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i 

65–466 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–18] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES HEARING 

ON

COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGY AND 

THE FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL 

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT 

REDUCTION AGENCY AND CHEMICAL 

BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 11, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

PETER VILLANO, Professional Staff Member 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

JEFF CULLEN, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Friday, March 11, 2011, Counterproliferation Strategy and the Fiscal Year 

2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency and Chemical Biological Defense Program ............ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Friday, March 11, 2011 ........................................................................................... 33 

FRIDAY, MARCH 11, 2011 

COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGY AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2012 

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE 

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 2 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ............................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Handelman, Hon. Kenneth B., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ...................................... 3 

Myers, Kenneth A., III, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency ................. 6 

Scarbrough, BG Jess A., USA, Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical 

and Biological Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense .............................. 7 

Weber, Hon. Andrew, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, U.S. Department of Defense ............... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Handelman, Hon. Kenneth B. ......................................................................... 40 

Langevin, Hon. James R. ................................................................................. 39 

Myers, Kenneth A., III ..................................................................................... 66 

Scarbrough, BG Jess A. ................................................................................... 90 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac ...................................................................................... 37 

Weber, Hon. Andrew ........................................................................................ 55 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 103 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Thornberry ................................................................................................. 107 

Mr. Ruppersberger ........................................................................................... 110 
(1) 

COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGY AND THE FISCAL 

YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, 

Washington, DC, Friday, March 11, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:44 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The hearing will come to order. 

Let me thank all our witnesses and guests for their patience as 

we have had votes on the floor. 

I appreciate everybody being with us today on this hearing related to counterproliferation strategy as well as the 2012 budget request for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the chemical 

biological defense programs. 

I think that there has been widespread agreement among those 

who have run for President and most others that the greatest single danger to this country’s national security is a weapon of mass 

destruction, which could be detonated here on our shores. 

As a matter of fact, I noticed in yesterday’s Washington Times 

is a press report quoting a study to Congress that says: While 

counterterrorism actions have disrupted Al Qaeda’s near-term effort to develop a sophisticated WMD [weapon of mass destruction] 

attack capability, we judge the group is still intent on its acquisition. 

So all of us ought to remember their intention and what they will 

do if they can get their hands on such a weapon. 

I notice that the 2010 QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] says 

that as the ability to create and employ weapons of mass destruction spreads globally, so must our combined efforts to detect, interdict, and contain the effects of those weapons. And that is what 

this hearing is about. 

Since 2002, the government has basically had a three-prong 

strategy: Nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence 

management. This hearing focuses primarily on 

counterproliferation, but it is important I think for us to look at the 
2 

whole strategy. And I appreciate the witnesses’ statements that 

have helped us do that. 

I do notice that as far as the budget goes, for 2012 for DTRA [the Defense Threat Reduction Agency], the request is about $76 million 

less than the 2011 request and the amount that this committee authorized. And for the Chemical Biological Defense Program, it is 

about $52 million less than the 2011 request. So it does lead one 

to wonder, why are these accounts going down? Although, we all 

are, of course, aware of the budget situation the country faces. 

So, again, I appreciate our witnesses being here. Before I turn 

to them, let me turn to the ranking member for any comments he 

would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to likewise welcome our witnesses before the subcommittee today. And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this very important hearing on a clearly important topic to our 

national security. The work obviously being done at the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, and Chemical Biological Defense Program is essential to keeping the Nation secure. With so many other 

pressing things going on in the world, it can be often easy to forget 

that we face many threats around the world, in particular with respect to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats to 

the country. 

Likewise, so I am glad that we are focusing attention on the 

work being done at DTRA and the Chemical Biological Defense 

Program. I look forward to getting an update on the work that you 

all are doing. 

I likewise, Mr. Chairman, am concerned about the reduction and 

the decrease in the budget request for fiscal year 2012 or fiscal 

year 2011, and I would like the witnesses to delve into those things 

in particular. And then I have other questions. 

So, with that, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing. And I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman. 

We will now turn to our witnesses. 

We have the Honorable Kenneth B. Handelman, Acting Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs; Mr. Andrew 

Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical 

and Biological Defense programs; Mr. Kenneth Myers, Director of 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and, Brigadier General Jess 

Scarbrough, Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense. 

If you all could, we would appreciate summarizing your statements in the interest of time. And, without objection, your complete 

written statements will be made part of the record. 

Mr. Handelman. 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH B. HANDELMAN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Langevin, members of the 

subcommittee, it is an honor to testify today with three close colleagues on the Department’s counterproliferation strategy and our 

efforts more broadly to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction. I would like to focus my opening remarks on an area that 

has attracted some significant attention; that is DOD’s [the Department of Defense’s] work on biodefense. 

Now, let me be clear about the administration’s WMD priorities 

overall. The President has said that the greatest threat to the 

United States is a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist. However, the President has also given a similar high priority to biodefense. The December 2010 National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats highlighted the significant threat to our people, our 

coalition partners, and our forces posed by especially dangerous 

pathogens. 

Sometimes it is not so obvious why DOD should care so much 

about biodefense issues. Let me briefly highlight why we care, and 

very much. 

First, biodefense is not merely about the health of U.S. troops 

and their families. It is about the ability of U.S. troops to fight and 

win in an environment that might be compromised by diseases 

against which we have no protection or treatment. 

Second, even if U.S. Forces are prepared to fight in such an environment, our doctrine and our force structure require that we fight 

alongside coalition partners. If our partners are vulnerable to biothreats, then we can count them out of the fight right from the 

start. 

Third, biodefense is an area where we can use modest investments prior to a conflict to maximize our capabilities during a conflict. Here are some of the things we are already doing in this area. 

To limit proliferation of especially dangerous pathogens, we are 

working with partner countries in areas where dangerous diseases 

are endemic to improve laboratory, physical security, and security 

practices. 

To improve our understanding of dangerous diseases that could 

impact our troops, we are expanding our cooperative research 

projects with partner countries and leveraging the U.S. military’s 

overseas lab network. 

To improve our early warning posture we are pursuing a disease 

surveillance capability that will give us a heads up about the origin 

and potency of outbreaks that could threaten our forces or our population. 

These are just a few examples of how DOD is trying to get ahead 

of what we believe is an underaddressed challenge. I want to emphasize how closely we coordinate with our colleagues in the public 

health business without getting into their business. 

We have been careful to maintain our focus on national security 

and avoid overlap with the efforts of established U.S. public health 

outreach overseas. But it is very important that DOD engage aggressively in this global biodefense effort. DOD and State are the 

only U.S. agencies with authority to develop biodefense relation-
4 

ships with partners around the globe in support of U.S. national 

security, and DOD, of course, has a special equity given how frequently and far afield we deploy our troops. 

Our work in this area is still in its infancy. We have a great 

partnership with other U.S. agencies, and we are learning important lessons. I want to leave you with two of those lessons as I 

wrap up. 

First, we have learned that, as with other weapons of mass destruction, threats to our forces are best addressed at the source in 

regions where dangerous diseases originate. And, second, we have 

learned that even as we carefully deconflict our biodefense work 

with the activities of our public health colleagues, there is really 

no way to draw a bright line between national security and public 

health. 

Mr. Chairman, I wanted to use my opening remarks to focus on 

DOD’s biodefense activities because this is a conversation that we 

need to expand with the committee. As biological science becomes 

more accessible and borders less secure, we believe that this threat 

will only increase and DOD’s biodefense activities will increase as 

well. And I look forward to discussing these and other issues with 

you today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Handelman can be found in the 

Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

Mr. Weber. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW WEBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND 

BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary WEBER. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Langevin, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for giving 

me this opportunity to discuss with you Department of Defense efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction. It is an honor to 

come before you today to testify with my close colleagues. 

Our offices work to ensure the Department of Defense’s posture 

to counter 21st-century WMD threats to our warfighters and citizens here and abroad. Accomplishing this has become more difficult 

recently due to the constraints of operating under a continuing resolution. 

Rapid advancements in technology and manufacturing techniques are making it easier for an adversary, whether state or 

nonstate, to develop biological and chemical weapons. The threat is 

real. As stated in the National Strategy for Countering Biological 

Threats, fanatics have expressed interest in developing and using 

biological weapons against us and our allies. 

The Chemical and Biological Defense Program provides the capabilities needed for a layered set of defensive measures against 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. These integrated capabilities improve our ability to sense chemical and biological warfare agents, shield our servicemembers, shape our operations, and sustain our forces. 

One capability that is fielded now with our forces in over 300 locations worldwide is the Joint Biological Agent Identification and 
5 

Diagnostic System. It is capable of rapidly identifying multiple biological agents, such as anthrax, plague, and avian influenza. 

Detection and diagnostics capabilities like this play a large role 

in biosurveillance, which is critically important to the Department. 

We need early warning of a biological attack within minutes, not 

days, through a comprehensive global biosurveillance network. 

Should an attack occur, we must be prepared to respond. 

In last year’s State of the Union address, President Obama directed the enhancement of the Nation’s capability to develop, license, and procure countermeasures against both bioterrorist attacks and naturally occurring infectious diseases. We are preparing 

to execute a medical countermeasures initiative that will provide 

agile and flexible advanced development and manufacturing capabilities to protect our warfighters against known agents and emerging threats for which countermeasures do not exist. 

President Obama has stated that one of today’s greatest dangers 

is nuclear terrorism. We believe Al Qaeda and their associates are 

seeking nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. It is clear 

that they would use such weapons if they managed to obtain them. 

Our offices are the focal point within the Department for both 

maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent, and 

countering nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats. 

In February, I visited the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air 

Force Base in Montana. I observed the execution of this critical deterrence mission and thanked the extraordinary airmen responsible 

for providing our Nation with this essential capability. 

In order to reduce the risk of emerging nuclear-armed adversaries, the Department of Defense is working with the Departments of Energy and State to implement the President’s Global 

Nuclear Lockdown Initiative to secure vulnerable fissile materiel 

worldwide. We are also working to improve the Nation’s capabilities in nuclear detection and forensics. 

To keep Congress fully informed of the U.S. Government’s development and fielding of countering WMD capabilities, the 

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee will provide an 

updated report in May of this year. It will relate prioritized capability gaps to programs and resources. 

The threat of a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack on our 

troops or the homeland is real and constantly evolving. This means 

the Department of Defense must develop and implement agile and 

effective programs to counter weapons of mass destruction. In support of the vision of President Obama and Secretary Gates, the Department is working to strengthen our capabilities to effectively 

prevent, deter, defeat, and respond to these threats. I ask for your 

support of the fiscal year 2011 appropriations bill and the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request so that we can work to 

achieve these goals. 

I appreciate the opportunity you have given me to testify today, 

and would be pleased to answer any questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Weber can be found in the 

Appendix on page 55.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Myers. 
6 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MYERS III, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY 

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin, and 

members of the committee, it is an honor to be here today. 

I will address the roles of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

and our Nation’s counterproliferation and consequence management efforts in the fiscal year 2012 budget. 

The mission of the nearly 2,000 civilian and military personnel 

of DTRA is to reduce, eliminate, detect, and counter weapons of 

mass destruction and mitigate their effects. We proudly serve as 

the combat support agency for the WMD mission. 

I am also the Director of the U.S. Strategic Command Center for 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The center is responsible 

for the synchronization of planning across the combatant commands. 

