About the Report

This report explores the Tokyo Mutual Accountability 

Framework (TMAF) for Afghanistan, which, after three years 

of implementation, donors and Afghan officials will refresh 

in 2015. Based on fieldwork and interviews and funded by 

the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the report looks 

into the dynamics shaping the agreement and discusses its 

background, how this has limited reform progress, and how 

political, economic, and cultural factors constrain the 

policy options for those seeking to adjust it.

About the Author

Trent Ruder is an economic growth specialist who has 

worked in and on Afghanistan since 2011, advising 

Afghan firms in Wardak Province and serving as lead 

donor coordinator for USAID in Kabul. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 378 September 2015

© 2015 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

The Political Challenge of Reform 3

Afghan Progress on TMAF Reforms 5

Donor Commitments to Aid Effectivenes 12

Recommendations 15

Trent Ruder

Lessons and Opportunities 

from the Tokyo Mutual 

Accountability Framework

Summary

• The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), the primary development agreement 

between donors and the Afghan government, provides political guidelines for Afghan reform 

and continued donor support. 

• With a new administration inaugurated in the fall of 2014, donors and Afghan officials are 

looking to refresh the three-year-old agreement. President Ashraf Ghani set out his vision 

for reform in “Realizing Self-Reliance,” a policy document released in conjunction with the 

December 2014 conference in London, and reiterated some of these goals in his March 2015 

state visit to Washington, DC.

• The TMAF has proven useful as a coordinating mechanism among and between donors and 

the Afghan government, but various factors—political, social, financial, and bureaucratic—

have limited results. 

• Addressing the policy trade-offs requires a clearer vision of TMAF’s ultimate purpose. Is the 

document intended to organize policy-level cooperation on all development efforts or is it a 

targeted and sequenced blueprint for enabling Afghan financial independence? 

• A shift in overall emphasis toward economic growth and revenue generation will be key to 

lasting gains for individual Afghans. 

• Narrow focus and an inherently political nature inhibited progress on rule of law, gender, and 

anticorruption. Future indicators should give space for policy discussion on health, education, jobs, agriculture, and infrastructure. 

• On-budget and alignment efforts should maximize use of existing engagement forums and 

project design mechanisms to help shift aid reforms away from contentious debate and 

toward more reciprocal and productive dialogue. 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378

• The TMAF has implied conditionality built in. Donor use of incentive mechanisms should 

help drive policy dialogue but may arise from a breakdown of trust. Incentives require a 

calculated strategy that features clear, objective metrics. Pragmatic and collective use of 

monitoring may support the data for such metrics. 

Introduction

Endorsed on July 8, 2012, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) is the primary 

development agreement between donors and the Afghan government for the country’s 

transformation decade.1 Now that a unity government has been formed, the December 

2014 London Conference has concluded, and three years of implementation experience have 

accumulated, it will soon be time for donors and Afghan officials to reexamine the document and make adjustments. 

The TMAF aims at coordinating development aid and government reforms over the coming 

transition decade, from 2014 through 2024. At the 2012 Tokyo Conference, donors pledged 

$16 billion in development aid from 2012 to 2015 and to sustain support through 2017 

to address the fiscal gap as estimated by the World Bank in exchange for Afghan reforms 

across five thematic areas.2 Afghan reforms address elections, human rights, gender, public 

finance, banking, government spending, and development. Donor commitments relate to 

overall funding, reaffirm previous commitments to place 50 percent of total assistance on 

the Afghan budget, and align 80 percent of assistance to Afghan National Priority Programs 

and other pledges to improve aid effectiveness. The TMAF calls for progress reviews using a 

Joint Coordinating and Monitoring Board (JCMB) and Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) every 

other year to review progress and update indicators where needed, and biennial ministerial 

meetings to assess commitments and resource requirements. 

The commitments and context of Tokyo were not new. The TMAF is the most recent in a 

series of coordination efforts undertaken since the 2001 Bonn Agreement. As policymakers 

look toward a 2015 “refresh” of the TMAF in the next SOM, it is important to understand the 

patterns that have emerged over the course of nation building in Afghanistan. The two leaders 

of the National Unity Government (NUG), President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah, 

as well as many Afghan counterparts, have been present in various forms since the beginning 

of the post-Taliban era. Few donor staff or policymakers have the same depth of experience. 

The past fourteen years of conferences reflect a long-standing involvement of key Afghan 

politicians, increasing trends toward accountability and conditionality, rising efforts to 

implement aid effectiveness, and a regular discrepancy between the strategy and requests 

of Afghans and their international community partners.3 Abdullah Abdullah participated in 

the Bonn 2001 conference and has been a frequent fixture at subsequent donor conferences. 

Ashraf Ghani played a lead role in Berlin 2004, working with the World Bank on the guiding 

strategy document, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, which sought to address fiscal gaps and 

“create a self-sustaining country that can fund its operations.” 4 Berlin raised $8.2 billion 

of its $27 billion goal. 

The Afghanistan Compact of the 2006 London Conference created mutually agreed upon 

targets and deadlines as well as introducing a Joint Coordinating and Monitoring Board 

(JCMB) to monitor progress. The Afghanistan Compact met with only limited success but 

was followed by the 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy and the 2010 London and Kabul Conferences. London introduced the “ambition” of delivering 50 percent of 

development aid through the Afghan budget. Kabul extended these ambitions with donors 

committing to 50 percent on budget (within two years) and to aligning 80 percent of their 

programming to Afghanistan’s National Priority Programs (NPP). 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and 

Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham 

H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, 

NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC 

Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil and 

Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378 3

The NPPs are a set of twenty-two thematic plans based on the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) intended to prioritize government and donor actions across six clusters: governance, agriculture and rural development, private sector, infrastructure, human 

resource, and security. However, all too often NPPs were political wish lists for ministries, 

favoring new projects and infrastructure over focused development priorities and complicating the endorsement process. For example, Governance NPP5: Law and Justice for All calls for 

$325 million, $222 million of which is for “increasing physical assets” but only $15 millon for 

capacity building.5 Total NPP cost exceeds the entire $16 billion TMAF donor commitment. 

NPP costs complicated discussions between donors and Afghan officials. At stocktaking 

events such as the 2013 SOM, the parties were not able to agree on how much donors had 

fulfilled their 50 percent on-budget and 80 percent alignment commitment. These challenges 

suggest that despite progress, the two sides approach pledges from very different perspectives. 

The 2012 Tokyo Conference and the TMAF reflected many of the elements developed 

previously. Like Berlin and Kabul, it featured a strategy paper guiding development commitments, Towards Self-Reliance. Since London 2006, both the Afghan government and 

donors sought to increase the level of accountability. Tokyo made the notion of implied 

conditionality more explicit than before. At Tokyo, donor commitments on improving aid 

effectiveness were the strongest yet, reflecting a growing drive for increased country-led 

development.6 This drive is reflected in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile Stages, or 

New Deal. Endorsed in 2011, the New Deal is part of a decadelong global aid reform effort 

that Afghanistan has helped shape. The New Deal emphasizes state and peacebuilding 

goals for a focused, country-led transition out of fragility.7 Afghanistan is a pilot country 

for implementation and the UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands implementation partners. 

Segments of the Afghan Ministry of Finance are ardent supporters, sometimes leading to a 

more ideological approach to aid reform. 

This past December 2014, London hosted its third international conference on Afghanistan. 

