Alan Schwartz 

Iraq Election Scenarios

Anticipating Alternative Futures

Summary

• The United States Institute of Peace sponsored a series of scenario-planning workshops with Iraq experts that was designed to anticipate Iraq election outcomes. 

Scenario planning includes an assessment of uncertain forces and factors, and of 

how they might shape the future. This process is designed to anticipate alternative 

futures, evaluate policy options that could affect those outcomes, and in so doing 

challenge mindsets and test assumptions.

• In the August 2004 workshop the participants identified the level and distribution 

of violence and the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the Iraq election rules and 

process as the driving forces that would shape the election’s outcome. These two 

“drivers” were arrayed as a matrix that produced four quadrants—each representing 

an alternative future—two of which underscored the potential that the legitimacy of 

the election could itself be jeopardized.

• The November 2004 workshop focused on possible election outcomes, looking primarily at the actions of various groups and leaders and at the election logistics. 

The workshop identified a series of potentially “undesirable” election outcomes that 

could most easily occur should there be either high levels of violence or a perception 

that the election process was unfair. Of greatest concern were disproportionately 

low Sunni turnout and a failure of election-day logistics. Whether Iraq would be 

adequately prepared for the elections was explicitly considered.

• At the final session, in January 2005, just before the election, the participants 

examined very specific possible election outcomes, postelection scenarios, and the 

challenges that the new Iraqi government would have to confront, notably basic 

powersharing and federal structures and the strength of the government itself. While 

particular election outcomes would make these challenges a bit harder or easier to 

address, the specific election outcomes would not alter underlying challenges facing 

Iraq.

• In the end it became clear that who won and who did not was not as important as 

whether the process was transparently fair and would be perceived as legitimate by 

the Iraqi people.

www.usip.org

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

SPECIAL REPORT 142 JULY 2005

ABOUT THE REPORT

The elections in Iraq have occurred, and the elected 

National Assembly and new interim government have 

begun grappling with Iraq’s substantial postelection 

challenge—governing a nation. In August 2004, 

the United States Institute of Peace launched a 

novel project in which it sought to develop multiple 

scenarios for the Iraq elections. This paper describes 

that project and illustrates how scenario planning 

can help policymakers grapple with great uncertainty 

and complex political environments. It was prepared 

by Alan Schwartz of PolicyFutures, LLC, who 

facilitated the scenarios exercise.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

SPECIAL REPORT

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect 

those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does 

not advocate specific policy positions.

CONTENTS

Introduction 2

Multiple-Scenario Analysis 2

The Scenario Workshops 4 

Conclusion 8
2

• This process may serve as a valuable template not merely for facilitating interactions 

among subject-matter experts but for channeling the collective expertise of those 

individuals into a product of additional value to policymakers. One cannot predict the 

future with consistent accuracy, but one can anticipate how the future might unfold. 

That is a useful addition to the policymaker toolkit.

Introduction

From August 2004 until January 2005 the United States Institute of Peace, with the 

assistance of PolicyFutures, LLC, conducted a series of three scenario workshops designed 

to explore various alternative outcomes of the Iraq elections. These workshops, each 

attended by approximately twenty Iraq experts, (1) explored the forces and factors that 

could have an impact on elections outcomes; (2) focused on the driving forces that would 

have the greatest impact, but for which there was substantial uncertainty; (3) sketched a 

number of potential election outcome scenarios; (4) explored strategies that the United 

States could pursue; and (5) evaluated the impact of various election scenarios on the 

postelection environment in Iraq.

The scenario workshops proved illuminating even to Iraq experts, as they provided a 

structured process to understand not only what could happen but also why, and to discern how those outcomes might be reinforced or even potentially altered. Moreover, the 

process gave the participants an opportunity to test, without attribution, various assumptions that they individually and collectively held. Finally, those who observed this process 

were provided not only a looking glass into futures that might unfold but also tangible 

evidence of potential causal links in the underlying chain of events.

Scenario planning is not new, but it is rarely invoked in a structured fashion to understand political environments and how those environments might develop. Subject-matter 

experts, such as country experts, are usually called on to render high-level evaluations 

and to provide subjective judgments about likely outcomes. Oftentimes these evaluations 

and judgments, based on years of experience and expert observations, are both accurate 

and useful. But subjective opinions are rarely transparent, and reliance on them usually 

means not having a clear picture of the data on which those opinions are actually based 

(and the data that were ignored or discounted). Moreover, one rarely has an opportunity 

to explicitly understand how the expert resolved uncertainty when there is a continuum 

of possible data points. Finally, even where an individual expert might make all of this 

clear, experts are rarely explicitly asked, in a structured process, to share the underlying 

bases for their judgments. Multiple-scenario analyses can provide greater transparency 

to evaluating political environments and thereby aid the necessarily important exchange 

between policymakers and the subject-matter experts with whom they confer.

