U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

35–611PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

HEARING ON H.R. 1004, PROHIBITING 

UNAUTHORIZED MILITARY ACTION 

IN VENEZUELA ACT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 13, 2019 

Serial No. 116–14 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Ranking 

Member 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

JASON STEINBAUM, Staff Director 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Republican Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE 

Hon. David Cicilline, a Representative in Congress from the State of Rhode 

Island .................................................................................................................... 7 

WITNESSES 

Bill Chavez, Dr. Rebecca, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Inter-American Dialogue ...................................................................................................................... 14 

Pearlstein, Deborah, Professor of Law and Co-Director, Floersheimer Center 

for Constitutional Democracy, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva 

University ............................................................................................................. 23 

Neumann, Dr. Vanessa, President, Asymmetrica ................................................. 34 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 62 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 63 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 64 

(1) 

HEARING ON H.R. 1004, PROHIBITING 

UNAUTHORIZED MILITARY ACTION IN 

VENEZUELA ACT 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot L. Engel (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ENGEL. The committee will come to order. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. 

This afternoon, the committee continues its examination of the 

ongoing crisis in Venezuela, with particular focus on legislation offered by a member of this committee, Mr. David Cicilline of Rhode 

Island. That bill is H.R. 1004, the Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act. Mr. Cicilline will testify on this bill 

presently, then we will welcome a second panel of experts. 

My position on Venezuela has been clear: I believe that the 

United States and our allies in the Lima Group and the European 

Union must continue to squeeze Nicolas Maduro and push for a 

peaceful, democratic transition. The suffering in Venezuela is a 

man-made humanitarian crisis in what was once the wealthiest 

country in South America. The people of Venezuela deserve far better than what Mr. Maduro’s dictatorship and his predecessor, Mr. 

Chavez, have given them. And I stand with Juan Guaido as he 

bravely leads his fellow citizens toward a brighter future. 

At the same time, we must be clear: U.S. military intervention 

to shape the future of Venezuela is not an option. I continue to 

worry about the Administration’s saber rattling and constant reminders that military action remains on the table. The Lima 

Group, which includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, the 

EU, and even my friend, former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, 

have rejected that possibility. Our former SOUTHCOM commander, Admiral James Stavridis, has written powerfully about 

the perils of U.S. military intervention in Venezuela. 

Today’s hearing is to explore this issue in greater detail. 

Now, I have heard arguments that we in Congress should not debate the use of force in Venezuela, that we should wait and see 

what course the President takes before we take up this issue. I disagree. Under Article I of the Constitution, Congress desides whether America will go to war; under Article II, the President has the 
2 

power to defend our country, but that is not what we are talking 

about here. 

The longer I have been in Congress, the stronger I feel that the 

Congress declares whether or not we should go to war. And, of 

course, we have not been doing that since 1941. 

The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution are clear that 

it is our responsibility to consider the use of force before any troops 

are introduced into hostilities. The law requires, and I quote, the 

President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities, unquote. 

And the President’s obligation does not end with consultation. If 

he decides to deploy our military, he needs congressional authorization before they are introduced into hostilities. 

I will be the first to admit that Congress has not done a good 

job in holding administrations of both parties to the letter of the 

law. We have handed over the keys for too long, and the executive 

branch has left Congress in the dust. We should not stand for it 

anymore, and I am not going to put off this debate a day longer. 

These are the gravest decisions our government must face, and we 

must do so only as the Constitution provides. 

As I have said again and again, I oppose military intervention 

in Venezuela. But since the Administration keeps raising the possibility, I want to know what would it look like, how does the Administration see this playing out. I would like to think after our disastrous war in Iraq, we have learned our lesson about plunging the 

United States into another war without a clear path forward. And 

let us not forget, Venezuela is more than twice the size of Iraq. 

Would Maduro’s colectivos join with rogue elements of the Venezuelan security forces and develop into an insurgency, what would 

be the impact of such a conflict be on Colombia, a country that has 

opened up its heart and homes to over a million Venezuelan migrants? Would a government that comes to power with the backing 

of the U.S. intervention have any legitimacy in the eyes of the Venezuelan people and other governments in the region? 

These questions barely scratch the surface, which is why it is so 

important that this committee deal with the serious and weighty 

concerns that accompany a military intervention before it occurs, 

not after it has already begun. 

I would like to close with this reminder: I did not call this hearing and Mr. Cicilline did not introduce his legislation as a solution 

in search of a problem. We have a problem when the Administration keeps telling us that the use of force remains on the table. 

Frankly, I would rather be focusing on how to support the people 

of Venezuela in their struggle for a better future. Tomorrow we will 

be considering three bills that would do so. 

But as a coequal branch of government with key responsibilities, 

dealing with questions of war and peace, we cannot just stand here 

and shrug our shoulders. We cannot wait for American 

servicemembers to be placed in harm’s way and then start to ask 

questions. 

So I hope we have an instructive discussion this afternoon. I will 

now yield to our ranking member, Mr. McCaul of Texas, for any 

opening remarks he might have. 
3 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The situation in Venezuela is really going from bad to worse. For 

the past week, the country has been struggling with nationwide energy blackouts, there are shortages of food and medicine. Simply 

put, this is a result of Nicolas Maduro’s socialist policies, criminal 

activity, and corruption. 

Over 3 million people have fled the country, with more escaping 

every day. Maduro has even turned his armed thugs or colectivos 

against those who are trying to deliver humanitarian aid. 

Our colleague and witness today, Congressman Cicilline, previously stated that the Maduro regime’s corruption and negligence 

has devastated Venezuela’s economy, starved its people, and 

brought the Nation to the brink of collapse. I could not agree more. 

All clear-eyed and freedom-loving people around the world want 

to see Maduro gone so free and fair elections can be held. To make 

that happen, Maduro and his cronies must understand that the 

best outcome for them is to step down and leave the country peacefully. I know all of us want that as well. However, this legislation 

we are discussing today jeopardizes that outcome in several ways 

by appearing to take military force off the table. 

First, it immediately takes pressure off the regime with punishing sanctions, a coalition of 54 countries supporting the opposition, and massive protests. Maduro is feeling the heat. We should 

not give him reason to breathe a sigh of relief. 

Second, it would put the security of Juan Guaido and his family 

in jeopardy, something I personally talked to the Vice President 

about. Maduro could easily become more aggressive in cracking 

down on the opposition. In fact, Ambassador Vecchio, I talked to 

this morning, told me that the attorney general has applied for a 

writ in the Venezuelan Supreme Court to arrest President Guaido. 

This could all lead to violence and potential casualties. 

As I said just yesterday, the attorney general launched a baseless investigation of Guaido for an alleged attack on the power grid. 

So the threat is real. We should not undermine the security of the 

very people we are trying to support, the people of Venezuela. 

Third, it sends the wrong signal to both our allies and adversaries. Without the threat of military force, it will look like we are 

hedging our bets. This will deflate Juan Guaido and his supporters 

and embolden our enemies, Russia and Cuba. This bill also plays 

right into the Maduro regime’s strategy. 

Just last month, in remarks at the United Nations, Maduro’s illegitimate foreign minister called on the Security Council to reject 

the threat of the use of force against the Venezuelan people. 

Finally, it will show a divided Congress, something the Ambassador has warned us about. As I said, I have personally spoken 

with the Vice President and Special Representative Elliott Abrams, 

and as recent as this afternoon with the Ambassador Carlos 

Vecchio, who all expressed concern about discussing this bill at this 

critical time. They all stress the need for bipartisan unity. 

Maduro’s repeated mention of U.S. military intervention is simply a ploy to divide the coalition of 54 countries supporting democracy and the people of Venezuela. Opponents of this legislation are 

not pushing for military actions. I for myself am a strong believer 
4 

in the sole power of Congress to declare war under Article I of the 

Constitution. 

I do not believe that this administration is planning to invade 

Venezuela. And if it did, I would be the first to push Congress to 

act. But this premature signal sends a dangerous message at a 

very delicate time. The nations that support Maduro’s illegitimate 

regime, especially Cuba and Russia, are the very ones carrying out 

the real foreign intervention. 

As Secretary Pompeo recently stated, the United States is drawing a clear line between those who aid forces of repression and 

those who give life to the Venezuelan people’s democratic dreams. 

One immediate step we can all take here today is to show our solidarity with the people of Venezuela and to directly recognize interim President Juan Guaido as the legitimate President of Venezuela just as 54 other countries have. I strongly do and encourage 

my democratic colleagues to do so today as well. 

The people of Venezuela have suffered enough. They are finally 

on the verge of taking their country back. Let us not do this bill. 

Let us not let this bill complicate their efforts to achieve freedom 

from socialist tyranny, and put an end to this humanitarian crisis 

and disaster. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. McCaul. 

Let me now introduce our first witness, though he is certainly 

well known to all of us. David Cicilline has represented Rhode Island’s First congressional District in the House since 2011. He is 

a senior member of this committee and chairman of the Judiciary 

Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law. 

And he is the author of H.R. 1004, the Prohibiting Unauthorized 

Military Action in Venezuela Act. 

Mr. Cicilline, you are recognized to offer your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. DAVID CICILLINE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 

Member McCaul and distinguished colleagues on this committee. I 

appreciate the opportunity to speak about my legislation, H.R. 

1004, the Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela 

Act. 

I appreciate the committee’s willingness to take on the important 

issue of executive overreach in military engagement, an issue that 

is fundamental to the constitutional role of Congress and on which 

there is bipartisan agreement that Congress must take a stronger 

stand in ensuring appropriate consultation and oversight. 

As we meet here this afternoon, the people of Venezuela are suffering in darkness, literally. Millions have been without power for 

days. We all agree the Maduro regime has destroyed Venezuela’s 

economy, starved its people, and engaged in widespread corruption 

and repression. We all agree the people of Venezuela deserve a better future, a future they determine. We all believe the Venezuelan 

people have a right to pick their leaders, a right Maduro has denied his people by refusing to hold free and fair elections. 

To be absolutely clear, Nicolas Maduro is a dictator who does not 

care about the Venezuelan people. Maduro’s corrupt kleptocratic re-
5 

gime has left Venezuela’s economy in shambles, its people without 

food, and its hospitals without basic medicines. Millions have fled 

this despair and oppression. 

The people of Venezuela deserve better. They deserve a democratic future. They deserve to pick their own leaders, which is why 

I joined many of my colleagues in supporting the Venezuelan National Assembly’s decision to choose Juan Guaido as the interim 

President of Venezuela. 

It is my hope that there will be a diplomatic solution that allows 

for free and fair elections in the near future, and I believe U.S. policy should be conducted with this end in mind. As the chairman 

said, we would not be here and considering this legislation, but for 

the actions and words of the Trump administration. 

This administration’s rhetoric implying that they are willing to 

use military force in Venezuela is unfortunate. Not only would military intervention be illegal; it would also come with serious consequences that I fear would not only hurt the Venezuelan people, 

but also the prospect for democracy. 

Under the Constitution and War Powers Act, the President may 

not take unilateral military action and must consult with and receive authorization from Congress. As Special Representative Elliott Abrams confirmed when he was testifying here before this 

committee, the conditions for unilateral Presidential military action 

have not been met. Congress has not declared war on Venezuela. 

There is not any existing statutory authorization that would allow 

for military intervention in Venezuela. And Venezuela has not attacked the United States, its territories or possessions or its Armed 

Forces. 

That is why I introduced this legislation, which would simply 

prohibit funds from being spent on any unauthorized military engagement in Venezuela. Although the Administration is well aware 

they do not have proper authorization to engage in a military action in Venezuela, they have continued the drumbeat of aggressive 

saber rattling rhetoric promoting military intervention as an option. 

We know from the past they have not seen the need to seek proper congressional approval for military intervention when they took 

action against the Assad regime in Syria without proper authorization. In my view, military action in Venezuela is not an option, not 

without congressional authorization. 

To be clear, nothing in this bill prevents military action against 

or in Venezuela or anywhere else. It simply prohibits funds to be 

used for unauthorized military action in Venezuela. Should the situation in Venezuela pose an imminent threat to American national 

security, nothing in this bill stops the Administration or any administration from seeking authority from Congress for military 

intervention per the War Powers Act. 

However, without meeting the conditions under the War Powers 

Act, any U.S. military action with respect to Venezuela would be 

illegal and ill-advised. Americans do not want another foreign military engagement, and the Administration has not made any case 

for military intervention in Venezuela. 

The United States must continue to work with the Lima Group, 

Europeans, and the international community to use diplomatic and 
6 

economic tools to pressure Maduro to honor the will of his people. 

Humanitarian aid must be allowed into the country to aid the suffering Venezuelan people. Congress should do everything in its 

power to support a peaceful, truly democratic transition of power 

in Venezuela. 

The Constitution gave Congress, not the executive branch, the 

power to determine when the United States goes to war. And it is 

time we assert our constitutional duty and send a clear message 

that without congressional authorization, this administration or 

any administration cannot take the country to war unilaterally. 

It is also worth noting that many foreign policy experts have 

noted that Maduro uses the threat of military action in his propaganda campaign to try to say in power. I am sensitive to the arguments that my colleagues may make that the timing is sensitive 

and we do not want to do anything to seem like we are supporting 

a dictator. While I appreciate the sincerity of my colleagues’ arguments, I have to say, when will the timing of military intervention 

not be sensitive? 

We are 18 years into war in Afghanistan, 16 years in Iraq, engaged in various ways in numerous engagements elsewhere, and 

yet Congress has never found time to reassert our control over military engagement. It is also important to note that the absence of 

congressional action sends its own message. The time for Congress 

to weigh in is now. 

I am thankful to the more than 50 bipartisan cosponsors, many 

of them members of this committee who are supporting this bill. I 

want to thank you, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, for 

how holding this important hearing and for considering this piece 

of legislation. And I look forward to the committee holding a markup and passing this legislation in the near future. And I thank you 

again. 

[The statement of Mr. Cicilline follows:] 
7 

Congressman David N. Cicilline 

Opening Statement 

House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on H.R. 1004 

Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act 

March 13, 2019 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, colleagues on the Committee, 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak about my bill, H.R. 1004 the 

Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act. 

I appreciate the Committee's willingness to take on the important issue of 

executive overreach in military engagement, an issue that is fundamental to the 

constitutional role of Congress, and on which there is bipartisan agreement that 

Congress must take a stronger stand in ensuring appropriate consultation and 

oversight. 

As we meet here this morning, the people of Venezuela are suffering in darkness 

literally. Millions have been without power for days. We all agree the Maduro 

regime has destroyed Venezuela's economy, starved its people, and engaged in 

widespread corruption and repression. We all agree the people of Venezuela 

deserve a better future, a future they determine. We all believe the Venezuelan 

people have a right to pick their leaders, a right Maduro has denied his people by 

refusing to hold free and fair elections. 

To be absolutely clear- Nicolas Maduro is a dictator who doesn't care about the 

Venezuelan people. Maduro's corrupt, kleptocratic regime has left Venezuela's 
8 

economy in shambles, its people without food, and its hospitals without basic 

medicines. Millions have fled this despair and oppression. 

The people of Venezuela deserve better. They deserve a democratic future. They 

deserve to pick their own leaders, which is why I join many of my colleagues in 

supporting the Venezuelan National Assembly's decision to choose Juan Guaido as 

the interim president of Venezuela. It is my hope that there will be a diplomatic 

solution that allows for free and fair elections in the near future, and that I believe 

U.S. policy should be conducted with this end in mind. 

