U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

30–562 2019

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–92] 

STATE AND NON–STATE ACTOR 

INFLUENCE OPERATIONS: 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 21, 2018 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA–PORTER, New Hampshire 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

JIMMY PANETTA, California 

JEN STEWART, Staff Director 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Breedlove, Gen Philip M., USAF (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S. European 

Command .............................................................................................................. 4 

Garnaut, John, Former Senior Adviser to Australian Prime Minister Malcolm 

Turnbull ................................................................................................................ 7 

Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D., Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 

Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, U.S. Department of Defense, and 

Former Special Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 9 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Breedlove, Gen Philip M. ................................................................................. 56 

Garnaut, John ................................................................................................... 62 

Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D. .............................................................................. 76 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 54 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ ............................................................... 53 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Banks .......................................................................................................... 89 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 89 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 89 

(1) 

STATE AND NON–STATE ACTOR INFLUENCE 

OPERATIONS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 21, 2018. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Let me welcome and appreciate our witnesses for being here, as 

well as members and guests. 

Whether the term used is ‘‘political warfare,’’ ‘‘influence operations,’’ ‘‘psycho-cultural warfare,’’ ‘‘indirect warfare,’’ ‘‘hybrid warfare,’’ or one of the many others that have been suggested, it is 

clear that the United States and our allies are under consistent attack using non-kinetic tactics designed to undermine and weaken 

us. 

We know that Russia intervened in a variety of ways to sow dissension during the 2016 election. History and now declassified documents establish that the former Soviet Union had a track record 

of active measures against NATO’s [North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s] deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, for 

example, and those active measures included providing propaganda 

themes to peace movement groups, as well as organizational expertise, financial resources, forged U.S. military documents, et cetera, 

et cetera. 

And according, again, to declassified CIA [Central Intelligence 

Agency] documents, that campaign was built upon a similar campaign they carried out against a proposed neutron bomb deployment in 1977 and 1978. 

The point is it is all part of a standard playbook, and we should 

expect more of the same, including against decisions called for, for 

example, in the Nuclear Posture Review. 

While most of the attention has been centered on Russia as a 

source of these attacks, they are not the only adversary using such 

methods. China has spent billions of dollars to gain economic leverage, buy access to infrastructure, and shape public opinion and perceptions around the world to its advantage. Iran, various terrorist 

organizations, and even North Korea make use of them as well. 
2 

These tactics challenge our traditional ways of thinking about 

warfare. They challenge our organizational structure on who is responsible for defending the country in this sphere. And they challenge our ability to develop and use tools needed to deal with them 

in a timely way. 

As the National Defense Strategy says, ‘‘China and Russia want 

to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.’’ And that was a quote. It is important for us to 

identify the motive behind these efforts, but the question remains 

whether we have the tools, the organizations, and the approaches 

to protect American sovereignty and national security. 

We hope to gain insight into these issues from our distinguished 

panel of witnesses, but first, let me yield to the ranking member 

for any comments he would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 53.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree substantially with 

all of your remarks about the importance of this. 

It is a fairly simple process, and we are kind of failing at every 

level right now, in terms of our information operations. I mean, 

first of all, if you are going to engage in an information operation, 

you need to know what your message is. What is our message? 

What is it we are trying to convey? How are we trying to influence 

people? 

Now, I think there are a couple very large issues there. One, we 

want to promote economic and political freedom as the ideal form 

of government and push that forward. We have not been conveying 

that message particularly well. 

And I think the second piece is to counter extremism—and all 

forms of extremism. Certainly we are familiar with ISIS [Islamic 

State of Iraq and Syria] and Al Qaeda, but they are not alone in 

their extremist views. And it is not just peculiarly people who bastardize the Islamic religion; it happens in other religions and other 

ideologies as well. 

So we need to be against extremism and for political and economic freedom. How do we communicate that? Well, to begin with, 

like I said, I don’t think we have even sort of settled on that message. And then, second, once you decide what your message is, you 

have got to decide who your audience is. Who are we trying to persuade? And I think most important in that is, how do those people 

get their information? 

So, ideally, if we have an information operation going on, we 

have got a message, we have an audience, and we have delivery 

mechanisms. And what has become clear is that the delivery mechanism right now is over the internet, is social media platforms, 

whether it is Facebook or YouTube or Twitter. That is what drives 

messages out there that get to people. 

And, if nothing else, I hope that what the Russians have helped 

do is make us aware of how that works. I mean, because I think 
3 

there was an understanding that the internet was obviously a 

brand-new form of messaging here a couple decades ago, but we 

never really figured out how to use it exactly. 

The Russians figured out how to use it. They figured out how to 

say, okay, this is our message, we are going to get it on the internet and get it on there in a way that it spreads. Part of that is setting up the bots, the automatic, you know, retweeting and sending 

out of information, but, beyond that, identifying sympathetic people. So you don’t even have to do it through, sort of, fake or the 

bot approach; you simply find sympathetic people and then make 

sure you get your message to them and make sure that they spread 

it. The Russians have figured out how to weaponize the internet in 

an information campaign in a way that we did not. 

We now have a template, as they, you know—I don’t have any 

problem with imitating the Russians in terms of making use of 

these platforms. They have shown us how to do it. Now we just 

need to do it. 

But we are not committed to that. And I think the largest problem is—there is a lot of commitment in this room. I think the members of this committee, I think the Members of Congress—you 

know, I haven’t heard too many Democrats or Republicans who 

don’t completely agree with all of this. What is missing is the executive branch. And they are really rather important in this. 

The State Department, as near as I can tell, isn’t even really engaging in an information campaign. And I know the Pentagon is 

trying, but this has to be a whole-of-government approach if we are 

going to be effective at it. And I think USAID [U.S. Agency for 

International Development] and some of our development efforts 

are important in delivering this message. And we are not there. 

Now, I will just briefly touch on the sensitive topic before stopping, and that is it starts with the President. The President has 

been unwilling to do this. 

Now, we can guess at a lot of different reasons for that. It seems 

like he is really worried about admitting at how good the Russians 

are at this for fear that somehow it will taint his election. As a 

Democrat, I want to say he won, okay? I don’t question that at all, 

and really whatever any of his campaign officials were doing, what 

the Russians did matters just because they did it, even if there, you 

know, was or wasn’t any collusion. We have got to engage in that. 

We have got to get the White House to decide that this is important and to engage. 

More troubling is that the President doesn’t seem to agree with 

the first part of that message that I said, that economic and political freedom matter. 

Now, he got a lot of grief here recently for calling up President 

Putin and congratulating him on his election, which as—John 

McCain said it better than anybody. You know, the leader of the 

free world doesn’t call up, you know, a dictator and congratulate 

him on winning a sham election. But it sort of undermines the political freedom message. 

But more troubling to me was last year when the President 

called up President Erdogan in Turkey to congratulate him on the 

success of the constitutional referendum that they passed. And the 
4 

constitutional referendum that they passed was to clamp down on 

opposition, was to consolidate authoritarian power. 

So does the President of the United States even agree with the 

message that political and economic freedom are things that we are 

supposed to promote? 

And I understand it is complicated. There are times where we 

face threats. We have allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt and elsewhere that are not necessarily engaging in what we want them to. 

How do you balance that? It is difficult. 

But right now it doesn’t seem like the White House is trying to 

balance it. They seem to be perfectly content to support the authoritarian approach. That is troubling, and we need to change that. 

With that, I yield back and look forward to the testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 54.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses. 

We have General Philip Breedlove, former Commander of U.S. 

European Command and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO; 

Mr. John Garnaut, who is former senior adviser to Australian 

Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull; and Honorable Michael Lumpkin, who is a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict as well as coordinator of the 

Global Engagement Center at the U.S. State Department. 

Just because I mentioned a few formers doesn’t mean these guys 

don’t have a lot more in their bio, which was provided to all members. 

Without objection, your full written statements will be made part 

of the record, and we would be pleased to hear any opening comments each of you would like to make. 

General Breedlove, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GEN PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF (RET.), 

FORMER COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND 

General BREEDLOVE. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman 

Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and other members of the 

committee, for the opportunity to speak with you about Russian interference in democratic processes. 

The Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election 

is deeply troubling but not surprising. It is up to us as Americans 

to acknowledge the threats that Russian disinformation provides 

and to develop the effective strategies needed to combat them. 

This weaponization of information by Russia is not new, as you 

have mentioned. In fact, it dates back to the Soviet Union. In 1983, 

a pro-Soviet newspaper in India published an article accusing the 

Department of Defense of creating AIDS [acquired immunodeficiency syndrome] in an attempt to develop new biological weapons. 

In 1964, the KGB [Russian Committee for State Security] used 

similar tactics in an effort to convince the Indonesian President 

that there was a CIA plot to assassinate him. 

The primary differences between these disinformation campaigns 

and those of today is twofold. First, the internet and social media, 

as you have stated, make it so much easier to spread disinforma-
5 

tion. And, secondly, these campaigns are increasingly targeting 

first-world Western nations. 

Russia took full advantage of this new media landscape by promoting disinformation to sow discontent among Americans. It exploited divides in the American populace to promote what many 

have referred to as culture war. Surveys have shown that the U.S. 

is more polarized than it has ever been on issues such as gun control, immigration, religion, and race. 

And Russian operatives, seeing an opportunity, have purchased 

social media advertisements and created profiles in order to promote partisan instances on their issues to further widen those riffs. 

Russian advertisements and profiles did not have a consistent political position. The only consistent aspect is that they all promoted 

partisan positions on immensely divisive issues. 

The details of Russia’s interference in the election are maddening; however, the reality is that we should not be surprised by 

this interference. The Russians have interfered with numerous 

elections in Western nations recently, including those in the Netherlands, Germany, and France. 

There is increasing evidence that Russia worked to influence the 

referendum in which the U.K. [United Kingdom] decided to leave 

the European Union [EU], as recently shown in a Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee report. It has promoted anti-immigration sentiment in Europe by creating and spreading the story of ‘‘Poor 

Lisa,’’ a 13-year-old girl who, as the fallacious story goes, was abducted and raped by migrants. 

Further, we ourselves have meddled in elections in our own way, and we have to face those facts. In 1953, Allen Dulles offered $5 

million to an agent to sway the Filipino elections. In 1958, Operation Booster Shot encouraged rural Laotian farmers to vote 

against communist politicians in Laos. 

Our meddling did not end with the Cold War. In the 2006 Palestinian elections in Gaza, the United States provided economic assistance in an attempt to bolster Fatah’s chances. The reality is 

that both the United States and Russia have meddled, and we 

should not be surprised if the trend continues. 

What is astounding about Russian meddling is how brazen Russia has been in executing it, as well as the fact that Russia seems 

to believe that it can escape this with its reputation unsullied. Russia appears to be surprised by the outrage that has been seen 

throughout the U.S. The U.S. has been a leader and a pillar of 

Western democracy, and the fact that Russia believed that it could 

interfere with American elections with no response is what is 

shocking to me. 

However, Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election is merely a symptom of a larger hybrid war against the West, 

in which economic, cyber, and disinformation tactics are used in 

conjunction with conventional forces in order to exert force or pressure on an adversary. 

In February 2013, General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, gave a speech entailing 

this strategy. He claimed, ‘‘The very rules of war have changed. 

The role of nonmilitary means in achieving political and strategic 

goals has grown. In many cases, they have exceeded the power of 
6 

force of weapons in their effectiveness. The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered the direction of the broad use of political, 

economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary 

measures, applied in coordination with the protest potential of the 

population.’’ 

This has led to the coining of the term the ‘‘Gerasimov Doctrine.’’ 

This describes Russia’s view that warfare is not simply a conventional affair but one that uses the aforementioned cyber, economic, 

and information tactics. This is notable because it shows Russia acknowledges that its election meddling is a form of warfare. While 

Russia may deny that it interferes with elections or claim that it 

is innocuous, the words of General Gerasimov ring loud and clear: 

Disinformation efforts are efforts of warfare. 

The reality is that Russia is using hybrid tactics to target Western values, democratic governments, and transatlantic institutions. 

President Vladimir Putin claimed in a state of the nation address 

that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster in the 20th century. 

Russia sees the West, and in particular a unified West, as an adversary. Waging a conventional war against the West would be unfavorable to Russia. As such, it has used hybrid warfare to break 

up Western unity. 

Exploiting divisions in U.S. society and promoting a culture war 

is one key element of Moscow’s efforts to weaken the West. 

Through disinformation, it has plied differences in Europe to promote Euroscepticism and to grow the notion among the peoples of 

Europe that the EU is not beneficial. It has waged cyberattacks, 

such as the NotPetya attack in Ukraine in 2017, the Fancy Bear 

attack of German members of parliament earlier this month, or the 

numerous distributed denial-of-service attacks on the Estonian 

Government. 

It has used economic subversion to exploit the relatively smaller 

economies of neighbors to subvert political power. Russia uses its 

vast energy resources to promote the dependence of its smaller 

neighbors, working to keep them in a Russian sphere of influence 

and preventing them from turning to the West. 

The Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election 

has received an unprecedented amount of media coverage. However, we should not be so limited as to see this interference in a 

vacuum. In order to effectively combat this interference, we need 

to understand the scope of Russian hybrid warfare. We need to 

view this as a comprehensive problem that connects the dots of recent Kremlin activity. We cannot simply take a stance against a 

specific case of election interference; we must take a stance against 

Russian hybrid warfare in its entirety. 

In all the cases of Russian disinformation and election interference, the West has been slow to see it and even slower to react. 

We need to move past simply trying to formulate a reaction to interference in this election, and we need to move to a place where 

we are ready to combat hybrid warfare and get past reacting. 

Hybrid warfare is a form of warfare that the United States has 

yet to fully understand, never mind prepare for. The revelation of 

Russian disinformation in the election is a wake-up call that hybrid 

warfare is occurring, even if we are unwitting. 
7 

Simply condemning the election meddling is not going to solve 

the problem, and it is not going to prevent future Russian hybrid 

operations. We must treat this with the gravity that it deserves. 

We need to take a position, establish policy, and then execute it. 

The Russian hybrid threat is larger than the election and larger 

than the United States. It is a threat to the liberal order that the 

West has become accustomed to, and it will continue to be until we 

develop an effective strategy and implement the necessary policies 

to combat it. 

Sir, thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Breedlove can be found in 

the Appendix on page 56.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Garnaut. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN GARNAUT, FORMER SENIOR ADVISER 

TO AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER MALCOLM TURNBULL 

Mr. GARNAUT. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry and Ranking 

Member Smith, distinguished members. Thank you for having me 

along today. 

Is this microphone okay? 

The CHAIRMAN. If you could just speak directly into it, because 

it is directional, and so if it is off to the side, it doesn’t work as 

well. 

Mr. GARNAUT. Sure. Thank you. 

To understand the mechanics of China’s international influence, 

we have to look beyond the gravitational pull of the Chinese economy and the warfighting power of the People’s Liberation Army. 

That is what we usually focus on, and they are both important, 

but, to me, the more interesting and the more important space is 

in between those two poles, and that is the space of influence and 

interference. 

This is the space where the Chinese Communist Party manipulates incentives inside our countries in order to shape the conversation, manipulate perceptions, and tilt the political and strategic 

landscape to its advantage. 

The party works relentlessly to find common interests and cultivate relationships of dependency with its chosen partners. The 

modus operandi is to offer privileged access, to build personal rapport, and then to reward those who deliver. From open-source materials, we can see this happening in universities, in business communities, in ethnic Chinese diaspora communities, in media and 

entertainment, and also in politics and government itself. 

But the institutions and ideologies and the methodologies are so 

alien to our systems, we are having trouble seeing it, let alone responding to it. The party has, to use its own terms, been winning 

without fighting. 

However, under the uncompromising leadership of President Xi 

Jinping, China’s activities have become so brazen and so aggressive 

that we can’t ignore it any longer. A reevaluation is taking place 

across half a dozen democracies in the world, including the United 

States and Australia, and this conversation is now taking root in 

many other countries as well. 
8 

I have described the Australian experience in an article this 

month in Foreign Affairs magazine, which I have attached to my 

written submission. I won’t duplicate that here, but I want to underscore what I think is the most important message from the Australian experience. And that is the importance of having analytical 

clarity, of working with principles, and responding with strategy. 

Our challenge, and the challenge of democracies across the 

world, is to work with the strengths and shore up the vulnerabilities of our open, multicultural, democratic systems. We need a rigorous and principled approach that is capable of supporting a broad 

and durable consensus within countries and between countries. We 

need to conceptually separate the black, the covert, from the white 

and recognize that there is a large gray area of ambiguity and 

plausible deniability that sits in between. 

This process requires a great deal of empirical work, both in and 

outside government. But once we have the empirical baseline and 

we have worked out which activities we care about and how much 

we care, then we can start to formulate and design a surgical response that manages the risks and targets the harm without harming ourselves. 

In my view, we should continue to welcome ordinary diplomacy 

and public diplomacy and economic activity that does not come 

with strings attached. But wherever there is covert, corrupting, or 

coercive behavior, when the legitimate and transparent influence 

processes cross the line into harmful interference, then we need to 

be uncompromising, ourselves. 

Shutting down the black—the covert, the coercive, the corrupting—is primarily a counterintelligence and law enforcement 

challenge, a very big one, but it won’t be enough on its own. We 

also have to build transparency and accountability mechanisms to 

illuminate the gray. We need to reinforce and reactivate the natural antibodies of our civil societies, the natural antibodies that the 

party, the Communist Party, has been working to suppress and, in 

some cases, disable. 

In Australia, the Turnbull government has been developing a 

counter-interference strategy that is built upon the principles of 

sunlight, enforcement, deterrence, and capability. The strategy is 

country-agnostic in that it is designed to apply to any country that 

misbehaves, not just China. And the strategy includes new legislation that is targeted at both the black and the gray. 

One set of laws introduces tough but graduated criminal provisions against political interference and espionage. Another set of 

laws imposes disclosure obligations for those working in Australian 

politics on behalf of a foreign principal. This is an updated transparency regime which is loosely modeled on your Foreign Agents 

Registration Act. 

Importantly, enforcement activities are also being brought within 

a central, integrated hub. 

But this is only the very early stages of a long struggle to reinforce the integrity of our democratic processes. There is an enormous body of work that needs to be done, and I am looking forward 

to this discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Garnaut can be found in the Appendix on page 62.] 
9 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Lumpkin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND FORMER SPECIAL ENVOY AND COORDINATOR 

OF THE GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, 

and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity today to address you on the topic of state and non-state 

actor influence operations. 

I believe the Congress has correctly identified such information 

operations as an ongoing and persistent threat to U.S. national security interests. Unfortunately, based on my previous experience in 

government, I am similarly convinced that we have quite a ways 

to go before we actually get it right in order to protect and defend 

those national interests in the modern information environment. 

Since the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, which arguably was the last period in history when the U.S. successfully engaged in sustained information warfare and counter-state propaganda efforts, advances in technology have enabled instantaneous 

global communications. We are living in a hyperconnected world, 

where the flow of information moves across borders in real time 

and across traditional and social media platforms. 

The lines of authority and effort between public diplomacy, public affairs, and information warfare have blurred to the point 

where, in many cases, information is consumed by U.S. and foreign 

audiences at the same time via the same methods. 

While the means and methods of communication have transformed dramatically, most of the laws and policies governing how 

the U.S. Government responds to sophisticated operations and 

disinformation campaigns by foreign adversaries have remained 

largely unchanged. It is true there has been some tinkering, there 

has been some tweaking, but nothing substantive or transformational. Simply put, our institutions have not kept pace with 

the evolving threats. 

Antiquated bureaucratic structures and traditional lines of authority remain a significant impediment to progress. To date, there 

is not a single individual in the United States Government below 

the President of the United States who is responsible for managing 

U.S. information dissemination and providing strategic guidance 

for how to confront our adversaries in the information environment. 

While the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act mandated 

that the Global Engagement Center, or GEC, lead, organize, and 

synchronize U.S. Government counter-propaganda and disinformation efforts against state and non-state actors abroad, it failed to 

elevate the head of the GEC to a position of authority commensurate with its expansive mission. 

The GEC operates at the assistant-secretary level and lacks the 

necessary authority to direct the interagency. In practice, this 

means that the GEC is considered, at best, a peer to a half-dozen 
10 

regional or functional bureaus at the State Department and numerous disparate organizations at the Department of Defense. Needless to say, the other departments have equity stakes in this space 

as well. 

Simply put, although the GEC is directed by law with the mission to lead interagency, the practical reality is that its role is reduced to simply suggesting function, which agencies can choose to 

follow or not to follow as they see fit. The result is a significant 

misalignment of responsibility, authority, and accountability which 

will continue until this is changed in statute. 