Multiple-Scenario Analysis

Multiple-scenario analysis is an analytic strategy that has proven effective for thinking 

about situations characterized by complexity and uncertainty: 

• Scenario analysis is based on an understanding of underlying forces and trends, and 

of the uncertainty related to the development of those forces and of the impacts they 

may have.

• Scenario analysis makes no assumptions regarding historical continuity or change. 

Instead, scenario analysis requires that possible outcomes be justified by plausible 

developments in underlying forces and trends.

• Because scenario analysis recognizes and embraces the uncertainty inherent in 

complex situations, multiple outcomes and the developments that produce them are 

always considered. Single-outcome forecasts are not allowed. 

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an 

independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by Congress to promote the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international 

conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets 

its congressional mandate through an array of 

programs, including research grants, fellowships, 

professional training, education programs from 

high school through graduate school, conferences 

and workshops, library services, and publications. 

The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by 

the President of the United States and confirmed 

by the Senate.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, 

Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, 

ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. 

Bumpers, Founder and former President, Peace Links, 

Washington, D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy 

Director, Physicians for Human Rights, Washington, 

D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. Schlesinger 

Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service, 

Georgetown University • Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, 

Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • Charles 

Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, 

D.C. • Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public 

Policy, George Mason University • Mora L. McLean,

President, Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y. •

Barbara W. Snelling, former State Senator and former 

Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt. 

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Population, Refugees, and Migration • Michael M. Dunn,

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National 

Defense University • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• Richard H. Solomon, President, United States 

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
3

• The analytic goal of multiple scenario analysis is not to forecast what a system will 

look like in the future. The goal is to estimate the range of behaviors the system can 

exhibit within a given time period.

Moreover, as an analytic strategy, scenario analysis allows for the inclusion of a wide 

range of disciplines, conceptual frameworks, and analytic techniques. While individuals 

can undertake scenario analyses on their own, teams generally produce better results, 

especially if their members differ on the perspectives they bring to bear on the focal 

issue.

Unlike most academic and intelligence analyses—which focus mostly on information 

that is known with confidence—scenario analysis focuses equal attention on uncertainties. The term “uncertainties” refers to factors or forces the development or impacts of 

which are impossible to forecast accurately. Although it is impossible to forecast the 

future state of uncertainties, there is much value in exploring how uncertainties might 

behave. It is possible to speculate on how rapidly a factor might change or how much 

improvement or deterioration in a condition is possible within a given time period. This 

kind of speculation provides insights into the volatility of situations and the constraints 

on change that exist in complex systems; it opens our eyes to what is possible and what 

is impossible.

There are several discrete steps in the scenario development process:

1. Define the focal issue—asking the right question is the first step in producing a 

useful answer. The focal issue is the guide to the insights we are seeking about the 

future. Often it relates to a decision that is to be made or involves identifying contingencies for which advance planning is desirable. For this project the focal question 

concerned the potential election outcomes in Iraq. Implicit in this was the possibility 

that the election might be postponed or be deemed illegitimate by one or more parties.

2. Identify the forces and factors that could affect developments relating to the focal 

issue. 

3. Separate out the forces and factors believed to have the greatest impact on the focal 

issue, then sort the important forces and factors into those that can be forecast with 

certainty and those about which there is much uncertainty over the analytic time 

period.

4. Identify the “driving” forces. These can be thought of as the “forces behind the 

forces” or aggregations of similar forces and factors.

5. Generate and select scenario themes. The development of scenario themes starts 

by combining the extremes of two drivers. To illustrate the relationship of the four 

scenarios to each other we used a diagram called a “matrix,” which consisted of two 

axes crossed at a right angle. Each axis represented a driver, and each quadrant a 

scenario.

6. Flesh out the scenarios by creating a plausible plot that takes into account the other 

key uncertainties as well as the drivers. 

7. Consider the implications of each scenario.

8. Identify leading indicators for each scenario so that we can effectively monitor events 

to see the degree to which events correspond to possibilities identified in the set of 

scenarios.