This Administration's rhetoric implying that they are willing to use military force 

in Venezuela is unfortunate. Not only would military intervention be illegal, it 

would also come with serious consequences that I fear would not only hurt the 

Venezuelan people, but also the prospects for democracy. Under the Constitution 

and War Powers Act, the President may not take unilateral military action and 

must consult with and receive authorization from Congress. 

As Special Representative Eliott Abrams confirmed when he was here testifying 

before this Committee, the conditions for unilateral Presidential military action 

have not been met: Congress has not declared war on Venezuela; there is not any 

existing statutory authorization that would allow for a military intervention in 

Venezuela; and Venezuela has not attacked the United States, its teiTitories or 

possessions, or its armed forces. 

This is why I introduced this legislation, which would simply prohibit funds from 

being spent on any unauthorized military engagement in Venezeula. Although the 

Administration is well aware that they don't have proper authorization to engage in 
9 

a military engagement in Venezuela, they have continued the drumbeat of 

aggressive, saber-rattling rhetoric promoting military intervention as an option. We 

know from the past that they have not seen the need seek proper congressional 

approval for military intervention, when they took action against the Assad regime 

in Syria without proper authorization. 

In my view, military action in Venezuela is not an option not without 

Congressional authorization. 

To be clear, nothing in this bill prevents military action against in Venezuela or 

anywhere else- it simply prohibits fund to be used for unauthorized military 

action against Maduro. Should the situation in Venezuela pose an imminent threat 

to American national security, nothing in this bill stops the Administration, or any 

Administration from seeking authority from Congress for military intervention, per 

the War Powers Act. 

However, without meeting the conditions under the War Powers Act, any U.S. 

military action with respect to Venezuela would be illegal- and ill-advised. 

Americans do not want another foreign military engagement, and the 

Administration has not made any case for intervention in Venezuela. 

The United States must continue to work with the Lima Group, Europe, and the 

international community to use diplomatic and economic tools to pressure Maduro 

to honor the will of his people. Humanitarian aid must be allowed into the country 

to aid the suffering Venezuelan people. Congress should do everything in its 

power to support a peaceful, tmly democratic transition of power in Venezuela. 
10 

The Constitution gave Congress not the Executive Branch the power to 

determine when the United States goes to war. And it is time we assert our 

Constitutional duty and send a clear message that without Congressional 

authorization, this Administration- or any Administration -- cannot take the 

country to war unilaterally. 

I am sensitive to the arguments that my colleagues may make, that the timing is 

sensitive, we don't want to do anything to seem like we're supporting a dictator. 

While I appreciate the sincere arguments of my colleagues, I have to say - when 

will the timing of military intervention not be sensitive? We are eighteen years into 

war in Afghanistan, sixteen years in Iraq, engaged in various ways in numerous 

engagements elsewhere, and yet Congress has never found the time to reassert our 

control over military engagement. It is also important to note that the absence of 

Congressional action sends its own message. The time for Congress to weigh in is 

now. 

I am thankful to the more than fifty bipartisan co-sponsors, many of them members 

of this Committee, who are suppotiing this bill. 

Thank you, Chairman Engel and Ranking Member McCaul for holding this 

important hearing and for considering this piece oflegislation. I look forward to 

the Committee holding a markup and passing this legislation in the near future. 
11 

Chairman ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Cicilline. 

We will now pause to allow our second panel of witnesses to take 

their seats. 

Chairman ENGEL. Well, good afternoon. Let me welcome our witnesses. Dr. Rebecca Bill Chavez is a nonresident senior fellow at 

the Inter-American Dialogue. She previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs, from 

2013 until 2017, as a senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense on 

Latin America. Dr. Chavez focused on supporting the Colombian 

Ministry of Defense’s role in the FARC peace process, increasing 

Mexico’s commitment to regional security cooperation, and shaping 

DoD contributions to President Obama’s Central American strategy. 

Dr. Vanessa Neumann is the founder and president of 

Asymmetrica, a consultancy on political risk and strategies to dismantle illegal trade. She served for 4 years at the OECD, where 

she worked on the task force on countering illicit trade. Dr. Neumann has been published in The Wall Street Journal, the Guardian, and is an author of the 2017 book, ‘‘Blood Profits: How American Consumers Unwittingly Fund Terrorists.’’ 

And to introduce our third witness, I will yield to Mr. Espaillat 

of New York. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member. 

Before I do that, I just want to acknowledge an 8th grade class 

here from Harlem Academy that I met outside of the hearing room, 

Mr. Chairman. 

I spoke to them a little bit about Venezuela, and they seem to 

know a little bit more than many of us here, so maybe they have 

a bright future. 

But I am proud to introduce Professor Deborah Pearlstein, a professor of constitutional international law at Cardozo Law School, a 

part of Yeshiva University, whose main campus is right in the middle of my district. A leading voice on law and counterterrorism, 

Professor Pearlstein has held positions at Princeton, Georgetown, 

and the University of Pennsylvania. She also currently serves on 

the editorial board of the Journal of National Security Law and 

Policy. 

Professor Pearlstein has researched, written, litigated, and advocated extensively on the human rights impact of the U.S. National 

Security Policy and U.S. detention and interrogation operations. 

And from 2003 to 2007, she served as the founding director of the 

law and security program at Human Rights First. Throughout her 

tenure, Professor Pearlstein worked closely with members of the 

defense and intelligence community, including helping to bring together retired military leaders to address key policy challenges in 

U.S. counterterrorism operations. 

Thank you for your time this morning, Professor, and welcome. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

I will now recognize our witnesses to offer their opening comments. Why do not we start with you, Dr. Chavez. 
12 

STATEMENT OF REBECCA BILL CHAVEZ, PH.D., NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on 

potential U.S. military intervention in Venezuela. And thank you 

also for your bipartisan commitment to maintaining focus on Venezuela and to helping resolve the crisis there. 

My name is Rebecca Bill Chavez. I am a senior fellow at the 

Inter-American Dialogue. From 2013 until January 2017, I served 

as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere, where I oversaw U.S. defense policy in the hemisphere. Before that, I was a tenured professor of political science at the U.S. 

Naval Academy. 

I am deeply troubled by the humanitarian crisis and the unraveling of democracy under Nicolas Maduro, a brutal and corrupt dictator. And I want to be clear here, Maduro stands at the center of 

Venezuela’s manmade disaster. He has followed Hugo Chavez’ footsteps by systematically dismantling democratic institutions and 

shamelessly violating human rights. 

The U.S. has a role in resolving the impasse, but the question 

today is whether the U.S. should use military force to remove 

Maduro from power. My answer is no. I will highlight two reasons 

for this. 

First, military intervention would be much more difficult than 

many believe. It would not be quick, and it would involve engagement with the Venezuelan military, armed civilians, and non-State 

actors. 

Second, international pressure via regional partners and European allies is one of our most important tools. We will squander 

that partnership if we continue to threaten military intervention 

and much more so if we do intervene militarily in Venezuela. We 

also risk losing the trust so painstakingly built in the region over 

the past couple of decades. 

There have been many references to the 1989 invasion of Panama as a potential template. This comparison is very misguided. At 

the time of Operation Just Cause, SOUTHCOM was headquartered 

in Panama, so logistics and intel collection were relatively easy. 

The conflict lasted less than 2 weeks and required 24,000 U.S. 

troops. 

Venezuela is a mountainous country, twice the size of Iraq, with 

multiple urban centers, which would mean thousands of civilian 

casualties. An invasion would likely require between 100,000 and 

150,000 U.S. troops, four to six times the number needed in Panama. In Panama, U.S. Forces had to contend with 4,000 Panamanian combat troops. The Venezuelan military is comprised of 

356,000 members. And, unfortunately, defections have not been on 

the scale that we had hoped. 

Maduro has deftly used both carrots and sticks to ensure military loyalty. Chavez’ practice of purging anyone seen as a threat 

has continued under Maduro. On the carrot side, Maduro gave officers control over food distribution, a lucrative black market. Promotions have been given for loyalty, which is why there are over 

2,000 generals in Venezuela. But the military would not be the 

only challenge. 
13 

Our troops would face an insurgency comprised of armed groups, 

such as the violent colectivos, and nonState actors with access to 

funding through drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion. 

Even Colombian ELN guerillas and dissident FARC members 

would have incentives to join the fight, and the conflict would certainly spill over into Colombia, adding to Colombia’s challenges as 

it struggles to implement the 2016 Peace Accord. 

Another consequence would be the unraveling of the hard fought 

regional and international consensus that has marginalized 

Maduro. The vast majority of our partners have unequivocally stated their opposition to military intervention, including Lima Group 

members Colombia and Brazil. A military intervention would set 

us back at a time when China and Russia are gaining influence in 

the region. 

For these reasons, it is critical that Congress play a role in any 

decision to intervene militarily in Venezuela. Congressman 

Cicilline’s proposed legislation would help accomplish that goal. 

Thank you again for shining a light on what is happening in 

Venezuela. I would be more than happy to assist the committee as 

it formulates policy approaches to address the ongoing tragedy in 

Venezuela. 

[The statement of Ms. Chavez follows:] 
14 

Testimony of Rebecca Bill Chavez 

Hearing on Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

March 13,2019 

Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and members of the Committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify today on potential United States military intervention in Venezuela. I also 

want to express my gratitude to this Committee for its bipartisan commitment to maintaining 

focus on Venezuela and to helping resolve the crisis there. 

My name is Rebecca Bill Chavez. I am currently a Senior Fellow at the Inter-American 

Dialogue, a think tank dedicated to analyzing, debating. and finding consensus solutions to the 

core issues we confront as a hemisphere. From2013 until January 2017, I served as Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs where I oversaw defense policy 

involving the countries of the hemisphere and defense cooperation programs in the U.S. 

Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command areas of responsibility. Betorc that, I was a 

tenured professor at the United States Naval Academy. focusing on democratization and security 

in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

I have spent my policy and academic careers focused on U.S.-Latin American relations, Latin 

American political systems, security, and the rule of law. As a close observer oft he region, I am 

deeply troubled by the humanitarian crisis and the dramatic unraveling of democracy under 

Nicolas Maduro, a brutal and corrupt dictator. 

A core question raised by this hearing is whether the United States should use military force to 

remove Maduro from power in Venezuela. My answer, which reflects the position of many other 

U.S. defense and foreign policy experts, is no. The negative consequences of military action to 

Venezuela, to the region, and to the interests of the United States are clear and foreseeable. 

In my testimony today I will highlight two broad reasons for avoiding U.S. military intervention 

in Venezuela. 

First, any military intervention would be much more difficult than many believe; it would not be 

quick and it could involve engagement with elements of the Venezuelan military loyal to 

Maduro, armed civilians. and non-state actors. 

Second, one of our most important tools is international pressure via our regional pattners and 

Emopean allies. We will squander that goodwill and partnership if we continue to threaten 

military intervention and even more so if we intervene militarily. Given our history in the 

region, we will risk losing the trust so painstakingly built since the end of the Cold War. 

For the above reasons, it is critical that Congress play a role in any decision to engage in military 

activity in Venezuela. Congressman Cicilline's proposed legislation, the Prohibiting 

Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act, would help accomplish that goal. Its 

introduction is a welcome reminder of the need to think through very carefully military 

engagement in Venezuela. 
15 

The Current Situation in Venezuela 

I want to be clear: Nicolas Maduro is responsible for the tragedy that has enveloped Venezuela. 

He stands at the center of Venezuela's man-made disaster. Maduro came to power as the 

handpicked successor of Hugo Chavez, and he assumed his second term through a rigged 

election in 2018. He has followed in Chavez's footsteps by systematically dismantling 

democratic institutions and shamelessly violating human rights. Multiple indicators demonstrate 

that Maduro has led Venezuela to state failure: 

Economic Free Fall. Venezuela was once one of the most prosperous countries in Latin 

America, but today the economy is in free fall. Gross Domestic Product has shrunk by half since 

2013, and the International Monetary Fund expects hyperinflation in Venezuela to reach a 

staggering ten million percent this year. And. though Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the 

world, incompetence, mismanagement. and corruption have led to a 60 percent decrease in oil 

production output since 2013, from 2.9 million barrels per day to 1.2 million barrels per day. 

This drop in output detrimentally impacts Venezuela's ability to service its debt of$150 billion, 

which is over five times its exports. 

Extreme Poverty. Ninety percent of Venezuelans live in poverty, and Maduro is literally starving 

his people. Much has been written about the "Venezuelan diet," a reference to the fact that the 

average weight loss has been 24 pounds. We've seen images of skeletal babies dying because 

there is no ftmnula. not even in emergency rooms, and the recent video released by Univision 's 

Jorge Ramos of hungry young men rummaging for food in the back of a garbage truck. 

Virtually Non-Existent Access to Healthcare. The speed at which Venezuela is losing access to 

essential medicine is like that of a war zone. The Pharmaceutical Federation of Venezuela 

reports an 85 percent shortage of medicine. In 2016, infant mortality increased by 30 percent and 

malaria infections rose by 75 percent. The country is also facing severe outbreaks of diphtheria 

and measles. The blackouts of recent days have exacerbated the medical crisis. Ninety percent of 

dialysis units were paralyzed, hospitals turned away pregnant women because they were unable 

to perform cesarean sections, and panicked nurses searched for manual resuscitators to keep 

premature babies a! ive. 

Rampant Crime. Venezuela has become one of the most dangerous countries in the world. Many 

have turned to criminal activity such as robbery and kidnapping to survive. According to the 

Venezuelan Violence Observatory, the country had a homicide rate of 89 per I 00,000 people in 

2017. That rate dropped to 81.4 per l 00,000 people, but only because even criminals are 

struggling to get by and therefore fleeing the country, according to a recent Washington Post 

report. 

Refugee Crisis. Of the 3.4 million Venezuelans who have left Venezuela, 2.7 million have 

emigrated since 2015. Some estimate that the diaspora is even larger. That's over I 0 percent of 

the country's overall population. Regional governments are struggling to cope with the 

humanitarian and political fallout from what is the largest mass migration in modern Latin 

American history. 
16 

The Consequences of U.S. Military Intervention in Venezuela 

The Venezuelan people deserve a democratically elected and accountable government that 

delivers public services and provides citizen security, and the temptation to look for a quick fix 

given the level of human suffering is understandable. However. as noted above, U.S. military 

intervention in Venezuela would have foreseeable negative consequences. 

A Long and D{{ficult Engagement 

Over the past few weeks. there have been many references to the 1989 invasion of Panama that 

overthrew Manuel Noriega as a potential template for action in Venezuela. The two are not 

comparable. At the time of Operation Just Cause, U.S. Southern Command was headquartered in 

Panama, so intelligence collection was relatively easy and the headquarters functioned as a sort 

of forward operating location. The conflict itself lasted less than two weeks. and involved 24,000 

U.S. troops. 13.000 of whom were already in Panama. 

An invasion of Venezuela would likely require between I 00,000 and 150,000 U.S. troops over a 

long period time under conditions of asymmetrical warfare. As a mountainous country twice the 

size of Iraq with multiple large urban areas, Venezuela would pose serious logistical challenges 

to an invading force. There would be thousands of civilian casualties. U.S. military intervention 

could create the need for a long-term occupation by setting the stage for prolonged low intensity 

conflict. with resistance from powerful elements of the military that will remain loyal to Maduro 

in addition to armed civilians and formidable non-state actors with access to funding through 

illicit activity such as drug-trafficking. illegal mining. and extortion. 