The threat is very real. It is growing in scope and evolving in its 

potential applications. The presence of international terrorism, the 

proliferation of weapons know-how, and the emergence of infectious 

diseases have all changed the game. The consequences of an attack 

would cause mass casualties, have a crippling economic impact, 

and cause major sociological harm. Terrorists are determined to acquire WMD and, if successful, will use them. 

We have an increasingly effective national strategy for countering the threat. It harnesses expertise across the whole of government and the international community. The new National Strategy 

for Countering Biological Threats, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the national military strategy all highlight the pressing 

need to build additional and more effective barriers between the 

threat and the American people. 

We work to reduce WMD threats at their source, detect, interdict 

and defeat them, and minimize the effects and consequences of possible attacks. We provide subject matter expertise to national, global, and battlefield levels. We conduct technology development and 

assist the warfighter with planning and help maintain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent. 

As you walk down the halls of our facilities, you see nuclear 

physicists, microbiologists, and Special Forces operators working 

together to solve complex problems. We truly are a unique institution. I would like to highlight some of our recent accomplishments. 

We successfully transitioned the Massive Ordnance Penetrator to 

the Air Force. It is a 30,000-pound penetrating weapon significantly more lethal and accurate than current weapons in the inventory to defeat hardened, deeply buried, potential WMD targets. 

In the past year, DTRA responded to 1,500 reach-back requests 

from the combatant commanders and the National Guard WMD 

civil support teams for subject-matter expertise. The total number 

of requests has more than tripled since 2008, and the product has 

become increasingly more complex. We provide support to everything from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Super Bowl 

and the State of the Union address. 

Over the last year, we have made great strides in improving the 

Department’s counter-WMD campaign plan. It details what the 

Pentagon will do to address the threat over the next 5 years, and 
7 

will have goals, tasks, and assessments that will gauge our 

progress. 

DTRA is placing great emphasis on protecting our military personnel against naturally occurring and manmade dangerous pathogens. Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Biological Engagement 

Program, we are working with the Departments of State, Health 

and Human Services, and Agriculture to improve biosurveillance 

and security with new partners in Africa and Asia. 

In addition, through the Medical Countermeasures Initiative, we 

will safeguard our troops against disease and deadly pathogens. 

Force protection programs such as these are a top priority for our 

warfighter and for DTRA. 

DTRA is reshaping our efforts through our latest strategic plan. 

It responds to evolving threats while taking into account the difficult economic situation. Our plan has three goals: First, adapt to 

and shape the dynamic global security environment; two, provide 

counter-WMD capabilities to meet current threats and challenges; 

and three, institutionalize a whole of DTRA and whole of government approach to enhance mission execution through collaboration. 

Members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the invitation to 

testify on our mission and for your support of the DTRA SEC in 

prior years. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers can be found in the Appendix on page 66.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF BG JESS A. SCARBROUGH, USA, JOINT PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

General SCARBROUGH. I thank the chairman and ranking member for the honor of testifying on behalf of the Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program. This program provides the joint warfighter with chemical and biological detection 

and reconnaissance systems, individual and collective protection capabilities, decontamination products, information management systems, and medical countermeasures. 

In fiscal year 2010, we provided over 1 million pieces of integrated chemical and biological defense capability to our soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, and marines. 

Consistent with our mission to protect the joint warfighter and 

the Nation, we are tasked with the mission of developing and integrating biological defense technologies to enable biosurveillance, 

which includes the early warning, identification, and tracking of biological threats. Toward that end, we are collaborating with the 

Department of Homeland Security’s BioWatch program to maintain 

a domestic capability. 

Regarding our acquisition portfolio, we are developing adaptable 

and flexible approaches to detect biological threats early enough to 

initiate a rapid and effective response as called for in the National 

Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. 

Improved detection and precise diagnostics are fundamental to 

biosurveillance and are key areas of our expertise in the Chemical 

and Biological Defense Program. We develop and integrate state-of- 
8 

the-art detection and diagnostic systems to enable both force protection and force health protection. A new program start in fiscal 

year 2012, the Next Generation Diagnostic System Program will 

develop a family of systems that provide improved diagnostics capabilities across all operational echelons. 

Another new start in the budget request before you is the DOD 

Medical Countermeasures Initiative. Based on the President’s request to redesign the United States medical countermeasures enterprise in collaboration with the Department of Health and 

Human Services, DOD plans to execute or establish a dedicated advanced development and flexible manufacturing capability for medical countermeasures. HHS [the Department of Health and Human 

Services] is focused on large-scale production to address the needs 

of the national population while we in the DOD are looking to address the unique needs of the joint warfighter. 

During early fiscal year 2012, the DOD plans to award a longterm contract to establish and commission this advanced development and manufacturing capability. This new effort is aligned with 

the DOD mission of protecting our people. 

In addition to the biological threat, the Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program is focusing on other challenges, such as nontraditional agents. These are chemicals and biochemicals reportedly researched or developed with potential application or intent as chemical warfare agents but which do not fall into the category of traditional chemical warfare agents. I can assure this subcommittee we 

are developing capabilities to counter this threat. 

Critical to making required investments in biosurveillance 

diagnostics, the DOD Medical Countermeasures Initiative and nontraditional agent defense is finding efficiencies within the current 

programs and operations. Pursuant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directive for better 

buying power, we are integrating measures to ensure all of our programs are affordable and provide a positive on return on investment for the taxpayer. 

This subcommittee understands we face a broad array of threats 

within a changing and uncertain environment. Accordingly, I urge 

support for funding the development of improved chemical and biological defense capabilities as outlined in the fiscal year 2012 DOD 

budget request. 

On behalf of the men and women of the Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program, I thank this subcommittee for the opportunity to 

testify, and I look forward to our discussion. 

[The prepared statement of General Scarbrough can be found in 

the Appendix on page 90.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

And let me thank you all for your brevity in summarizing what 

is an important and somewhat complex topic. Let me just ask one 

question, and then I will turn it to Mr. Langevin. 

When we talk with folks—and probably for you primarily, Mr. 

Handelman—when we talk to folks about cybersecurity, they tell 

us that the numbers and the sophistication of the threat is growing 

at a very rapid rate, but our ability to deal with the threat is not 

growing as fast. So the gap between the problem and the solution 

is growing wider. 
9 

My question for you all is, how is the gap doing between the proliferation in numbers and in sophistication of chemical, biological, 

and nuclear weapons around the world, and our nonproliferation 

and counterproliferation efforts to deal with that? Is the gap growing bigger, or are we closing in on it? 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is an apt comparison. In the 

cyber world, which actually, in another hat, I share some responsibility for, one of the real intriguing challenges is that it is almost 

completely dual-use. Among the WMD areas, the three areas, nuclear, chem, and bio, bio is the one that is mostly dual-use. In other 

words, it is not strictly military. 

So, in terms of your construct of the gap, my own view is that 

we are actually doing a little bit better in the bio area than in the 

cyber area. Part of that is just because, even though biological 

science is expanding, accessibility to it is expanding rapidly, it is 

not expanding the way access to the Internet and computer skills 

is expanding. 

As a bonus item, I would say, just as a comment, that one of the 

things that keeps me up at night that I have trouble figuring out 

is the combination of threats across domains. In other words, the 

unimagined, what I haven’t been able to imagine, combination of 

a bad guy who wants to somehow combine a biothreat with a cyber 

attack. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me just ask, Mr. Myers, what is your opinion? Is it getting worse? Are we closing in on it, or is it getting further away from us? 

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, I will tell you. I go to work every day 

with 2,000 people who dedicate themselves to eliminating that 

threat. To date, we have been successful. As you pointed out in 

your statement, and my colleagues have as well, the threat is constantly evolving, and the challenge is to stay ahead of it. To date, 

we are doing that. 

I believe every successful encounter that we have with states of 

the former Soviet Union, with our expansion into places in Africa, 

Asia and elsewhere, every new technology we develop, every new 

relationship that we create brings us closer to a successful in-depth 

defense for the American people. But it is a challenge every single 

day. To date, we have met that challenge, and we will continue to 

do so. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, again thank you for your testimony. 

If I could, Secretary Handelman, I would like to return to an 

area that I mentioned in my opening statement, and the chairman 

did as well, about the budget for fiscal year 2012. As you know, the 

pending fiscal year 2011 defense budget contains a significant increase in funding for our counterproliferation efforts, especially for 

DTRA, but it is decreased in the fiscal year 2012 proposed budget. 

I am sure you would agree that the world is not likely to be significantly safer in fiscal year 2012 than in fiscal year 2011. And I 

would like you to explain the Department’s choice to lower the 

spending amounts for DTRA and chem-bio protection efforts in fiscal year 2012. 
10 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Sir, with respect to the DTRA budget, as you 

may know, the budget request and the appropriated and authorized 

amount was really flat for many years. The fiscal year 2011 request was actually a significant ramp-up. The fiscal year 2012 request reflects a hard balancing of priorities across our whole department, decisions made at levels above all of us. 

I guess I am confident in the capability that that budget request 

can deliver. I would characterize it as a moderate ramp-down of 

what had been a previous ramping up. That is my view from the 

strategy and policy level. Mr. Myers has to live this every day as 

the director of the agency. He might want to amplify. 

Mr. MYERS. Thank you. 

We have taken a number of steps over the last 6 months to make 

the agency as effective and efficient as we possibly can, and we 

found a number of areas where we could combine operations, lower 

our overhead, specifically in two to three different areas. We have 

also gone and closed down two facilities, offices that we had. One 

was in Dugway, Utah. The other was supporting efforts at NATO 

[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]. The efforts that they were supporting will continue on, but we believe that we will be able to provide the same amount of support and expertise from our headquarters at Fort Belvoir than we were on site. 

Lastly, we did a strong and very strict rack and stack of all of 

our priorities, starting from the very top all the way to the very 

bottom. And those items that were at the bottom—I will give you 

one example, we have an in-house think tank that is called ASCO 

[Advanced Systems and Concepts Office]. Its job was to go out, do 

research, to find the latest thinking on various subjects. And we 

have cut back significantly in that arena. So savings from each of 

those three elements will allow us to continue operations, even at 

a lower budget level. 

General SCARBROUGH. Sir, if I could just add one comment as 

well. From an acquisition and a programmatic standpoint, we have 

been able to get some efficiencies by being joint. For example, we 

now deliver one ground respirator, the Joint Service General Purpose Mask, to all four services, the same protective mask, on the 

ground side. That has reduced some of our operations and support 

costs by being joint and delivering a common solution. The same 

thing is with our Joint Chemical Agent Detectors. We have been 

able to deliver one of those detectors across all of the services, 

thereby presenting a common solution which can then streamline 

some costs as we maintain that in the operational force. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I have studied WMD issues and been involved with them for 

many years now, whether it is in my role in the Homeland Security 

Committee or in the Armed Services Committee or Intelligence 

Committee. I clearly think that the threat in the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat fields continues to increase. We 

know our enemies are dedicated and determined. I am particularly 

concerned about the chem-bio and, of that, probably the biological 

threats that we face because of dual-use technologies, because of 

the knowledge that is out there and how that can be proliferated. 

What is the Department doing to ensure that it supports new and 
11 

evolving technology, especially in the chem-bio protection field, as 

well as surveillance? 

Secretary WEBER. First, I would like to thank this subcommittee’s leadership in this area and your leadership and Chairman 

Thornberry’s leadership in this area. 

Although the top line for the Chem-Bio Defense Program, from our 2011 request to our 2012 request declined $52 million, down 

from $1.578 billion, so about a 3.3 percent decline, within that we 

were able to eliminate some poorly performing programs and actually add two significant new programs in the area of biodefense. 