Similar to the 2010 London Conference, the event came on the heels of a heavily contested 

presidential election, restricting its scope. However, London 2014 succeeded in outlining President Ghani’s agenda via a paper entitled “Realizing Self-Reliance”, similar to his Berlin paper a 

decade earlier. Donors reiterated their political and financial support to Afghanistan, and both 

sides reaffirmed their commitment to the TMAF, agreeing to develop implementation details 

and a refresh of TMAF indicators for a Senior Officials Meeting in 2015. 

As policymakers look forward toward the SOM, a few trends are worth remembering. One, 

Ghani, Abdullah, and many government staffers have a far deeper institutional memory than 

donors do. Two, Afghan officials view the pre-conference strategy papers—such as Towards 

Self-Reliance and “Realizing Self-Reliance”—as the documents that shape the reform agenda 

more than the multilateral joint reports that conclude conferences. Three, whereas strategic 

papers have focused on a path to independence, conferences have centered on donor pledging. 

Four, as donors remain concerned with the lack of government progress on promised reforms 

and develop incentive programs, they should note that the Afghan government bristles with 

a view that 50/80 commitments and aid effectiveness reforms are incomplete. As progress is 

mutual, so is frustration. Finally, although working-level implementation of TMAF is separate 

from the security sector, higher level politics on both sides is always linked to security. 

The Political Challenge of Reform

National Unity Government (NUG) reform efforts are constrained not only by limited government resources and capacity, but also by a history and culture that has often resisted radical 

change and by the political compromise nature of the NUG. Afghan history can be seen as 
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378

an evolving balance between inward-looking conservative social values centered on independence and outward-looking economic dependence. Afghan leaders must bring together 

a diverse population proud of the notion that their nation has never been conquered, while 

managing an economy that has never been productive enough to support itself. 

Two former leaders offer brief illustrative examples of the historical and cultural constraints that President Ghani and CEO Abdullah face as they pursue reforms. The “Iron Amir” 

Abdur Rahman Khan is a model Afghan leader and built the Afghan nation state as we know 

it. He successfully balanced economy and society by uniting the Afghan public around Islam 

while receiving support from the British government. In contrast is the cautionary lesson of 

Amanullah Khan, whose rule from 1919 to 1929 led to civil war. Amanullah’s ambitious social 

reforms, particularly regarding the treatment of women, alienated the religious ulema. His 

economic programs required new taxes that angered the public. Ultimately, Amanullah was 

overthrown and his reforms abolished.8

Like Amanullah, President Ghani was significantly influenced by time abroad, is outspoken 

about reform for women, and has a tendency to brusque behavior. Ghani’s rise to the presidency suggests that he learned from the past. However, he has also shown a propensity to micromanage and centralize governance in a way that has alienated much-needed political allies.9

Beyond historical parallels, the NUG faces its own challenges. Both Ghani and Abdullah 

owe a degree of their political power to select segments of Afghanistan’s ethnic, regional, 

and political power holders. These debts played out with the nearly three-month delay of 

cabinet nominations. The process was exacerbated with Ghani’s insistence that no former 

cabinet members serve in his administration. Such an insistence does help make a clean 

break from warlord dominance, but those left out in the cold are unlikely to provide full 

throated support for the administration’s reform efforts. Indeed, ex-mujahedeen leaders 

such as Abdul Sayyaf and Ismail Khan have voiced their opposition to Ghani’s sidelining 

warlords in cabinet selections.10 The move also meant that some reformers and managers 

who had been in the previous administration could not continue in office. 

As president, Ghani has shown a penchant for sweeping declarations and struggled to 

deliver on them. Blowing past his forty-five-day deadline on cabinet nominations dented 

Ghani’s political capital. In the context of such challenges and delays, policymakers should 

be wary of a refreshed TMAF that establishes reform benchmarks beyond the government’s 

capacity to deliver in a contested political environment. Donors would be wise to be mindful 

of the unique and complex Afghan political and social structures, which are often opaque to 

foreigners when making political demands. 

Many present concerns parallel Amanullah’s lessons. One, Ghani cannot push too hard 

or fast on social reforms, particularly in regard to women. Rural areas provide the barometer for acceptable change. Two, the administration faces high programmatic and security 

expenses and has limited capacity to balance its finances. Revenue generation options, such 

as the VAT, need to be implemented on a measured basis. Three, internal conflict hobbled 

Amanullah and Ghani acknowledges the huge cost that fighting the Taliban imposes on the 

budget.11 Four, Ghani needs a degree of support from key religious groups as well as the 

larger public. Effective engagement with the ulema and civil society groups will help foster 

continued support. Five, even with broader public support, the NUG is a naturally divided 

political entity and must satisfy its patronage networks. Finally, the donor community needs 

to remain mindful that its engagement with a narrow swath of Kabul elite will not reflect 

the tone or complexity of ongoing political dialogue in Afghanistan.12

Donors would be wise to be 

mindful of the unique and 

complex Afghan political and 

social structures, which are 

often opaque to foreigners when 

making political demands.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378 5

Afghan Progress on TMAF Reforms

The TMAF is part of a long legacy of success and failure in Afghanistan. Given significant 

increases in life expectancy, literacy, access to health care, clean water and education, the 

nation is without question transformed.13 At the same time, the Afghanistan conflict is the 

longest in U.S. history and more expensive than the Marshall Plan.14 Despite incomplete 

results and shrinking donor budgets, principle donors show little desire for a total international community withdrawal that would risk repeating the problems of the 1990s. TMAF 

implementation thus far has involved a host of subindicators that include “hard deliverables,” “priorities going forward,” and “next steps.” Although such items do create measurable objectives, the process of negotiating them detracted from discussions on development 

results. This examination of Afghan reform progress is therefore not a performance yardstick 

but instead an effort to learn and adjust course for the post–transition era. As a refresh of 

the TMAF approaches, donors face difficult trade-offs. Addressing these trade-offs requires a 

clearer vision to the TMAF’s ultimate purpose: is the document designed to organize policylevel cooperation on all development efforts or is it a targeted and sequenced blueprint for 

establishing Afghan self-sufficiency? 

Area 1: Elections

The 2014 presidential elections made history and great controversy. The first and second 

rounds of voting on April 5 and June 14 brought historic voter turnout despite violence in 

certain parts of the country. Ashraf Ghani’s swearing in on September 29 marked the first 

peaceful transfer of power in Afghanistan. At the same time, despite significant Afghan and 

international effort, suggestions of fraud in as many as two of the eight million votes marred 

the elections.15 The four-month delay in resolving the elections included rumors of a coup 

and ultimately required U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s intervention.16 Although generally 

accepted by the international community, the months-long delay in releasing results, accusations of massive vote fraud, and internationally negotiated settlement make it difficult to say 

that the elections fully met the “credible, inclusive, and transparent” bar in the TMAF.17

Resolving issues with the elections system will help foster long-term political stability 

and fulfill the negotiated agreement between Ghani and Abdullah. Past collective donor 

discussions around the TMAF proved successful, using the 2013 Senior Officials Meeting to 

roundly denounce poor legislative progress. Two weeks later, the Afghan parliament passed 

elections legislation. 

The run-up to the 2014 elections allowed donors to be forceful, but they now face a more 

delicate process. Secretary Kerry’s deal was a face-saving compromise enabling both parties 

to move past allegations of fraud. Consequently, donors, particularly the United States, may 

seek to remain gently positive and avoid potentially picking sides. Ghani has largely remained 

quiet on reform; his twenty-four-page London conference paper contained only one sentence 

on electoral reform.18 Abdullah, by contrast, has been vocal on the need for reform, even 

criticizing Ghani’s approach after the president announced an eleven-person reform commission just before his March 2015 U.S. visit. 19 Parliament and the IEC present an additional layer 

of political complexity. In December 2014, the Wolesi Jirga released its proposal for electoral 

commission reform.20 The IEC, however, has not supported establishing such a commission. 