It is not unreasonable to think that the U.S. will always be at 

some disadvantage against our adversaries in the information environment. We are a nation of laws, where truth and ethics are expected, and rightly so. Our enemies, however, aren’t facing the 

same constraints. Our adversaries, both state and non-state actors, 

can and will continue to bombard all forms of communication with 

their messages in attempts to influence public perception, create 

doubt of our actions or intentions, and recruit people to their cause. 

We must ensure that we organize U.S. Government efforts in 

such a manner that maximizes desired outcomes through discipline, agility, and innovation. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lumpkin can be found in the Appendix on page 76.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I will just mention that a number of members of this committee 

are also members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. And looking at 

the issue that you mentioned about the appropriate level of the director of the Global Engagement Center is something, I think, that 

a number of members probably should look at on both committees 

because it is their jurisdiction. 

I think a lot of the questions that you all are going to get are 

going to be about what we do, but I want to just take a moment 

to shine a little brighter light on what is happening, because I 

think understanding is really critical as a first step. 

A lot of attention, as we all know, to what happened in the 2016 

election. And so there are recommendations, even this week, about 

shoring up our electoral process. 

I don’t think there has been as much attention devoted to these 

other countries trying to influence our decisions. And I mentioned, 

as did General Breedlove, some of these efforts in the past, to prevent us from deploying the Pershing II and the GLCMs [ground 

launched cruise missiles] in the 1980s or the neutron bomb in the 

1970s, that they are continuing to be involved—have been involved 

historically in trying to make sure that we didn’t make national security decisions that would run counter to their interests. 

And so that is the reason, when I think about the Nuclear Posture Review, or various other funding decisions that this committee 

has to make, I worry about those attempts continuing but us not 

recognizing it. 

General Breedlove, could you elaborate just a little bit, because 

you have been on the front lines of this, about, in your case especially, the Russian attempt to not just influence our elections but 
11 

influence the political decisions we make, especially in the area of 

national security? 

And then, Mr. Garnaut, if you could help us think about the 

ways the Chinese are attempting to influence not just our elections 

or our perception of them but the decisions we make that affect national security. 

General Breedlove. 

General BREEDLOVE. Thank you, Chairman. 

And I completely agree with the statement before your question. 

I would point out, for instance, what happened when Russia first 

went into Crimea and then into the Donbass. Russia clearly had 

a very localized overmatch when it came to military forces, but if 

all of NATO awakened, it could rapidly have changed. And so what 

we saw was a campaign that started immediately with very bellicose talk, to include what I have called in this room before loose 

talk about nukes, in order to try to influence the decisions of the 

West about how they would respond to what was going on. 

So, very broadly, in cases like the Ukraine, they have tried to influence us. And I would also say that some of the actions early in 

Syria are of the same ilk. The long-range shots out of the Caspian 

Sea into Syria had very, very little tactical effect, and I think they 

were mainly taken to show the West, ‘‘Look, we can range your 

capitals from the Caspian Sea. Don’t mess with us.’’ 

And so I think in every case, as we look at application of Russian 

capabilities, we need to have our eyes open to a broader message, 

because they are trying to, as you said, Chairman, influence our 

decisions in these spheres. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Garnaut. 

Mr. GARNAUT. Yeah, there are lots of parallels between Russia 

and China. They are fascinating, and sometimes they are illuminating. 

One of the parallels is the effort to fragment alliance systems. 

So, certainly in Australia and elsewhere, there is a huge amount 

of effort to weaken the commitment of allies to the United States 

and to each other. 

And part of that, I think, is quite a sophisticated messaging system which is kind of inconsistent when all together but you can see 

how it works. And one is the message that China is inherently and 

possibly uniquely peaceful; you don’t need to set up your armed 

forces because they are peaceful. That is it. 

Two, the second message is that China’s rise is inexorable. So, 

even if you don’t like it, there is nothing you can do. Resistance is 

futile. 

The third message, which is contradictory to the first but it 

comes out from different channels, back channels, and is really important when targeted at certain times, is that, actually, China is 

really dangerous, and it is ruthless, and if you get in the way, it 

is going to really hurt. 

And so it is this orchestra of messages which has worked to manipulate the public opinion, elite opinion backdrop and the mental 

wallpaper of decisionmakers as they are making decisions about 

their own force capabilities and build-up and the commitment to 

the U.S. alliance system and other security partners. 
12 

The CHAIRMAN. That is helpful. Thank you. 

Let me yield to Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I will go where the chairman suggested. What could we be 

doing better? Or, put differently, if you were to say, ‘‘Here is the 

plan,’’ and you could walk over and be God for the moment in the 

White House in terms of how we do a better job of countering all 

of this very aggressive messaging that the Russians, the Chinese, 

and the extremists are pushing, how would you organize that as a 

starting point? Who in our government plays the most important 

role? White House? You know, NSC [National Security Council]? 

Pentagon? State Department? What would the team look like? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, so let me take the first stab 

at it. And I may or may not actually hit what you are shooting at, 

but I want to offer that we are here sort of talking about the information piece of this conflict that we are in. And I think, first and 

foremost, we need to recognize that we are actually in a conflict. 

The second thing I would offer in how to organize our response 

is to understand that our opponent is broadly attacking us. I use 

that very simple model, DIME—diplomatic, informational, military, 

and economic—to describe a nation’s power. There are much more 

sophisticated models, but for a fighter pilot that works. 

And what we see is our opponent is attacking us diplomatically 

at the values that we have and our legitimacy in the West. It is 

attacking us, as we have talked about in this committee, in the information space in incredible ways. In Europe, Russia is now using 

force again to change internationally recognized borders. And then 

Russia, as we talked about, is using its economic sphere to influence pricing and availability of fuel to nations that need it. So—— 

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry, but that is not what I asked. It is all very 

helpful, but we have heard that. What would the team look like? 

I mean, if I can just give you an analogy—— 

General BREEDLOVE. Sure. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. That I think worked for us. After 9/11, 

General McChrystal kind of led the notion that we are being attacked by a network, and it takes a network to beat a network. 

So, A, we went to an elaborate effort to understand what that 

network was that was attacking us, and then we built our own network. And all over the world, every morning, all the different 

pieces of that—and I won’t get into all the different pieces of it— 

got together at 7:00 a.m. east coast time and said, how are we 

doing, what is going on here, what is going on there, what piece 

of it do you have, FBI, whoever. 

You know, I think we need that type of comprehensive approach. 

And I just want, what is the first step? What is the building block 

to build that counter-narrative? 

General BREEDLOVE. Slow to get to my conclusion, which was we 

have to have an all-of-government response, and that has to be led 

somewhere, either an empowered GEC to bring all of government 

together or an entity in the NSC to bring all of government together. But we need to respond in an all-of-government way. 

Mr. SMITH. And right now it is fair to say nobody is in charge, 

right? There are some people doing a few things here and there, 
13 

but there is no person who is like, I get up this morning, my job 

is to counter this information campaign? 

General BREEDLOVE. I think that is correct. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. And, sir, if I could add—— 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Mr. LUMPKIN [continuing]. I kind of think of the information 

space as we have an orchestra; what we don’t have is a conductor. 

And we need to have a single person that is held accountable for 

U.S. Government information efforts. 

Mr. SMITH. Just quickly on that piece, since there are kind of, 

like—there are several different pieces here. One, obviously, is the, 

you know, Russia—well, there is Russia and their efforts to undermine democracy and freedom. There is China and their efforts to 

do the same. There are the violent extremist groups that we are 

trying to counter. And then there is what the chairman mentioned, 

is the collective effort to, you know, interfere in our politics, not 

just in the elections but in our decision-making process. 

Is it possible, do you think, to wrap all of that into one thing and 

say, ‘‘Okay, you are in charge, here is the information warfare, you 

have got to cover it all’’? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think what we have done as a nation correctly 

is we created the Director of National Intelligence to get 17 intelligence agencies together kind of marching in the same line. 

And they also advocate for budgets, resourcing, legislation, people. I mean, again, I always can tell people’s priorities by where 

you put your resources, your people, money, and your time. 

And I would offer that we don’t have a whole-of-government approach to this. When I took over the GEC, we had a $5.6 million 

base budget. 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah. Thank you. 

Mr. GARNAUT. If I could add just to that, from the China angle, 

they are very good at playing off the different silos of our systems 

against each other. 

So if I can only underscore what General Breedlove was saying 

about the importance of elevating this issue and making it very 

clear the strategic importance of this issue, and then decisions 

flowing down to each part of our system, rather than the individual 

bureaucracies and agencies coming up with their own solutions and 

trying to sort of horse trade at the top. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Chairman. 

Our Intel Committee will release tomorrow, we think, our findings and recommendations of what we thought the Russians did or 

didn’t do pertaining to our elections and the systems that we have 

in place, the voter registration and the tallying systems. All those 

kind of things are a little more mechanical. 

The real fight is, as the chairman may have said and General 

Breedlove said, is between the ears of Americans, and how do you 

protect. Jefferson wrote extensively about how valuable an educated public is to the preservation of democracy. 
14 

And I am looking right now at RT America—RT, Russia Today— 

which is a Putin tool to propagandize in America. And Jesse Ventura has a show on there, Ed Schultz has a show on there, Larry 

King has a show on there. I assume they know who they are working for, but the American people may not. 

So we, how do we—and this is more just a statement than a 

question, but the real issue for us is how do we make sure that 

Americans aren’t improperly influenced? In a free society with a 

free press where anybody can get access to these channels, how do 

we make sure Americans understand who they are listening to, 

who they are being influenced by? 

Because at the end of the day, Putin’s real issue was, can I get 

somebody to vote differently than they would otherwise have voted 

had I not engaged in this fight? 

And that is, you know, probably not an Armed Services Committee circumstance, but helping the American people understand 

where the risks are, looking at—you know, like, RT, you pull it up, 

it looks like it is a regular, legitimate American news source, when 

the truth of the matter is at its core is a Putin-driven propaganda 

machine. 

Just a statement, Mr. Chairman. I don’t have much of a question 

in that regard, because, really, this issue is more how do we make 

sure Americans, when they go to the polls, have in mind the right 

person to vote for, or against, based on legitimate sources. 

So if any of the three have a comment in that regard, I would 

be happy to listen to you. 

All right. I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to all of you for being here. I really appreciate 

your remarks. I think we all do. 

You have talked, and certainly Mr. Lumpkin, you have talked 

about the Global Engagement Center and you have talked about 

the need for a conductor. But where is the executive in this? How 

important would the executive be to an elevated and empowered 

GEC? And could it actually not be that important if it wasn’t seen 

as critical to the country? 

Where does it stand? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Well, I mean, I kind of scratch my head sometimes, wondering, you know, where is the executive right now in 

this process. 

I mean, I think what we see is the—I mean, information operations are military operations, just—you know, information operations to support, you know, military objectives. 

We have the public affairs team out there, you know, messaging 

to the American population. We have the State Department, who 

is focusing on the public diplomacy, which is influencing populations abroad. The gaps and seams in those are massive. 

And not only do you have the gaps and seams between them, but 

you have the hyper-connected world where what goes on in the 

public affairs is reached near simultaneously internationally. What 

happens in country X affects—it hits the American populations. 
15 

So the world has changed on how we can consume, manage information and what flows where, but our silos are still there. Our 

silos still exist. 

And this committee, in conjunction with their counterparts in the 

Senate, have done some tremendous work in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. In fact, it took the Armed Services Committee to legislate in the State Department on how they manage 

information, because it wasn’t getting done. 

So I do think it starts here, to get the executive going in the 

right direction. But I think it is time to do a holistic look as far 

as how we manage information. It may be time for, you know, a 

control-alt-delete and look at new ways to do business. And I think 

elevating the GEC or a GEC-like element may be the right course 

of action. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. 

General, did you want to respond—— 

General BREEDLOVE. Just—— 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. On where do we start? 

General BREEDLOVE [continuing]. A small add-on. 

I really liked the words Mr. Garnaut used. This should be a topdown-driven thing. It doesn’t have to be the executive, but if it is 

not the executive, then the executive needs to empower someone 

below them, give them authority, responsibility, and accountability 

for the mission and then tell them to move out. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Mr. Garnaut, did you want to respond? 

Mr. GARNAUT. No, I won’t add to that. 

Mrs. DAVIS. All right. Great. Thank you. 

As you know, the whole-of-government approach that we tried to 

work with after 9/11 was—how do you think that that was transformative on some levels? What did we accomplish—why did we accomplish that and not accomplish other things? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think it is, first of all, there was an immediate 

call to action because of the event that happened, because the horrific nature of what 9/11 did to the psyche of the American people, 

as well as physically damaging and hurting families and the American people writ large. 

Until we have that—I have learned that policy generally doesn’t 

make itself. You need a forcing function. I would like to think that 

people are awake enough, based on what has happened and what 

is happening in the information environment, that it is time to do 

something about it before something horrific does happen. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. 

I am thinking also about our relationships with our NATO partners. And, certainly, General Breedlove, you were very involved 

with NATO. We know that, in many ways, it is really our Western—Western nations are strong, but that also makes us susceptible, because of our institutions. 

How do you think we do address these issues with our partners 

without compromising those values? 

General BREEDLOVE. So let me agree, Congresswoman, with 

something you said which is important. And sometimes our 

strengths, which are our freedoms and our values, make us vulnerable. We are not accountable to the truth in the way we operate 
16 

in these public spaces, where—or, we are accountable to the truth 

in these public spaces, while our enemies are not. 

And so I am not in favor of stooping to the wrong type of tactics 

in reply and compromising our strengths. And that is what I see 

in NATO as well. Western democracies, Western values, Western 

institutions are one of the first targets of these kind of efforts coming from our opponents. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank each of you for being here today. We appreciate you 

highlighting such important issues that have been a great concern 

of the committee over years. 

One issue in particular that I recognize is working on China’s ongoing influence campaign through the establishment of Confucius 

Institutes across the United States. 

Currently—and this is a question for each of you—there are 103 

active Confucius Institutes that were described in 2009 by Li 

Changchun, the head of propaganda for the Chinese Communist 

Party, as, quote, ‘‘an important part of China’s overseas propaganda setup,’’ end of quote. 

It is for this reason that yesterday I introduced legislation, H.R. 

5336, the Foreign Influence Transparency Act, which would require 

transparency of these institutes through modifying the Foreign 

Agents Registration Act for disclosure. 

Do you believe it is appropriate to require organizations like the 

Confucius Institutes to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act? 

And, additionally, it has been 23 years since the Foreign Agents 

Registration Act, FARA, has been last updated. What recommendations would you give to the committee on how it should be changed 

to deal with Confucius Institutes or other influence operations that 

you have discussed today? 

Mr. GARNAUT. Well, thank you. And I did note those reports with 

interest. 

Now, Australia has had a close look at your FARA legislation. 

We didn’t have any before, so we are coming from a standing start. 

And I think what we have tried to do in Australia is to broaden 

the definitions a little bit to account for the fact that a lot of foreign 

interference is indirect. You know, FARA tends to be focusing on 

a more contractual relationship, so you need to have some broader 

definitions. 

And I think that the direction you have taken with that draft 

legislation is very encouraging. And leaving aside whether or not 

the Confucius Institutes themselves should be registered, I think 

that is the right direction. 

Because what they do is partly propaganda, but I think even 

more important is their connection to the United Fronts Work Department system. And that is that, you know, they can potentially 

be used, or we need to stop them being used, as a platform within 

universities for influencing decision making in universities, as well 

as having an element of propaganda in itself. 
17 

I think your expansion of the FARA legislation is certainly a very 

encouraging thought. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I absolutely agree. I think we need to look at the 

definitions within the FARA to see what is included and what is 

not and maybe take a fresh look at them. But the legislation at 

first glance looks really, really good, so I am pleased you did that. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

General. 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, just to save your time, I would just 

completely align myself with the concept of transparency. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank each of you for that. 

And, Mr. Lumpkin, given your previous experience as Special 

Envoy and Coordinator for the Global Engagement Center, could 

you inform the committee as to ways in which this committee can 

support their mission, whether it be increased authority, funding, 

or coordination with SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] 

in their counterpropaganda efforts? Do you believe more can be 

done to ensure their success? As I believe their mission is absolutely critical. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I do. Thank you. 

I think one of the pieces, as I mentioned, is that they need to be 

fully empowered to effectively execute across the interagency, to include USSOCOM as one of the combatant commands. 

I additionally believe they need to be resourced, not only with 

money but with people and with leadership. Since my departure in 

2017, there has been an Acting Special Envoy, and I would like to 

see somebody permanently put into that place to guide that institution. 

But I do think that one of the key pieces is to elevate them to 

the point where they can have a compelling and effective voice. I 

think the other piece the committee could do is—hearings always 

assist in transparency, so I think that hearings on subjects like 

this one go a long way in moving forward. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

And, General Breedlove, the Governments of the U.K., U.S., 

France, and Germany have recognized the use of the nerve agent 

Novichok as an offensive use of weapons. 

Do you believe that the use constitutes an act of war? If so, what 

should the U.K. or allies do to reciprocate? 

General BREEDLOVE. Thank you for the question. 

And I quickly found, when I was the head of NATO, I couldn’t 

determine what was an act of war. The NACC [North Atlantic Cooperation Council] got to do that. But I would definitely construe 

it as a warlike action on a friendly soil. 

And I think that the more surprising piece of this is, again, how 

brazenly and how open these actions were. And I think that we 

have seen actions like this in our own capital in the past, and so 

these are concerning. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you all. 

The CHAIRMAN. Just briefly, on the funding for the Global En- gagement Center, Mr. Lumpkin had mentioned $5 million previously. As I understand, in the omnibus there is the authority to 
18 

transfer up to $60 million of DOD [Department of Defense] money 

for specific projects in the Global Engagement Center, and then, of 

course, what State Department puts in. So just to let everybody 

know, again, it is—DOD money can be transferred as well as the 

State money. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Garnaut, first off, congratulations on winning the Brownlow 

Award in 1993 as the best and fairest player in the Australian 

Football League. Having grown up watching the early days of 

ESPN and a lot of Australian football, I didn’t know there was a 

fair way to play it, and I am glad to know that there is. So congratulations. 

And for you, as well, because of your experience in Australia, one 

of the concerns I have about how we are approaching the relationship with China is that we have a defensive playbook and not an 

offensive one. We are not filling gaps that China is filling, where 

we can fill those gaps. And one of them has to do with the Confucius Institutes issue. 

And I am wondering—I think another way to approach the Confucius Institutes is to actually identify these universities and 

maybe expand Federal funding for Chinese language and Chinese 

culture for students so that they don’t have to outsource that activity to Confucius Institutes. 

And I am wondering in Australia what you are doing, since you 

mentioned in your testimony that universities, I think, need new 

processes and transparency to deal with Chinese influence on campuses. How are you approaching that there? 

Mr. GARNAUT. Well, you have hit upon a key vulnerability here. 

China is really filling—providing a service that we are failing to 

provide, and that is China capability—linguistic capability, understanding of Chinese contemporary politics and history. So the Confucius Institutes have found a kind of, you know, great black hole 

that they can fill. 

So, yes, we do need to work hard on rebuilding our China capability—I think that applies to the United States as well as Australia—at universities. 

I would just flag one thing about the Confucius Institutes, which 

is at least we know about them and people are talking about them. 

And, in a way, that degree of transparency goes a long way to curing the problem. What I am personally more concerned about is 

things that, you know, don’t have a big flag over their building. So 

we see other institutes and research institutes performing similar 

functions but without the attention, and I think that is where we 

need to pay a lot more attention. 

But transparency is absolutely key. I think we are unanimous on 

this panel. Inside universities, I can think of a couple things to do. 

And, you know, in many cases, it is up to the universities themselves, but I think there is a lot more room for transparency about 

the sources of funding, particularly donations. We should be honest 

about the political connections of money that comes. We should 

have more transparency about who is funding research projects— 

who exactly is funding research projects and, also, who is funding 

trips to China. You know, the junket trade is rife. We just need 
19 

to—we don’t want to stop it, but we need to flag it when it is happening. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. Great. 

And I want to follow up on the point you made about consistency 

and really giving that message from the top down. 

So, here in the U.S., we have just—one agency has concluded 

that the Belt/Road initiative [BRI] is a tool of domination for the 

Chinese, while another Federal agency is actively trying to find 

ways for U.S. businesses to participate in Belt/Road projects. That 

seems to be, to me, inconsistent. And we can decide which one we 

ought to choose, but it is just flat-out inconsistent. 

