Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-376 | August 28, 2018 Page 1 of 14

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mary A. Findling

Findling Park Conyers & Woody, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Karl L. Mulvaney

Nana Quay-Smith

Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

David S. Strite

Rachel K. Dalton 

O’Bryan, Brown & Toner, PLLC

Louisville, Kentucky 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cynthia Morrison, Individually 

and on behalf of Ernest 

Morrison, Deceased,

Appellants-Plaintiffs,

v.

Ricardo Vasquez, M.D., and 

Vascular Center & Vein Clinic of 

Southern Indiana,

Appellees-Defendants,

Kevin O’Connor M.D., Fort 

Wayne Radiology Association, 

LLC, Amar Pinto M.D., Premier 

Healthcare, LLC, Mohamed 

Nassar, M.D., and Indiana 

University Health Bloomington, 

August 28, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CT-376

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court 

The Honorable David J. Dreyer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D10-1712-CT-46774
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-376 | August 28, 2018 Page 2 of 14

Inc. d/b/a Bloomington 

Hospital, Inc., 

Defendants. 

Brown, Judge.

[1] In this interlocutory appeal, Cynthia Morrison (“Morrison”), individually and 

on behalf of Ernest Morrison (“Ernest”), deceased, appeals from the trial 

court’s order that the case be transferred from Marion County to Monroe 

County. We affirm. 

Procedural History

[2] On December 20, 2017, Morrison filed a complaint for medical malpractice in 

Marion County naming as defendants Dr. Ricardo Vasquez and Vascular 

Center & Vein Clinic of Southern Indiana (together, “Appellees”), as well as 

Dr. Kevin O’Connor, Fort Wayne Radiology Association, LLC, Dr. Amar 

Pinto, Premier Healthcare, LLC, Dr. Mohamed Nassar, and Indiana University 

Health Bloomington, Inc. d/b/a Bloomington Hospital, Inc., (“Bloomington

Hospital”).

1

 The complaint alleged in part that the care, advice, and treatment 

 

1 According to the Indiana Secretary of State’s record for Bloomington Hospital, a copy of which was 

attached as an exhibit to Morrison’s objection to Appellees’ motion for change of venue and which is filestamped January 18, 2018, Bloomington Hospital’s registered agent was Mary Beth Clause, Esq., with an

address on 10th Street in Indianapolis. The filing also shows a “principal office address” for Bloomington 

Hospital on Second Street in Bloomington, Indiana. Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 62. 
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of the defendants fell below the acceptable standard of care, proximately 

resulting in Ernest’s death. 

[3] On January 17, 2018, Appellees filed a Motion to Transfer Venue requesting 

transfer of the case to the Monroe Superior Court pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 

75(A). Appellees argued that Marion County does not meet preferred venue 

requirements and the greater percentage of defendants reside in Monroe 

County. They argued in part that Ernest presented to Dr. Vasquez’s office in 

Bloomington in November 2013 and underwent a procedure at Bloomington 

Hospital in December 2013; Ernest presented to Bedford Hospital on May 27, 

2014, where a CT was performed; Dr. O’Connor in Fort Wayne remotely 

interpreted the CT; Dr. Pinto agreed to consult; Dr. Nassar, the hospitalist at 

Bloomington Hospital, accepted care of Ernest and Ernest was transferred from

Bedford Hospital to Bloomington Hospital on the evening of May 27, 2014; and 

Ernest expired at Bloomington Hospital on May 28, 2014. Appellees further 

argued that they, as well as Dr. Pinto and Premier Healthcare, LLC, reside in 

Monroe County; Dr. Nasser resides in Marion County; Bloomington Hospital

is primarily located in Monroe County; and Dr. O’Connor and Fort Wayne 

Radiology Association, LLC, are located in Allen County, and noting that five 

of the eight named defendants are located in Monroe County. 

[4] On January 18, 2018, Morrison filed an objection to Appellees’ motion to 

transfer venue and argued that Marion County is a county of preferred venue 

because the registered office and agent of Bloomington Hospital, one of the 

defendants, are located in Marion County. In support of her objection, 
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Morrison cited to Trial Rule 75(A)(4) and Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 

857 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. 2006). On February 19, 2018, the trial court entered an 

Order Granting Transfer of Venue which ordered that the case be transferred to 

the Monroe Superior Court pursuant to Trial Rule 75(A). Morrison now brings 

this interlocutory appeal. 

Discussion

[5] The issue is whether the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ motion to 

transfer venue from Marion County to Monroe County. We review factual 

findings on an appeal from a ruling on a motion for transfer of venue for clear 

error and review conclusions of law de novo. Arkla Indus., Inc. v. Columbia St. 

Partners, Inc., 95 N.E.3d 194, 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Am. Family Ins. 

Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 857 N.E.2d 971, 973 (Ind. 2006)), trans. denied. Where 

factual determinations are made from a paper record, those determinations are 

also reviewed de novo. Id. 

[6] Ind. Trial Rule 75(A) allows a case to be filed in any county in Indiana. Id. 

However, the rule also sets forth criteria establishing ten “preferred” venues. Id. 

at 196-197. Trial Rule 75(A) provides in part:

Preferred venue lies in: 

(1) the county where the greater percentage of individual 

defendants included in the complaint resides, or, if there is 

no such greater percentage, the place where any individual 

defendant so named resides; or

* * * * *
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(4) the county where either the principal office of a defendant 

organization is located or the office or agency of a 

defendant organization or individual to which the claim 

relates or out of which the claim arose is located, if one or 

more such organizations or individuals are included as 

defendants in the complaint; . . . .

[7] Trial Rule 75(A) does not create a priority among the subsections establishing 

preferred venue, and there may be multiple preferred venues in a given case. 

Arkla Indus., 95 N.E.3d at 197. “A motion to transfer venue cannot be granted 

when an action has been filed in a preferred venue, but if the complaint is not

filed in a preferred venue, the court is required to transfer the case to a preferred 

venue upon a proper request from a party.” Id. (citing Am. Family Ins. Co., 857 

N.E.2d at 974). 

[8] The Indiana Supreme Court has observed that “[p]referred venue is located in 

counties where information is readily available, where relevant land and 

personal property can be found, where witnesses can be easily brought to court, 

and where the litigants reside or hold office” and that litigants “benefit from 

relative certainty about the preferred forum and from the savings in time and 

expense that such rules provide.” Randolph Cty. v. Chamness, 879 N.E.2d 555, 

557 (Ind. 2008). 

[9] Morrison argues that Marion County is a county of preferred venue under Trial 

Rule 75(A)(4). She contends that, pursuant to the Indiana Supreme Court’s 

opinion in Am. Family Ins. Co., the registered agent and office of a domestic 

corporation provide the basis for venue under Rule 75(A)(4), that the address of 
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Bloomington Hospital’s registered agent was an address in Marion County, and

thus that Marion County is a county of preferred venue. Morrison also argues 

that the complaint was filed on December 20, 2017, that venue is determined as 

of the time the complaint was filed, and that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12,

2 which 

became effective on January 1, 2018, does not apply to this case. 

[10] Appellees maintain that Marion County is not a county of preferred venue. 

They argue that Am. Family Ins. Co. applies only to foreign corporations without 

a physical office in Indiana. Appellees further maintain that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-

4-12 should be applied because they filed their motion to transfer venue after 

the statute became effective and, alternatively, that it is a procedural and 

remedial statute which should be applied retroactively. They contend that 

venue statutes are procedural rather than substantive in nature and that Ind.

Code § 23-0.5-4-12 was a legislative response to Am. Family Ins. Co. 

[11] In reply, Morrison maintains that Am. Family Ins. Co., by its language, applies

equally to domestic and foreign corporations and its holding is not limited to 

corporations without a physical office in Indiana. She further maintains that 

Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 is ineffective under Trial Rule 75(D) and there is no 

compelling reason to apply the statute retroactively. 

 

2 Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) provides: “The designation or maintenance in Indiana of a 

registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented entity in 

Indiana. The address of the agent does not determine venue in an action or a proceeding involving the 

entity.” 
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[12] The parties do not dispute that Monroe County is a county of preferred venue 

under Trial Rule 75(A)(1). Thus, if Marion County is not a county of preferred

venue, the trial court was required to transfer the case to a preferred venue upon 

request. See Arkla Indus., 95 N.E.3d at 197. 

[13] Trial Rule 75(A)(4) provides for preferred venue in “the county where . . . the 

principal office of a defendant organization is located.” In Am. Family Ins. Co., 

the Indiana Supreme Court addressed preferred venue under Rule 75(A)(4) 

where the plaintiff filed suit in Marion County against Ford Motor Company, 

which had no offices in Indiana but maintained a registered office and agent in 

Marion County. 857 N.E.2d at 972. The Court found that the term “principal 

office” in Rule 75(A)(4) refers to a domestic or foreign corporation’s registered 

office in Indiana and thus that Marion County was a county of preferred venue. 

Id. Subsequently, in CTB, Inc. v. Tunis, the plaintiffs filed suit in Marion County 

against CTB, Inc., an Indiana corporation with a registered agent and office in 

Kosciusko County, CTB requested transfer of venue to Kosciusko County, and 

the trial court denied the request. 95 N.E.3d 185, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), 

trans. denied. This Court cited Am. Family Ins. Co., noted that CTB’s principal 

office under Rule 75(A)(4) was in Kosciusko County, and found that the court 

should have transferred the case to Kosciusko County. Id. at 189. Our opinion 

in CTB specifically acknowledged that revisions to Indiana’s corporation law

took effect on January 1, 2018, and that the parties did not argue that the 

revisions were applicable. Id. at 187. We also note that, in CTB, the complaint 
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was filed on May 9, 2017, CTB filed its motion to transfer venue on June 20, 

2017, and the court entered its order denying the motion on September 8, 2017. 

