About the Repor

This Special Report explores the dynamics of radicalization 

and violent extremism in Kosovo with a special focus on 

the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq as the most 

prominent symptom of a multifaceted religious militancy 

problem facing the country and the region of the Western 

Balkans. Part of a larger effort by the United States Institute 

of Peace (USIP) focused on understanding violent extremism 

in the Western Balkans and developing tailored and viable 

responses to prevent and counter it, the report relies heavily on 

empirical evidence collected by the author over an extensive 

period as well as on official data provided by Kosovan law 

enforcement authorities.

About the Autho

Adrian Shtuni is a senior foreign policy and security analyst 

with a regional focus on the Western Balkans and the eastern 

Mediterranean. He consults on countering violent extremism 

(CVE), counterterrorism, political risk, irregular migration, and 

other transnational threats. He also designs and implements 

CVE trainings and programs, and regularly presents at national 

and international conferences, summits, and symposiums. 

He acknowledges the invaluable input and review by Georgia 

Holmer, director of CVE at USIP. He further wishes to thank the 

Kosovo Police Counterterrorism Directorate for providing access 

to demographic data of foreign fighters.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 397 December 2

© 2016 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Conten

Introduction 2

Demographic Trends and Geographic Footprint 2

Socioeconomic and Political Factors 5

Geopolitics and Identities in Flux 7

Martial Social Identity and a Legacy of War 9

Inspirational Leadership and Group Dynamics 11

Conclusion 11

Recommendations 12

Adrian Shtuni

Dynamics of Radicalization 

and Violent Extremism in 

Kosovo

Summary

• Kosovo, a country with no prior history of religious militancy, has become a prime source of 

foreign fighters in the Iraqi and Syrian conflict theater relative to population size.

• About three in four Kosovan adults known to have traveled to Syria and Iraq since 2012 were 

between seventeen and thirty years old at the time of their departure. By mid-2016, about 

37 percent had returned.

• The vast majority of these known foreign fighters have moderate formal education. In comparative terms, this rate appears to be superior to the reported national rate. Two-thirds live 

in average or above-average economic circumstances.

• Five municipalities—four of which are near Kosovo’s Macedonian border—judging from their 

disproportionately high recruitment and mobilization rate, appear particularly vulnerable to 

violent extremism. More than one-third of the Kosovan male combatants originate from these 

municipalities, which account for only 14 percent of the country’s population. 

• Long-term and targeted radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization efforts by foreign-funded 

extremist networks have been primarily active in southern Kosovo and northwestern Macedonia for more than fifteen years. These networks have often been headed by local alumnae of 

Middle Eastern religious institutions involved in spreading an ultra-conservative form of Islam 

infused with a political agenda.

• Despite substantial improvements in the country’s sociopolitical reality and living conditions 

since the 1998–1999 Kosovo War, chronic vulnerabilities have contributed to an environment 

conducive to radicalization. 

• Frustrated expectations, the growing role of political Islam as a core part of identity in some 

social circles, and group dynamics appear to be the telling drivers of radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization in Kosovo. 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397

Introduction

What started in 2011 as a popular uprising against the Syrian regime escalated in the five 

years that followed into an intractable sectarian war that has engulfed both Syria and 

Iraq, drawn in a suite of regional actors and world powers, and attracted an unprecedented 

number of volunteer combatants from more than a hundred countries. Although so-called 

foreign fighters have been a common feature of conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya and Dagestan, Iraq, and most recently in Ukraine, their flow to Syria and 

Iraq is the largest influx of its kind in recent history. More than 36,500 individuals, including 

at least 6,600 from Western countries, are estimated to have traveled to the conflict theater 

since 2012, mostly to join designated terrorist organizations operating in the region.1

Not long after the bloody secessionist wars that brought about the disintegration of 

Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Western Balkans became a prime source of foreign fighters for 

the Syrian conflict. More than a thousand nationals of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are estimated to have traveled to the battlefields of Syria and Iraq since 2012.2 The significance of this number becomes apparent in 

the context of the combined population across these small countries of less than nineteen 

million. Rates of mobilization relative to the population size—particularly in Kosovo but 

also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia—are far higher than in western European 

countries most afflicted by the phenomenon. Now that the flow of those traveling to the 

conflict theater has subsided—for a variety of reasons—and about 37 percent of all Kosovan nationals estimated to have traveled to Syria and Iraq have returned home, the task 

of understanding the dynamics of their radicalization has become even more critical. This 

is not only in regard to managing the security challenge associated with their return but 

also to adopting effective strategies for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

This report explores the dynamics of radicalization and violent extremism in Kosovo, 

focusing on the flow of foreign fighters as the most prominent symptom of a multifaceted 

religious militancy problem facing the country. It is important to emphasize from the outset 

that though the number of foreign fighters in itself represents a quasi-insignificant minority of the Kosovan society, it also constitutes merely a fraction of an extensive network of 

like-minded militants, supporters, and enablers who not only openly share the same ideology 

but are also actively engaged in its dissemination and recruitment efforts through physical 

and virtual social networks. This report shines some light on that less well-understood part 

of the supply chain of violent extremism. 

Demographic Trends and Geographic Footprint

According to official data from May 2016, at least 314 Kosovan nationals are known to have 

traveled to Syria and Iraq since 2012.3 Of these, forty-four are women and twenty-eight are 

children. Forty others were intercepted by the police before they could reach the conflict 

theater.4 No official estimate exists for the number of children born to Kosovan parents 

in Syria and Iraq between 2012 and 2016, but social media research indicates that such 

children are not uncommon. About thirty-four individuals, or 11 percent of the Kosovan 

contingent, hold dual citizenship and are known to have resided in western European countries. Given these numbers, and a rate of more than 134 adult men—broadly categorized 

as foreign fighters—per million nationals, Kosovo is among the European countries most 

affected by this phenomenon relative to population size. Women and children are not 

counted as fighters given that they are generally considered noncombatants. That said, 

firsthand research indicates that a few teenage males have received weapons training and 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

email: permissions@usip.org.

