United States Institute of Peace • www.usip.org • Tel. 202.457.1700 • Fax. 202.429.6063

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“Blame for the electoral 

failures in 2009 lies with all 

stakeholders in the elections—

the donor community, Afghan 

government institutions, the 

IEC, and candidates and 

agents themselves. But until 

the government and the election commission recognize 

that dramatic improvements 

are needed to correct problems with the 2009 elections, 

there is little prospect for 

Afghanistan having better 

elections than before.”

February 2, 2010 

Delays Will Not Improve Afghan 

Elections

Summary

• The presidential and provincial council elections held in Afghanistan in August 2009 were 

marred by irregularities and fraud, leading voters and candidates to question the fairness and 

utility of the democratic process there.

• The Afghan government announced in late January that it will delay Parliamentary elections 

until September 2010—several months beyond the deadline set by Afghanistan’s constitution. 

• The extra time is needed to make adequate logistical preparations, but little has been done so 

far to reform electoral institutions or policies to prevent a repeat of the problems of the 2009 

elections.

• Without signi cant changes in the personnel and policies of the Independent Electoral 

Commission (IEC)—the constitutional body responsible for overseeing all electoral processes—

the 2010 election is likely to fall below international standards and risks undermining government (and international) legitimacy at a critical period for the counterinsurgency strategy.

• In addition, signi cant long-term reforms, including a wholesale revision of the voter registry, 

must be initiated now to ensure that the district council and other future Afghan elections are 

credible and acceptable. 

Presidential and Provincial Council Elections: One Step 

Forward, Two Steps Back

The 2009 Afghanistan presidential and provincial council elections were a signi cant setback in 

the development of democracy in Afghanistan. They were the  rst to be run entirely by Afghan 

institutions, although with signi cant international  nancial and technical support. Yet despite 

$490 million in donor funds (including the 2008-09 voter registration exercise) and signi cant 

input by dozens of international advisers, the elections struggled to meet minimum standards of 

credibility and acceptability. 

The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), which was mandated to adjudicate all electoral 

violations, invalidated more than 1.2 million fraudulent votes in the presidential election—

resulting in a less than 50 percent majority for any candidate and requiring a runo between the 

incumbent President Hamid Karzai and the runner up Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. (The second round 

was not held because Dr. Abdullah withdrew from the race, citing the lack of fraud reduction 

mechanisms as one of his main reasons.) 

SCOTT WORDEN

E-mail: sworden@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.3811

PEACEBRIEF9
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Delays Will Not Improve Afghan Elections

page 2 • PB 9 • February 2, 2010

The provincial council elections were equally  awed. Although fewer complaints were  led, the 

ECC still found hundreds of polling stations across the country to be fraudulent, and invalidated 

thousands of votes. 

Numerous observer organizations—including the Afghan Free and Fair Elections Association 

(FEFA) and the European Union Observer Mission—and the United Nations Assistance Mission in 

Afghanistan pointed out signi cant problems in the way the elections were conducted and noted 

concerning irregularities in the results. 

On the positive side, the  aws were transparent and voters did peacefully accept the results. But 

given the considerable shortcomings of the 2009 elections, it is reasonable to ask what can and is 

being done to ensure that improvements are made for the 2010 parliamentary elections? 

Unfortunately, so far the answer is not much. The Afghan government has yet to acknowledge that 

signi cant election irregularities occurred. The same IEC personnel who oversaw fraud are still in their 

jobs and the same policies that allowed fraudulent votes to be counted are in place. Blame for the 

electoral failures in 2009 lies with all stakeholders in the elections—the donor community, Afghan 

government institutions, the IEC, and candidates and agents themselves. But until the government 

and the election commission recognize that dramatic improvements are needed to correct problems 

with the 2009 elections, there is little prospect for Afghanistan having better elections than before.

Key Flaws of the 2009 Elections

Among the many de ciencies in the conduct of the 2009 elections, three problems stand out as 

most signi cantly a ecting voting irregularities and fraud: 

Fraudulent Voter Registration—First, Afghanistan does not have a proper voter registry, which 

means that anyone can show up at any location in the province in which they registered to vote, 

and there is no way to verify their identity or determine whether or not their voter registration card 

is valid. The IEC embarked on a $100 million donor-funded voter registration exercise to enable 

new voters to register for the 2009 elections, but its implementation was so fundamentally  awed 

that the new vote cards issues actually increased the opportunity for fraud. Of the 4.5 million 

new voter cards issued in the 2009 registration exercise, more than 1 million of them may have 

been fraudulent (because of improper record keeping, it is impossible to tell). Moreover, the IEC 

was unable to process data entry of vital registration information in several provinces before the 

election, which meant that lists of voters recorded at polling stations could not be veri ed against 

a database of actual registered voters to see whether multiple voting occurred. 

