by the inability of the National Police to deploy in areas 

of civil conflict, as can be seen in Benghazi or Sabha and certain neighborhoods of Tripoli. 

The difference in visibility between the South Tripoli zone (28 percent), the scene of repeated 

clashes, and West Tripoli’s residential zone (47 percent) is telling of this divide.

Photo 1. Police chief workshop, February 2014 (Media Square Multimedia).

Figure 6. How often do you see the National Police?

■ Daily ■ Weekly ■ Montly ■ Once a year ■ Never ■ Don’t know ■ No answer

Female 2013 Female 2014 Male 2013 Male 2014

20%

2%

13%

44%

5%

4%

18%

18%

11%

35%

28%

3%

4%

16%

65%

12%

1%

1%

5%

14%

47%

23%

11%

1%

2%

Note: 2,256 people surveyed.
18 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

Effectiveness

Perceptions of effectiveness of the National Police have also declined substantially, from 26 percent in 2013 to 15 percent in 2014 (see figure 7). Of the 72 percent ranking the National Police 

as ineffective, an extremely critical 29 percent score the effectiveness at 1 of 10.

Examining the results by location shows that perceptions have fallen in nearly all districts. 

Even in cities such as Misrata, where the National Police have proved to be a visible security 

actor, just 24 percent rate them as effective, a significant drop from the 35 percent in 2013. In 

Tripoli, Benghazi, and Sabha, 82 percent consider them ineffective. In Darnah and Sirte, 89 

percent and 66 percent do. In these last two districts, 68 percent and 43 percent, respectively, give 

the lowest possible score (1 of 10). This suggests that in cities where competing policing actors 

exist, such as Ansar Al Sharia, which is present in Darnah and Sirte, perceptions of National 

Police efficiency are undermined. However, paired interviews in both 2013 and 2014 revealed 

that Libyans often believe reporting crime to the National Police is the right thing to do.

This slump in perceptions of effectiveness shows that the drive for police reform seen in 

2013 under Ashour Shuwail has largely disappeared. The story of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) is worth examining to understand the limitations of police reform 

in Libya. Shuwail decided to merge the CID and the newly formed Counter Crime Agency 

(CCA) to better control the CCA while reinforcing the National Police’s capacity for investigations.25 However, this reform did not succeed once again due to a rift between institutional 

and revolutionary actors. The CCA was founded to work under the authority of the SSC, and 

0

20

40

60

80

■ Ineective ■ Neutral ■ Eective

Tripoli Misrata Benghazi Sabha Darnah Sirte Libya

82%

10%

8%

56%

19%

24%

82%

10%

8%

82%

10%

8%

89%

5%

6%

66%

8%

26%

72%

13%

15%

Figure 7. How effective are the National Police?

Note: 2,256 people surveyed.
USIP.ORG 19

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

some institutional CID staff perceived it as “a group of thugs and bandits.”26 The CID more 

generally, meanwhile, perceived the reform itself as an attempt to weaken the National Police. 

A police reform expert in Libya explained that the lack of willingness of the National Police to 

implement reforms and integrate revolutionary actors could be explained by a feeling among 

police officers of being marginalized by postrevolutionary actors. The police expert gave an 

example where a group of revolutionary trainees were not officially transferred to their police 

unit, and left without guidance, they had drifted back to their revolutionary brigades.27

National Army

The concept of a Libyan National Army is highly contested, as later results make clear. Many 

Libyans perceive today’s entity to be the remnants of the Gadhafi regime army. Islamistleaning, Misratan, and other revolutionary brigades think differently, defining the National 

Army as any groups operating under Army Chief of Staff Jadallah Al Obeidi. This report uses 

the first definition (for detail, see appendix B).

Historically, the Libyan National Army’s relative absence from public and political life, 

especially after its defeat in the war with Chad, meant that the public often saw it as a neutral 

and low-profile body. This perception changed during the revolution, when many easternbased units defected to the revolutionary brigades, creating positive support for the National 

Army. The assassination, it is believed by Islamist hard-liners, of Special Forces commander 

Abd Al Fatah Younis during the revolution triggered a further wave of support. The National 

Army’s profile has been raised once again by General Khalifa Haftar, who is supported by 

certain eastern-based National Army units. 

Photo 2. Army parade, Salah Al Din, Tripoli. September 2013 (Media Square Multimedia).

The concept of a Libyan 

National Army is highly 

contested. Many Libyans 

perceive today’s entity to be 

the remnants of the Gadhafi 

regime army.
20 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

Figure 8. Perceptions of the National Army and Special Forces

Perceptions of the National Army remain relatively poor, with 61 percent thinking that it is 

not doing a good job (see figure 8). Support is for the most part substantially higher in eastern 

districts—52 percent in Tobruk, 46 percent in Marj, 43 percent in Kufra, and 31 percent in Al 

Jabal Al Akhdar, though only 25 percent in Benghazi—than in western or southern districts—

such as Tripoli at 18 percent and Sabha at 27 percent. The lack of awareness concerning its role, 

as well as some negative perceptions, can be explained by its historically selective recruitment 

policy, which was limited to tribes such as the Gadhadfa or Warfalla in the west and certain 

branches of Al Obeidate in the east.28

Perceptions of the Special Forces (Saeqa) are better than those of the National Army, with 

44 percent of Libyans believing that they are doing a “good job in Benghazi” and supporting 

its actions against Islamist groups there. Support in Benghazi, at 52 percent, is higher than the 

national average. Rather than being based on performance or professionalism, support for the 

Special Forces is largely political, given their vehement opposition to Ansar Al Sharia.29

Overall, the National Army and its Special Forces enjoy strong popular support in their 

“war against terror.”30 This support is fragile, however, and could fall if the campaign led by 

Haftar does not succeed. As one Benghazi resident noted,

We know Ansar Al Sharia. They have undertaken a number of policing tasks successfully in the city, guarding schools and hospitals, whereas Al Saeqa forces failed in providing security. Al Saeqa are less organized and badly behaved. However, if Ansar Al Sharia 

is proved to be behind the assassinations, we are completely in support of Bou Khamada 

and Haftar.

So far, all assaults launched by Haftar appear to have failed, and his attempt to take control of Benghazi’s port in late June 2014 caused a number of deaths. It is possible that further 

casualties could trigger anger against Haftar as well as against Islamist-revolutionary brigades. 

Islamist figureheads with links to Ansar Al Sharia confirmed that “revolutionaries and Ansar 

Al Sharia are still in control of the city in spite of their modest military means.”31

■ Agree ■ Neutral ■ Disagree

34%

22%

44%

61%

16%

24%

Special Forces 

doing a good job 

in Benghazi

National Army

doing a good job 

in Libya

Rather than being based 

on performance or 

professionalism, support 

for the Special Forces is 

largely political, given their 

vehement opposition to 

Ansar Al Sharia.

Note: 2,256 people surveyed.
USIP.ORG 21

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Auxiliary Security Actors

Most of the brigades that emerged during the Libyan revolution benefited from a process 

of legalization as postrevolutionary authorities, particularly the National Transitional Council 

(NTC) and the Al Kib government, attempted to fill the security vacuum created by the fall 

of the Gadhafi regime and return to a state of normalcy. As described earlier, many brigades 

joined the newly created Ministry of Defense, others identified with the Ministry of Interior, 

and many more became affiliated with the Army Chief of Staff.

However, a few exceptions aside, this transformation has not prevented the majority of revolutionary brigades from becoming increasingly unpopular. This trend was noticeable in 2013 but 

has become increasingly obvious since then. The two actors that have taken the brunt of unpopular sentiments have been the brigades that developed contracts with the SSC and the LSF, 

which have charted rather different paths over the last year. While the SSC has dissolved—

with brigades either merging fully into institutional actors, such as the Special Deterrent Forces 

and the Rapid Intervention Force, or reforming outside the state, such as Ansar Al Sharia in 

Sirte—the LSF is still alive and is reported to be increasingly organized and well equipped (see 

appendix B).

The aim of this section is to measure change in perceptions regarding informal security 

providers and to understand how their evolution over the past year has affected perceptions of 

their visibility and effectiveness. In spite of the SSC’s official disbandment, the research team 

decided to reassess perceptions of it and compare them against 2013, because SSC-affiliated 

groups that now respond directly to the Ministry of Interior have largely kept the same structure and hierarchy, such as the SDF in Tripoli. Furthermore, paired interview respondents from 

several locations cited the SSC as an existing and active force.

Supreme Security Committee

The SSC was created by the NTC in late 2011 on the initiative of revolutionaries—including 

Abderrezak Al Aradi, Omar Al Khadrawi, and Fawzi Waniss Al Gadhafi—and by design reported to the Ministry of Interior. It aimed to bring together many local military councils and 

revolutionary brigades under one command and control structure to better provide security 

as the National Police and the National Army weakened.32 Whereas most security initiatives 

born from the security vacuum in Libya were implemented only at a local level, the SSC had 

a national reach and numerous branches across the country. In many cases, it took over police 

personnel and equipment.33 In some towns, the local police station was simply reformed as a 

branch of the SSC.34

Perceptions of the SSC have substantially worsened (see figure 9). In 2013, 23 percent of 

Libyans considered the SSC effective, but only 8 percent did in 2014. This is due partly to the 

disbandment of the SSC in many locations but mostly to a genuine and large drop in popularity. This assertion can be inferred because in Misrata, where the SSC had been disbanded for 

well over a year, positive perceptions still reached 19 percent, well above the national average of 

8 percent and statistically similar to the 25 percent in 2013. In Tripoli, where the SSC is also 

disbanded, just 7 percent believe it is effective, which demonstrates marked dissatisfaction with 

the auxiliary policing body. Reasons include perceptions of corruption, involvement in drug 

trafficking, kidnappings, and growing Islamization.

Despite such extremely poor perceptions, many former SSC units live on, such as the SDF 

in Suq Al Jum’a and the Ghnewa Brigade in Abu Salim (see appendix B). The prolonged 

In 2013, 23 percent of 

Libyans considered the 

Supreme Security Council 

effective, but only 

8 percent did in 2014.
22 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

existence of unpopular brigades such as Ghnewa indicates the military strength of many SSC 

units that allows them to survive in a hostile environment. However, in nearly all cases, these 

units distance themselves from the SSC brand.

Table 4 clearly maps the perceptions of a Libyan security vacuum. Some 67 percent of respondents reported that no one is in charge apart from the National Police and National Army. 

