BANGLADESH

BANGLADESH

U n i t e d S t a t e s C o m m i ss i o n o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l i g i o us F r e e d o m

F ALL 2 0 0 6

THE U.S. COMMISSION 

ON INTERNATIONAL 

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

was created by the International Religious Freedom 

Act of 1998 to monitor 

the status of freedom 

of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief 

abroad, as defined in the 

Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights and related 

international instruments, 

and to give independent 

policy recommendations to 

the President, Secretary of 

State, and Congress.

visit our web site at 

www.uscirf.gov

The Supreme Court Building, Dhaka

POLICYFOCUS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In January 2007, the People’s Republic of Bangladesh will hold a national election, its fourth 

since the fall of a military dictatorship in 1990. 

This election will be a critical test for the country. The last national election in October 2001 

was marred by violence; many of the victims 

were Hindus, Bangladesh’s largest religious 

minority. That election was won by an alliance 

that included, for the first time in Bangladesh, 

religiously based parties. The largest of these, 

Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, openly promotes 

Bangladesh becoming an Islamic state with a 

legal system based on sharia, or Islamic law, 

and the establishment of an “Islamic social 

order.” Moreover, avowedly Islamist political 

parties serving in the government coalition 

have sought to impose a more Islamic cast on 

government and society, a goal that could have 

serious implications for religious freedom in 

Bangladesh. Since the 2001 election, Bangladesh has experienced an upsurge in violence 

by religious extremists and, as a result, growing 

concerns expressed by the country’s religious 

minorities, including Hindus, Christians, and 

Buddhists. In addition, Islamist activists have 

mounted a vocal public campaign against the 

Ahmadi religious community.1 The 2007 election will help determine whether Bangladesh 

will be able to sustain its democratic institutions and effective secular legal system, which 

guarantee the human rights of all Bangladeshis. 

Bangladesh is by many standards a moderate and democratic majority-Muslim country. 

It is a functioning, albeit flawed, democracy 

with a representative government, periodic 

elections that have led to changes of power, a 

judiciary that sometimes rules against executive authority, a lively and critical press, and 

a functioning civil society with active human 

rights groups and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Bangladesh’s constitution 

contains strongly worded protections for religious freedom and other human rights and affirms the equal rights of all citizens regardless 

of religious faith, ethnicity, or gender.2 These 

protections have been upheld in the courts 

and publicly reaffirmed by those in authority. Tolerance for religious diversity has deep 

roots in Bangladeshi popular culture. Women, 

although still disadvantaged in Bangladesh, 

have held leadership positions in government 

and in society.

In recent years, however, growing extremist 

militancy in the majority Muslim community 

has marred Bangladesh’s ability to protect all of 

its citizens. Violence, both religiously inspired 

and politically motivated, has targeted Hindus, 
2

POLICYFOCUS

Ahmadis, and other minorities and has 

threatened to undermine the democratic institutions that protect religious 

freedom and to silence the country’s 

voices of tolerance and moderation. 

That violence escalated in 2005, reaching its height in August when 459 bombs 

exploded throughout the country on a 

single day in a demonstration of the militants’ operational reach and organizational capabilities.3

 The country’s courts 

and secular legal system have been 

subjected to terrorist attacks by those 

wishing to impose Islamic law. These 

attacks have included suicide bombings, a new phenomenon in Bangladesh. 

Secular NGOs, anti-extremist journalists, 

and other public figures have also been 

attacked, sometimes fatally. 

The government of Bangladesh 

initially downplayed the problem of violence by radical Islamists and even tried 

to discredit those seeking to publicize 

it. Only belatedly has the government 

become more assertive in its response, 

banning some groups and arresting 

several suspects. Even when arrested, 

however, some terrorist ringleaders 

have reportedly received indulgent, 

even accommodating treatment from 

the authorities, being kept in an apartment rather than imprisoned, and 

allowed to receive visitors.4 Meanwhile, 

law enforcement personnel, including 

elite units involved in counter-terrorist 

operations, have been further discredited by their participation in numerous 

extrajudicial killings, locally termed 

“cross-fire” killings. 

To examine these and other concerns, 

a Commission delegation traveled to 

Bangladesh in February-March 2006. 

The delegation met with senior government officials, political leaders, human 

rights monitors, leading members of 

various religious communities, including Sunni Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, 

Christians, and Ahmadis, civil society 

representatives, and journalists. The 

government of Bangladesh received 

the delegation at a high level, including 

separate meetings with four members 

of the Cabinet: the Foreign Minister, the 

Minister for Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs, the Minister of Education, and the Minister of Industries, 

who is also the head of Jamaat-e-Islami 

Bangladesh, Bangladesh’s most prominent Islamist political party. Below the 

cabinet level, the delegation met with 

the Minister of State for Religious Affairs 

and with the Secretary for Home Affairs, 

whose responsibilities include law 

enforcement. The delegation was also 

received by the former Prime Minister 

and leader of the parliamentary opposition and senior members of her party, 

the Awami League. 

In May 2006, the Commission again 

placed Bangladesh on its Watch List. As 

a functioning democracy with a vibrant 

Felice D. Gaer

Chair

Director, Jacob Blaustein 

Institute For the 

Advancement of Human 

Rights, The American 

Jewish Committee

Michael Cromartie

Vice Chair

Vice President, 

Ethics And Public 

Policy Center

Elizabeth H. Prodromou

Vice Chair

Associate Director of 

the Institute on Culture, 

Religion, and World Affairs 

and Assistant Professor of 

International Relations, 

Boston University

Nina Shea

Vice Chair

Director of the Center 

for Religious Freedom, 

Freedom House

Preeta D. Bansal

Commissioner

Partner, Skadden, Arps, 

Slate, Meagher & Flom

Archbishop Charles J. 

Chaput 

Commissioner

Archbishop of Denver 

Khaled Abou El Fadl

Commissioner

Professor of Law At UCLA

Richard D. Land

Commissioner

President and CEO of 

the Ethics and Religious 

Liberty Commission of 

the Southern Baptist 

Convention 

Bishop Ricardo Ramirez

Commissioner

Bishop of the Diocese of 

Las Cruces, New Mexico

John V. Hanford Iii 

Ex-Officio

Non-voting Commissioner 

Ambassador-at-large for 

International Religious 

Freedom, U.S. Department 

of State

Joseph R. Crapa 

Executive Director

C OMMI S S IONER

S

Minority rights activists meeting with the 

Commission delegation 
B ANGLADE S H

INDIA

INDIA

SRI LANKA

BANGLADESH

INDIA

Bay of Bengal

Andam

Mangalore

Panaji

NEPAL

Belgaum

Sholapur

Dhaka

Male

Colombo

B ANGLADE S H

civil society and a constitution that 

enshrines internationally recognized 

human rights, including freedom of 

religion or belief, Bangladesh could be a 

model for other emerging democracies 

with majority Muslim populations. That 

model is in jeopardy as a result of growing Islamist militancy and the failure to 

prosecute those responsible for violent 

acts carried out against Bangladeshi 

individuals, organizations, and businesses perceived as “un-Islamic.” 