The challenge posed by Venezuela's military is acute. In Panama, the U.S. had to contend with 

only 4.000 Panamanian combat troops. Jn contrast, the National Bolivarian Armed Forces of 

Venezuela is comprised of 356,000 members. Defections have not been on the scale that we 

hoped because both Chavez and Madura have deftly used both carrots and sticks to make sure 

that the fate of the armed forces has been tied closely to their own. After the 2002 coup attempt, 

Chavez expelled any soldier that he suspected might challenge him, and the practice of purging 

anyone seen as a threat has continued. With the help of Cuban advisors, the Madura regime 

monitors closely the military for signs of dissent. 

On the carrot side, promotions have been based on loyalty, which is why there are over 2,000 

Venezuelan generals. Maduro also rewards loyalty with lucrative government positions. giving 

officers a stake in preserving his control. Approximately half of the country's governors arc 

current or retired military officers, and current or retired officers lead about one-third of the 

country's ministries. Control over food distribution has been one ofthe most powerful patronage 

tools to buy off members of the military. It has not only allowed officers to feed their families, it 

has also given them control over the profitable black market in food, a major source of illicit 

enrichment. 

Although it is true that some Venezuelans would welcome an invasion, it is unrealistic to think 

that there would be no significant civilian resistance. As Venezuela expert Javier Corrales has 

pointed out, multiple armed groups with distinct interests would defend the status quo no matter 
17 

what the cost, whether for ideological reasons or because their livelihood is linked to the Maduro 

government. In addition to high ranking military officers, the Special Action Forces (FAES) and 

the infamous pro-government co/ectivos would be poised to become what defense expert Adam 

lsacson has called a "chavista insurgency" in a post-intervention scenario. Even Colombian 

National Liberation Army (ELN) guerillas and dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia (FARC) members would have incentives to take up arms in Venezuela, and the 

conflict would certainly spill into Colombia, adding to the challenges facing our close ally as it 

struggles to implement the 2016 peace accord and consolidate government control over 

previously ungoverned territory. 

Loss 1!{ Partnership and Goodwill of Allies ami Partners 

A U.S. military intervention would shatter the hard-fought regional and international consensus 

that has marginalized the Maduro government. The United States is one of the 54 nations, 

including most Latin American and European countries, that have recognized Juan Guaid6 as 

Venezuela's interim president. At the same time, the vast majority of our partners have puhlicly 

and unequivocally stated their opposition military intervention in Venezuela including 

Venezuela's closest neighbors: Colombia and Brazil. Eleven members of the Lima Group issued 

ajoint statement last month: "[Tjhe transition to democracy must be conducted by the 

Venezuelans themselves peacefully and within the framework of the Constitution and 

international law, supported by political and diplomatic means, without the use of force." 

It's not surprising that the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean would oppose U.S. 

military intervention given the history of the region. Recent saber-rattling along with references 

to the Monroe Doctrine have created concerns among Latin American governments that the 

United States may return to its Cold War posture. As members of this Committee know, past 

U.S. action and support for military coups in Latin America often led to deep-seated despair and 

resentment. During my tenure as DASD, I was frequently reminded of the history of U.S. 

intervention in countries from Chile to Guatemala to Mexico. Former U.S. Southern Command 

Commander James Stavridis captures this in his reference to the 2008 creation of the Fourth 

Fleet, which focuses on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief: medical diplomacy, and 

counter-narcotics. In an interview last month, he recalled that regional partners saw the Fourth 

Fleet as '·a return to gunboat diplomacy. We had to work very hard to overcome that." 

Indeed. the U.S. government has worked to overcome these perceptions and has created a 

significant amount of trust with our Latin American partners. A military intervention would set 

us back at a time when China and Russia are gaining influence in the region. It would also give 

Maduro an effective propaganda tool to usc against the U.S. in the region and thus potentially 

strengthen his hand. 

Military action in contravention of the stated policies of the Lima Group countries would stand 

to jeopardize the U.S. military's broader work in Latin America and the Caribbean. As Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense, I became keenly aware of the importance of our partnerships to 

combat effectively transnational criminal organizations, respond to natural disasters, strengthen 

defense institutions, and develop military human rights programs. Military intervention would 

put at risk our important collaboration with the governments and armed forces of the hemisphere. 

4 
18 

Recommendations for Moving Forward 

There is a crisis in Venezuela, and there are potential non-combat roles for the U.S. armed 

forces, especially in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, although the focus of 

today's hearing is on military action, we cannot Jose sight of the non-military policy tools at our 

disposal to address the current challenges of the Maduro regime. 

Non-Combat Role for the U.S. Military: Humanitarian Assistance. Although a unilateral 

intervention would be a mistake. the U.S. military should be ready to provide humanitarian 

assistance. When the time comes, the United States armed forces (always in support of civilian 

authorities) should be part of a broader coalition of countries that steps in to alleviate the 

suffering of the Venezuelan people. The militaries of regional partners such as Brazil, Chile, and 

Mexico have extensive experience and expertise in delivering aid under diftlcult circumstances. 

A humanitarian mission presents an opportunity to strengthen our military-to-military 

partnerships and broader defense relationships in the Western Hemisphere at a time when the 

U.S. government is working to minimize Chinese and Russian influence in the region. A longtime goal of U.S. Southern Command has been to promote the United States as a partner of 

choice. Recognizing our partners' capabilities would go a long way towards conveying the 

message of equal partnership and building trust, which- as noted above- is critical to our 

mission in the region. 

Depoliticize tlte Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance. The provision of essential supplies to 

mitigate the dire humanitarian crisis must be the priority. We should continue to look for ways 

get aid into Venezuela. In order to do this effectively, donors must not politicize the delivery of 

assistance, which means distancing the provision of aid from political goals. Humanitarian aid is 

most effective when it adheres to the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. As 

humanitarian response expert Jeremy Konyndyk explains, humanitarian action in contested 

environments will not reach those in need if it becomes entangled in the wider political power 

struggle. One of the challenges of the well-intentioned February 23 effort was the 

characterization of the aid as support for Guaid6, which helped Maduro potiray the mission as an 

attempt to ovenhrow him. In the future, we can apply lessons learned by keeping a low profile 

and ceding leadership to a credible and neutral party such as the International Red Cross, the 

U.N. or local NGOs. 

Support the 3.4 million Venezuelans Who Have Fled to Other Nations. Supporting 

Venezuelans abroad means designating Venezuelans for Temporary Protected Status and 

providing additional financial assistance to the countries that have welcomed Venezuelans. 

Currently, we are asking nations in the region to host Venezuelan refugees when we aren't doing 

so ourselves. Supporting the refugees also entails pledging additional assistance for the 

Venezuela regional response. As Cynthia Amson pointed out in recent testimony. the U.S. 

government pledge of$152 million between fiscal years 2017-2019 is important but nowhere 

near the $738 million needed according the U.N. Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan. 

Stand Behind the Lima Group. From the perspective of regional stability and institutionbuilding, the Lima Group's unity and resolve to take a front seat in addressing the Venezuelan 

crisis is a welcome change from the hands-off approach of most Latin American nations until 

5 
19 

2017. We should give the Lima Group the oppottunity to continue to take a leadership position 

and find diplomatic solutions to the Venezuelan crisis. 

Continue to Pursue Multilateral Diplomacy. The U.S. government should continue to be part of 

multilateral engagement. Our efforts to support a democratic transition will not be effective 

unless we work closely with our partners especially those in the region, including Mexico. 

Though it will be difficult, the U.S. should also put Venezuela on the agenda during 

engagements with China, Cuba, and Russia-- countries that wield significant sway with 

Maduro. 

Keep Our Eyes on Colombia. Colombia is often held up as a rare example of bipartisan foreign 

policy success. With the help of Plan Colombia, the country moved from the brink of state 

failure in 2000 to a liberal democracy with a strong market economy. The 2016 peace accords 

signaled that conflict with the FARC had finally drawn to a close after decades of civil war. 

Moreover, Colombia has the potential to increase its role as a security exporter, contributing to 

global stability. The crisis in Venezuela, however, has the potential to destabilize our closest ally 

in Latin America. Colombia has been the largest recipient of Venezuelan refugees, which has 

strained the country's economy, infrastructure, health system, and security. The government of 

President fv{m Duque has the unenviable task of implementing the peace accords while dealing 

with the influx of 1.2 million Venezuelans, both of which require tremendous resources. The 

U.S. government should commit to supporting President Duque in this endeavor. The United 

States and the region have a lot riding on the consolidation of peace in Colombia. 

Conclusion 

Thank you again for shining a light on what is happening in Venezuela. I also want to thank the 

Committee for its attention to Latin America and the Caribbean more generally, a region that is 

too often an afterthought for policymakers. I would he happy to assist this Committee as it 

formulates its policy approaches to the Venezuelan challenge. 

6 
20 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Dr. Chavez. 

Ms. Pearlstein. 

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN, PROFESSOR OF LAW 

AND CO-DIRECTOR, FLOERSHEIMER CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL 

OF LAW, YESHIVA UNIVERSITY 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ENGEL. If you can pull the mike a little closer. Is the 

button pushed? 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Thank you. Is this better? 

Chairman ENGEL. Yes. 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Thank you very much, Chairman Engel and 

Ranking Member McCaul and the members of the committee. 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss legal issues 

surrounding H.R. 1004, a bill to restrict Federal funding for the introduction of U.S. troops into hostilities in Venezuela. 

As I teach my first-year students in constitutional law, a few 

things were as clear in the documents designed, is the expectation 

that Congress would play a central role in our democracy and defining the purpose and regulating the use of U.S. military power, 

most importantly, when it comes to the introduction of U.S. Forces 

into hostilities. This allocation of responsibility was made evident 

throughout the Constitution’s text and structure and was unmistakable in the Framers’ intent. As James Madison put it, in no part 

of the Constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the claws 

which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature and 

not to the executive. The trust and the temptation, Madison said, 

would be too great for any one man. 

While the past half century or so Presidential practices at times 

have obscured that design, it has not changed two key propositions 

of Constitutional law that I would like to highlight in these few 

minutes. 

First, Congress enjoys exclusive power under the Constitution 

over the expenditure of Federal funds. Congress holds not only 

sweeping spending authority under Article I, Section 8, to provide 

for the common defense and general welfare of the United States, 

but also authority directed toward spending for the military, particularly, including the power to raise and support armies and provide and maintain a Navy, and of course, declare war. 

Of equal significance is the parallel requirement in the Constitution in Article I, Section 9, providing that no money shall be drawn 

from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by 

law. As reflected in these and other provisions, Congress’ power in 

the purse is among our democracy’s most fundamental checks on 

the exercise of executive power. 

H.R. 1004 is an unremarkable exercise of Congress’ power in this 

respect under Article I of the Constitution. The bill, as drafted, is 

consistent with many such appropriations restrictions Congress has 

enacted in the past, restricting the actions of Republican and 

Democratic Presidents alike, and is limited by its terms to preserve 

the United States’ ability to respond in self-defense to armed attacks. 
21 

Second, while there has long been a debate among constitutional 

law scholars and others about the scope of the President’s power 

under Article II of the Constitution, to use force in the absence of 

congressional authorization. There is far less debate on the effect 

on the President’s power of an express congressional prohibition. 

As has been clear since Justice Jackson set the framework for 

evaluating questions and executive power in the steel seizure case, 

a framework the court justices of both parties continue to embrace 

vigorously today, the scope of the President’s power under Article 

II of the Constitution depends first and foremost on the position of 

Congress. When the President takes steps incompatible with the 

expressed or implied will of Congress, whatever independent constitutional power he possesses, is at its lowest ebb. 

At this lowest ebb, the President’s claim to any power to act in 

the face of a congressional prohibition must be scrutinized with 

caution, the court wrote, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. This is an equilibrium, in 

my view, that ensures the President is bound by the duly enacted 

laws of the United States. 

This equilibrium is far from altered in the realm of foreign affairs. On the contrary, Congress’ full engagement is critical in ensuring that the activities of America’s military enjoy the full support of America’s people. As the Supreme Court emphasized only 

recently, the executive is not free from the ordinary controls and 

checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue. It 

is not for the President alone to determine the whole content of the 

Nation’s foreign policy. 

While the President can rightly argue that he has the independent constitutional duty to repel sudden attacks against the 

United States, I do not think 1004 can be read to infringe on the 

President’s power in this respect. The bill exempts from its coverage circumstances in which it may be necessary for the armed 

forces to respond to attacks on U.S. Forces or on the United States. 

And were there any doubt in this regard, longstanding principles 

of statutory construction require that a court facing a statute of 

ambiguous meaning prefer a reading of this statute that avoids any 

constitutional question. 

The Framers knew acutely, personally, what war could cost republics, so they built in a series of hurdles. The Constitution would 

require Congress to publicly authorize military expenditures in the 

face of their constituents every 2 years. The Armed Forces would 

be manned, the idea was, by the citizen soldier, one incapable of 

acting inconsistent with the will of the people of which he and she 

were part. And a majority of the country’s elected representatives 

would be required to approve any decision to commit the country 

to war. 

Fast forward two centuries, and all of those checks have been 

disabled. What we spend on military action is at times obscure to 

the public by vast sums spent on private contractors. Just half of 

1 percent of Americans serve in the military. We are a Nation, according to poll results, in which 80 percent of Americas support the 

troops. But during the height of the war in Afghanistan, 90 percent 

of Americans were unable to locate Afghanistan on a map. 
22 

Today, Congress is one of the last nominally operating checks on 

the President’s power in this regard. I am enormously grateful for 

this committee’s decision to engage it. Thank you. 

[The statement of Ms. Pearlstein follows:] 
23 

Statement of 

Deborah N. Pearlstein 

Prepared Testimony to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

United States House of Representatives 

March 13,2019 

Hearing on H.R. 1004 

Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act 

Pearlstein Testimony Page I 3/12/2019 
24 

Deborah N. Pearlstein 

Prepared Testimony to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

United States House of Representatives 

March 13,2019 

Hearing on H.R. 1004 

Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act 

lntrodnction 

Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the Committee, thank 

you for giving me the opportunity to discuss legal issues surrounding the Committee's 

consideration of H.R. I 004, a bill to prohibit the introduction of U.S. Armed forces into 

hostilities in Venezuela. Congress plays an indisputably central role in our constitutional 

democracy in defining the purpose and regulating the usc of U.S. military power 

oversc:as, most importantly when it comes to the introduction of U.S. forces into 

hostilities. This responsibility is evident in the Constitution's text and history, and in 

Congress' engagement throughout the nation's history both in authorizing the usc of 

force, and in placing a wide range of restrictions on its usc. While I take no position on 

whether it is wise policy to engage the U.S. Armed forces in addressing the crisis in 

Venezuela today, I have no doubt that H.R. I 004 is an unremarkable and constitutional 

assertion of congressional power to restrict the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into 

hostilities there. 

This testimony presents two primary arguments. First, H.R. I 004 is a lawful 

exercise of Congress' Appropriations Power under Article I of the Constitution to restrict 

federal expenditures. The bill as drafted is consistent with many such appropriations 

restrictions Congress has enacted in the past, and it is carefully limited by its terms to 

Pearlstein Testimony Page 2 3/12/2019 
25 

preserve the United States' ability to respond in self-defense to armed attacks. Second, 

while the President possesses some independent power to use force absent congressional 

authorization under Article Jl of the Constitution (notably, the power to repel attacks 

against the United States and its embassies), any residual presidential power to use force 

in the face of an express congressional prohibition against the use of funds for such a 

purpose is narrow indeed. In all events, H.R. I 004 cannot properly be construed to 

infringe upon that power here. 