Scenario analysis builds on critical thinking about uncertainties and certainties to 

create a set of plausible scenarios or stories about how a situation can develop from 

today forward. The set of scenarios will illuminate the variety of paths developments may 

take. Because that set displays a range of potential developments, it helps move analysts 

beyond the conventional wisdom or mindsets about a situation.

Scenario analysis does not produce new information, although experts participating in 

a scenario development group may learn things from their colleagues. Instead, scenario 

Scenario planning is not new, 

but it is rarely invoked in a 

structured fashion to understand 

political environments and 

how those environments might 

develop.

Multiple-scenario analysis is an 

analytic strategy that has proven 

effective for thinking about situations characterized by complexity and uncertainty.

Scenario analysis does not produce new information.
4

analysis will lead to new insights about what can and cannot happen, about which factors matter most, about how factors interact, about the relative value of new information, 

and about which indicators it is most important to monitor.

The Scenario Workshops

First Workshop

The first workshop was held on August 12–13, 2004. Over several hours of lengthy and 

detailed discussion the first day, the working group generated a list of more than sixty 

forces and factors that were classified as certainties or uncertainties (almost all were 

uncertainties, even the impact of demographics). To stimulate thinking further, the participants were asked to generate a list of “headline events” that might be emblematic of a 

force or factor coming to bear. PolicyFutures “translated” these events into a list of forces 

and factors for which the participants could vote, aggregating similar forces and factors 

and giving participants an opportunity to comment whether groupings were appropriate 

and reflected common issues. By their votes, the participants identified those forces that 

they believed were both uncertain and within the range of uncertainty able to exert a 

powerful influence on the election and its outcomes:

• The level and distribution of violence

• The perceived fairness and legitimacy of the election rules and process

• The role played by Iraqi leaders, the United States, and foreign governments

• Whether and how the main election actors would boycott the election or form coalitions in developing slates of candidates

Of these four forces, the working group focused the greatest attention on the level and 

distribution of violence and the perceived fairness/legitimacy of the election process.

For the working group, violence included violence to intimidate or coerce voting 

decisions, violence designed to disrupt the election process, violence among competing 

factions, and anti-U.S. or antigovernment violence from insurgents. Also included were 

nonviolent forms of voter intimidation. However, it was important to consider the distribution (location) of the violence, that is, how widespread or localized it would be, as 

well as the level of violence. The perceived fairness, competency, and legitimacy of the 

election included rules and process for party registration, the timing of naming slates 

after registration, the enforcement of rules against militias, and rules for counting and 

distributing votes.

A scenario matrix was thereby constructed—a graphic display of two axes, each representing a continuum of a force/factor, that appeared to be orthogonal to each other, 

that is, independent variables rather than dependent variables. The graphic on page 5 

contains notional titles for each of the four quadrant scenarios.

This scenario matrix recognized explicitly that at some level of violence (in either its 

intensity or its distribution), the election process itself would be endangered. While the 

precise description of the characteristics of this “tipping-point” level and distribution of 

violence remained to be explored, at some point violence would so degrade confidence 

in an open and secure election process that either the election would be postponed or 

its results would lack the confidence of the parties and the people of Iraq. The shaded 

area represents the portions of each quadrant along the continua where the election itself 

would be endangered.

Likewise, the matrix recognized that at some point the degree of confidence in the 

election process itself might be so low that the election and any election results would 

be rendered illegitimate in the eyes of the parties and the Iraqi people. Moreover, the 

combined effect of low election process legitimacy and high violence would create a 

tipping point with a lower threshold for either individual condition. In this sense, it 

To stimulate thinking further, the 

participants were asked to generate a list of “headline events” 

that might be emblematic of a 

force or factor coming to bear.
5

was discussed that these two forces were not purely orthogonal. Greater violence could 

reduce the opportunity for voter education and election transparency. Likewise, less violence provides fewer incentives or excuses for acts of violence, while an unfair election 

process could provoke violence. Nonetheless, while the forces were not purely independent variables, their reinforcing nature did not substantially burden their distinctiveness 

for purposes of constructing scenario matrices.

In the upper right quadrant, increasing levels of violence, even with a fair election 

process, would put the Sunnis at a disadvantage as they would have difficulty turning 

out the vote. This could lead to either a Sunni boycott or efforts to dampen turnout in 

competing regions by exporting violence (e.g., to Kurdish strongholds).