About the Institu

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Di

Stephen J. Hadley (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and 

Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham 

H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, 

NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC 

Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil and 

Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Offi

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397 3

may have participated in armed hostilities, and that some women are actively involved in 

propaganda and recruitment efforts.5

To put Kosovo’s foreign fighter recruitment problem in perspective we compare it with 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, another Western Balkan country affected by the phenomenon. 

With 188 reported male combatants as of April 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a foreign 

fighter recruitment rate of fifty-four per million nationals.6 Even if the recruitment rates 

were calculated based on respective Muslim populations—emphasizing that available estimates on religious affiliation are outdated and somewhat speculative—the foreign fighter 

rates would be higher in the case of Kosovo, 146 versus 105 per million.7

As of May 2016 about fifty-seven Kosovan men, some 18 percent of all nationals who 

have traveled to Syria and Iraq, are reported killed. No deaths among women and children 

have been reported. As many as 117 people (37 percent) have since returned to Kosovo. 

Returnees are overwhelmingly men; in other words, 45 percent of all men who traveled to 

Syria and Iraq have since returned. By contrast, only one in seven women, less than 14 percent, have returned to Kosovo. Given that most Kosovan women have reportedly traveled to 

Syria and Iraq with their husbands, this trend may indicate that the men who have traveled 

to the conflict theater with their spouses are arguably more committed to the cause and 

less likely to return home. At the same time, it is more difficult for women to leave the conflict zone because they can travel only when accompanied by a man. When their husbands 

are killed, widows are often forced to remarry. An estimated 140 Kosovan nationals, or 45 

percent, were still in the conflict theater as of May 2016.

According to official demographic data provided by the Kosovo police, about 75 percent 

of Kosovan nationals of adult age (men and women) known to have traveled to Syria and 

Iraq after 2012 were born between 1984 and 1997. Considering that most Kosovans reached 

the conflict theater between 2013 and 2014, it is safe to conclude that they were largely 

between seventeen and thirty years old at the time of their departure or mobilization. The 

data suggest that the age group most vulnerable to mobilization is twenty-one to twentyfive years old, which accounts for more than a third of the total recruits, though the group 

represents only 9 percent of the country’s total population (see figure 1).8 This trend is 

Figure 1. Adult Kosovan Nationals in Syria and Iraq (n=277)

Source: Author’s calculations

© Shtuni Consulting LLC
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397

consistent with the findings from a previous study on ethnic Albanian foreign fighters in 

Syria and Iraq.9

Focusing more on male foreign fighters’ formal education, police records indicate that 

of the 142 Kosovans for whom educational data is available, 3 percent have completed 

elementary education, 87 percent secondary education, and 10 percent tertiary education. 

The overwhelming majority of known foreign fighters from this dataset have moderate rather 

than poor formal education, contrary to what anecdotal evidence sometimes indicates. Put 

differently, it is not necessarily or primarily the less educated—and by implication more 

uninformed—segments of society who are recruited to fight in Syria and Iraq.

In fact, the Kosovan foreign fighters’ rate of achieved tertiary education of 10 percent 

appears to be superior to the national rate, which according to the official 2011 census, is 

about 6.7 percent.10 Although Kosovo’s rate of achieved tertiary education is the lowest 

in the Balkans and in Europe, no causal relationship is observable between education and 

recruitment into transnational terrorism. Furthermore, the Kosovan contingent of foreign 

fighters appears to be better educated than their counterparts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

the majority of whom have only a primary-level education.11 By contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s national rate of achieved tertiary education, at 12.7 percent, is almost twice as 

high as Kosovo’s.12

Nevertheless, the typical Kosovan foreign fighter is marginally less educated than the 

average foreign fighter at the time of joining the Islamic State, according to a study based 

on foreign fighter registration forms collected at the Syria-Turkey border between mid-2013 

and mid-2014 by the Islamic State.13

Mapping the footprint of the foreign fighter phenomenon in Kosovo is a critical step 

toward identifying the communities most vulnerable to radicalization, recruitment, and 

mobilization. The official demographic data on male foreign fighters confirmed that Kosovan 

recruits originate predominantly from the municipalities of Pristina (35) and Prizren (26). 

Yet, though these municipalities are home to about 25 percent of known recruits, they are 

also the country’s two most populous, home to about 20 percent of the national population. 

In sum, the phenomenon is observed most often in Pristina and Prizren but these municipalities are not necessarily where the problem is most acute.

Therefore, in determining with more accuracy the communities most vulnerable to 

foreign fighter mobilization for Syria and Iraq, and in turn assessing the etiology of the 

phenomenon at municipality and country level, it is arguably more useful to focus on the 

rate of mobilization per capita in each municipality rather than simple proportions (see 

figure 2). Calculations based on this methodology revealed that though virtually all of the 

twenty-seven municipalities with an ethnic Albanian majority have been affected by the 

phenomenon, five have a disproportionately high mobilization rate: more than two foreign 

fighters per ten thousand residents. Indeed, eighty-three recruits, or more than a third of 

the overall contingent of male foreign fighters, originate from these five municipalities, 

namely, Hani i Elezit, Kaçanik, Mitrovice, Gjilan, and Viti, which account for only 14 percent 

of the country’s population.

Moreover, the two tiny municipalities of Hani i Elezit and Kaçanik, which border the 

Republic of Macedonia, appear to be most vulnerable to foreign fighter mobilization, given 

that they have jointly contributed thirty fighters to the war in Syria and Iraq but account 

for only 2.4 percent of Kosovo’s population.