Again, thinking about going on offense—and maybe Australia 

has looked at this question—what can the U.S. do to compete or 

at least have a presence in those places where China’s BRI has a 

presence, as opposed to just saying we are going to try to ignore 

it, put on blinders, think it doesn’t exist, but actually have a presence in these same places where BRI is being implemented? 

Mr. GARNAUT. Yeah. The policy responses to BRI have been disjointed all around the world. And, typically, economic agencies will 

support it—you know, they see the idea of building things and 

making things to be a good thing—and security agencies don’t. And 

often it is a very messy, unmediated response that happens. We see 

that from a lot of countries around the world. 

So, yes, that does highlight the central importance of elevating 

China and Russia policy to a higher level and pushing down the 

objectives and the strategies. 

With BRI, obviously, again, they filled a vacuum. You know, if 

we are, between us, no longer supporting development in the way 

that we used to in my part of the world, in Southeast Asia and the 

Pacific, well, it provides opportunities for others. 

So I think that there is opportunity to do more there but, also, 

really to focus again on transparency. Because if we can just empower civil societies to do a better job, to do more of what they are 

doing—local communities, local media, local journalists—sunshine 

will cure a lot of the harm that we are worried about. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you very much. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having 

this important hearing. 

And I am going to make an editorial comment real quickly before 

I ask my question of the witnesses. And that is, no matter what 

the President does or doesn’t do, he is going to be criticized. If he 

doesn’t congratulate Putin, some people would say he is not reaching out, he is going it alone, et cetera, et cetera. So I just want to 

defend the President by saying it is important to take some of the 

criticism with a grain of salt. 

Okay. To my questions of the panel. 

You have already been asked about China, and you have talked 

a lot about that. I want to follow through a little more on that. 

What happens to democratic institutions in the United States and 

in Australia if we don’t push back on the kind of influence that 

they are trying to exert on our political institutions as a democracy? 
20 

Mr. GARNAUT. I might have first crack at that. 

Well, you lose control of the debate. 

So, in China’s case, one of the things that we have just failed to 

recognize and failed to address for decades, and it has allowed the 

problem to fester, is the extent to which China or the Chinese 

Communist Party has been able to co-opt friendly voices in the Chinese community, the Chinese media in our countries, and to coerce 

and intimidate others out of participating in the debate. So it rewards and nurtures favorable conversations and shuts down others. 

So we really need to go and protect people and provide safe 

spaces for people to have their freedom of expression, which the 

rest of us have taken for granted. And now we are seeing that 

modus operandi spread out of the Chinese communities into the 

mainstream. And so we are seeing major efforts by China to intimidate publishers, journalists out of participating in the conversation 

and to reward others. You know, they help you succeed. They find 

a favorable sympathizer, and they help you succeed. 

We need to balance that. We need to protect people who have 

been coerced and threatened, and, where necessary, we need to create safe spaces to have these conversations. At universities, you are 

untainted by political money from overseas. In the Chinese diaspora, we need to create or help or reinforce independent media 

platforms, because at the moment they are being completed 

drowned out. We are losing—literally losing sovereignty over the 

public discussion places in our countries. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. In addition to losing control of the narrative, you 

lose the audience. You lose that audience to connect with not on 

just that issue but other issues. 

The attention span for many people is very short. That is why 

social media platforms, the early—you know, 140 characters. You 

can captivate and actually change and influence people. But what 

we don’t want to do is cede this space to our adversaries and lose 

access to the audience. 

General BREEDLOVE. So, sir, I would just echo that by saying, in 

military terms, we have to take the field. If the only voice in the 

fight is that attacking our democratic institutions, then that is all 

that the people will hear, and we will be diminished. We have to 

purpose to take the field. 

Mr. LAMBORN. We have talked a lot about information campaigns 

by the U.S. and how that is important. But sanctions in other 

human rights arenas has been very effective. The Russians vehemently reacted against the, if I say this correctly, the Magnitsky 

sanctions when that law was passed by Congress and signed by 

President Obama, which shows that we hit a nerve. It was effective 

and continues to be effective. 

Do sanctions on high-placed officials in Russia and China have 

a place to play in this campaign that we are waging? 

General BREEDLOVE. I have been outspoken on this a little bit, 

so let me take the first shot. 

Of course our sanctions have helped, and they are effective in 

many ways. But if the only tool we use are sanctions and if they 

are always under sanctions, they become the new normal and they 

begin to diminish in effect. And the longer they are in effect, the 
21 

longer they have to find out ways around them, through shell companies and other things that are happening. 

So that is why I advocate, as I did in my opening speech, we 

need a more all-of-government response. We need to look into the 

other silos where they are using tools against us and also open up 

our thoughts and imagination there. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. And if I can, we are not going to message our way 

to—it is not a panacea. We are not going to sanction our way to 

get where we need. We are not going to kill our way. It is about 

having a layered approach in our national policies to ensure that, 

from a security perspective, the American people are safe. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the panelists for being here today. 

General, this question is for you. There is a saying that the best 

defense is a good offense. This is an adage that has been applied 

to many fields of endeavor, including sports and combat. I recognize that this strategic offensive principle of war might not be applicable to our nuclear defense strategy, but when it comes to our 

cyber strategy and our information operations, shouldn’t this principle be applied? And, really, the question is, are we doing enough 

offensively? 

I recently visited Latvia and Estonia and Ukraine, had an opportunity to speak with U.S. and partner officials, both military and 

nonmilitary. And I couldn’t help but walk away, you know, with 

the perception that we are just not doing enough offensively. 

Can you comment? 

General BREEDLOVE. We like to say as a fighter pilot, ‘‘The best 

defense is your missile on the way to your enemy.’’ 

So, sir, in short, I don’t think we are doing enough. We have sort 

of ceded the offense. We are under attack. Now, we have to take 

a more offensive reply, is the way I would offer it. 

And it goes back to the answer I had for the other Congressman, 

and that is that, especially in the information space, we truly have 

not taken the field yet. And we don’t have to disinform, but I believe there are a lot of truths about Western institutions and values that we can use in a more offensive way. 

Mr. GARNAUT. Look, I might take a slightly different angle on 

this. I think, especially in relation to China, we underestimate the 

amount of defensive work we have got to do. And so I think offense 

is a terrific conversation, but I would first want to make sure that 

we have actually begun our resilient strategy at home. Because if 

we don’t have that foundation, we can’t get very far. So it is just 

a sequencing issue for me. 

Mr. BROWN. And then let me follow up with you. Is it ‘‘Garnaut’’? 

Mr. GARNAUT. ‘‘Garnaut.’’ 

Mr. BROWN. Okay. Thank you. I want to follow up not on this 

question or your answer to this question but your response to Mr. 

Larsen about the Confucius Institutes. And we have one at the 

University of Maryland. They are basically—they are springing up 

all over the country and the world. 

Just last month, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] director testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that the Chi-
22 

nese Government uses these nontraditional collectors, like the Confucius Institutes, to exploit the open research and development of 

the U.S. and serve as outposts—now, I am paraphrasing—of Chinese overseas intelligence networks. 

You suggested that, you know, with the Confucius Institutes, as 

long as you know that they are there—transparency and accountability. My concern is that, number one, they are paid for by a government that has a modus operandi of influencing private-sector, 

nonprofit, and academic institutions to promote its policies and its 

objectives. And, number two, how do you police, you know, so many 

universities and campuses around the world? 

So I guess my question is, what about a set of standards that 

would be applicable? And maybe even reporting? And how do you 

balance that particularly with Confucius Institutes on a college 

campus, where we invite freedom of expression? 

Mr. GARNAUT. I couldn’t agree more about the need for standards. There are some pretty basic standards that often get buried 

in the top drawer when it comes to Confucius Institutes. For example, I don’t understand the need for secrecy around the contractual 

arrangements that are often set up. Of course, they should be 

transparent, they should be on the website. 

I don’t see why Confucius Institutes, unlike almost any other 

similar foreign cultural organization, needs to imbed itself in universities. So, going forward, I would encourage university administrators to keep them at arm’s length. 

And where we see problems with Confucius Institutes, it is almost always because universities have failed to impose, you know, 

even the most basic accountability. And you see the institute kind 

of moving or seeping into decision making elsewhere in the university. So if you tightened up management and you improved accountability, you would go a long way. 

But I would just add that there has been such conversations, 

there has been such attention on the Confucius Institutes, I 

wouldn’t want that to distract us from all the other stuff which is 

more difficult to see, we have got to work harder to see. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Panelists, thank you so much for joining us today. 

Mr. Garnaut, I wanted to begin with focusing on the Chinese 

One Belt, One Road initiative and the things that they are doing 

to make infrastructure investments in places like Sri Lanka, where 

they are developing a port there, and in Djibouti, where they built 

a military base. 

What we are seeing is investment that is being guised as economic, that has definite strategic implications. And all you have to 

do is to talk about neighbors in the area. India and others feel 

very, very differently about the intentions of those efforts by China. 

Can you give me your perspective from your—in your testimony, 

you said that some of these efforts are about winning without fighting, so essentially winning by other means. And that is creating 

strategic blocks to, I think, take away the ability for other countries to do certain things and therefore take away their capability. 
23 

And how do these types of what really are influence operations 

by China, how do they play into this strategy of winning without 

fighting? And can these activities be seen as tipping points for sites 

and other activities around the world that may include further expansions in these areas under the guise of economics for these particular nations? 

Mr. GARNAUT. Look, I think the example of Djibouti has been instructive to all of us—and Sri Lanka. Too often we are seeing that 

things that were advertised as just pure economic investments in 

infrastructure have ended up being used in this process of debttrap diplomacy—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yeah. 

Mr. GARNAUT [continuing]. To kind of change a leasehold into 

freehold ownership of crucial infrastructure. 

So there is a real problem there. The information is now in; it 

is no longer an abstract, hypothetical process. And it is much harder for developing countries to tackle this than robust democracies, 

because it is easier for the elite to be bought off and to actually sell 

out their national interests without the same degree of accountability. 

So the pattern now is pretty striking. Those two examples that 

you mentioned—you could have mentioned a couple of others, including Pakistan—where, you know, the countries should never 

have signed up to that degree of debt, and it gives China enormous 

leverage, which it can use for strategic purposes. So, yes, we are 

all on notice that this is a problem. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Garnaut. 

General Breedlove, the United States military, I think, has made 

a lot of advances along the lines of cyber issues, establishing some 

centers for excellence, especially the NATO Cyber Center for Excellence. And Estonia has been a great example about how those 

things have progressed. And, obviously, your time there with 

NATO and with EUCOM, you know, was a great part of that. 

But it seems like, though, on many of the other less-definitive 

issues, the U.S. is lagging behind somewhat. And I wanted to get 

your take on what are the necessary steps going forward for the 

U.S. to do more to protect its data, and not just data in a defense 

system but also data on the commercial side; to safeguard the 

American system from dirty money, that money that kind of makes 

its way through and undermines efforts for us to guard information 

and to keep a strategic superiority place for us; and, also, to restrict the influence that nations like China are having over our 

universities? 

Mr. Garnaut spoke a little bit about these Confucius Institutes, 

but it is more than just the Confucius Institutes. That is one element of it, but there is a lot of other, more clandestine efforts that 

are going on there to have influence but also to gain intellectual 

capacity back to China. 

So I wanted to get your perspective there on those issues. 

General BREEDLOVE. Thanks for the question, sir. 

And I would just disqualify myself about talking about the dirty 

money. I think that the answer there is what we have talked about 

a couple of times: transparency in business practices and standards. And that is about as far as I can go on the economic front. 
24 

I think you really hit the nail on the head when you mentioned 

the exfil [exfiltration] of commercial data. One of our past DNIs 

[Directors of National Intelligence] said that we have had terabytes—terabytes—of proprietary data about our most advanced 

systems that have been exfil’ed from our commercial entities. 

And so I think we need to recognize that that is a strategic problem for the United States, to include its military. And then we 

probably need to rally around those who are struggling. And I 

think, in general, we look to our commercial entities to do it on 

their own. And so I would advocate for sort of increased collusion 

on how we defend these very important and valuable things. 

And on the restricting influence on universities, again, we run up 

against those things we value, which are freedoms of expression 

and so forth. But I think Mr. Garnaut hit it right on the head: 

Having some standards and setting expectations before is really 

important. And that then empowers the universities to not be seen 

as an ogre in the business, and they can adhere to those standards 

and expectations. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Panetta. 

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, good morning. Thank you for being here. 

Mr. Garnaut, kind of going a little bit more into what you were 

just talking about, I realize that we have talked a lot about our 

country’s offensive and defensive capabilities. Talk to me about 

other countries’ offensive capabilities and our coordination with 

those other countries, if you can. How is that? How are we at that 

point? 

Mr. GARNAUT. Well, we are not. So this is the very early stages 

of a long, long conversation. 

So the answer is that, you know, it only seems like yesterday we 

were all woken up to the defensive piece. And I think there are 

many countries, you know, in this game that are actually actively 

working out the offensive piece, let alone coordinating between 

each other. 

So the answer is it is all to be done. 

Mr. PANETTA. Please. 

General BREEDLOVE. I would just point out some exercise experience, not real-world experience. 

In an alliance with multiple nations, each nation brings different 

levels of restrictions to its use of offensive power. And sometimes 

in these scenarios, again, in exercises, we find that while one government will not approve something, another might use their tool. 

And so commanders, who have to deal with alliances, have to understand the ability to do bilateral work inside of an alliance to use 

tools that may not come to the front. 

And I would just say one more time, a third time: In exercises 

we have looked at this. 

Mr. PANETTA. Understood. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. And I do have one real-world example of where 

this coordination has happened, and that is the counter-ISIS mission among the coalition. 
25 

The messaging piece—there was a strategic communications 

messaging group that worked hand-in-glove together because of authorities of different countries’ understanding of specific audiences, 

where we could synchronize and coordinate the messaging to make 

sure we hit the right message to the right audience at the right 

time with voices that would resonate. 

Mr. GARNAUT. Let me stand corrected. On ISIS, that is right. 

There is a lot of work to be doing in actually emulating the work 

we have already done on ISIS, including working together. 

Mr. PANETTA. But it appears that all of you would agree that, 

when it comes to these revisionist countries and their guerilla geopolitics, there is not really a coordination amongst the other nations in pushing back on them. 

General BREEDLOVE. NATO is beginning to have those conversations. 

Mr. PANETTA. Great. 

General BREEDLOVE. I have been out of NATO for a little while 

now, so I can’t speak for their most recent conversations. 

Mr. PANETTA. Great. Great. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In U.S. campaign finance laws, we have provisions whereby if 

someone wants to do political ads on radio or TV, they have to disclose who they are, who the organization is. We have never updated those laws to reflect social media platforms. Do you think 

that that transparency would serve the American people well? 

I am wondering if you all might comment on that, starting with 

you, General. 

General BREEDLOVE. Absolutely. It is a really short answer. But, 

clearly, we did not understand what has happened in our past in 

this, and we need to be a lot better at it in the future. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think there is something ‘‘there’’ there with that. 

But I also think that there should be some sort of credibility rating 

on the veracity, not just who is paying for it, but is it true, is it 

not true. And I don’t know if it is—you know, historically, you get 

five stars because your truth over time for 20 years is, you know, 

at the top 1 percent, or however it works. But I think we need 

some sort of veracity scale to see that what is actually coming out 

is true and accurate. 

Mr. GARNAUT. And if I could add, on China, so China doesn’t yet 

work the English language social media in the same way that Russia does. Maybe it is learning; maybe this is all to come. 

But where we’ve really got a problem is in the Chinese-language 

social media systems and channels. So the fact that China has been 

successfully able to block out the big American platforms—the 

Facebooks, the Twitters, et cetera—has given it a near monopoly 

of Chinese-language social media, and it follows the diaspora 

abroad. 

And so we have actually lost—you know, these messages that are 

going to most Chinese-language social media users in Australia 

and the United States are filtered through Beijing, so we have ac-
26 

tually lost the delivery mechanism. So it is well beyond just tagging that there is some government involvement in the message; it 

is filtered and delivered and created by a Beijing-sponsored platform. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

General Breedlove, as a former U.S. commander for European 

Command, you had mentioned in recent testimony—in prior testimony about the Russian attack against its former spy and his 

daughter as not necessarily an act of war but a warlike act. 

In Article V of the NATO charter, it speaks to the requirement 

for NATO members to come to the defense of any NATO member 

who has been attacked. The problem is what constitutes an attack. 

And what the Russians—I almost said ‘‘Soviets.’’ I don’t know if 

there is a difference. But what the Russians have been developing 

is these hybrid tactics. And so, you know, it is about, you know, 

information operations. It is about using covert forces in conjunction or to augment indigenous elements that they have stirred up 

within the country. They have obviously done this in the Ukraine. 

My guess is they could very well be looking at the Baltic States as 

a test to break NATO. 

How well-defined is Article V? And what would you anticipate a 

European response, a NATO response in something that may not 

be a clear-cut conventional attack? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, this is a tough question that 

is being discussed in NATO when I left and still is being discussed. 

When do these—and I liked—I used that, ‘‘hybrid,’’ in my own 

testimony. I really like Gerasimov’s words because they illustrate 

what you are talking about: active measures and asymmetric methods. 

But Article III, defense starts at home. Article IV, we consult 

with our allies to determine have we been attacked and what is the 

response. And Article V is then the collective response. 

So that process kind of walks through. And at the point that we 

are now, most of the nations are using that process individually to 

determine, have we had an Article V sort of response. And so it is 

hard to draw the line of what is and what isn’t. 

And, frankly, I believe Mr. Gerasimov and Mr. Putin believe they 

can get away with different things in different countries, to include 

our own. They have a line which they think they can operate to. 

And so it is a tough question to answer, and I can’t give you a 

definitive piece. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

this hearing. In my view, this is an extremely important hearing, 

and it is one of a series that I believe we ought to engage in. 

I recall a hearing in the Senate, about a month ago now, in 

which the heads of the intelligence agencies, when dealing with 

this asymmetric warfare, said that it appeared to them that there 

is no risk to Mr. Putin; there has been no pushback. 

Last week, the Departments of Energy and Homeland Security 

issued a bulletin that clearly said that Russia had hacked into our 

electric grid systems, into our power plants, including nuclear 

power plants, and various transportation, including airports, and 
27 

that they had probably gained control of those systems. In other 

words, they could shut down the electric grid; they could shut down 

the cooling systems in power plants, probably including nuclear 

power plants. 

The question that this committee must ask Cyber Command, 

who is responsible, as I understand it, for the defense of this Nation against cyberattack—and, by the way, the Departments both 

said it was an act of war. 

The question for this committee is to ask the question of Cyber 

Command: Are you defending the Nation? And what can you do to 

make Russia understand that there is a risk, that they will pay the 

price for what they have already done and what they might do in 

the future? 

So, Mr. Chairman, this is more to you, to ask you to have Cyber 

Command in here. I understand they may be here on April 11. And 

we must ask them the tough question: Are you defending this Nation? If so, how did it happen—how did it happen that the Russians are able to gain control of our key infrastructure? Which 

would be a pretty good indication that our Nation is not being defended. 

And, furthermore, what instructions has Cyber Command or any 

government agency been given by the President to defend this Nation and to strike back? If there is no risk, then we are at serious— 

if there is no risk to Russia, then we are at serious risk. 

This being the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Chairman, our 

task is to hold this administration accountable, to find out what 

they are doing to protect us or what they have not done and what 

they could do. And until we do that, it is very clear, from the ongoing information war and cyber war, that there is no risk to Russia 

for what they have already done, which has been described by our 

Homeland Security and the Department of Energy as an act of war. 

Mr. Chairman, we have a job to do here, because this administration is not doing it. 

If any of you gentlemen would like to comment, please do. You 

have 53 seconds. 

General BREEDLOVE. I would just add that, when we consider 

giving Mr. Putin risk, we certainly need to, as you have talked 

about, look in the cyber and information spaces, but as I have said 

already this morning, we need to also look in the other spaces. We 

need an all-of-government reply in these areas. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. If I might, sir, in your initial testimony, you 

said that we needed a plan, a comprehensive plan. We don’t have 

one, obviously. I would be delighted to hear your idea of what that 

might be. And, obviously, you won’t do it in 16 seconds, but you are 

welcome to come back to my office or maybe to another hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for this very, very important hearing. 

General Breedlove, it is good to see you again. I am used to seeing you in uniform, but I appreciate your expertise continued and 

your testimony. 

And I just want to highlight a few things and then bring it home 

and then ask for your advice. 
28 

You say that Russia’s interference in the election is merely a 

symptom of the larger hybrid war against the West in which economic, cyber, and disinformation tactics are used in conjunction 

with conventional forces in order to exert force, pressure on the adversary. 