In the upper left quadrant, a perceived fair and legitimate process combined with 

dampened violence would produce a level playing field where all parties could compete 

on their merits. Presumably this would invite robust participation by independent candidates and parties that organized around nontribal, nonreligious issues of policy.

In contrast, in the lower right quadrant, a perceived unfair election process combined 

with violence could endanger the election and any election results.

In the lower left quadrant, an election process that was not transparent and was not 

perceived to be fair would, in the absence of violence, advantage existing organizations, 

which could get out the vote, while independents and issue-oriented candidates would 

have a harder time connecting with the voters.

Second Workshop

Building on the base scenarios set out in the matrix, the second working group (held on 

November 9–10, 2004) focused on possible election outcomes, based primarily on the 

actions of various groups and leaders and election-day election processes. After reviewSCENARIO MATRIX

LEVEL OF VIOLENCE/ELECTION LEGITIMACY/FAIRNESS

ELECTION PROCESS CONSIDERED FAIR/LEGITIMATE

ELECTION PROCESS CONSIDERED UNFAIR/ILLEGITIMATE

LEVEL PLAYING

FIELD

ORGANIZATION

COUNTS

Low 

Levels of

Violence

High 

Levels of

Violence

NEAR THE

CLIFF

ELECTION

GOES

OFF

THE CLIFF

SUNNIS

STRIKE BACK

Less violence provides fewer 

incentives or excuses for acts

of violence.
6

ing potential election outcomes and working backward to see what kinds of events 

might trigger such outcomes, the working group concluded that a variety of “undesirable” election outcomes could occur in three of the four quadrants displayed in the 

matrix, that is, wherever there were either high levels of violence or a perception that 

the election process was unfair. It is worth noting that the participants recognized that 

there were some undesirable outcomes that could occur even in the absence of violence 

or a perception of unfairness; rather, it was the existence of violence/unfairness that 

bolstered the likelihood or intensity of undesirable outcomes. Of greatest concern to 

the working group were two undesirable outcomes and the associated potential causal 

events/conditions: disproportionately low Sunni turnout (in the Sunni triangle region) 

and a failure of election-day logistics. One of the values of focusing on specific outcomes is that it concentrates attention on strategies and actions that can be pursued 

to ward off those outcomes or at least ameliorate their effect.

With respect to a Sunni boycott, the working group reviewed several proposed strategies to reduce the potential of either a formal Sunni boycott or a poor turnout:

• Finish the Fallujah operation as quickly as possible, and then promptly begin major 

reconstruction and job-production efforts. (The Fallujah operation was largely concluded in the week following the workshop, but similar operations were under way 

in other important cities, including Mosul.)

• Create a wedge between the insurgents and others in the Sunni community. This 

might be accomplished by assurances of some positions of power, either by the 

formation of a coalition or by ceding to local control administrative responsibilities 

in a “federal” system. Some participants expressed concern about whether it was 

wise to essentially bypass the national democratic elections by agreeing in advance 

to a distribution of seats in the National Assembly. In addition, the notion of 

decentralization of power for Sunnis would cause similar issues to surface in Kurdish 

areas and dilute the overall power of the national government. Some participants 

expressed concern over any effort that would add greater emphasis to ethnic and 

religious divisions (Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd) or that would undermine a national 

democratic election.

• Focus on security, with an Iraqi and not an American face, in polling places in key 

Sunni areas, that is, where there was the greatest potential that an increase in 

turnout might occur (e.g., neighborhoods in Baghdad vs. Fallujah).

• Press an aggressive public education campaign designed to foster participation in 

the elections and to encourage the public to take control of their own destiny and 

vest in themselves ownership of the election (as was successfully done in Afghanistan).

At bottom, the working group was skeptical that any of these strategies would be 

successful, implicitly recognizing the need in the postelection environment to find 

mechanisms to draw Sunnis into the new government to a greater extent than Sunni 

success at the ballot box would otherwise warrant. While this would be hard to prearrange, it might be more plausible once competing groups felt more secure in the 

aftermath of the election.

With respect to the election-day processes, the working group stressed its sense 

of urgency that everything possible be done to assure that they succeed. This would 

include maintaining ballot security, protecting the integrity of the voting process, and 

ensuring that eligible voters would be able to cast votes at polling places. So daunting were the logistical challenges that consideration had to be given to postponing 

the elections, or at least delaying the national-level elections while proceeding at the 

local level.