Table 4 also underscores the perceived importance of auxiliary security providers. In Misrata and Tripoli, 12 percent and 15 percent of respondents, respectively, reported the SSC as the 

most active brigade. The first reason for the perception is confusion over the identity of certain 

brigades that had been under the SSC and keep the same name today, such as the Al Nawassi 

Brigade. The second reason is that some groups continue to operate under the command of 

the Ministry of Interior but still enjoy a high degree of autonomy, such as Salah Bakri’s and 

Ghnewa’s brigades in Abu Salim.

The survey also reveals that younger generations were more inclined to identify with 

postrevolutionary actors than their older counterparts. Approximately 82 percent of older Libyans (age fifty-five and older) were unable to recognize a security actor in their area outside the 

National Police and the National Army. This percentage decreased to 62 percent among those 

between the ages of twenty-five to thirty-four, who are most likely to have personal connections with revolutionary brigades, given that brigade commanders and members are typically 

in the same age group.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

■ Ineective ■ Neutral ■ Eective

Tripoli Misrata Benghazi Sabha Libya

10%

8%

10%

8%

10%

8%

5%

6%

84%

10%

7%

15%

68%

14%

19%

89%

6%

5%

85%

9%

6%

84%

9%

8%

Figure 9. Is the SSC effective?

Note: 2,256 people surveyed.
USIP.ORG 23

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Table 4. What is the most active brigade in your area? 

Libya Shield Forces

The Libya Shield Forces were proposed in early 2012 by a popular colonel from Misrata, Salem 

Jeha, in an attempt to group former revolutionary brigades into a cohesive national force able to 

support the National Army in its peacekeeping missions, notably in Kufra, Sabha, and Zuwarah. 

The LSF were authorized the same year, are paid by the state, and nominally respond to an official chain of command, at the top of which is the Army Chief of Staff.

Unlike the SSC, which was disbanded beginning in 2013, the LSF role has been confirmed 

and supported by a number of government and GNC decisions, such as the mandate to secure 

a number of locations, notably Tripoli in November 2013 and Sabha in January 2014.

Only 15 percent of respondents believed the LSF effective, a result comparable to reported 

perceptions of the SSC, also a postrevolutionary security actor with an Islamic orientation 

(see figure 10). In spite of its national reach through its four Shield Divisions, the LSF seems 

to enjoy only local legitimacy in some areas. Whereas it was unpopular in Tripoli, Sabha, and 

Benghazi (15 percent, 15 percent, and 5 percent efficiency rating, respectively), it remained 

rather popular in Misrata (40 percent) and to a limited extent in other cities where it has a 

strong recruitment platform, such as in Zawiya (25 percent). Its open involvement in the fighting in Benghazi alongside Ansar Al Sharia has not helped the LSF’s image, despite repeated 

television commercials aiming to distance the group from the jihadist movement and to explain its motivations.

Tripoli Misrata Benghazi Sabha Darnah Sirte Libya

Supreme Security Committee 15 12 2 3 – 3 8

Libya Shield Forces 4 23 1 16 – – 6

Local brigade 10 9 4 4 13 2 7

Ansar Al Sharia – – 4 – 16 38 2

Tribal armed group – 2 – 4 – – 2

No one 63 46 82 68 71 46 67

Anti-crime unit – – – – – – –

Community 1 – – – – – 1

Army Chief of Staff 3 6 5 3 – 7 4

Ministry of Defense 2 – – – – – 1

Militias – – – – – – –

Don’t know 1 3 1 3 – 4 3

Note: Responses in percentages. 2,256 people surveyed.
24 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

The LSF’s extremely poor results in Benghazi and Tripoli were most certainly driven by the 

LSF’s involvement in fatal clashes with armed demonstrators in Benghazi in June 2013 (Shield 

1) and in Tripoli in November 2013 (Shield 6), which resulted in more than a hundred deaths.

Regarding Tripoli, it is surprising that the LSF did not enjoy strong support even within 

revolutionary strongholds such as Suq Al Jum’a, in spite of the area’s postrevolution political 

and military alliance with Misrata. This lack of support is likely related to the powerful Misratan identity of Shield 6, which has deployed in Tripoli on several occasions and thus reduced 

its credibility as a national force. Additionally, in November 2013, brigades from Tajura and 

Suq Al Jum’a clashed with Misratan-affiliated brigades within Shield 6 based in Tripoli. The 

head of Al Noussour Brigade from Suq Al Jum’a was killed in one of these incidents.

Interestingly, given that 15 percent of Sabhans believe that the LSF is effective, and 21 

percent of Sabhans believe that Shield 3 (Central Shield, from Misrata) in particular was doing 

a good job of securing Sabha, the LSF was the most popular security actor in Sabha, leading 

the National Army (12 percent) and the National Police (8 percent). One Shield 3 soldier 

noted, “Unlike our intervention in Sabha in 2012, we’re now more organized and have fixed 

term rotations. We’re not allowed to use our personal vehicles, and we’re transported by air to 

Tamenhent airbase near Sabha.”

Unsurprisingly, Misrata opinions of Shield 3’s operations in Sabha were at 37 percent, the 

highest in Libya, and at 20 percent Shield 3 had an above-average reputation in Tripoli as well. 

Key informant interviews with Shield 3 members indicate that the unit has indeed professionalized, which may explain the increased perceptions of its effectiveness.

These approval ratings remain very modest, however, and the main message is clear: Libyans have a very poor perception of both the LSF and the SSC. The tarnished images coupled 

with the security vacuum likely has created space for more disciplined independent security 

actors with alternative narratives to progressively impose themselves as key security actors in 

certain locations.

0

20

40

60

80

100

■ Ineective ■ Neutral ■ Eective

Tripoli Misrata Benghazi Sabha Libya

15%

5%

15%

72%

13%

15%

39%

21%

40%

87%

7%

69%

15%

73%

12%

Figure 10. Is the LSF effective?

Note: 2,256 people surveyed.
USIP.ORG 25

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Ansar Al Sharia

Ansar Al Sharia has two facets, a military wing increasingly visible as a Jihadist-Salafist violent 

extremist group and a rather less well-known philanthropic organization involved in providing 

social assistance. The movement’s philanthropic activities have allowed it to gain a foothold in 

several cities, including—from east to west—Darnah, Benghazi, Ajdabiyah, Sirte, Tajura, and 

Sabratha. Despite close ties with some revolutionary groups, such as Shield 7 in Benghazi, Ansar 

Al Sharia does not rely on a revolutionary narrative but instead on a discourse of Islamic unity 

that goes beyond the revolutionary fault lines. It has proved a particularly powerful recruiting tool 

in cities that were strongly divided in the revolution.

Eastern Regions

Ansar Al Sharia appears to have reached its most mature state in Darnah, where it has met with 

a large degree of success imposing itself as the sole security and justice actor in that city after the 

defeat of the National Police and National Army and the suspension of the judicial system.35

Ansar Al Sharia’s position in Benghazi is far more contested, though it is following a clear 

strategy to improve its foothold. The strategy relies first on developing a strong military capability in order to dominate as the sole security provider, as in Darnah and Sirte. Ansar Al Sharia in 

Benghazi tends to show off its military power and broadcasts videos and images of its convoys 

and military equipment on its Facebook and Twitter accounts and certain jihadist websites.36

Second, it has an active social policy with activities including distributing food to the needy, 

providing fighters with psychological support, and providing schools with teaching equipment. 

Third, it markets itself as having disciplined and efficient security and policing actors. Several 

paired interviews in Benghazi confirmed that its forces are generally regarded this way, despite 

broad support for Haftar. Also in Benghazi, Ansar Al Sharia aims to provide protection for visible infrastructure, such as universities and hospitals (such as the Jela Hospital), which helps it 

gain respect across the population. Finally, it also uses media effectively to broadcast the effects 

of its social, policing, and justice policies; that its radio station in Benghazi was bombed (as well 

as in Sabratha) reveals the power of local radio to Ansar Al Sharia.

Central Regions

Ansar Al Sharia’s Sirte branch, which is made up mainly of former SSC elements, appears to 

have learned lessons from the SSC, which was perceived as a revolutionary actor, rejected by 

most local tribes, and forced to leave the city in late 2012.37 It returned to Sirte in May 2013, 

however, after restructuring and rebranding and coming to an agreement with local tribes.38 Its 

ability to militarily impose order, mediate between tribes, and enforce their strict social code as 

a solution to the proliferation of drugs and weapons in Sirte contributed to the invitations for 

its forces to return.39 Since then, Ansar Al Sharia has been cautious to develop a good public 

image and build influence in a number of public services, including policing and education. 

Ansar Al Sharia has also established its own radio station in Sirte, which plays an important 

role in communicating the group’s alleged achievements and engaging with the population. 

After receiving calls by some members of the community publically denouncing what they 

described as Afghan uniforms, the movement has provided its members with modern and 

disciplined uniforms.40

Ansar Al Sharia does not rely 

on a revolutionary narrative 

but instead on a discourse 

of Islamic unity that goes 

beyond the revolutionary 

fault lines. It has proved 

a particularly powerful 

recruiting tool in cities 

that were strongly divided 

in the revolution.
26 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

Western Regions

In the west of Libya, Ansar Al Sharia’s branches in Tajura and Sabratha have a more moderate 

discourse limited to religious issues. Key informant interview respondents reported that Ansar 

Al Sharia engages successfully with youth who are often disappointed by their experience 

in the other militias and who no longer receive state salaries.41 Its stance is rather moderate 

even in politics: Following the bombing of its radio station Al Tawheed in Sabratha in May 

2014, Ansar Al Sharia issued a moderate statement in which it refused to excommunicate 

members of the government or the National Police and National Army, an attempt to distance 

the movement from the head of Ansar Al Sharia in Benghazi, Mohammed Al Zahawi, who 

excommunicated the Libyan government in late June.42 While promoting this moderate discourse, Ansar Al Sharia in Sabratha, along with other branches, benefits from popular discontent toward institutional, traditional, and postrevolutionary security actors and portrays itself 

as an independent actor not involved in corruption or struggles over power, reminiscent of its 

successful strategy in Sirte and Benghazi. The movement’s Salafi credentials also help it build 

a constituency within a Libyan population deeply influenced by a quietist Salafi ideology.43

Policing Role

Survey respondents were asked to whom they would refer if they were a victim of a burglary 