Although donors may remain cautious to avoid further appearances to influencing elections or upsetting fragile political alliances, reform remains important to full legitimacy. 

Consequently, donors may need to play a more active role, particularly with delays making 

the 2015 parliamentary elections timeline increasingly unrealistic. The EU and UK have 

begun to voice concerns. In the absence of a clear picture on reform strategies from Ghani’s 

Although donors may remain 

cautious to avoid further 

appearances to influencing 

elections or upsetting fragile 

political alliances, reform remains 

important to full legitimacy.
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378

“Realizing Self-Reliance,” the EU’s report on elections—which includes eight categories for 

suggested reforms—may be a helpful template for discussion.21 Ultimately, as was the case 

before the 2014 elections, the TMAF should not be the sole avenue. Rather, the TMAF can 

help set standards for Afghans while fostering collective donor action. 

Area 2: Human Rights, Gender, and Rule of Law

Area 2 of the TMAF covers some of the most contentious issues—human rights, gender, and 

rule of law—on which donors and the Afghan government have frequently been at odds 

over the depth and pace of reform. Implementation has followed a far narrower scope than 

TMAF goals. However, Ghani has sent signals to suggest he is more reform oriented than 

his predecessor. Even with a reform-minded president, however, substantive changes must 

overcome the political obstacles of a unity government and cultural resistance like that 

Amanullah faced nearly a hundred years ago. 

Human Rights – Time for the Long View

Afghanistan’s poor human right’s record stems from decades of war, entrenched poverty, and 

a culture that views human rights differently than traditional donor nations do. Despite the 

indicator calling for the government to “ensure respect for human rights of all citizens,”22

TMAF efforts over the past two years focused narrowly on the status of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) with the International Coordinating Committee of 

National Institution for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC). 

The government made progress with AIHRC by placing it in the national budget. However, 

unilateral appointments by then president Karzai caused international stir and risked the AIHRC’s 

A-status with the UN Commission for Human Rights.23 Ghani’s “Realizing Self-Reliance” paper 

notes that the A-status will be maintained with the ICC but takes a broader approach to human 

rights than what has been pursued thus far.24 The paper anchors human rights in the concepts 

of good governance and citizen’s rights. It commits to “promoting human rights in the justice 

and security sector” through improvements in the court system, police training, prison reform, 

and child protection.25 This expanded and institutionally focused approach may enable a more 

cooperative relationship on human rights and promote better development outcomes. 

Afghanistan will require many years for human rights practices and institutions to recover 

from the aftermath of Taliban rule and decades of war, especially as abuses continue in certain 

areas.26 Given such a time line, donors need to consider the ultimate purpose of the TMAF. Is it 

a big tent framework for cooperation on all development efforts or a sequenced blueprint for 

enabling the country to reach financial independence? Insomuch as donors seek an Afghan-led 

approach, “Realizing Self-Reliance” clearly follows the latter. In taking the development focus 

tack, donors and the Afghan government will need to make significant adjustments to avoid 

missing segments of the human rights effort, such as internally displaced people, security sector abuses, or child abuse. Such an approach to human rights is comprehensive but suggests an 

impossibly long wish list for a cash-strapped, low-capacity government. Political will alone will 

not ensure that Afghanistan has the institutional capacity to fully address human rights issues. 

One solution could be sequencing specific benchmarks, which may provide balance between a 

comprehensive approach and an achievable one. 

Gender – A New Chance for Afghanistan’s Women 

From the National Geographic’s “Afghan Girl” to the iconic blue burka, the plight of women 

and girls has played an outsized role in shaping Western views and donor support for 

Afghanistan and been an emotive issue for many Afghans. Starting from abysmal levels in 

Political will alone will not 

ensure that Afghanistan has the 

institutional capacity to fully 

address human rights issues. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378 7

2001, conditions for women in Afghanistan have improved dramatically; maternal mortality 

plunged 80 percent, life expectancy increased by twenty years, girls in school went from 0 

percent to 37 percent, and women now hold key posts in government.27 Yet the TMAF has 

not played a driving role in supporting this progress. 

As is true for other areas, TMAF’s gender goals are significantly broader than implementation thus far. Although the goal calls to “ensure women fully enjoy their...rights,” the 

specific indicator shrinks to implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women 

law (EVAW) and National Plan for Women (NAPWA).28 Interim deliverables for 2013 were 

narrower still, solely calling for a report on EVAW law implementation. Despite real value 

in specific, time-bound measures, donors fell victim to the diminished standards of pursuing low-hanging fruit. At the 2013 Senior Officials Meeting, no notable progress was made 

on gender. At the 2014 JCMB six months later, an EVAW report was touted but delivered 

two weeks late. Collective donor pressure created positive outcomes in areas such as 2013 

elections legislation, but was not as effective with gender. Clearly, political will was the 

limiting factor. 

Ashraf Ghani’s election to president represents a significant potential shift in the tone 

of Afghan politics toward women. First Lady Rula Ghani is active in public life. Ashraf Ghani 

and Abdullah Abdullah helped four women ultimately get approved for the cabinet in April 

2015.29 On the donor side, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) launched 

PROMOTE, the largest gender program to date.30 This shift in attitude is reflected in “Realizing Self-Reliance.” The paper presents a three-pillar strategy for empowering women: 

addressing discrimination and violence, increasing economic and educational opportunities, and focusing on government. I suggest that reforms pressing against conservative 

social values are likely to meet with resistance, as parliamentary obstacles to the EVAW law 

demonstrate. By bringing gender into economic and institutional spheres, Ghani offers a 

mechanism to improve women’s lives without directly challenging social values. 

Despite meaningful progress on gender over the past decade, issues remain before the 

TMAF can have maximum impact on the lives of Afghan women. One, by only pursuing lowhanging fruit, such as an EVAW implementation report, standards for the whole of gender 

reform were lowered. Two, the Afghan government is not monolithic and donors can do a 

better job enlisting gender reform supporters. Three, gender should not be constrained to 

one subsection of the TMAF; economic participation is essential to achieving meaningful 

gender equality as well as full economic growth. Shifting the scope of gender efforts into 

the economic realm should prove less divisive than the political tack taken thus far. Finally, 

supporting women in Afghanistan is the right thing to do. 

Rule of Law – Overlooked Foundation for Self-Reliance

TMAF rule of law efforts have been narrowly pursued, focusing largely on asset declarations 

rather than a strategic approach to “improving access to justice for all” as the TMAF goal 

states. (In practice, asset declarations are coordinated with public financing and commercial banking.) Although the United States has five federal agencies involved in rule of 

law reform, and other donors make similar efforts, lack of Afghan political will has led to a 

reduction in the scope of engagement for TMAF. 

Since 2012, TMAF policy discussions spent little time addressing the capacity or fairness 

of the judicial system, land ownership, or counternarcotics, despite the impact of these 

issues on instability and economic growth. A broader scope for rule of law in the TMAF does 

present some questions, notably counternarcotics. Although explicitly cited as part of the 

area 2 goals, counternarcotics have been ignored in TMAF implementation. Involvement 

in the TMAF raises issues of how to manage the civil-military institutional divide, how to 
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378

coordinate across multiple Afghan institutions, and how to address Russia’s and Iran’s role 

in counternarcotics. Going forward, donors and the Afghan government need to decide 

more completely whether counternarcotics will become an active part of TMAF or will be 

addressed independently. 