[14] We observe that, unlike in Am. Family Ins. Co., where defendant Ford Motor 

Company had no offices in Indiana but maintained a registered office and agent 

in Marion County, see Am. Family Ins. Co., 857 N.E.2d at 972, the Indiana 

Secretary of State’s record for Bloomington Hospital shows a “principal office 

address” for Bloomington Hospital on Second Street in Bloomington, Indiana. 

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 62. We further observe that, unlike in CTB, 

where defendant CTB was an Indiana corporation based in Kosciusko County 

and which had a registered agent in that county, see CTB, 95 N.E.3d at 186-187, 

Bloomington Hospital’s principal office address, according to its filing with the 

Indiana Secretary of State, is in Monroe County. Also, unlike in CTB, where 

the trial court made a determination regarding venue well before Ind. Code § 

23-0.5-4-12 became effective and the parties did not argue the statute was 

applicable, in this case Bloomington Hospital filed its motion to transfer venue 

after the statute became effective, and Appellees argue the statute is applicable. 

We also note that the greater number of defendants are located in Monroe 

County, a medical procedure and the decedent’s death occurred in Monroe 

County, medical records and fact witnesses are in Monroe County, and Cynthia 

Morrison does not live in Marion County. 

[15] We find that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) is applicable in this case. 

The statute provides in part: “The address of the agent does not determine 

venue in an action or a proceeding involving the entity.” This Court has stated 
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that the venue status of a county is determined when an action is commenced 

by the filing of a complaint. See Painters Dist. Council 91, 906 N.E.2d at 257

(citing Shelton v. Wick, 715 N.E.2d 890, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied). 

Also, statutes generally will not be applied retroactively absent strong and 

compelling reasons. Bourbon Mini-Mart, Inc. v. Gast Fuel & Servs., Inc., 783 

N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ind. 2003). However, an exception to this general rule exists 

for remedial or procedural statutes. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Watson, 70 

N.E.3d 380, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Martin v. State, 774 N.E.2d 43, 44 

(Ind. 2002)). Although statutes and rules that are procedural or remedial may 

be applied retroactively, they are not required to be. Id. A remedial statute is 

intended to cure a defect or mischief that existed in a prior statute and will be 

applied retroactively to carry out its legislative purpose unless to do so violates a 

vested right or constitutional guaranty. Bourbon Mini-Mart, 783 N.E.2d at 260. 

[16] The provision of Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 related to the determination of venue 

is procedural in nature. If new legislation changes only a mode of procedure in 

the law while providing a remedy substantially similar to the existing one and 

does not violate vested rights, “it will be applied to all cases pending and 

subsequent to its effective date.” Borgman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 713 N.E.2d 

851, 855 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added) (citation omitted), trans. 

denied; see also Hayden v. State, 771 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) 

(“Procedural, adjective or remedial law is that portion of the law which 

prescribes the method of enforcing a right or obtaining a redress for the invasion 

of that right. Substantive law, on the other hand, is that portion of the law 
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which creates, defines and regulates rights.”), trans. denied. We further observe

that an entry in American Jurisprudence provides in part: 

“Venue” refers to the place of trial or the locality where an action 

may be properly brought. . . . Venue is not a jurisdictional 

requirement or substantive right but is merely a procedural matter

designed for the convenience of the parties, judicial efficiency, 

and allocating judicial resources. . . . 

77 AM. JUR. 2D Venue § 1 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Also, an entry

titled “Retroactive application of venue statute” provides in part: 

Normally, venue provisions are considered procedural in nature, 

not substantive, and courts generally apply them retroactively. . . . It 

is the rule in a number of jurisdictions that a statute fixing venue 

is applicable even to actions pending on the effective date of the statute. 

77 AM. JUR. 2D Venue § 7 (footnotes omitted) (emphases added). 

[17] The provision of Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 related to the determination of venue

is procedural. Although the complaint here was filed on December 20, 2017, 

Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 became effective twelve days later on January 1, 2018, 

Appellees filed their motion to transfer venue on January 17, 2018, and the 

court granted the motion on February 19, 2018. Thus, this action was pending,

and the court had not yet made a determination regarding venue, as of the date 

Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 became effective. Morrison has not established that she 

has been deprived of any substantive right. We conclude that the venue 

provision of Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 is applicable. See Capps v. State, 268 Ind. 