(see table 5). Examining the responses by location shows that in areas where the Ansar Al 

Sharia presence is strong, particularly Benghazi, Darnah, and Sirte, most replied “no one” and 

were less likely than average to refer to the National Police: 26 percent, 12 percent, and 10 percent, respectively, against a national average of 40 percent. Key informant interviews showed 

that tribal structures are increasingly unable to provide security and justice in today’s Libya. For 

example, even in Al Wahat (Ajdabiyah city), a very tribal area where 19 percent of the population reported they would refer to their tribe or family after a burglary, interviews with elders 

confirmed a state of societal weakening. The elder lamented this as “an inability to control our 

sons anymore.”44 This trend could lead to a vacuum, a potential entry point for groups, such as 

Ansar Al Sharia, to intervene and provide policing and justice services where the tribes and 

institutional actors are failing. As a powerful symbol, Ansar Al Sharia in Sirte occupies the 

headquarters of the local branch of the SSC, which was the Internal Security Department 

under the Gadhafi regime.45
USIP.ORG 27

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Don’t knowNo answer

Tripoli 1 38 43 1 2 5 1 4 2 4 –

Misrata 1 56 19 9 2 3 – 5 2 5 –

Benghazi – 26 59 1 – 6 – 1 5 2 –

Sabha – 37 42 3 1 13 – 1 2 1 –

Al Jabal Al Akhdar 2 53 25 – – 12 – – 6 2 –

Darnah – 12 74 – – 5 2 4 – 3 –

Al Wahat – 38 36 2 – 19 – – 2 2 –

Al Jabal Al Gharbi – 50 34 1 4 3 1 5 – 2 –

Zawiya 1 45 31 3 1 7 1 4 4 1 –

Sirte – 10 59 2 – 20 – 7 2 – –

Al Margeb 2 37 51 1 1 7 – – – 2 –

Marj 2 57 30 2 – 5 – – 4 – –

Kufra – 53 35 – – 12 – – – – –

Nalut – 61 32 7 – – – – – – –

Al Butnan – 67 25 – – – – 5 3 – –

Al Niquat Al Khms – 50 42 3 – – 2 1 2 – –

Aziziya 1 25 54 2 2 9 – 3 2 1 1

Bani Walid 5 45 39 – – 4 – 2 5 – –

Jufra – 42 28 – 16 5 – 10 – – –

Murzuq – 36 36 – 4 – – 24 – – –

Note: Responses in percentages. 2,256 people surveyed. Local Civil Council National Police Nobody

SSC/PSA/LSFLocal military councilTribe/FamilyGovernment/MinistriesLocal brigade

National Army

Table 5. Who would you go to if your or your family’s house were burgled?

Informal Security Actors

Beyond revolutionary and religious credentials, most informal or extra-legal security actors assert their legal legitimacy and dispute the legal status of other groups. One of the most controversial subjects in Libya today is defining the boundaries of the National Army, which depends 

heavily on personal convictions and generational grouping. Perceptions of legal legitimacy of 

the LSF and the Petroleum Facilities Guards (PFG) illustrate this dynamic.

The LSF is a legal security actor under the command of the Army Chief of Staff. Libyans 

have not reached any consensus that the LSF is actually part of the National Army, however, 

and from this lack of consensus, perceptions of legality can be inferred.
28 USIP.ORG

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0

20

40

60

80

100

120

26%

8%

8%

35%

13%

8%

12%

Tripoli Misrata Benghazi Sabha Libya

20%

52%

4%

8%

18%

2%

17%

2%

2%

14%

6%

6%

56%

17%

2%

8%

30%

36%

13%

8%

4%

7%

27%

39%

16%

7%

3%

■ Denitely ■ Somewhat ■ Neutral ■ Not really ■ Not at all ■ Don’t know ■ No answer

Figure 11. Is the LSF part of the National Army?

Although 27 percent of Libyans consider the LSF to be definitely part of the National 

Army, 39 percent did not (see figure 11). Perceptions are notably uneven among districts and 

are a function of the predominant political identity. For example, in Misrata and Zawiya, both 

known for being reservoirs of recruitment for the LSF, greater than average proportions of 

the local population believe the LSF is part of the National Army (60 percent and 48 percent, 

respectively). In Benghazi, however, 61 percent consider it not to be part of the National Army, 

despite its important physical presence there, and this negative perception is undoubtedly influenced by recent clashes involving the LSF. Similarly, poor figures were seen in Kufra, suggesting 

that Shield 7 is poorly perceived there as well, though these results are not as robust statistically. 

Sabha, where 38 percent of the population considered the LSF to be part of the National Army, 

is an interesting case in which the reputation of Shield 3 appears to be rather better than other 

LSF units.

Note: 2,256 people surveyed.

The PFG was founded in 2007 as a unit of the Libyan Army and was based in Al Brega. 

Now it is based in Tripoli, in the Salaheddine area. However, it is only after the revolution that 

the force gained ground as it has become an important reservoir for former revolutionaries and 

armed men. As a matter of fact, the PFG counted only some two thousand members, while the 

force has now up to fifteen thousand members. This was made possible by the NTC decision in 

August 2011 mandating the PFG to protect oil fields and infrastructure. The defection of the 

PFG commander Ali Ahrash to the NTC has facilitated the latter’s decision and improved the 

force’s revolutionary credentials. Mainly composed of ex-revolutionary, the PFG force is perceived by most Libyans as a postrevolutionary security actor. Most units integrated to the PFG 

were organized along tribal, ethnic, and regional faults lines.

The PFG’s involvement in a number of clashes between armed groups has shaped an image 

that is not in line with the older generation’s expectations of what the Libyan Armed Forces 

should look or act like. The PFG’s Central Division, under the command of Ibrahim Jadhran, 

blocked eastern oil terminals and tried to export oil without the authorization of the Libyan 
USIP.ORG 29

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

government. Indeed, perceptions of the PFG are a good example of how older generations 

perceive the legality of revolutionary actors generally.

Although 61 percent of Libyans between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four consider the 

PFG to be part of the National Army, only 37 percent of older Libyans feel the same way 

(see figure 12). The correlation between age and perceptions of illegality across a number of 

postrevolutionary actors is similarly strong, as mentioned earlier. This correlation also applies to 

postrevolutionary groups assessed in this survey, such as the LSF or the Libya Revolutionaries 

Operations Room (LROR). Leaders in their early thirties may lack credibility among the older 

generations, but expanding their visibility might reinforce confidence in the security institutions 

among a particularly youthful society.

Figure 12. Are the Border and Petroleum Facilities Guards part of the National Army?

However, a substantial part of the population, both young and old alike, do not recognize 

the legality of any of Libya’s current security actors, institutionalist or postrevolutionary. These 

low confidence levels correlate well with the security vacuum identified earlier. This vacuum 

leaves room for the emergence of new independent groups trying to gain the confidence of the 

population with new narratives and local approaches to service delivery.

Conclusions

Four major conclusions are especially significant: First, Libya’s security landscape has fragmented even further since the 2013 research and is splitting along clear institutional-revolutionary lines. Second, perceptions of security have also worsened substantially, driven by intercommunal tensions and rising fear of crime. Third, support is strong for institutional security 

and justice actors despite the fragmentation of the security and justice sectors. Fourth, the rise 

in auxiliary security actors is linked to the lack of visibility and efficiency of the institutional 

security providers, particularly the National Police.

0

20

40

60

80

52%

9%

4%

17%

12%

16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+

16%

2%

■ Denitely ■ Somewhat ■ Neutral ■ Not really ■ Not at all ■ Don’t know ■ No answer

47%

11%

4%

5%

21%

12%12%

42%

8%

6%

4%

23%

17%

39%

11%

2%

8%

19%

21% 29%

23%

6%

9%

28%

5%

Note: 2,256 people surveyed.
30 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

• Libya’s security landscape has fragmented further. Libya’s security sector is highly 

fragmented and characterized by the relatively minor role that institutional security 

actors play. Since 2013, the roles of both the National Police and the National Army 

have further declined across the country. Libya’s security sector is thus characterized 

by the increased role of auxiliary forces, often paid by the state but outside real state 

control, and the struggle between institutional security actors and these auxiliary 

forces. This fragmentation is occurring along increasingly clear fault lines, the most 

important of which is the nature of command and control lines. Actors typically report 

to either the Ministries of Interior or Defense or to the Chief of Staff or act essentially 

independently of any Libyan authority. The next key fault line is religious-political 

orientation, for which actors can be classified in four ways: institutional, conservative, 

Islamist, or Jihadist.

• Public perceptions of Libya’s security situation have worsened. Since 2013, perceptions of security have worsened considerably both at the national and local levels. As 

of summer 2014, 58 percent of Libyans believe that security is “rather good” or “very 

good” compared with 67 percent a year earlier. This decline remains modest at the 

national level, but degradation in certain cities has been substantial. In Tripoli, 27 

percent of the population thought that security was “rather bad” or “very bad” in 2014 

against 15 percent in 2013. In Benghazi, the corresponding figures were 48 percent in 

2014 and 20 percent in 2013. Districts that are ethnically homogenous and have no 

sharp internal political divides appear to be safer. In Misrata, perceptions were quite 

positive and improving, 69 percent considering the security situation very good in 

2014, up from 46 percent in 2013. Consensus on what Libyans perceive is causing 

instability is strong: a lack of police (26 percent), armed individuals (21 percent), 

militias (12 percent), drug addicts and dealers (7 percent), and fanatics (6 percent).

• Support for institutional security actors remains strong. Despite significantly 

declining perceptions of the efficiency and visibility of institutional actors, Libyans 

across the country are strongly attached to the concept of institutional security actors. 

The National Police are perceived as much more legitimate and efficient than competing policing actors, such as the SSC or local brigades operating under the Ministry of 

Interior. This point is also confirmed by Libyans’ reluctance to recognize the legal 

status of postrevolutionary security actors. Only a minority recognized the legality of 

groups such as the LSF, the Qa’qa’ brigade, and other auxiliary actors, despite the fact 

that they all benefit from a legal mandate and nominally operate under the command 

of the Army Chief of Staff.