The participants recognized that 

there were some undesirable outcomes that could occur even in 

the absence of violence.

Some participants expressed 

concern over any effort that 

would add greater emphasis to 

ethnic and religious divisions. 
7

Third Workshop

By the time of the third workshop, on January 14 and 18, 2005, matters had clarified—a 

bit. The elections were not going to be postponed, slates of candidates appeared to assure 

widespread candidate participation, and the election process seemed stable. However, the 

level of violence, particularly in the Sunni-majority areas, remained high. On January 14, 

the working group constructed four specific election outcomes, projecting percentages 

of National Assembly seats won by Kurdish, Sistani, Allawi, and other slates, and the 

national turnout as well as turnout in the Sunni-majority areas. The key variables across 

the alternative outcomes included:

• Whether the Sistani slate would win a plurality or an outright majority

• Whether the Allawi slate would win a sizeable portion of seats

• How high the Kurdish turnout would be, and whether the Kurds could become a necessary partner with a Sistani slate

• Whether national turnout would exceed 50 percent

• Whether Sunni turnout would be as high as 40 percent or as low as 15 percent

The workshop then turned to identifying the postelection issues and examining them 

in light of the alternative election outcomes. These issues included the religious nature 

of Iraq, the extent of postelection coalition formation, the inclusiveness of the new 

government, the extent of insurgent violence, security provided by the new government, 

the role of Iran and others in the region, attitudes toward the United States, U.S. commitment to Iraq, the drafting of the new constitution, the Sunni reaction, the Kurdistan Assembly and any move toward federalism/decentralization of power, and the potential breakup of Iraq by secession or other means. Interestingly, the participants generally 

agreed that none of the various election outcomes would uniquely or substantially affect 

the key issues they had identified. The lesson of this workshop session was that the 

particulars of the election outcomes mattered much less than whether the election itself 

was conducted successfully, thus giving the Iraqi people confidence that a legitimate 

process had taken place.

While it was agreed that many of the various outcomes would have some impact on 

these issues, the more fundamental understanding was that all of these issues would 

remain on the table and would have to be addressed under any election outcome, and 

those outcomes would not fundamentally alter the essential political dynamic that exists 

in Iraq today. For example, while a more polarized National Assembly would make it 

less likely that coalitions would form, some coalitions would likely still form. Likewise, 

though a polarized National Assembly with little Sunni participation would reflect an 

environment that might prompt greater violence and insurgent activity, violence and the 

insurgency would be real problems even in the “rosiest” scenario, where there was higher 

Sunni turnout and successful results for the secular, moderate slates. In other words, 

at bottom, deals would have to be struck among the parties and solutions attempted 

to resolve the economic, security, and other challenges Iraq faces. None of the election outcomes would fundamentally alter that calculus. And with respect to the United 

States, most election outcomes would likely result in a National Assembly that was not 

“pro-American.” However, Iraq would still need the help of the United States to address, 

among other things, its security challenges and reconstruction needs. 

Accordingly, at the final session, on January 18, 2005, the working group participants 

focused on the key postelection challenges as a way to consider how the parties might 

cooperate and/or compete, and what outcomes might be obtained. This discussion drew 

on the issues/challenges identified in the January 14 session and focused on those considered most compelling by the participants : how the Iraqi constitution addresses basic 

powersharing and federal structures, and the strength of the new government. These two 

are quite related.

The election outcomes mattered 

much less than whether the 

election itself was conducted 

successfully.
8

The workshop developed three emblematic scenario stories that played out various 

dynamics in the postelection environment: 

• The first scenario focused on the important negotiations that would occur primarily 

between Shiite and Kurdish leaders over Kurdish demands to be part of a ruling coalition. If the Kurdish leadership were unable to manage expectations or were otherwise 

unable to reach an accommodation with the Shiites, this could be quite destabilizing 

and have various ripple effects. Not only would Iraq be deprived of a stable ruling 

government; it might prompt a series of actions, including by the Kurds to assert 

control over Kirkuk and the oil revenues from Kurdistan.

• The second scenario grew from the possibility that the election process (and subsequent negotiations) would fail to produce a strong government as intersectarian 

competition sapped the vigor of the National Assembly and the new leadership. While 

the National Assembly would nominally go about its business, the insurgency would 

likely grow and, without an effective and strong national government, increasingly 

begin to exercise control at the regional, provincial, and even local level. This would 

take Iraq down a path of questionable long-term stability.