Regardless of TMAF scope, rule of law efforts presently lack a clear mechanism for policylevel coordination. Expanding the scope of TMAF dialogue on rule of law and linking it with 

“Realizing Self-Reliance” benchmarks will create such a coordination mechanism. As is true 

for any change in scope, donors and Afghans must be strategic in their thinking. A trade-off 

exists between comprehensive development planning and focused accountability on achievable results. In a refresh, donors should answer how rule of law in the TMAF will contribute 

to Afghanistan’s functional independence. 

Area 3: Public Finance and Commercial Banking

Scandal, corruption, and inefficiency have marred Afghanistan’s ability to attract investment and bring funds into government channels. The $900 million-plus Kabul Bank scandal 

remains a symbol of entrenched corruption, and despite public financial management (PFM) 

reforms, the government cannot absorb all of the on-budget funds the TMAF calls for. Area 3 

addresses Kabul Bank, the IMF program, public finance reforms, and anti–money laundering 

(AML) and counter funding of terrorism (CFT) efforts. For donors, area 3 is the de facto area 

for coordination on anticorruption. Despite bolstering donor coordination in this area, the 

TMAF has not translated to notable results in banking or anticorruption, though President 

Ghani’s focus on strengthening the financial sector brings a new start. 

Kabul Bank – A Critical Reboot

By reopening the Kabul Bank case, Ghani made a dramatic statement on his stance toward 

corruption. The new trial extended the sentences of the two primary defendants, Sher Khan 

Fernod and Haji Khalil Ferozi, and froze the assets of Mahmood Karzai, former president 

Karzai’s brother.31 These are important steps in establishing justice and faith in the banking 

sector, but corruption remains deeply entrenched. 

Ghani promised to accept the recommendations of the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption 

Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC), aggressively pursue asset recovery, and confiscate the property of those implicated. Entrenched interests suggest limits to how much 

progress is possible. It remains unclear whether the apparent change in political will is sufficient to generate substantive investor and public confidence. Future TMAF indicators should 

center on bolstering such confidence. 

PEFA – Paper Progress Needs Sustainability 

In contrast to prior government obstinacy on the Kabul Bank scandal, MOF improvements 

in PFM are noteworthy, as indicated in the 2013 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment. Donors acknowledged this progress during the July 2013 SOM.32

In considering a refresh of TMAF indicators, policymakers should look to make these improvements sustainable and translate into greater government ability to absorb on-budget funds. 

Indeed, a World Bank study found that while postconflict nations can reform public finance 

management, such improvements come largely on the back of externally funded technical 

assistance and do not lead to increases in on-budget assistance.33 Afghanistan has very 

large on-budget flows but much of this runs through the ARTF and depends on foreign 

technical assistance. Public finance reform efforts should be more closely tied to on-budget 

assistance challenges than PEFA scores.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378 9

IMF Program – Key to Continued Financing

The IMF program provides an example of external reform benchmarks helping create shared 

agendas between donors and the Afghan government. Using the IMF Extended Credit Facility program as a benchmark reduces donors’ management burden and increases objectivity 

through an external standard. In December 2014, the IMF welcomed the new government’s 

focus on macroeconomic stability and pro-growth reform agenda and suggested that “good 

progress” was made in discussions with the new government.34 Such progress is key because 

the program has not disbursed fund tranches since 2012, though the IMF reached an agreement on a Staff-Monitored Program in March 2015.35

FATF – Begrudging Progress

The final component of area 3, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) compliance, is critical for 

Afghanistan’s linkage to the international banking system. In June 2014, Afghanistan narrowly missed being placed on the FATF blacklist after passing—under heavy donor pressure 

and the real threat of black listing—anti-money laundering and counter funding of terrorism legislation.36 Looking forward, FATF recommendations are another example of external 

benchmarks that reinforce the broad objective of financial self-reliance. 

Despite mediocre progress on area 3 to date, a new government presents opportunities to 

strengthen the financial sector and reduce corruption. In a complex political environment, 

donors may choose to allow the president and CEO to work their process under an umbrella 

of donor support. Regarding TMAF indicators, area 3 makes smart use of PEFA, FATF, and IMF 

as external benchmarks, thereby enhancing objectivity and shared reform agendas. 

Area 4: Revenue, Budgeting, and Subnational Governance

In light of shrinking donor funds, the Ghani administration is acutely aware that it cannot 

continue relying on foreign aid. A self-sustaining Afghanistan cannot be achieved without sufficient revenue and effective budgeting that reflects both national and provincial priorities. 

“Realizing Self-Reliance” therefore centers on improving revenue collection and budgeting. 

Despite these issues, donors have not given this area the same degree of political or programmatic attention as they have to gender, anticorruption, or elections. Because area 4 is key 

to the new administration and requires relatively less political or financial capital than other 

areas, donors have an important opportunity to bolster Afghan financial independence. 

Revenue Collection – Faltering Backbone of Independence 

Despite TMAF commitments, the Afghan government has consistently missed revenue collection targets, falling short by close to 35 percent in 2014, an overall decline of 8 percent 

from 2013 revenue.37 Afghanistan relies heavily on customs duties for government revenues, 

covering nearly a third of revenue.38

Afghanistan’s customs system is byzantine, the forty-seven agencies involved leaving 

generous space for corruption and nepotism. The Ghani administration walks a tightrope 

between maintaining support from regional power brokers and addressing customs revenue 

holes. Thus far, donor efforts to modernize and clean up customs collections have met only 

middling success. One could argue that customs corruption presents a greater threat to 

financial independence than the Kabul Bank. 

Complementary to customs reform is the VAT roll out, which will require time and a balanced approach to make a reliable impact on revenue. Ghani has stated he will have a “full 

strategy to stabilize revenue” by the 2015 Senior Officials Meeting.39 Donor engagement 

A self-sustaining Afghanistan 

cannot be achieved without 

sufficient revenue and effective 

budgeting that reflects both 

national and provincial priorities. 
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378

on a revenue strategy is critical to independence and must replace past tendencies to offer 

MOF bailouts and create moral hazards. 

Budget Execution – Process not Numbers

Budget execution rates are often highlighted as a sign of government’s inability to handle the 

massive on-budget flows required by the 50 percent on-budget commitment and that provinces cannot absorb additional assistance. This is only partially true. One, even with difficulties, 

Afghanistan processes significant on-budget funding. Two, the TMAF indicator here does not differentiate between operational and development budgets, the former generally being fully spent. 

A one-year budget cycle creates inefficiencies in Afghanistan’s procurement process, 

particularly given its top-down nature, and inefficiencies provide space for corruption. Presidential efforts to streamline and strengthen the procurement process through a procurement 

office are important efforts, but also need to reinforce existing institutions.40 Future TMAF 

efforts regarding budget execution should examine more than a number to ensure policy 

discussions focus on the right issues. 

Subnational Governance – Key to Legitimate Institutions

Despite budget challenges, the Afghan government has made progress on its subnational 

governance policy. In 2014, USAID released $15 million in incentive funding in recognition 

of a strengthened policy.41 Improvements in how the central government engages with 

provinces on governance and budgeting are essential to building self-sufficient institutions, 

reducing waste, and improving budget execution. The Independent Directorate of Local 

Governance (IDLG), tasked with managing provincial governments, has been somewhat of 

an orphan, sitting outside the MOF budgeting process and service ministries. Meanwhile, 

the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) has had significant resources, 

particularly through the World Bank funded National Solidarity Program (NSP), to conduct 

local development. As former minister of finance and transition adviser, Ghani is well placed 

to empower and integrate IDLG into the system and clarify MRRD’s role. He has taken positive steps with provincial councils.42 New TMAF indicators could seek to address the parallel 

structures within the government and the disconnect between allocation of government 

resources and roles. Although donors do not have uniform views on the next step, forming 

an SNG working group was a positive action in developing consensus; further efforts should 

continue at the working level. 