• Auxiliary security actors have increased their local visibility. In spite of Libyans’ 

desires to see an efficient and visible National Police, support for the National Police 

in its current form has dropped from 32 percent in summer 2013 to 19 percent, making it the second most popular security provider in Libya after the communities 

themselves. Analysis has shown a statistical correlation between the visibility of the 

National Police and perceptions of their performance. As cities increasingly have been 

the scene of inter-militia fighting, the National Police has gradually withdrawn from 

the streets. When asked, “Who provides security in your community?,” answers such 

as “the community” or “local brigades” increased significantly compared with 2013.

Within the context of ongoing rounds of fighting in Tripoli and Benghazi, the population 

is turning to short-term solutions, such as local brigades. These groups are mainly composed of 
USIP.ORG 31

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

local youth, among which some joined from or were still members of security actors, such the 

SSC or military councils. They have thus enjoyed easy access to weapons and, most important, 

a certain legitimacy in providing policing tasks. Further driving the reinforcement of local security actors is that most of them operate according to a logic of territorial control, preventing 

the emergence of any competing security actor, institutional or otherwise.

Final Thoughts

This research has shown that restoring security and establishing the rule of law in Libya is of the 

highest importance to the Libyan population. At the time of writing, insecurity in the country, 

mainly the result of clashes between rival political blocks, has increased enough in several major cities to severely disrupt people’s daily routines. Understanding how to restore security and 

justice is becoming increasingly complicated as Libya’s security and justice landscapes become 

increasingly fragmented as, in turn, an array of security and justice actors try to build up their 

local and national legitimacy on tribal, territorial, and ideological credentials.

Libyans have strong and relatively cohesive opinions on how they want their security and 

justice sectors to be shaped, however. In 2014, they demonstrated again a clear preference for 

institutional actors over postrevolutionary actors. The National Police and the National Army 

remain the most popular of a wide range of security actors operating in Libya at present, and a 

majority of the population still refer to the state justice system rather than the parallel nonstate 

and often sharia-based justice systems starting to emerge.

Despite the popularity of institutional actors, current events and the rapidly deteriorating 

security situation are accelerating the emergence of competing security and justice actors. These 

actors do not have much popular support at present. However, if Libyan authorities do not 

quickly reinforce their authority and begin to deliver adequate security and justice services to 

their citizens, these competing actors could displace the institutional security and justice providers in the long term. This deep fragmentation of the security and justice sectors would threaten 

not just Libya’s political transition but also the fundamental cohesion in Libyan society that has 

largely held the country together since the 2011 revolution.
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Appendix A. Objectives, Methodology, and Sampling

The objective of this research was to study Libyans’ perceptions of the security and justice 

sectors, to assess the popular legitimacy of the current security and justice actors, and to understand Libyans’ needs in terms of delivery of security and justice services.

Specific objectives included

• updating the summer 2013 baseline indicators with summer 2014 indicators that are 

statistically meaningful at both a national level and for several key districts (Tripoli, 

Benghazi, Misrata, and Sabha);

• assessing Libyan perceptions of causes and solutions of insecurity;

• assessing attitudes toward institutional and auxiliary security actors and understanding why Libyans prefer one security actor over another;

• assessing Libyans’ preferences over which security actors should have a legal use of force;

• identifying narratives used by the security actors in the media to boost their legitimacy; and

• assessing attitudes toward the state justice system and understanding perceptions of 

the justice system’s compliance with sharia.

Research Approach

Results were derived from four research modules:

§	 a landscape mapping that included a literature review and key informant interviews

§	 a national survey

§	 paired interviews with both youth and middle-aged and male and female Libyans

§	 a narrative assessment of Libyan television and social media outlets

Landscape Mapping

Literature review

• Ashour Shuwail, “Arab Spring Consequences on the Security Sector: A Reality and 

a Vision” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2014)—describes 

the main challenges facing the security reform in Libya

• International Crisis Group, “Trial by Error: Justice in Post-Qadhafi Libya” (ICG, 

April 2013)—discusses deficiencies in Libya’s justice sector and stresses the necessity 

to stop militia-like justice

• International Legal Assistance Consortium, “Rule of Law Assessment Report” 

(ILAC, May 2013)—presents the affairs of the Libyan justice sector, its challenges 

and its achievements

• Jason Pack, Karim Merzan, and Mohamed Eljarh, “Libya’s Faustian Bargains: 

Breaking the Appeasement Cycle” (Atlantic Council, May 2014)—analyzes the causes 

of the general degradation of Libya’s political, economic, and security situation

• Frederic Wehrey and Peter Cole, “Building Libya’s Security Sector” (Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, August 2013)—examines the dynamics behind 

the deterioration of the security situation and the failure to reform a security sector 

that is extremely fragmented 
USIP.ORG 33

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

• Wolfram Lacher and Peter Cole, “Politics by Other Means: Conflicting Interests in 

Libya’s Security Sector” (Small Arms Survey, October 2014)—a comprehensive 

description of attempted security sector reforms, failures, structures, and main challenges since 2011

• Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn, eds., The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath 

(Oxford University Press, February 2015)—describes in detail the evolution of the 

security sector since 2011

• Wolfram Lacher, “Libya’s Fractious South and Regional Instability” (Small Arms 

Survey, February 2014)—examines political and military dynamics in the south, 

offers a comprehensive understanding of the impact of transnational communities on 

the security situation in the south

• Wolfram Lacher, “Fault Lines of the Revolution” (German Institute for International 

and Security Affairs, May 2013)—details how military and political dynamics interact 

in Libya and the emergence of two competing political-military blocs in the country

Key Informant Interviews

A series of interviews were conducted in May and June 2014 with experts, police officers, 

judges, lawyers, brigade members, tribal and community leaders, religious leaders, and politicians to identify the past and present security and justice structures, to identify current issues, 

and to support the design of the quantitative and qualitative research tools. All informants have 

been kept anonymous for their security.

National Survey

For the national survey, 2,340 Libyans from all twenty-two districts of the country were interviewed through Altai’s call center in Tripoli to produce robust national results. Quotas were 

set using a proportional-to-population sampling approach, which made use of the population distribution in each district (shabiah) from the 2006 Libyan Census and the population 

pyramid estimated by the United States Census Bureau. Approximately 48 percent of survey 

respondents were females. The data has been post-weighted to match the best available demographic profile (see figure A1). By design, the survey oversampled Libya’s key districts of 

Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata, and Sabha, which permits statistically meaningful comparisons 

across these four key districts. National results can also be disaggregated by gender and age 

group using demographic information collected in the questionnaire. In Tripoli, results were of 

sufficient quality to disaggregate results into six distinct zones: Janzour and western suburbs, 

Abu Salim and south Tripoli, Hay Al Andalus and west Tripoli, Suq Al Jum’a, Tajura and 

eastern suburbs, and the Old City and Central Tripoli (see figure A2). Overall, national results 

are accurate to ±3 percent, and key district results to ±5 percent.
34 USIP.ORG

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Figure A1. Paired interview locations

The 2014 survey questionnaire was similar to that for the 2013 study, though substantial 

changes were made to reflect changes in the security and justice sectors. Several key indicators 

were kept to allow tracking of trends. The final tool included approximately sixty questions.

Figure A2. Six Tripoli zones

TRIPOLI 

MISRATA

ZUWARAH

GHARYAN

MISRATA AJDABIYAH

BENGHAZI BAYDA

SABHA

MURZUQ

Nalut Al Jebel Al Gharbi

Wadi Shati

Ghat

Wadi Al Hayat

Murzuq

Kufra

Jufra

Al Wahat

Sirte

Al Butnan

Darnah

Al Jabal Al Akhdar 

Marj 

Benghazi 

Margeb

Jif 

N Al. Khums 

Paired interview locations

 0 100 200 300 400 500 Kilometers

Al Fatih

Ayn Zarah

Shatal al Ghabat

Bu al Ashhar Tajura Suq Al Jum’a

Bab Tajura

Bu Sittah

Bab Akkarah

Abu Salim

Tripoli

Bab Qarqarish

Qarqarish

Qabilat Awlad 

Bin Ahmad

Janzour

0 1 2 4 Kilometers

N

Tajura and eastern suburbs

Suq Al Jum’a

Abu Salim and south Tripoli Janzour and Western suburbs

Hay Al Andalus and 

West Tripoli

Old City and 

Central Tripoli
USIP.ORG 35

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Table A1. Questionnaire Structure

Paired Interviews

To better understand results from the quantitative survey, a series of paired interviews were 

conducted after the survey. For each, two ordinary citizens of similar sociodemographic profiles—such as young women at Tripoli University, young men at a shisha café in Misrata, and 

so on—were arbitrarily selected. Because the interviewees usually knew each other, they were 

able to discuss and debate openly within the boundaries of a semi-structured, open-ended 

guideline. These interviews had two main objectives:

• to obtain a deeper understanding of developments in the local security and justice 

landscape, the presence of different security and justice actors, and trends; and

• to understand reasons behind trends identified in the quantitative survey.

In total, thirty interviews were conducted with a total of sixty participants in ten cities. Interviews planned for Kufra and Sirte could not be conducted due to local insecurity. Youth were 

between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five. Older participants were age forty-five and up.

Sections Example Data Points

Demographics gender, age, location, main occupation

Perceptions of security local security, national security, frequencies of specific security incidents, 

responsibility for security

Attitudes toward prerevolutionary institutional 

security actors 

visibility, trust, effectiveness, honesty, preferred security providers

Attitudes toward postrevolutionary security actors visibility, trust, effectiveness, honesty, preferred security actors

Media and security sector narratives media role in shaping perceptions of security actors

Attitudes toward the justice sector trust, effectiveness, honesty, preferred justice actors, motivations

Table A2. Interview Participants

Tripoli 1 1 1 1

Benghazi 1 1 1 1

Misrata 1 1 1 1

Ajdabiyah 1 – 1 –

Bayda 1 – 1 –

Bani Walid 1 – 1 –

Gharyan 1 – 1 –

Murzuq 1 – 1 –

Sabha 1 1 1 1

Zuwarah 1 1 1 1

Total 30

High School Young Older University-Educated

Educated Young Males Females Men Youth
36 USIP.ORG

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Sampling

The sample frame was designed from the three best available sources of Libyan demographic 

information:

• The 2006 Libyan census, United Nations OCHA, Common and Fundamental 

Operational Datasets for North Africa provides population estimates by district, 

though the data is not disaggregated by any other characteristic.

• The 2013 U.S. Census Bureau population pyramid provides an estimate of Libya’s 

population pyramid—specifically, the numbers of males and females for each age year.