H.R. 1004 Is a Constitutional Exercise of Congress' Appropriations Power 

It is among the least controversial propositions in constitutional law that Congress 

enjoys exclusive power over the expenditure of federal funds. Congress holds not only 

sweeping spending authority under Article I, Section 8 "to provide for the common 

Defense and general Welfare of the United States," but also authority directed toward 

spending for the military particularly, including the power to "raise and support Armies,'' 

to "provide and maintain a Navy," and indeed "To declare War." Of equal significance is 

the Constitution's parallel requirement in the Article I, Section 9 Appropriations Clause, 

providing: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 

Appropriations made by Law." As reflected in these and other express provisions of the 

Constitution, Congress' "power of the purse" is among our democracy's most 

fundamental checks on the exercise of Executive power. 1 

1 See, e.g., TilE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 297-98 (James Madison) (Jan Shapiro ed., 2009). (describing 

Congress' power of the purse "the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can 

arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for 

carrying into effect every just and salutary measure"). 

Pearlstein Testimony Page 3 3/12/2019 
26 

Far from understanding these powers to be more constrained in the realm of 

foreign a flairs or national security, the Constitution's Framers recognized the 

appropriations power as an especially important check on the Executive's ability to 

deploy the military. 2 Determined to learn the negative example ofthc British military 

they had foremost in mind, the Framers thought it essential that control over the military 

not be vested in an Executive alone. Indeed, to ensure that the President and the military 

remained politically accountable to the public, the Constitution expressly requires 

Congress to authorize military expenditures "in the face of their constituents" every two 

ycars,3 ensuring that the government's most profound power remained squarely in the 

hands of"the representatives of the people."4 Preserving accountability in this sense was 

equally favored by the military itself, which feared being made the political scapegoat of 

civilian policy decisions. 5 

Given this history, it should be unsurprising that Congress has repeatedly enacted 

legislation in the modern era prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to support various 

U.S. military activities abroad- and Presidents have repeatedly complied. Congressional 

appropriations restrictions were ultimately pivotal in curtailing U.S. participation in 

2 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 TilE PAPIJZS OF TIIOMAS 

JEFFERSON, 392, 397 (Julian P. Boyd cd .• 1958) ("We have already given ... one effectual check to the Dog 

of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those 

who are to spend to those who are to pay."). 1 U.S. CONST., art. I,§ 8. cl. 12; see also TilE FE!li'RALISTNO. 26, at 170 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 

Rossiter ed., 1961 ). 4 TilE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 179-80 ("Independent of all other 

reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against 

military establishments in time of peace to say that the whole power of the proposed government is to be in 

the hands of the representatives of the people."); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra 

note 3, at 259 (arguing that giving control over military appropriations to representatives facing elections 

every two years provides a check on the dangers of a powertul military). 5 CiiARl.ES ROYSTI:R, A REVOLUTIONARY PFOPI.E AT WAR: TilE (\JNTINFN lA I. ARMY AND AMERICAN 

CiiARACTLR, 1775-1783, at 312 ( 1979). 

Pearlstein Testimony Page4 3/12/2019 
27 

combat operations in Indochina in the 1970s;6 appropriations restrictions likewise 

operated to prohibit the use of funds for various military activities in Nicaragua in the 

1980s;7 and analogous provisions were again enacted to limit the role of U.S. military 

forces in Somalia and Rwanda in the 1990s. 8 While it is true that a few Presidents have 

occasionally voiced objections to such congressional constraints on policy grounds,9 the 

most comprehensive historical survey of which I am aware examining presidential 

responses to legislative restrictions on military force (from the founding era through 

2008) was able to identify only a single instance in which a President could be said to 

have actually violated a specific appropriations restriction. 10 As to that incident, 

involving President Ford's 1975 decision to engage the military in evacuating a group of 

U.S. and foreign nationals fi·om Vietnam, it remains entirely unclear whether Congress 

would have in fact objected to the particular operation under the circumstanccs. 11 

The measure currently under consideration by this Committee, H.R. 1004, is fully 

consistent with Congress' historic exercise of its appropriations power in this realm. 

''See, e.g, P.L. 91-652. §7(a) (1971) (prohibiting funds appropriated !rom being used to introduce U.S. 

ground troops into Cambodia); P.L. 93-50, §307 (1973) (prohibiting appropriated funds from being used in 

U.S. combat activities in Indochina after August 15, 1973 ). 7 Sec, e.g, i>.L. 98-473, §8066 (1984) (providing that "no funds available" to the Defense Department or 

any other agency "may be obligated or expended for the purpose ... of supporting ... military or 

paramilitary operation in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual''). 8 See P.L. 103-139, §8135 (1993) (barring appropriations from being used for combat forces in Somalia 

after March 31, 1994). For additional examples, see CRS Report RS20775, Congressional Use of Funding 

Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments, and CRS Report RL33803, 

Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and 

Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches, by Amy Belasco et al. 

"Sec David J. Barron & MartinS. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb--A 

Constitutional Histm}', 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1067 (2008) (recounting President Nixon's veto of early 

congressional efforts to restrict funding for operations in Cambodia). 10 ,)·ee id., at 1072-73 (describing President Ford's decision to authorize U.S. forces to aid in rescuing U.S. 

and foreign nationals in Vietnam, notwithstanding the statutory prohibition on the usc of appropriated funds 

to involve U.S. forces in "hostilities"). 11 See Zachary S. Price, l·imding Restrictions and the Separation of Pmrers, 71 VANIJ. L. RLV. 357, 432 

(20 18) (noting that the President had convened a special session of Congress to amend the operative 

restriction, and that "while Congress was still searching for precise language when he acted unilaterally, it 

appeared receptive to his general objectives"). 

Pearlstein Testimony Page 5 3/12/2019 
28 

Tracking the 1973 War Powers Resolution (WPR) framework, 12 H.R. I 004 provides that 

'"[nJone of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available" to any 

Federal agency ··may be used to introduce the Armed Forces of the United States into 

hostilities with respect to Venezuela'' absent a declaration of war. specific statutory 

authorization, or an attack ··upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or the 

Armed Forces." 

While H.R. I 004 thus contains clear prohibitory language against the expenditure 

of funds, it is carefully limited in two significant ways. First, H.R. 1004 mirrors the 

WPR in applying only to the introduction of forces into '·hostilities"; the usc of U.S. 

forces in circumstances not rising to the level of '·hostilities" (including, for example, the 

ongoing mission of U.S. Marine guards at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas) are thus 

excluded from the bill's coverage. 13 Second, 1-LR. 1004 likewise exempts from its 

coverage circumstances in which it may be necessary for the U.S. Armed Forces to 

respond in exigent circumstances to an •·attack upon the United States," or against our 

Armed Forces otherwise lawfully present. The bill thus does nothing to undermine the 

long settled recognition, under U.S. and international law, of a nation's right to respond 

to armed attacks in sclf-dcfense. 14 

12 P.L. 93-148 (1973). 11 See, e.g, 10 U.S.C. § 8183. 14 See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, PRloS!DENTIAI. WAR POWI:R 6-8 (1995) (describing debates of Constitutional 

Convention); THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE AC I'ION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMfll 

AJTACKS 76-96 (2002) (recognizing as legitimate self-defense within the meaning of At1icle 51 of the UN 

Charter state efforts to protect nationals abroad where threat is "demonstrably real and grave'" and 

intervention is proportionate). 

Pearlstein Testimony Page 6 3/12/2019 
29 

The President's Artiele II Power to Repel Sudden Attacks 

Given the scope of congressional power to set the terms of federal appropriations, 

the sole constitutional objection that might be raised to H.R. l 004 is the prospect that the 

restriction somehow infringes upon the exercise of a power that the Constitution grants 

exclusil•ely to the President under Article II. Such a power is not lightly to be assumed. 

As the Supreme Court has long recognized: "Presidential powers are not fixed but 

fluctuate depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those ofCongress.'' 15 

While the President's power is accordingly at its constitutional maximum when he acts 

pursuant to express congressional authorization, his power is likewise '·at its lowest ebb" 

when he takes steps "incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.'.J 6 At 

this lowest ebb, the President's claim to any such ''preclusive" power '·must be 

scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our 

constitutional system." 17 An equilibrium that ensures the President is bound by the duly 

enacted laws of the United States. 

Whatever initiative the President may enjoy to commit U.S. forces to hostilities in 

the absence of congressional authorization, it is an entirely different matter to suggest he 

retains any such power in the face of a congressional prohibition like the one 

contemplated in H.R. I 004. Indeed. the single occasion in U.S. history in which the 

Supreme Court has recognized the existence of such a preclusive Executive power 

(respecting the issuance of passports), it did so only while making clear at the same time 

that it was identifying an extraordinary exception to the application of legislative 

restrictions, not the rule. As the Court put it then: ''The Executive is not free from the 

15 Youngstown Sheet & Ti1be Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,635 (1952) (Jackson, J .. concurring). 

'"!d., at 637-638. 17 !d., at 638. 

Pearlstein Testimony Page 7 3/!2/2019 
30 

ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue. It is 

not for the President alone to determine the whole content of the Nation's foreign 

Here, to the extent the President retains any residual authority to exercise an 

Article II power as Commander in Chief in contravention of congressional funding limits, 

it could only be, as the WPR itself implies, ''in a moment of genuine emergency, when 

the Government must act with no time for deliberation, ... [ and when there is] an imminent 

threat to the safety of the Nation and its people." 19 Indeed, among the lessons one can 

glean from the debates at the Constitutional Convention is that the Framers' decision to 

change the text of Article 1- tl·om an earlier version giving Congress the power to '·make 

war" to the version adopted, giving Congress the power to "declare war"- was in order 

to ensure the President would retain "the power to repel sudden attacks."20 

Yet for reasons noted above, I do not think H.R. I 004 can fairly be read to curtail 

the President's power in this respect. The bill expressly exempts from its coverage 

circumstances in which it may be necessary for the U.S. Armed Forces to respond to 

attacks on U.S. forces or on the United States. Were there any doubt in this regard- H.R. 

1004 docs not, for example, define what might constitute "a national emergency created 

by an attack on the United States"- longstanding principles of statutory construction 

require that a court facing a statute of ambiguous meaning prefer a reading of the statute 

that avoids any constitutional question.21 This 'canon of constitutional avoidance' 

'"Zivotof,ky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1059 (20 15) (holding that "Congress cannot command the President to 

contradict an earlier recognition determination in the issuance of passp011s"). 19 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in pat1, and 

concurring in the judgment). 2

° F!SIIER, supra note_, at 6-7 (describing the framers' desire to recognize the President's duty to take 

actions necessary to resist sudden attacks). 21 See, e.g .• Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 ( 1935). 

Pearlstein Testimony Page 8 3/12/2019 
31 

without question includes avoiding any interpretation of a statute that might trench on 

any presidential power that remains available "at its lowest ebb." 

Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, I have no doubt that it is well within Congress' 

constitutional power to enact the appropriations restriction contained in H.R. I 004. The 

greater challenge, of course, is to see it done. Justice Jackson's often-quoted opinion in 

the Steel Seizure Case is in this respect especially prophetic: '"I have no illusion that any 

decision by this Court can keep power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and 

timely in meeting its problems .... We may say that power to legislate for emergencies 

belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from 

slipping through its fingers."22 This Committee's work to bring attention to these critical 

questions of military force is essential to preserving Congress' constitutional role as a coequal branch of U.S. Government responsible for the weighty decision to put U.S. troops 

in harm's way. I am grateful for the Committee's eftlxts. and for the opportunity to share 

my views on these issues of such vital national importance. 

''Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,654 (1952) (Jackson. J., concurring). 

Pearlstein Testimony Page 9 3/1212019 
32 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

Dr. Neumann. 

STATEMENT OF VANESSA NEUMANN, PH.D., PRESIDENT, 

ASYMMETRICA 

Ms. NEUMANN. Thank you. Thank you very much. We had—there 

are some visuals, I do not know what the protocol is, they have 

been entered as the exhibits. 

To my credentials already presented—and it is Dr. Neumann, by 

the way. Thank you for having me very much, members of the committee, for inviting me to testify here today, but more broadly, for 

your concern for my beloved Venezuela. 

As you know, I am an Venezuelan American. I hold both passports. And I am a long-time vociferous advocate for Venezuela’s return to democracy. To my credentials already presented, I would 

only add, I am also a fellow at Yale University’s Global Justice Program. My company, Asymmetrica, is part of the research network 

for the U.N. Security Council’s Counterterrorism Executive Directorate, CTED. I worked reintegration of paramilitaries in Colombia, 

which is why I am also the academic reviewer for U.S. Special Operation Command’s teaching manual on counterinsurgency in Colombia. 

My doctoral dissertation in 2004 from Colombia University was 

specifically about—it is entitled, The Autonomy and Legitimacy of 

States: A Critical Approach to Foreign Intervention. And it is ironic 

to me that it is now directly on point to my home country 15 years 

after its publication. 

In many ways, Venezuela is already suffering from war. The 

functions of State have been captured by a serious transnational 

criminal organization that provides safe haven and financing for 

terrorists, actively bombing their neighbors, as the ELN did a 

month ago to the Colombian police academy. It is the main transit 

point for cocaine into the rest of the world, destabilizing Central 

America, and therefore our southern border, all while wresting territorial control from a legitimate government, and intentionally 

murdering Venezuelan citizens. 

On February 23, Maduro used armed gangs to blockade the entry 

of humanitarian aid and shoot to kill unarmed civilians carrying 

food to their starving relatives. On the border with Brazil they 

massacred the Pemon tribe. On March 11, the dictator Maduro 

went on national television ordering armed gangs to slaughter the 

people. This is what Third Sergeant Miguel Torrosa warned us of 

when he crossed a bridge into Colombia on February 22. ‘‘Maduro 

wants to slaughter the people,’’ he shouted. The dictatorship certainly seemed happy to let us starve and die of treatable disease. 

For me, the paradigmatic case is of the woman who took her 19- 

year-old daughter who was dying of starvation to a hospital that 

was closed because of the first night of blackouts. The child died, 

and she roamed the streets carrying her 19-year-old child’s body 

that weighed 10 kilos, that is 22 pounds. It is the perfect storm of 

nightmares. 

It has worst inflation than any war zone, about to hit 10 million 

percent in 2019; a higher infant mortality rate than Syria. More 

than 330,000 people have been killed by violence under the 
33 

Bolivarian Revolution. 18.7 million Venezuelans are losing weight 

rapidly, 25 pounds in the past year. That means we are facing a 

massive starvation that rivals that of Ethiopia, Somalia, and 

Darfur, but in our hemisphere. And according to Gallup 2018 Global Law and Order, Venezuela is the least safe country in which to 

live. It is no wonder that Venezuelans are leaving in droves. 

At 3.4 million, Venezuela is the second largest refugee population 

in the world, second only to Syria. There are more Venezuelan refugees than South Sudanese, Somalis, or Afghans. 

Before the pervasive blackouts caused by the greatest 

kleptocracy the world has ever seen, the U.N. And the OAS estimated that 2 million more Venezuelans would flee this year alone, 

making the total refugee to 5.4 million. And Brookings and the 

OAS estimate that that would be 7.2 million refugees by the end 

of 2020. That would absolutely destabilize the entire hemisphere. 

Now, that was before the lights went out and before we ran out of 

gasoline, which is happening now. We can easily anticipate that we 

will skyrocket past those horrific projections. 