“Despite Afghanistan’s well-deserved reputation for independence,” Thomas Barfield notes, 

“no government there was ever stable without access to foreign sources of revenue.” 43 Donors 

need to be realistic about the economic gains that can be made over the coming decade, and 

a meaningful move toward self-reliance cannot occur without greater focus on revenue and 

budgeting. This reality is further evidence for the need to make a strategic choice between 

focusing the TMAF on organizing development and sequencing financial independence. 

Area 5: Inclusive and Sustained Growth and Development

Area 5 is a medley of development topics and has received only minimal policy attention 

relative to other TMAF segments. Despite notable Afghan government and donor progress, 

area 5 lacks a coherent reform strategy to address the spectrum of health, education, extractive industry, private sector, transportation, and trade. Moving forward, opportunities for 

cementing progress exist if donors and the Afghan government clarify reform objectives, 

sequence efforts, and address gap areas where development challenges exist but the TMAF 

does not address. 

Donors need to be realistic 

about the economic gains that 

can be made over the coming 

decade, and a meaningful move 

toward self-reliance cannot 

occur without greater focus on 

revenue and budgeting.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378 11

Health and Education – Time to Discuss Sustainability 

Aid agencies often tout population health and education as evidence of taxpayer-funded 

impact. From the two decades added to Afghan life expectancy to the millions of boys 

and girls attending school, gains were huge. However, the TMAF does not provide a space 

to address challenges in health and education. Rather than be rolled into an indicator on 

millennium development goals, health and education need to be split apart to allow policy 

discussions. Furthermore, the time has come to shift the focus from producing results to 

addressing financial sustainability for the Afghan government. 

Extractive Industry – Persistence and Balance

Over the transformation decade, the extractive industry should play an increasingly large 

role in Afghan self-reliance. With a potential value of as much as $1 trillion, mineral and 

hydrocarbon mining has received its share of attention and controversy from Afghans and 

foreigners alike.44 Despite differing views, donors were able to come together with the 

ministries of finance and mines to push for passage of the Minerals Law, which was essential for foreign companies to begin mining.45 Yet environmental, land, social, and oversight 

concerns mean that a balanced approach will be necessary to help Afghanistan avoid the 

resource curse. Donors should continue to engage all parties and ensure that the TMAF supports a balanced view. 

Private Sector, Employment, Agriculture, Water, Infrastructure – Missing Keys

Despite being a grab bag for development items not covered elsewhere in the TMAF, area 5 is 

notable in its failure to fully address key items, particularly the private sector and job development, agriculture and water, and infrastructure. Each is essential in a functioning Afghan 

economy. By mentioning only the private sector via the World Bank’s Doing Business Index, 

job growth is left out. The WTO and extractives are important entities, but at present the TMAF 

has no overall strategy for addressing private-sector growth and is overly reliant on government involvement. Similarly, despite being both the main livelihood for upward of 80 percent 

of the Afghan populace and critical to food security, agriculture and water are only tangentially 

addressed in the TMAF. A Kabul-centric donor group needs to rethink the role that agriculture 

and water play in the sustainability and stability of Afghanistan. Similarly, despite massive 

donor investment, infrastructure does not receive explicit attention. Although road, rail, and 

civil aviation institutions are essential to Afghan transportation, so are the operations and 

maintenance of Afghan roads. The O&M Facility, which is part of the World Bank’s Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and designed to incentivize increased operations and maintenance spending and improve fiscal flows to provinces, is a positive step toward supporting 

infrastructure in Afghanistan.46 The TMAF would benefit from making infrastructure its own 

measure, though donors may be weary of inviting calls for project support. 

In looking to refresh the TMAF in the SOM, donors and the Afghan government have an 

opportunity to adapt area 5 to create space for policy discussions on key topics. This means 

splitting indicators into discrete items without creating a laundry list. TMAF indicators 

should be high-level, long-term policy priorities. Health, education, private sector, agriculture, and infrastructure are each essential to Afghan sustainability and should be treated as 

such. These issues also provide space for an expanded policy discussion on gender. 

These areas have a direct impact on the lives of voting Afghans and thus a bearing on 

government legitimacy. Should donors and Afghan officials weary of a bloated TMAF, then a 

separate mechanism for addressing the food, health, and employment of millions of Afghans 

may be needed. Lacking the political or social complexities of other TMAF segments, area 5 

Despite being both the main 

livelihood for upward of 80 

percent of the Afghan populace 

and critical to food security, 

agriculture and water are 

only tangentially addressed 

in the TMAF.
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378

should drive cooperation on items that are essential for Afghanistan’s financial self-reliance 

and the well-being of Afghan citizens. 

Donor Commitments to Aid Effectiveness

The second half of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework addresses donor reform commitments. Specifically, it includes a reaffirmation of donor commitments to place 50 percent 

of aid onto the Afghan budget (conditional on further progress on PFM, anticorruption, 

and budget execution), align 80 percent of programming to National Priorities, efforts to 

improve aid effectiveness, and above all, financial support through 2017.47 It also seeks to 

address the ownership, efficiency, and transparency of aid in Afghanistan. Although Afghan 

efforts to direct aid stretch over a decade, donors feel a squeeze between fulfilling TMAF 

commitments and satisfying oversight agencies such as the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

Neither side seems to appreciate the other’s context, and therefore TMAF implementation is plagued with complex metrics and negotiations rather than development solutions. 

Given the fewer dollars and staff going forward, donors and their Afghan counterparts face 

trade-offs. Better taxpayer funding protection requires robust monitoring and management 

of fiduciary risk, and reinforcing Afghan institutions requires investments of capital as well 

as, according to many, hearty on-budget flows. Limited donor resources cannot fully satisfy 

both options. 

On-Budget Assistance

The commitment to placing 50 percent of assistance on budget is perhaps the most complex 

donor pledge. Globally, donors—including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the 

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)—increasingly see advantages with on-budget 

assistance (OBA) in building domestic capacity, strengthening the budgeting process, and 

reinforcing state legitimacy.48 Afghanistan’s ministries of public health and of education 

have effective on-budget programming. However, on-budget projects are more time and 

labor intensive for donors, partly because of onerous procedures. For Afghans, the one-year 

budgeting cycle, convoluted procurement system, and inadequate institutional capacity 

limit ability to absorb funds, creating a pipeline of billions in unspent funds. Furthermore, 

most donors use the World Bank’s ARTF for their on-budget commitments. 

Should the Afghan government seek to shift programming, it must either create enough 

financial safeguards for a new avenue or engage the World Bank to change ARTF programming. Both options entail significant obstacles, making the government essentially locked 

in to existing programming. 

Meeting the 50 percent on-budget target leads to difficult policy decisions and tense 

donor-government engagement. To maintain funding, aid agencies must fulfill their fiduciary 

responsibility and satisfy oversight agencies. SIGAR audits have found numerous “critical or 

high” risks in ministries planned or receiving on-budget assistance.49 In practice, addressing 

these concerns often requires USAID to choose a balance between fiduciary responsibility 

and TMAF commitments. Most U.S. on-budget projects have milestones that must be met 

before funds are disbursed. This protects U.S. funds but complicates efforts for a cashstrapped Afghan government that must front funds for many projects. Throughout TMAF 

implementation, Afghan officials have focused on such donor policies and skirted absorptive 

capacity concerns, seemingly unaware that such a ballooning pipeline makes justifying high 

levels of funding to Congress increasingly difficult. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378 13

The Ghani administration brings a shift in attitude that may allow for greater collaboration. “Realizing Self-Reliance” states that “the government will take all necessary 

measures...to enable donors to further increase their on-budget assistance.”50 Forming 

a procurement office and shifting to a three-year budgeting process are good steps to 

addressing absorptive constraints. If the government, particularly the MOF, is open to new 

measures, donors would do well to develop a clearer consensus within the international 

community on the specific challenges facing on-budget assistance. 