The American people need to know this, and I am so glad we are 

having this hearing today. 

You go on and say: Waging a conventional war against the West 

would be unfavorable to Russia. As such, it has used hybrid warfare to break up Western unity. Exploiting divisions in the U.S. society and promoting a cultural war is one key element of Moscow’s 

effort to weaken the West. 

That is spot-on. 

I want to bring it home. I represent part of Missouri, and I represent the University of Missouri. That is my alma mater. Here are 

a couple of headlines that came in my local paper there. 

‘‘Report: Russia sparked fear at the University of Missouri during 

2015 protests.’’ 

Another article: ‘‘Mueller indicts Russian agency cited as origin 

of University of Missouri disruption efforts.’’ We had some unfortunate protests, some discord locally on our campus, and the same 

people that were involved in the Presidential election from Russia 

inserted themselves into our local issue to make the matter worse. 

And there was a really great report done by Lieutenant Colonel 

Jared Prier, who did the research and connected the dots and 

brought this to light. I just want to read a couple things that he 

said. 

He said, ‘‘Defendants, posing as U.S. persons and creating false 

U.S. personas, operated social media pages and groups designed to 

attract U.S. audiences. These groups and pages, which address divisive U.S. political and social issues, falsely claim to be controlled 

by U.S. activists when, in fact, they were controlled by the defendants.’’ 

He goes on and says, ‘‘The role of the Russian trolls and bots 

wasn’t to generate a controversy but to feed and amplify it in an 

attempt to fan discord.’’ 

And then he had another real quote. He says, ‘‘It is like when 

someone gets in a fight and there is someone in the back of the 

room saying, ‘Yeah, punch him. He’ll think you’re weak,’ egging it 

on.’’ 

And so we have got to bring this to light. And I think, as Americans, it is time that we rally as a family. You know, it reminds me, 

back home in Missouri we have a lot of common sense. And sometimes we have our own interfamily squabbles, and the brothers and 

sisters may fight a little bit. But, boy, the neighbor kid or somebody else wants to attack our brother or sister? Boy, we rally 

around that family, and don’t mess with my family. 

And I think, as Americans, we need to wake up. This is what our 

adversaries are doing across the world, whether it be Russia or 

China. They are exploiting our own family squabbles, making them 

worse, making us not only fight ourselves but fight other people 

and weaken the whole thing. And it is time that we wake up to 

this. 
29 

And you conclude by saying we need to take a position, establish 

policy and execute it. And all of you have given a lot of good advice. 

And I know we need a strategy. 

But I wanted to ask you General Breedlove, specifically on this 

issue, where you have social media from the Russians coming in, 

interfering with our own family squabbles, what do you think our 

policy should be? And what should the execution of that be? What 

should we do in retaliation for them interfering? 

General BREEDLOVE. So, very quickly, to pile on, I use this very 

example as I speak around the country of what happened at 

Mizzou. And it was even multilayered. After they instigated problems, they went back in and chastised the local press for not covering their disinformation and further spreading it. It was really 

audacious, what they characterized there. 

The first thing, ma’am, is that America needs to understand this. 

There are other examples equally as bad as Mizzou surrounding removing Confederate statues, both sides being egged on by the Russians. In order to try to keep oil prices down, they are instigating 

fights on both sides of things like oil pipelines and fracking in 

order to cause discord and disharmony and to hopefully continue 

to suppress those efforts to keep oil prices up. 

And so the first step, I think, is making Americans aware that 

the Russians and the troll factory there in Saint Petersburg, the 

Internet Research Agency, is out there orchestrating these battles 

in these spaces, and make our folks aware that when they go into 

their social media they are getting an echo chamber of their own 

thoughts. They are really not seeing both sides. And in that echo 

chamber they are being fed by these people who are trying to incite, again, on both sides of the issues. 

So awareness first. And then to begin to hold responsible those— 

and I think we need to start having tough conversations with those 

that prepare the social media platforms on what they allow in their 

spaces. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Halleran. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess I am going to make some statements and take up some 

time. But I am an old investigator here, and I look for verification 

of issues and gaps in issues. And we are dealing right now with 

an issue that, if they attack our electrical grid, we could find some 

ways of changing the process, but they are shaping our citizens’ 

minds. They are shaping the values of how people feel about our 

government and our country. And that is something that we just 

don’t turn off. That is something that we have to gain back the 

trust of the American people and be able to do that. 

And it is not just social media. I listen to TV also. And it is ‘‘I 

think,’’ ‘‘I believe.’’ There is no verification of anything anymore. 

And I have heard statements of whole-of-government approach 

all year long, and I don’t see it where it is working. And I heard 

it earlier today. This is the kind of stuff that started after 9/11. So 

we have been 17 years of talking about whole-of-government, and 

it is apparently not working. 
30 

It is hard for me to believe—I was channel surfing one time, and 

I saw RT on. And it took me about 5 minutes to understand what 

it was about. And I didn’t even know at the time it meant Russia. 

And now here we are today, and I cannot believe that our intelligence people have not picked up on this for the last number of 

years. And so they either missed what was happening totally, they 

chose not to make it a priority, or they did not understand the consequences. Because if they knew that this was occurring and they 

didn’t take the appropriate action over the last 17 years, then we 

really have a problem. We are behind by 17 years. And I believe 

all of you made that type of a statement. 

And, Mr. Lumpkin, you said you were scratching your head right 

now, and you also said that the world has changed. And I am shaking—and silos are still there after 17 years. I find it very difficult 

to—if I were sitting at home as an American citizen listening to 

this, I would be not only shaking my head but I would have to 

question the viability of how our government addresses these serious issues on an ongoing basis. 

I am new in Congress, but I have to tell you that, like many 

American citizens, I want to be able to believe my country is going 

to react in the appropriate way when this occurs, and I haven’t 

seen that at all, whether it is this hearing or subjects leading up 

to this hearing, where the faith of the American people, in making 

sure that they trust their government and trust what they are 

hearing across the entire spectrum. 

We talked about standards here today. It appears that, in my 

lifetime, standards have not only gone down because of social 

media, but also because of ratings and the fact that we don’t have 

much investigative reporting anymore and it is all quick, 30-second 

sound bites or 3-minute sound bites and move on to the next issue. 

So having given—I have a little bit of time here, so what do you 

think? 

General BREEDLOVE. I will be really quick, sir. 

I think that after 9/11 we did have sort of an all-of-government 

response, but it is my opinion that we are extremely limited in our 

all-of-government response on issues since then. We tend to take 

very military approaches to Middle Eastern problems, and we tend 

to take very economic approaches to Russian problems. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Anybody else? 

Mr. GARNAUT. If I could just add, essentially we are talking 

about intangible harm, and it is very intrinsically hard to define 

and to see, so where there is no body bags, there are no explosions. 

So it is easy to be disillusioned on where we are. 

But 18 months ago, we weren’t even talking about this problem. 

At least there is now a conversation. These—— 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. I am going to interrupt you because my time 

is running out. 

Mr. GARNAUT. Please. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. That is the problem. We weren’t talking about 

it. 

Mr. GARNAUT. That is right. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. But I guarantee you we knew about it, and we 

weren’t working at it. And I guarantee you, because we knew about 

it, we should have been working on it. 
31 

And the issue of transparency, we have talked about a lot today. 

We haven’t defined what transparency means. We have said the 

word, but we really don’t know what that means. 

And I yield. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to follow up a little bit on what Mr. O’Halleran was 

talking about. 

When Tom Brokaw was on the news, he was not only the anchor, 

but he was the managing editor of his news show. And I do not 

believe that Tom Brokaw would have told America a boldfaced lie. 

Today, it seems that we don’t have anchors who are also the editors but that the people that are on TV are simply repeating what 

is on a Teleprompter, what their editors are telling them to say. 

And while I think it is worse on the television, I think that is also 

accurate in what happens in the print media today. 

And so, General Breedlove, you mentioned in your testimony, 

‘‘Russia took full advantage of this new media landscape.’’ 

And when we are talking about the weaponization of information, information can either be true or information can be false. 

Would it be more accurate to say that it is the weaponization of 

misinformation? 

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. And then, as you spoke, Mr. Garnaut—is that right? 

Mr. GARNAUT. ‘‘Garnaut.’’ 

Mr. SCOTT. You spoke about how transparency goes a long way 

to solving the problem. And what transparency would do is let the 

American public know what is true and what is false. And if it is 

false, then hopefully it would not have the influence on our beliefs 

that it would have if it was true. 

Mr. GARNAUT. Look, just as a former journalist, let me defend 

journalism for a second here. And that is to point out, in Australia 

it has been a handful of journalists who have really pushed the 

issue of foreign interference to the front of the agenda. So, over 

several years, some hard investigative work has been done to actually illustrate the problem, put it on the front pages, and start to 

define the harm and to show the state connections. 

So media still does have a role—— 

Mr. SCOTT. That may be happening in your country, but in 

America a news outlet is either pro-Obama/anti-Trump or antiTrump/pro-Obama. I mean, that is—— 

Mr. GARNAUT. That sounds tricky. 

Mr. SCOTT. It is just the way—it is unfortunate. But most news 

outlets in the U.S., if we can call them news—I think ‘‘media’’ is 

a better way to portray them now, because I don’t consider them 

to be news anymore—give just enough truth in their story to lead 

people to jump to the conclusion that they want the people to jump 

to, which creates the chaos. 

So I am very much in favor of journalism. It is the editorialism 

that I think is destroying the credibility that our news outlets have 

with America. 

And if I could, I will quote you from a Pew Research poll. And 

Pew does pretty good polling. 2017, this is just over a year ago, Republicans—‘‘Percent of U.S. adults who trust the information they 
32 

get from national news organizations: Republicans, 11 percent.’’ 

That means that 89 percent of Republicans don’t trust the national 

news. ‘‘Democrats, 34 percent.’’ That means 66 percent of Democrats don’t trust the national news. And 15 percent of independents 

trust, so 85 percent of independents don’t trust the news outlets. 

And I would just tell you, I think the loss of journalism has been 

one of the real problems in this country, and the bias that is out 

there. But if it is not the truth, then it is propaganda. And as we 

have seen in Missouri, I think this is going to get worse, if the journalists are not allowed to tell the truth. 

Which brings me to you, Mr. Lumpkin. You talked about we have 

the information but what we don’t have is a conductor. And 

shouldn’t the journalists be the conductors? Shouldn’t the journalists be allowed? What is your thought on the conductor? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. You said something at the front end of your statement here, is that if it is not truth, it is propaganda. I wish it was 

that easy, from where I sit, and maybe it is just from where I was 

sitting, is that, for example, this to some person is a receptacle; 

other person, it is a bottle of water; somebody else, it is a hydration 

device. 

I mean, that, in conjunction with five different pieces of information, or different stories altogether, can shape somebody’s mental 

picture of a situation. 

And that is where, I think, the key is. You have to understand 

your audience and what resonates with them and what doesn’t resonate with them. For example, at the GEC, there were some messages that worked really well in a small village in Libya that would 

have no take in Malaysia. Same message, but culturally they look 

at the world differently. 

So messages and information and truth are kind of—they are not 

an absolute. Because all of those things I just mentioned about this 

bottle of water are true. I mean, it just depends on what is your 

perspective and how you look at it. 

And I think that the key is that you have to understand the audience you are trying to hit. You need to devise messaging strategies that will resonate with that audience. And then you have to 

have a data feedback loop. Did it hit? Did it take? Did it move the 

needle on behavior? 

And behavior change is the one of the hardest things to measure, 

especially in a short period of time. But you have to have—it is 

about data to make sure that you are managing the process and 

the information. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank our panel of witnesses for your testimony 

today. And, in particular, General Breedlove and Secretary Lumpkin, thank you both for your service, as well, to the Nation. 

So, Mr. Lumpkin, if I could start with you, I am a big fan, as 

you know, of the Global Engagement Center, and I believe that it 

really does have a critical role to play when it comes to countering 

messages perpetuated by our adversaries. 

And I know we have talked about the Global Engagement Center 

several times here today, and while I am glad that the State Department has finally accepted the allocated transfer of funds from 
33 

the Department of Defense to assist in the effort, of course pending 

congressional approval, I am still worried that it is not being utilized to its greatest potential and that there now exists a lack of 

leadership guiding it toward success. 

I know that we have to make better use of the Global Engagement Center and we have to figure out how we can better support 

its mission. But, domestically, there is no department or agency of 

the U.S. Government tasked specifically with protecting the U.S. 

public from foreign propaganda, and, of course, probably rightly so, 

since we have to be mindful of First Amendment protections and 

such. But there is, again, no U.S. public—no one protecting the 

U.S. from public or from foreign propaganda or various forms of information warfare. 

What role do you feel that industry has to play here, and what 

are their responsibilities? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think that industry does have a role. Again, I 

kind of mentioned earlier a—again, I would love to see some sort 

of veracity scale on what is going out, based on historic trends, of 

whether a news piece or that source is reliable or not. That is 

something that could be done by industry. 

But because of the diverse nature of media in this country, 

whether it is social media, print media, word of mouth, blogs, it is 

very, very difficult to control while protecting privacy of the American people as well as those First Amendment protections that we 

have. So, extremely complicated. 

But I do think we are at the point where we need to have some 

serious discussions about the best way to preserve those freedoms 

of Americans but at the same time make sure they are getting effective and accurate news. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So, Twitter announced that they are looking to 

partner with outside experts to improve what they describe as the 

health of their content, with the underlying goal of, among other 

things, cutting down on abuse and manipulation of the platform. 

This is on top of several other steps that have been taken to 

date, which include, from what I understand, their new initiative 

to increase transparency of political advertisements prior to the 

elections this fall. Much work of course remains to be done still, I 

believe, but I am encouraged that this is a positive step in the right 

direction. 

But how could the government work to better assist companies 

like Twitter to identify threats from foreign state actors who are 

seeking to engage in information operations against the United 

States? 

I will start with Secretary Lumpkin, but if our other two panelists want to chime in as well, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think the first step is have the dialogue, I mean, 

because you have to understand the privacy restrictions and privacy goals that each of these social media platforms, for example, 

have with their clients. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I think the dialogue is important, but it has to, 

I think, go beyond that. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Yeah, no, but I think—when I got to the GEC, we 

had virtually no relationship with some of these social media platforms about understanding how they saw the world. I think that 
34 

we can work with them. In fact, if you see some of the things that 

the private sector has done to regulate content, whether it is people 

screening the content or removing the hundreds of thousands of 

Twitter handles that have been removed by Twitter, they are doing 

things. We just have to make sure that we are working with them 

and not against them. Again, I think it is just about opening the 

dialogue at this point. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Anybody else want to chime in? 

General BREEDLOVE. I would just add, I agree. And I think that 

part of that conversation with these providers is what is their intent, what do they see as their responsibility. They are taking actions, but those actions are in sort of limited ways. And is it their 

intent to try to begin to ensure the veracity of data or content, that 

would be a good conversation. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would just say this is really a challenging problem, because this 

is a nation-state attack, and they are using our own private companies to carry out those attacks. And they are not necessarily the 

ones that are equipped with being able to defend against such a 

nation-state attack, with all the tools of statecraft and power that 

can be brought to bear. And this is a difficult challenge and dilemma that we have to tackle. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. 

This has been an interesting conversation today, to say the least. 

I would like to compliment Mr. O’Halleran on some of the things 

that he had to say today. But it seems to me that our own people 

sometimes don’t know what we have until it is gone. And today we 

have an adversary that is a very patient warrior in all that they 

are doing. 

And I found it interesting—I appreciated Mr. Garamendi’s passionate response to the situation today, but, in my opinion, he just 

played into exactly what they want us to do. 

And I look at the election cycle. For the Russians, it was heads, 

I win, tails, you lose. If Hillary Clinton wins, we have destabilized 

her and criticized her, and if Donald Trump wins, then he is not 

legitimate. They got it coming and going, either way. 

And then he took this issue today—and he is a friend. I appreciate his passion. But he turned it into ‘‘this administration,’’ as 

though this problem just started in January of 2017. And let’s not 

forget, Mitt Romney said Russia is our biggest geopolitical foe, and 

he was laughed at. Adam Schiff has said the Obama administration response to what was going on was inadequate. 

We have to move forward here, folks. Because that type of thing, 

blaming the other administrations or whatever, is not going to get 

us where we need to be today. And that is exactly what they want 

us to be doing. 

And we do need a whole-of-government, Republican and Democrat, to go after this issue and bring it more to the forefront and 
35 

America’s awareness. Because, you know, we always judge a country by how many want in and how many want out. And America 

has usually been the place where people want in, to become Americans. Now we have them wanting to come in to disrupt America. 

And I am curious if we are really even looking at that. 

But my concern is, you talked about the new normal, sanctions 

would just become the new normal. And my concern is their way 

of life, for Russia and China, perceived as the new standard in the 

world. My question to you is, how does this affect our democratic 

institutions and our rule of law and what we consider international 

norms if they become the standard bearer of what is supposed to 

be normal, as opposed to democracy? 

Mr. GARNAUT. Can I just comment on the importance of something you raised there? And that is, I think in Australia we have 

made some progress in this respect: the importance of establishing 

a consensus about the nature of the problem and the principles 

that inform and underpin your response. 

And so, one, democracy is under attack. You know, that is the 

core of our systems, our sovereignty. Two, we will defend it against 

interference from all comers, whether it is Russia, or China, or 

Iran, or ISIS. 

And once you have established, you know, a firm consensus, then 

you can start building your resilience strategy. But until you have 

your consensus, you are just groping in the dark and it is all over 

the place. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. 

Any other comments? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I do. 

I know the name we usually use for this is ‘‘hybrid warfare.’’ I 

prefer the term ‘‘modern warfare,’’ because this is what we are 

looking at. This is not just, you know, a slice in time; this is what 

we are looking at in a hyperconnected world. So we have to develop 

strategies that are layered, comprehensive, that transcend elections, that do all of these things to protect, again, our national security and the American people. 

But this is not going away. As social media and new media platforms iterate, we are going to see this morph, shift, and change. 

And we can either be chasing our adversaries—I would like to 

catch up with them now, let alone surpass them. But we need to 

put some more effort here. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. General. 

General BREEDLOVE. Just very quickly, I am in violent agreement with the last couple of things you said. It is really about them 

attacking Western institutions, democratic values, democratic nations. 

And as was said in a couple of responses, they are in on both 

sides in a lot of these, because it is not really about one side or the 

other winning. It is about causing disarray and loss of confidence 

in the things that our citizens need to be confident in. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 
36 

General Breedlove, you talked about, in your opening remarks, 

a few examples of American interference in foreign elections in the 

past. To add to the examples that you gave, there was a study that 

was released at the end of 2016 documenting 81 elections in 47 

countries between 1946 and the year 2000 where the United States 

either overtly or covertly sought to influence the outcome of elections in these countries and were successful more often than not. 

And this doesn’t include any of the CIA or military regime-change 

overthrows that also happened in addition to this. 

So, you know, as recent as the Iraq war—during the Iraq war, 

we paid millions of dollars to plant propaganda articles in Iraqi 

newspapers; sought to influence Russia’s elections in 1996. 

I say all this to raise the question about, if someone turns on 

cable news today, and to hear a lot of the conversations here, one 

would think that Russia’s actions in 2016, this is the first time this 

has ever happened, and that the United States does not have the 

history that we do with the tactics that we have and may continue 

to use. 

So my question is, how should anyone take the issues that you 

are raising and the attacks that you are citing in any context other 

than the historical context that exists? 

General BREEDLOVE. So, ma’am, you made the point that I was 

trying to make in my opening statement, that I am not surprised 

and I don’t think anyone in America should be surprised that Russia tried to influence our election, because, as you have aptly described, we have been into that business in the past. 

And I would like to join Mr. Lumpkin’s remarks, in that this 

word ‘‘hybrid war’’ I don’t think gets it. It makes it sound new and 

exciting, and it is really old tools used in new ways. 

And what I didn’t say well in my opening statement is the thing 

that surprises me the most is the boldness that Russia believes it 

can have in our spaces, that they can do these things and absolutely get away with them. 

Ms. GABBARD. Have we lacked that boldness in U.S. actions in 

other countries? 

General BREEDLOVE. As I said, I am trying to open the conversation—— 

Ms. GABBARD. Sure. 

General BREEDLOVE [continuing]. Beyond the election, to all of 

the elements of national power: targeted assassinations, SCADA 

[supervisory control and data acquisition] attacks, information attacks, elections. 