• The Libya Statistics Book 2009, General Authority for Information verifies the 2006 

census data and the U.S. Census Bureau extrapolations and also provides estimates 

of household size and foreign populations.

The sample plan required interviewing individuals stratified by district, gender, and age (in 

five age bands), and oversampling in four key districts (Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata, and Sabha). 

2,340 interviews were conducted between May 14 and June 19, 2014. Several interviews were 

rejected when the interviewer felt the respondent had not been candid, leaving a final dataset 

of 2,303 interviews.

Figure A3. Final sample of 2,303 individuals

Female Male

 Female Male Grand

16–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55+ Total 16–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55+ Total Total

Tripoli 49 54 46 24 23 196 49 61 47 23 25 205 401

Benghazi 40 53 44 24 8 169 47 57 46 22 23 195 364

Misrata 34 55 43 24 20 176 47 59 44 23 22 195 371

Bani Walid 5 2 4 1 2 14 6 7 5 3 3 24 38

Aziziya 11 11 12 7 3 44 14 15 13 6 6 54 98

Al Margeb 12 14 11 6 4 47 12 16 11 8 6 53 100

Al Jabal Al Gharbi 8 11 8 5 4 36 9 11 8 5 4 37 73

Zawiya 8 9 8 4 2 31 8 10 9 4 4 35 66

Al Niquat Al Khms 7 8 7 4 1 27 8 10 9 4 5 36 63

Al Jabal Al Akhdar 5 6 5 3 2 21 6 7 5 3 3 24 45

Marj 5 6 5 3 3 22 5 6 5 2 2 20 42

Al Wahat 5 6 5 3 2 21 5 6 5 2 2 20 41

Darnah 1 5 7 2 4 19 5 9 2 2 1 19 38

Al Butnan 4 7 5 2 18 4 6 5 4 19 37

Sirte 4 7 5 1 17 1 7 7 1 16 33

Sabha 41 56 44 25 23 189 47 57 45 23 23 195 384

Nalut 3 1 3 4 1 12 3 2 5 2 12 24

Murzuq 5 2 2 9 1 3 1 3 1 9 18

Ash Shati 1 4 2 3 10 5 1 3 9 19

Wadi Al Haya 1 3 1 2 1 8 1 4 2 1 1 9 17

Jufra 2 3 1 6 1 2 3 1 7 13

Kufra 1 4 1 1 7 1 2 1 2 1 7 14

Ghat 1 1 1 2 3 4

Grand Total 241 326 274 152 107 1100 282 360 278 148 135 1203 2303
USIP.ORG 37

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

The sample of 2,303 individuals was post-weighted using the described demographic 

sources to give a final weighted sample of 2,256, on the basis of which the charts in this report 

were derived.

Thus, national-level figures are presented with an accuracy of ±2 percent. Key district data 

is presented with a minimum accuracy of ±5.1 percent.
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Key Indicators

Table A4. Key National and Regional Security Indicators

Summer 2013 Summer 2014

1 Security situation in area is good or very good

Nationwide 67 58

Tripoli 85 56

Benghazi 62 26

Misrata 80 87

Sabha 42 25

2 National Police are definitely effective*

Nationwide 26 15

Tripoli 24 8

Benghazi 19 8

Misrata 35 24

Sabha 25 8

3 Seeing National Police officer daily

Nationwide 54 41

Tripoli 57 35

Benghazi 52 20

Misrata 63 64

Sabha 46 29

4 Justice system definitely effective *

Nationwide 11 11

Tripoli 11 5

Benghazi 8 11

Misrata 11 13

Sabha 9 11

5 Worried about travel between cities

Nationwide 27 56

Tripoli 30 61

Benghazi 33 62

Misrata 17 39

Sabha 40 70

6 Victim of items stolen at illegal checkpoint

Nationwide 9 12

Tripoli 12 15

Benghazi 9 10

Misrata 6 6

Sabha 10 11

7 Most active brigade is Ansar Al Sharia

Nationwide 1 2

Tripoli – –

Benghazi 9 4

Misrata – –

Sabha – –

8 Would visit state justice for burglary

Nationwide 62 33

Tripoli 65 36

Benghazi 63 22

Misrata 67 47

Sabha 66 23

Note: All figures in percentages. 

* 2014 data grouping response levels 9 and 10
USIP.ORG 39

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Appendix B. Security Actors

Ministry of Interior

National Police

The National Security Directorate (NSD), formerly the National Police General Directorate, 

has a presence in all twenty-two Libyan districts, giving it a national reach rarely achieved by 

other security actors. All policing units of the National Police work under the NSD: the Municipal Guard and the Diplomatic Protection Police as well as the regular policing units—the 

Station Police, Patrol Police, Traffic Police, and the CID.

Whereas the Egyptian and Tunisian police forces were perceived as essential components 

of the former regimes’ repressive apparatuses, the National Police in Libya played a marginal 

role relative to the Ministry of Interior’s Internal and External Security Branches. Already weak 

before the revolution, the National Police today has lost much of what little policing capacity it had. An international security advisor noted, “The National Police leadership is lacking 

motivation and determination to reform. They are on standby but hang on their positions. They 

perceive any reform attempt as a threat to their power and have rejected the integration of newly 

trained recruits in their police stations on many occasions.”

As a result, with the exception of a few figureheads, the Libyan revolutionary camp has largely 

spared the National Police, the structure of which has been preserved in many parts of the country.

It suffers from many structural and operational problems, however. Reforms have been 

isolated and inefficient because of the lack of a comprehensive and unified strategy at the 

Ministry of Interior. The ministry itself is undermined by ongoing struggles between oldguard institutionalists and newly appointed revolutionaries, as well as divided along political, 

regional, and sometimes tribal fault lines. Hundreds of former revolutionaries invited to join 

the National Police were not assigned positions after their training, symptomatic of the absence of a strategic plan and the reluctance of the old guard to integrate revolutionaries.

Most of the efforts to reform the police are focused on Tripoli. However, the capital is 

divided into five militia-controlled territories, and both the role of the National Police within 

these territories and the effect of police reform programs are marginal. Attempts at reforming the police outside Tripoli have been sporadic and uncoordinated. Only the Diplomatic 

Protection Police, which is of particular interest to the international community, seems to have 

undergone a successful reinforcement. It is currently headed by Fawzi Abu Katf, the former 

head of the February 17th Brigade in Benghazi, which is unique given that few revolutionaries 

hold leadership positions within the National Police.

The initial weakness of the National Police under the Gadhafi regime, coupled with its increased vulnerability in the aftermath of the revolution, allowed new actors to take over policing 

tasks. As a result, the National Police found itself in competition with other armed groups, in particular the Supreme Security Committee. Further compounding the situation, competing groups 

often paid their staff more, lowering police morale. Many policemen opted to join alternative 

policing actors in certain locations to benefit from higher salaries and better-regarded positions.

Special Deterrence Forces (Al Nawassi Brigade)

Based in Matiga airport in Tripoli’s district of Suq Al Jum’a, the Salafi-oriented Al Nawassi 

Brigade operated under the authority of the SSC until the SSC was disbanded in 2013. Affiliated with the 8th Support Branch, it is in early 2015 under the command of First Lieutenant 

Abd Al Raouf Karra, a former revolutionary who joined the Ministry of Interior. The SDF is 
40 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 108

prominent within Tripoli’s security landscape and has important military means at its disposal. 

Its forces have built up a certain respectability in Tripoli thanks to their discipline and successes 

in combatting drugs. However, its various strong local and political identities are provoking 

some communities outside Suq Al Jum’a to reject them.

Special Operations Force

The Special Operations Force (Quwat Al Amaliyat Al Khasah) was created by former deputy 

minister of interior Omar Al Khadrawi, an Islamist-leaning figure, as an elite policing unit. When 

Zintani armed groups took over control of the Ministry of Interior in July 2013, however, they also 

took control of the Special Operations Forces, which they are now deploying in Tripoli to demonstrate their policing capacities in an attempt to redeem their fairly poor reputation among the 

local population. For example, the Special Operations Forces played a notable role policing petrol 

stations in western Tripoli in the June 2014 petrol shortages. The Special Operations Force should 

not be confused with the National Army Special Forces operating in Benghazi.

Supreme Security Committee (disbanded)

Among the various substitutes to the National Police that emerged after the revolution, the 

Supreme Security Committee stands out as one of the largest and longest-lived initiatives. 

Ultimately, it failed to impose itself as a valid alternative to the police and was progressively 

disbanded in 2013 and 2014, first in Benghazi and Misrata then in the western regions. Many 

of its former members now operate under the Mobile National Force or the LSF Western 

Division. As of early 2014, some forty thousand SSC members had declared their willingness 

to join the security institutions, mainly the National Police, and twenty thousand had already 

undergone the necessary integration training.

Former SSC Brigades

It is worth mentioning several brigades that used to operate under the SSC that are now operating as individual units reporting to the Ministry of Interior. The Special Deterrence Force, as 

mentioned, is one. It is based at the Matiga airbase, controls a swath of eastern Tripoli, and has 

built a reputation for counter-drugs operations. Hashem Bishar, former head of SSC Tripoli, now 

leads the Rapid Intervention Force (Qawat Atadakhul Sari), which operates in a similar fashion 

to Al Nawassi.

The Ghnewa Brigade and Bakri Support Branch Brigade are Salafi-oriented ex-SSC units 

operating in Abu Salim. As SSC units, they were pushed out by Zintani brigades (with popular 

support) in June 2013 but returned to Abu Salim in July 2014. The Knights of Janzour (Fursan 

Janzour) were until late 2013 an SSC unit but now operate locally in Janzour. However, although 

the Knights of Janzour are nominally under command of the Ministry of Interior, many of its 

members in reality report to the Army Chief of Staff, and this muddled reporting system is typical of many former SSC brigades operating in Tripoli that have an array of personal connections.

Army Chief of Staff

National Army

Under the former regime, the eastern-based National Army was understaffed and highly fractured—according to the International Crisis Group report “Divided We Stand,” published in 
USIP.ORG 41

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

September 2012—“with independent lines of communication” among different brigades. In 

addition to the National Army, the former regime relied on a number of loyal brigades, the most 

important of which were under the command of Gadhafi’s sons, such as the famous Brigade 

32—headed by Khamis Gadhafi and the Special Forces headed by Saadi Gadhafi. These brigades 

were better equipped and trained than the regular National Army units. During the revolution, 

according to a general interviewed in March 2013, many of their soldiers died or fled the country.