Such a massive and rapid exodus will also mean that they would 

destabilize the hemisphere. People will look for employment that 

could well be provided by the ELN, FARC, or even ISIS in Trinidad 

and Tobago, which has alarming rates of recruitment. And there 

recruitment patterns are very different from what we have seen in 

Europe and North Africa. They are better suited to the profiles of 

Venezuelan refugees. 

If we have learned something from our past experience with 

ISIS, is that when gasoline is a rare and precious commodity, as 

it is now becoming in Venezuelan, armed groups make those forward operating bases. Venezuela has 960 political prisoners. The 

catastrophic state of repression and chaos is entirely predictable 

and part of regime policy. 

In the 19th century, Immanuel Kant in his Metaphysical Elements of Justice argued that one of the results of globalization is 

not just of money and information, but also of responsibility. Let 

us meet that responsibility. Rid our region of our greatest threat, 

restore the dignity and freedom of millions of Venezuelans who 

were once our close friends. Let us find a path back to democracy 

and friendship and cooperation and not hand a dictator a carte 

blanche for further slaughter of our only democratic forces and 

your friends with a legislation that is unnecessary and serves only 

to plunge my people’s misery in DC partisan politics. The Venezuelan crisis has been a source of bipartisan cooperation. Thirtytwo million of us need you to keep it that way. 

I thank the committee for its time in letting me speak here today 

and for its concern for Venezuela. I remain at your service as you 

develop policies that will be productive for both my countries. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Ms. Neumann follows:] 
34 

Testimony by Dr. Vane...;;sa Neumann, president of Asymmetrica 

to the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Congress 

Hearing on H.R. 1004: Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act 

13 March 2019 

Thank you, ladies and gemlemcn of the committee, for inviti11g me to testify here today, but more broadly, for your 

concem for my beloved Venezuela. 

As you know, lam a Venczuelan-Amct'ican, born in Caracas, and a long-time vociferous advocate for Venezuela's return 

lo democracy. 

I am the author of Blood Profits, about my decade of work mapping out transnational criminal net\vorks, corruption, and 

their connections with terrorism, mostly in the Western Hemisphere, but also in the Levant, Middle East and Horn of 

Africa. f am also the president ofAsymmetrica, a political risk and anti~corruption consultancy specializing in Latin 

America. Asymmetrica is a member of the Global Counter-Terrorism Research Network (GCTRN) for the United Nations 

Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). l worked DDR of Colombian 

paramilitaries, \Vhich is why I was also the academic reviewer for USSOCOM's ARIS Series reference text on 

counterinsurgency (COIN) in Colombia. I served 10ur years on the OECD's Task Force on Countering Illicit Trade (since 

its inception) and on their Advisory Group. I also co-authored The Many Criminal Head"> ofthe Golden Hydra (for the 

Counter-Extremism Project, May 2018), an extensive analysis of illicit trade and corruption in the Tri-Bordcr Area. l got 

my Ph.D. in moral political philosophy in 2004 from Columbia University for my dissertation The Autonom.v and 

Legitima()· of States. A Critical Approach to FOreignlnterrention. It is ironic that 15 years later, it is directly on point for 

Venezuela. 

In it, 1 foresaw thal political changes were laying the ground for tyranny. I also foresaw a situation where a country could 

collapse into chaos and bc~ome unahlc to deliver basic goods in an orderly manner to its citizens. I also foresaw a 

situation where the rulers would lose legitimacy through two mechanisms: questionable elections or acting counter to 

what the citizens would want, including widespread human rights violations. What I did not foresee was the comhination 

of all these scenarios or the depth of hurnan suffering that \Vould befall rny country. 

In many ways, Venezuela is already suffering from a war. 

A Country Already in a State of War 

lhe functions of state have been captured by a serious transnational criminal organization that provides safe haven and 

financing for terrorists (actively bombing their neighbors, as the ELN did a month ago to the Colombian police academy), 

is the main transit point for cocaine into the rest of the world (destabilizing Central America and therefore our Southern 
35 

border), all while wresting territorial control from a legitimate govemment and intentionally murdering Venezuelan 

citizens. On Fcbmary 21rd, Maduro used armed gangs to blockade the entry of hurnanitarian aid and shoot to kill unarmed 

civilians carrying food to their starving relatives. On the border with Brazil, they massacred the Pcm6n tribe. On March 

llth, the dictator Maduro went on national television ordering armed gangs to slaughter the people. This is what Third 

Sergeant Miguel Torrosa wamed us of when he crossed a bridge into Colombia on fiebruary 22nd: "Maduro wants to 

slaughter the people!'' he shouted. The dictatorship certainly seems content to let them starve and die of treatable disease. 

Vwlence and Starvation 

For rnl:, the paradigmatic case was the woman who took her 19 year old daughter to the hospital because she was dying of 

starvation. It was the first night of the blackouts and the local hospital was shut. She later walked the streets carrying the 

hody of her 19 year old daughter, who weighed only 10 kgs -- 22 lhs. 

Venezuela suffers as a country at war: 

• It has worse inflation than any war zone-- set to hit 10,000,000% in 2019. 

• It has a higher infant mortality than Syria. 

• More than 333,000 have been killed by violence under the Bolivarian Revolution. 

18.7 million Venczudans are losing weight rapidly (25 pounds in the past year). 

Thai means we arc facing a massive starvation-- that rivals that of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Darfur-- hut in our hemisphere. 

And according to the Gallup 2018 Global Law and Order, Venezuela is the least safe. country in which to live. It is no 

wonder then that Venezuelans arc fleeing in droves. 

Refugee Crisis 

At 3.4 million, Venezuela is the second largest refugee population in the world. It is second only to Syria. There arc more 

Venezuelan refugees than South Sudanese, Somalis, or Afghans. 

Before the pervasive hlackouts (caused by the greatest kkptocracy the world has ever seen), lhe UN and the OAS 

estimated two million more Venc;ruclans would flee in 2019, bringing the total refugees from the dictatorship to 5.4 

million by the end of this year. The Brookings Institute and the OAS Working Group to Address the Venezuelan Migrant 

and Refugee Crisis in the Region eslimated that more than 7.2 million Venezuelans will have fled by the end of2020. 

Now that there is almost no electricity or gasoline (in addition to no food, medicine, or money), those numbers should 

skyrocket well past those projections. 

Such a massive and rapid exodus, will absolutely dcstabilise the entire hemisphere, as people will look for employment 

that could wc11 be. provided fly anned groups like the EI .N and FARC and even ISIS, in Trinidad and Tobago, where. it has 

an alarming rate of recruitment, and those recruitment patterns arc very different from what we have seen in Europe or 

North Africa: they are better suited to the profiles of Venezuelan refugees. 

2 
36 

Lessons from ISIS 

We have learned somdhing else from our past experience with ISIS: when gasoline is a rare and precious commodity, as 

it is now beco1ning in Venezuela, an11ed groups make what small distribution points they can flnd qr ga-;olinc refineries 

they can cobhlc together from makeshift parts and convert them into operational bases. ISlS did this and sold the oil and 

gasoline to whoever paid the highest price, even their enemies on the hattlcfield. rherc is no reason to think that this will 

not happen in Vcnc?.ucla, further fracturing into warlord fiddorns. 

Human Rights Abuses 

According to Venezuelan NGO Foro Penal, there are more than 960 political prisoners. The last case happened within the 

last 48 hours. Well-respected journalist Luis Carlos Diaz was illegally detained by the dictatorship when he was heading 

home. His whereabouts were unknown for several hours until the security forces ransacked his home and robbed his 

bedridden cancer-stricken \Vife. The journalist was ludicrously accused of being responsible i(w the five-day national 

blackout. This is just but one example of the escalation in the dictatorship's war on freedom of speech and information, 

v ... 'hich are the lifeblood of any democracy. 

A Dictatorship's Policy 

This catastrophic state of repression and chaos was entirely predictahle, as it is the result of regime policy. It will not 

allow humanitarian aid to save the 18.7 million starving Vent":zudans, hecausc it would rather kt~ep the political control 

starvation affords it. Venezuela's war-like conditions are due solely to the intransigence ofMaduro who does not care 

about the human cost of his clinging to power. 

Venezuela needs international humanitarian aid to enter its borders as soon as possible to prevent the horrors that will 

predictably ensue if it doesn't. 

A Request for Assistance 

\Vhat is unique ahout V enezucla is it has a legitimate interim government that is loved hy the people and broadly 

recognized by the world's democracies; it can request international assistance in the provision of aid and restoring 

territorial control away from NSAGs (non-state armed groups), such as the FARC, the ELN. tht": cokctivos, the 111ega1 

miners, or even Ilezbollah. After all, we have already been invaded: our slaughter is at the behest ofnefatious foreign 

powers, such as Cuba, whlch insists on ils oil shipments, even through the blood of my people. 

I am not here today to discuss whether military intervention is justified now or not. I am here to say that there arc 

numerous scenarios where some form of international assistance is foreseeable, and this proposed legislation is not only 

redundant, repeating what is already wcll-cstahlishcd in the US Constitution, but it sets the conditions for the further 

endangerment of my people. We arc ruled hy thugs, who understand only force. If they think thal our assistance in a crisis 

of a hrcakdown of civil order or a mass starvation will he entangled in the partisan wranglings of US domestic politics, we 

could well be doomed. 

3 
37 

International law recognizes an exceptional right to take action in a case of overwhelming humanitarian necessity. For this 

there are three criteria: 

1. convincing evidence of large scale humanitarian distress requiring immediate relief 

2. no practical alternative to save lives 

3. the use of force is: 

a. necessary, 

b. prop01iionate to the crisis, and 

c. limited in time and (ge-ographical) scope 

We are not framing this as a war, intervention, or lnvasion. The correct framework is a military cooperation which, hy the 

way, should he multilateraL According to the Venezuelan ( 'onstitution, Article 1 R7.ll, the National Assembly could 

request a foreign mission to Venezuela. In such a case, it would be a legally-sanctioned act by the only legitimate and 

democratic institution in Venezuela. I .et's hope that won't be necessary, but many fear it might. 

lt is widely accepted that the 'responsibility to protect' is owed in the first instance by all sovereign states to their own 

citizens, over whom it exercises authority in a contractual relationship of rights and obligations, but must be picked up by 

the international community if that firsHier responsibility is abdicated, or if it cannot be exercised, as a logical 

consequence of taking seriously the concepts of equality and dignity of all people. This view was first espoused in the 

18th century by Immanuel Kant in his Metaphysical Elements o__(Justice: one of the results of globalization is a 

globalization not just of money and infOrmation, but also ofresponsibillty. Let us meet that responsibility, rid our region 

of its greatest threat, restore the dignity and freedom of millions of Venezuelans who \vere once our close friends. Let us 

1ind a path back to democracy in friendship and cooperation, and not hand a dictator a carte hlanche for further slaughter 

(of our only democratic forces and your friends) with a legislation that is unnecessary and serves only to plunge my 

people's misery in DC partisan politics. The Venezuelan crisis has been a source of bipartisan cooperation; 32 million of 

us need you to keep it that way. 

I thank the committee for the time it has afforded me here today, and for its concern for Vene7uela. J rernain at your 

service as you develop policies that will be productive for both my countries. 

4 
38 

Chairman ENGEL. I thank you, Dr. Neumann. 

Let me ask Dr. Chavez a question. Let me ask you about the position of the Colombian Government on military intervention in 

Venezuela. Former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, a friend 

with whom I worked closely when he was head of State and I was 

chair of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee between 2006 and 

2010—President Uribe is certainly no dove, yet he was crystal clear 

last month that military intervention in Venezuela must not be an 

option. And the current President of Colombia, Ivan Duque, signed 

his government on to the February 25 declaration of the Lima 

Group, which also included major countries in the Americas like 

Argentina, Brazil, and Canada, stating that a transition to democracy, and I quote, ‘‘must be conducted by Venezuelans themselves 

peacefully and within the framework of the constitution and international law supported by political and diplomatic means without 

the use of force’’, unquote. 

My feeling is that Colombia has more at stake in the Venezuela 

crisis than any other country. And the Colombian people have 

opened up their hearts and homes to over 1 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees. 

So let me ask you, Dr. Chavez, why do you think President 

Duque and former President Uribe have been so adamant in rejecting any type of military intervention in Venezuela? What is at 

stake for Colombia? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Thank you for the question. I think it is really important to note, as you did, that Colombia is the country—arguably 

the country that is most impacted by the refugee crisis in the region. I think the current number, it is at 1.2 million Venezuelan 

refugees and migrants are in Colombia. 

And as you said, President Ivan Duque, as well as former President Uribe, have unequivocally stated their opposition to military 

intervention. This is because military intervention in Venezuela 

would destabilize Colombia when it is already—it is a very precarious moment for Colombia. 

The low-intensity conflict that I described in my remarks and in 

my written statement would certainly spill over into Colombia, undermining the 2016 Peace Accord and the delicate PDR process. 

And it would make consolidation of control over the Colombian territory even more difficult. 

Dissident FARC members as well as ELN guerillas, and then 

there are the BACRIMs, the armed criminal bands in Colombia, 

would likely join the struggle. I think their numbers are currently—there is 1,500 to 2,000 FARC members that have refused 

to disarm; they would definitely be part this of. And we have to remember that the border between the two countries, that is 1,400 

miles long and it is very porous, so spillover is inevitable. 

Chairman ENGEL. Professor Pearlstein, in your testimony, you 

explained why enacting H.R. 1004 would be a constitutional assertion of congressional war power. In my view, Congress’ role as a 

check on the President’s use of military force, has been diminished 

over the years, and we are no longer really fulfilling the role the 

Framers of the Constitution intended. 
39 

Do you have any recommendations for steps Congress could take 

to reassert its constitutional role in decisions over America’s use of 

military force, not just in Venezuela, but in other contexts as well? 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Certainly. And thank you for the question. To 

be clear, I think 1004 is supported by multiple facets of congressional power under Article I, Section 8, not just the declare war 

power. But in terms of additional steps that Congress could take 

in this context and beyond this context to reassert its role as a coequal branch, I think there are several. 

One, and this is an initiative that I know Senator Kaine has 

worked on and others on the Senate side, there are what he would 

call zombie authorizations for the use of military force, not just the 

2001 authorization for the use of military force that authorized the 

invasion of Afghanistan. The 2002 authorization for the use of military force that authorized the initial invasion of Iraq, and there are 

actually a number of others on the books. Authorizations that have 

long outlived their purpose, but are nonetheless still sitting on the 

books that any President might at any time invoke as a source of 

statutory authority for the use of force. Repealing the zombie 

AUMFs would be an important first step. 

A second step that comes to mind, just this week, the President 

made a decision to rescind an Obama-era order that had required 

the reporting of civilian casualties in areas outside of active hostilities, not only casualties that are as a result of military activities, but CIA activities as well. Congress could easily restore those 

reporting requirements. Congress can frequently, and I think more 

frequently than it does, use the power of the purse that it is trying 

to do here to restrict and guide the President’s exercise of authority 

where it does believe that the use of force is possible. 

And then, of course, there is the 2001 authorization for the use 

of military force, the statute that has now been on the books for 

nearly 18 years that has justified or been used to justify now by 

three different Presidents, use of military force in well over a half 

dozen different countries all over the world. It is possible, and 

there are variety of ways to do this, to clarify, limit sunset, and in 

other ways constrain the exercise of the President’s authority over 

this way outdated authorization for the use of military force that 

it is, in my view, past time for Congress to revisit. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just first say at the outset that I think you and I, and 

I think I speak for pretty much every member of this committee, 

clearly believe that Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the 

authority to declare war. And the Founding Fathers thought that 

constitutional democracies would never go to war with each other, 

which why they gave Congress that authority, I believe. 