To put their numbers in perspective, Hani i Elezit and Kaçanik have respectively five and 

two times the rate of mobilization per ten thousand residents of the Belgian municipality 

of Sint-Jans-Molenbeek, often referred to as one of Europe’s most prolific jihadist hotbeds.14

In fact, the disproportionately high rate of mobilization is far from a coincidence. Extensive 

The overwhelming majority of 

known foreign fighters from this 

dataset have moderate rather 

than poor formal education, 

contrary to what anecdotal 

evidence sometimes indicates.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397 5

firsthand research and numerous counterterrorism operations in both Kosovo and Macedonia 

appear to indicate that the rate is the result of targeted and effective radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization efforts by extremist networks that have operated in that particular 

geographic space across borders for over a decade. This is further substantiated by the fact 

that Skopje, the nearby capital city of Macedonia, which has close ties to southern Kosovo is 

in the world’s top five locations for volume and proportion of Islamic State foreign fighters 

per capita, according to a recent study based on Islamic State registration forms leaked in 

early 2016.15

Socioeconomic and Political Factors

Kosovans were undoubtedly the most socially marginalized and discriminated people in 

Yugoslavia. Their basic political rights and social liberties were systematically denied under 

Slobodan Miloševic’s repressive regime. They were also the worst off educationally and economically, and had staggeringly high rates of unemployment driven by ethnocentric state 

policies. Yet, this host of adverse conditions, often cited as push factors that drive recruitment into violent extremist groups, did not push Kosovans toward violent extremism any 

more strongly than other people in Yugoslavia.16 On the contrary, the Kosovan leadership, 

headed by President Ibrahim Rugova, explicitly chose nonviolent resistance for many years 

to address oppression under Miloševic’s regime. In fact, in the early 1990s, violent ethnosectarian conflicts broke out much earlier in other parts of Yugoslavia—Slovenia, Croatia, and 

Bosnia and Herzegovina—among Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, and Muslims alike. 

Only at the end of the 1990s did Kosovans resort to violence for political ends, opting to 

wage guerrilla warfare against government forces. A brief insurgency followed in Macedonia 

along the border with Kosovo.

In relative terms, though still lagging behind all former Yugoslav republics in economic 

performance and social development, Kosovo since the 1998–1999 war has progressed 

Figure 2. Rate of Foreign Fighter Mobilization by Municipality

Source: Author’s compilation

Kosovans were undoubtedly 

the most socially marginalized 

and discriminated people in 

Yugoslavia. Their basic political 

rights and social liberties were 

systematically denied 

under Slobodan Miloševic’s 

repressive regime.
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397

steadily according to most measurable socioeconomic indicators and observable social and 

political conditions. The state of political rights and social liberties has improved. Kosovans 

now have an independent state and elected representatives, and receive education in their 

own language in an increasingly high number of educational institutions. On a per capita 

basis, Kosovo has also received the largest flow of aid distributed by the international community to a developing country.17 This, paired with the flow of remittances from the sizable 

diaspora in western Europe, has had a substantial positive impact on the country’s economy. 

In 1989, Kosovo’s GDP per capita was 25 percent that of Serbia and 40 percent that of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina.18 By 2015, it had risen to 67 percent that of Serbia and 80 percent that 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina.19 Despite being lower-middle-income, Kosovo is one of only 

four European countries to experience uninterrupted growth since the onset of the global 

financial crisis in 2008.20

According to World Bank data, registered unemployment in Kosovo in 2014 stood at 

35 percent. Youth unemployment was even higher.21 Indeed, unemployment is one of the 

country’s most serious challenges. Yet the official unemployment rate among Kosovo’s 

ethnic Albanian majority has halved relative to 1997, just before the start of the conflict.22 

Moreover, although Kosovo has one of Europe’s highest unemployment rates, at least part 

of that problem is attributable to informal employment, which the International Monetary 

Fund reports as being widespread in the country. In fact, according to the 2011 census only 

fifteen thousand people were formally working in agriculture, but studies from the Kosovo 

Agency of Statistics indicate that the actual number was ten times as high.23

Indeed, it would be hard to deny that in relative terms the trajectory of the country 

overall has been positive. Kosovans have legitimate reason to be somewhat content and 

optimistic. According to a 2008 Gallup poll, the year Kosovo proclaimed its independence 

from Serbia, Kosovans were the most optimistic people in the world.24 Attitudes, though, 

would appear to have soured since 2008. According to a recent poll, in 2015 Kosovo was 

the third unhappiest country in Europe.25 The most emblematic display of the popular dissatisfaction with the country’s reality came when about a hundred thousand Kosovans—5.5 

percent of the population—applied for asylum in European Union (EU) states between mid2014 and mid-2015.26

Meantime, Transparency International ranked the country much lower than any of the 

other Western Balkan countries in the 2015 Corruption Perception Index.27 These perceptions are in line with the findings of the National Democratic Institute’s Kosovo May 2016 

Focus Group Report, according to which focus group participants “expressed little trust in 

most government institutions, and perceived them as largely corrupt, self-interested and 

incapable of addressing important issues for ordinary citizens.”28 The distrust in government 

institutions and politicians is also reflected in the findings of the 2015 Kosovo Security 

Barometer, according to which the government and the Assembly of Kosovo are the two 

least trusted public entities.29 By contrast, religious institutions enjoy extraordinarily high 

levels of popular confidence that are twice as high.30 Kosovo’s sociopolitical reality and 

living conditions have improved, but the country still faces pervasive perceptions of failed 

leadership efforts, corruption, and unmet popular expectations. Indeed, as previous studies 

demonstrate, rising and frustrated expectations are a far more common source of extremism 

than economic deprivation.31

This frustration, however, is unlikely to sufficiently explain either Kosovo’s high radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization rates or its considerable reactionary gravitation toward 

religious leadership and dogmatic values. Rather than a simple byproduct of socioeconomic 

and political dynamics, these outcomes are as much the fruit of sustained and targeted 

investments by various Islamic countries that use religion as a foreign policy tool—often 

The most emblematic display 

of the popular dissatisfaction 

with the country’s reality 

came when about a hundred 

thousand Kosovans—5.5 percent 

of the population—applied for 

asylum in European Union (EU) 

states between mid-2014 and 

mid-2015.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397 7

aggressively promoting the primacy of religious identity and a conservative Islamic way of 

life in open tension with Kosovo’s religious tradition and Western liberal democracy—as 

they are the result of a peoples’ quest for a more constant identity that transcends competing, and at times confusing, national, state, and supranational identities.32

Specific Socioeconomic Considerations

According to related police records (mostly self-declared after arrest) of 112 known foreign 

fighters, about 64 percent are in average or above-average economic circumstances, and 

only about 36 percent in poor circumstances. Furthermore, none of the five municipalities 

with the highest rates of foreign fighter mobilization (Hani i Elezit, Kaçanik, Mitrovice, 

Gjilan, and Viti) are among the municipalities with the lowest 2014 Human Development 