Several revolutionary brigades, to pacify the country, were integrated into the National 

Army, whether the Military Intelligence and Military Police, new Army units, the now-defunct 

National Guard, or the invigorated Border and Infrastructure Guards. Some former Gadhafibrigade soldiers reportedly also joined the newly created units. For example, the First Infantry 

Brigade of the Borders and Infrastructure Guards has been accused by revolutionary brigades 

of having integrated Brigade 32 members. Salem Derbi, Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade operating in Darnah, accuses Al Qa’qa’ of being trained by the United States and of having integrated 

Brigade 32 members.

Today, the National Army is fragmented and weak and lacks soldiers as well as lowerranking officers. Some divisions or brigades play a crucial role in the security landscape, but the 

lack of coordination and unclear chains of command weaken the Army’s effectiveness. In the 

West, where it traditionally had very few units, the National Army’s presence remains sporadic, 

a few exceptions—such as an Islamist-leaning 3rd Infantry Division in Tajura—aside. According to army officers interviewed during the research period, little has been done to improve 

working conditions: Salaries are still very low, and no major reforms have been implemented 

so far, except for the Navy that appears to attract particular foreign assistance.

Special Forces

Under the Gadhafi regime, the National Army’s Special Forces were Libya’s most elite army 

unit, based only in eastern Libya. It now counts a few thousand paratroopers and commandos 

and is often seen as a symbol of the new Libyan armed forces and is popular in Benghazi for its 

stance against Ansar Al Sharia. The Special Forces should not be confused with the Ministry of 

Interior’s elite policing unit, the Special Operations Forces, or the Suwa’iq Zintani brigade operating in Tripoli. The Zintani brigade are clearly trying to emulate the National Army Special 

Forces, to the extent that they use the pluralized name of the National Army Special Forces, 

suwa’iq, meaning thunderbolts.

First Infantry Brigade

The First Infantry Brigade is one of the key National Army units in the east that extensively 

recruited tribal elements in the aftermath of the revolution to counterbalance revolutionary 

forces. While reluctant at the beginning of Operation Dignity to join Khalifa Haftar, Hamid 

Bilkhayr, the brigade commander, finally opted to support Operation Dignity in May 2014, 

reportedly under the pressure of his military officers.

Qa’qa’ Brigade

The Qa’qa’ Brigade was also established in Zintan in 2011, and its trajectory is similar to that 

of the Suwa’iq Brigade. It has since remodeled itself, without legal authority, as a unit of the 

National Army—the First Infantry Brigade of the Borders and Infrastructure Guards. It nominally reports to the Army Chief of Staff.
42 USIP.ORG

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Libya Shield Forces

Authorized under Law no. 47 in 2012, the LSF is an official body tasked with supporting the 

National Army in peacekeeping missions. Its reputation was badly damaged by several incidents 

in 2013, particularly fatal clashes with demonstrators in Benghazi in June 2013, after which LSF 

units across the country have been increasingly perceived as being military wings of local Islamist 

interests. As a direct result of the Benghazi clashes, the GNC decided on June 9, 2013, that the 

LSF’s Eastern Division hand over their bases to the National Army’s Special Forces division. 

However, as of summer 2014, elements of the LSF are still alive and reported to be increasingly 

organized and well equipped.

The LSF has three main divisions, Eastern, Central, and Western Shield Divisions, making it 

the security provider with the greatest geographical coverage after the National Army and National Police. However, it is hardly a homogenous force because under these loose division-level alliances are numerous individual brigades that retain their own distinctive leadership and ideologies.

Eastern Shield Division

The Eastern Shield Division is composed of four shields that are themselves made up of 

Benghazi-based revolutionary brigades:

§	 Shield 1 is under the command of Wissam Bin Hamid and is mainly composed of 

members of the Ahrar Libya Brigade. It was the Shield 1 attack on armed demonstrators 

in Benghazi that left more than thirty dead in June 2013. Shield 1 is said to be the first 

LSF brigade.

§	 Shield 2 is under the command of Buka Al Eribi and is thought to be more moderate 

than other shields, though it has the same political interests as other shields in Benghazi.

§	 Shield 7 is under the command of Mohammad Al Garabi and Ismail Sallabi and is 

known for its hard-line Islamist positions and gathers elements of the February 17th and 

Rafallah Al Sahati Brigades.

§	 Shield 10 absorbed former elements of the SSC in Benghazi and appears to be less visible and influential.

In 2013, the Eastern Division was heavily engaged in peacekeeping missions in the south 

of the country, particularly in Kufra. However, Shield 7 declared its withdrawal from Kufra 

following the GNC decision asking Shield 1 to evacuate Benghazi in June 2013. LSF support 

in eastern Libya is generally limited to Islamist circles, and though many LSF leaders became 

popular for their actions during the revolution, many are now discredited. Wissam Bin Hamid, 

the once-popular young leader of Shield 1, is now a wanted individual since he is suspected of 

commanding the killing of forty demonstrators in Benghazi in June 2013.

Central Shield Division

The Central Shield Division is divided into two main entities with rather different structures 

and ideologies.

Shield 6, or Misrata Shield, comprises some twenty brigades from the Misrata and Zliten 

Brigades, which have largely preserved their structures. The different brigades rotate between 

the different positions where Shield 6 is deployed: Sirte, Jufra, Bani Walid, Tarhuna, Al 

Khoms, and in certain locations in Tripoli, such as Gharghour. In November 2013, brigades 

operating under Shield 6 were involved in confrontations that led to the killing of almost 

forty Benghazi demonstrators.
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PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Shield 3 was founded by Army Colonel Salem Jeha, who led the revolutionary forces in 

Misrata during the revolution and then set up the Misrata Revolutionaries Union. It is reportedly—according to a soldier returning from Sabha, where Shield 3 has been involved in 

peacekeeping operations—less politicized and more disciplined than Shield 6.

Western Shield Division

The Western Shield Division is less visible and effective than the other divisions due to intercity tensions that affected brigade willingness generally to align under the LSF umbrella. 

As a result, according to an army general interviewed in 2013, brigades from Tripoli provided 

fewer than 20 percent of the LSF’s soldiers in 2013. Initially, the LSF was composed of forces 

provided by the local military councils of Zawiya, Zuwarah, Zintan, Nalut, and some Misrata 

units in the western region and deployed to resolve conflicts between clashing western towns, 

such as Regdalin and Jmeil. However, after interbrigade clashes over the Millita oil refinery 

in 2012, the Zintanis withdrew from Western Shield. The remaining structure was renamed 

the Mobile National Forces (MNF). However, indicative of the complex personal alliances 

between brigades and the LROR, some units still identify themselves with the Western Shield 

name and have been involved in clashes against Special Operations Forces in Tripoli as recently as July 2014.

Mobile National Force

The MNF, which, in spite of the “national” name, operates only in northwestern Libya, was created by the NTC in May 2012 to replace the LSF Western Division. The MNF follows Islamist 

goals and responds to the Army Chief of Staff, Abdulsalaam Al Obaidi, who has reportedly 

been close to the Islamist camp since 2011. It is mainly composed of revolutionary brigades 

from Zuwarah, Zawiya, Sabratha, and even Misrata. Although the MNF played an important 

role in imposing ceasefires in Sabha, Mezda, Bani Walid, and Zuwarah, it has not completely 

supplanted the Western Shield Division, and some units associate with both security bodies.

Libya Revolutionaries Operations Rooms

The LROR, set up in 2013 by GNC chairman Nuri Abu Sahmayn, was officially tasked with 

protecting the capital. Its members were responsible for kidnapping then Prime Minister Ali 

Zeidan in October 2013, after which the GNC stripped the LROR of its protective mandate. 

According to the BBC’s May 2014 article “Guide to Key Libyan Militias,” LROR members 

are close to LSF’s Western Shield Division brigades.

Joint Operations Security Room

Originally a forum between all security actors in Benghazi (even opposing ones, such as the 

LSF and Special Forces), the Joint Operations Security Room was taken over by the Special 

Forces after the Jela Hospital was taken over by Ansar Al Sharia. The Special Forces use the 

facility, to an extent, to coordinate their efforts against Ansar Al Sharia but also to try and 

project a more capable policing posture in Benghazi to win over popular support.
44 USIP.ORG

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Preventative Security Apparatus

The Preventative Security Apparatus (PSA) was created in Benghazi after the revolution with 

the objectives of arresting former regime elements and protecting eastern frontiers. It is composed mainly of Islamist revolutionary elements.

Army Officer Brigades

After the revolution, several National Army officers built up new brigades such as the Zawiya 

Martyrs Brigade and the Awfiyah Brigade. These officers often brought some soldiers with 

them, but they also recruited civilians. These units are often conservative, however, and are highly 

opposed to Islamist-leaning actors, such as the LSF, MNF, PSA, National Guard, and LROR: 

Units such as the Zawiya Martyrs Brigade have clashed with LSF units in the past. They report 

to the Chief of Staff in name only, enough to be able to draw National Army salaries.

National Guard

The National Guard was designed by the Deputy Minister of Defense Khaled Al Sharif to 

protect state institutions, oil fields, and other sensitive sites and serve as a recruitment pool for 

the National Army. Supposed to be composed of eight thousand revolutionaries selected mostly 

from Abd Al Hakim Belhaj’s Tripoli Military Council, it was never fully operational and has 

little relevance today.

Ministry of Defense

During Gadhafi’s regime, the Ministry of Defense did not exist. It was only created in 2011 and 

therefore struggles to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the public, the army, its chief of staff, and 

the ruling elites unfamiliar with this type of institution. Under these circumstances, with the 

exception of a few rather powerful Zintani-affiliated brigades, very few security actors yet report 

to the Ministry of Defense.

Suwa’iq Brigade

The Suwa’iq Brigade was established in 2011 and originates in Zintan. It participated in the 

assault on Tripoli in September 2011, after which, in October 2012, it was placed under the 

control of the Ministry of Defense. There it enjoyed a close relationship with Usama Al Juweili, 

a Zintani field commander who served as minister of defense in 2011 and 2012, and offered 

Zintani brigades a legal mandate and authority to sign arms deals. It used to provide personal 

protection for key NTC figures and is currently active in Tripoli and the Nafussa Mountains 

area. It has in recent months been physically controlling the Ministry of Interior.