So I guess what I am trying to say is there is a broader attack 

on us than just the election piece. And we need to be examining 

that in a holistic view and then, again, I think, replying in a holistic way. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

You know, Mr. Garnaut, you talked a lot—obviously, you focused 

a lot on China, on China’s actions, both in Australia but generally, 

and in different ways that they are seeking to influence policies, 

elections, views, et cetera. 

Why—and, you know, whether it is you or General—and any of 

you who would like to answer this—why is it that, again, all we 

hear about is Russia’s actions generally if you turn on the news, 
37 

whereas there are countries like China, like Saudi Arabia, like 

Qatar, and other countries who, you know, purchase TV ads, who 

fund think tanks here in Washington, who, you know, who fund institutions in our universities, seeking to achieve that same objective? Why is it that Russia’s actions stand out from all of the rest 

that have been going on for quite some time? 

Mr. GARNAUT. That is a great question. And I think one answer 

may be that because China is very good at it. They put an enormous amount of effort into making sure we don’t talk about what 

it is doing. So if you look at the pattern of influence and interference, a lot of it is about suppressing contrary voices in our systems, 

you know, shutting down conversations about the nature of the 

Chinese Communist Party and what it is doing, while nurturing 

others. 

And it is quite—and unlike Russia, where Russia seems to be, 

you know, as much for a good time rather than a long time, the 

Chinese are strategic and patient and they set down foundations 

of organizations, very consistent narratives over a long period of 

time, so often it is quite incremental in the way that China behaves, whereas Russia tends to do these kind of focused, sharp 

kind of strikes. So very different methodologies. 

But you could argue that—but it doesn’t mean that China is less 

important. You know, I think that we just failed to recognize a lot 

of what activity has been going on, and that needs to change and 

it is starting to change, certainly in Australia, and starting to 

change in the United States. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, yesterday, China approved a new broadcasting entity 

called Voice of China, which, obviously, is mimicking the Voice of 

America. And they are doing that to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to shape public opinion and to project a certain positive image around the world. 

Do you see this as a tool for China to use to gain influence globally? Are you concerned by it? If you are concerned by it, what 

should we be doing about it? I know it is pretty new, but it is something we ought to talk about. 

Mr. GARNAUT. Can I just jump in quickly? So we are talking 

there about an overt propaganda platform. So in the kind of the tricolor spectrum, the black, the gray, the white, this is white. 

Now, on its own, I think propaganda is not the main focus of our 

concerns, but when it becomes a problem is when it is mixed with 

covert and deceptive work to spread. You know, the channels of 

distribution are really important. So rather than worry about the 

contents so much, is how is it penetrating our societies, and then 

I think you will find a lot of the black and the gray operations that 

we should be focused on, if that makes some sense. 

Mr. BYRNE. Do the other two gentlemen want to comment on 

that? 

General BREEDLOVE. No. 

Mr. BYRNE. One of the things that some of us who have traveled 

to China, and certainly are trying to watch it, are observing is that 

a country that heretofore had been holding itself back is now be-
38 

coming extremely aggressive. Certainly, there is some tie between 

that and the recent decision by the Chinese Congress to give unlimited tenure to President Xi Jinping. 

Should we expect for him and for the Chinese Communist Party 

to further these activities to use propaganda, whether it is white, 

gray or black, around the world and particularly here in the United 

States? 

Mr. GARNAUT. Well, the short answer is yes. We have seen a 

massive intensification of Chinese covert and deceptive operations, 

and that has been led by Xi Jinping, so we are in a new era. You 

know, I think that this pattern has become—has been becoming increasingly clear since probably the tail end of 2013. So this is a 4- 

or 5-year process. And I can’t see any reason why that process of 

intensification won’t continue perhaps for the duration of his tenure, which might be a very long time. 

Mr. BYRNE. There has been some discussion already today about 

the Confucius Institutes. In some places, they are providing some 

more cultural information on college campuses. They have at least 

a quasi-legitimate role to do that, along with other countries that 

do that. 

How do we know when the Confucius Institutes go from a legitimate activity to something that is illegitimate? And when we know 

about it, what do we do about it, in a democracy with rights to free 

speech, free association, like the United States? 

Mr. GARNAUT. Look, I think when we see examples of behavior 

in the black, of shutting down free speech, then we actually have 

to be really, really tough. And if it is a pattern, then we should 

hold the system responsible. At the moment, I think up until now, 

it has been a very permissive environment. We haven’t tracked 

how the responsibility—Confucius Institutes and other foreignfunded institutions have been used to stifle debates elsewhere in 

the universities. I think we have got to be much tougher when we 

catch it. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I would just say, Mr. Chairman, I know there 

has been a lot of talk in America the last year or so about Russia 

and what Russia is trying to do to influence things in the United 

States and interfere with the operation of our society and our government, but I would say that I am equally concerned about activities from China. And I hope that in some of our politically driven 

attention to what Russia is doing, which is valid that we should 

pay attention to that, that we don’t lose sight of similar and, I 

would say, equal activities on behalf of China to try to influence 

and disrupt American life and our American political institutions. 

And so I appreciate all three of you and your perspectives on 

this. Hopefully, we will continue to study this. And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Abraham. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think we all agree that this hybrid or modern warfare or whatever we want to call it, is certainly not a new concept. I would 

think that the Canaanites would consider the trumpets that Joshua and the Israelites blew as hybrid warfare in their time. And I 

would postulate that in a few years, with quantum computing and 

the super computers that I am told China now has the fastest of, 

the discussion we are having today about the hardware, the fiber 
39 

optics that are being used, will be obsolete, and we will be talking 

about a completely different set of dynamics and metrics as to how 

to combat this. 

You know, I will take exception to some things that have been 

said about the President and the present administration being 

asleep at the wheel. I think this President has, for the very good 

thing, been able to call out what we call fake news, whether it is 

domestically or foreign, and this highlights where we have gone as 

a country, unfortunately, as to looking at how we receive misinformation or truthful information. 

Secretary Lumpkin, to your statement that that bottle of water 

will be perceived differently from Malaysia, Syria, wherever you 

want to go, but, in fact, of all the things it may be, it may be a 

receptacle, it may be this, it is still to—it is still at least a bottle 

of water to everyone when it is front and center. So that—and I 

agree with you and to your statement. 

Mr. Garnaut, I also agree with you that, certainly, some in our 

media have been co-opted by some nefarious governments, either 

state or non-state actors. Unfortunately, I don’t see that changing, 

unfortunately. I totally agree that we need transparency in our 

government. We certainly have, I think, that, and we certainly 

need it more in the foreign fields, in the foreign actors to—I don’t 

think that is going to happen either, unfortunately. But we have 

got space wars that are fixing to happen. We have things that will 

start occurring that we couldn’t even think of 15 years ago, probably 10 years ago. 

So I guess my question is, in my 21⁄2 minutes left, we in the 

United States, we welcome, we actually encourage foreign development, foreign investments in our products. We have companies that 

are now owned by China and other foreign governments that have 

knowledge and they have direct access to some of our most technologically advanced equipment. 

So my question to each of you, quickly, can you give me concrete 

examples of where this commercialization of foreign investment has 

directly hurt us in the national security level? 

General, I will start with you. 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, so I alluded earlier to what I think is 

the real issue, and that is not through legitimate means, as you 

have talked about owning, but the exfil of commercial proprietary 

data around our most important systems. That is what worries me 

the most. 

I do have a little more confidence in committees, in DOD and 

others, like the LO/CLO [Low Observable/Counter-Low Observable] 

committee that protects our secrets. And I think it is a fairly sophisticated system. I am worried about what you said, but I am 

much more worried about the illegitimate exfil of data. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Mr. Garnaut. 

Mr. GARNAUT. Just briefly, I think we have underestimated the 

level of sophistication and organization of a lot of foreign-sponsored 

technology transfer programs. It is—so cyber is obviously a big part 

of it, but also the networks of scientists, how they link back up 

with foreign governments. We just haven’t had our eyes on the ball. 

And I know that Congress and other institutions in the United 

States are now kind of more alert to the upstream technology com-
40 

panies being sort of purchased by state-driven actors. So I am confident that there is at least movement in the right direction in this 

field. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I have nothing to add. Thank you. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Okay. And the only thing I will add in my last few 

seconds is that, General, I agree with you that, you know, a lot of 

these things are intangible, at least in conceptual ability. I hope as 

a Nation we can unite against this. Unfortunately, unless there is 

physical damage and physical, you know, human life at stake, I 

just, unfortunately, don’t see that happening, and that is very unfortunate. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bacon. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. And I have got to say for 

the record that it was an honor to serve under General Breedlove’s 

command, one of the finest bosses, commanders, leaders I have 

ever met. And so it is great to see you back here today, sir. 

It is clear to me that we are under attack in a different way, and 

we have to be clear with our citizens with that. It is imperative 

that we not make this a partisan matter. This should be a unifying 

thing. We are under attack. And I think we should just agree on 

making it clear that the Russians were trying to undermine our 

election and our—create discord. They were going after our election 

systems. We need to analyze that to figure out how do we defend 

better, make it more resilient, to give our citizens more confidence. 

It is clear that they are trying to penetrate our energy grid and 

our financial sector. The next December 7 won’t be planes or torpedoes coming into Pearl Harbor, it will be preceded by rolling 

blackouts or collapse of financial sector because of a cyberattack. 

And we just got to realize this. So we need to work now to make 

these systems more resilient. 

It was clear they were trying to create discord and divide us, and 

I think we have fallen for it. We keep falling for the bait and beating each other up. And yet we need to know—we need to be unifying and making it clear what the Russians are doing. And it is 

saddening to see that we have been taking the bait and we take 

the bait every day attacking each other, when it is actually what— 

that is what the Russians want. And I think transparency and 

making that clear would help. 

I think on the good side, I think the President has made clear 

in the National Security Strategy that Russia is a primary threat. 

And I think our defense budget that we are hoping to get done here 

real soon makes that clear too with our 10 percent increase in 

spending. 

So my question at this point is, what do you think their goal is? 

I mean, we know that they are trying to create discord, but that 

is a means to an end. So what is their end? What is the purpose 

of the discord and the partisan divide? 

General Breedlove, thank you. 

General BREEDLOVE. Right back at you, sir, about your experience as a commander. Thank you. 
41 

So let me, as I think my colleague tried to do, give the press 

some relief. What we do now see is that institutions in America, 

and the press, universities and others, think tanks all around the 

country, are beginning to speak to what has been happening for 

some time. It has been a slow awakening, but people are now understanding, primarily, what Russia is doing, less so what the PRC 

[People’s Republic of China] is doing. 

But so I think we need to not be hypercritical, because folks are 

beginning to wake up to this. And that is the most important thing. 

We need to reach my brothers and sisters in small-town Georgia 

with this message so that they understand what is going on. And 

as I have said just before, I really believe that while they do have 

some short-term goals to try to push forward one or the other of 

approaches, it is really about destroying the confidence in America 

and American democracy, I think, in the endgame. 

Mr. BACON. Do you think it is also maybe a goal to give them 

a freer hand with their neighboring countries? You know, what 

they are doing in Ukraine. If we are divided here, it is harder to 

come up with a unified response to other matters internationally. 

General BREEDLOVE. So now I would answer sort of in the role 

of the former EUCOM and NATO commander. Clearly, they wanted to find cracks in our alliance, expand those cracks, live in those 

cracks, to destroy a unified response by the alliance. 

Mr. BACON. Would you say we are in a Cold War now or is that 

an appropriate term? 

General BREEDLOVE. I think we are in a warm war. 

Mr. BACON. A warm war. 

Any other comments from our two panelists? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. It takes time to establish audiences. So you want 

to establish an audience well before you need or want to use it. You 

need to build the tentacles, you need to have the infrastructure; it 

takes time. So I think what we are seeing, in my view, is that not 

what is—what today is a prelude to something in the future, I just 

can’t tell you what that is. 

Mr. BACON. One of the things, it seems to counter what they are 

doing. We need to see what are their weaknesses. We know they 

are very dependent on the energy sector. They are very concerned 

about what we are doing in the Baltics and Poland. It just seems 

to me that there are some leverage points that we also have that 

we need to be exploring more aggressively. 

But any comments with that before I—— 

General BREEDLOVE. In 15 seconds, I would say we need to be 

intellectually honest enough to know that there is two sides to 

every story. And we need to understand what is motivating the 

Russian leadership, and I am not sure that we are very good at 

that. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Cheney. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you to all the witnesses. This has been very enlightening. 

You know, the first thing I would say is, I think there is general 

bipartisan agreement you have heard, for the most part, on the 

committee about the threat, but I think it is really important for 

us to recognize that the strength of our system is debate and the 
42 

strength of our system, you know, the sort of explosion of different 

sources of information is not a negative. And I certainly, frankly, 

personally, wouldn’t want to return to a time—I am not sure a 

time ever existed, frankly, where there was one source of information. And I do think that our adversaries have been genius in many 

ways at exploiting what is a strength, but people ought to have the 

ability to choose from different sources of information and not expect that every single source is going to be some sort of, you know, 

approved, verified version of the truth. 

My question, though—my first question is for you, General 

Breedlove. You know, we are very concerned—I am very concerned 

that the administration has not issued—does not have any sort of 

a cyber policy, even though this committee has called for it. It is 

crucial. I am not sure how we move forward without that. But it 

seems to me that we have got to be in a position where we are not 

just thinking about what is our response to these attacks, but we 

are talking about deterrence, and that requires some kind of a template. And a template that says, look, there is a public diplomacy 

piece of this, there is an information piece of this. We need to be 

spreading the message about the importance of freedom and democracy. But there has got to be a line someplace where it becomes 

an act of war against us, an attack on the power grid, an attack 

on our election process. 

So my question is, first of all, can you be a little bit more specific 

about where that line is? And, secondly, when you talk about an 

all-of-government approach, could you be more specific about the 

deterrent piece of this in terms of what are the kinds of things, 

even from the perspective of a declaratory policy, that we would be, 

you know, saying to the Russians, to the Chinese, you step over 

this line, these are the kinds of responses you will meet from us? 

General BREEDLOVE. So thank you for the question, ma’am. I 

would just say that I don’t label just this administration as not 

having these policies, these spanned administrations. We have 

been crying for certain policies since the first attack in Crimea, 

Ukraine, and other places. So these are things that I think all governments, regardless of which administration is running—— 

Ms. CHENEY. There is just one in the office now. 

General BREEDLOVE. Right. We need these things in the tools of 

our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines and others as they respond. 

I have sort of been boring today by saying all-of-government response. We tend to, as I said, do economic things with Russia and 

military things in the Middle East. And I think that we need to sit 

down and be more direct about asking our interagency governmental process to bring diplomatic, informational, military, and 

economic tools in each case, and for each country there are different responses. 

Ms. CHENEY. But would you be in favor, for example, General, 

of saying, you know, that any of our adversaries, no matter who it 

is, a particular kind of attack, they ought to expect that that will 

be met with a particular response from us that may or may not be 

in kind? 

General BREEDLOVE. I do believe that we need to understand 

how to deter. I am not a huge fan of red lines, because when we 
43 

draw a red line and then we don’t stand behind it, it is catastrophic. And so I would be careful in how I did that. But deterrence is in the mind of those deterred. It is less about writing 

something on a piece of paper. And we need to make sure we understand what gives Mr. Putin cost so that we can deter him. 

Ms. CHENEY. Mr. Lumpkin, could you address this issue as well 

in terms of what are the kinds of things that would be most likely 

to deter action, and do you think that there is a particular line in 

terms of the kinds of actions against us that we ought to be focused 

on deterring? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Yeah, I think it goes back to General Breedlove’s 

comment, you know, it depends. And it depends on if we are talking about Russia, you are talking about China, you are talking 

about the Iranians, each one has different points and places that 

pressure could be applied to have the outcomes, whether they are 

broad or very narrow to achieve. But what you do have to have is 

a process to make sure that you don’t get locked into something 

you can’t get yourself out of ultimately as you design these strategies for specific countries. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hice. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome and thank 

you for this very important hearing. 

And, General Breedlove, thank you for your service and what you 

continue to do at Georgia Tech, and I welcome the students as well, 

although I am a Bulldog through and through. Glad to work with 

you. 

I want to go back to what you were discussing a little while ago 

but didn’t have time to get into regarding the energy. In your written testimony, you stated that Russia is using its vast energy resources to promote the dependence of its smaller neighbors and to 

keep them from turning to the West. Could you elaborate a little 

bit more on that, please? 

General BREEDLOVE. So if I could just use a few examples from 

the Ukraine piece, and it has happened in others. When Russia is 

trying to bring pressure on a government, in Ukraine’s case, calling 

in payments early, raising the price of the fuel to bring problems, 

or withholding delivery so that households would go cold in a very 

cold Ukrainian winter. So there are lots of tools they use. Russia 

has an elaborate, as you know, pipeline setup in eastern Europe, 

western Russia, in order to be very good at this, moving gas 

around. And so it is a tool they can use. 

And then what I mentioned also in the testimony, in the Q&A, 

is that Russia, of course, is very keen on keeping the price of oil 

up because it is very much an oil-dependent economy. And so it attacks into countries like ours to prevent ventures like pipelines, 

fracking, other things, that would tend to suppress the price of energy. And so they are very keen to try to influence governments 

like ours in that respect. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. So what about our potential ability to export 

LNG [liquefied natural gas], wood pellets, that type of thing? What 

kind of impact would that have? 

General BREEDLOVE. Much talk about how we might in the West, 

larger than us, Canada and others, be a big part of reducing East-
44 

ern European dependency on Russian energy. I believe it would be 

a great tool. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. So a great tool on multiple fronts, obviously, for 

the national security of Europe. Is that what you are refer—when 

you say a great tool? 

General BREEDLOVE. And the United States. 

Mr. HICE. And the United States. All right. What other methods 

do we need to be aware of and have on our radar to help combat 

this hybrid warfare, specifically energy? 

General BREEDLOVE. I will get back to you on that, sir. Right 

now, I think that the first and foremost on this is to be able to reduce our dependence, and now I am offering Phil Breedlove’s opinion, to increase our own capacity to create. And then to offer to our 

allies cheap energy that we can deliver to reduce their dependence 

on those that would use its course of capabilities. 

Mr. HICE. All right. That sounds like a great plan to me. 

Do either of the others have comments on this? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. No. 

Mr. GARNAUT. No. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Stefanik. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to go 

through pretty quickly because I have seven questions and I am determined to get through all of them. 

So the first one is for you, Mr. Lumpkin. Is the State Department 

the correct place to have this conductor? Setting aside some of the 

issues with the Global Engagement Center, do you believe that 

State is the best place for this point person to be? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think he needs to be outside of all departments. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Outside of all the departments. Okay. So what— 

functionally, how would that work? Would it be similar to the DNI 

in terms of having all the—you know, setting aside intel, having 

the appropriate agencies be a part of that process? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think so. It is the only concert that I know that 

is cross-cutting across all departments. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Okay. Within DOD, who is the conductor? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. For—I mean, that is a great question, because 

public affairs has a conductor at DOD that it is in the information 

space, and you have military information operations that resides 

oversight at ASD SO/LIC [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict]. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Right. So I ask that question to highlight something that I think we need to focus on. On the Subcommittee for 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities, we have quarterly briefings 

when it comes to CT [counterterrorism] and when it comes to cyber 

operations. And the briefer is able to go around the world and say 

globally what the threats are and what our operations are. 

I fear that if we had quarterly briefings, we would not have one 

point person who was able to answer our questions region by region by region. So are those models that we should use as we seek 

to tackle IO [information operations]? So what we have worked 

through over the past 14 years on CT, what we are currently doing 

in terms of elevating Cyber Command. 
45 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Yeah. I think that the Joint Staff, J–39, which is 

their operation shop that is in information operations, should be 

able to give you and represent what each of the combatant commands is doing with regard to information operations, keeping in 

mind that the information operations piece supports military objectives. 

Ms. STEFANIK. So do you think that is an important kind of forcing mechanism in terms of congressional oversight, thinking about 

having quarterly briefings on IO? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I do, and I would recommend it. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Okay. What role does Cyber Command have in 

terms of IO? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I mean, they are—because—— 

Ms. STEFANIK. What role should they have? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Because they are largely in the intelligence community, not in the information space, there is a role, but it is a 

narrow niche. 

Ms. STEFANIK. General Breedlove, you are nodding your head, I 

would like you to add to that. 

General BREEDLOVE. It was a great question, that is what I was 

nodding my head to. In the end, Cyber Command is more about the 

medium by which information is transferred and how to adjust and 

control and, if necessary, defend and attack in that medium. So I 

was shaking my head as I was trying to think through the answer. 