The Commission will continue 

to monitor the religious freedom 

situation in Bangladesh. It urges 

the U.S. government to 1) face up to 

the seriousness of the threat facing 

Bangladesh, 2) lead the international 

community in monitoring the January 

2007 elections, 3) urge the Bangladeshi 

government to prevent anti-minority 

violence during that upcoming election, and 4) encourage the government 

of Bangladesh to address the growing 

problem of religious extremism and 

violence. With regard to the latter in 

particular, the U.S. government should 

make greater efforts to encourage the 

government of Bangladesh to confront 

and tackle this problem, rather than to 

embrace or ignore it, as Bangladeshi 

authorities have done until only very 

recently. The Commission recommends a series of measures needed to 

protect Bangladeshis against religious 

extremism and to promote universal 

human rights, including religious freedom, and encourages enhanced U.S. 

assistance programs to advance freedom of religion or belief and related 

human rights.

Bangladesh is ethnically 

more homogenous than 

many other countries, as 

some 98 percent of its approximately 145 

million inhabitants are Bengali. Religiously, 

however, Bangladesh is somewhat more diverse. Sunni Muslims constitute at least 

88 percent of the population, Hindus approximately 10 percent, and Buddhists and 

Christians together 1 percent. There are also small communities of Ahmadis, Baha’is, 

Shi’a Muslims, Sikhs, and followers of traditional tribal religions.5 Among the 2 percent of the population who are not Bengali, Bangladesh’s tribal peoples are largely non-Muslim. Many of them live in Bangladesh’s remote eastern Chittagong Hill 

Tracts region. 

Although Hindus are Bangladesh’s largest religious minority, their proportion of 

the population is declining. At the time of the partition of British India in 1947, Hindus accounted for approximately a quarter of the population of what is now Bangladesh.6

 Yet, each subsequent census since 1971, when Bangladesh gained independence, has recorded a drop in the proportion of the Hindu population.7

This steady decline can be ascribed to a “push/pull” phenomenon. As Pakistan was 

established as a homeland for the Subcontinent’s Muslims, Hindus found themselves 

in a precarious position, automatically suspect because of their perceived affinity to 

India and subjected to both official and societal discrimination, and sometimes to 

violence. In response, millions of Hindus, denied opportunities and sometimes actively persecuted in Muslim-majority East Pakistan and later Bangladesh, have left 

over the past few decades to seek homes in neighboring India. 

After obtaining independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh was established 

as a secular state in which national identity would be based on Bengali language and 

culture, instead of the Islamic religion, as in Pakistan. The original secular Constitution has been amended, however, to introduce references to the religion of the majority community. In 1977, language was added to the Constitution’s Preamble stating 

that “absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah” would be one of the “fundamental 

principles of the Constitution.”8 Eliminated were earlier provisions enshrining the 

“principle of secularism” and barring “the granting by the State of political status in 

Background

Continued on page 4

3
favor of any religion” and “the abuse of religion for political purposes.”In 1988, the 

Constitution was further amended to declare Islam the state religion, while stating 

that “other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in the Republic.”9 Although these constitutional changes were made under military dictatorships, subsequent democratically elected governments have let them stand. Minority rights 

advocates maintain that these changes give a special status to Islam and make nonMuslims less than equal members of Bangladeshi society. To date, however, sharia 

has not been adopted as a basis for Bangladeshi jurisprudence.10 

Following its hard-won independence from Pakistan, Bangladesh’s early political 

history was characterized by authoritarian regimes and political instability. Since 

1991, two major political parties—the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the 

Awami League—have alternated in power through three national elections (1991, 

1996, and 2001) that were viewed by international observers as free and fair. Nevertheless, the democratic experience in Bangladesh has been marred by high levels of 

political violence and occasional paralysis of the political system. When in opposition, both major parties have turned to parliamentary boycotts, general strikes, and 

street power to challenge the government. In this environment, criminal elements 

and religious extremists have operated with relative impunity, while undermining 

the security of all citizens. This particularly affects the more vulnerable members of 

society, including religious minorities, tribal peoples, and women. 

Although many of those advocating a stronger role for Islam in Bangladesh have 

been engaged in peaceful political and social activities, others, drawing inspiration 

from extremist movements elsewhere in the Islamic world, have adopted a jihadist ideology of violent struggle against perceived opponents of Islam.11 This more 

militant interpretation of Islam gradually developed as a political and social force in 

Bangladesh, aided by the expansion of madrasas (Islamic schools)12 , charities, and 

other social welfare institutions, some receiving foreign funding from Saudi Arabia 

and elsewhere. Islamic militant groups also appeared in lightly policed rural Bangladesh, where they gained some popular support by employing vigilante justice 

against other criminal elements and armed groups. Militants later demonstrated 

their strength in urban Bangladesh by attacking—and sometimes killing—authors, 

academics, and journalists who expressed opinions deemed by the militants to be 

offensive to Islam. Some outspoken activists against extremism, including Bangladeshi author Taslima Nasreen and journalist Saleem Samad, have chosen voluntary 

exile in the face of threats of violence.

BACKGROUND

Continued from page 3

4

U.S.-

Bangladesh

Relations

After an initial coolness created by U.S. 

support for Pakistan during Bangladesh’s 

war for independence, the United States 

and Bangladesh have developed a good 

bilateral relationship over the past three 

decades. The United States became a major 

aid donor and a reliable source of relief during Bangladesh’s recurrent natural disasters. 

U.S. economic assistance, food aid, and 

disaster relief have totaled over $5 billion 

since 1971. According to the U.S. Agency for 

International Development, U.S. assistance 

objectives for Bangladesh include stabilizing population growth, improving public 

health, encouraging broad-based economic 

growth, and building democracy.13 Both 

the previous Awami League government 

and the current BNP-led government have 

publicly supported the United States in its 

post-9/11 conflict with Al-Qaeda.14

Commissioners Michael Cromartie and Felice 

D. Gaer meeting with Foreign Minister M. 

Morshed Khan, with photograph of Prime 

Minister Khaleda Zia in background

POLICYFOCUS
Bangladesh’s last general election 

in October 2001 was distinguished from previous Awami 

League/BNP contests by the decisive 

role played by avowedly Islamist political 

parties, which threw their support to the 

BNP. Since independence, such parties 

had been outside Bangladesh’s political 

mainstream. In 2001, however, the BNP’s 

electoral alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami 

Bangladesh and Islami Oikya Jote (the 

Islamic Unity Front) proved a winning 

combination. As a result, Jamaat-e-Islami 

was awarded the important government 

ministries of industry, agriculture, and 

social welfare, and Islami Oikya Jote was 

included in the ruling coalition. The 

inclusion of religiously based parties in 

government has given greater legitimacy 

to their political agenda and strengthened their influence on both government 

and Bangladeshi society.15 For example, 

Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh and Islami 

Oikya Jote have allegedly used their positions in the current BNP-led government 

to favor Islamist organizations and to 

deny public funding to, or otherwise to 

disadvantage, groups viewed as opposing 

an Islamist political and social agenda. 