We have put more emphasis within the CB Defense Program on 

biodefense and, in particular, medical biodefense, because that had 

been underinvested in over the last decade. 

So we are launching in the fiscal year 2012 request a Medical 

Countermeasures Initiative that will leverage the rapid growth in 

new technologies in the biotech sector for biodefense purposes. And 

there are two sides to the advancement and spread of biotechnology. One is that our adversaries like Al Qaeda and Al 

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in their Inspire publication just 

put out a call for microbiologists and chemists to help develop 

weapons of mass destruction. So we are very concerned about that. 

But we have put more focus on leveraging cutting-edge biotechnology to improve our biodefenses. And this is in partnership 

with other departments like Health and Human Services and 

Homeland Security. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. 

There were two big spending initiatives, for lack of a better phrase. One that Secretary Gates said, let’s find $100 billion across 

DOD and redeploy that in better, more effective uses. The other is 

the $78 billion in, I guess, efficiency initiatives. Collectively, were 

you involved at all in the first initiative in which you were part of 

the $100 billion? And, if so, how did you redeploy those assets? And 

then take a couple seconds on each one of those, each of you. 

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir. 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency was certainly a part of 

that process. And as I was explaining earlier, we really took three 

steps. We looked at all of the programs that we were running, and 

we tried to identify, where can we combine those efforts to become 

more efficient, provide a more integrated product for our customers? Where can we combine the leadership and support functions for these efforts? Secondly, we took a very long look across. 

We have a number of facilities—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Excuse me. I understand that piece. Help me out, 

where did you put the money? Or were you able to use the money 

that you found in efficiencies under that $100 billion umbrella, 

were you able to redeploy that somewhere else for more effective 

use, or that went to a pie somewhere else? 

Mr. MYERS. No, sir. That was returned to the Secretary. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So that was collectively a loss; you just had to 

come up with things that were less priorities than others, and then 

that money went somewhere else? 

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir. 
12 

Mr. CONAWAY. Then you had to come back and find $78 billion, 

your share of that. Help me understand the difference between the 

two. I can understand the motivation for, if I get to spend it somewhere else, the motivation to find something and then redeploy 

that. That is a different motivation than I am just going to cut. So 

it appears that the $178 billion was asked of you just to cut and 

give those dollars to the Secretary and/or taxpayers. How did you 

distinguish between the two? Or is it just another layer further up 

your priority chain off your bottom stack that you had to go to get 

your part of the $78 billion? 

Mr. MYERS. The approach we took, sir, was really across the 

board in terms of identifying just each and every single thing we 

do, how can we do it more effectively, more efficiently? So while 

they were separate efforts, we didn’t really distinguish between 

them. We really saw that as an effort that had to be undertaken 

because of, obviously, the economic situation that we are facing. 

And we are not done there. We are continuing to look for more 

ways to do more with fewer funds. And it is across the board. 

So, sir, I don’t believe—we didn’t look at it that way. We didn’t 

look at it as two separate things. We looked at it as an overall 

across-the-board process that we are not done yet. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Others want to enlighten us as to how that might have worked? 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Sir, the organization I work in is OSD [Office 

of the Secretary of Defense] policy, so, frankly, we don’t own a 

whole lot of money. Just in terms of looking across the whole Department and reflecting on the mission space that is represented 

here, I have to tell you, I think that the importance of the countering-WMD mission area to the Department was reflected in the 

fact that, by and large, if you could add up everything across the 

entire mission space, which actually is very difficult—it depends on 

how you define countering-WMD—there actually weren’t massive 

reductions. I think Mr. Weber reflected 3.3 percent—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me ask you a different way, because I am a 

little frustrated here. The $100 billion, you sent that money to the 

Secretary. Did he send any of it back across your spectrum? 

Secretary WEBER. Within the Chemical and Biological Defense 

Program, the efficiencies that we identified were reinvested back 

into the CB Defense Program. So the answer is yes. And for the 

services, that was especially true. In terms of the big picture, they 

were able to reinvest their efficiencies in priority procurement 

areas for the warfighter. 

But the point I would like to emphasize is that the President’s 

fiscal year 2012 budget request to Congress from this program represented today already includes a significant amount of belt tightening in it. And we would ask that you fully support the request. 

Now, for the fiscal year 2011 request, which it is unfortunate that 

after 10 years of flatlining, especially for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, we had succeeded in putting an 18 percent increase into the fiscal year 2011 request, but the effect of the continuing resolution is that we are actually operating significantly 

below the fiscal year 2011 request because fiscal year 2010 was so 

much lower. 
13 

Mr. CONAWAY. We share your frustration operating under a CR 

for Department of Defense-wide. We understand what a wreck that 

is. Any help you can give us with the good folks on the other end 

of the building would be helpful. I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being 

here. 

I think, Mr. Myers, you spoke of one of the strategic goals, the 

whole of DTRA approach. And we kind of throw around whole-ofgovernment approaches a lot, too, and I think from many of our efforts, it is easier said than done. So could you tell me, where do 

you see some of the blocks in that? And it is not so much funding, 

right? It is more culture? Or what is it that you see, and how do 

you really see that making a difference? 

I know that you have spoken of the jointness, and that is an important part of this, I think. But could you speak a little bit more 

to that and how we ought to be thinking and framing that? 

Mr. MYERS. Certainly. Thank you. 

When I was speaking of the whole of DTRA approach, I mentioned also that we are a pretty unique organization. We have a 

full 24/7, 365-days-a-year operation, capability, that we run, as well 

as research and development. So we really have two parallel processes. And my main goal at DTRA is to make sure that the research and development is fully supporting the operations and vice 

versa. We must work as one, as one entity, one unit, because we 

are the WMD. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Where is the biggest disconnect in that? 

Mr. MYERS. I don’t believe I could say or identify one specific 

thing. But let me give you a potential example. Arms control inspections: The operational side of DTRA does the inspections, and 

we also host the inspectors that are doing inspections. On our research and development side, we are developing the technologies to 

verify arms control commitments. We must make sure that the 

equipment that we are producing in our research and development 

side fits the needs and the constraints and the conditions that our 

inspectors are going to have to operate in. So we need to make sure 

that the equipment is rugged; it can move long distances and be 

strapped to somebody’s back; come off on site and work exactly as 

advertised. So we need to make sure that those things are all working together as one with one common picture. And we have made 

a lot of progress in that area. 

On the whole of government, I would say to you that we have 

worked extremely hard on that, specifically with our friends at the 

NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration], the Department 

of Energy. The three of us just participated in what we call the 

bridge meeting. It is DTRA, policy, NCB [Nuclear, Chemical, and 

Biological Defense Programs] and NNSA all sitting down identifying where we are working in similar areas and fully coordinating, 

making sure there aren’t gaps, making sure there aren’t overlaps, 

making sure that the communication is there. Not only at the strategic level, if you will, but at the action officer level, that the contracts that we are letting in certain areas are meeting it, not overlapping and not leaving gaps. 
14 

Similarly, a couple of months back, Mr. Handelman and I spent 

an afternoon at the Department of State making sure that our biological engagement efforts were completely in synch, completely 

synchronized with the work that the Department of State and HHS 

do in those areas. 

I think those would probably be the best examples I could give 

you. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Mr. Weber. 

Secretary WEBER. If I could please just add to that. Countering 

weapons of mass destruction by its very nature is a cross-cutting 

issue, interagency and globally. So this presents a challenge within 

the Department, within the U.S. Government. Also, within the 

Congress, there are so many committees that have jurisdiction in 

this area, as Ranking Member Langevin mentioned the Homeland 

Security piece. And so leadership from us within the Department, 

from your subcommittee and committee is critically important. And 

I will just give one little example. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And we know we don’t make it easy. 

Secretary WEBER. Well, we really need to work together on this, 

and we are committed to working with you on this. But just one 

example, biosurveillance: There is a very small program that the 

Centers for Disease Control executes called the Global Disease Detection and Response Program. It is critical to our national security. But because it is over in CDC [the Centers for Disease Control], it gets very little funding. These are the types of cross-cutting 

issues. 

But I will say that although it is difficult, under this administration—and I have served in public service for 26 years—I have 

never seen better leadership from the WMD coordinator’s office, 

from the counterterrorism coordinator’s office, and interagency cooperation. We have an excellent team that works across agencies, 

whether it be at the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Health and Human Services, or the Department of Energy 

or State. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you gentlemen for being here. I appreciate you 

keeping watch on behalf of all of us. 

Secretary Weber, I wanted to address my first question to you. 

I know that many have already expressed a concern about the 

aftermath of a chemical or biological or radiological attack, and I 

share that concern. But it occurs to me for many reasons that with 

the terrorist threat, it seems to me that the nuclear threat is one 

that they would most like to affect if they could, something about 

the psychology of it I am afraid. 

With that in mind, I am concerned about the potential, sort of 

the ultimate asymmetric weapon that they might use if they had 

one warhead and some ability to put it above our country and 

launch an EMP [electromagnetic pulse] attack on our country. And 

I know that that is something that has grown to be more and more 

aware on the part of many of us. 
15 

But I guess I would like to know, in light of the potential of an 

EMP attack leaving us with a severely damaged grid and without 

electrical power for an extended period of time, what is the strategy to redress a scenario of Americans without power for an extended period of time? 

Secretary WEBER. Well, preventing terrorist use of an improvised 

nuclear device is our number one priority. The hardening against 

EMP attacks is also a priority for the Department of Defense and 

other areas. And we work with leadership from DTRA in hardening. This year we did testing at Pax River, EMP testing on the 

E4B aircraft, and in the coming year we will be testing the B2 aircraft. So we have significant expertise in this area. 

And although the domestic power grid is not the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense, we are lending our expertise 

in this area to the Department of Homeland Security. And I would 

ask my colleague Ken Myers how DTRA contributes to this effort. 

Mr. MYERS. Thank you. 

DTRA is the technical lead within DOD for the EMP challenge. 

We are involved in technology development, technical assessments, 

technical assistance, and we develop the standards by which we 

judge our ability to withstand an EMP attack or situation. 

As Mr. Weber said, we are not the lead, but we have provided 

specific technical assistance to our interagency partners on exactly 

the type of threat that you have identified there. 

We continue to work, again, as an interagency process, bringing 

those skill sets that we have to bear to the EMP threat on specifically the grid, as you mentioned. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Myers. 

I am hoping that perhaps you might take a look at the Shield 

Act designed to ameliorate the danger of an EMP attack or, for 

that matter, a geomagnetic storm, which is certainly an inevitable 

reality at some point. But for the purposes of this committee, the 

EMP application is the most significant. 

I have sponsored that bill and a number of members of this committee are cosponsoring it. We would love to have your input on it 

because it is something that, from my perspective, it represents a 

real opportunity for terrorists to do us a catastrophic harm. And it 

is one of those things that is difficult sometimes to articulate without seeming to employ hyperbole, but it is, as you know, a very real 

threat, and it is something that I am afraid that there is still a fundamental lack of awareness of, and I am hoping that you folks will 

keep an eye on it. I would love to have your response on the Shield 

Act. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 103.] 

Mr. FRANKS. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I am going to I yield 

back. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It pains me that during our consideration of the 2011 budget, 

Congress degenerated into the politics of ‘‘just say no.’’ And as a 

result, or as one of the results, DTRA’s budget, which had been 

upped 18 percent, with good reason, ended up remaining at 2010 
16 

levels. So it didn’t get the bump that was justified, apparently, and 

now, due to political realities, a movement to reduce the 2011 proposed level of funding downward. This comes at a time when the 

detonation of a nuclear device or the release of a chemical or biological agent on American soil coupled with a coordinated cyber attack, it could have—it just, the consequences are unimaginable. 