If the President were to commit troops in Venezuela, I would be 

the first member to call upon you, Mr. Chairman, to hold a hearing 

for unauthorized use of military force, but that is not where we are 

today. This is a premature—premature bill that takes all options 

off the table. 

Anybody that has ever negotiated in the State Department 

knows that you need all options on the table to achieve results so 
40 

the diplomats can do their job. That is what the diplomats have 

asked of me, not only of the U.S. Government, but the legitimate 

President Guaido’s administration. 

So, Dr. Neumann, let me first say that I believe you speak for 

those millions of Venezuelans who are oppressed and starving and 

dying. I want to thank you for your courage to come forward before 

the Congress. President Guaido has clearly stated his support for 

the use of—or the threat of the use of military force against 

Maduro. I believe it is the one thing keeping him alive today. 

In your opinion, what impact does this debate and this legislation have on the life and safety of President Guaido and others who 

are risking their lives on the ground as we speak? 

Ms. NEUMANN. Thank you so much for having me again, and 

thank you for your kind words. I can only hope or be honored 

enough to represent my fellow compatriots, many of whom have— 

some people who are here in the audience today have been tortured 

by the Maduro regime. I am not—it is not for me to identify them, 

those are private matters, but there are several. And I have had 

my own address posted online by Chavez’, claiming I was out to 

have him assassinated. That was back in late 2011. Fortunately, 

he got my address wrong. After I accused him of being—funding— 

being in cahoots with money laundering for Hezbollah, and it 

turned out I was right, because I then went to Lebanon to go see 

for myself. 

So the impact that it would have is terrible because it gives 

Maduro something to hold up to say that even—even the gringos, 

you know, do not agree with this, that there is division. That even 

within the Empire, which is—these are the words he likes to use— 

have people who side with him and see the beauty of the 

Bolivarian Revolution. And we will see—and for us he will take it 

that they would understand, ‘‘you would be entangled in domestic 

wranglings. These people are thugs. All they understand is force.’’ 

If they think that there is no force coming or no force possible, 

I firmly believe that he will view it as carte blanche to continue 

to slaughter us and possibly take Guaido and other people who 

support him and work with him, and that would be the utter devastation of the last vestige of democracy in my country. These are 

also some of my friends, so it is a deeply felt matter as well as a 

moral duty. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Dr. Neumann, let me ask you one more question. 

Fifty-four countries have now recognized the interim President 

Guaido as the legitimate President of Venezuela today. How important is it, in your opinion, that the U.S. Congress also make that 

same recognition? 

Ms. NEUMANN. It is hugely important. I actually cannot think of 

a way to overstate its importance, because we need the United 

States to stand behind us. We understand that the United States 

is part of a broader coalition. We want a broader coalition. It is 

very important. But the moral standing of the United States, it is 

well-known that the United States has a complicated relationship 

with Latin America. The best book on the subject was actually 

written by a Venezuelan, called The Latin Americans: Their LoveHate Relationship with the United States.’’ However, it has always 
41 

been a beacon of some north, and we have already been intervened 

and invaded. We continue to send oil to Cuba, literally over the 

bodies of my compatriots. 

So the importance of consistency and coherence and leadership 

by the United States, which is our north, in this issue of human 

rights and democracy, we welcome the opportunity for the United 

States to take up that role and that mantle again. 

My own family were refugees from the Nazis and then the Soviets and into Venezuela. And now, of course, we have the Maduro 

regime. We have always looked to the United States for support 

and guidance on these moral issues. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Dr. Neumann, for your powerful testimony. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 

to our speakers today. 

You know, today, the Venezuelan people are suffering under a 

crisis caused by authoritarian leader, Nicolas Maduro. Since 

Maduro came to power in 2013, he has consistently repressed 

human rights and caused an economic collapse that has left 90 percent of Venezuela in poverty and forced over 3 million Venezuelans 

to leave the country. 

A week ago, I chaired a hearing in the Subcommittee on Western 

Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, examining the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. One key takeaway from our hearing was 

that the U.S. should follow the lead of our allies in the Lima Group 

in pursuing a regional solution to this crisis. After many years of 

disagreement, there is now consensus in the region that Maduro is 

an illegitimate president, and new elections must be called. 

It also came through in our hearing that the U.S. should convey 

solidarity with the people of Venezuela who have shown incredible 

resilience in the face of a brutal authoritarian regime. I believe we 

in Congress should be unified in condemning the Maduro regime, 

expressing our full support for the interim government of Juan 

Guaido, and calling for free and fair election as soon as possible. 

It is important that while we conduct the appropriate and necessary oversight of this administration, we never lose sight of who 

caused the manmade crisis. I encourage my colleagues to make 

every effort to call out Maduro and his thugs for who they really 

are as we consider next steps to support the Venezuelan people. 

I have been following the Venezuela issue very closely for many 

years, and I have seen how Maduro has repeatedly called for dialog. Each time he merely used it as a stalling tactic to weaken the 

political opposition. That said, I do not feel that military intervention is the answer to this problem. It is not the way to bring democracy back to Venezuela. The Venezuelan people and governments throughout the region have all been loud and clear in calling 

for a peaceful, civilian-led solution to this crisis. 

But in pressing for a peaceful transition to democracy, we need 

to be careful not to play into Maduro’s tactics for self-preservation. 

I firmly belief that in this battle between democracy and dictator-
42 

ship, we must stand on the side of the Venezuelan people who are 

clearly demanding change. 

So with this goal in mind of free and fair elections in Venezuela, 

I want to ask Dr. Chavez, can you talk about what steps the Administration could take to further coordinate its diplomatic and humanitarian responses with the allies in Latin America? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Thank you for the question. So I think you are 

touching on two issues that are both very important. One is the delivery of humanitarian assistance, which I will get to a second. The 

first, though, I think is about the role of dialog and working in a 

multilateral fashion. 

So I do agree, I think there have been, in the past, I think three 

major attempts at negotiation with Maduro, and in all cases he 

used them to buy time, basically. However, I think that there is a 

new opportunity now with the International Contact Group, which 

was created in early February, to push—you know, with the sole 

purpose of pushing for new elections and also for delivering humanitarian aid. 

It has been very active behind the scenes as sort of a shuttle diplomacy, discrete meetings with Maduro—with the Maduro regime, 

with the opposition, and also with civil society members. I think we 

should continue to encourage that. 

The other thing that I think is very important about this new effort at dialog is that it includes preconditions, which is something 

that the other dialog’s previous attempts did not. 

You are right about the Lima Group. I think we need to continue 

to let it take this leadership position to find diplomatic solution. 

And I do not think we should underestimate the fact that the Lima 

Group actually exists and has been so outspoken and has taken a 

front seat, given the very hands-off approach that we saw from the 

Latin American countries until 2017. And I also think that OAS, 

under Luis Almagro’s leadership, has also had a lot of potential 

and is having impact. 

As far as the delivery of humanitarian assistance, I think it is 

very important that we, as much as we can, we depoliticize it, 

which would mean the U.S. and other donors turning—at least taking a lower profile and turning to a more neutral organization, 

such as the U.N. or the International Red Cross, or even local 

NGO’s that are ready and standing by to support the delivery of 

humanitarian assistance into the country. 

Mr. SIRES. My time is up. Thank you. 

Mr. CICILLINE [presiding]. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panelists 

here. 

Dr. Chavez, what form of official government does Venezuela 

have that is recognized? What is the form of it? Or, Dr. Pearlstein, 

whichever one wants to answer that. Go ahead. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. So the current under Maduro, it is not a—— 

Mr. YOHO. No, what is it recognized as? If you look it up, what 

form of government does it have? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. It is a dictatorship. 
43 

Mr. YOHO. It is registered as a Presidential constitutional republic is what it is registered as. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Right. 

Mr. YOHO. And that is what is recognized in the world. But as 

you pointed out, that is not what is being practiced, right? 

Were the last elections fair? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. No. So, first of all, Maduro was Chavez’s handpicked successor. 

Mr. YOHO. OK. So we are all in agreement with that. The Venezuelan Government, or the Constitution, allows for Juan Guaido 

to claim the Presidency, does it not, if we go by the Constitution? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. So—— 

Mr. YOHO. Their Constitution. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. So actually, the Constitution, the Venezuelan Constitution, does not really address the possibility that something like 

this—that this would happen. However, because the National Assembly is really the only—— 

Mr. YOHO. The National Assembly—— 

Ms. CHAVEZ [continuing]. Democratic institution and Juan 

Guaido is president of the National Assembly, it makes—I mean, 

it is appropriate that he is interim president. 

Mr. YOHO. OK. Does anybody have a different opinion? Dr. Neumann? 

Ms. NEUMANN. Yes, I am sorry. It actually is entirely foreseen 

in the Constitution, which was actually drafted and passed in 1999, 

that would be under Hugo Chavez. So Juan Guaido is the interim 

president of Venezuela, under the Constitution that is supposed to 

be defended by the dictatorship. Ironically, it is the Guaido side 

that is defending the Constitution. It entirely foresees that if the 

position is vacated because the election is not recognized, as it was 

not at the time by more than 60 countries in the world, and the 

Venezuelan National Assembly, then it is vacant. And then it falls 

to the President of the National Assembly. That is written in the 

Constitution. 

Mr. YOHO. That was my understanding. We met with the Ambassador Vecchio and we talked about that. The research I did says 

that there are approximately 65 countries that recognize Juan 

Guaido as the legitimate president. That is about a third of the 

world’s countries. You know, of 195 countries, approximately about 

a third of them recognize Juan Guaido. 

And then you have Maduro, who, as you said, is a dictator. There 

are roughly 33 million people. There has been blackouts. It is one 

of the richest countries, resource-wise, that they have plundered. 

And they have stolen over $11 billion worth of petroleum revenues 

from and robbed them from the Venezuelan people. 

So now, as you pointed out, there is a third of the population has 

lost over 25 pounds. There is rampant debt. There is starvation. 

Maduro is stopping the humanitarian crisis there. And, you know, 

and I cannot fathom this, but it is like a 1.3 million percent inflation. Now, I cannot imagine anything getting any worse, but if we 

do nothing, it will be worse. 

And, Dr. Chavez, you were talking about, you know—and I agree 

with David, my colleague here, Mr. Cicilline, about interfering in 

there, that it may destabilize that area. But I would argue it is de-
44 

stabilized now. And the 14,000 FARC members, they are going to 

destabilize anyways, whether we are there or not. 

And I agree with the sentiment that I would rather have an 

AUMF authorized by Congress, but to argue now at this point is 

going to jeopardize the legitimate president that is recognized by 

their Constitution and the National Assembly. 

And, you know, let me ask you this: What countries are there 

helping Maduro? What government or other countries are helping 

Maduro, propping him up? Dr. Neumann? You raised your hand 

first. 

Ms. NEUMANN. I like to raise my hand. 

Well, Russia, Cuba, China, Iran, but all in different ways 

and—— 

Mr. YOHO. And Turkey. I am about out of time. What countries 

are there helping the Venezuelan people? 

Ms. NEUMANN. Well—— 

Mr. YOHO. Let me ask Ms. Pearlstein. 

Ms. NEUMANN. None really. The U.S. has the food at the border. 

That is the closest we have come. 

Mr. YOHO. Other than Colombia? 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. I am an expert in U.S. Constitutional law, not 

international law. 

Mr. YOHO. Dr. Chavez, other than Colombia, are there any other 

countries helping them, helping the Venezuelan people? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. I think that there are 54 countries have declared 

their support for Guaido. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. But Colombia is the only one, because all those 

people are going into Colombia right now. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Well, actually, Colombia is not the only one country 

that is—— 

Mr. YOHO. I will take—it is probably the largest country. The 

point is—— 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Other countries have accepted, for example, 

800,000. I mean, I just want to emphasize—— 

Mr. YOHO. I stand corrected. 

Ms. CHAVEZ [continuing]. It is not just Colombia. 

Mr. YOHO. And my chairman is gaveling me, so I have to stop, 

but I think to pull that AUMF right now is going to jeopardize the 

Venezuelan people, and you will see Mr. Guaido go to prison or 

worse. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CICILLINE [presiding]. I thank the gentleman. He yields 

back. I recognize myself for 5 minutes. I want to start with you, 

Ms. Pearlstein, as an expert in this area. I think actually in your 

written testimony, you said there is nothing remarkable—H.R. 

1004 is an unremarkable and constitutional assertion of a congressional power to restrict the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into 

hostilities. 

I would normally maybe not appreciate my legislation being considered unremarkable, but I think you make a really important 

point, that this legislation is really reflecting the constitutional requirement that before men and women of the Armed Forces are deployed in hostilities, that it requires congressional authorization. 

And the only remarkable thing, frankly, has been that it has hap-
45 

pened so often without congressional authorization. And that is 

really the point to Dr. Neumann’s comment about it, you know, 

being a partisan divide. 

One of the things we can do to the world is continue to act like 

a democracy, and let people see real debate and respect for rule of 

law, and a Constitution that, by its terms, requires congressional 

action. And when a President, not a dictator, is what we have in 

America, says he is going to use force without coming to Congress 

that we ought to speak out against that. And so I just wonder if 

I have gotten that right? 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. I think you have it exactly right, sir. I would 

just note, sort of historically, there has been this perfect catch–22 

that Congress has designed to explain its inaction generally, or its 

lack of action generally in this area. And it is in the firsthand, 

right? Well, it would be premature to act now because we do not 

want to tie the President’s hands, which makes sense; but it is invariably coupled with the second part of the argument, which is, 

once a President has acted, Congress regularly says, we do not 

want to act now, so as to undermine the initiative of the President, 

or undermine and, indeed, endanger our troops overseas. 

And the effect of that invariable coupling of rationales has been 

inaction, sort of, permanently. The good news is Congress is capable of sending more than one message at once, and Congress is 

equally capable of acting on more than one occasion as circumstances evolve. 

So it seems to me entirely plausible and, indeed, possible, based 

on the sort of bipartisan sense of the room, that Congress may legislate to condemn the actions of their current leader, to decry the 

gross violations of human rights that are going on there, and, at 

the same time, to make clear that in a democracy, we are going to 

follow the rule of law. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. And that is why this legislation is actually bipartisan, I think, for precisely that reason. We all acknowledge the horrors of what is happening in Venezuela. I said that 

during my testimony. The real question before this committee is 

whether or not this declaration by Congress that the use of force 

is not authorized without congressional action is helpful or not. 

And, Dr. Chavez, I want to ask you, you say in your written testimony and you said it again in your oral testimony, that we would 

squander the goodwill and partnership if we continue to threaten 

military action. 

Would you speak a little bit about what you mean by that? Because I have heard from a number of people that we have to be 

conscious of our history in the region, and what we have done to 

repair America’s standing in that region, and what the repeated 

threats of military action might do to undermine our effectiveness 

as a partner? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Sure. Well, first of all, I do want to acknowledge 

and applaud the Administration for the multilateral work that it 

is—especially working closely with the Lima Group and the European Union. But the threats, I think, are actually—there are a 

number of reasons that I think they are counterproductive. 

One is the reason that you are referencing, that this continued 

saber rattling is going to hinder our ability to act multilaterally 
46 

with our allies. It undermines the consensus. One of the beautiful 

things that has happened is that there is consensus. Again, this is 

unprecedented for such outspoken consensus in the region with the 

United States. And the consensus is that a negotiated solution is 

the best option. 