Index in Kosovo.33 In other words, taking into account the limit to what can be inferred 

based on available data, no correlation is readily observable between income and educational levels and vulnerability to mobilization. Indeed, extreme poverty and low levels of 

education in Kosovo are highest in other municipalities—such as Skenderaj, Kastriot, and 

Malisheve—and disproportionately high among ethnic minority households, especially in 

Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities (predominantly Sunni) in the central and western 

parts of the country.34 Yet nothing suggests that large numbers from these communities 

have left for Syria and Iraq.35

Geopolitics and Identities in Flux

The Western Balkans, lying as they do between Europe and Asia, have historically been 

a region where competing dogmas, ideologies, and spheres of influence have intersected 

and often collided. Not accidentally, national and religious identities are so entrenched 

and intertwined in this region traditionally shaped by external powers rather than internal 

dynamics. Islam is one of the main legacies of the long Ottoman conquest and rule in the 

Balkans, where over a few centuries large swaths of indigenous populations converted from 

Christianity to Islam. With more than 90 percent of its population considered either observant or nominal Muslim, Kosovo has the highest proportion of Muslims relative to population 

size in the Western Balkans. Nevertheless, unlike in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Islam 

has been long regarded as an ethnic marker, in Kosovo it has traditionally been much less 

significant than the Albanian ethnic identity. Communism also diminished the role of religion in society for almost half a century.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, a suite of powerful states with aggressive foreign 

policy agendas rushed to restore historical ties to the region or to spend petrodollars to 

acquire new influence. Investments were made in strategic economic sectors and in reviving 

cultural and religious heritage in the region. Much effort also focused on spreading an ultraconservative form of Islam infused with a political agenda through Middle Eastern charities 

at times infiltrated by violent extremist organizations.36 The efforts of faith-based organizations, primarily from the Persian Gulf states but also Turkey, intensified extensively after the 

1998–1999 Kosovo War. Indeed, numerous Middle Eastern charities often accused of actively 

spreading Wahhabism set up chapters in Kosovo and dedicated considerable resources to 

building an extensive network of unlicensed mosques across the country, providing educational scholarships to hundreds of talented Kosovan youths to study in religious institutions 

in the Middle East, and sponsoring Koranic schools and local faith-based organizations often 

led by local fundamentalist alums of Middle Eastern religious institutions.37
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397

Aside from providing much needed humanitarian aid and social services these faithbased organizations promoted a pan-Muslim identity rooted in principles of brotherly solidarity, which was particularly appealing to Kosovans at that critical juncture in their postwar 

healing and recovery. To be sure, many foreign aid and faith-based entities from both the 

East and the West provided assistance to Kosovans after the war, but none had a stronger 

agenda that directly addressed identity needs and provided spiritual and emotional support 

at the grassroots level than Islamic organizations. Some of these painstakingly invested in 

an expansive religious infrastructure that provided people with spiritual comfort and a sense 

of community, and identity seekers with structure, guidance, perspective, belonging, and 

a sense of mission. These organizations planted the seeds of a new group identity shaped 

in the mold of political Islam that gradually came to fruition with the galvanizing effect 

of the armed conflict in Syria and Iraq. This emotional solidarity and religious guidance in 

the postwar context was arguably as meaningful to long-victimized and long-segregated 

Kosovans as humanitarian aid itself, if not more so.

With time, local radical imams were able to use this newly crafted religious bond with the 

Ummah (supranational Islamic community) to recast the Kosovans’ grievances and struggles 

as local manifestations of a greater global trend of oppression against Muslims. In a video 

statement from 2010 posted online, a Kosovo Liberation Army veteran and the first Kosovan 

to be reported killed in Syria in November 2012 provided his view on the reasons behind the 

Kosovo War. “Those who fought us were crusaders. Those who think that the Kosovo War was 

a nationalist war are wrong! [The Serbs] came here to fight against Islam.”38 In this video he 

appears alongside a much younger leading activist of a faith-based nongovernmental organization operating in Kaçanik who will go on to become a Kosovan Islamic State commander. 

In another propaganda video posted on YouTube in late 2013 this commander, among 

threats and calls to action, expresses his appreciation for the opportunity Allah gave him 

to “defend the honor of Muslim sisters and Muslim children in Syria.” Judging from a large 

number of similar statements posted continuously on social media platforms and even made 

by returned foreign fighters in trial, the excessively high rate of radicalization and mobilization among particular circles of young religious Kosovans may be more plausibly explained 

by their professed feelings of solidarity with the Islamic community they integrated in—the 

Ummah—than through other socioeconomic drivers. The systematic efforts of a cohort of 

fundamentalist clerics from Kosovo and Macedonia currently convicted or under criminal 

investigation, and the active network of faith-based organizations affiliated with them, now 

largely closed down, have been particularly instrumental in this process. Indeed, this sensation of intra-community solidarity has been reinforced by some clerics interpretation of the 

armed conflict in Syria and Iraq as defensive jihad, a compulsory duty for all Muslims who 

should act in solidarity with other Muslims under attack. The recent memories of violence, 

rape, humiliation, and massive expulsion from their homes during the Kosovo War arguably 

made the work of recruiters on Kosovans less challenging because the plight of the Sunnis 

in Syria closely resonated with them.

Unsuccessful Integrations and Religious Revival

For generations, Kosovans have lived in a sociopolitical reality where they were made to feel 

unequal and unwanted. They struggled or refused to properly integrate in former Yugoslavia 

in part because of outright discrimination but also in fear of assimilation by the Slavic 

majority in a country where they were both an ethnic and a religious minority. This caused 

them to integrate Islam into their lives not simply as a dogma but also as part of a pragmatic strategy of ethnic and territorial preservation.39 In a country where they could face 

prison for using the Albanian national flag they could at least build mosques to demarcate 

With time, local radical imams 

were able to use this newly 

crafted religious bond with 

the Ummah (supranational 

Islamic community) to recast 

the Kosovans’ grievances 

and struggles as local 

manifestations of a greater 

global trend of oppression 

against Muslims.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397 9

their territory and proclaim their diversity. In other words, religion became somewhat of a 

metaphor for ethnic identity.