And that threat is certainly a foreseeable event. 

And this is a clear example of politics putting the people of the 

Nation at risk, and we are further hurting ourselves by funding the 

government in 2-week increments. And we just cannot, as much as 

this committee is bipartisan, we cannot fail to look at the results 

of our overall political strategies in this country, which have gotten 

into just which party is going to be in control as opposed to what 

is best for this Nation. 

Mr. Myers, I think our annual budget or your annual budget is 

about worth 1 week of fighting in the war in Afghanistan. And I 

have heard you say that you have refigured your operations; your 

think tank you dismantled? Is that basic research? How do you 

compensate for the dismantling of your think tank? And also, I 

would like to know if the likelihood of a state or nonstate actor 

could detonate a nuclear device or a chemical or biological event on 

U.S. soil? Is the likelihood of that lower or higher than it was 10 

years ago? 

Mr. MYERS. Thank you, sir. 

On the first step, when we were talking about ASCO, ASCO did 

not do basic research. That was done at our research and development enterprise at the agency. ASCO was responsible for funding 

think tank research and efforts such as that, multilateral dialogues 

and things such as that. Those efforts will continue. The funding 

stream will still be there. The infrastructure that surrounded it 

will be cut back, and we—I guess, as I said, we have reprioritized 

those billets to our highest priorities. So for the foreseeable future, 

those efforts will continue. But we have been able to do them in 

a much more efficient and a much more effective manner. 

Secondly, with regard to your second question, from my perspective, the number one threat, the threat that, as we always say, 

keeps us up at night is the intersection of the weapons and the materials and the know-how of mass destruction and terrorist groups. 

That is an extremely daunting task, both in terms of detecting, 

interdicting, stopping as well as deterring. So I would answer the 

question that way. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

And I appreciate the panel being with us today, and I am learning from your testimony. Thank you very much. 

I would like to follow up on some of the points that Mrs. Davis 

I think was bringing to the fore, concerns I have with regard to our 

whole-of-government approach and particularly how we streamline 

command-and-control work requirements and field those requirements. 

So why don’t we begin with General Scarbrough. And I am interested to know both in terms of your agency, and then if you could 
17 

comment on across the spectrum of how we defend ourselves from 

chemical and biological agents, the interactivity and command-andcontrol relationship between your organization, the Department of 

Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Northern Command. And as you are working in your response, I am interested 

in particularly, who identifies requirements, and how do you 

prioritize those requirements? And then if you could speak to RAID 

[Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection] teams, the RAID teams 

at the state level in terms of their command and control, state adjutant generals, State Department of Homeland Security, Federal 

Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Defense. 

General SCARBROUGH. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to address those questions. 

First, with respect to interagency coordination strategically, my 

particular organization and the Chem-Bio Defense Program work 

very closely with the Department of Homeland Security in the area 

of BioWatch and biomonitoring. This is an entity that the Department of Homeland Security has put in a command and controlled 

aspect that they have put in 30 major urban areas. 

Mr. GIBSON. Can you operationally define ‘‘work closely’’? I mean, 

you have working groups? Is there like a battle rhythm that you 

go through? What do you mean by that? 

General SCARBROUGH. Yes, sir. We do have working groups, and 

we also have interagency agreements that define roles and responsibilities of how we move forward. 

At the same time, we take some of those particular areas that 

the BioWatch program is doing and we put it on some of our major 

installations, and those installations are obviously prioritized by 

the threat. Case in point, Andrews Air Force Base is one; some of 

the other installations in some major urban areas. 

With respect to Department of Health and Human Services, we 

work very closely with them, as I have a medical countermeasure 

portfolio, and I deliver or I bring certain vaccines, like anthrax and 

smallpox, to FDA [the Food and Drug Administration] approval. At 

the same time, we work with DHHS as they manage the Strategic 

National Stockpile. So the services draw on that capability based 

on the needs that they have and the requirements that they have 

wherever they go throughout the entire world. 

With respect to requirements. With respect to requirements, we 

work very closely with the Joint Staff. They identify, with the services, the gaps and the requirements. They also take into account 

what Mr. Weber was talking about, national priorities. But at the 

same time, they look at their—each service—particular areas that 

they would like for us to deliver to them based on their mission 

sets. 

With respect to command and control, I would offer one of the 

things that I am trying to do within my particular organization and 

within the CBDP [Chemical and Biological Defense Programs] portfolio and have been working very closely with Mr. Myers and 

DTRA on this, is to develop an integrated holistic solution set for 

the warfighter. Basically, in the area of biosurveillance, I have 

multiple programs that I deliver that meet that particular integrated concept in the area of detection, in the areas of diagnostics, 

and in the areas of information management. What we want to do 
18 

is we want to bring those all together, deliver that to the 

warfighter, so the commander can make measured responses quickly in any type of WMD incident. 

Mr. GIBSON. In terms of fielding the joint alarm, do you get requests for fielding from the Department of Homeland Security for 

some of their subordinate organizations? 

General SCARBROUGH. Sir, we work very closely with the Department of Homeland Security, and we would trade. But, for example, 

I would deliver capability to the National Guard, and then the National Guard has a role that they work very closely with 

NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] in the area of 

consequence management. So some of my capabilities, I would say 

a lot of my capabilities are dual-use, both for the warfighter but yet 

at the same time can help the National Guard and be defense in 

depth to the first responders under the homeland defense with 

NORTHCOM. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thank you very much. I had further interest, 

but I think in the interest of yielding back here, I will just say that 

the whole-of-government approach and who is in charge and how 

the Department of Defense works with the Department of Homeland Security and all the subordinate agencies is something of concern to me, and I look to explore that in future opportunities. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

It is of interest to me as well. 

Ms. Castor. 

Mrs. CASTOR. Thank you much. 

And welcome, gentlemen. I wanted to start by complimenting the 

Obama administration and all of you and everyone on your team 

for the progress made over the past year on nonproliferation, and 

I look forward to fruits from your further efforts as well. 

I am interested in some of the biodefense detection and diagnostic tools that you have, particularly the Joint Biological Agent 

Identification and Diagnostic System. Can you discuss the research 

and development and acquisition? You say you have 300 in various 

locations. I have seen some research devices back home in Florida 

that may be similar on detection of disease and diagnostics. But 

are these efforts, are most of the efforts coming from the private 

sector? Or are you all in the lead, or are you giving direction? 

Then with the FDA approvals on some of the things you are 

doing, I know that the underfunding of that review process is a 

problem for the private sector. Does that hamper what you all want 

to accomplish? 

And then, could you also highlight to some of the next-generation 

detection and diagnostic tools that you are working on? 

General SCARBROUGH. Yes, ma’am. Thank you. 

The first one, when we talk about diagnostics, the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System was a requirement 

that was levied onto us by the services so they can increase their 

diagnostics and surveillance activities globally throughout the 

world. 

I work very closely on the science and technology and the research development side with Mr. Myers and his office, because 

they do the joint science and technology for the Chemical and Bio-
19 

logical Defense Program. At the same time, what we are doing with 

the diagnostics program is that we have FDA-approved assays in 

there that can detect plague, tularemia, avian flu. At the same 

time, we have 70 prepositioned emergency-use authorizations for 

multiple influenza or bio-incidents that could be dropped immediately within the FDA in case we have a national emergency. We 

have to get those licensed by the FDA. 

On the next-generation diagnostics, what we are looking there is 

providing a capability on the back end that can tie into an information management system. JBAIDS [the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System] kind of stands on its own; that 

program stands on its own. But what we would like to do is now 

tie it into an information management system so we can get into 

command and control and things of that nature. 

Mrs. CASTOR. Do the rest have another brief answer? Because I 

want to try to get one more question. 

Secretary WEBER. I would just add quickly that time is everything in biodefense. So to the extent that we can improve our early 

warning and detection capabilities and have rapid accurate 

diagnostics, and then if we detect an event, delivery of medical 

products quickly, we will save lives. So it is an area we are going 

to be putting a lot of increased investments into. 

Mrs. CASTOR. Let me ask one other quick question. 

Director Myers, do the current events in the Middle East, have 

they informed anything new in what you are doing? Has 

CENTCOM [United States Central Command] given you additional 

requests for support? 

Mr. MYERS. We provide support to the combatant commands on 

a constant continual basis. As I laid out in my opening statement, 

in terms of the reach-back, it is almost a continuous conversation 

and sharing of information and expertise. We do have significant 

subject-matter expertise that they reach back to us to identify in 

terms of how to plan, how to prioritize and the like. And that is 

all ongoing and continual. That is probably as far as I would like 

to go in this forum. 

Mrs. CASTOR. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. West. 

Mr. WEST. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. 

Of course, one of the great things having a name that starts with 

a W, you are always last. But it really is an honor to be here with 

each and every one of you today. And 3 weeks ago I had the opportunity to go down and have a nice visit with U.S. SOUTHCOM 

[United States Southern Command], and then also I had an office 

call with the CGF [Commander Ground Forces] SOUTHCOM and 

CGF NORTHCOM. Very concerned, because we know that in the 

SOUTHCOM AOR [Area of Responsibility], Hezbollah has a footprint; Iran has a footprint as well. And some of the recent developments that we have seen coming out of there, these mini 

submersibles. I believe one was recently discovered in the last 3 or 

so weeks. Very hard to detect. And then also, of course, we have 

a very porous border down South. And if you go to the Border Patrol Web site, you have a category called OTMs. OTM stands for 
20 

‘‘other than Mexicans,’’ and I think you know where we are going 

with this. 

I just want to know, how is the agency working with 

SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM? Because I really believe we have 

a soft underbelly. Right now it could be drugs coming up in these 

mini submersibles, but the next thing you know, we have some of 

these nontraditional agents or some other type of weapons of mass 

destruction. So what are your resources that you have down there 

to cover that SOUTHCOM AOR and then, of course, as it transitions to NORTHCOM and into the continental United States? 

Thank you. 

Mr. MYERS. Thank you, sir. 

Our support to SOUTHCOM is robust. We have a number of 

what we call LNOs [Liaison Officers] that are based at 

SOUTHCOM to facilitate the coordination and communication. We 

do work with them on a number of different fronts. One of the 

areas that is getting a lot of attention is proliferation prevention, 

as you point out. You know, whether it is a counternarcotic issue 

or whether it is a counterproliferation issue, whether it is a 

human-trafficking issue, very often the technologies that are used 

for one have applicability to all. So we are again trying to maximize the leverage we have on all the different efforts that are 

under way. 

In our research and development programs, we also spend an 

awful lot of time working with our interagency partners on detecting tunnels, just as we do in terms of hard deeply buried targets. 

Obviously, slightly different skill sets are brought to bear on each. 

But it is something that we are working on. It is something that 

we communicate and we collaborate and we share lessons learned, 

experience and expertise. And perhaps most importantly, we share 

the products. If our research and development organization develops a tool that works for counter-WMD, we want to share it across 

the board to get the maximum impact from that taxpayer investment. And to date, we are doing that today with a number of technologies and look forward to continuing. 

Secretary WEBER. If I could please just briefly add to that. These 

are all global problems, and we have to work with our international 

partners, because the weakest link is the one that is going to come 

back to bite us. So we are increasing cooperation with all of the geographic combatant commands to build partner capacity for countering weapons of mass destruction. And this is a little bit of a different focus. It is not always military forces that are the leads in 

these governments, as we know from counterterrorism and 

counterdrug. 