There is not a good answer right now. 

Ms. STEFANIK. All three of you referenced the strategic communications messaging strategy when it comes to countering ISIS. 

Can you specifically talk about how this is structured, both, you 

know, who the players are within DOD and State, how we work 

with our allies? 

And then the reason I am asking that question is, if we were to 

identify the top threats in the IO space, I would list Russia, China, 

and potentially Iran, as top three. I would love to get your assessment on the specifics of how that is structured, what we can learn 

there, and whether you think those three threats are—where we 

should prioritizing having messaging strategies when it comes to 

those adversaries. 

Mr. Garnaut, do you want to go first on that? 

Mr. GARNAUT. Look, if I understood your question correctly, but 

let me just talk about the—so when you talk about Russia information operations, it tends to be the military piece or the cyber piece 

and a little bit of the astroturfing of protest movements. 

China is in a broader space, and so it doesn’t have a direct bureaucratic counterpart in our systems, and that is part of the problem, right? So we need to create a place where it all comes together. And I agree with Dr. Lumpkin, it has to be above the bureaucratic systems. But who—we have got to have as part of our 

law enforcement, you know, capability, an ability to track united 

front networking operations, to see it spread across all the silos of 

our systems, and it is much bigger than just the military piece or 

the cyber piece, it is a whole of public opinion emphasis. 

Ms. STEFANIK. So let me rephrase my question. Since we have 

what you—the three of you have said is a successful strategy when 

it comes to countering ISIS in the information space, do we need 
46 

to come up with threat-specific equivalence when it comes to countering Russia, countering China, and countering Iran, in terms of 

our prioritization? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Yes. The way the construct was, is in the coalition 

against ISIS, we had a communications working group where we 

would go and we would meet quarterly, and we would sit there and 

hammer out, you know, the messages that audiences, and what— 

and how we were going to work it against a single adversary. And 

it was an ad hoc group, worked very, very well. But I think you 

have to be focused on who is the adversary and what are the outcomes you are looking for. 

Ms. STEFANIK. General Breedlove. 

General BREEDLOVE. So what made this coalition and this capability successful is that the leadership of our Nation and other nations in the coalition gave them the authority, responsibility, and 

accountability to take on the mission. And I would argue that that 

is what we are missing in the arrangements with Russia and 

China. We haven’t really given one entity, like maybe the Global 

Engagement Center or some other entity that is uber other entities, we haven’t given them that policy, authority, responsibility, 

and accountability. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. My time has expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

If you all will indulge me for just a couple of more probably brief 

questions. I am sitting here think—as I listen to all of this, I am 

sitting thinking about all of the effort we put into understanding 

the Soviet Union and the philosophy behind it and the tactics it 

was using around the world. It was enormous. And then it all went 

away. We are starting to rebuild, for example, our understanding 

of deterrence and thinking about these things again. 

My simplified question to you all is, from kindergarten to Ph.D. 

level, where are we today at understanding the influence operation—I kind of like psychocultural warfare myself. Where are we 

in understanding what is going on to us? 

General. 

General BREEDLOVE. I will start with something, sir, I said to 

you when I was wearing a uniform. We have backed up, and probably for right reasons, not at the height of the Cold War, but when 

the wall fell in the early nineties, we had over 12,000 analysts on 

Russia. And when I testified to you in uniform the last time, we 

had 1,028. So we had cut our capability to look into Russia and 

understand Russia by 92 or so percent. 

And so I would answer that we are back in junior high or maybe 

entering high school, and our intel communities are refocusing harvest. There are other things they are doing, sir, I think they are 

on it, but we have work to do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

Mr. GARNAUT. Look, on China, I am not sure that we are at kindergarten yet. The amount of analytical capability we have got is 

so small. I can count on my hands the number of experts on Chinese influence operations, one of them is in this room, up the back, 

Peter Mattis, Mark Stokes, couple of people in Australia. It is 

thought—it is unbelievably thin, and that has got to be a major pri-
47 

ority in building up analytical capability on Chinese politics, Chinese history, and patterns of hybrid warfare. 

The CHAIRMAN. Just briefly, based on your experience, is there 

the appropriate exchange between analytic experts here and in our 

most valued allies, like Australia, on this issue? 

Mr. GARNAUT. Well, yes. I think the flow of information analysis 

is really quite strong between Australia and the United States. 

This is a topic that comes up often. But we just don’t have the 

depth of capability. We don’t have enough to share at this stage. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Mr. Lumpkin, what grade are we in? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I was going to address the Iran issue, and I would 

say we are probably in middle school somewhere. 

The CHAIRMAN. In where? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. In middle school, junior high as well, just because 

of the number of resources we have against it. It is very small. 

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to go back at the end to the central 

purpose of this committee, and that is overseeing the Department 

of Defense and the U.S. military. Taking all of your points about 

whole-of-government, the importance of intelligence in law enforcement and all of that, can you provide just a few comments on the 

role of the United States military in dealing with the problems that 

we have discussed today? 

General BREEDLOVE. I don’t want to pump sunshine, but I would 

offer to you that there are some really brilliant people working 

hard on this issue. And I have absolute trust and confidence in Joe 

Dunford and in our Secretary of Defense, because I have watched 

them, served with them, et cetera, over the years. And I know that 

inside of the Joint Staff, General Dunford is doing some work on 

trying to reorganize around Russian issues. I led one of those efforts in uniform. And Harry Harris, as the commander of PACOM 

[U.S. Pacific Command], led a similar issue as we looked at China. 

And building a broader rubric under which to address these than 

just the combatant commanders, and reaching out in those processes to other governmental agencies to bring them in. 

So, sir, I am encouraged by what I see inside of our DOD and 

our uniform military services on how they are approaching this. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. And, sir, the Department of Defense is carrying a 

lot of water on this front. They are carrying a lot of water for the 

interagency. But everything can’t be tied back to a military objective, and that is where we fall short. Our gaps and seams are massive. And the GEC, frankly, and during my tenure, would not have 

been functional at all if it wasn’t for the detailees that came over 

from the Department of Defense because the positions themselves 

weren’t resourced within the building. 

So, again, I think the U.S. Government’s efforts are maturing, 

but the Department of Defense is doing a lot of the heavy lifting 

for us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garnaut, in a broader sense, military role in 

this space? 

Mr. GARNAUT. Look, I think military systems and defense departments have had to pull too much weight here, because—almost by 

default because the rest of the system haven’t been carrying their 

weight. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. I think that’s definitely true here. 
48 

Mr. GARNAUT. Especially the law enforcement piece. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. All right. This has been very helpful. 

Thank you all for being here. A lot of insight is gained. We really 

appreciate you all taking the time to be with us today. 

The hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 21, 2018 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 21, 2018 

(53) 

Statement of Chairman William "Mac" Thornberry 

House Armed Services Committee Hearing: 

State and Non-State Actor Influence Operations: Recommendations 

for U.S. National Security 

March 21, 2018 

Whether the term used is "political warfare," "influence operations," 

"psycho-cultural warfare," "indirect warfare," "hybrid warfare," or one of many 

others that has been suggested, it is clear that the United States and our allies are 

under consistent attack using non-kinetic tactics intended to undermine and 

weaken us. 

We know that Russia intervened in a variety of ways to sow dissension 

during the 2016 election. History and now declassified documents establish that 

the former Soviet Union had a track record of "active measures" against NATO's 

deployment of intermediate range missiles in Europe, and they included providing 

propaganda themes to peace movement groups, as well as organizational expertise, 

financial resources, forged U.S. military documents, etc. And according to 

declassified CIA documents, that campaign was built upon a similar campaign they 

carried out against the proposed neutron bomb of 1977-78. 

It's part of the standard playbook, and we should expect more of the same 

against the decisions called for in the Nuclear Posture Review, for example, only 

given their recent success, a more sophisticated version. 

While most of the attention has been centered on Russia as the source of 

these attacks, they are not the only adversary using such methods. China has spent 

billions of dollars to gain economic leverage, buy access to infrastructure, and 

shape public opinion and perceptions around the world to its advantage. Iran, 

various terrorist organizations, and even North Korea make use of some of them. 

These tactics challenge our traditional ways of thinking about warfare; they 

challenge our organizational structure on who is responsible for defending the 

country in this sphere; and they challenge our ability to develop and use the tools 

needed to counter them in a timely way. 

As the National Defense Strategy says, "China and Russia want to shape a 

world consistent with their authoritarian model-gaining veto authority over other 

nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions." It is important to identify 

the motive behind these efforts, but the question remains whether we have the 

tools, organizations, and approaches to protect American sovereignty and national 

security. 

We hope to gain insight into these issues from our distinguished panel of 

witnesses. 
54 

Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith 

House Armed Services Committee Hearing: 

State and Non-State Actor Influence Operations: 

Recommendations for U.S. National Security 

March 21, 2018 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for hosting today's hearing and welcome to the 

witnesses. I look forward to hearing your views on influence operations, the impact 

of such operations to U.S. national security, and recommendations for countering 

and deterring campaigns that undermine U.S. and allied interests. 

Violent extremist organizations have used propaganda to recruit, inspire, and 

spread their message for decades. Terrorists have filmed videos and recorded 

messages in ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, intended to 

shape the narrative for tactical, operational, and strategic gain. 

In recent years, ISIS has demonstrated a greater degree of sophistication in 

spreading its message and in manipulating information to achieve desired 

objectives on and off the battlefield. This was evidenced by the large number of 

volunteers recruited from across the globe and ISIS' ability to inspire terrorist 

attacks outside of its territorial strongholds, as well as through ISIS use of publicly 

available information to target key military members, agency officials, and others. 

State-actors also have a history of using influence activities as a means to an 

end. The Nazis had a Ministry of Propaganda. During the Cold War, the Soviet 

Union and other communist countries used influence, through proxies and 

propaganda, to spread their ideology. 

However, the global information environment of today provides an 

opportunity for countries like Russia and China to exploit information and to 

spread disinformation to mass audiences on a scale that was previously 

unimaginable. You don't have to look far for an example-Russia is conducting a 

campaign to undem1ine American democracy and other democratic institutions in 

Europe. As I stated last week, Russia's destabilizing actions are becoming ever 

more apparent. 

Influence activities are not just taking place in the information environment. 

Russia is backing political candidates, employing proxies, conducting cyberattacks, 

and using unconventional methods to achieve its goals and objectives. China 

leverages economic suasion to further foreign policy objectives that don't 

necessarily adhere to the international rules-based order. 

Country-specific responses aren't enough to address these challenges. 

Confronting and deterring holistic influence campaigns spanning military, 

economic, political, and social bounds requires a holistic response. We must 

leverage all instruments of national power across the whole-of-government, 

including the Department of Treasury, Department of Education, elements of the 

Intelligence Community, and the Department of State. 
55 

Yet, there appears to be no concerted etfort at the highest level of 

government to come up with a sound strategy that counters and deters influence 

campaigns, advances U.S. interests, achieves strategic effects, and remains in line 

with our ethics and core values. This is not only disappointing, but extraordinarily 

dangerous. 

I look forward to working with my colleagues on this committee and others, 

to continue to move the ball forward on this issue. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
56 

I 

Russian Interference in Domestic Politics 

Prepared .statement by 

General Philip M. Breedlove USAF (Ret) 

DiJtin'--r,uiJhed Profe-rJor, Sam 1\lunn School, Georgia Institute of Technology 

Board Diredot~ The ,\tlantic Council of the United States 

Former 1\/lTO S1rpreme Allied Commander E!.~trope; COmmander, CS European Command 

Before the 

United States House Committee on Armed Services 

United States House of ReprcscntatiYcs 

115111 Congress 
57 

Good morning, and thank you Chairman Thornberry, Ranking J'vlember Smith, and members of the 

Committee for the oppo1·tunity to speak with you about Russian interference in democratic politics. The 

Russian interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election is deeply troubling, yet unsurprising. lt is up to us 

as "\mcricans to ackn()\vlcdge the threats that Russian disinformation provides~ and de\'clop the effective 

strategies needed to combat them. 

This weaponization ofinforn1ation by Russia is not ne\v; in fact, it dates back to the Soviet Union. In 1983, a 

pro~Soviet nc\vspapet in India published an article accusing the Department of Defense of creating AIDS in 

an attcn1pt to develop new biological weapons. In 1964, the KGB used similar tactics in an effort to con\Tincc 

the Indonesian President that there \Vas a CIA plot to assassinate him. The primary differences bet\veen these 

disinformation campaigns and those today, is twofold: firstly, the internet and social 1nedia make it much 

easier to spread disinfotmation, and secondly, these campaif..,l11S arc increasingly targeting ftrst world \\/estern 

nations. 

Russia took full ~tthantage of this new media landscape by promoting Jisinformation to sow discontent 

among Americans. Russia exploited divides in the American populace to promote what many have referred to 

as a "culture war". Surveys have shown that the US is more polarized than it has ever been on issues such as 

gun control, immigration, religion, and race. Russian operatives, seeing an opportunity, purchased social 

mcdi<1 advertisements and created social media profiles, in order to promote partisan stances on these issues 

to further widen the rift. Russian advertisements and profiles did not have a consistent political position; the 

only consistent aspect ls that they all protnoted partisan positions on im.mcnsely divisive issues. 

The details of Russia's interference in the election arc maddening. Ho\vever, the reality is that \Ve shoulJ not 

be surprised by this interference. The Russians have interfered with nmncrous elections in \Xi estern nations 

recently, including those in the Netherlands, (;ermany, and France. There is increasing evidence that Russia 

worked to influence the referendum in which the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Cnion, as 

recently sh()\Vn in a report prepared by some on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It has promoted 

anti-immigration sentiment in Europe, by creating and spreading the story of "poor Lisa," a thirteen-year-old 

girl \vho, as the fallacious story goes, was abducted and raped by migrants. 

Furthermore, we have "meddled" in elections in our o\vn \vay. In 1933, Allen Dulles offered $5 million to an 

agent to sway the l'ilipino elections. 1938's Operation Rooster Shot cncouxagcd rural Laotian fanners to vote 

against Communist politicians in Laos. This meddling did not end with the Cold \\-'ar; in the 2006 Palestinian 

elections in Gaza, the United States provided economic assistance in an attempt to bolster Fatah's chances. 

The realitr is th.r both the L:nitcd States and Russia have meddled, and we should not be surprised by this 

trend continuing. 

\'X,bat is astounding about Russian meddling is how brazen Russia was in executing it, as "vell as the fact that 

Russia seems to believe that lt can escape this with lts reputation unsullied. Russia appears to be surprised by 

the outrage that has been seen throughout the US. The US has been a leader and pillar of \X'cstern 

democracy, and the fact rhat Russia believed that it could interfere \vi.th American elections with no response 

is truly shocking. 
58 

Howeyer, Russia's interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election is merely a symptom of a larger hybrid 

war against the \\/est, in which economic, cyber, and disinformation tactics arc used in conjunction with 

conventional forces in order to exert force or pressure on an adversary. ln February 2013, Ceneral Valery 

Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed l;orces of Russia, gave a speech entailing this strategy, 

claitning: 

The very 'rules of \var' have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving- political and 

strategic goals has gro\vn, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in 

their effectiveness. The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad 

usc of political, economic, infonnational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary 1neasures--applied in 

coordination with the protest potential of the population. 

This led to the coining of the term "the (;erasimov Doctrine." This describes Russia's view that warfare is 

not simply a com.rentiona1 affair, but one that uses the aforementioned cyber, economic, and informarion 

tactics. 

This is notable because it sho\vS that Russia acknowledges that its election meddling is a form of warfare. 

\\/hile Russia may deny that it interferes \\Tith elections, or claim that it is innocuous, the words of General 

Gerasimov ring loud and clear: disinformation efforts arc efforts of warfare. 

The reality is that Russia is using hybrid tactics to target \\/estern values, democrat"ic governments, and 

transatlantic institutions. President Vladimir Putin claitned in a state of the nation address that the collapse of 

the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century. Russia sees rhe \'\lest, and in 

particular, a unified \"'\:est, as an adversary. \\>'aging a conventional war against the \\lest would be unfavorable 

to Russia. 1 \s such, it has used hybrid \varfare to break up \X' estern unity. 

Exploiting divisions in US society and promoting a "culture \Vat'' is one key clement of l\Ioscow's efforts to 

weaken the \\lest. Through disinfonnation, it has plied differences in Europe to pr01note Eurosccpticism and 

to grow the notion among the peoples of Europe that the EU is not beneficial to them. 1t has waged cyberattacks, such as the NotPetya attack in Ukraine in 2017, the Fancy Bear attack on Getman l\fcmbets of 

Parliament earlier this month, or the numerous distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks on the Estonian 

government. It has ut'ed economic subversion to exploit the relatively smaller economies of its neighbors to 

subYert political power. 

Tt uses its vast energy resources to promote the dependence of its smaller neighbors, \vorking to keep them in 

the Russian sphere of intlucnce and preventing them from turning to the \\'est. In short, while the 2016 

Presidential Election is the most nmablc case of Rnssian hybrid warfare, especially for Americans, it is not the 

only case of Russian hybrid warfare. 

The Russian interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election has received an unprecedented amount of 

media coverage. However, we should not be so myopic as to see this interference in a vacuum. Tn order to 

effectively combat said interference, we need to understand the scope of Russian hybrid warfare. \\/c need to 

Yiew this as a comprehensive problem that connects the dots of recent Kretnlin activity. \\/e cannot sitnply 
59 

take a stance against a specific case of election interference, we n1ust take a stance against Ru:-;sian hybrid 

\Varfarc in its cnUrcty. Tn all the cases of Russian disinformaUon and election interference, the \Vest has been 

slow to sec it, and even slo\ver to react. \\/ c need to move past simply trying to fo1mulate a reaction to 

interference in the Presidential J>:lcction, we need to move to a place \Vhcre we are ready to combat hybrid 

warfare and not need to react at all. 

IlYbrid warfare is a form of warfare that the United States has yet to fully understand, never mind prepare 

for. The tevclation of Russian disinformation in the election is the \.Vake-up call that hybrid \varfare is 

occurring, even if \VC arc un,vitting participants in it. Sllnply condetnning the election meddling is not going 

to solve this problem, and it is not going ro prevent future Russian hybrid operations. \X/e must treat this with 

the gravity that it deserves. \'(/e need to take a position, establish policy, and execute it. The Russian hybrid 

threat is larger than the 2016 Election, and larger than the United States. lt is a threat to liberal order that the 

\X' est has become accustomed to, and it will continue to be until we develop an effective strategy and 

implement the necessary policies to combat it. 'l 'hank you, and I look foGvard to your questions. 
60 

Philip Breedlove 

Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, Ret., is a proven strategic planner, motivational leader and 

talented communicator. He is a highly decorated retired general of the U.S. Air Force where he 

reached the highest levels of military leadership as one of six geographic combatant commanders 

and the Supreme Allied Commander ofNATO. 

During 39 years of service, General Breedlove served in a variety of demanding command and 

staff positions, leading large-scale, diverse, global operations across two theaters of combat and 

earning a reputation as an inspirational leader focused on his people, their families and mission 

accomplishment. Leading a diverse political- military alliance, he was able to build consensus 

and form teams to accomplish complex tasks spanning multiple continents. 

As the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Commander of U.S. European Command, he 

answered directly to NATO's governing body, the North Atlantic Council, and to the President 

of the United States and Secretary of Defense. He led the most comprehensive and strategic 

structural and policy security changes in the alliance's 70-ycar history. His diplomatic skills 

reassured allies, deterred potential aggressors and maintained alliance unity during the most 

dynamic and challenging period since its inception. He led the forces of28 nations and multiple 

partners in ensuring the security of an alliance that accounts for more than half the world's gross 

domestic product. 

As Commander, U.S. Air Forces Europe and Air Forces Africa, General Breedlove was 

responsible for organizing, training, equipping and maintaining combat-ready forces while 

ensuring theater air defense forces were ready to meet the challenges of peacetime air 

sovereignty and wartime defense. This diverse portfolio included both theater and operational air 

and ballistic missile defense, areas where his operational designs remain in place today. 

As Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, he presided over the Air Staff and served as a member of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Requirements Oversight Council and Deputy Advisory Working Group 

during a period of intense challenge, including devising measures to meet the requirements of the 

Budget Control Act's required $480 billion reduction of the Department of Defense budget. 

Accordingly, he led the organization, training and equipping of more than 690,000 people 

serving in the U.S. Air Force and provided oversight of its $120 billion annual budget. 