The 2001 elections also occasioned the 

most serious episode of anti-minority violence since independence, with killings, 

sexual assaults, illegal land seizures, 

arson, extortion, and intimidation of religious minority group members, particularly Hindus, because of their perceived allegiance to the Awami League.16 The new 

BNP-led government essentially denied 

the scope of these abuses. There has been 

no thorough official investigation of the 

wave of violence following the elections 

and few perpetrators have been brought 

to justice. Investigative journalists and 

human rights groups who have sought to 

document the anti-Hindu violence have 

concluded that the perpetrators included 

partisans of the BNP and the smaller 

Islamist parties allied to it.17 Some of these 

journalists have been harassed by the government for their investigative work.18 

The continued lack of accountability 

for the violence in 2001 raises serious 

concerns about a renewal of violence 

against Hindus and members of other 

religious minorities in the 2007 general 

election. Human rights activists and 

minority advocates also voiced serious 

concerns to the Commission delegation 

that the current process of voter 

registration was being politically manipulated in such a way as to disenfranchise many minority voters, who are in 

most cases easily identifiable by their 

non-Muslim names. Some with whom 

the Commission met had personally 

been overlooked during the process and 

were themselves experiencing difficulties 

in becoming registered. Others claimed 

that locations dominated by minority 

voters had not been visited by the enumerators conducting the registration or, 

on the other hand, alleged that non-citizens believed to be favorable to Islamist 

parties were illegally registered. Such 

complaints, coupled with the partisan 

behavior of the current Chief Election 

Commissioner, who was forced by public 

outcry to restart the registration process 

on the basis of the previously existing 

voter list, have severely compromised 

public confidence in the impartiality of 

the Election Commission, and thus in 

the upcoming elections themselves.19 

The 2001 Elections

B ANGLADE S H

The continued lack of accountability for the violence in 

2001 raises serious concerns about a renewal of 

violence against Hindus and members of other religious 

minorities in the 2007 general election.

Political demonstration in Dhaka 
POLICYFOCUS

During the last two years, bombing has 

become a more common tactic used by 

Bangladeshi militants to attack their opponents or to make political statements. 

Whereas fewer than six bombings occurred annually between 1999-2004, and 

only 11 in 2004, there were 147 bombing incidents in 2005 alone, resulting 

in 60 deaths and 944 injuries.20 Targets 

have included Sufi 21 shrines, cultural 

programs, NGOs involved in women’s 

empowerment, and secular politicians.22 

In the most dramatic incident, militants 

belonging to a group called Jamaatul 

Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) claimed 

credit for the coordinated wave of 459 

nearly simultaneous bomb attacks carried out in all but one of Bangladesh’s 64 

districts on August 17, 2005. 

Militants added a new target with a 

series of bomb attacks on the judicial 

system in October-November 2005. These 

terrorist incidents included Bangladesh’s 

first recorded suicide bombing, which left 

two judges dead, followed by further suicide attacks on courthouses. JMB leaflets 

were reportedly found on the scene following the suicide attacks. The two judges 

who were bombing victims were Hindus. 

The bomb attacks were accompanied by 

calls by the militants for the substitution 

of sharia for Bangladesh’s current system 

of secular jurisprudence based on English 

common law and by threats against 

courts and judges for not applying sharia. 

The judicial system had earlier won the 

enmity of Islamists by ruling that fatwas 

(expert opinions on Islamic law) are illegal in Bangladesh, though such decisions 

are often used by rural clerics to punish 

alleged “moral transgressions,” usually 

by women.23 

The Increasing Influence of 

Extremist Groups

The increasing political power of 

Islamist movements and parties reflects 

a shift away from the secularism that was 

a key founding principle for Bangladesh 

as a nation. Moreover, the insertion of 

references to Islam into Bangladesh’s 

fundamental law—and the de-emphasis of secularism as a governing principle—aided the political rehabilitation of 

certain Islamist political groups. As noted 

above, the most prominent and best 

organized of these groups is the political 

party Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. When 

meeting with the Commission’s delegation, Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh’s leader 

(self-styled “Amir”) Maulana Matiur 

Rahman Nizami, who serves as Minister 

of Industries in the current government, 

told the Commission delegation that his 

party’s goal is “Islamic rule” and a shariabased legal system, which he maintained would provide “justice for all.” In 

response to a direct question, however, 

Nizami denied that these changes would 

necessarily require further amendments 

to the current constitution. 

In sharp contrast to these reassurances, Bangladeshi human rights monitors 

The Growth of Religious Extremism

6

Minister of Industries and Amir of Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh Maulana Matiur Rahman Nizami 

(right) and Jamaat-e-Islami Senior Assistant Secretary General Mohammad Kamruzzaman 
and minority rights advocates repeatedly expressed concerns regarding the 

potentially negative impact of Jamaat-eIslami’s growing political power, based 

on the group’s participation in Pakistani 

atrocities during Bangladesh’s struggle for 

independence and the past affiliation of 

many violent militants with the group or 

its student wing. In addition, one highranking Bangladeshi government official 

told the Commission that Jamaat-e-Islami was brought into the government 

because of that party’s ability either to 

incite or dampen societal violence. In his 

meeting with the Commission, Nizami 

himself took credit for the absence of serious violence in Bangladesh in response 

to the Danish cartoon controversy, suggesting that he and his party could have 

chosen a different outcome. 

Moderate Muslims and the leaders of 

Bangladesh’s minority religious groups, 

including Ahmadis, drew connections 

between the growth in violent extremism and the tendency toward greater 

social conservatism among Bangladesh’s 

Muslim majority with the expansion of the 

country’s madrasas. For example, Ahmadi 

community leaders told the Commission 

delegation that madrasa students provide 

readily available foot soldiers for anti-Ahmadi demonstrations and showed the delegation video footage as evidence. There 

are also allegations of weapons training in 

some madrasas, particularly in Bangladesh’s more remote and poorly policed 

districts. Marginalized Muslim groups 

such as stateless Biharis24 and Rohingya25 

refugees from Burma are believed to be 

particularly vulnerable to recruitment. 

The Government’s Lukewarm 

Response to Rising Violence

The current Bangladeshi government at 

first denied the extent of the extremist 

threat, claiming that such criticism was a 

politically motivated desire to discredit its 

rule both domestically and internationally. As the level of violence increased, 

however, the government’s response 

became more assertive. In February 2005, 

the government banned two militant 

groups implicated in bomb attacks, 

specifically the attacks on such major 

secular institutions as the Bangladeshi 

NGO BRAC 26 and the Grameen Bank.27 

The 459 mass bombings and subsequent 

terrorist acts on August 17, 2005 caused 

the authorities to further step up their response. In March 2006, 21 suspected militants, including some who were madrasa 

students, were sentenced to death for the 

August 17 bombings. In a separate case, 

it was announced on the same day that 

a suspect was sentenced to death for an 

October 2005 bombing attack on a Hindu 

judge. Reputed senior militant leaders 

were among those arrested, including Siddiqul Islam, better known as the 

infamous rural Islamist vigilante “Bangla 

Bhai.”28 In May 2006, Bangla Bhai, JMB 

leader Abdur Rahman, and five associates 

were sentenced to death for the bombing 

murder of two judges in November 2005. 