So this is an area where we are increasing our investment. But 

I think it is vitally important that we work around the world to 

build capacities to prevent and prepare for and respond to countering potential weapons of mass destruction. 

General SCARBROUGH. Sir, if I could just add one other note. Important to all this tactically and programmatically is to get feedback from the field. So we have a joint acquisition chemical and biological, radiological, nuclear knowledge management system that 

allows soldiers to give us immediate feedback on their capabilities 

as they support the COCOMS [combatant commanders]. 
21 

This is an invaluable tool, as you can imagine, because the bottom line is we want to make sure we are giving them good equipment that is effective and combat-ready. And at the same time, 

tactically, I do do and conduct joint quarterly equipment readiness 

reviews, where the services as well as the enterprise come in and 

we talk about some of their issues as we work together as a team. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Let me—I don’t know to whom to direct this, so whoever makes 

it. My impression is that there is not a uniform definition across 

the U.S. Government on WMD. I was thinking about it a while ago, 

Mr. Langevin’s question. He mentioned radiological, but often that 

is not included with what one hears. 

And I guess my question is, does it matter that there is not a 

uniform definition of what is included in a weapon of mass destruction? And in your all’s work day to day, does that create impediments? Should there be some standardization, and should radiological weapons be included in it? 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Sir, perhaps I will take the first stab. I think 

your observation is trenchant. But when I look at what we do on 

a day-to-day basis, I can’t recall an instance or some situation 

where the admitted flexibility of the definition has been an impediment to our work. I think, to some extent, this is like obscenity. 

You know, when we are dealing with uranium of a certain level of 

enrichment or a certain type of pathogen, we know how to 

prioritize it. The radiological threat I think is certainly different 

than a full-up nuclear weapon. But it is certainly within the broad 

ambit of what we work on and what we think about it. Because one 

might look at an RDD [radiological dispersal device] as not your 

stereotypical WMD, it doesn’t mean that it is not part of our planning or our thinking. I am not sure if my colleagues would want 

to amplify. 

Mr. MYERS. The definition of weapons of mass destruction in a 

lot of ways are defined by some of the international agreements 

that we are a party to. You know, one of the examples that comes 

to mind is the Chemical Weapons Convention, and in the Chemical 

Weapons Convention, you have a number of different schedules: 

Schedule I being an actual weapon; Schedule II being a direct precursor; Schedule III perhaps being a more distant precursor. 

And as Mr. Handelman was saying, identifying where the threat 

stops or where it begins is often difficult. And that is why, specifically in the nuclear and radiological area, the communication in 

terms of the types of expertise different departments and agencies 

bring to bear on this threat is critically important. Obviously, most 

of our work, most of the work that the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency has done in the past has really been weapons-focused. I 

mean, implementation of arms control agreements and things such 

as that. Our colleagues at the NNSA have an awful lot of experience in the nuclear materials and the radiological sources and 

things such as that. But from our perspective, we really look at 

WMD as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear. And we— 

I think that is a pretty common understanding if it is not specifically written down in law. 
22 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And we are preparing for a radiological weapon just as we prepare for a chemical or biological weapon? 

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir. In fact, there are a number of programs 

that our partners at the NNSA run specifically are focused on identifying radiological threats and sources and materials, and collecting those up and bringing them back into safekeeping. We have 

a role as well. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And I presume also consequence management, 

which is going to be a completely different sort of thing than chembio. 

Let me turn, if I could, to the Medical Countermeasures Initiative. I am interested in exactly what gap this initiative is designed 

to fill and how it differs from other activities, both within this Department and other departments. And let me give you just a little 

bit of background. 

GAO [the Government Accountability Office] came out with a report recently that said the Federal Government lacks strategic 

oversight mechanisms and international and interagency efforts in 

the area of biodefense and biosurveillance; that our efforts are fragmented; and some of these programs were in its report about duplicative programs that got so much attention a week or two ago. So, 

on one hand, you have got GAO saying we are scattered all over 

the place. Then you all come and propose a new program in that 

very area. So I need some help in bringing this together, if you 

please. 

Secretary WEBER. Let me start answering that. The H1N1 pandemic, it exposed a national gap, a vulnerability. It took us 8 

months to deliver a vaccine to our public. You may recall the long 

lines. And so we need and the President has really taken a lead 

on this and been personally involved in building a concerted national approach to creating a capability for agile, flexible development, enhanced development, and manufacturing of medical countermeasures. And the Department of Defense has to contribute to 

that, because whether it is a member of our Armed Forces in the 

field deployed or whether it is a citizen on the street, the same 

FDA-approved medical countermeasures are required to save lives 

in the event of a bio-attack. 

The GAO report I believe is in a little bit of a time warp because 

last year, Secretary of Health and Human Services Sebelius led a 

review of the medical countermeasures enterprise. And as DOD, we 

participate in the biodefense countermeasures enterprise, and we 

were part of that review. The report itself had some recommendations, and with strong leadership from the White House, we are implementing those recommendations. 

In terms of the gaps that it is meant to address, there are infectious diseases for which we have no vaccines or effective antimicrobial drugs or antiviral drugs. So we need to fill those gaps. 

Again, whether it is in Northeast Asia or here in the homeland, we 

can’t afford to have it take 15 years to develop a vaccine against 

a particular drug. 

DOD is also very, and has been since the late 1990s, very concerned about the potential for bio-engineered threats, and that is 

why we are exploring some of these platform technologies that 

could be multi-use against the unknown threat that would give us 
23 

an ability to quickly characterize a pathogen and then develop a 

countermeasure once we have been able to characterize that. 

And then a specific example I will cite is during the H1N1 pandemic, we did a live-fire exercise with an antiviral capability that 

we had developed through our Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative. We obtained a sample of the H1N1 strain, and 

within 14 days, we were able to produce a new antiviral drug targeted at that particular strain. And then we conducted testing in 

ferrets, and it had better efficacy than Tamiflu®, and that particular effort has now resulted in an IND [Investigational New 

Drug] drug candidate that General Scarbrough through his program is pursuing advanced development of. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I think I want to learn more about it. I 

am concerned that too many medical issues have been put over on 

DOD, largely as a result of Congress. And I do appreciate the fact 

that it is not easy to draw a line between what sort of infectious 

disease scenario could be a matter for the Department of Defense 

and what should be CDC, Department of Health and Human Services, and others. I just, again, want to understand the issue about 

duplication and coordination, which you may well be right, the administration may be ahead of GAO, but also the proper role of 

DOD in doing certain things in the medical area. Because I think, 

my own view is that it has shifted probably outside of scope. 

Mr. Weber, let me stick with you and ask another question. In 

the 2010 Defense Authorization Act, the House report proposed disestablishing the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, 

and I believe the Department of Defense was okay with that. Now, 

it got dropped in conference, so it did not make it into law. But I 

still think it is worth asking, what are they doing now? And how, 

in the various reorganizations, have other entities taken over some 

of that coordinating function? 

Secretary WEBER. Well, since the requirement was not dropped, 

we will deliver a report to you in May of this year. And based on 

some of the GAO comments, we hope it will be a more useful and 

effective report in that it will not just track the budget request but 

also the actual appropriations and expenditures. 

The leadership has really changed with the filling of the position 

of a WMD coordinator at the White House. Gary Samore and his 

team have done an excellent job, and also, on the homeland security side, under John Brennan’s leadership, of coordinating these 

efforts. And I think that is something that didn’t happen as effectively before that position was established and filled. 

So the CPRC [Counterproliferation Program Review Committee] 

is a useful venue. In fact, it is meeting this afternoon at the Pentagon, and we have representatives from the Department of Energy, State, Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence and others participating in that. So it is useful, and we hope to make the report this year more useful. And we 

hope to use it to better align our resources and investments against 

gaps. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

For the panel, the last question that I have, in the range of 

threats that we face from nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biologi-
24 

cal, obviously the consequences of such an attack would be devastating. Worst-case scenario likely is that of a detonation of a nuclear device. Results would be, obviously, the damage would be catastrophic and loss of life. But not to be overlooked and perhaps almost, if not equally, devastating would be that of a chemical or biological attack. The thing that concerns me the most is a biological 

attack. With nuclear, Mother Nature didn’t make it easy to make 

highly-enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium, and in 

many cases, it is very difficult for terrorists to get their hands on 

it. If they stole it, at this point, it would take a nation-state to 

make the nuclear fuel. But that is not like the chemical or biological weapons. And the thing that bothers me the most, of course, is 

if they can develop a biological weapon and they can disburse it, 

they can do it again and again and again. 

My question is, particularly on anthrax, which is a highly likely 

biological agent that they would—terrorists would develop and use, 

how close are we to developing the next-generation effective antidote for an anthrax attack and biological agent? And also, tell me 

about where we are in terms of surveillance. Right now, our surveillance capabilities are really lacking in many ways, very human 

dependent, human interactive. It requires a few days before we actually test and then do the analysis and get the results of the biological tests. What we really need is real-time surveillance. How 

close are we to having a real-time nonhuman interactive surveillance system deployed? 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Let me take a crack briefly at the second part 

of your question, the surveillance piece. And I will focus on one aspect of it. 

To have the surveillance system of ultimate elegance, we are 

some time off. But I think we are a lot further ahead in our efforts 

than we were just a few years ago to sort of move that surveillance 

system farther away from our borders, to move our defensive perimeter as far out as we can. We are starting to build new relationships in Africa. We just did a trip with Senator Lugar to establish 

some cooperative relationships in some of those countries last fall, 

and we will be looking to build similar relationships in Southeast 

Asia soon, I hope. There is a long way to go, and it is labor-intensive. 

Let me turn to my other colleagues on the antidote piece. 

Secretary WEBER. Secretary Danzig has written on this reload 

problem that you described, because an improvised nuclear device 

would probably be a one-time event because of the finite supply of 

fissile materiel. But with bio, it is different. There could be a capability, if you can launch one attack, that you could launch multiple 

attacks. 

We have looked at some of the historical examples of biological 

attacks. One in particular, the Aum Shinrikyo, is well known for 

its attack with sarin gas on the Tokyo metro, but they also 

launched two attacks using anthrax. And the only reason those two 

attacks failed was because they had not acquired the correct virulent strain of anthrax. So that tells me that we need to focus and 

continue to focus more efforts on keeping virulent strains of Bacillus anthracis out of the hands of terrorist groups. And we are doing 
25 

that globally through the Nunn-Lugar program, by consolidating 

and securing pathogen collections around the world. 

And as my colleague mentioned, we traveled, the three of us, 

with Senator Lugar to east Africa this last fall and saw for ourselves anthrax being stored in a regular veterinary laboratory with 

hardly any security. So that nexus between terrorism and the materials is of great concern to us. 

On your point about biosurveillance and just preparedness for 

such attacks, time really is everything. And whether it is detection 

to know that an attack has occurred, if you don’t know about it 

until people are symptomatic and start showing up in hospitals, 

your ability to treat has significantly declined. 