• The third scenario anticipated a more stable and secure Iraq, predicated on a strong 

and balanced turnout in the election, which itself was bolstered by an announcement by President Bush that the United States would remove its troops according to 

the wishes of the elected Iraqi government—a “sovereign” government. (President 

Bush made such a pledge just a few days after the January 18 workshop meeting.) 

Following the elections, a coalition government would hammer out a series of compromises on key issues, such as Kirkuk and related Kurdish matters, the allocation of 

oil revenues, the place of Sunnis and former Baathists in the new government, and 

long-term security plans, including a timetable for U.S. withdrawal and bolstering 

Iraqi security and police requirements.

This third workshop concluded an effort that began in August 2004 to understand the 

forces and factors that could have an impact on the Iraqi elections, which were scheduled 

to take place five months later, and to anticipate alternative election scenarios.

Conclusion

Early on it was apparent that the level and distribution of violence and the fairness of 

the election process were key ingredients that would have a substantial impact on the 

election. Even in August it was appreciated that the election process could itself be jeopardized by widespread violence or perceptions that the elections were not fair. Indeed, 

the ensuing months focused our attention on the rising levels of violence and concern 

that the election logistics were at best uncertain, and that there would likely be great 

disparities in voter turnout across Iraq. By the time of the second workshop, in November, 

there was great uncertainty concerning whether the process was sufficiently in jeopardy 

to warrant a postponement of the elections.

While the participants attempted to understand who might prevail and who might not 

prevail in the elections, in the end it became clear that who won and who did not were 

not as important as whether the process was transparently fair and would be perceived as 

legitimate by the Iraqi people. Only if this occurred could Iraq begin the path of using the 

democratic process and the postelection negotiation among groups and leaders to address 

the various hurdles that face the nation, including the insurgency, crime and security, economic development and job creation, and a fair distribution of power among the various 

ethnic and religious groups. This would help allow the development of a trusted, moderate 

leadership that can forge alliances and reach compromises within and among the various 

economic and political interest groups, and create a government strong enough to hold 

the country together without suppressing the strong ethnic and religious identities.

The third scenario anticipated 

a more stable and secure Iraq, 

predicated on a strong and balanced turnout in the election.

Even in August it was appreciated that the election process 

could itself be jeopardized by 

widespread violence or 

perceptions that the elections 

were not fair.
9

The scenario planning process facilitated a shared appreciation for a complex environment, an appreciation for what forces and factors mattered the most, an understanding 

of what the United States could affect and what it could not (and what it should and 

should not do), a recognition of the paths that lead to one scenario or another, and 

a recognition of signposts along the way. The participants did not produce a series of 

papers reflecting their perspectives or simply have a discussion. Rather, they engaged in 

a structured process that tested the conventional wisdom, challenged their assumptions, 

and provided them with sets of stories that vividly and concretely painted a picture of 

what Iraq might become.

Moreover, those who observed this process and read the three workshop reports had an 

opportunity to test both the validity of their own assumptions and the potential impact 

of policy alternatives under consideration, and to see where they could have an impact 

and how. This process may serve as a valuable template not merely for interactions among 

subject-matter experts but for channeling the collective expertise of those individuals 

into a product of additional value to policymakers. One cannot predict the future with 

consistent accuracy, but one can anticipate the future and how the future might unfold. 

That is a handy addition to the policymaker toolkit.

One cannot predict the future 

with consistent accuracy, but one 

can anticipate the future and 

how the future might unfold. 


Of Related Interest

A number of other publications from the United States Institute of Peace examine issues 

related to Iraq, elections, and complex postconflict environments.

Recent Institute reports include

• The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: 

Lessons Identified (Special Report, April 2005)

• The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Governance in Iraq: Lessons Identified (Special Report, April 2005)

• Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Shaping a Vision for the Country's Future (Special Report, 

February 2005)

• Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy (Special Report, 

May 2004) 

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of 

Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-

3832; fax (202) 429-6063; or e-mail: usip_requests@usip.org.

Recent books from USIP Press include

• Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict 

Stability Force, by Robert M. Perito (2004)

• Elections and Conflict Management in Africa, edited by Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew 

Reynolds (1998)

For book sales and order information, call (800) 868-8064 (U.S. toll-free only) or (703) 

661-1590, or fax (703) 661-1501.

An online edition of this report can be 

found at our website (www.usip.org), 

together with additional information 

on the subject.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org