Things like a tweet that glorifies past military interventions, in 

particular, there was a tweet with images of before and after of Qadhafi. I mean, those I think in the region—I mean, that is meant, 

I guess, to kind of keep Maduro on his toes or off balance, but what 

that is is, it is seen by the region as glorifying past U.S. military 

interventions, which, in this region, does not go over well. The logic 

behind a threat is—like I said, I understand it. It is to keep 

Maduro off balance, to, you know, we do not know—— 

Mr. CICILLINE. Can I ask you one question, because my time is 

running out. Have you seen any evidence—I have heard from a 

number of people about the use of this saber rattling by Maduro 

and by the regime as propaganda to kind of rally the country 

around him. If you could speak to that. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Yes. Yes, absolutely. I mean, this plays into—I 

mean, these are—the tweet, for example, that was a gift to 

Maduro. It plays into his narrative about the United States. And 

it plays into the message to the entire region. It plays into his narrative or the message he is trying to convey to the rest of the region as well. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Rooney, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me make one thing clear. There has been a lot of talk about 

use of military force, but the question before the table now is 

whether or not to keep the option in our quiver, not whether to use 

military force right now. It is a major distinction. 

And I would say after the actions of the Attorney General and 

the Venezuelan Supreme Court today, if we ever needed to keep 

every weapon and tactic in our quiver, we need to do it right now. 

We are just fortunate that Mr. Guaido is still alive. 

I would say, third, that thousands of years of human nature 

make it pretty clear that to take away an important weapon in a 

fight like this will only embolden a person like Maduro and probably, ironically enough, make it more likely that we have to use 

military force someday that we would otherwise not ever have to 

use. 

Elliott Abrams made it clear that none of our allies in the Lima 

Group, et cetera, have any problem with the fact that we have said 

we want to keep all options on the table. And the last thing he said 

is, there is no plan for military action now. 

With clarifying those record matters, I would like to ask Dr. Neumann, what do you think our adversaries, like Russia, China, Iran, 

et cetera, are going to perceive were we to remove military force 

from our quiver of weapons? 

Ms. NEUMANN. Thank you very much. They will see it as a sign 

of weakness and an exploitable weakness. So my company is called 

Asymmetrica, because one of my other credentials is I have pre-
47 

viously worked with the Asymmetric Warfare Group at DoD for 

years, in fact. 

And what you do is what we call a vulnerability detection exercise, which the Russians are also very good at. So it is important 

that it be kept on the table. I want to be very clear, that I agree 

that the discussion of intervention is entirely premature. 

My concern—and I am not opining on U.S. constitutional matters. My sole opinion here is that having this debate and passing 

this legislation significantly endangers a vast population, the last 

vestige of democracy, and greatly increases the odds that we will 

have vast terrorist recruitment, and a larger conflagration in our 

hemisphere just a few months from now. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you. Dr. Neumann, one more question, kind 

of the obverse of Mrs. Chavez’s answer: What message would this 

type of legislation and the obvious reflection of divisions among the 

Congress send to those military officials who may be thinking of 

defecting from Maduro, would like to break with him, but are either too timid, or too coerced, or their family is too coerced to do 

it? 

Ms. NEUMANN. Thank you for the question. Yes. So the question 

of military changing their mind. There are a number of things. As 

you know, if you have ever worked with off-ramping armed fighters, which I have, they need to believe that the exit ramp is credible and that there is a path that will entail their security, and 

that their families will not be killed. 

That is one of the problems that the military commanders have 

in Venezuela is that Cuban officers follow their kids to school, harass their wives as they leave their chemo treatments, because they 

are about the last people who can get chemo treatments in Venezuela, and other such forms of harassment. And they will tell 

them where their relatives are. So it is the behavior of a cartel, and 

that is one of the issues. 

Removing the stick off the table, separate from American constitutional issues, will complicate the transition to a democracy, 

which we so desperately need. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Dr. Neumann. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I thank the gentleman for yielding back. And I 

would just remind the gentleman that nothing in the legislation 

that we are currently considering takes this military option off the 

table. It simply requires engagement from the Congress of the 

United States. 

So, with that, I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Espaillat, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all the panelists because all of your testimoneys 

have been compelling, and I think they make us think about the 

different perspectives that are out there regarding Venezuela. 

And, in fact, you know, there is not much of a divide here. I 

think there is a consensus that Maduro is a dictator. I think there 

is a consensus that Venezuela is facing a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented levels. I think there is a consensus that we must have 

free and democratic and transparent elections in Venezuela, that, 

in fact, sanctions should be applied and the Magnitsky Act has 
48 

been applied to certain people. There is a consensus, a very large 

consensus here. 

I think the difference here is whether or not military action 

should be applied. And I believe that an empty threat is not a 

threat at all. So unless you are willing to use military force, do not 

use the threat. I think the countries are far too sophisticated to understand when there is an empty threat or not and, in fact, some 

of you have specified during the—detailed during this panel, the region itself is very sensitive to dictators, right, first of all, from both 

sides, from the left and the right, and also to intervention. 

So the region is very sensitive and open to help, because many 

of the countries in the regions have been under the boot of a dictator, and many of the countries in the region have also been intervened and occupied. So these are two very sensitive issues. 

And so, what I would like to ask is something more specific. The 

U.S. is still purchasing oil from Venezuela. Do you think that we 

should stop purchasing oil? I know that there has been a reduction. 

Do you think that we should stop, totally stop purchasing oil from 

Venezuela? First, Ms. Neumann and then anyone else that would 

like to. 

Ms. NEUMANN. Yes. I mean, I believe we stop that and any purchases of money now go into frozen bank accounts that cannot be 

controlled by Maduro. So I think that is satisfactory. I mean, I 

would have no insight into whether Guaido administration has access to those bank accounts or not. I have no way of knowing. But 

that is good not to hand money to the dictator who is not there constitutionally, and is causing the biggest humanitarian crisis in the 

hemisphere. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Now, I understand also that there is a rift between some Chavistas and the Maduro regime. Could you elaborate 

a little bit on that? Is there any truth to that, that some hard-core 

Chavistas are also not for Maduro? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. I think there has historically been tension. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Please, Ms. Chavez, Dr. Chavez. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. There has historically been tension. I mean, I think 

you have the Diosdado Cabello, who is always kind of angling in 

for a position. I think that there are fissures in that sense within 

the government. Would you agree? I mean—— 

Ms. NEUMANN. Yes, I would agree. So if Chavez rose—Chavez 

rose as a sort of revolutionary hero with the phrase por ahora in 

1992 when he failed in his coup attempt. So once a putschist, always a putschist maybe. I do not know. But he had some credibility 

or backing by the people as being a fighter for them. There are a 

lot of people who think that Bolivarian experiment has gone off 

course by becoming basically a criminal organization. And by that, 

I mean even people who supported the movement. 

The other issue is that Chavez was a revolutionary fighter. 

Maduro is not. He is a former bus driver who has basically been 

trained in Cuba. So he does not have—and if you have worked 

these issues in Africa, they have similar things where, like, if you 

were the anticolonialist fighter, it gives you some more public support, rather than just being viewed as a foreign puppet, which is 

what Maduro is. 
49 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Just one last quick question: And so, given the 

very fragile condition of Venezuela and the Venezuelan people are 

going through hell right now, do any of you believe that military 

intervention would exacerbate and maybe spiral the situation out 

of control into conditions that we have never seen in this continent? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Absolutely. As I said in my written testimony, I go 

into great detail on this, that this would set the stage for a prolonged low-intensity conflict. I am as concerned about a Chavista 

insurgency as I am about the Venezuelan military. 

The number of unarmed groups—I mean, armed groups and 

weapons in the country is extraordinary. I think there are 2.7 million illicit arms flowing around the country, second only to Brazil. 

You have the Colectivos. You have the Bolivarian militias. You 

have the Special Forces, the FAES. All of these groups—and the 

FARC and the ELN, as mentioned earlier. All of these groups have 

incentives, whether it be ideological or because their livelihood is 

tied to Chavez, to continue the struggle and to enter into a phase 

of guerilla warfare. 

So, I think it would create an extremely messy situation, and it 

would be prolonged. It would be ugly. There would be massive casualties. So I think the picture is very grim. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Zeldin, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And one of the interesting dynamics of this particular conversation—I do not know any member of this committee—I am not 

aware of any member of this committee advocating for military 

intervention in Venezuela. I do not know any member of this committee who believes that Congress does not have an important Article I responsibility here as it relates to military intervention with 

Venezuela. 

I would be interested in knowing, are any of you familiar with 

the four instruments of national power? 

Ms. NEUMANN. Well, DIME, DIMEFIL, yes. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Can you explain the DIME principle? 

Ms. NEUMANN. Diplomatic, intell—— 

Mr. ZELDIN. Information. 

Ms. NEUMANN. Diplomatic, information, military—wait, wait— 

economic. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Perfect. 

Ms. NEUMANN. Thank you. And then the FIL is the other three, 

yeah. 

Mr. ZELDIN. All right, gold star. So there are four instruments 

of national power, the DIME principle: Diplomacy, information, 

military, economics. And what we have seen around the globe over 

the course of history with our foreign policy where the world of our 

military overlaps with the State Department. You could talk about 

the DIME principle in North Korea, the DIME principle in Iran, 

where having the M option on the table in North Korea ends up 

making the diplomatic effort for multilateral or bilateral diplomacy 
50 

or your efforts to ramp up the economic pressure more effective, because the M is real. The intelligence on Kim Jong-un is he is 

known not to be—known to be homicidal, not suicidal. And where 

he thought that there was a possibility that the United States may 

actually strike North Korea, that was something that was a dynamic that changed over the course of 2017. 

I think one of the main areas that just really get to the heart 

of where there might be a disagreement right now is that there are 

many members of this committee who believe that the diplomatic, 

information, economic components of the DIME principle are more 

effective with the M option on the table. 

That does not mean that member is advocating for military intervention. It does not mean that that member is advocating against 

Congress’ important Article I powers. But I do believe that it is 

very important for the military option to be on the able, but I do 

not want to see military—I do not want to see the military option 

actually get implemented. 

So it is just something—I mean, it is an elephant that is in the 

room right now that I just wanted to get to the heart of. I do believe that this debate is very important for a future date. It is fine 

that we are having this conversation and we are talking about really important issues for Venezuela. There is a possibility that at 

some point in the future, that we might be debating an authorization for the use of military force or some type of declaration. Maybe 

it is not—maybe it is Venezuela, maybe it is some other country. 

We do not know exactly what is ahead as it relates to that in the 

future. 

But I would not want any of the points to be taken away from 

any members on either side of the aisle, because I think there is 

actually a lot more bipartisan agreement here on this issue than 

might manifest itself over the course of the hearing. 

Earlier on, there was a discussion of the Venezuelan Constitution. Article 233 has been interpreted to give Juan Guaido power 

in a situation such as this. It is the United States Government’s 

position to recognize Juan Guaido, and in the current position that 

he is in, in charge of the National Assembly, it is important for us 

to support Juan Guaido in that capacity. I fear for his life at this 

particular moment in time. 

And I think that in this conversation, while we debate what Congress’ appropriate role is here, in this particular moment, we also 

should find the bandwidth. We should find the room in this debate 

to also talk about what Congress can do to help the situation as 

much as possible so that that does not get lost. 

So I appreciate the chairman here right now, I guess Chairman 

Cicilline for the moment, for him encouraging this debate on this 

day, but I just wanted to share some thoughts as to why—we say 

we cannot be silent not because we want war, but because we want 

to prevent it. And we should never send our troops into harm’s way 

unless they are set up to succeed. You send your troops to succeed 

or you do not send them at all. There are basic principles I believe 

that we all would agree on. But hopefully, the Congress’ action as 

a result of this hearing is not one that takes the military option 

off the table, not because we want war, but because we want the 
51 

diplomacy, the information effort, and the economic pressure to be 

as effective as possible. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. I thank the gentleman from New 

York. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Allred, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. ALLRED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here today, and thank you for your 

testimony. I read through your written testimony. I have learned 

a lot from it and, of course, I think it is very important that we 

are discussing this right now. 

You know, I am a new Member of Congress, and when I was 

seeking this office I talked a lot about how things here can too simply be boiled down into black and white. This issue to me falls into 

a gray area. I am a civil rights lawyer, and I am very sensitive to 

the constitutional concerns at play with our war powers exercise 

and how that has been eroded over time and how Article I powers 

have been ignored for too long. 

But I am also sensitive to some of the statements that my colleagues have made here on the other side of the aisle about sending conflicting signals and trying to make sure that whatever 

comes out of the U.S. Congress is a unified message that we oppose 

the Maduro regime, that we support the new government under 

President Guaido, and that we are not going to allow this to happen in our region, in our hemisphere. So I want to try and boil 

down a little bit and get past kind of the caricature of, you know, 

Democrats are trying to do this or Republicans are trying to do 

that. 

Dr. Chavez, maybe this would be best directed to you first. What 

would you recommend that we do in addition to this bill that is 

being considered and is being discussed to make sure that if we do 

take this action, that we are not sending a conflicting signal and 

that we are speaking with a single voice here? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. I think one step would be the formal recognition of 

Juan Guaido, bipartisan. I think that would be one I think that 

would be relatively easy. I think that there are other things that 

we could do, maybe not directly related to the particular question 

of military intervention, but one would be, I mean, to continue to 

focus on the fact that there are 3.4 million refugees and migrants 

flowing out of the country. 

My question, I think an important question we should be asking 

is how can we, as the United States, help with this? And I think 

there, there are two things that we could do. One is we could contribute more to the regional response. The U.N. recently had a 

study, it was 2019, that says that it is going to require—and this 

is just today, and as we know, it has been referenced so the numbers are going to increase. 

There is about $750 million required. The U.S. had, between fiscal years 2017 and 2019, has said it is about $150 million. That 

is a nice start, but it is not near enough. We need to be giving 

more. Colombia alone is going to need $315 million. So more financial assistance to this effort. 

The second piece of that, is extending temporary protected status 

to Venezuelans. I mean, what is happening now is we are asking 
52 

countries of the region—we are acknowledging that they are overwhelmed. We are acknowledging that not just Colombia but, as I 

referenced earlier, Peru, Argentina, Chile, the islands in the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago is being overwhelmed, that we extend 

temporary protected status to Venezuela. I think that is something 

that we can do. We can do it soon. I heard when Abrams said that 

that is something that is being under consideration, I hope it is 

being considered very seriously. 

Mr. ALLRED. Thank you. I completely agree with you. And we 

have had a bipartisan request from some Senators to extend TPS 

protections to Venezuelan refugees, and I would encourage members of this committee to consider that as well. 

My time is running out, so I want to go to you, Professor 

Pearlstein, and talk about the constitutional issues here. And I 

want to go back to law school a little bit. I am a lawyer and we 

can kind of nerd out here a little bit and go back to the Steel Seizure case, and just ask you if this expression of Congress, how that 

would affect the President’s ability to act under Article II, and how 

that it would interact with that precedent? 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Thank you. I am delighted to nerd out on constitutional law. 

So let me begin by responding to that by picking up on the point 

that has been made by describing what 1004 is trying to do is removing authority, or taking something off the table, right? Currently, the President has no authority under the Constitution or 

under any source of authority statutorily to introduce forces into 

hostilities in Venezuela. My view is, I do not believe in a democracy 

a President can credibly threaten force that he has no legal authority to use. That is the current status quo, right? That is the state 

of affairs if Congress does absolutely nothing here. 