According to press accounts, following 

sentencing, Abdur Rahman objected to 

being punished “under worldly laws,” i.e., 

not under a sharia-based legal system.29 

The government also began investigating alleged foreign funding of extremist 

groups and speaking up more forcefully 

against the militant violence.30 

At the local level, Bangladeshi Islamist 

militants initially were treated with a certain tolerance by police and officials, who 

viewed them as a counter to the armed 

leftist groups active in rural Bangladesh. 

As such, for many years the militants 

enjoyed a level of impunity from prosecution for engaging in vigilante-style 

actions, including extrajudicial killings. Similarly, attacks on journalists 

who investigated extremist violence 

or those expressing opinions deemed 

“un-Islamic” usually went unpunished. 

In May 2005, the Committee to Protect 

Journalists (CPJ) named Bangladesh as 

one of the world’s “five most murderous 

countries for journalists” and pointed to 

“the newer and potentially graver threat” 

to journalists posed by “radical Islamist 

groups.” In one case, a former leader 

of the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami 

reportedly confessed to participating in 

a fatal bomb attack on a journalist, only 

to flee when released on bail. According 

to CPJ, investigations into the murders of 

nine journalists over the past five years 

“have yielded no convictions.”31 

Bangladesh’s problem with religiously 

motivated violence is also symptomatic 

of broader law and order problems. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 

most recent report on human rights 

conditions in Bangladesh, “Violence 

often resulting in deaths was a pervasive element in the country’s politics” 

and “Vigilante killings were common.” 

Moreover, members of the security 

forces, including both the regular police 

and various special security units such 

as the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), 

were themselves culpable, committing 

“numerous extrajudicial killings,” according to the State Department report, 

which also noted that “Nearly all abuses 

went uninvestigated and unpunished.”32 

This climate of impunity, combined with 

serious problems in the judiciary involving widespread corruption33 and a heavy 

case backlog, seriously erode public 

confidence in government’s ability or 

willingness to protect basic rights. 

7

B ANGLADE S H
Generally speaking, followers of minority religions in Bangladesh are free to 

worship and minority religious institutions appear to be subject to little official 

interference. Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian holy days are in some cases public 

holidays. Despite constitutional protections, however, non-Muslims in Bangladesh face societal discrimination and 

are disadvantaged in access to government jobs, public services, and the legal 

system. They are also underrepresented 

in elected political offices, including the 

national parliament. Minority advocates 

also claim that religion plays a role in 

property and land disputes—disputes 

that occasionally result in violence. Since 

the 2001 election, Bangladesh has experienced growing violence by religious extremists, intensifying concerns expressed 

by the country’s religious minorities.

Continuing Problems for Hindus

Hindus are particularly vulnerable in a 

period of rising violence and extremism, 

whether motivated by religious, political, 

or criminal factors, or some combination. 

The position of Hindus has multiple disadvantages: perceived identification with 

India; an alleged preference for one of 

Bangladesh’s two major political parties; 

and religious beliefs abhorred by Muslim 

fundamentalists. Massive anti-Hindu 

violence, and resulting flight by millions 

of Hindus, marked both the partition of 

British India and the breakup of Pakistan. 

Although mass communal violence has 

been relatively rare in independent Bangladesh, Muslim mobs have occasionally 

targeted Hindus, e.g., in 1992 following 

the destruction of the Babri Mosque at 

Ayodhya in India. In many instances, 

such violence appears aimed at encouraging Hindus to flee in order to seize their 

property in what is a desperately landpoor country. 

During and immediately after Bangladesh’s parliamentary elections in October 

2001, there were numerous reports of illegal land seizures, arson, extortion, sexual 

assault, and intimidation of religious minority group members, particularly Hindus.34 Some of the attackers demanded 

that Hindus sell their land for a fraction 

of its value or pay extortion money. Police 

protection was inadequate. Thousands 

of Bangladeshi Hindus reportedly fled 

to India to escape persecution. Minority 

group representatives and human rights 

groups with whom the Commission met 

ascribed these attacks to armed militant 

groups or to partisans of the BNP. As Hindus and other non-Muslims are popularly 

perceived to favor the Awami League, 

intimidating Hindu voters was viewed 

as a way to help the BNP and its Islamist 

allies in the elections. 

The Plight of Bangladesh’s

Religious Minorities

8

Commissioner Preeta Bansal greets Bishop Theotonius Gomes, Auxiliary Bishop of 

Dhaka (left) and Archbishop Paulinus Costa, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Dhaka 

POLICYFOCUS
The lack of accountability for reported 

crimes against minority group members in the 2001 election promotes an 

atmosphere of continued impunity for 

such crimes, as well as the possibility of 

a renewal of violence against Hindus and 

other non-Muslims in the January 2007 

general election. In their meetings with 

the Commission, Hindus expressed concern about alleged political manipulation 

of the voter registration process, which 

could result in members of their community being excluded from the voter rolls, 

and maintained that minority neighborhoods had been overlooked by government representatives administering the 

voter registration process.

Anti-minority discrimination is a 

common problem for Bangladesh’s 

Hindus, so much so that one prominent 

Hindu declared to the Commission 

delegation that “discrimination is everywhere.” Muslim human rights activists 

and Hindu community leaders agreed 

that Hindus face pervasive discrimination 

in government employment and in access 

to the legal system. Hindus, as well as 

other religious minorities, are underrepresented in the military, the security services, and in other government 

service, particularly in the diplomatic 

corps and similarly prominent official 

positions. Hindu leaders with whom the 

Commission met also described problems their children faced in gaining access to religious education in their own 

religion, as is supposed to be the case in 

Bangladesh’s public education system. 

Hindus have also been disadvantaged 

on property rights issues. Independent 

Bangladesh adopted one of Pakistan’s 

key instruments of anti-Hindu discrimination, the Enemy Property Act (1965), 

renamed the Vested Property Act (1974) 

by Bangladesh. This discriminatory 

legislation was used selectively to seize 

Hindu-owned property after the 1965 

Indo-Pakistani War and has continued 

to be used under successive Bangladeshi 

governments to reward well-connected 

members of the Muslim majority community. Democratically elected governments in power since 1991 have failed 

to resolve the issue, exacerbating Hindu 

resentment over past injustices and 

continuing the uncertainty regarding the 

security of Hindu-owned property. 

Buddhists and Christians Face 

Second-Class Status 

Buddhists and Christians in Bangladesh 

experience many of the same problems 

as Hindu Bangladeshis. In their meetings with the Commission, Buddhist 

and Christian community representatives noted discrimination in the public 

service, especially access to the higher 

ranks, erosion in Bangladesh’s founding 

principle of secularism, and the threat 

of extremist violence. They blamed this 

trend in part on foreign influence, pointing to funding for certain Islamic institutions from foreign sources, particularly 

from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Both 

minority groups reported being able to 

worship without interference, including 

to the extent of holding public religious 

festivals, although the climate for such 

expressions of non-Islamic faith is less 

hospitable than in the past. 