As Assistant Chief of Staff for Air Operations, Plans and Requirements, General Breedlove 

directed all Air Force operations across the globe, oversaw strategic and operational planning, 

and set the requirements for all Air Force procurement. Additionally, he was one of two original 

authors of the Defense Department's Air-Sea Battle Concept. 

General Breedlove served in a variety of assignments leading up to those leadership positions, 

including commanding a squadron, a group, three fighter wings and a numbered Air Force in 

service across three different continents. His extensive command and control experience in 

wartime, contingency planning, and humanitarian relief actions include operations in Africa, 

Asia and the Middle East. 

He earned his Bachelor of Civil Engineering degree from the Georgia Institute of Technology 

and a Master of Science in aerospace technology from Arizona State University. Additionally, he 

completed a Masters of International Security Affairs from the National War College, a 

Fellowship in International Security Affairs, Seminar XXI from the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology and completed Leadership at the Peak at the Center for Creative Leadership, 

Colorado Springs. 

General Breedlove currently serves on the Georgia Tech Advisory Board, as a Distinguished 

Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech, as a Senior Advisor 
61 

to Culpeper National Security Solutions and on the Board of Directors of the Atlantic Council. 

Retired from the Air Force in 2016, General Philip M. Breedlove's active duty biography is 

available on the Air Force website. 
62 

Testimony to US House Armed Services Committee, 21 March 2008. 

John Garnaut, in personal capacity. 

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished Members of the 

Committee. It's an honour to be here. Thank you for the generous invitation to talk with you 

all today. 

To understand the mechanics of China's international influence we need to look beyond the 

gravitational pull of the Chinese economy and the war-fighting power of the People's 

Liberation Army. Both are important. But neither are as important as the world of influence 

and interference which sits between those two poles. This is the domain in which the 

Chinese Communist Party manipulates incentives inside our countries in order to shape the 

conversation, manage perceptions and tilt the political and strategic landscape to its 

advantage. 

The party works hard to find common interests and cultivate relationships of dependency 

with chosen partners. The modus operandi is to offer privileged access, build personal 

rapport and reward those who deliver. From open source materials we know this is 

happening in universities, in business communities, in ethnic Chinese communities, in media 

and entertainment, and in politics and government. But the Communist Party institutions, 

ideologies and methodologies involved are so alien to our systems that we have been 

having trouble seeing them let alone responding. The party has been "winning without 

fighting", to borrow some of its terminology. 

However, under the uncompromising leadership of President Xi Jinping, China's activities 

have become too brazen and aggressive to continue to ignore. A re-evaluation is taking 

place in half a dozen established democracies around the world, including Australia and the 

United States. Many more are entering the conversation. 

I have described the Australian experience in a Foreign Affairs article which is attached to 

my written submission and I won't it duplicate now. But there is one point I'd like to 

underscore -and that is the vital importance of maintaining principles, analytical clarity and 

strategy. 

Our challenge- the shared challenge of democracies across the world- is to work with the 

strengths and shore up the vulnerabilities of our open, multicultural, democratic systems in 

order to push back against authoritarian interference. We need a rigorous and principles 

1 
63 

approach that is capable of securing a broad and durable consensus within countries and 

between them. 

We need to identify and conceptually separate the "black" from the "white" while recognising 

that there is a large grey area of ambiguity and plausible deniability that sits in between. This 

requires a great deal of empirical work, both in and outside government. 

Once we have an empirical baseline, and clarity about which categories of activity we care 

about and how much we care, then we can design a surgical response that manages the 

risks and targets the harm without hurting ourselves. 

In my view, we should continue to welcome ordinary diplomacy, transparent public 

diplomacy and economic activity that does not come with strings attached. I doubt we could 

lift the drawbridge and cut ourselves off from the world even if we wanted to. 

But wherever covert, coercive, or corrupting elements are involved - when legitimate and 

transparent forms of influence cross the line into harmful "interference"- then we need to 

respond. 

Shutting down the black is primarily a counterintelligence and law enforcement challenge. An 

enormous one, I might add. 

But this won't be enough on its own. 

We also have to build transparency and accountability mechanisms to illuminate the vast 

array of grey. We need to reinforce and re-ativate the antibodies of our civil societies- the 

natural antibodies which the party has been working to disable and suppress. 

In Australia, the Turnbull Government is developing a counter-interference strategy that is 

built upon the principles of sunlight, enforcement, deterrence and capability. The strategy is 

country-agnostic in that it is designed to apply to any country's misbehaviour, not just 

China's. 

The strategy includes new legislation to tackle the black and also the grey. One set of laws 

introduces tough but graduated criminal provisions against political interference and 

espionage. Another set of laws imposes disclosure obligations for those working in 

Australian politics on behalf of a foreign principal -this is an upgraded transparency regime 

2 
64 

loosely modelled on your Foreign Agents Registration Act. Importantly, enforcement 

activities are also being brought into a central integrated hub. 

But this is only the very early stages of a difficult struggle to reinforce the integrity of our 

democratic processes. There is an enormous body of hard work to be done. I'm very much 

looking forward to the discussion. 

3 
65 

March 9, 2018 

How China Interferes in 

Australia 

And How Democracies Can Push Back 

--------------------------------------------

john Garnaut 

JASON LEE I REUTERS 

The Australian flag flutters in front of the Great Hall of the People during a 

welcoming ceremony for Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull in Beijing, 

China, Apri/2016. 

Australia is the canary in the coal mine of Chinese Communist 

Party interference. Over the past 18 months, the country has 

been shaken by allegations of the Chinese party-state working 

curate the wider political landscape. There are claims of 

Beijing-linked political donors buying access and influence, 

universities being co-opted as "n:rnrLag:g.JJJj_g_ vehides," and 
66 

Australian-funded scientific research being diverted to aid the 

modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Most 

notoriously, an ambitious young senator, Sam Dastyari, was 

exposed for parroting Communist Party talking points and 

giving countersurveillance advice to a Chinese political donor 

before being hounded into premature retirement. 

The scandals might seem odd. Few countries on the planet 

have benefited as clearly from China as Australia has. Its 

society has been enriched by waves of Chinese migrants and 

sojourners for 160 years. Its national income grew as much as 

13 percent in a single decade as a result of China's resourceintensive construction boom, according to the Australian 

Reserve Bank. And an easing of the resources boom has been 

offset by the spending power of 180,000 Chinese students and 

a million tourists each year, along with hundreds of thousands 

of migrants who have mostly thrived in their new country. 

Yet these are the very ingredients that make Australia's 

debate over Chinese influence so interesting. Nobody knows 

what happens when a mid-sized, open, multicultural nation 

stands its ground against a rising authoritarian superpower 

that accounts for one in every three of its export dollars. Even 

the firebrand editorial writers of China's tabloid press seem 

unsure. "Australia calls itself a civilized country, but its 

behavior is confusing," wrote. "While it is 

economically dependent on China, it shows little gratitude." 

The Australian conversation has evolved from amorphous 

anxieties about Chinese influence and soft power into more 

precise concerns about covert interference by the Chinese 

Communist Party. Media reports are shedding light upon a 

hidden world of inducements, threats, and plausible 

deniability. They reveal a dimension of risk that sits between 

the poles of economic attraction and military force, which 

Western Sinologists, diplomats, and national security officials 

had not previously focused on. The more we learn, the more it 
67 

seems that there is little that is soft about the way the party 

wields power beyond its borders. 

The distinctive part of the Australian experience is not what 

China is doing there but how Canberra is pushing back in the 

face of threats from Beijing and pressure from local business 

leaders worried about economic retaliation. Clarity of 

diagnosis has set the stage for a surgical response-one that 

manages the risks and targets the harm while attempting to 

maintain the overall project of engagement. This is not an 

easy balance to strike, but Australia's efforts to do so should 

be closely watched by leaders from Washington, Auckland, 

Ottawa, and Berlin-who may soon find themselves in a 

similar position. 

CHINESE AUSTRALIANS LEAD THE DEBATE 

Key to the party's operations in Australia is collapsing the 

categories of Chinese Communist Party, China, and the 

Chinese people into a single organic whole-until the point 

where the party can be dropped from polite conversation 

altogether. The conflation means that critics of the party's 

activities can be readily caricatured and attacked as antiChina, anti-Chinese, and SiJ1QJ;d.lmbir;-labels that polarize and 

kill productive conversation. And it is only a short logical step 

to claim all ethnic Chinese people as "sons and daughters of 

the motherland," regardless of citizenship. 

Yet contrary to claims of Sinophobia, the Australian debate 

has from the beginning been anchored in the community of 

Chinese Australians. Ethnic Chinese writers, entrepreneurs, 

and activists have led in drawing the nation's attention to the 
68 

party's efforts to suppress the diversity of their opinions 

through surveillance, coercion, and co-option. 

In 2005, Chinese defector Chen Yonglin exposed an enormous 

informant network that kept tabs on Chinese Australians, 

including Falun Gong practitioners, who defied the party line. 

He explained how he would use the information to take 

targeted coercive actions like confiscating passports, denying 

visas, and shutting down meetings. In 2008, Chinese 

Australian writer illuminated the party's efforts 

to mobilize thousands of red-flag-waving students to march on 

Canberra's Parliament to "defend the sacred Olympic torch" 

against pro-Tibet and other protestors, as the torch wound its 

way to the Olympic ceremony in Beijing. After the 2009 arrest 

of Australian iron ore executive Stern Hu, several Chinese 

Australian entrepreneurs revealed that they were targeted by 

the Chinese security system in ways that other Australians 

were not. They were all jailed on trumped-up charges, 

stripped of their assets, and mistreated during interrogations. 

The Kafkaesque tragedy of and 

Du Zuying became front page news in Australia because they 

and their families chose to tell their stories. 

More recently, Chinese Australian journalists have laid a 

foundation of investigative reporting on the party's concealed 

links to Australian politics. Philip Wen, Beijing correspondent 

for The Sydney Morning Herald, showed how the party was 

"astroturfing" grassroots political movements to give the 

impression of ethnic Chinese support for Beijing's policies 

and leaders and to drown out its opponents. He also 

discovered that Australian politicians did not know basic 

details about Chinese citizen political donors who were 

bankrolling their campaigns, ~LLM~~..k!d,_Qll_!_S2:!d±.~lill=· 

Student journalist Alex]oske, who owes his Chinese language 

fluency to his Beijing-raised mother, has mapped the party's 

"united front" networks and shown that they are now so 

ubiquitous-and well-resourced-that they are crowdinq out 
69 

independent opportunities for ethnic Chinese community and 

political representation. He's also shown how those networks 

can be activated to silence Chinese AustraU&n::;, including_his 

own experience of being intimidated by leaders of the local 

Chinese Students and Scholars Association. 

And for every story of state-sponsored coercion and co-option 

that Chinese Australians publicize, there are dozens that 

never surface. One journalist told me how he'd been 

summoned to a karaoke bar and physically assaulted in 

retaliation for his report on the dealings of a Chinese stateowned company in Australia. Another gave a parliamentary 

committee a confidential dossier detailing how Beijing sought 

to choke one of Australia's last independent Chinese-language 

media platforms by intimidating its advertisers. In this case, 

one China-based advertiser was forced to stop after a 

Ministry of State Security official camped in its office for two 

weeks. Another, in Australia, agreed to stop after being 

invited to a three-hour "tea" session at a Chinese consulate in 

Australia. At the same time, !!L'\L::bl-""-~JA!.!¥.-1"~'-'"'"-q!JLI-!'-~-~JdL;"'-""'--'-'Lu".-";; 

rewarded with free content, equipment, and business 

opportunities. 

VULNERABILITIES TO INTERFERENCE 

The Chinese Communist Party invests enormous resources in 

shutting down discordant voices and providing incentives to 

develop more favorable ones. The party's United Front Work 

Department, which, according to former U.S. intelligence 

analyst Peter Mattis, seeks to "mobilize the party's friends to 

strike at the party's enemies," reaches not just into Australia's 

Chinese diaspora but also beyond, through front 

organizations such as the Australian Council for the Peaceful 

Promotion of Reunification of China. Similarly, the PLA 

outsource the party's messaging by finding common ground 
70 

with self-interested or naive intermediaries. The modus 

operandi is to offer privileged access, build a personal 

rapport and reward those who faithfully recite the suggested 

talking points. 

Authoritarian interference probes and exploits different 

vulnerabilities of democracies in different ways. Australia's 

vulnerabilities include broken funding models for universities 

and media, uniquely lax campaign finance laws, and a special 

egalitarian disrespect for retired politicians. Interference 

activities corrode the trust that makes open, democratic, and 

multicultural systems work. They can corrupt political 

processes. And to the extent that they impact directly on the 

parliamentary system, they cut to the core of sovereignty 

itself. In May of last year, Meng Jianzhu, then China's security 

chief, warned the Labor opposition leadership about the 

electoral consequences of failing to endorse a bilateral 

extradition treaty. According to IM Australian newspaper: 

"Mr Meng said it would be a shame if Chinese government 

representatives had to tell the Chinese community in 

Australia that Labor did not support the relationship between 

Australia and China." 

In some Australian quarters, the party's predilection for 

shutting down critical voices has become deeply internalized. 

The first book-length treatment of Chinese influence 

work~Clive Hamilton's Silent Invasion-was shelved by three 

successive publishers over preemptive fears of retaliation by 

Beijing. Similarly, Australian university leaders have publicly 

Ul~~m~-s~':l·l;/Y, __ G~Jm~e_l"JlS. about improper Chinese 

pressure-including from their own scholars-while 

simultaneously launching a fence-mending mission to soften 

the~~~~~&W~~Ud~~~~ruL~wn~~· 

CANBERRA STEPS UP 

In recent months, the conspiracy of silence has been 
71 

punctured by a catalytic process in which journalists, 

scholars, security officials, and politicians have all started to 

learn from each other. The process has involved security 

agencies communicating warnings to the public more clearly 

than before; journalists building on those warnings and 

drawing upon scholarly expertise; and politicians taking 

security agencies and credible media investigations seriously. 

In June 2017, a joint investigation by the Australian 

Broadcasting Corporation and Fairfax Media that 

the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) had 

warned the major political parties that two of Australia's most 

generous donors had "strong connections to the Chinese 

Communist Party" and that their "donations might come with 

strings attached." One of them leveraged a $400,000 donation 

in an attempt to soften the Labor Party line on the South 

China Sea. A Fairfax reporter, Nick McKenzie, also revealed 

that a Liberal trade minister had stepped directly from office 

into a consultancy job at a party-linked company, earning 

$ 8 8 0, 000 a year +-"'-"----~-'"-"'-.!!'-"'-''"'~-·-"-"'--"'"-'----~"'-""'" 

Late last year, as the media reports kept rolling in, Prime 

Minister Malcolm Turnbull's Liberal coalition government 

declared political war on Senator Dastyari's collaboration 

with an "agent of a foreign country." By then, Dastyari had 

been shown to have recited Beijing's South China Sea talking 

points almost word for word, immediately after his benefactor 

had threatened to withdraw a $400,000 donation. He had 

counseled the Chinese citizen donor-whom ASIO had labeled 

as a security risk-to place his phone aside to avoid 

surveillance of their conversation. The Turnbull government's 

attacks served a partisan political purpose, but they also 

brought the question of foreign interference into the 

mainstream conversation and, for the first time, showed that 

there were limits to acceptable conduct. 

Turnbull also revealed that he'd commissioned a classified 
72 

investigation into foreign interference in August 2016. The 

findings had "galvanized" the government to map out a 

strategy shaped by four principles. First, a counter-foreigninterference strategy would target the activities of foreign 

states and not the loyalties of foreign-born Australians. As 

Turnbull put it "Our diaspora communities are part of the 

solution, not the problem." Second, the strategy would be 

country agnostic and not single out Chinese interference. 

Third, it would distinguish conduct that is "covert, corrupting, 

or coercive" from legitimate and transparent public 

diplomacy. And fourth, it would be built upon the pillars of 

"sunlight, enforcement, deterrence, and capability." Turnbull 

introduced legislation that banned foreign political donations; 

imposed disclosure obligations for those working in 

Australian politics on behalf of a foreign principal; and 

introduced tough but graduated laws against political 

interference and espionage. (Days after Turnbull introduced 

these new laws, reports suggested that Beijing may have 

g_<;tivated its United Front networks to campaign against the 

"ant-China, anti-Chinese" ruling Liberal coalition in a crucial 

by-election.) 

Elite opinion, however, seems skewed the other way. 

University, media, and business organizations have accused 

the government of overreach and argued for exemptions. The 

government has conceded ground-carving "media" out of 

some secrecy and espionage offences-and it may go further 

after a parliamentary committee delivers its review at the end 

of this month. Some critics say that the government has failed 

to explain the interference problem, others that it has been 

too negative about Australia's relationship with China. Many 

are concerned that loose language and allegations can too 

easily taint all ethnic Chinese people. Some are even more 

harsh and dismissive. Sydney University Vice Chancellor 
73 

Michael Spence, for example, has said that the Turnbull 

government should stop its "Sinophobic blatherings." 

DAVID GRAY I REUTERS 

Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull waves with Chinese Premier U 

Keqiang to members of the public as they walk along the Sydney Harbour 

foreshore in Australia, March 2017. 

THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD'S PATH FORWARD 

The Australian polity has become alive to a threat that other 

nations share but are only starting to recognize and confront. 

This recognition has been assisted by the sheer brazenness of 

Chinese President Xijinping's drive for global influence and 

by watching Russian President Vladimir Putin and his agents 

create havoc across the United States and Europe. In the 

aftermath of the U.S. presidential election, it is far more 

difficult to dismiss foreign interference as a paranoid 

abstraction. 
74 

If Australia has "woken up" the world on China's interference, 

as a senior Pentagon official puts it, it has been able to do so 

for five reasons. First, the debate originated inside the 

Chinese Australian community and has distinguished what the 

party is doing from its subjective ~""-"""'""·-""''-""~~="-"-""-""""'''"""~=· 

Second, Australia has sidestepped important but 

unproductive normative arguments about what China "is" and 

instead focused on empirical questions about what the 

Chinese party-state is doing. Third, the government 

commissioned a thorough cross-agency investigation that 

supported a firm internal consensus. Fourth, participants 

have worked hard to define the line that separates legitimate 

influence in an open society from intrusive interference. 

Finally, the principles are framed to apply equally to all 

countries that engage in covert, corrupting, or coercive 

behavior. 

Turnbull aims to build a consensus around the defense of core 

democratic values and institutions, something Australia's 

opposition Labor Party is likely to support. And Canberra is 

increasingly finding common cause with other democracies, 

including the United States. But there is a very long way to 

go. 

Australia and the democratic world need to reinforce 

independent Chinese-language media platforms so that 

diaspora communities are not forced to rely on news that has 

been filtered by Beijing. Universities need new processes to 

ensure transparency, restore the integrity of research, and 

rebuild China literacy. journalists, writers, and politicians 

need to avoid loose generalizations that make it easier for the 

party to make its case against them. And diplomats need to 

ensure that the relationship with China is a tool for achieving 
75 

national objectives, not an end in itself. 

Intelligence agencies have begun to articulate their concerns, 

but they now need to go further. Warning about an abstract 

risk to "sovereignty" is not as helpful as explaining the modus 

operandi. And although U.S. agencies may be following 

Australia's lead, Australian agencies should borrow from the 

playbook of S_p__ecial Prosecutor Robert Mueller and use the 

prosecution process as an opportunity to advance public 

education. To date, journalists and politicians have had to 

carry too much of the load. 

Australia has no choice but to work with the strengths and 

shore up the vulnerabilities of its open, multiculturaL 

democratic system. It will match spies against spies when it 

has to. But, like all liberal democracies, it will only truly 

succeed when it can battle it out with evidence and reasoned 

argument on open terrain. 

JOHN GARNAUT is the founder of JG Global, a strategic risk advisory. He previously 

worked as China correspondent for Fairfax Media and was Senior Adviser to Prime 

Minister Malcolm Turnbull. 

© Foreign Affairs 
76 

STATEMENT OF 

HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN 

VICE PRESIDENT 

LEIDOS HEALTH 

BEFORE llSTH CONGRESS 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITIEE 

1 
77 

Introduction 

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the Committee, 

thank you for this opportunity to address you today as a private citizen and in a personal 

capacity on the topic of "State and Non-State Actor Influence Operations: Recommendation for 

U.S. National Security". My knowledge on this topic stems from my time as an employee of the 

U.S. government and I currently do not work in the field of information operations nor have I 

received, directly or indirectly, any compensation for work in the field since departing 

government service in January 2017. That said, I trust my experience as a career special 

operations officer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict, and Special Envoy and Coordinator for the Global Engagement Center (GEC) at the 

Department of State will be helpful in providing perspective as Congress assesses the U.S. 

government's strategy, capabilities and overall effort towards countering state and non-state 

sponsored propaganda and influence operations. 