Poor Security—Second, the security situation was so poor in many areas of Afghanistan that 

there was no way for observers or candidate agents to independently verify whether voting 

procedures were followed—or even whether real voting occurred. According to ISAF  gures, 

Election Day 2009 had by far the greatest number of security incidents nationwide since it began 

tracking that data in 2004. Twenty-six people were killed in election related violence on polling 

day—most were members of Afghanistan’s security forces. And for weeks before the election, 

the Taliban—as well as warlords and other powerbrokers that sought to disrupt the vote—were 

warning voters and observers to stay inside on Election Day or risk being harmed.

In this climate of violence and fear, observers and candidate agents were unable to reach 

planned polling sites to witness the voting process, even in the relatively more peaceful north 

and west of the country. Most international observers were deployed only to provincial capitals 

and could only travel within tight security boundaries. This left the door wide open for corrupt or 

biased o cials to stu ballot boxes and falsify return forms in favor of their preferred candidates. 

ECC investigations indicated that this occurred on a massive scale. 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Delays Will Not Improve Afghan Elections

page 3 • PB 9 • February 2, 2010

O cial Misconduct—Third, and most poignantly, the fraud could not have occurred on the 

large scale that it did without serious  aws in the way the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) 

recruited and trained sta , as well as how it compiled and counted the results. Although many of 

the IEC’s sta is dedicated professionals who managed a very complex electoral process under 

di cult conditions, clearly a number of the IEC’s provincial administrations were corrupt and 

enabled massive fraud to occur. The ECC identi ed 1,400 polling stations of some 25,000 total 

nationwide where 100 percent of the votes for the presidential election were fraudulent. It also 

found that at least 50 percent of the polling stations in 450 polling centers and 23 districts were 

fraudulent. This fact alone directly implicates hundreds of electoral o cials who were either complicit in committing fraud or at least failed to report it so that the IEC could invalidate the results.

More problematic—and controversial—is the degree to which the IEC leadership and other 

government o cials may have contributed to or enabled fraud. Dr. Abdullah and other candidates 

accused the IEC chairman of bias in favor of President Karzai (who directly appoints all IEC commissioners) and Abdullah withdrew from the runo election in part because the IEC chairman 

remained in his post despite manifest irregularities in the presidential election. Observer organizations have also questioned the IEC’s impartiality and transparency—particularly its calculations 

of vote totals at the counting center. Moreover, reports of improper government interference 

indicate that in many cases IEC o cials may have been pressured to look the other way to enable 

fraud. While a comprehensive, objective investigation would be needed to determine the extent to 

which any government o cial was directly involved in electoral misconduct, it seems clear that at 

the very least, the IEC did too little to stop fraud from a ecting the results. 

Fixing the Problems for Parliamentary Elections in 2010

Considering these  aws, one must ask what can be done to  x electoral problems to avoid a repeat 

of the 2009 fraud in 2010? 

Unfortunately, many of the necessary reforms simply cannot be achieved between now and 

the September election. A proper voter registration drive would take at least a year and cannot 

be implemented in many areas of the country during winter. Meaning, the earliest that a new 

registry could be in place for future elections is in spring 2011. At this point, however, it would 

make more sense to have the voter registry combined with a long-planned civil registry that 

would link voters to speci c addresses and polling districts. This will take even more time to 

coordinate.

Observers and candidate agents are unlikely to have fundamentally greater access to elections 

in 2010 because the security situation is also unlikely to improve until at least the end of the year 

(although more can be done to recruit and train observers in safer areas of the country). The surge 

of international security forces provided by the U.S. and NATO will not be fully deployed until the 

summer of 2010, and the surge in Afghan troops must wait until new trainers are put in place and 

recruiting intensi es. While the Afghan government has recently announced it will embark on a 

new reconciliation strategy with the Taliban, no one knows when this will be achieved or if it will 

yield any ‘peace dividend’ in time for the September elections. 

The Urgent Need to Reform the IEC 

The most useful reform that may be taken in the short term therefore lies within the IEC. As the 

principal institution responsible for regulating and administering Afghan elections, there is much 

that needs to be changed right away by President Karzai and the IEC commissioners:
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Delays Will Not Improve Afghan Elections

page 4 • PB 9 • February 2, 2010

• First, President Karzai should replace the IEC chairman and other IEC leaders who failed to 

take adequate action to prevent or punish fraud as soon as possible. This is necessary to 

signal to candidates, voters, and IEC sta members that it will not be ‘business as usual’ for 

the parliamentary elections and to enable IEC adoption of more rigid and transparent fraud 

prevention policies. The new IEC chairman should be selected in consultation with key 

Afghan stakeholders, including parliamentary leaders, but overall should be an individual 

widely recognized for his or her independence and integrity. In the future, the law should 

be amended to require parliamentary consent for IEC commissioner appointees.