Both Buddhist and Christian leaders 

noted as their fundamental concern the 

increasing discriminatory treatment of 

religious minority members relative to 

their Muslim compatriots and the resulting societal pressure on these minority 

groups. They pointed to increasing Islamic 

influence in the public school curriculum 

and to an alleged “shortage” of religion 

teachers for non-Muslim students. They 

also expressed concern that their political rights are in increasing jeopardy. Like 

the Hindus, they are concerned that the 

preparation of voter rolls for the next election provided pro-government election 

officials with the opportunity to exclude 

many minority voters. 

Christian representatives told the 

Commission delegation that if the next 

elections strengthen the position of the 

Islamist parties, they expect increased 

pressure for the imposition of sharia, for 

blasphemy laws similar to Pakistan’s, and 

for new, more intrusive legal restrictions 

on churches and other religious organizations. One prominent Christian leader 

told the Commission that although he 

could call on police protection for his 

own person, his community lives “always 

in fear” of extremist violence, particularly 

in the villages where “there is no one to 

protect” religious minorities. He went 

on to describe the future of the entire 

Christian community in Bangladesh as 

“unclear” because of “a small group” of 

extremists who want all Christians to 

leave the country.

B ANGLADE S H

Whereas fewer than 

six bombings occurred 

annually between 

1999-2004, and only 

11 in 2004, there were 

147 bombing incidents 

in 2005 alone, 

resulting in 60 deaths 

and 944 injuries.

9
Both Christians and Buddhists reported pressure regarding land and property 

rights. More powerful Muslim neighbors 

take advantage of the growing perception 

that Bangladesh, once a secular state, 

is becoming a country in which nonMuslims have either no place or, at best, 

limited legal rights. This problem is particularly acute for Bangladesh’s predominantly non-Muslim tribal communities.35 

Local notables and office holders, who 

are predominantly Muslim, exploit their 

political connections to dispute the often 

poorly documented claims of poor minority villagers or tribal peoples to their 

ancestral lands. 

Anti-Ahmadi Agitation

The Ahmadis, also referred to as Ahmadiyya, are a relatively small religious 

community in Bangladesh, representing approximately 100,000 persons in a 

population of over 140 million. Using the 

allegedly heterodox nature of Ahmadi 

beliefs as a justification for political 

mobilization, Islamist militants in recent 

years have mounted a widespread, and 

sometimes violent, campaign against 

the Ahmadis under the banner of the 

International Khatme Nabuwat Movement Bangladesh.36 This organization is 

reportedly linked to Jamaat-e-Islami and 

other Islamist political parties.37 When 

meeting with the Commission delegation, 

Jamaat-e-Islami leader Nizami supported 

the call for the government to declare Ahmadis to be non-Muslims, while disavowing support for anti-Ahmadi violence or 

for an official ban on Ahmadi literature. 

Bangladeshi human rights monitors 

and minority representatives told the 

Commission delegation that the concern 

about the anti-Ahmadi agitation lies not 

only in the threat to the freedom of individual Ahmadis, but in its use to recruit 

and mobilize a constituency favoring the 

radical Islamization of Bangladesh. 

 When meeting with Ahmadi community leaders in Dhaka, the Commission 

delegation was shown video footage of 

the intimidation tactics used by the antiAhmadi movement, of police negligence 

or even complicity in anti-Ahmadi violence, and interviews with victims. AntiAhmadi demonstrators have called on 

the government of Bangladesh formally 

to declare Ahmadis to be “non-Muslims,” 

as has been done in Pakistan and which 

has been used there to justify extensive 

legal restrictions on the Ahmadis’ human 

rights. Anti-Ahmadi activists object to 

Ahmadi houses of worship being called 

“mosques” and, on a number of occasions, have organized mass demonstrations against Ahmadi houses of worship, 

have attempted to occupy the sites. 

They have also forcibly replaced signs 

identifying Ahmadi places of worship as 

mosques, sometimes with the assistance 

of the police. In some instances, the antiAhmadi agitation has been accompanied 

by mob violence in which Ahmadi homes 

have been destroyed and Ahmadi converts held against their will and pressured 

to recant. Some Ahmadis have even been 

killed because of their beliefs. Although 

the campaign against the Ahmadis has 

continued, the violence has diminished 

in recent months due to improved and 

more vigorous police protection for 

members of this community. Nevertheless, Ahmadi leaders told the Commission delegation that there had not been a 

single prosecution of anyone responsible 

for violence against Ahmadis. 

Although the government of Bangladesh has thus far been unwilling to succumb to pressure to declare Ahmadis to 

be non-Muslims, in January 2004, it bent 

to militant demands and banned the 

publication and distribution of Ahmadi 

religious literature. Police have since 

seized Ahmadi publications on a few occasions. The ban was stayed by the courts 

in December 2004, and the government 

has not appealed the ruling. Although 

the ban is not currently being enforced, 

neither has it been withdrawn by the 

government. Ahmadi representatives 

have credited U.S. and other international pressure, rather than the guarantees 

enshrined in Bangladesh’s own constitution, for dissuading the government from 

further restricting their religious freedom.

10

Commission delegation meeting with Ahmadi community leaders 

POLICYFOCUS
Violence against women is 

widespread in Bangladesh. 

In addition to domestic violence, “honor killings,” and trafficking 

in persons, mostly women and children, 

Bangladeshi women suffer from “dowrykillings” and “acid-throwing,” victimizing 

hundreds annually.38 Minority women 

are particularly vulnerable, according 

to statements made to the Commission 

delegation. Rape is reportedly a common 

form of anti-minority violence. 

The movement to impose a stricter 

form of Islamic observance, as well as 

intimidation and violence by extremists, also restricts and victimizes women 

accused of acting “un-Islamic” or seen as 

threatening the extremists’ beliefs about 

the “proper role” of women in society.39 

Some Muslim clerics, especially in rural 

areas, have sanctioned vigilante punishments against women for alleged “moral 

transgressions.” Although the clerics’ 

judgments, or fatwas, have no legal standing in Bangladesh, they are sometimes 

enforced by customary village councils in 

defiance of the legal protections provided 

in the regular courts. The Commission 

was told that there has been increasing 

pressure from extremist sources, including political groups, on women to dress 

in a more overtly Islamic manner in place 

of the traditional sari. Moreover, women’s 

more frequent employment outside the 

home has also generated a backlash. 

Islamist extremist armed groups typically 

oppose, and have sometimes attacked, 

NGOs such as the Grameen Bank that 

promote the economic betterment of 

women, because such action is allegedly 

counter to the militants’ interpretation 

of Islamic correctness. 

Although the bombing campaign 

against those that employ women in 

“un-Islamic” ways elicited a strong 

government response, government efforts to protect women remain deficient. 