We are better positioned with antibiotics in our National Stockpile, and of course, the force is vaccinated against anthrax. But we 

need to do everything we can to reduce the times to use our environmental and medical diagnostics, to quickly and accurately become aware of an attack and get early warning, but also in the 

event of an attack, to deliver medical countermeasures in time to 

save lives because it really is the case where hours matter. And 

with DARPA [the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] and 

some of the efforts in the Chem-Bio Defense S&T program, we are 

going to be investing in presymptomatic diagnostics that will allow 

us to know even before somebody is showing symptoms that they 

have been exposed to a dangerous agent like anthrax. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I guess my question, though, is on airborne surveillance systems that we have take days right now between the 

time something is detected and tested. That is too long for to administer prophylactic antibiotics. You have to get it into someone 

within the first 24 to 48 hours. Or by the time people start showing 

symptoms, it is too late. So what I want to know is, how close are 

we to having that real-time airborne biosurveillance system in 

place? 

Secretary WEBER. In terms of the domestic capability and I believe in 30 of our urban areas, the BioWatch program of the Department of Homeland Security is developing its next generation 

that will have automated detection capability. Right now, the air 

samplers have to be taken back to a laboratory for analysis, and 

clearly, we can’t afford to lose that time. But I understand they are 

fairly close to achieving a capability to have that real-time surveillance. 

But I also want to emphasize the domestic biosurveillance is extremely important, but so is global biosurveillance. And the Department of Defense has a network of overseas laboratories around 

the world that help us provide an early warning system on a global 

basis, including in countries where some of these rare diseases are 

endemic. And so we have to look at it in terms of protecting our 

own urban areas, but also, it has to be a global approach to be effective, given how quickly an H1N1, whether it was mild form of 

the virus, it showed how quickly these self-spreading contagious 

diseases can move around the world. 

Secretary WEBER. If Mexico had had a bio-surveillance system, 

perhaps H1N1 could have been isolated and contained within that 

part of Mexico where it originated. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
26 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Myers, it has been brought up several 

times, the budget ups and downs with your organization. I want to 

understand what—there was a substantial increase in the request 

last year. This committee authorized that. It has not been appropriated. What would you have done or would you do with that 

extra money that you are not doing now with a flatline 2010 level? 

Mr. MYERS. A number of things. 

First of all, during the preceding decade, as Mr. Handelman explained, we faced a flatline budget. We took on a number of different additional mission areas, and we went ahead and funded 

that from within, so we did not receive additional funds to take on 

those new mission areas. And, as a result, we had to make some 

very, very difficult decisions. Some of that is in terms of our infrastructure, information technology capabilities, and the like. So the 

fiscal year ’11 request helps us fix some of those problems that we 

incurred. 

In addition to that, the fiscal year ’11 request gave us some specific capabilities to move out with strong support for the combat 

and the commanders, specifically, our ability to help detect nuclear 

radiological threats. 

In addition, specific efforts, we have talked a lot about the lines 

of defense, moving them as far forward as possible. The fiscal year 

’11 budget request included specific increases in our engagement 

and biological threats in Africa and Asia and elsewhere, as well as 

the Nunn-Lugar program’s role in the global nuclear lock-down effort, our efforts to eliminate potential threats by securing and making them more safe. 

I would say, on a macro level, that 171⁄2 percent, in terms of 

making sure that we have the tools to serve the warfighter, what 

it really did was it looked at each line of defense that we have 

erected between the threat and the American people and made substantial improvements to each one. I would be happy to share some 

of the details of that with the subcommittee, but just in terms of 

the overall view, at the source was a large part of it. 

Detection was another large part of it. Interdiction, it significantly increased the special relationship we have with Special Operations Command and the tools that we work with them on. 

And also, quite frankly, it helped us develop the consequence 

management, the forensic tools. If we are able, as Mr. Weber said, 

in terms of identifying the threat before it happens—unfortunately, 

if an event were to occur, the quicker we are able to identify where 

that threat came from and who was responsible, the quicker we are 

able to respond. And if we are able to do that with a high level of 

effectiveness, we will be able to deter perhaps some of those who 

would otherwise attack. 

So, again, that request was across the board, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Well, I think we will obviously need to 

be in touch once we see what happens finally with fiscal year ’11, 

to analyze then your request for fiscal year ’12 to see how it is 

changed. And it is a very difficult situation for everybody to be in, 

there is no question. And so we want to look at that again. 

Let me ask you one other thing. You talked earlier about your 

R&D efforts. Talk to me just a little bit, if you would, about how 

you coordinate that with lots of other R&D efforts. We had a whole 
27 

hearing with all the services S&T folks and DARPA recently where 

that was a major thing we talked about, is how do you coordinate 

all of this, and so you are another player in that R&D arena. 

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

The participants in the hearing you referenced we work very 

closely with, Assistant Secretary Lemnios, research and engineering, as well as Regina Dugan, the director of DARPA. They are 

very close relationships. 

Mr. Lemnios provides us with the guidance in terms of apportioning our resources in terms of basic research, where to really 

focus a lot of our efforts. We coordinate very closely with DARPA 

to ensure that we are working in similar lanes, if you will, in terms 

of towards common goals, but that we each have a role to play. I 

work with her quite a bit, and it is a good working relationship. 

In addition to that, our research and development is guided in 

great part by the requirements that we receive from the services, 

from the Secretary, from the joint staff, and the like; and we utilize 

those as the basis for our commitment of funding in various areas. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. It seems to me I am sure there is some coordination with the national laboratories. When you start just thinking 

through the different organizations in the government who do some 

of this, it is a lot. 

Mr. MYERS. Sir, let me give you an example. One of them would 

be specifically increasing our capabilities in terms of verification 

technologies, the technologies that we would have to verify compliance with arms control treaties. In that case, you have the Department of State, the Bureau of Verification, Assistant Secretary 

Gottemoeller. You also have NNSA in conjunction with the national labs, and you also have an effort at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. And so you have these three parties, plus the labs. 

And we meet regularly. In fact, Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller 

hosted a large roundtable for all the partners to really come in and 

identify goals, identify paths to those goals. What are the limitations? What are the conditions that, A, they might be used in, B, 

they might be transported or, C, what kind of technologies are we 

talking about? So, A, we have a common set of goals that we are 

all working towards but that we all understand the paths and ensure that they are complementary of each other of. 

And obviously, our friends at the NNSA have a tremendous relationship and resource with the national labs, but DTRA is also very 

pleased. We do an awful lot of contracting work with the laboratories. And, again, we work very hard to deconflict those contracts 

and those efforts with our other government partners. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. General, you talked in your statement and in 

your oral summary about nontraditional agents. Can you give me 

an example of the sorts of things—because, again, it seems to me 

that it could be a wide universe that you would research. And so 

what sorts of things are you working on? 

General SCARBROUGH. Sir, nontraditional agents are, as I explained in my oral, are things outside of the chemical warfare, biological warfare convention. I really can’t go in open session here 

and elaborate, because I would breach security rather quickly to 

talk about specific areas, but I am more than happy to—— 
28 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And I appreciate that. I presume that the 

areas you work on would be informed by the Intelligence Community on what to pursue. 

General SCARBROUGH. Yes, very much so, sir; and we try to develop capabilities quickly around those. 

If I could, if I may, sir, one other thing. I just want to take this 

opportunity to correct the record. Earlier, I indicated in my response to Mr. Gibson that the Strategic National Stockpile is managed by DHS, Department of Homeland Security. It is managed by 

the Department of Health and Human Services, not DHS. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. If I could switch a little bit into 

the broader-strategy-like questions, particularly cooperative threat 

reduction, we are still spending money to do things in Russia that 

a lot of folks might say they ought to be doing for themselves at 

this stage. One of the first trips I took when I got to Congress was 

to Ukraine and Russia looking at some of those efforts, which at 

that time was absolutely critical, it seems to me, and very important work. But why are we still doing that? 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is an excellent question. 

Let me explain a couple of things about the process. 

First of all, in general, they ask; we don’t offer. We don’t always 

say yes. This is very much a process of looking at what they have 

that needs to be secured or eliminated and what matters most to 

us. One of the problems we have in evaluating these requests is 

that, you know, Russia is back on its feet economically. The way 

in which the country handles all of its affairs in its different regions is not quite as consistent as certainly we do here in the 

United States. 

So just for example, if we want to have 100-percent confidence 

that a mobile missile launcher has in fact been completely eliminated, whether it is pursuant to a treaty or, you know, some other 

reason that it is being taken out of service, one of the things we 

think about is that if we can be part of the process of eliminating 

it, that gives us that 100-percent confidence. 

The other thing that I would say about nonproliferation with the 

cooperation with the Russians is that it has been one of the few 

areas in a relationship that certainly has its peaks and valleys that 

has been consistent. Cooperation that we have from the Russian 

ministry of defense continues to be very straightforward. The same 

with the atomic energy ministry, Rosatom. 

Russia has played an important role I think in sort of the coalition of the willing on nuclear security initiatives that were started 

under the Bush administration and continued now. I am not saying 

that the Nunn-Lugar program somehow purchases that goodwill, 

but it is the foundation of a nonproliferation relationship we have 

with the Russians that has endured. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I realize that the dollars we are talking 

about now are not enormous like—compared with the money we 

have spent before, and I appreciate that. But I still get the sense 

maybe we are being asked to pay for things that they could and 

should be doing for themselves. But that is, you know—— 

But let me expand. I was very interested in y’all’s trip with Senator Lugar to Africa and where all that is leading. Can you give 

me some idea of what you see the role of the Department of De-
29 

fense is in that greater security over potential biological pathogens, 

whether it was in the countries you mentioned or beyond that? Can 

you flesh that out a little bit? Again, DOD’s role versus others. And 

give me kind of a vision of where that is heading. 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Sure. Let me start. Of course, my colleagues 

can amplify. 

I mentioned in my opening remarks the point that the Department of Defense and, to some extent, the Department of State are 

the only two departments in a position to look at biosecurity internationally from a national security perspective. So you are familiar, 

I think, with the biosecurity work that was done in the former Soviet states. The model there, or at least the point of departure, was 

that there had been a very complex and significant bioweapons program complex, and the foundation of the work there was eliminating infrastructure and other things that existed. 

So looking out in a place like Africa or other regions, obviously, 

you know, they are not bioweapons programs. There are endemic 

diseases. There is some science capacity. They are not necessarily 

evidence of terrorist organizations in any particular place at any 

particular time. But, frankly, our goal is to get ahead of the potential presence of terrorist organizations, and we think a lot about regions that have trouble with securing their own borders. So that 

is sort of the strategic framework. 

Why Africa? Well, to tell you the truth, one reason was that 

there already is a significant international and U.S. public health 

presence there, and our view was this is a place to partner with 

other U.S. agencies. I am thinking of the CDC that has been in Africa for years, a little more recently the PEPFAR [President’s 

Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief] program. 

So the point is not that the Department of Defense is coming in 

and, you know, parachuting in and taking over. Far from it. In fact, 

depending on what the particular type of activity may be, whether 

it is just providing basic physical security for a laboratory or helping foreign scientists and laboratory workers improve their laboratory security practices or working on disease surveillance, it could 

be that we actually work through the CDC or other agencies. And 

it is not that they are our subcontractors. It is that they are on the 

ground and we don’t need to duplicate what they are doing. 

So that is an example of sort of the nuts and bolts. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I would appreciate any comments. But, also, is 

there any money in this budget request in this effort—and, if so, 

to do what—for fiscal year ’12? 

Mr. HANDELMAN. For fiscal year ’12, yeah. Indeed. Off the top of 

my head, I am not sure what it is, but it would be to establish 

some of these laboratory relationships. It goes in the broader rubric 

of biosurveillance. 

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir. The fiscal year ’11 request for the NunnLugar program, overall, was $522 million. That included specific 

requests for bioengagement, Africa, Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 

Iraq, places such as that. 