Addressing on-budget challenges for the next phase of TMAF will require trust, frank 

discussion, and pragmatism at both policy and project levels. On the policy side, rather than 

finger pointing, discussions need to focus on what must be adjusted in the budget cycle, 

procurement process, and PFM systems to achieve development results. At the project level, 

donors and the Afghan government should expand existing collaboration in the project 

design phase. Front-end discussions on specific ARTF or bilateral projects may result in a longer design timelines, but will support the intent of reforms with meaningful Afghan input. 

For Afghans, it will be important to be active in the design phase but then allow donors to 

implement projects according to their own regulatory requirements. 

National Priority Program Alignment

Commitments to align donor programming with Afghan priorities are intended to ensure 

substantive host country leadership in donor programming. Instead, alignment with Afghan 

National Priority Programs (NPPs) has been contested throughout the TMAF and created 

paperwork exercises. Joint reports for the 2013 SOM and 2014 JCMB meetings only agreed 

to disagree: “differences in the interpretation of the term alignment mean that it is not possible to confirm the precise degree of alignment with NPPs.”51 This disagreement extends 

beyond debate over control of priorities and programs to the practical obstacles of actually 

aligning projects and plans. While the Afghan government and general consensus suggest 

alignment should be at the deliverable (output) level, some NPPs do not have deliverables. 

Others match in spirit but not specific language. Furthermore, many ministries drafting NPPs 

used them to create infrastructure wish lists rather than meaningful prioritization. Given 

these challenges, a reboot of the alignment effort is in order. 

President Ghani suggests just such a process: “the current 22 national priority programs 

are too many to manage properly. They will be reduced to 10-12 and restructured around 

results.”52 With so many NPPs focusing on infrastructure rather than outcomes, the current 

system is indeed unwieldy and virtually ignored as a guide for project design. Ghani will face 

political opposition as winners and losers are chosen from existing NPPs. Donors would be 

wise to use a light touch in pushing for NPP readjustment. 

Whether or not NPPs are cleaned up, donors should expand the involvement of Afghan ministries in the project design process. Ex post facto alignment is cumbersome and problematic, 

and donor-ministry collaboration during project design has seen some success. Such collaboration occurs at the technical rather than policy level, generally resulting in a more practical 

discussion. To encourage such collaboration, donors need to be more flexible and involve 

Afghan partners earlier and more extensively in their project design process. At the same time, 

Afghan counterparts need to understand the financial and regulatory limits facing donors. 

The “Realizing Self-Reliance” paper calls for introduction of monitoring systems. Donors 

and Afghan officials do well to emphasize monitoring in a refreshed TMAF. As they do, it is 

essential that issues of management, costs, and reporting are addressed up front. Establishing clear arbiters of progress ahead of time, perhaps during the project design cycle, will 

reduce bureaucratic wrangling later. 

Donors need to be more flexible 

and involve Afghan partners 

earlier and more extensively 

in their project design process. 

At the same time, Afghan 

counterparts need to understand 

the financial and regulatory 

limits facing donors. 
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378

Partnership Reforms

Beyond donor commitments to overall support, on-budget assistance, and alignment, the 

TMAF calls for a number of reforms that reinforce Afghan leadership and are intended to 

increase efficiency. The New Deal and a decade of aid delivery shape these commitments. 

Donors make frequent use of technical assistance in capacity-building projects. These 

programs have too often substituted for rather than built Afghan capacity, however, and are 

often not fully coordinated with actual needs. Donors must ensure that technical assistance 

builds long-term capacity rather than simply plugs in holes. Linked with adjusting technical 

assistance is salary reform. Adjusting pay scales will help ensure that the Afghan government 

can attract and keep capable staff. The National Technical Assistance Policy and World Bank’s 

Capacity Building for Results program are good steps and deserve better donor attention. 

Transparency is a recurring issue in the donor-government relationship. Historically, many 

donor projects were not registered or coordinated with the Afghan government. As the government takes a larger role in initiating and maintaining development projects, information 

sharing becomes more essential. Yet a combination of trust and technical issues related to 

the Donor Assistance Database (DAD) inhibit cohesive donor-government sharing. Donors are 

weary of excess data calls and government intervention with implementing partners as Afghan 

ministries seek to understand and budget for projects in particular locations. Both the government and donors need to use existing annual forums such as Donor Coordination Dialogues and 

project design collaboration as their primary mechanisms for information exchange. 

Regional and Domestic Collaboration

Essential to a soft landing from aid dependency is improved collaboration with Afghanistan’s 

neighbors and its own civil society and private sector. The Tokyo Declaration endorses such 

collaboration but without explicit goals. TMAF implementation played only lip service to it.

This contrasts with President Ghani’s early visits to Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia, and 

Turkmenistan. As discussions on refreshing the TMAF proceed, a more clearly articulated role 

for regional and domestic collaboration will reinforce broader TMAF objectives. Enhanced 

focus on regional collaboration requires Western donors to address the involvement of China, 

Russia, Iran, and Pakistan in Afghan development. These regional partners play a larger 

political role than their aid dollars suggest. Expanding the 5+3 coordinating group is not 

feasible, but strategic and measured engagement would help avoid blind spots, particularly 

regarding Iran’s role in trade and Russia’s counternarcotics interests. 

Ghani’s vision for Afghanistan as a “regional roundabout” and efforts such as the Central Asia South Asia (CASA-1000) power project, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-PakistanIndia (TAPI) pipeline, the Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan 

(TUTAP) energy project, and the Istanbul Process should be harmonized with the TMAF 

coordination process.53

Despite participation in the London and Tokyo conferences, civil society and the private 

sector have not received regular or active roles in TMAF implementation. Mutual interests of 

donors and these groups outweigh the complications brought by having them in the room. 

Civil society and the private sector play critical roles in a self-reliant Afghanistan. Donors 

should ensure regular participation by these groups yet be aware of their political dynamics. 

Incentives and Conditionality

The TMAF has an implied conditionality built into its language. Recently, donors have acted 

on this conditionality by developing incentive programs, most notably the U.S. Incentive 

Fund. Considered a mechanism to drive results, incentives and conditionality are complex 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378 15

and can produce negative consequences. In Afghanistan’s multifaceted political environment, incentives are unlikely to produce major reforms. The ARTF’s Incentive Program is 

an example of moderate success. Modest incentive programs can drive dialogue and help 

targeted reforms tip toward success.54

Monitoring

Monitoring is essential to effective development and often required by development agencies and Afghan government partners yet has not been strategically integrated into the 

TMAF. There is a symbiotic opportunity, however, for the TMAF to serve as a coordination 

mechanism for monitoring efforts and those efforts to feed data that helps TMAF policy 

decisions. Thoughtful pairing of benchmarks and monitoring efforts should lead to a more 

streamlined, objective process. A trade-off does exist between precise, monitorable benchmarks and flexibility on policy decisions. When donors focus on development outcomes 

rather than metrics, they are less likely to be forced into adversarial conditionality decisions. 

Consequently, monitoring should inform on development results more than on metrics. 