The authorities often fail to punish the 

perpetrators of violence against women, 

as the law enforcement and the judicial 

systems, especially at the local level, remain vulnerable to corruption, intimidation, and political interference. Activists 

who met the Commission delegation 

claimed that the current government 

was backsliding on its own commitment 

to protect women’s human rights. They 

pointed to the government’s decision to 

have parliamentary seats reserved for 

women to be selected by the political parties rather than filled by direct election 

and cited changes to previous national 

policies to ensure women’s equal rights in 

inheritance and property ownership and 

guaranteed representation for women at 

all levels of decision-making.40 

B ANGLADE S H

Women’s Human Rights

Also Threatened

by Religiously Based Extremism

11

In addition to domestic 

violence, “honor killings,” 

and trafficking in 

persons, mostly women 

and children, Bangladeshi 

women suffer from 

“dowry-killings” and 

“acid-throwing,” victimizing 

hundreds annually.

Top Photo: Leading women human rights and civil society activists, with Commissioners Preeta Bansal and Felice D. Gaer 
POLICYFOCUS

12

 Urgent Measures to Prevent 

Anti-Minority Violence in the 

Upcoming Elections

In light of Bangladesh’s upcoming national elections, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should:

• urge the government of Bangladesh to 

safeguard the voting rights of all Bangladeshis in the next national elections 

and ensure that those elections are free 

and fair by:

• restoring public confidence in the 

non-partisan and independent 

character of both the Election 

Commission and the electionperiod caretaker government 

through the appointment of 

impartial personnel, in order to 

ensure free and fair elections and 

avoid the politicization of government bodies during the election 

period, with the recognition that 

in the past, caretaker governments 

headed by Bangladesh’s Chief Justice have not been fully impartial;

• making every effort to prevent violence before and after the election, 

including by ensuring that the 

caretaker government is provided 

with authority over the Ministry of 

Defense and the power to instruct 

law enforcement bodies to ensure 

the security of all Bangladeshi 

citizens throughout the 

voting process;

• instituting a registration process that 

will facilitate the enrollment of the maximum number of eligible voters before 

the election, in a manner that does not 

discriminate on the basis of perceived 

religious or political affiliation or ethnic 

background, and investigating and 

resolving complaints about the registration process fairly, promptly, and well in 

advance of the actual election;

• using all practical technical means 

of ensuring the security of the ballot, 

including by use of “transparent” and 

numbered ballot boxes; 

• permitting and facilitating international and domestic non-governmental monitoring of the entire electoral 

process, in view of the fact that as a 

member of the United Nations and 

of the Commonwealth, Bangladesh 

should be encouraged to avail itself of 

the resources of these and other international organizations with experience 

assisting member states in conducting 

credible elections; and

• investigating fully the acts of violence 

committed in the aftermath of the 2001 

elections and holding the perpetrators 

to account, with the aim of preventing 

potential similar recurrences in 2007 

and during any other election period 

in the future;

• encourage Bangladeshi authorities, 

and in particular the caretaker government overseeing the election period, to 

ensure that the elections are not marred 

by violence by: 

• deploying the security forces to 

work now to identify and prepare 

against specific threats to vulnerable localities and communities, 

including religious and ethnic 

minorities;

• publicly ordering the security forces 

to undertake a maximum effort to 

prevent and punish election-related 

violence, particularly violence targeting members of religious minority communities, whether during 

the election campaign, on election 

day, or in its aftermath; and

• publicly condemning, outlawing, 

and swiftly responding to antiminority violence and discrimination in the advance of the election 

and ensuring, through legislation 

if necessary, that election-related 

violence will be thoroughly investigated and that those responsible 

will be brought to justice; 

• prepare and publicize a comprehensive 

pre- and post-election analysis of the 

election process with recommendations for needed reform; 

• provide official U.S. government 

monitors in advance of and in connecRecommendations

1 
B ANGLADE S H

tion with the upcoming elections in 

addition to those already planned by 

the National Democratic Institute for 

International Affairs and the International Republican Institute; and

• urge other states and international 

organizations to work together to 

increase monitoring and other efforts 

to forestall violence, with the assistance 

of indigenous human rights and other 

civil society organizations, and coordinate its actions in support of a peaceful, 

free, and fair election in Bangladesh 

with other countries and international 

organizations.

 Urgent Measures to Protect 

Those Threatened by Religious 

Extremism 

The Commission recommends that the 

U.S. government should urge the government of Bangladesh to:

• investigate and prosecute to the fullest 

extent of the law perpetrators of violent 

acts, including future acts and those 

already documented, against members of minority religious communities, non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs) promoting women’s human 

rights, and all those who oppose religious extremism; 

• rescind its January 2004 order banning 

publications by the Ahmadi religious 

community, continue to reject extremist 

demands to declare Ahmadis to be nonMuslims, protect the places of worship, 

persons, and property of members of 

this religious community, and fully investigate and promptly bring to justice 

those responsible for violence against 

Ahmadis; and 

• protect women from vigilante or antiminority violence, combat claims of 

religious sanction or justification for 

violence against women, and vigorously 

investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of such violent incidents. 

 Longer-Term Measures to 

Protect Universal Human Rights

The Commission recommends that the 

U.S. government should urge the government of Bangladesh to:

• ensure that decisions on public employment in national institutions such as 

the civil service, the military, law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary, 

including at the highest levels, do not 

discriminate on the basis of religious 

affiliation, belief, or ethnic background; 

conduct and publicize the results of a 

comprehensive survey of minority representation in the public service; 

• establish effective, legally transparent 

mechanisms for handling complaints 

regarding discrimination in public 

employment;

13

2 

3 
POLICYFOCUS

• ensure that law enforcement and security services are equally protective of 

the rights of all regardless of religious 

affiliation or belief;

• establish the independence of the 

judicial system from the executive at 

all levels in order to prevent political 

interference in the judicial process 

and to ensure that the courts afford 

equal access and equitable treatment 

to all citizens; 

• include in all school curricula, in 

school textbooks, and in teacher 

training for both public schools and 

government-regulated madrasas lessons that teach tolerance and respect 

for human rights, including freedom 

of religion or belief; 

• promote the use of history and social 

studies texts in public schools that reflect the country’s religious diversity and 

are reviewed by an independent panel 

of experts to exclude language or images that promote enmity, intolerance, 

hatred, or violence toward any group of 

persons based on religion or belief; 

• repeal the Vested Property Act of 1974, 

discriminatory legislation that has 

been used unjustly to seize Hinduowned property in the decades since 

Bangladesh’s independence and has 

continued to be used under successive 

governments to reward well-connected 

members of the majority community in 

Bangladesh; 

• ensure that publicly-funded support 

for domestic faith-based charitable, 

humanitarian, developmental, or 

educational activities be on a nondiscriminatory basis;

• permit NGOs to conduct legitimate 

humanitarian and developmental 

activities without harassment, undue 

interference, or discrimination and 

ensure that they are protected from 

extremist intimidation or violence; and

• guarantee the right of human rights defenders to receive funding, as set forth 

in the relevant UN instruments,41 from 

foreign sources without harassment, 

unless such foreign funding incites or 

supports religious extremism, hatred, 

or the destruction of any of the rights 

and freedoms guaranteed to Bangladeshi citizens.