From my time leading the GEC, I'm familiar with the bicameral interest and bipartisan 

engagement by Members of Congress on these important issues. First established by Executive 

Order 13721, the mission of the GEC was expanded by the 2017 National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA) to include counter-state propaganda and disinformation efforts, well beyond its 

original charter which directed the Center to diminish the influence of terrorist organizations 

such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the information domain. This congressional 

mandate was a big step in the right direction; for the first time a single entity was charged with 

leading, synchronizing, and coordinating efforts of the Federal Government towards countering 

foreign state and non-state disinformation efforts. 

I believe Congress has correctly identified such information operations as an ongoing and 

persistent threat to U.S. national security interests. Unfortunately, and based on my previous 

experience in government, I am similarly convinced that we are still far from where we 

ultimately need to be in order to successfully protect and defend those national interests in the 

modern information environment. 

I am very pleased to be joined here today by General Phil Breedlove and Mr. John Garnaut. I 

believe we are collectively postured to address your questions on the issue at hand. 

The Current Situation 

Since the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, which arguably was the last period in 

history when the U.S. successfully engaged in sustained information warfare and counter-state 

propaganda efforts, advances in technology have enabled instantaneous global 

communications; we are living in a hyper-connected world where the flow of information 

moves across borders in real time and across traditional and social media platforms. The lines 

2 
78 

of authority and effort between public diplomacy, public affairs, and information warfare have 

blurred to the point where in many cases information is consumed by U.S. and foreign 

audiences at the same time via the same methods. 

While the means and methods of communication have transformed dramatically, most of the 

laws and policies governing how the U.S. government responds to sophisticated information 

operations and disinformation campaigns by foreign adversaries have remained unchanged. It 

is true that there has been some tinkering and tweaking, but nothing substantive or 

transformational. Put simply, our institutions have not kept pace with the evolving threats. 

Lack of Accountability and Oversight 

Antiquated bureaucratic structures and traditional lines of authority remain a significant 

impediment to progress. To date, there is not a single individual in the U.S. government below 

the President of the United States who is responsible for managing U.S. information 

dissemination and providing strategic guidance for how to confront our adversaries in the 

information environment. While the 2017 NOAA mandated that GEC lead, organize, and 

synchronize U.S. government counter-propaganda and disinformation efforts against state and 

non-state actors abroad, it failed to elevate the head of the GEC to a position of authority 

commensurate with its expansive mission. The GEC operates at the Assistant Secretary level 

and lacks the necessary authority to direct the Interagency. In practice, this means that the 

GEC is considered at best a peer to a half dozen regional or functional bureaus at the State 

Department and numerous disparate organizations at the Defense Department, to say nothing 

of the other departments and agencies that have an important stake in this fight. Simply put, 

although the GEC is directed by law with the mission to lead the Interagency, the practical 

reality is that its role is reduced to simply a "suggesting" function which agencies can choose to 

follow or not follow as they see fit. The result is a significant misalignment of responsibility, 

authority, and accountability which will without doubt continue to hamper efforts until and 

unless corrected by statute. 

To correct this imbalance, I believe that elevating the GEC and it role of leading, coordinating, 

and synchronizing U.S. government efforts in the information environment to something similar 

to what the Office of National Intelligence does for the intelligence community would bring the 

appropriate alignment of responsibility, authority, and accountability while minimizing 

significant bureaucratic tension and cost. 

Such an elevation in stature would enable the GEC to advocate for resourcing levels for the 

Interagency as well as drive a single information strategy and bring discipline to the whole of 

government efforts. I know firsthand that many talented people in government are working 

3 
79 

these issues thoughtfully and diligently; unfortunately, they are not always working in unison 

because they are answering to different leaders with different priorities. 

The Limitations of Truth and Bureaucracy 

It is not unreasonable to think that the U.S. will always be at some disadvantage against our 

adversaries in the information environment. We are a nation of laws where truth and ethics 

are expected, and rightly so. Our enemies, on the contrary, are not constrained by ethics, the 

truth, or even the law. Our adversaries, both state and non-state actors, can and will continue 

to bombard all forms of communication with their messages in attempts to influence public 

perception, create doubt of our actions or intentions, and recruit people to their cause. We 

must ensure that we organize U.S. government efforts in such a manner that maximize desired 

outcomes through discipline, agility, and innovation. 

When using the terms agility and innovation, the U.S. government is generally not the first thing 

to come to mind. This is especially true in the information environment as anyone who has 

served in government can attest. For example, it remains difficult to introduce new social 

media analytic tools and forensic tools onto government IT systems because of lengthy and 

highly complicated compliance processes. Although these tools are crucial to understanding the 

social media landscape and are required to ensure the U.S. efforts are hitting the right audience 

with the right message at the right time, we are often hampered by bureaucratic hurdles and 

outdated systems. Analytic tools are advancing as fast as the information environment itself 

and any lag in implementation can have a devastating effect. 

To be clear, these tools cost money and it takes significant resources to train on these everadvancing capabilities. While budgets for U.S. government information warfare and counterpropaganda efforts have increased significantly in recent years, they still pale in comparison to 

the resources applied to kinetic efforts. As single kinetic strike against a high value terrorist can 

tally into the hundreds of millions of dollars when conducted outside the area of active armed 

hostilities (when adding intelligence efforts before or after the strike) and in many cases, only 

have short term affects. While many obstacles can be overcome by new authorities and 

clarification on lines of authority, we must be clear that, simply put, more investment is also 

required. 

Even when fully resourced and masterfully executed, information warfare and counterpropaganda efforts contain a high element of risk. While bureaucracy in government is 

necessary to standardize routine tasks, it cannot be left to control the totality of our efforts in 

the information environment. The bureaucratic standard operating procedure strives to reduce 

risk to almost zero which, while appropriate in certain circumstances, is not effective in the 

information space. A failure to accept a reasonable degree of risk can ultimately lead to diluted 

messaging efforts and result in missing the correct audience with an effective message that 

shifts their thought and/or behavior to our desired end state. To be successful in this fight we 

4 
80 

must learn to accept a higher level of risk and accept the fact that sometimes we are just going 

to get it wrong despite our best efforts. When we do get it wrong, we must learn, adapt, and 

iterate our message rapidly to be relevant and effective. 

In Conclusion 

I applaud Congress as whole, and especially the Armed Services Committees of both chambers, 

for its leadership in seeking to address the urgent threats of disinformation and propaganda 

campaigns from state and non-state actors. Indeed, Congress has driven the Executive Branch 

to make real progress. That said, much more still needs to be done in order to even catch up 

with our adversaries, let alone effectively compete against them. 

5 
81 

Michael D. Lumpkin 

Phone: 202.679.4804 

Email: warlordfrog@gmail.com 

WORK EXPERIENCE 

Leidos Health 

Reston, VA 

Vice President for Human Performance and Behavioral Health 

12/17- Present 

Designs and implements performance programs focused on optimizing human performance. 

Manages the daily operations and P&L (profit and loss) of this emerging health sector. 

Neptune 

Washington, DC 

Principal 

3/17-12/17 

Conducts research and consulting in the fields of defense, finance and health care focused on 

providing our clients access to highly regulated federal markets. 

Department of State 

Washington, DC 

Special Envoy/Coordinator for the Global Engagement Center 

1/16- 1117 

Served as the leader and manager of the new effort to combat the online messaging of terrorist 

groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 

Specific accomplishments include: 

Hand selected to design, build, and lead this organization. 

Designed social media strategies that leveraged private industry social 

media companies to maximize their capabilities while minimizing the cost to US 

taxpayers. 

Built an innovative and agile capability that fully leveraged cutting edge 

data analytic tools to ensure the right message was received by the right audience at the 

right time. 
82 

Department of Defense, Pentagon 

Washington, DC 

12/13-1116 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) 

Nominated by President Obama and con finned by the U.S. Senate to serve as the principal 

civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict 

matters to include oversight of policy and resources. These core tasks include counterterrorism; 

unconventional warfare; direct action; special reconnaissance; foreign intemal defense; civil 

affairs, info1111ation and psychological operations; and counterproliferation ofWMD. In addition 

to policy oversight for special operations and stability operations capabilities, provided policy 

oversight for strategic capabilities and force transformation and resources. This includes 

oversight of capability development to include general-purpose forces and the Department's 

suppoti of counter narcotics activities. After the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, served as the 

principal oflicial charged with oversight over all warfighting capabilities within the senior 

civilian management of the Department of Defense. 

Specific accomplishments include: 

Simultaneously served as Acting Under Secretary for Policy. 

Led the Department's Task Force that oversaw the eradication ofEbola in 

Liberia. Sought and received emergency $1 billion dollar congressional reprogramming 

effort to support this effort. 

Oversaw DoD's efforts to retum Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl to US control 

from the Taliban after five years of confinement. 

Restructured DoD's Prisoner of War (POW) and Missing in Action (MIA) 

accounting community to be more responsive to families and their loved ones. 

Provided oversight of U.S. Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) 

$10.6 billion dollar budget. 

Championed and sought congressional support and budgets that led to the 

growth of the USSOCOM. 

Awarded the Distinguished Public Service Medal 

Department of Defense, Pentagon 

Washington, DC 

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

5/13-12/13 

Recruited by Secretary Chuck Hagel to serve as advisor to Secretary of Defense on personnel 

and readiness issues of the a1111ed services. Specific emphasis on the redesigning the military's 

electronic health records ensuring capability with the Department of Veterans Affairs and 

restructuring Departmental oversight and accountability in combatting sexual assault in the 

military. 

Awarded the Distinguished Public Service Medal 
83 

Industrial Security Alliance Partners, USA 5/12-4/13 

Chief Executive Officer 

Responsible for all aspects of management oflndustrial Security Alliance Partners (!SAP) 

holding company, its wholly owned subsidiaries, and relationships with key partners. Led and 

managed the profit and loss aspects or six companies focused on the national security sector. 

!SAP product offerings include innovative energy solutions, tactical equipment, and tactical 

training facilities. Served as a voting member of the Board of Directors and interacted daily with 

shareholders and customers on a daily basis. 

Department of Defense, Pentagon 

Washington, DC 

Consultant to the Secretary of Defense 

Served as on-call, unpaid consultant to the Secretary of Defense. 

Department of Defense, Pentagon 

Washington, DC 

5/12-4/13 

4/ll- 5/12 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict (SO/LIC) 

In addition to duties of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary served as Assistant Secretary from 

April until December of2011. Served as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of 

Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters to include oversight of policy 

and resources. These core tasks include counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; direct action; 

special reconnaissance; foreign internal defense; civil affairs, information and psychological 

operations; and counterproliferation ofWMD. In addition to policy oversight for special 

operations and stability operations capabilities, provided policy oversight for strategic 

capabilities and force transformation and resources. This includes oversight of capability 

development to include general-purpose forces and the Department's support of counter 

narcotics activities. After the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, served as the principal official 

charged with oversight over all warfighting capabilities within the senior management of the 

Department of Defense. 

Specific accomplishments include: 

Served as both Principal Deputy and Acting Assistant Secretary for much 

of incumbency. 

Coordinated USSOCOM policies and objectives with Interagency 

counterparts as a member of the Counter Terrorism Board of Directors. 

Reorganized oversight of USSOCOM, ensuring availability of the special 

operations capacity critical to the National Security Strategy. The reorganization 
84 

significantly enhanced the Department's oversight of USSOCOM's $10.4 billion-dollar 

budget and 66,000-member force. 

Effectively advocated for both critical special operations capabilities and 

the building partnership capacity mission which resulted in programmatic gro\\lth in both 

areas despite significant budget reductions within the Department over the next ten years. 

Designed and oversaw the implementation of the Department's Counter 

Threat Finance mission, including the development of the Department of Defense 

Counter Threat Finance cells in Iraq, Afghanistan, and at the Combatant Commands, 

which has significantly degraded terrorist capabilities. 

Restructured the Department's strategy for supporting interagency 

counternarcotic efforts. EtTectively designed a threat based model that realized significant 

et1iciencies and cost savings in this $1.48 billion-dollar program while enhancing 

support. 

Provided oversight of sensitive special operations which significantly 

weakened al-Qaida and its affiliates resolving threats to the homeland abroad. 

Twice awarded Outstanding Public Service Medal. 

Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC 8/10-4/11 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary/Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 

Served as Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on issues specific to Veteran 

health care and benefits. As the only Veteran of either Iraq or Afghanistan in the Office of the 

Secretary, provided insight on those concerns specific to the current generation of Veterans. As 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, oversaw the Department's operations on behalf of the 

Secretary and served as principal interface with the Under Secretaries of Health, Benefits, and 

National Cemeteries. 

Specific accomplishments include: 

ATI 

Served as interlocutor between the Department, White House, Department 

of Defense, Veteran Service Organizations, and the Congress in the successful 

development and implementation of a comprehensive caregiver support program for post 

9/11 Veterans. Developed supporting budgeting and spend plans for $1.5 billion dollars 

over 5-year implementation based on new legislation. This program has been universally 

praised by its participants and all stakeholders. 

Restructured the Department's Office of Small and Disadvantaged 

Business Utilization (OSDBU) to ensure it was effectively servicing Veterans through 

rapid status veriiication. The verification process was streamlined which significantly 

reduced processing time and improved accuracy. 

Coordinated execution within the Depanment for the Secretary's vision to 

end Veteran's homelessness by 2015. 

4/08-8/10 

Executive Director of Business Development 
85 

Responsible for both business generation and overall operations of this midsized defense 

business focused on tailored logistics and complex distribution. 

Department ofthe Navy 

Naval Officer 

10/86-9/07 

US Navy SEAL who held every leadership position fi·om Platoon 

Commander to Team Commanding Officer. Veteran of numerous campaigns and 

contingency operations around the world that included deployments to Afghanistan, 

Colombia, Iraq, Panama, Philippines, and Somalia. Served on active duty in the U.S. 

Navy for 21 years. 

Unique assignments/specific accomplishments: 

USSOCOM Oftice of Legislative Aflairs. Served as USSOCOM's liaison 

to Capitol Hill. Represented USSOCOM's equities to both House and Senate authorizers 

and appropriators. 

Deputy Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force Arabian 

Peninsula. Oversaw the daily operations of2,000 special operators and supporting 

personnel in 40 locations throughout Iraq. 

Commanding Officer of Naval Small Craft and Technical Training School 

• Qualified as both US Navy SEAL and Surface Warfare Officer. 

Received over 40 awards and citations for superior performance both on 

and off the battlefield. 

Highest Education 

Naval Postgraduate School 1995 

Master of Arts, National Security Affairs 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 21, 2018 

(89) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The internet has significantly changed propaganda delivery. Social 

media platforms have lowered the cost of entry, while simultaneously increasing targeting fidelity and output. These activities are not necessarily cyber operations but 

do occur through cyberspace. The elevation of cyberspace as a domain of warfare 

caused us to rewrite U.S. doctrine, separating cyber operations from information operations. Our adversaries do not make this distinction. Instead of cyberspace, Russia 

refers to the information space. How do you feel the separation of cyber and IO has 

affected capability integration and effectiveness? 

General BREEDLOVE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. Declassified CIA assessments from 1983 detail specific Russian active 

measures related to the previous generations nuclear modernization and missile defense programs. For example, one report stated: ‘‘their campaign covers a whole 

spectrum of activities—from overt efforts to create a fear of nuclear war to covert 

measures, including forgeries and disinformation.’’ 

General Breedlove, how much have Russian tactics changed from the Soviet days 

and adapted themselves to new technologies? 

General BREEDLOVE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS 

Mr. BANKS. Mr. Lumpkin, last week, General Mattis met with senior U.S. and Afghan officials to discuss the military campaign addressing the Taliban threat. Despite the promising intentions of the meeting and the note that the Taliban ‘‘may’’ 

be willing to pursue negotiations, without the entire Taliban leadership on board 

or firmly engaged, these meetings continue to yield little in terms of measurable 

success. 

Hon. Lumpkin, how can the U.S. and coalition forces minimize Taliban influence 

on the domestic population so we accomplish the goal of winning the people’s hearts, 

minds, trust and commitment to democracy? 

What does this influence look like? Is it only brute force, extortion, coercion, and 

intimidation or are there sneakier, softer forms? 

Despite the U.S. air campaign ramping up, are there ways to minimize Taliban 

influence that don’t endanger American lives? 

Do you suspect any adversarial or competitive states (e.g. Russia, China, Iran) influencing against us in the war on terror in this area of responsibility? Please detail, 

if so. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. How can the U.S. and coalition forces minimize Taliban influence 

on the domestic population so we accomplish the goal of winning the people’s hearts, 

minds, trust and commitment to democracy? 

The lack of infrastructure and strong central government in Afghanistan makes 

technical influence methods largely ineffective. Technical influence delivery methods 

to include television, radio, and social media are not viable methods of influence 

when much of the population neither has access nor the infrastructure to receive 

such means of communication. Highly successful influence operations cannot be 

achieved in Afghanistan without a much larger commitment by U.S. and Coalition 

forces operating with extended horizons. 

What does influence look like? Is it only brute force, extortion, coercion, and intimidation or are there sneakier, softer forms? 

Influence is dependent on the targeted audience. Variables like audience culture, 

size, and available infrastructure must be taken into consideration. Many variables 

must be factored into creating a discrete program to achieve very specific goals 

against a targeted audience. The most effective methods of influence do not consist 

of brute force, extortion, coercion, and intimidation. Subtle influence methods where 
90 

the audience does not overtly recognize that they are targeted are the most effective 

methods. 

Despite the U.S. air campaign ramping up, are there ways to minimize Taliban 

influence that don’t endanger American lives? 

No. American lives will be endangered as long as we continue operations in Afghanistan. It is the nature of military operations during open hostilities or low intensity conflict. 

Do you suspect any adversarial or competitive states (e.g. Russia, China, Iran) influencing against us in the war on terror to this area of responsibility? Please detail, 

if so. 

Indeed there are adversarial or competitive States that are actively influencing 

both the Taliban and general population in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s neighboring 

States are actively conducting direct and indirect influence operations in the country. This key influencing neighbors of Afghanistan are Iran and Pakistan. Each is 

conducting influence operation to achieve their own specific goals. 

Mr. BANKS. Mr. Lumpkin, thank you for your service as well as for your frank 

and hard-hitting testimony. I agree that our adversaries have taken advantage of 

the U.S. rule of law and order with their disregard for any adherence to international norms of conduct. Your assessment of the Global Engagement Center 

(GEC) is helpful as well. 

How do you envision a GEC with the right authorities and capabilities, works 

within the law, and is still nimble enough to outpace strategic competitors, but also 

doesn’t create another bureaucracy? 

While the Director of National Intelligence has a number of authorities and duties 

as the principal intelligence advisor to the President with a well-defined intelligence 

community, the stakeholders within the ‘‘information environment’’ are not as well 

defined across the U.S. Government. How well defined the stakeholders in the ‘‘information environment’’ in law? If they are not well-defined, what is the remedy? 

How do you envision this future GEC working in conjunction with the National 

Security Council and Staff? How would you delineate responsibilities between the 

two? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. How do you envision a GEC with right authorities an capabilities, 

works within the law, and is still nimble enough to outpace strategic competitors, but 

also doesn’t create another bureaucracy? 

The GEC should be orchestrating the information activities in the federal government and not actually conducting information operations themselves. A narrow 

charter will limit bureaucratic growth and allow for agility. At the same time, Congress should be actively involved in providing strong and robust oversight to ensure 

that the GEC has the correct capabilities in the ever-evolving information environment. 

While the Director of National Intelligence has a number of authorities and duties 

as the principal intelligence advisor to the President with a well-defined intelligence 

community, the stakeholders within the ‘‘information environment’’ are not well defined across the U.S. Government. How well defined are the stakeholders in the ‘‘information environment’’ in law? If they are not well defined, what is the remedy? 

I strongly recommend Congress conduct an ‘‘information environment’’ review of 

both the oversight structure and laws surrounding the key elements to include Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and Information Operations. Each has unique laws 

and policies as well oversight structure. The means of communication and influence 

have drastically evolved over the past twenty years but the laws and governance 

structure have failed to keep pace. 

How do you envision this future GEC working in conjunction with the National 

Security Council and Staff? How would you delineate responsibilities between the 

two? 

I believe the GEC Director should be both Senate confirmed and a member of the 

National Security Council. Like the Director of National Intelligence, this would provide a structure for open and full interoperability between the GEC and National 

Security Council. 

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