Recommendations

This report argues that the TMAF is an effective avenue for coordination on development but 

that results for both Afghans and donors have been mixed given political and social constraints, bureaucratic wrangling, and a patchwork approach to fostering self-reliance. TMAF 

efforts should consistently answer whether engagement is focused on satisfying metrics or 

producing development results.

These recommendations are intended to provide policy options for evolving TMAF strategies and principles to approach to accountability, monitoring, and incentive challenges. 

With that in mind, specific benchmarks should involve the input of subject matter experts 

in each relevant field. 

General Conclusions

• Using the Afghan government’s “Realizing Self-Reliance” agenda as a blueprint for 

refreshing the TMAF and aligning the paper’s seven critical areas will help reduce 

disagreement, but parties should be weary of overly ambitious aims. 

• Determining whether the TMAF should drive for self-reliance or organize overall 

development assistance will provide a focus for allocating resources and strategy. Given 

the political environment and limited resources, a focus on financial independence may 

be more realistic. 

• TMAF implementation process must emphasize efficiency and development results over 

bureaucratic wrangling. Engaging and delegating work to clusters, working groups, and 

shared tasks is key to implementation with limited staff. 

• Expand TMAF’s scope but narrow its ultimate purpose. History provides cautionary lessons 

for leaders who overreach on reform and donors that do not address the full scope of 

the problems. A broader scope for addressing issues should be paired with modest and 

disciplined ambitions for reform. 

• TMAF implementation should involve a broader range of actors. Active participation by 

service ministries as well as the ministry of finance, regular involvement of civil society 

and the private sector, and a thoughtful link to regional players will reinforce TMAF efforts. 

More efficient use of working groups and clusters should help offset the larger audience. 
16 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378

• New indicators should focus on institution building and be sequenced to avoid 

overburdening reform efforts. Using external indicators such as PEFA and FATF bring clarity 

and objectivity. Terms must be clearly defined in the TMAF. Donors must avoid the trap of 

diminished outcomes brought by pursuing low hanging fruit or submetrics. Intermediate 

indicators such as hard deliverables may be used as a management tool only so long as 

creating and monitoring them does not eclipse reform efforts. Sequenced and time-bound 

objectives may balance the need to avoid a laundry list of metrics, monitor progress, 

address broad development issues, and prioritize effort. 

• Greater focus on institutional development and sustainability is necessary for self-reliance. 

Reforming pay and technical assistance imbalances, increased focus on O&M, and 

expanded dialogue on financial sustainability, particularly in health and education, are 

needed to make lasting strides in Afghanistan’s development. 

• Incentives can be used to set the agenda, spur the unity government, and encourage 

greater intergovernmental collaboration. 

Afghan Progress

• Economic growth is key to transforming Afghanistan. Political and social issues such as 

gender and anticorruption are decades-long efforts. The Amanullah trap is an example of 

potential challenges facing rushed reform without comprehensive social support. Reform 

timelines, especially given challenges facing the NUG, should therefore be modest.

• All the elements of budgeting and revenue generation—including customs, subnational 

governance, and development budget execution rate—need far greater donor attention. 

• Health, education, agriculture, jobs, and infrastructure need their own place in the TMAF 

indicators to allow for policy discussion. 

• Private-sector and job growth cannot be buried in a subsection of area 5. 

• Rule of law deserves a larger platform if it is to support changes that foster stability, good 

governance, and economic growth. 

• Anticorruption should be addressed more broadly than just Kabul Bank and asset 

declarations. Customs problems need to be addressed. 

• An expanded thematic scope for the TMAF can be addressed, in part, through strategic 

decisions to focus the framework’s ultimate purpose, greater emphasis on development 

results in policy dialogue, and more complete and efficient use of forums such as working 

groups and thematic clusters. Regardless of scope, TMAF implementation requires more 

disciplined and productive dialogue. 

• Gender should be mainstreamed into other segments of the TMAF, particularly economic 

efforts in area 5. 

Donor Commitments

• Finding trust will be essential for productive collaboration. Efforts should focus on 

development results rather than finger pointing. 

• On-budget and alignment efforts should be split into project-level efforts pairing service 

ministries with relevant technical experts during the project design phase and policy-level 

efforts helping solve management burden and absorptive capacity issues through dialogue 

at existing annual meetings. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378 17

• Reducing NPPs is a valuable goal that should be pursued with a focus on development 

results. 

The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework should help Afghanistan have a soft landing from the conflict and chaos it has faced over the past thirty years. The coming decade 

brings hard realities that can be better dealt with through collective effort under the TMAF 

umbrella provided that pragmatism, efficiency, and results become watchwords for both 

Afghans and donors alike. With diligence and a measure of luck, these efforts will create a 

successful Afghanistan where the TMAF is no longer relevant. 

Acknowledgments

The author thanks USIP for its editorial support, particularly Colin Cookman and Scott Smith. The report relies on 

the generous insights of colleagues at USAID’s Mission in Kabul, the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, and 

international donor colleagues, particularly from the UK’s DFID and the Japanese Embassy. 

Notes

1. “Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework,” presented at the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan, July 8, 2012, www.

mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/tokyo_conference_2012/tokyo_declaration_en2.html.

2. Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014,” World Bank, May 2014, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/

INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Vol1Overview8Maypm.pdf. 

3. For additional Afghanistan conference commentary, see William Byrd, “Avoiding Meeting Fatigue,” Peace Brief 

no. 130, U.S. Institute for Peace, June 29, 2012, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/avoiding percent20meeting 

percent20fatigue.pdf. 

4. Government of Afghanistan, “Securing Afghanistan’s Future,” presented at the Bonn Conference, March 17, 

2004, http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/securing-afghanistans-future-accomplishments-and-strategicpath-forward, p. 10. 

5. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “National Priority Program Five: Law and Justice for All,” June 

23, 2013, www.thekabulprocess.gov.af/images/npps/gov/GOV-NPP5-JFA.pdf, p. 10.

6. Reforms were outlined in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the 2008 Third High Level Forum on 

Aid Effectiveness in Accra, and 2011 New Deal for Fragile States (New Deal). 

7. “A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States,” International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State Building, www.

pbsbdialogue.org/documentupload/49151944.pdf. 

8. Thomas J. Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

2010), p. 191.

9. Thomas Ruttig, “The Unity Government’s First Six Months: Where is the Governance?” Afghan Analysts 

Network, March 26, 2015, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-unity-governments-first-six-months-where-is-thegovernance/. 

10. Margherita Stancati, “Lawmakers Balk at Approving Cabinet,” Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2015, www.wsj.

com/articles/lawmakers-balk-at-approving-afghan-cabinet-1422293896. 

11. “More than 60 percent of our national operating budget goes towards covering security sector costs and the 

government is bearing an increasing responsibility for security expenditures at the expense of critical civilian 

operating and development priorities.” Government of Afghanistan, “Realizing Self-Reliance: Commitments to 

Reform and Renewed Partnership,” presented at the London Conference on Afghanistan, November 20, 2014, www.

afghanistan-un.org/2014/12/realizing-self-reliance-commitments-to-reforms-and-renewed-partnership, p. 21.

12. Barfield, Afghanistan, p. 340.

13. Candace Karp and Michael O’Hanlon, “Protecting the Gains in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2015, 

http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/01/07/protecting-the-gains-in-afghanistan. 

14. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report for the Congress of the United 

States,” July 30, 2014, www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-07-30qr.pdf. 

15. Carlota Gall, “In Afghan Election, Signs of Systemic Fraud Cast Doubt on Many Votes,” New York Times, August 

23, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/world/asia/in-afghan-election-signs-of-systemic-fraud-cast-doubt-onmany-votes.html.