 U.S. Assistance to Promote 

Human Rights, Including 

Freedom of Religion or Belief

The Commission recommends that the 

U.S. government should:

• use public diplomacy, including international exchange programs, to bolster 

the position of Bangladesh’s voices of 

moderation and of those reformers who 

respect, and advocate respect for, internationally recognized human rights, 

including the human rights of women 

and of members of religious minority 

communities;

• assist Bangladeshi educational authorities in improving and expanding 

public education in order to enhance 

the availability and quality of education of all Bangladeshis, regardless of 

faith, gender, or ethnicity, and support 

non-governmental review of curricula 

and textbooks of public schools and 

madrasas;

• support efforts to improve the human 

rights performance and professional 

competence of the security forces so 

that they can better protect all Bangladeshis from violence and intimidation 

by extremists;

• act to counter the extremist assault 

on Bangladesh’s secular legal system, 

including by 1) strengthening U.S. assistance to promote the rule of law and 

to enhance access to the legal system by 

women and members of religious minorities, and 2) informing Bangladeshis, 

through educational and cultural 

exchanges, broadcast and print media, 

and other means of public diplomacy, 

of the universality of human rights and 

the compatibility of Islam and universal 

human rights, including freedom of 

religion or belief; and 

• support, and provide technical assistance for, the creation of an independent national human rights commission in Bangladesh able to investigate, 

publicize, and bring to the courts all 

categories of human rights abuses, 

including violence and discrimination 

against religious minorities, in accordance with international standards42 

for such organizations, i.e., independence, adequate funding, a representative character, and a broad mandate 

that includes freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief.

14

4 
B ANGLADE S H

1 Ahmadis are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, 

who founded a religious community in the late 19th 

century in what was then British India. Although 

Ahmadis consider themselves to be Muslim, some 

Muslims consider them heretics because of the 

Ahmadis’ claim that their founder was the recipient of 

divine revelation, a claim believed by some Muslims to 

violate a basic Islamic tenet that Mohammed was the 

last of the prophets.

2 Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Art. 27, 28, 39, and 41. 

3 Eben Kaplan, “Bangladesh: Nationwide Attacks 

Raise Fears of Growing Islamic Presence,” Council 

on Foreign Relations, August 29, 2005 (http://www.

cfr.org/publication/8767/bangladesh.html, accessed 

August 8, 2006).

4

 Selig S. Harrison, “A New Hub for Terrorism? In 

Bangladesh, an Islamic Movement with Al-Qaeda 

Ties Is on the Rise,” The Washington Post, August 2, 

2006 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/01/AR2006080101118.html, 

accessed August 8, 2006). According to Harrison, 

“When the key leaders of these groups were captured, they were kept by the police in a comfortable 

apartment, where they were free to receive visitors.” 

5

 U.S. Department of State, Annual Report on 

International Religious Freedom 2006, “Bangladesh,” 

November 8, 2005 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/

irf/2005/51616.htm, accessed May 24, 2006).

6

 Extrapolating from the 1941 and 1951 census figures that showed the Hindu proportion of the population as 27.97 percent and 22.03 percent respectively. 

7

 This phenomenon is not unique to Bangladesh. 

Pakistan, the Subcontinent’s other large majorityMuslim country carved out of the British Indian Empire, has experienced an even sharper decline in its 

Hindu community, which is now less than 2 percent 

of the population, down from over 20 percent at the 

time of Pakistan’s founding. 

8

 Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Art. 8.

9 Op. cit., Art. 2A. 

10 For more on relevant constitutional and legal issues 

see Abdelfattah Amor, Interim report of the Special 

Rapporteur on the Commission on Human Rights on 

the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief: Addendum 2; 

Situation in Bangladesh, United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc. A/55/280.Add.2, August 9, 2000. 

There are separate bodies of personal status law for 

Muslims, Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists relating 

to matters such as marriage, divorce, guardianship, 

and inheritance. 

11 Some returning Bangladeshi veterans of the antiSoviet struggle in Afghanistan may have contributed 

to the development of radical Islamist groups such 

as Harakatul-Jihad-Islami/Bangladesh (“Movement of 

Islamic Holy War,” or HUJI-B). In any event, some 

radical Islamists in Bangladesh have cited Taliban 

Afghanistan as their model, with the slogan chanted 

“We are all Taliban and Bangladesh will become Afghanistan.” One of the five signatories of Osama bin 

Laden’s infamous February 1998 declaration of “Jihad 

against Jews and Crusaders” was a shadowy “Fazlur 

Rahman, Amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh.” 

For an English language translation, with a link to the 

Arabic text, see “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: 

World Islamic Front Statement,” February 23, 1998 

(http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-

fatwa.htm, accessed July 20, 2006).

12 Bangladesh has a mixed system of Islamic education, with both government-regulated and private 

schools. There are almost 7,000 government-regulated high-school-level madrasas that teach secular 

subjects such as English, mathematics, and the 

sciences, alongside Arabic, Koran interpretation, 

and other religious subjects. There are in addition, 

6,500 other secondary level madrasas and 18,000 

elementary-level madrasas that are wholly privately 

funded and subject to only limited government regulation. These private madrasas serve approximately 

1.5 million students and employ 130,000 teachers. 

The curriculum in these schools is much more heavily 

focused on religious subjects, although general educational subjects have been added to some in recent 

years. Some private madrasas receive foreign funding, including from Saudi charities. Bangladesh’s 

madrasas serve mainly the poor, including many 

orphans. The great appeal of private madrasas to 

the poor is that they provide free food and board, in 

addition to the free education. The great drawback for such students is the limited career options 

following graduation from an educational program 

emphasizing religious studies and rote learning, 

including Koran memorization. 

13 For a fuller description of USAID programs in 

Bangladesh see USAID/Bangladesh, Strategy Statement FY 2006-2010, September 2005 (http://www.

usaid.gov/bd/files/strategic_statement.pdf, accessed 

July 20, 2006).

14 U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Bangladesh, August 2005 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/

bgn/3452.htm, accessed July 20, 2006).

15 Maneeza Hossain, Countdown to Election: High 

Stakes for Bangladesh, Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies White Paper, July 2006, 1-2. 

16 Of the two major parties, the Awami League 

is viewed as more secular, more inclined toward 

improved relations with India, and more favorably 

disposed toward the concerns of Bangladesh’s 

religious minorities.

17 Amnesty International, Bangladesh: Attacks 

on members of the Hindu minority, December 

2001 (http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/

engASA130062001!Open, accessed August 9, 

2006); Abbas Faiz, Testimony before the U.S. 

Commission on International Religious Freedom, 

Hearing on Bangladesh: Protecting the Human Rights 

of Thought, Conscience, and Religion, April 30, 

2004 (http://www.uscirf.gov/events/hearings/2004/

april/04302004_bangladesh_testim.html, accessed 

August 11, 2006); Ain o Salish Kendra, Deadline 

15

END NOTES

Wearing hijab, rather than the traditional sari, is increasingly common among Muslim women in Bangladesh 
POLICYFOCUS

Bangladesh: Violence Against Hindus in September 

and October 2001, December 2001. Ain o Salish 

Kendra (ASK) is a Bangladeshi legal aid and human 

rights organization (http://www.askbd.org). 