The constantly frustrated nationalist aspirations of joining Albania, regarded as the 

mother state, also did not help with integration. Yugoslavia’s collapse both as a political 

system and a social project—that is, as a multinational federation and a socialist society—brought more fragmentation. The Kosovo War and its aftermath further deepened 

ethnocultural cleavages, resulting in an even more polarized society. Despite Yugoslavia’s 

defeat in 1999, the aspirations of those in Kosovo who sought unification with Albania or 

outright independence were once more constrained. Kosovo instead became a protectorate 

managed by the international community until February 2008. Even the transition to an 

independent state has been rocky and fraught with recurring disappointments. This reality 

of constant shifts, transitions, failures, and thwarted integration aspirations has arguably 

pushed Kosovans closer to their religious identity—the one that has remained constant—in 

a sort of religious awakening. According to a 2012 study, although 58 percent of the respondents said they are “just a Muslim,” only 41 percent reported growing up with this identity, 

and a substantial percentage of Kosovan Muslims said they were unaware of their childhood 

affiliation.40 Nevertheless, this religious awakening should not be confused with religious 

militancy. Only a small fraction of those who gravitate toward religion end up tangled in the 

web of violent extremist organizations. Yet the scale of this revival would have been unlikely 

without the vigorous efforts of faith-based organizations.

Indeed, though for Kosovans the aspired supranational European identity has become 

increasingly elusive given the plethora of obstacles to EU integration, the national Albanian 

identity unfeasible and frustrating in light of clear indications by the international community that it will not accept border changes or unification with Albania, and the prescribed 

Kosovar state identity somewhat confusing for its fluidity, the Muslim identity appears to 

have become increasingly appealing and is gaining significant ground. According to a 2016 

survey by a think tank focusing on the issue of identity among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, 

almost one-third of respondents identified either primarily or exclusively as Muslims rather 

than Albanian.41 The conservative part of this new reality is on display in the streets of 

Kosovo, where it is increasingly common to come across women wearing the hijab and men 

sporting the Salafi’s trademark long beard with the upper lip clean-shaven and above-theankle slacks. This trend was much less observable immediately after the war.

That Kosovo is the only country in the Western Balkans that does not enjoy visa-free 

travel within Europe is adding to the frustration and contributing to a general feeling of 

isolation and alienation from the rest of Europe, especially among the country’s youth. The 

widely shared perception of being unwelcomed or unwanted in Europe is associated with 

resentment toward a political class that has repeatedly failed to meet the benchmarks set 

by the European Union as conditions for visa-free travel.

Martial Social Identity and a Legacy of War

According to various studies, adoption of a religious belief system provides a fulfilling and 

cohesive social identity and sense of belonging to a broader cultural community.42 Aggression and acts of violence against the members of “their community” (despite geographic 

distance) perpetrated by another group provoke in some individuals a transformative process described as “a self-categorization into a martial social identity.”43 Believing they are 

soldiers protecting their community and doing the will of God, they adopt violence as a 

justified method of defense. This is believed to be one of the most common pathways to 

political violence.

Aggression and acts of violence 

against the members of “their 

community” (despite geographic 

distance) perpetrated by 

another group provoke in some 

individuals a transformative 

process described as “a selfcategorization into a martial 

social identity.”
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397

Similarly, a handful of Kosovan foreign fighter interviews and statements before, during, 

and after their participation in the war in Syria and Iraq capture perspectives in line with 

this idea, the concept of humanitarian jihad interwoven in their narrative. In a televised 

interview in early 2016, a highly educated returnee—who elected not to hide his identity—

explained: “I decided to travel to Syria for humanitarian reasons....I did not leave because 

I was desperate...and can’t deny the role of religion. Sacrificing oneself to protect someone 

who is defenseless is a noble cause.” One of the first known returnees gave a similar interview in 2013, claiming that his motivations were shaped by the urge to defend civilians and 

fulfill a religious duty: “I left for Syria for religious reasons; I saw that the Shia and Alawites 

started waging war against Sunnis....Inspired by the Koran and the teachings of the Prophet 

I decided to travel to defend the country...every Muslim is obliged to wage war against nonbelievers.” Along the same lines, a high school teacher turned jihadist who was arrested in 

2014 told a journalist, “I got the idea from viewing videos online. I was deeply disturbed. I 

knew I would go one day. The Koran and Muhammad’s teachings clearly stipulate that a day 

spent waging jihad is equal to sixty years of piety and devotion.”

The legacy of the Kosovo War is referenced prominently in returnees’ accounts. A seemingly disillusioned young man who traveled to Syria in 2013 told a journalist under conditions of anonymity, “When the Arab Spring began, I wanted to help the Syrian people. I have 

experienced war and horrific raids firsthand as a child in Kosovo, and wanted to help those 

children, the families.” In another interview to an Italian TV station, a Kosovan youth under 

house arrest showed a mix of remorse and resolve fueled by his childhood war experience: 

“It was a mistake. I should not have left for Syria. I saw the images of Syrian population 

being massacred. We know well what war is in Kosovo and that the international community 

should help people seeking liberty from the yoke of tyranny.” A waiter who had just returned 

to Kosovo from a short stint in Syria in 2014, instead spoke of his experience as a rite of 

passage, emphasizing an anticipated feeling of fulfillment brought about by going to war: 

“I spent time watching videos of Assad’s cruelties against Syrian children. I wanted to fight 

against that criminal man. I also wanted to experience war. During the Kosovo War I was too 

young to fight, which made me feel like I was incomplete.”

As often the case with clan-based societies, Kosovo is dominated by an entrenched patriarchal mindset where rigid gender norms place harsh expectations on young men. Physical 

toughness, bravery, and eagerness to fight are often regarded as traditional traits of successful and honorable men.44 In the aftermath of the Kosovo War, the constant overflow of 

narratives and epic songs that glorify the manliness and heroism of Kosovo Liberation Army 

fighters has further reinforced these social values.