And the fiscal year ’12 request is a little bit smaller than that 

at about 508, but, again, reflects a large component of that is biological, the cooperative biological engagement program, amplifying 

and taking advantage of the relationships we are able to build in 
30 

Africa and elsewhere and look to expand those to other areas as 

well. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I presume that the more you engage, the 

more you will find to do. I mean, that is what happened with Russia. You find greater gaps, greater vulnerabilities, places that need 

security, and then we will be asked to help provide that security 

around various pathogens. I presume that it is going to grow. 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me give you an example. 

The bottomless pit for U.S. assistance is certainly not something 

that we want our nonproliferation programs to become, and I understand the point you are trying to make. But let me give you an 

example of a situation with Russia where we had lots of requests 

but we prioritized what we thought would have the biggest bang 

for the U.S. buck and what addressed the most troubling threat, 

and it is the chemical weapons elimination facility at Shchuchye. 

They had chemical weapons depots across Siberia. And I think you 

are familiar with this one. This one was not blister agent. It was 

nerve agent. And it was not bulk storage. It was, I think, 2.1 million artillery shells and rockets. So it is the most dangerous stuff 

in its most proliferable form. And with a minor, I think, two minor 

exceptions, that really has been the core of our chemical weapons 

elimination program with the Russians. 

So the applicable point I am making to biosecurity in Africa or 

anywhere else is that I am sure you are right. Once our new partners get familiar with how we work we will get lots of requests. It 

doesn’t mean we are going to say yes to all of them. 

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one quick point, 

if I may. I think it is also important that we scope the size of some 

of these challenges we are dealing with. When we are talking about 

the biological programs and efforts of the former Soviet Union we 

are talking about an absolutely massive infrastructure, numerous 

facilities across the country. And those are expensive undertakings. 

When we are looking at places like the countries that the three 

of us visited with Senator Lugar, we are talking about individual 

facilities that don’t quite have that same infrastructure, if you will. 

I think the scope and the cost of what we are talking about are a 

completely different scale than those that we were talking about in 

the FSU [former Soviet Union], and I think a fraction of the money 

we spent on the threats we dealt with in the former Soviet Union 

will have tremendous impacts on these facilities. 

And, as Mr. Handelman said, we get requests from these governments on a number of different levels. And the three entities—Policy, NCB, as well as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency—work 

very closely together to prioritize and identify where we are going 

to make the biggest impact to benefit U.S. national security. 

Mr. HANDELMAN. I might add the State Department is also part 

of that dialogue. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I think this is very important work, and 

I am very supportive of expanding it. I think, as you heard from 

some of my colleagues earlier today, we are always going to be interested in how government agencies coordinate together, and you 

have just highlighted the importance of that in this particular instance. But I am very sympathetic with the idea that some better 
31 

security around some of these pathogens is a very important goal 

for our security as well as for many others. I just want us, as far 

as DOD is involved, to understand what is involved and as well as 

the dollars that are being asked. 

I think we have worn everybody else out. Again, I appreciate 

y’all’s patience in being here, waiting on votes and so forth, and answering our questions. 

And, with that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 11, 2011 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. MYERS. The purpose served by the Shield Act is of interest to the entire 

American populace considering the potential impact of the phenomenology that it 

is trying to protect against. As highlighted within the Shield Act, the Act’s purpose 

is ‘‘to amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk power system and electric 

infrastructure critical to the defense and well-being of the U.S. against natural and 

manmade EMP threats and vulnerabilities.’’ As both a practical and authoritative 

matter, such protection as described within the Act is a collaborative effort with the 

overall responsibility for protecting the U.S. electric infrastructure residing with the 

Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense (DOD) playing 

a supporting role. Among other things, and in collaboration with other U.S. Government entities such as the Department of Energy, the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA) provides technical expertise in relevant phenomenology such as nuclear-driven electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and naturally occurring geomagnetic 

storms—both of which have a potentially large effect on the bulk-power system and 

U.S. electric infrastructure. Accordingly, as the DOD lead agency for EMP effects 

and the associated military standards established to protect against those effects, 

DTRA conducts research on the magneto hydrodynamic (MHD) E-3 portion of the 

EMP pulse and its late-time effects on DOD systems and critical infrastructure. 

This portion of the EMP spectrum is of interest from both a manmade and naturally 

occurring perspective as the MHD E-3 produces similar frequency content to that 

of a geomagnetic storm, albeit not quite of the probable level of intensity generated 

during a nuclear blast. As part of its CWMD capability, DTRA maintains an MHD 

E-3 testbed that has been used to investigate MHD E-3 phenomology on a representative portion of the U.S. power grid. DTRA is also in the process of conducting 

research with the Idaho National Laboratory to examine damage to large transformers due to thermal overheating from such effects. 

As a matter of institutional responsibility, the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Homeland Defense) oversees the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) 

and therefore assists DHS as DHS publishes a National Infrastructure Protection 

Plan (NIPP) to address the 18 sectors of the national infrastructure, e.g., electric 

power grid, banking, transportation, telecom, water, pipelines, etc. As such, DHS 

serves as the overall U.S. government lead in collaboration with other agencies such 

as DOE to modernize the electric grid and enhance its reliability. [See page 15.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 11, 2011 

(107) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY 

Mr. THORNBERRY. As you know, the GAO has reported that our 

counterproliferation programs need to better align with our strategy. Since you deal 

with the larger policy and strategy issues associated with WMD and 

counterproliferation, can you outline how you plan to improve in this area? 

Mr. HANDELMAN. We believe that the most recent authoritative strategy statement on Countering WMD, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which highlighted the need to: increase barriers to WMD proliferation and use; identify and 

mitigate emergent WMD threats; develop layered and integrated defenses to WMD; 

and manage WMD Threats that emanate from failing or fragile states. We believe 

these priorities have been followed quite closely by programmatic changes to enhance measures aimed at better understanding potential threats, securing and reducing dangerous materials wherever possible, positioning forces to monitor and 

track lethal agents and materials and their means of delivery, and, where relevant, 

defeat the threats themselves. 

To further these ends, the FY11 Defense Appropriation provides funding for WMD 

Elimination ($99.3M), enhanced nuclear forensics ($109.2M), R&D for non-traditional agents ($300M) and biological threat reduction ($300M). We continue to work 

closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology & Logistics 

(AT&L) to ensure these policy and strategy issues align with programming. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction outlines three pillars for dealing with WMD: nonproliferation, 

counterproliferation, and consequence management. Are these pillars effective in 

providing a strategic framework for U.S. Combating WMD activities? Is the current 

DOD organization effective in responding to the nonproliferation, 

counterproliferation, and consequence management pillars? Within which of these 

pillars do our greatest challenges lie? 

Mr. HANDELMAN. The three pillars for WMD provide an effective framework for 

managing DOD’s countering WMD activities to prevent proliferation and use of 

WMD, means of delivery, and related materials, increase force protection, and prepare to respond to the range of WMD threats. 

Each pillar of CWMD contains unique challenges. However, our greatest challenge 

is how we coordinate activities across the CWMD mission space to create a truly 

layered defense. As stated in the 2010 QDR, an integrated, layered defense is essential to preventing an attack before it occurs, through efforts such as securing material at its source or ensuring robust interdiction capabilities as part of UN Security 

Council Resolution enforcement, as well as responding to an attack should prevention fail. Therefore, efforts to cut across pillars and examine issues in a holistic 

manner are of primary importance to the countering WMD mission. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. In your written testimony, you discuss the partnership between 

the U.S. government and large pharmaceutical companies in developing biological 

countermeasures. Can you provide more detail about this partnership and outline 

some of the challenges? 

Mr. WEBER. DOD will enter into a cooperative partnership with industry, including both experienced pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology innovators, for 

the advanced development and manufacturing of medical countermeasures (MCMs). 

This is the Medical Countermeasures Initiative (MCMI). 

The events of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, along with the ongoing development of 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) MCMs, revealed major challenges remaining in advanced development and domestic manufacturing capacity 

when facing an emerging disease. These challenges require new approaches to 

counter anticipated and unanticipated attacks, as well as natural disasters or naturally occurring infectious-disease threats. The most evident challenge was the ability 

to meet demand for MCMs during an outbreak. Current capabilities would not provide sufficient countermeasures to the armed forces or to the Nation as a whole in 

an emergency situation. 

DOD will address this gap by establishing the MCMI to provide agile and flexible 

advanced development and manufacturing capabilities to support the development, 

licensure, and production of MCMs for U.S. military forces and the Nation. The 
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MCMI will also support science and technology efforts to develop next-generation 

MCM-platform technologies, manufacturing systems, and regulatory science technologies. 

DOD’s need for MCMs is variable in quantity, ranging from thousands of doses 

to several million. The potential spectrum of exposure, from CBRN threats to 

emerging infectious diseases, is diverse. Although the DOD dose requirements are 

relatively small, there are still great risks as each MCM candidate navigates product development (e.g., product and manufacturing scale-up, pivotal animal studies, 

and clinical studies) and regulatory pathways-including compliance uncertainty in 

the Federal Drug Administration policy on animal testing in the development of 

medical countermeasures. 

By focusing on advanced development and manufacturing technologies, while 

HHS focuses on manufacturing services on a large scale (tens of millions of doses), 

DOD will be involved in protecting national security by first protecting the members 

of the U.S. Armed Forces. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. What is currently being done in the way of consequence management planning and preparedness against CBRNE attacks both abroad and within the U.S.? 

Mr. WEBER. Within the United States, the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) is the lead Federal agency, and DOD provides support. The Joint Staff and 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) have responsibility for planning and preparedness for both domestic and foreign consequencemanagement operations. Overseas, the Department of State (DOS) is the lead Federal agency, and DOD provides support. Each Combatant Command is tasked to develop supporting plans for consequence management activities within their area of 

responsibility. 

USNORTHCOM has the lead for planning for and executing DOD support to consequence management activities within the United States. DOD conducted a comprehensive review of its domestic CBRN Response enterprise following the 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The result is an ongoing two-year effort to increase DOD’s lifesaving capability within the existing 18,000-person response enterprise. The overall change is a shift from centralized Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) #2 and #3 

to create ten Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) postured to respond in 6–12 hours. 

This new structure will be certified and in place by the end of Fiscal Year 2012 

(FY12). 

Independent of the CCMRF restructuring, my office recognized the need to assist 

the Combatant Commands with their Foreign Consequence Management (FCM) requirements. To that end DTRA will establish the Consequence Management Assistance Program (CMAP) in FY12. This program will increase the tactical training and 

operational capabilities of targeted partner nations to respond to CBRNE incidents 

effectively, and it will support Combatant Commanders’ requirements to assist partner nations by building capacity to respond effectively to the use of WMD. DTRA 

is currently coordinating with the Combatant Commanders to identify and prioritize 

partner nations to be assisted. It is also working with DOS and the Embassy Country Teams to develop engagement plans tailored specifically for these key partner 

countries. DTRA will also partner with industry and subject matter expert organizations to develop training modules, procure response equipment through the Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) program, and conduct hands-on training in support of the 

Combatant Commands’ objectives and country-engagement plans. The desired end 

state is a cadre of regionally based leader nations, which have effective consequencemanagement-response capabilities, and which are able to respond to assist themselves and regional partners during the critical first 96 hours following a CBRN incident. 

DTRA is also supporting the DOD-wide effort to assist Japan in its response to 

the ongoing crises associated with the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear facilities. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. How concerned are we with the proliferation of dual-use technologies that could potentially be used for WMD development activities? Do we have 

good tracking mechanisms in place, and what are some of your programmatic and 

policy challenges in this area? 