18 Amnesty International, Bangladesh: Attacks on 

members of the Hindu minority, section entitled “Arrest of Shahriar Kabir.”

19 In Bangladesh, unlike in the United States, voter 

registration is conducted primarily by enumerators 

through house-to-house surveys. The resulting voter 

rolls are then published. Potential voters not listed 

may petition to have their names added to the rolls. 

Poverty and low literacy rates, however, limit this 

mechanism for adding eligible voters missed by the 

enumerators. For further information on elections in 

Bangladesh, see the Election Commission Secretariat’s web site http://www.bangladeshgov.org/ecs/. 

20 Ain o Salish Kendra, List of Bomb Explosions 

in Bangladesh (1999-2005); Ain o Salish Kendra, 

Chronological List of Bomb Explosions in Bangladesh 

1999-2005.

21 Sufism is the mystical tradition in Islam, emphasizing personal experience of divine love and acceptance. As such, Sufism is suspect in the eyes of 

those advocating strict adherence to sharia. 

22 In August 2004, multiple bomb explosions killed 20 

people at a Dhaka rally attended by Awami League 

leader and former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajid, who may have been the principal target. Several 

senior party figures were killed or wounded. A previously unknown Islamist group claimed responsibility 

and followed up with death threats to prominent 

Awami League activists, terming them “infidels.” In 

January 2005, former Finance Minister and Awami 

League Member of Parliament Shah A.M.S. Kibria, 

a prominent secular Muslim, was assassinated in a 

grenade attack. 

23 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on 

Human Rights Practices, 2003, “Bangladesh,” 

February 25, 2004 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/

hrrpt/2003/27944.htm, accessed July 25, 2006).

24 Non-Bengali Muslims, originally from northern India, 

stranded in Bangladesh after independence from 

Pakistan. 

25 The Rohingya (or Rohingja) are also referred to as 

Arakanese Muslims as they come from the Arakan 

region of Burma. 

26 BRAC’s full, but seldom-used, name is the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. BRAC’s 

declared vision for Bangladesh is “a just, enlightened, 

healthy and democratic Bangladesh free from hunger, 

poverty, environmental degradation and all forms of 

exploitation based on age, sex, religion and ethnicity” 

(http://www.brac.net/cgi-bin/parser.pl/0002/www.

brac.net/about.htm, accessed July 12, 2006).

27 The Grameen Bank is a financial institution that 

specializes in micro-credit lending to the poor, including pioneering work with rural women. For more 

information on the Grameen Bank see http://www.

grameen-info.org/.

28 A nom de guerre meaning “Bengali Brother.” 

29 “7 JMB linchpins handed death in Jhalakathi,” The 

Daily Star, Dhaka, May 30, 2006.

30 To a national conference of imams in November 

2005, Prime Minister Khaleda Zia denounced those 

who were “trying to establish a reign of terror and turmoil” in the name of Islam. At a national conference 

on “interfaith harmony” in February 2006, the Prime 

Minister declared her government to be “dead against 

the practice of any discrimination on the basis of religious identity.” Similarly, the Religious Affairs Ministry 

arranged public activities against Islamic militancy in 

conjunction with the 35th anniversary of Bangladesh’s 

independence on March 26, 2006. 

31 Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the 

Press in 2005, “Bangladesh” (http://www.cpj.org/attacks05/asia05/bangla_05.html, accessed August 

9, 2006).

32 2005 Country Reports, “Bangladesh” (Internet). 

The human rights monitoring organization Hotline 

Bangladesh has complied a list of 211 so-called 

“cross-fire” killings by RAB for the period July 2004 

to December 28, 2005, in addition to 394 deaths attributed to the regular police for the period May 2004 

to December 28, 2005.

33 Bangladesh and Chad share last place on Transparency International’s most recent rank ordering of 

perceived government corruption, viz. Transparency 

International, Transparency International Corruption 

Perceptions Index 2005, October 2005 (http://www.

transparency.ca/Reports/CPI%202005%20PressKIT

final111005.pdf, accessed August 9, 2006).

34 For a more detailed discussion of these events 

see Amnesty International, Bangladesh: Attacks on 

members of the Hindu minority, December 2001 

(http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/

ASA130062001ENGLISH/$File/ASA1300601.pdf). 

35 The best known, and most violent, example being 

in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, where the predominantly 

Buddhist Chakma ethnic group led a long-running 

insurgency against Bengali Muslim settlers. Although 

this insurgency ended in 1997 with the signing of 

a peace accord negotiated by the previous Awami 

League government, tensions remain amid complaints 

that the accord has not been fully implemented, either 

to resolve land disputes or to provide tribal peoples 

with a real share in local government. 

36 “Khatme Nabuwat” is derived from an Arabic 

phrase for the “finality of the Prophethood” of Mohammed. For a detailed description of the anti-Ahmadi 

agitation and the government of Bangladesh’s response, see Human Rights Watch, “Breach of Faith: 

Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Bangladesh,” June 2005 (http://hrw.org/reports/2005/bangladesh0605/, accessed July 20, 2006). See also 

Amnesty International, “Bangladesh: The Ahmadiyya 

Community – their rights must be protected,” April 

23, 2004 (http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/EN

GASA130052004?open&of=ENG-BGD, accessed 

July 24, 2006). In June 2006, Amnesty International 

reported that 22 Ahamdi families in Dhaka were 

threatened with death by members of the International 

Khatme Nabuwat (http://web.amnesty.org/library/

Index/ENGASA130062006?open&of=ENG-BGD, 

accessed August 22, 2006).

37 Human Rights Watch, “Breach of Faith,” 2, 4-5.

38 U.S. Department of State, 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “Bangladesh,” 

March 8, 2006 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/

hrrpt/2005/61705.htm, accessed May 31, 2006.

39 This is despite Bangladesh’s unusual distinction of 

having had two women serve as Prime Minister and 

as heads of both major political parties. This circumstance, however, owes more to the South Asian tradition of “legacy” politics than to Bangladeshi women’s 

empowerment per se.

40 See also Hameeda Hossain, “Women’s Rights in 

Retreat,” The Daily Star, Dhaka, July 5, 2005.

41 Article 13 of the Declaration on the Right and 

Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of 

Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 

passed in 1998, states that “Everyone has the right, 

individually and in association with others, to solicit, 

receive and utilize resources for the express purpose 

of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means...”

42 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning 

of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, found in the Annex to Fact 

Sheet No. 19, National Institutions for the Promotion 

and Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High 

Commissioner for Human Rights (http://www.unhchr.

ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm, accessed July 27, 2006).

BANGLADESH

For additional information 

on this issue contact:

Steve Snow, Senior Policy Analyst

202-523-3240, ext. 21

ssnow@uscirf.gov

16