Although returnees appear more inclined to cite humanitarian reasons and moral outrage 

as motivations for traveling to Syria, the fighters issuing video statements from the conflict 

theater put much more emphasis on the opportunity to wage jihad. A student of Islamic 

studies killed in July 2014 explained his decision in an Islamic State propaganda video 

posted online: “I came [to Syria] for Jihad, so that the word of Allah is the highest and 

sharia is our law.” In another video statement, a former firefighter turned foreign fighter and 

eventually killed in Syria in 2015 exclaimed, “May our generation be the one to destroy all 

the hypocrites, nonbelievers and rejectionists....We will not stop until we elevate the word 

of Allah across the world and make sharia the only law.” Likewise, in a bellicose video statement issued in January 2014 the most prominent Kosovan foreign fighter and a successful 

recruiter said, “We will strive to establish the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria and all around the 

world. We will either achieve our goal or you, nonbelievers, will walk on our dead bodies. I 

call on you Muslims, when will you wake up?”
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397 11

Inspirational Leadership and Group Dynamics

The 314 Kosovan nationals who have traveled to Syria and Iraq are the most visible part 

of the problem but this contingent neither appeared nor operates in vacuum. Firsthand 

research on the dynamics of radicalization and recruitment in the Western Balkans online 

suggests that those who openly support the cause and disseminate the ideology of terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (previously 

Jabhat al-Nusra) are in the thousands. The Facebook page “Halal Channel” run from Pristina 

by Islamic State supporters had more than eight thousand followers at the time it was shut 

down in July 2016. The Jabhat Fateh al-Sham page “Minarja e Bardhe” or “The White Minaret” (also run from Pristina) had almost four thousand followers before being shut down in 

June 2016 only to reopen again shortly thereafter. These social media pages are only two 

of many platforms where Albanian-speaking individuals from diverse social and economic 

backgrounds congregate to create virtual communities that transcend geographic limitations. In this regard, far from an individual process, radicalization and recruitment are more 

than anything else collective or social activities.

The response of the Kosovan authorities so far has mainly focused on criminalizing 

participation in foreign conflicts and cracking down on recruiting cells and returnees. From 

2013 to July 2016, the Kosovo police have kept 292 individuals suspected of involvement 

in acts of terrorism or promoting religious extremism under surveillance. Criminal charges 

have been brought against 219, 119 have been arrested, and indictments have been filed 

against 92.45 The last five indictments were lodged in mid-September 2016 against four 

of the most prominent conservative clerics and the leader of an Islamist political party in 

Kosovo. In fact, the number of Kosovan clerics known to have traveled to Syria and Iraq to 

join jihadist groups or to have been arrested by authorities on charges related to terrorist 

activities stands at seventeen. The corresponding numbers for Albania and Macedonia are 

four and three, respectively.

Kosovo has cracked down more aggressively than neighboring countries on fundamentalist clerics and their associates, but the disproportionately larger number of these clerics 

arrested as part of numerous counterterrorism operations points to the significance of 

religious leadership in the radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization dynamics within 

Kosovo. Indeed, these inspirational figures make up one of the main observed clusters of 

Kosovans actively involved in violent extremist activities in Kosovo, both on the ground—

through a number of so-called cultural associations—and on social media. The other one 

is composed of foreign fighters connected to each other through kinship ties. Firsthand 

research on male Kosovan foreign fighters (excluding noncombatants) indicates at least 

eleven cases of two or three brothers and other cousins traveling together to Syria and Iraq, 

for a total of twenty-eight known fighters. In one case, ten members of the same family—

three brothers with their two wives and five children—left for Syria in late 2014.46 Preliminary research also suggests that in a large number of cases known fighters were neighbors 

or friends who followed the same clerics or belonged to the same faith-based grassroots 

organizations. Although more in-depth research is needed for Kosovo, the described trends 

appear to be in line with the findings of anthropologist Scott Atran, that group dynamics 

are critical in turning ordinary people into violent extremists.47

Conclusion

The foreign fighters currently in the battlefields of Syria and Iraq are only one manifestation of violent extremism in Kosovo. Another significant part of the supply chain of violent 

The 314 Kosovan nationals who 

have traveled to Syria and Iraq 

are the most visible part of the 

problem but this contingent 

neither appeared nor operates in 

vacuum.
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397

extremism includes fundamentalist clerics and key influencers involved in proselytizing and 

radicalization efforts, recruiters, facilitators, would-be fighters intercepted by the police 

before they could get to Syria and Iraq, and the plethora of like-minded activists supporting and promoting violent extremism online and on the ground. Yet another contingent is 

composed of Kosovan women, children, infants born in the conflict theater, and other family 

members of fighters who either decided or were forced to migrate with the combatants. 

Another includes returnees either serving prison sentences or struggling to be reintegrated 

in the society, though it is hard to determine with certainty their intentions. Then, inevitably, are the invisibles, those who have managed to stay under the radar, about whom the 

authorities know nothing. This mosaic of people with various levels of ideological conviction (in some cases arguably none at all) and involvement in the armed conflict in Syria 

and Iraq is still incomplete. Their families, relatives, and friends are directly affected by the 

phenomenon and remain particularly vulnerable to violent extremism.

The age group most susceptible to mobilization into violent extremism is twenty-one 

to twenty-five year olds. The typical Kosovan fighter has a moderate formal education and 

lives in average or above-average economic circumstances. A range of reasons explain why 

Kosovans become directly or indirectly, willingly or forcibly involved in violent extremism, 

but economic deprivation and inadequate education are not among them. Instead, factors 

closely tied to a recent past defined by interethnic strife, segregation, and victimization 

and a current reality marked by popular perceptions of failed leadership efforts and unmet 

expectations against a backdrop of identities in flux in a nascent country struggling to 

define itself appear to be more relevant. Yet foreign fighter mobilization is not spread 

uniformly across the country. It is instead particularly concentrated in a cluster of contiguous municipalities (Hani i Elezit, Kaçanik, Gjilan and Viti) near the border with Macedonia. 

Although more detailed research is needed for a comprehensive assessment, this trend can 

be attributed in large part to the radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization efforts by 

extremist networks that have operated in that particular geographic space across borders 

for more than a decade. Relatedly, social networks and group dynamics appear to be of particular significance, and would request special attention especially as they relate to Middle 

Eastern trained radical clerics who have successfully taken on leadership roles, channeled 

the frustrations of the youth, and fostered the creation of a martial social identity.