Mr. WEBER. With rapid technological advances around the world, the task of discerning illicit activities from legitimate dual-use activities grows more complex. Our 

key programmatic challenge in monitoring and controlling proliferation is the development of technology to distinguish dual-use technologies for civilian use from those 

intended for weapons development. 

New technology advances are critical to our ability to detect and assess potential 

WMD proliferation. For nuclear weapons, this involves assessing uranium-enrichment facilities to verify that the degree of enrichment is consistent with power and 
109 

medical-isotope reactor operation and not with nuclear-weapons production. We 

must also have appropriate technology to monitor and control the nuclear-fuel cycle, 

limiting the ability of potential proliferant nations to separate plutonium for weapons from reactor fuel. 

The revolution in synthetic biology and bioengineering requires new monitoring 

techniques to discriminate precursors for dual-use biological materials (e.g., vaccines) from bioagents. Emerging chemical threats also place great emphasis on the 

ability to identify and detect possible proliferant material. Developing analytic technology for life-cycle monitoring of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons supports 

the President’s non-proliferation agenda and is consistent with the purposes of applicable international agreements, including the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the 

Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. In your written testimony you discuss the threat posed by Al 

Qaeda and their determination to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In terms of 

our ability to plan and prepare for such a threat, do we have a clear understanding 

of Al Qaeda’s technical abilities, or relationships with state actors that may transfer 

technology? What are you most concerned with? Please respond via classified channels if needed. 

Mr. MYERS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Can you discuss how recent changes in the Middle East are impacting DTRA’s operations and planning? Have you received additional requests for 

support from CENTCOM? What are some of your largest concerns? 

Mr. MYERS. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) operations and plans 

have been affected by recent events in the Middle East. We’ve had to curtail one 

mission support element’s travel to Bahrain and we have increased our travel coordination with USCENTCOM to ensure the safety of personnel traveling to the region. To date, we have not changed any of our plans to engage and work with partner nations in the Middle East, and we will coordinate with our interagency partners before changing any program plans. 

In the last month, DTRA and the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons 

of Mass Destruction (WMD) surged their capabilities to support Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. We have been providing USAFRICOM and its subordinate commands 

with advice and assistance in its planning and conduct of the operation. DTRA’s liaison to the USCENTCOM headquarters participates in all coordination meetings to 

ensure USCENTCOM’s operational requirements are considered and met. 

We have not received any additional requests for support from USCENTCOM, but 

remain acutely interested in what is going on in the region. We are closely observing 

the evolving social and political dynamics in the region, and are maintaining our 

effective working relationship with USCENTCOM in order to assist should the need 

arise. 

DTRA’s concerns extend to all aspects of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

or high-yield explosive impacts, including mitigation of toxic industrial chemicals or 

hazardous materials, which might affect U.S. personnel or interests. Our primary 

concern is the acquisition by terrorist groups of weapons, materials, and know-how. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. What are some of your unfunded requirements? Where are your 

largest gaps in funding? 

Mr. MYERS. We fully support the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 budget request, and 

DTRA has no unfunded requirements. 

If additional funding was to be provided, I would recommend applying it to improved technical reachback support for the Combatant Commanders, the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD), National Guard WMD Civil Support teams, and 

others; accelerated development of WMD detection and interdiction technologies and 

their integration into operational concepts; and accelerated development of hardened-target and WMD-defeat capabilities. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Since our forces have been so focused on counterinsurgency in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, are you concerned that some of the specialized and highly 

technical counterproliferations skills and capabilities have eroded in the U.S. government? 

Mr. MYERS. Yes. There are continuing concerns about the future availability of 

a cadre of technical experts in the area of nuclear weapons. These were identified 

in the ‘‘Report of the Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons 

Expertise’’ to the Congress and Secretary of Energy Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Acts of 1997 and 1998 published March 1, 1999 for the Department of Energy (DOE), and in the ‘‘Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force 

on Nuclear Deterrence Skills,’’ published in September 2008 by the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics for DOD. 
110 

The demands of ongoing contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in particularly officers spending large portions of their career performing 

functions that are not combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD). Although 

they are providing critical leadership on the battlefield conducting combat patrols 

or planning counter-insurgency operations, they are not honing technical skills essential to this mission space. Since most officers entering the military today do not 

possess technical degrees in sciences such as chemistry and biology, the need for 

self-study or formal education provided by the military departments is essential. 

When officers are afforded the opportunity to attend schools, general Professional 

Military Education training does not include CWMD-specific coursework. The technical CWMD training that is offered at institutions such as the Naval Post Graduate School and the Defense Nuclear Weapons School are often difficult to fill because officers are simply not available to attend due to ongoing deployments. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. By which mechanisms is the intelligence community coordinating and sharing information pertaining to CBRNE threats with the appropriate 

officials in the Department of Defense and other key U.S. agencies? 

Mr. MYERS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. In your written testimony you talk about the threat of non-traditional agents (NTAs) and how your program is working to mitigate this threat. 

Can you outline for us some of your concerns in this area? Can NTAs be exploited 

by non-state actors or transnational threats such as Al Qaeda? Please respond via 

classified channels if necessary. 

General SCARBROUGH. [The information referred to is classified and retained in 

the committee files.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. In your written testimony you outline several DOD Efficiencies 

that you have implemented including the reduction of thirty-one full-time positions 

and the reduction of contractor support. Do you expect any gaps or limitations as 

a result of these drawdowns? 

General SCARBROUGH. The Joint Program for Chemical and Biological Defense 

(JPEO-CBD) does not anticipate any gaps or limitations as a result of the actions 

described in the written testimony. The JPEO-CBD views the consolidation of acquisition programs and reduction to contractor support as described in the prepared 

statement as commonsense efforts to operate more efficiently and cost-effectively. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. What are some of your unfunded requirements? Where are your 

largest gaps in funding? 

General SCARBROUGH. We fully support the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 budget request. 

If provided with additional funds, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical 

and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) would apply them (in order of priority) to: 

1. Accelerating progress in our current priority areas: 

• Medical Countermeasures; 

• Biosurveillance, including improvements to information technology and 

diagnostics capabilities; and 

• Defense against Nontraditional Agents (NTA). 

2. Medical countermeasures for radiological threats. 

3. Hazard mitigation for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 

threats. 

4. Standoff detection capabilities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Aberdeen Proving Ground in my district is home to the 

Army Research Lab, Army Chemical Material Agency and the Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense. There is tremendous growth at APG because of the 

2005 BRAC. Buildings are going up all over APG, but there are old, dated buildings 

which must be heated and cooled because of the chemicals within them. The Army 

does a good job of putting up building, but I haven’t seen any progress on demolition 

of buildings. Is demolition of building adequately funded in the Army FY12 budget 

and the Future Year Defense Plan? 

General SCARBROUGH. I referred your question to the office with appropriate jurisdiction, the Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) Garrison Commander, who provides 

the following response: 

With fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 demolition funding, APG has demolished 53 facilities, with 24 more to be demolished using fiscal year 2009 funding. There was no fiscal year 2010 demolition funding provided to APG. For 

fiscal year 2011, there is tentatively $1.03M for the demolition of 25 facilities 
111 

designated for APG. This money has not yet been allocated. For fiscal years 

2011-2017, APG has a $85.8M plan to demolish 188 additional facilities. This 

funding has not yet been programmed. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Our National Guard is no longer supplemental. They are an 

integral part of today’s fighting force. It is important to provide the National Guard 

with the equipment they need, just as the regular Army. What is the funding and 

fielding plan for the National Guard’s Chemical Biological Protective Shelter which 

is currently on the Top 25 Unfunded List? 

General SCARBROUGH. 

Funding 

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 DOD Budget Request outlines current and planned 

procurement of Chemical and Biological Protective Shelters (CBPS) systems (FY10 

through FY16). Current plans indicate Procurement, Defense-Wide funds would buy 

CBPS systems for both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Active 

Component while Other Procurement, Army funds would buy CBPS systems for the 

Army National Guard (ARNG). 

Procurement, Defense Wide 

FY 2010—$10.6M for 7 systems 

FY 2011—$19.7M for 12 systems 

FY 2012—$6.0M for 2 systems 

FY 2013—$6.0M for 2 systems 

FY 2014—$19.7M for 21 systems 

FY 2015—$22.6M for 26 systems 

FY 2016—$23.8M for 25 systems 

Other Procurement, Army 

FY 2016—$50.3M 

It is important to note that the ARNG can also receive equipment through the 

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA). 

Fielding 

ARNG and Army Active Component units are fielded CBPS systems depending 

upon the Headquarters, Department of the Army Master Priority List and Basis of 

Issue Plan. The List and Plan are not complete, so numbers may change. The draft 

Headquarters Department of the Army Master Priority List currently identifies approximately 439 CBPS systems for the ARNG. However, achieving that total depends on the availability of funds, Army priorities, and DoD priorities. 

Program Status 

The CBPS program has been transitioning from a High Mobility Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) platform to a Medium Tactical Vehicle (MTV) platform. 

With the inability to add the required armor protection due to weight limitations, 

the Army decided to integrate the CBPS mission module onto the MTV platform. 

The Chemical and Biological Defense Program recently completed first-article testing, and production of the integrated system is scheduled to begin in FY12. The 

ARNG is currently planning to procure additional systems using NGREA funding 

once production begins. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense 

at Aberdeen Proving Ground uses live monkeys to show the effects of patients that 

have been exposed to chemical or nerve agents and medical trainees observe these 

effects. It is my understanding that the monkeys are an ineffective way to treat patients as they do not show the same symptoms as humans and that the human simulators that are used in addition to this would provide accurate training if only 

those were used. In addition, over the next ten years, the use of only human simulators would provide a cost savings for the Army. Is there a reason why the monkeys 

are still used for this purpose if human simulators can provide more accurate training? 

General SCARBROUGH. I have referred this question to the office with appropriate 

jurisdiction, the U.S. Army Medical Department (AMEDD), which provides the following response: 

‘‘The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) is 

dedicated to employing the best possible training techniques to prepare medical-care 

providers to treat battlefield injuries while minimizing the use of live animals. The 

Field—and Medical—Management of Chemical and Biological Casualties courses 

make extensive use of manikins, computer-based training, and other training aids 

to maximize training effectiveness. 
112 

The anesthetized African green nonhuman primate (NHP) model is currently the 

best model for simulating a cholinergic crisis in humans. In the live-animal exercise, 

physostigmine, a short-acting, FDA-approved medication for humans, is used to simulate effects of a nerve-agent exposure in fully anesthetized animals; actual nerve 

agent is not administered. The use of physostigmine in this species produces effects 

that are identical to the effects that occur in humans after exposure to nerve agents. 

After administering physostigmine, students observe changes that occur in the animal’s muscle tone, respirations, mucous membrane color, salivation, heart rate, and 

body temperature. Students provide supportive care and administer antidotes. Following treatment, they observe the animal’s recovery from a cholinergic crisis. The 

animals recover without incident and are treated humanely at all times. 

USAMRICD is committed to continually evaluating and actively seeking non-animal alternatives that may provide equivalent or superior training experiences. 

USAMRICD uses a variety of different manikins and continually collaborates with 

the manufacturer to improve the realism of these simulators. However, even the 

most advanced of the currently available manikins are incapable of adequately modeling the range of clinical signs or the individually variable response to nerve-agent 

exposure and treatment seen in live patients, both human and animal.’’ 

Æ