614, 618, 377 N.E.2d 1338, 1340 (1978) (finding that the procedural mechanism 
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in the Indiana criminal rules governing change of venue did not deprive the

appellant of a substantive right such as a fair trial before an impartial jury); 

Borgman, 713 N.E.2d at 855-856 (finding, in response to an argument that a bad 

faith statute should not be applied retroactively, that the statute was procedural 

and merely set forth the proper forum for certain claims, and also noting the 

statute simply designated the proper forum for bringing enumerated claims and 

did not operate to strip the plaintiffs of an established right of recourse”); see also

Gardner v. Gardner, 43 N.C. App. 678, 681, 260 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1979)

(“Generally, a statute fixing venue is applicable even to actions pending on the 

effective date of the statute.”) (citing 77 AM. JUR. 2d Venue § 1), aff’d. 

[18] Further, we do not find Morrison’s argument that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 is 

ineffective under Trial Rule 75(D) to be persuasive. Trial Rule 75(D) provides

in part: “Any provision of these rules and any special or general statute relating 

to venue, the place of trial or the authority of the court to hear the case shall be 

subject to this rule, and the provisions of any statute fixing more stringent rules 

thereon shall be ineffective.” As explained above, Trial Rule 75(A)(4) provides 

that preferred venue lies in the county where “the principal office of a defendant 

organization” is located, and Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 provides that the address 

of the registered agent does not determine venue. Thus, Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-

12 does not, by its express terms, fix more stringent rules related to venue than 

the terms of Trial Rule 75(A)(4). 

[19] To the extent Am. Family Ins. Co. may have determined that the term “principal 

office” in subsection (4) of the rule referred to a domestic corporation’s 
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“registered office,” that determination was premised on Indiana corporation 

law which has since been considerably amended. Specifically, the Court in Am. 

Family Ins. Co. observed that, at the time Rule 75 was adopted in 1970, 

Indiana’s corporation law required that corporations maintain a “principal 

office in this state” where an agent for service of process could be found and 

that, “[w]hen the Business Corporation Act was adopted in 1986, what had 

formerly been called the ‘principal office in this state’ was designated the 

‘registered office.’ I.C. § 23-1-24-1 (2004).”3 857 N.E.2d at 974-975. The 

Court expressly found that, “[b]y adopting the term ‘registered office,’ the 

Business Corporation Act did not intend to change the venue rules for foreign 

corporations.” Id. at 975 (emphasis added). Thus Am. Family Ins. Co. was 

based on the corporation law adopted in 1986 and the fact the statutory 

provisions added by the legislature at that time did not intend to change the 

venue rules. However, Indiana’s corporation law was significantly amended by 

Pub. Law No. 118-2017 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). Among other changes, the law 

 

3 Ind. Code § 23-1-24-1 (2004), subsequently repealed, provided: 

Each corporation must continuously maintain in Indiana:

(1) a registered office; and

(2) a registered agent, who must be:

(A) an individual who resides in Indiana and whose business office is identical with the 

registered office;

(B) a domestic corporation or not-for-profit domestic corporation whose business office is 

identical with the registered office; or

(C) a foreign corporation or not-for-profit foreign corporation authorized to transact 

business in Indiana whose business office is identical with the registered office.
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repealed all of Ind. Code §§ 23-1-24, including Ind. Code § 23-1-24-1 upon 

which Am. Family Ins. Co. depended, and added the new article of Ind. Code §§ 

23-0.5 which contains §§ 23-0.5-4 governing the designation and maintenance 

of registered agents, including Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 which, unlike the 

provisions adopted in 1986, expressly intends a change to the venue rules.4

 See

Pub. Law No. 118-2017, § 5 (enacting Ind. Code §§ 23-0.5), § 11 (repealing Ind. 

Code §§ 23-1-24). Thus the Indiana corporation law upon which Am. Family 

Ins. Co. was centered has been extensively amended, and the specific statutory 

provision relied upon in that case has been repealed and Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-

12 has been added. We decline to find that Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12’s provision 

that the address of a registered agent does not determine venue fixes a more

stringent rule related to venue than Trial Rule 75 or is ineffective pursuant to 

Trial Rule 75(D). 

[20] Pursuant to Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12, the address of Bloomington Hospital’s 

registered agent does not determine venue and Marion County is not a county 

of preferred venue for purposes of Trial Rule 75(A)(4) on that basis. 

Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court’s order that the case be 

transferred to the Monroe Superior Court. 

 

4 Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12 is modeled after Section 1-414 of the Uniform Business Organizations Code and 

Section 15 of the Uniform Model Registered Agents Act. See Uniform Business Organization Code (Last 

Amended 2011), § 1-414; Model Registered Agents Act (2006) (Last Amended 2011), § 15. The Comment to 

Section 15 of the Model Registered Agents Act states in part: “This section makes clear that the address of a 

registered agent does not determine venue.”
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Conclusion

[21] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s February 19, 2018 Order 

Granting Transfer of Venue. 

[22] Affirmed. 

Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.