Assessing the extent and complexity of this mosaic and the dynamics that have given 

shape to it is the first step to understanding the range of social vulnerability and security 

threats that Kosovo and the region are and will be subject to for some time to come. Such 

assessment will require not only adequate technical expertise, resources, and coordination 

but also political will, resolve, and focus to expose the nature, scale, and scope of the 

problem and to adopt policies to tackle it at its root in a comprehensive but nuanced way, 

not overwhelmingly through law enforcement and punitive measures but primarily through 

civil activism and community-based programs that raise awareness and strengthen the community’s immunity to violent extremism.

Recommendations

Numerous factors—including criminalizing participation in armed conflicts abroad—have 

contributed to a significant drop in the outflow of Kosovan foreign fighters. This positive 

trend is not to be overlooked. Yet the relatively robust level of support for violent extremist 

organizations, particularly visible online, advises against assuming that repressive measures 

by themselves have countered the problem. The Kosovan government and international 

policymakers and practitioners would do well to take the following steps.

Assessing the extent and 

complexity of this mosaic and 

the dynamics that have given 

shape to it is the first step to 

understanding the range of 

social vulnerability and security 

threats that Kosovo and the 

region are and will be subject to 

for some time to come.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397 13

• Resist the temptation of overestimating the impact of the reactive measures implemented 

so far and downplaying the actual level of sympathy or support that some violent 

extremist organizations and the core beliefs they espouse continue to enjoy among 

particular segments of the population. To be sure, this approach will not come without 

political and image costs in the domestic and international arena. Moreover, considering 

the lingering interethnic tensions in the region and Kosovo’s EU integration ambitions, 

exposing the full extent of the country’s “vulnerability to violent extremism” may even 

seem injudicious. Yet, the long-term cost of misdiagnosing and undertreating this critical 

social ill far outweighs any short-term public relations and political benefits.

• Close down informal places of worship and faith-based nongovernmental organizations 

that promote interethnic and racial hatred or have proven links to violent extremist 

organizations. Doing so is critical. Yet it is arguably even more critical not to leave a 

vacuum behind. Rather, focus more efforts on promoting, fostering, and facilitating other 

genuine grassroots initiatives and platforms for citizen participation and community 

support.

• Intensify efforts to implement the National CVE Strategy with the support of international 

partners. In particular, support community-based early-intervention and prevention 

programs and target the age groups and geographic communities most vulnerable to 

radicalization. Identify the factors that, judging from their low rate of recruitment into 

violent extremist activities, make some municipalities significantly more resilient to 

radicalization.

• Prioritize programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees—both within 

prisons and outside them—as well as their families. Inform such programs with both 

academic research and best practices from similar projects in other countries, being 

mindful of local resource and capacity constraints. Harness the capacities of civil society 

and community groups that are uniquely placed to provide continued reintegration 

support. Build these programs on a sound understanding of local dynamics of 

radicalization and violent extremism and a thorough and ethical assessment of Kosovan 

returnees’ reasons for returning, their grievances, and their needs.

• Coordinate closely with international donors and local implementers of preventing violent 

extremism, CVE, and reintegration programs to avoid duplication of efforts, increase 

effectiveness of interventions, and maximize limited resources. Resist the temptation of 

centralizing the implementation process. Build close partnerships with municipality-level 

stakeholders and work with local implementers wherever the expertise allows.

• Partner with organizations and specialists with established CVE capacity building and 

programming expertise to develop local capacity to raise awareness and counter violent 

extremism online. Dedicate particular attention to providing young activists with 

the skills and means to run public information campaigns systematically, safely, and 

effectively with the end goal of creating independent regional networks of CVE activists.

• Prioritize preventive and rehabilitation efforts on the five identified municipalities that 

have shown a heightened vulnerability to violent extremism. This is particularly important 

in view of limited resources and capabilities. The successful outcome of these targeted 

efforts will hinge as much on the quality of interventions, constancy of engagement, and 

adaptability to dynamic radicalization trends as on the ability of stakeholders to address 

the problem set with empathy, avoiding overly securitizing communities or stigmatizing 

specific populations.
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397

Notes

1. U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 

Community” (statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, February 9, 2016). 

2. Adrian Shtuni, “Islamic State Influence Threatens the Western Balkans” (London: IHS Jane’s Defense and Security, 

2016).

3. Kosovo police official data provided to the author, May 2016.

4. Erjone Popova, “About 140 Kosovan Nationals in the War in Syria and Iraq,” Kallxo, July 19, 2016, http://kallxo

.com/afer-140-kosovare-ne-lufterat-ne-siri-e-irak/. 

5. Shtuni, “Islamic State Influence Threatens the Western Balkans.”

6. Vlado Azinovic and Muhamed Jusic, “The New Lure of the Syrian War: The Foreign Fighters Bosnian Contingent,” 

Atlantic Initiative, 2016. 

7. Kosovo Agency of Statistics, “Kosovo Census 2011” (Pristina, 2012); Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013: Final Results (Sarajevo, June 2016). 

Because considerable proportions of foreign fighters originating from western European countries are recent 

converts to Islam—possibly as many as a quarter in the case of France—calculating and comparing the rate 

of foreign fighter mobilization for Syria and Iraq based exclusively on demographic data on respective Muslim 

populations in European countries and countries of the Western Balkans would yield a skewed perspective of 

recruitment and mobilization trends. However, the comparison of the rates of foreign fighter mobilization among 

the countries of the Western Balkans based exclusively on Muslim populations may be less problematic given the 

marginal number of recent converts among the nationals known to have traveled to Syria and Iraq.

8. Kosovo Agency of Statistics, “Kosovo Census 2011.” 

9. Adrian Shtuni, “Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria” (New York: CTC Sentinel, 2015): 11–14.

10. Kosovo Agency of Statistics, “Kosovo Census 2011.” 

11. Azinovic and Jusic, “The Lure of the Syrian War.” 

12. Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, 2013.

13. Nate Rosenblatt, “All Jihad Is Local: What ISIS’ Files Tell Us About Its Fighters,” New America, July 20, 2016. 

14. Bibi van Ginkel and Eva Entenmann, eds., The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union: Profiles, 

Threats & Policies, ICCT Research Paper (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism 2016); T. Hume, 

“Brussels raids: Police hit Molenbeek, area at heart of Belgium’s jihadist threat,” CNN.com, 2015; Emma-Kate 

Symons, “Belgium attacks–10 years ago, this undercover reporter warned of terror hotbeds in Brussels,” New York 

Times, March 25, 2016. 