16. Matthew Rosenberg, “Amid Election Impasse, Calls in Afghanistan for an Interim Government,” New York Times, 

August 18, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/08/19/world/asia/amid-election-impasse-calls-in-afghanistan-for-aninterim-government.html. 

17. “Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework.” 

18. Government of Afghanistan, “Realizing Self-Reliance,” p. 11.

19. Sharif Amiri, “Abdullah Speaks out Against Ghani’s Approach to Election Reform,” Tolo News, April 11, 2015, 

www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/19014--abdullah-speaks-out-against-ghanis-approach-to-electoral-reform. 

20. Mirabad Joyenda, “Wolesi Jirga Finalizes Proposal for Amendments to Electoral Commissions,” Tolo News, 

December 12, 2014, www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/17444-wolesi-jirga-finalizes-proposal-for-amendmentsto-electoral-commissions. 
18 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378

21. European Union Elections Assessment Team, “Final Report: Presidential Election 5 April and 14 June 2014,” 

December 16, 2014, www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/FINAL-REPORT-EUEAT-AFGHANISTAN-2014-c_en.pdf, p. 46.

22. “Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework,” p. 3.

23. Rod Norland, “Critics Question Karzai Choices for Rights Panel,” New York Times, July 1, 2013, www.

nytimes.com/2013/07/02/world/asia/karzai-choices-for-afghan-human-rights-panel-raise-questions.html?

pagewanted=all&_r=0. 

24. Government of Afghanistan, “Realizing Self-Reliance,” p. 20. 

25. Ibid. p. 19.

26. “Afghanistan: Abusive Strongmen Escape Justice,” Human Rights Watch, March 3, 2015. www.hrw.org/

news/2015/03/03/afghanistan-abusive-strongmen-escape-justice. 

27. David Ignatius, “Afghanistan’s Improving Ways,” Washington Post, January 6, 2013. www.washingtonpost.com/

opinions/david-ignatius-afghanistans-improvingways/2013/01/16/d7fa01f6-5f3d-11e2-9940-6fc488f3fecd_

story.html.

28. “Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework,” p. 3.

29. “Afghan Cabinet Nearly Complete After Months of Delay,” BBC News, April 21, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-32391844. 

30. Tariq Majidi, “New USAID Women’s Empowerment Program Starts in Afghanistan,” Tolo News, November 8, 2014, 

www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/17049-new-usaid-womens-empowerment-program-starts-in-afghanistan. 

31. Ali Latifi, “Afghan Group Finds Uneven Progress in Ghani’s First 100 Days,” LA Times, January 6, 2015, www.

latimes.com/world/afghanistan-pakistan/la-fg-afghan-report-ghani-100-days-20150106-story.html. 

32. Government of Afghanistan. “Senior Officials Meeting Joint Report,” presented at Senior Officials Meeting, Kabul, 

July 7, 2013, http://mof.gov.af/Content/files/TMAF_SOM_Report_Final_English.pdf.

33. World Bank, “Public Financial Management Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries,” June 15, 2012, www-wds.

worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/06/15/000356161_20120615033527/

Rendered/PDF/699640WP0P1206070023B0PFM0Web0Final.pdf, pp. 68–69.

34. “Statement at the End of an IMF Mission to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” December 2, 2014, www.imf.

org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr14548.htm. 

35. “IMF Mission Reached Staff-Level Agreement on SMP with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” Press release no. 

15/128, March 20, 2015, www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15128.htm. 

36. “Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going process,” FATF, October 24, 2014, www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/

a-c/afghanistan/documents/fatf-compliance-oct-2014.html.

37. “Afghan Government’s Revenue Drops by 8 percent in 2014,” Wadsam, January 7, 2015, http://wadsam.com/

afghan-business-news/afghan-governments-revenue-drops-by-8-in-2014-232. 

38. Declan Walsh, “At Afghan Border, Graft is Part of the Bargain.” New York Times, November 11, 2014, www.nytimes.

com/2014/11/12/world/asia/in-afghanistan-customs-system-corruption-is-part-of-the-bargain.html. 

39. Government of Afghanistan, “Realizing Self-Reliance,” p. 13.

40. Geeti Mohsini, “Ghani to Create Procurement Office, Oversee Contracting,” Tolo News, November 10, 2014, www.

tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/17059-ghani-to-create-procurement-office-oversee-contracting. 

41. Stefan Korshak, “U.S. Gives $30 Million in Incentive Funding to Afghan Government,” USAID press release, March 

5, 2014, www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/news-information/press-releases/us-gives-30-million-incentive-fundingafghan-government.

42. “Ghani Moves to Revive Provincial Council Oversight Powers,” Tolo News, February 1, 2015, www.tolonews.com/

en/afghanistan/18045-ghani-moves-to-revive-provincial-council-oversight-powers. 

43. Barfield, Afghanistan, p. 311.

44. David Phillips and Lois Hooge, “Responsible Resource Extraction in Afghanistan: the First Strategy,” Guardian, no 

date, www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/adam-smith-international-partner-zone/

resource-extraction-in-afghanistan. 

45. Lynne O’Donnel, “New Afghan Mining Law Lacks Transparency Say Experts,” South China Morning Post, August 

23, 2014, www.scmp.com/business/commodities/article/1579556/new-afghan-mining-law-lacks-transparencysay-experts.

46. “Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Policy Reform Program,” World Bank, June 2014, www.artf.af/policyreform-program.

47. “Communique,” presented at the London Conference on Afghanistan, January 28, 2010, http://mfa.gov.af/

Content/files/LONDON%20CONFERENCE.pdf, p. 17.

48. Stefan Koeberly and Zoran Stavreski, “Budget Support: Concepts and Issues,” World Bank, May 2006, http://

siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/budgetsupportconceptsissues.pdf; Asian Development Bank 

and United Nations Development Program, “Aid Effectiveness Portal,” www.aideffectiveness.org/Tools-Aidmodalities-Budget-support.html.

49. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Direct Assistance: USAID Has Taken Positive Action 

to Assess Afghan Ministries’ Ability to Manage Donor Funds, but Concerns Remain,” SIGAR 14-32 Audit Report, 

USAID Assessments of Afghan Ministries, January 2014, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/

SIGAR-14-32-AR.pdf.

50. Government of Afghanistan, “Realizing Self-Reliance,” p. 13.

51. The language in both reports was identical, reflecting the contested nature of statements on alignment. 

Government of Afghanistan, “Special JCMB Joint Report,” January 29, 2014, www.embassyofafghanistan.org/

document/special-jcmb-joint-report-january-29-2014.

52. Government of Afghanistan, “Realizing Self-Reliance,” p. 15.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 378 19

53. Ibid. p. 20.

54. Trent Ruder, “How to Spur Afghan Reforms: The Limits and Benefits of Incentives,” Peace Brief no. 181, U.S 

Institute for Peace, November 20, 2014, http://www.usip.org/publications/donor-aid-challenges-in-shapingincentive-programs-and-spurring-afghan-reform.
Of Related Interest

• Managing Conflict in a World Adrift edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela 

Aall (USIP Press, 2015)

• Afghanistan’s Continuing Fiscal Crisis: No End In Sight by William A. Byrd (Peace Brief, May 2015)

• Aid to Civil Society: A Movement Mindset by Maria J. Stephan, Sadaf Lakhani, and Nadia Naviwala 

(Special Report, February 2015)

• Donor Aid Challenges in Shaping Incentive Programs and Spurring Afghan Reform by Trent Ruder 

(Peace Brief, November 2014)

ISBN: 978-1-60127-306-2

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

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