Petroleum Facilities Guards

The PFG was founded in 2007 as a unit of the Libyan Army and was based in Al Brega. Now 

it is based in Tripoli, in the Salaheddine area. However, it is only after the revolution that the 

force gained ground as it has become an important reservoir for former revolutionaries and 

armed men. As a matter of fact, the PFG counted only some two thousand members, while 

the force has now up to fifteen thousand members. This was made possible by the NTC decision in August 2011 mandating the PFG to protect oil fields and infrastructure. The defection 

of the PFG commander Ali Ahrash to the NTC has facilitated the latter’s decision and im-
USIP.ORG 45

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

proved the force’s revolutionary credentials. Mainly composed of ex-revolutionary, the PFG 

force is perceived by most Libyans as a postrevolutionary security actor. Most units integrated 

to the PFG were organized along tribal, ethnic, and regional faults lines.

Independent Actors

Divisions within the security sector and the inability of official actors to provide security services 

have catalyzed the proliferation of entities that largely operate independently of any Libyan 

government entity or personality. Some, such as the jihadi brigades, are highly ideological, while 

others are rather more conservative, such as the tribal battalions and General Haftar’s supporters.

Jihadi Brigades

Several jihadi brigades have emerged in Benghazi, such as Ansar Al Sharia and the Rafallah 

Al Sahati Battalion, both of which espouse hard-line jihadi ideologies and engage equally in 

policing and enforcing social codes as well as more military and insurgency pursuits. The presence of Ansar Al Sharia or other jihadi movements in Libya cannot be explained by their ability to project force only. Their presence also finds its roots in their ability to provide successful 

governance and public services. Before its alleged involvement in assassination campaigns and 

attacks against foreigners, Ansar Al Sharia had built up a respected reputation in Benghazi by 

providing security to a variety of vulnerable sites, such as schools and hospitals. Its members 

also appeared disciplined and respectful, as opposed to National Army Special Forces soldiers 

and militiamen. Recent rumors that Ansar Al Sharia has received military vehicles from the 

Army Chief of Staff underscore how blurred the lines have become between governmentcommanded groups and Ansar Al Sharia. Indeed, the Rafallah Al Sahati Battalion officially 

belongs to Libya Shield 7.

General Haftar

At the opposite end of Libya’s ideological spectrum lies General Haftar, who has been categorized as an independent actor in this report, given that the Army Command, the Army 

Chief of Staff, and the GNC have each described him as an outlaw and explicitly objected to 

his Operation Dignity. However, on the ground Haftar has a fair degree of support among 

the institutionalist security actors, including the Special Forces and the Waqwaq Brigade controlling Benina (Benghazi) Airport. Al Saeqa Special Forces under the command of Waniss 

Bou Khamada announced their alliance with Haftar over the objection of Army Chief of Staff 

Jadallah Al Obeidi.

Tribal Battalions

Some tribal battalions operate largely independently of Libyan government entities or personalities. For example, the Warshefana Battalion, which controls much of the South Tripoli 

Zone, has clashed several times with Islamist brigades, such as Bakri’s ex-SSC Support Branch 

Brigade based in Abu Salim, and the Special Deterrence Force from Suq Al Jum’a, most 

recently in January 2014.
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Appendix C. District Charts

Table C1. How would you evaluate security in your area?

Very 

Good

Rather 

Good Neutral

Rather 

Bad

Very 

Bad

Don’t 

Know

No 

Answer

Tripoli 25 31 16 8 19 – –

Misrata 69 18 8 1 4 – –

Al Jabal Al Akhdar 53 35 – 2 10 – –

Benghazi 11 15 11 14 48 1 –

Darnah 12 17 10 7 52 – 2

Al Wahat 35 32 15 – 18 – –

Al Jabal Al Gharbi 56 16 11 3 14 – –

Zawiya 53 25 8 6 9 – –

Sabha 8 17 14 12 49 – –

Sirte 26 12 37 9 16 – –

Al Margeb 38 16 14 15 17 – –

Marj 62 16 9 2 10 – –

Kufra 13 34 39 – 13 – –

Nalut 44 13 27 – 16 – –

Al Butnan 63 26 7 – 4 – –

Al Niquat Al Khms 51 22 11 1 15 – –

Aziziya 16 24 18 8 34 – –

Bani Walid 41 32 12 9 6 – –

Wadi Al Haya 4 32 4 10 50 – –

Jufra 81 14 – 5 – – –

Ash Shati 63 17 4 7 9 – –

Murzuq 17 38 30 9 6 – –

Ghat 46 20 34 – – – –

Note: All numbers in percentages.
USIP.ORG 47

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Table C2. How worried are you when traveling between cities? 

Not 

at All

Not 

Very Neutral Rather Very

Don’t 

Know

No 

Answer

Tripoli 8 7 4 17 61 2 –

Misrata 26 9 4 19 39 3 –

Al Jabal Al Akhdar 20 11 – 17 52 – –

Benghazi 13 6 3 14 62 3 –

Darnah 24 22 2 21 31 – –

Al Wahat 18 7 – 14 60 – –

Al Jabal Al Gharbi 8 9 1 21 60 – –

Zawiya 24 9 3 18 47 – –

Sabha 8 7 2 12 70 1 –

Sirte 18 2 – 5 75 – –

Al Margeb 18 12 2 22 47 – –

Marj 17 5 – 24 53 2 –

Kufra 28 7 – 15 47 4 –

Nalut 24 – – 42 33 – –

Al Butnan 22 13 6 15 45 – –

Al Niquat Al Khms 16 7 2 16 54 6 –

Aziziya 14 3 3 18 62 – –

Bani Walid 13 5 – 20 62 – –

Wadi Al Haya 6 – – – 89 4 –

Jufra 15 5 – 13 67 – –

Ash Shati 6 8 3 4 75 4 –

Murzuq – – 21 16 63 – –

Ghat 20 – – – 80 – –

Note: All numbers in percentages.
48 USIP.ORG

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Table C3. Who should be in charge of security in your munteqa? 

Tripoli 50 – 1 27 – 4 1 – – – 10 – – 3 3

Misrata 52 – – 24 3 3 – – – – 11 – – 2 4

Al Jabal Al Akhdar 54 – – 31 2 – – – – 2 7 – – 2 2

Benghazi 51 1 1 28 – 1 1 1 1 – 6 – – 3 6

Darnah 66 – – 21 2 – 4 – – – 2 – – – 7

Al Wahat 50 – – 27 – – – – – – 8 – – 13 2

Al Jabal Al Gharbi 50 1 – 26 – – 3 – – – 14 – – 5 1

Zawiya 49 1 – 34 1 – 3 – – – 3 2 – 4 2

Sabha 46 1 – 36 1 2 – – – – 10 – – 3 2

Sirte *26 – – 48 – 3 – – – – 21 – – – 3

Al Margeb 56 – – 29 1 1 3 1 – – 8 – – 1 –

Marj 55 5 – 21 – – – – – – 10 – – 4 5

Kufra 53 – – 15 – – – – – – 28 – – – 4

Nalut 44 – 15 20 – 2 4 – – – 9 – – 6 –

Al Butnan 66 – – 29 – – – – – – 5 – – – –

Al Niquat Al Khms 46 – 2 40 – 1 – 1 – – 10 – – – –

Aziziya 50 – – 34 – 1 – – – – 10 – – 2 3

Bani Walid 50 – – 27 – – – – – – 18 – – 5 –

Wadi Al Haya 51 6 7 14 – – 6 – – – 12 – – 4 –

Jufra 64 – – 21 – – – – – – 15 – – – –

Ash Shati 65 – – 11 – 3 – – – – 3 – – 18 –

Murzuq 84 – – 13 – – – – – – 3 – – – –

Ghat 80 – – 10 – – – – – – – – – – 10 National Police Khalifa Haftar Supreme Security Committee National Army Libya Shield Forces Local Brigade Local Military Council Preventive Security Apparatus Al Saeqa Forces Border Guards Units Community No One Internal Security Apparatus God Don’t Know

Note: All numbers in percentages.
USIP.ORG 49

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Table C4. What are the main sources of instability in your district?

Tripoli 14 10 26 7 3 25 3 2 1 2 3 – 7 – – –

Misrata 12 9 21 7 4 19 3 2 3 13 1 – 6 – – –

Al Jabal Al Akhdar 13 3 21 7 3 30 1 – 1 4 3 3 10 – – –

Benghazi 13 4 19 12 2 28 1 2 – 2 2 1 12 1 – –

Darnah 5 2 12 11 3 44 – 1 – 3 3 – 15 – – –

Al Wahat 12 2 32 4 4 32 – 3 – 5 2 – 5 – – –

Al Jabal Al Gharbi 9 10 26 5 3 26 3 1 1 7 2 2 6 – – –

Zawiya 10 9 26 4 2 32 – 2 1 3 2 – 9 – – –

Sabha 13 6 22 2 1 29 2 11 – 1 4 2 7 – – –

Sirte 11 12 20 4 2 33 – – 1 7 – 1 9 – – –

Al Margeb 15 7 21 5 1 33 1 3 2 3 3 – 4 – – –

Marj 13 7 15 7 5 24 2 7 5 5 – – 10 – – –

Kufra 3 – 3 3 – 37 – 3 – – 14 3 26 7 – –

Nalut 6 21 24 3 5 20 1 – – 5 – – 15 – – –

Al Butnan – 1 15 9 8 37 – – – 12 4 4 9 – – –

Al Niquat Al Khms 13 4 22 5 4 30 – 2 7 4 – – 9 – – –

Aziziya 15 6 28 3 2 31 2 1 1 1 1 1 10 – – –

Bani Walid 13 8 25 2 3 25 5 3 3 7 1 – 3 4 – –

Wadi Al Haya 8 – 21 2 9 47 – 9 – – – 3 – – – –

Jufra 27 – 33 – – 10 7 – – 14 – – 8 – – –

Ash Shati 3 6 9 4 11 28 3 – 18 10 – – 6 – – –

Murzuq 5 – 9 – – 37 – 16 – – – – 32 – – –

Ghat – – 34 – – 20 – – – – – – 46 – – –

Note: All numbers in percentages. Militia-Brigades Drugs and Alcohol Arms Religious Fanatics Unemployed Youth

Lack of Police

Former Regime Elements

Tribalism

No Answer

Don’t KnowLack of Social Cohesionllegal Migrations-SmugglingGovernment Policies

Foreign Intervention

Petrol Shortage

February 17th Revolution
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Figure C1. Are the National Police effective?