15. Rosenblatt, “All Jihad Is Local.”

16. Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism (Washington, DC: USAID, February 

2009), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadt978.pdf. 

17. Aiden Hehir, “How the West Built a Failed State in Kosovo,” The National Interest, August 31, 2016. 

18. Mills Kelly, “GDP in Yugoslavia: 1980–1989,” Making the History of 1989, Item #671 (2016) https://chnm.gmu

.edu/1989/items/show/671. 

19. Trading Economics, “Bosnia and Herzegovina GDP per capita, 1994–2016,”December 2016, www.tradingeconomics

.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina/gdp-per-capita. 

20. World Bank, “Kosovo: Country at a Glance,” www.worldbank.org/en/country/kosovo.

21. Kosovo Agency of Statistics, “Results of the Kosovo 2014 Labour Force Survey” (World Bank, June 2015, 

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/629671468190183189/Results-of-the-Kosovo-2014-labour-force

-survey.

22. William Zartman and Tanya Alfredson, “Negotiating with Terrorists and the Tactical Question,” in Coping with 

Terrorism: Origins, Escalation, Counter Strategies, and Responses, ed. Rafael Reuveny and William Thompson 

(Albany: State University of New York, 2010).

23. World Bank, “The World Bank Group in Kosovo–Country Snapshot,” April 2015, www.worldbank.org/content

/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/Kosovo-Snapshot.pdf.

24. Gallup International and INDEX Kosova, “Kosovo–The Most Optimistic Again,” December 18, 2008, www

.indexkosova.com/docs/doc2_8.pdf. 

25. Happiness Research Institute, “Happiness Equality Index: Europe 2015,” 2016, www.happinessresearchinstitute

.com/publications/4579836749. 

26. Susanne Koelbl, Katrin Kuntz, and Walter Mayr, “What Is Driving the Balkan Exodus?” Spiegel Online, 

August 26, 2016, www.spiegel.de/international/europe/western-balkan-exodus-puts-pressure-on-germany-and

-eu-a-1049274.html.

27. Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,” www.transparency.org/cpi2015/. 

28. National Democratic Institute, “Kosovo 2016 Focus Group Report” (copy in author’s possession).

29. Kosovar Center for Security Studies, Kosovo Security Barometer, Fifth edition,” December 2015, www.qkss.org

/repository/docs/Kosovo_Security_Barometer_-_Fifth_Edition_523670.pdf. 

30. Ibid.

31. Denoeux and Carter, Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism.

32. Adrian Shtuni, “Breaking Down the Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters Phenomenon,” Soundings 98, no. 4 (2015): 

460–77.

33. Matthias Lücke et al., Kosovo Human Development Report, 2014: Migration and a Force for Development (Kosovo: 

United Nations Development Programme, 2014), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/khdr2014english.pdf. 

The Human Development Index is a summary measure of key dimensions of human development. It measures 

the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, 

access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 397 15

34. Kosovo Foundation for Open Society, “The position of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities in Kosovo,” 2009. 

35. World Bank, “Kosovo Country Snapshot.”

36. Adrian Shtuni, “Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria.” 

37. Ibid.; David Gardner, “Saudis have lost the right to take Sunni leadership,” Financial Times, August, 13, 2014; 

Besiana Xharra, “Kosovo turns blind eye to illegal mosques,” Balkan Insight, January 12, 2012.

38. Gazeta Express, “Lavdrim Muhaxheri in Pristina: Serbia Fought Our Islam,” video, September 29, 2015, www

.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/lavdrim-muhaxheri-ne-mes-te-prishtines-serbia-erdhi-te-na-e-luftoje-islamin-video

-133589/?archive=1.

39. Shtuni, “Breaking Down the Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters Phenomenon.”

40. Pew Research Center, “The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity,” August 9, 2012, www.pewforum.org/2012/08/09

/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-executive-summary/. 

41. Agon Demjaha and Lulzeim Peci, “What Happened to Kosovo Albanians,” Policy Paper no. 1/16 (Pristina: Kosovar 

Institute for Policy Research and Development, June 2016), www.kipred.org/repository/docs/What_happened

_to_Kosovo_Albanians_740443.pdf. 

42. Renate Ysseldyk, Kimberly Matheson, and Hymie Anisman, “Religiosity as Identity: Toward an Understanding of 

Religion from a social Identity Perspective,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 14, no. 1 (February 2010): 

60–71.

43. Marc Sageman, “Understanding Terror Networks: The Turn to Political Violence” (London: The Henry Jackson 

Society, July 13, 2010).

44. Sophie Namy, Brian Heilman, Shawna Stich, and Jeffrey Edmeades, “Be a Man, Change the Rules: Findings and 

Lessons from Seven Years of CARE International Balkans’ Young Men Initiative” (Washington, DC: International 

Center for Resarch on Women, 2014). 

45. Besnik Bislimi, “Deradicalization, Mission (Im)possible,” Radio Free Europe, September 10, 2016, www

.evropaelire.org/a/27979187.html. 

46. Telegrafi.com, “Images from Hasani family from Kosovo to ISIS,” http://telegrafi.com/pamje-te-familjes-hasani

-nga-kosova-qe-gjenden-ne-isis-fotovideo/.

47. Scott Atran, Talking to the Enemy: Religion, Brotherhood, and the (Un)making of Terrorists (New York: 

HarperCollins, 2010).
Of Related Interest

• Afghan Women and Violent Extremism by Belquis Ahmadi and Sadaf Lakhani (Special Report, 

November 2016)

• Islamist Groups in Afghanistan and the Strategic Choice of Violence by Arian Sharifi (Peace 

Brief, November 2016)

• The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan by Casey Garret Johnson (Special Report, 

November 2016)

• Violent Extremism and Clan Dynamics in Kenya by Ngala Chome (Peaceworks, October 2016)

• Community Resilience to Violent Extremism in Kenya by Lauren Van Metre (Peaceworks, October 

2016)

ISBN: 978-1-60127-635-3

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(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

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