• The IEC must also substantially reform its sta to ensure that workers who were responsible 

for fraud, and those who did nothing to stop it, are replaced. This applies to a handful of 

headquarters sta and hundreds of  eld sta who are linked with clear violations of IEC 

procedures. The IEC must initiate personnel reforms as soon as possible so that a comprehensive training program can be put in place to ensure old and new sta understands 

clearly the election rules and the importance of enforcing them.

• The IEC must work to improve the transparency of the electoral process. First, it should 

allow su cient time between candidate nominations and the certi cation of the  nal 

candidate list so there can be a thorough public review and vetting process. Second, the IEC 

must promote access by observers and agents to the counting process by certifying agents 

more quickly so they may receive training on counting procedures. Third, the IEC must 

publish station-by-station results so that candidates and observers can verify the results 

they witnessed at counting locations are properly recorded (This was done for the presidential election but not for the provincial council races.)

• The IEC can mitigate the negative e ects of bad security in many areas of the country by 

limiting the number of polling stations in insecure areas, and/or by reducing the number 

of ballots sent to those areas. In 2009 the IEC sent thousands of ballots to polling stations 

where it was unrealistic for more than a few hundred people to vote. These were highly 

sensitive decisions, because of the need to strike a balance between the risk of disenfranchising voters in remote or dangerous locations against the risk of providing materials to 

insecure places that could be used to promote fraud. Clearly, this balance was struck in 

favor of fraud in 2009.

• Finally, the IEC should institute a host of technical policy changes that would make fraud 

more di cult—including better tracking of both used and unused ballots sent to the 

provinces; ensuring that questionable patterns of results are investigated before being included into the count; and better protection for the chain of custody of sensitive materials. 

But even the best policies and procedures will have no impact if the people implementing 

them are ine ective or corrupt.

Ultimately, however, the responsibility for conducting free and fair elections rests with all stakeholders to the process, including Afghan government agencies (beyond the IEC), candidates and 

their supporters, voters, and donors as well. Therefore, public education and outreach programs 

must begin now to better educate all parties about what the voting process is for and how fair 

elections bene t them. In particular:

• Afghan government o cials—including the security services—must fear real consequences 

for improperly interfering in the electoral process.

• Candidates must realize that unfair elections undermine their legitimacy in o ce. 

• Observers and agents must fully understand the complex process they are tasked with 

monitoring.
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

202.457.1700

www.usip.org

ABOUT THIS BRIEF

Scott Worden is a senior rule of 

law adviser with the U.S. Institute 

of Peace, and recently served as 

one of three international commissioners appointed by the United 

Nations Special Representative to 

the Secretary General for Afghanistan to serve on the Electoral 

Complaints Commission (ECC) for 

the 2009 Afghan elections. The 

ECC was mandated to adjudicate 

all electoral disputes according 

to the Afghan electoral law. This 

report refl ects the personal views 

of the author.

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end confl icts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the fi eld of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the offi ce 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

• Voters must realize the value of their votes and to report wrongdoing protect them from 

being diluted by fraud by reporting wrongdoing.

In addition, donors should recognize that their money and assistance is wasted if necessary 

resources are not available in enough time to help achieve the above reforms, and if the Afghan 

government and the IEC do not demonstrate the political will to reform. Donors must ultimately 

consider whether enough has been done to improve the electoral process to warrant its considerable  nancial and diplomatic support.

Conclusion

Overall, the announcement of a delay in the parliamentary elections until September 2010 is a 

positive development that recognizes the formidable logistical di culties of organizing elections 

in Afghanistan. It is important to realize, however, that the bene ts of this delay will be limited 

given the substantial reforms that need to occur to address the widespread fraud that occurred in 

the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections. Indeed, no election in Afghanistan can hope 

to meet international standards as long as the security situation remains as bad as it was in 2009 

and until a proper voter registry can be established. Even then, it takes years of civic education to 

build a base of reliable election workers and observers to self-enforce a fair process.

Nonetheless, there are urgent reforms that can and must be made within the IEC to avoid 

the most acute problems of the 2009 elections. New IEC leadership would signal to candidates, 

voters, and donors that better practices will govern the 2010 elections. It would also pave the way 

for removing IEC  eld sta that contributed to fraud and for implementing more robust fraud 

prevention procedures. In addition, work should begin now to create a credible voter registry that 

would enable district council elections to improve upon the parliamentary process in 2010. Even 

the most progressive changes will not make the 2010 elections a democratic model to follow. But 

without signi cant reforms, they are sure to be just as  awed as before.

Delays Will Not Improve Afghan Elections

page 5 • PB 9 • February 2, 2010