Figure C2. Is the National Army effective?

Tripoli

Misrata

Al Jabal Al Akhdar

Benghazi

Darnah

Al Wahat

Al Jabal Al Gharbi

Zawiya

Sabha

Sirte

Al Margeb

Marj

Kufra

Nalut

Al Butnan

Al Niquat Al Khms

Aziziya

Bani Walid

Wadi Al Haya

Jufra

Ash Shati

Murzuq

Ghat

■ Ineective ■ Neutral ■ Eective

82% 10% 8%

56% 19% 24%

41% 35% 24%

82% 10% 8%

90% 10%

89% 11%

81% 4% 15%

75% 5% 19%

89% 11%

62% 11% 27%

86% 7% 7%

54% 21% 25%

54% 26% 20%

52% 9% 38%

60% 36% 4%

43% 20% 36%

81% 7% 12%

66% 8% 26%

82% 10% 8%

89% 5% 6%

68% 19% 13%

64% 12% 23%

69% 11% 20%

Tripoli

Misrata

Al Jabal Al Akhdar

Benghazi

Darnah

Al Wahat

Al Jabal Al Gharbi

Zawiya

Sabha

Sirte

Al Margeb

Marj

Kufra

Nalut

Al Butnan

Al Niquat Al Khms

Aziziya

Bani Walid

Wadi Al Haya

Jufra

Ash Shati

Murzuq

Ghat

■ Ineective ■ Neutral ■ Eective

75% 11% 14%

64% 15% 20%

54% 23% 23%

52% 20% 27%

77% 23%

92% 5%

76% 3% 21%

90% 10%

77% 5% 18%

67% 20% 13%

81% 10% 9%

53% 24% 24%

37% 22% 41%

60% 24% 15%

71% 20% 9%

31% 28% 41%

70% 16% 14%

77% 7% 16%

73% 15% 12%

64% 20% 16%

66% 17% 16%

58% 10% 32%

65% 17% 18%

3%
USIP.ORG 51

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN LIBYA

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to acknowledge the support of Peter Cole, an independent security 

expert, in identifying and analyzing the myriad of security and justice actors in Libya. Field 

research in Libya was managed by Abdurahman Al Basir and Esra Mhanni from Al Istishari, 

Altai’s research partner in Libya. The UK’s Department for International Development kindly 

gave permission for Altai to use data from their 2013 security and justice research. The authors 

also kindly thank the U.S. Agency for International Development for their partnership with 

USIP and support of this research. Finally, the authors and Altai are grateful to all the security 

and justice actors and the several thousands of Libyans who gave their time and expressed their 

opinions and aspirations for the sake of this research. The authors hope that future security 

reforms are implemented by the Libyan government and international donors cognizant of 

these opinions and aspirations.

Notes

Data provided for the figures and tables in this report were rounded to the nearest whole number, which may cause the 

total to be over or under 100 percent.

1. The term auxiliary describes such actors, given that many militia brigades have legal status. They operate at 

times alongside the institutional state actors—police and army—and at other times independently. In recent 

years, various terms have been used to describe these actors: quasi-state actors, informal actors, extra-legal. 

No single term comprehensively captures the full identity of these groups, thus for this publication, auxiliary 

actors refers to all noninstitutional actors.

2. Until the nomination of Abderrazak Al Nazuri as the new chief of staff by the House of Representatives in 

August 2014, his predecessors Youssef Al Manqush and Jadallah Al Obeidi were considered close to the 

Islamist-revolutionary camp. Many brigades within this camp were hence granted a legal status between 

2012 and 2014. Because this research dates from May 2014, the chief of staff in this report refers to Jadallah 

Al Obeidi. 

3. These are notably tribes from the Al Saadi tribal alliance. Although most eastern tribes backed the 2011 

revolution, they have become increasingly vocal against a postrevolutionary political process they perceive as 

dominated by Misrata and its allies. In May 2014, eastern tribes that supported the 2011 revolution participated in a conference in Warshefana—hosted by Western tribes known for their historical support to 

Gadhafi’s regime—to discuss ways to counter the Islamist-revolutionary influence.

4. The SSC was officially disbanded in 2013.

5. Abd Al Fatah Younis was a former senior military official under Gadhafi who defected to the revolutionaries 

and was subsequently declared commander-in-chief of the Libyan Armed Forces.

6. Interview with former Benghazi local civil council member, Tripoli, May 2014.

7. Interview with international diplomat, Tripoli, May 2014.

8. Chris Stephen, “Abd Al Fatah Younis Assassination Creates Divisions Among Libya Rebels,” The Guardian, 

July 29, 2011, www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/29/abdel-fatah-younis-death-libya.

9. Interview with leading Warfalla figure, Tripoli, May 2014.

10. Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn, The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2015).

11. Key informant interviews with policemen and soldiers, 2013 and 2014.

12. “Haftar Issues a 48 Hours Ultimatum for Turks and Qataris to Leave Benghazi,” Daily Al Bayan, June 23, 

2014, http://www.albayan.ae.

13. Bani Walid data is excluded from Misrata district data.

14. The Tripoli zone is one defined by Altai Consulting. Research for this report was conducted just before the 

battle for Tripoli International Airport on July 13, which transformed much of South Tripoli into a 

battlefield.

15. This unit, which still exists despite the disbanding of the SSC itself, is named for its chief Ghnewa, a Salafist 

with links with Suq Al Jum’a brigades. “Youth of Abu Salim Channel,” Facebook, June 2013, www.facebook.com/AbuSalim.media.channe?ref=profile.

16. Paired interview, Tripoli, 2014.

17. Interview with Warfalla notable, Tripoli, May 2013.

18. Paired interview, Tripoli University, May 2014.
52 USIP.ORG

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19. “South Korean Trade Chief Kidnapped in Tripoli,” Libya Herald, January 20, 2014, www.libyaherald.

com/2014/01/20/south-korean-trade-chief-kidnapped-in-tripoli/#axzz36xRf2cdF.

20. Brian McQuinn, “After the Fall: Libya’s Evolving Armed Groups,” Small Arms Survey working paper, 

October 2012, 35, www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP12-After-the-FallLibya.pdf.

21. Key informant interview, local official, Misrata, May 2014.

22. Arthur Quesnay, “Renégocier l’Espace Politique Libyen: du Local au National,” Noria Research, October 

1, 2012, www.noria-research.com/2012/10/01/renegocier-lespace-politique-libyen-du-local-au-national/.

23. Phone interview with social council member, Bani Walid, May 2014; Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Fair 

Trial Concerns for Ex-Officials,” April 14, 2014.

24. Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.713.

25. “Libya Merges Criminal Investigation Organizations,” Saudi Gazette, February 3, 2013.

26. Interview with police colonel, Tripoli, May 2013.

27. Interview with international policing advisor, Tripoli, May 2014.

28. Interview with Warfalla elder, Tripoli, May 2013.

29. Frederic Wehrey, “The Battle for Benghazi,” The Atlantic, February 28, 2014, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/the-battle-for-benghazi/284102/.

30. Terminology used by Khalifa Haftar and his lieutenants. 

31. Phone interview with former LIFG member from Benghazi, July 2014.

32. Wolfram Lacher, “Fault Lines of the Revolution,” SWP research paper, German Institute for International 

and Security Affairs, May 2013, 16, www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/

2013_RP04_lac.pdf. 

33. Paired interview with former SSC member, Tripoli University, April 2014.

34. Peter Cole, interview, 2014.

35. Phone interview with eastern-based judge, July 2014.

36. Ansar Al Sharia’s media outlets are managed by Al Raya Media Group. It also has two radio stations in 

Benghazi and Darnah, Al Furqan and Al Tawheed.

37. The Sirte SSC was a composite force made up of Misratan, local, and eastern elements.

38. Interview with Ansar Al Sharia and former SSC member, Sirte, May 2013.

39. Interview with international expert on Jihadi movements, April 2014.

40. Interview with Sheikh Fawzi Al Ayat, the movement’s local spokesman, on Radio Free Sirte, July 2013.

41. Interview with traditionalist religious scholar, Zawiya, April 2014.

42. Ansar Al Sharia Sabratha Branch’s Facebook page, May 2014. 

43. Altai Consulting, Strengthening Moderate Voices, March 2014.

44. Paired interview, Ajdabiyah, May 2014.

45. Field visit to Sirte, May 2013.
 5

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan 

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Chairman of the Board: Steven J. Hadley

Vice Chairman: George E. Moose

President: Nancy Lindborg

Chief Financial Officer: Michael Graham

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, Washington, 

D.C.• George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The 

George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Judy Ansley, Former 

Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under 

George W. Bush, Washington, D.C. • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished 

Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 

International Studies, Washington, D.C. • Joseph Eldridge, University 

Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. 

Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram 

U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, Nev. • 

Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International 

Relations, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif. • John A. Lancaster, 

Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, 

Potsdam, N.Y. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, Va. • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, 

Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, D.C.

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense 

• Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, National 

Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
2 Looking for Justice

Three years after the revolution that toppled Gadhafi’s 

repressive regime, Libya is on the brink of civil war. 

Despite local successes in maintaining security and justice 

services, mistrust between regions, political struggles for 

power, and sporadic and uncoordinated security and justice sector reforms have progressively driven Libya toward 

a complex civil war. This report examines Libyans’ perceptions of the security sector and aims to understand 

changes in those perceptions from 2013 to 2014. 

Of Related Interest

■ Managing Conflict in a World Adrift edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen 

Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (USIP Press, 2015)

■ Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies edited by 

Deborah Isser (USIP Press, 2011)

■ Security and Justice in Post-Revolution Libya by Fiona Mangan and 

Christina Murtaugh with support from Ferdaouis Bagga (Peaceworks, 

September 2014)

■ Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses by Mark Shaw 

and Fiona Mangan (Peaceworks, February 2014)

■ Security Sector Transformation in the Arab Awakening by Donald J. Planty 

(Special Report, September 2012)

■ Security Sector Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East by Mark 

Sedra (Special Report, November 2011)

■ Stakeholders of Libya’s February 17 Revolution by Susanne Tarkowski

Tempelhof and Manal Omar (Special Report, December 2011)

PEACEWORKS • MAY 2015 • NO. 108

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE • 2301 CONSTITUTION AVE., NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20037 • USIP.ORG 

@ usip