What this does is interject and say, Congress is watching. We are 

not taking anything off the table, but we are saying before you take 

the next step, we will specifically authorize funding, right? This is 

just about the money, right? And this is simply reiterating you cannot spend money we have not given you to spend, right? I think 

that is the critical point here. This does not change the constitutional dynamic in any important way, with the exception of the 

Steel Seizure point, right? 

The Steel Seizure point, Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence 

says the scope of the President’s powers waxes and wanes as a 

function of what Congress does. When Congress has said nothing, 

right, the President is acting in, effectively, a constitutional twilight zone. Perhaps the President can claim power that even 

though we know what the Constitution says he does not have, perhaps the President will have an argument there. It will depend on 

temporary imponderables, in the words of the Court. 

The President is in a different constitutional position when Congress has affirmatively said not yet, or no. And that is the shift, 

that is the gearshift that this legislation would make. It would say, 

whatever arguments you think you have based on past practice are 

not available in the moment in which we have said not yet. 

Mr. ALLRED. Thank you so much. 

Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. 
53 

Mr. ESPAILLAT [presiding]. I recognize the gentleman from New 

Jersey, Mr. Smith, 5 minutes. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your testimoneys. I would like to ask Dr. Neumann, if you could—and a lot of my questions have been answered. 

So I do have one final question I would like to ask, and that is on 

the issue of war crimes, or crimes against humanity indictments. 

I was very involved with the court of Yugoslavia, with Slobodan 

Milosevic, and worked very hard on that, held multiple hearings on 

it as well. When Rwanda and the atrocities committed there occurred, I also was very supportive of the court, which was a regional court. And then David Crane, who was the chief prosecutor 

for the court of Sierra Leone, I had several hearings and he was 

extraordinarily effective. And Charles Taylor sits in prison today 

with a 50-year prison sentence, former President of Liberia, for his 

egregious crimes because of those prosecutions. 

What kind of game-changer might it be if Maduro were to be indicted? There is preliminary work that is being done by the ICC. 

I think it is often too slow and not aggressive enough in gathering 

facts, but nevertheless, the chief prosecutor, Mrs. Bensouda, has 

gotten a referral from six States, beginning with Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru, and on February 18th 

announced that she has opened an independent impartial review 

on the number of communications—from the number of communications and reports documenting alleged crimes falling within the 

jurisdiction of the ICC. 

And, of course, this is not a panacea, but I have met with Bashir; 

I am one of the few people who met with Bashir. The first thing 

he wants lifted from his resume is the fact that he is an indicted 

war criminal. He always runs the risk of being extradited. I remember we tried very hard in the European Union especially, to 

get Ankara to do that when he was going to visit there. China 

would do it. But that does hang over him as kind of a sword of 

Damocles. He is wanted and we prosecuted him. People like 

Milosevic never thought that they would face a jury or a group of, 

I should say, judges. Of course, he died before a verdict was rendered in Yugoslavia. 

But it seems to me the time has come in addition to—and I do 

believe all cards should be on the table. I do not think intervention 

by the U.S., that case has been made, but it might. But I think, 

as you said, Dr. Neumann, multilateral—I mean, we do it all the 

time. We empower African Union peacekeepers all the time where 

there is no peace to keep. They go in more as peacemakers under 

the guise of peacekeepers. And I was in Darfur when the first deployment was made there by peacekeepers and there was no peace, 

but they were there, nevertheless, trying to separate the Janjaweed 

and others from their victims. 

So what would an indictment do to this situation? Do you have 

confidence that the ICC might be able to really take this up aggressively? One of the knocks against them is that most of the indictments have been against sub-Saharan Africans, including the 

President of Kenya. So it seems to me if Maduro does not fit the 

bill for someone who is committing atrocities, I do not know who 

does. So my hope is one of the messages going out of this hearing 
54 

will be ‘‘let’s indict Maduro.’’ Let’s let the world community bring 

him to the Hague and to be held accountable for these egregious 

crimes that he is committing every day. 

Dr. Neumann, your thoughts. 

Ms. NEUMANN. Thank you very much. Yes, from a Venezuelan 

perspective, it is a real game-changer for a number of reasons. As 

I explained before, you know, this whole concept of the Bolivarian 

Revolution was supposed to bring peace, justice, include 

marginalized populations, and a greater enactment of human 

rights. The fact that it has gone in precisely the opposite direction 

and the OAS—you will forgive me, I do not have the numbers 

today, but I believe that—to hand, but it is the OAS report, which 

was comprehensive. 

I do not know. Over 13,000 extrajudicial killings. It considered 

the use of food and privation of food as political policy as a form 

of—I do not know, I think they called it a slow-motion genocide. I 

am not sure. They definitely called it a crime against humanity. 

And it is a game-changer, because it undermines the narrative 

of what these guys are about. It really presents the opportunity 

that he will be gone, that there is a possibility that he will face 

trial. It acts as a disincentive to those who support him, that you 

do not want to be caught up in this. I mean, you know, you are 

in it either for the money or either the ideology first and then the 

money later, but you want to change your mind. 

And also, quickly, from a Latin American perspective, the fact 

that all those other Latin American countries backed the case before the ICC has never happened before in the hemisphere. So that 

is another signal that the countries of the hemisphere are changing 

in their relationship to international institutions, their views of institutional support and democracy. They want to play on the side 

of rule of law and be taken seriously, despite the fact that they 

have a complicated history with their own democratic institutions 

in the past. The region has been growing up and Venezuela remains a black mark, and the ICC case is a turning point, both internally and internationally. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for your indulgence. 

Our other distinguished witnesses, should he be indicted, 

Maduro? 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Could Maduro be indicted? 

Mr. SMITH. Should he be? 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Should he be? I am a supporter of the role of 

international criminal law in this role. I think the ICC is in a position to play an effective role. I think their role would be more effective with active U.S. support of international criminal law in this 

regard. 

Mr. SMITH. As you know, both Republicans and Democrats have 

not—I mean, President Obama had House and Senate, there was 

no ratification. Clinton did sign it, but there has always been opposition from the Pentagon. But, that said, there could be a referral 

from the Security Council. So there is no doubt that that is one avenue that is open even to us. There is already enough. Six countries, I think, is enough to get the ball rolling. 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. But should he be indicted, in your view? 
55 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Should the facts—— 

Mr. SMITH. Maduro. 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Yes. Should the facts support it, I would absolutely support an indictment. 

Mr. SMITH. Based on what you know? 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Based on what I know, certainly. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Dr. Chavez. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. So I think that this is a question that is going to 

be up to the people of Venezuela. I mean, there are a lot of questions over amnesty, but there is also talk of providing Maduro some 

sort of off-ramp. As repugnant as that might be, there has been 

talk about—and I do not think we want to necessarily take that off 

the table either. 

Mr. SMITH. Sometimes an indictment sharpens the mind. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. No, no. 

Mr. SMITH. Mengistu has an off-ramp out of Ethiopia, but there 

was a lot—there was a clamor for his prosecution, not at the ICC, 

but elsewhere. Thank you. 

Mr. CICILLINE [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Malinowski, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me start by saying I like Congressman Smith’s idea of 

the ICC. One small problem is that my understanding is that the 

Administration is currently considering imposing a visa ban on ICC 

officials, and sanctioning countries around the world that support 

the ICC. And that might be another direct blow to the solidarity 

within the region that has built up around Colombia and Venezuela. And I would hope that we would urge the Administration 

not to go in that direction. 

Dr. Chavez, I want to come back to the very scary picture that 

you painted of potential conflict in Venezuela. Now, you painted 

that picture in the context of potential military intervention. But 

when you describe a country that contains millions of people who 

are armed, that is extremely polarized and factionalized, where all 

sides are increasingly desperate, it sounded to me like you were 

painting a picture of a potential conflict or civil war that could very 

well take place without any sort of external intervention, and I 

wanted you to maybe elaborate on that a little bit. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. No. And I do think that something—that—you are 

right, and I think that the level of violence is increasing. The level 

of desperation of the Venezuelan people is increasing. And so I 

think that things could get a lot worse before they get better, which 

is why I think the very sad fact is that there is really no silver bullet, and perhaps that is why military intervention was considered 

an option is maybe that would be something that would be quick. 

I think we all want something quick to stem this tide, this tragedy. 

I think the issue of peacekeeping came up. I could imagine, at 

some point, an international coalition, and the U.S. being part of 

this coalition of forces, to deal with the situation in Venezuela. It 

is a unilateral U.S. military intervention that I am opposed to. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Well, you just anticipated my next question, 

and that is precisely whether that kind of State collapse followed 

by an outbreak of civil war-type violence in Venezuela could alter 
56 

the perceptions of regional countries—the OAS, Colombia—about 

the need for some sort of cooperative multilateral intervention to 

restore peace and protect civilian life. And that does get back to the 

question on the table, because this resolution does not really differentiate between various scenarios that might arise in the future. 

Now, as everybody has pointed out, the resolution does not, in 

fact, take the threat of military intervention off the table. Legally, 

it does not do that. It could be perceived, though, as carrying that 

message, which is one reason there has been kind of confused debate about it today. Are we debating the merits of military intervention, or are we simply debating the congressional role in a decision with respect to military intervention? 

Is there a risk, because, again, we have to make a decision as 

to what is wise here. The resolution is not compelled legally. We 

have an absolute legal right to pass this, but we are not compelled 

to. So the question is, is it wise? And I think we all understand 

that threats of military intervention are unwise right now. Tweets 

of the sort you describe, profoundly unwise. 

But convince me that an affirmative vote by the Congress for a 

resolution that could be perceived as taking the possibility of any 

form of military involvement, including through peacekeeping, off 

the table would be wise and necessary at this point. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. So what I can say to that is I am going to defer to 

the constitutional law scholar about the type of military intervention would be permissible, but what I would say is that I would not 

want to take a multilateral coalition-type response to what is going 

on off the table. Our right to protect—I mean, I think there are— 

it might come to that. And just—and if we—one thing I want to 

say about this is that the countries of the region of Latin America, 

it is often overlooked that they have great experience and knowhow when it comes to peacekeeping. Uruguay, Chile, Brazil. Mexico 

is getting into this game. I mean, I think that if the calculus 

changes, that would be the way to go. 

As far as the legal constitutional piece, I am not as clear on. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you. My time is up, so it is up to the 

chairman. But if you want to address that, sure. 

Mr. CICILLINE. The gentleman’s time has expired, but the witness is certainly free to answer the question. 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Certainly. I think the constitutional question 

here is straightforward and noncomplicated. The concern that this 

might convey a message that Congress is not intending to convey, 

right, I think that is beyond my pay grade as a lawyer. But I want 

to make clear, right, that this is a funding restriction, and it says 

by its terms, we can do this by specific statutory authorization. 

If this bill is coupled with some of the other measures that Congress is considering, it seems to me entirely plausible that the message sent will be one of a Congress actually seized of the issue and 

determined to engage. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you very much. 

The chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from the 

State of California, Mr. Vargas, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, thank you, again, and thank you for 

this opportunity. And thank you for bringing H.R. 1004 forward. I 

think it is important that we have this discussion. As I read section 
57 

2 of it, it says: ‘‘None of the funds authorized to be appropriated 

or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense or any 

other Federal department or agency may be used to introduce the 

Armed Forces of the United States into hostilities with respect to 

Venezuela except,’’—‘‘except a declaration of war, a specific statutory authorization described in subsection B, or a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its territories 

or possessions or the Armed Forces.’’ 

So what we are debating here, this bill is, in my opinion, what 

is that balance between the authority that we have as Congress, 

and the authority the President has. Arthur Schlesinger, I believe, 

was the author, the historian who said that there is the imperial 

Presidency now, and that in the last 100 years, the Presidency has 

grown tremendously and has usurped in a sense a lot of what Congress should be doing. 

So, in my opinion, what we are doing here is debating what is 

that balance. And I think, Dr. Pearlstein, you mentioned it well. I 

think you mentioned James Madison, quoted him saying one person, it is not wise to have one person take us to war. Instead, it 

should be the community, in the sense the representatives, that 

make that decision. I agree with that wholeheartedly. And I think 

it is time that we take back that responsibility. 

I think that we, unfortunately, have allowed the Presidency to 

grow in a way that is not healthy for our country, and I think we 

are seeing that right now in this particular Presidency, although 

we have seen it in other Presidencies, also with Democrats, to be 

fair. 

So I think that this is very appropriate. I certainly will support 

it. However, I do think that what has been brought up here today, 

the issue of, you know, what message do we send to Venezuela, because I think we are all in agreement, and I have listened to all 

the testimony here today. I mean, it is a terrible situation. It is a 

horrible situation. No one disagrees with that. And that Maduro is 

a dictator, a thug, and a horrible human being, no one disagrees 

with that. I think we are all in agreement. Just what role do we 

have to play as Congress? And I think that that is important. We 

need to reestablish our position. And so that is why I certainly support it. 

But I do have some questions, and I do want to follow up a little 

bit on this notion of how this will be taken in Venezuela. And, Dr. 

Neumann, maybe I will ask you that specifically. I know you take 

a little bit harder line than the other two, but I would like to know 

how you take this, because we are not taking anything off the 

table. We are just simply saying, you have to jump through these 

constitutional necessities first that are important to us, maybe not 

as important to Venezuela at this moment, but important to us. 

But I would like to know your opinion. 

Ms. NEUMANN. Thank you very much. Thank you for your question. Yes, I am la mujer venezolana on the panel, and I am thrilled 

to be on with two other women. For the record, I wanted to say 

that. 

And, of course, yes, I want to be really clear. I do not want to 

opine on the complications of internal domestic U.S. politics. I am 

a dual citizen. I am here to discuss the concerns from the Ven-
58 

ezuelan perspective. I have, you know, as a moral political philosopher, vastly hundreds of pages on the rule of law. 

Mr. VARGAS. Doctor, how will this affect the mentality in Venezuela? That is my question. 

Ms. NEUMANN. The mentality is the mentality of a thug. It will 

be misconstrued to understand, to think that President Trump is 

hamstrung. Whether that is the intent or not, that is how it will 

be understood and represented by a man who has just called for 

the slaughter of his people by a multitude of armed groups. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. 

Dr. Chavez, will you comment on that? Is that the way that you 

think that it will be understood in not only Venezuela, but Latin 

America? I know, because we do have allies here that are working 

with us. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. So I actually think it would be welcomed by Latin 

America, the passage of this legislation, because I think that there 

have been so many mixed messages. So you have, for example, the 

tweets I referred to, or Secretary Pompeo’s recent statement about 

the reason we are removing officials from our embassy is because 

we want to be—we do not want to be constrained when it comes 

to policy responses. 

I think those sort of—I think having a clear message that no, 

that—I mean, not that we are not going to intervene militarily, but 

this particular legislation shows that we are going to think this 

through really carefully. This is a really big decision. Congress 

should play its role in it. So—— 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. My time is almost expired. I do want 

to say that I think we are out of equilibrium. The Constitution has 

these checks and balances, and we need to get back into that constitutional equilibrium. So I support this motion. Thank you. 

Mr. TRONE [presiding]. I recognize Mr. Costa for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members 

of the committee and the witnesses. I think you have done an excellent job. 

The measures before us have as much to do with our own constitutional authority and the role in which Congress has abdicated 

part of that responsibility, as it does about our policy toward Venezuela. But let me drill down on a couple of things that have been 

discussed here already. 

The policy of this administration, and I like the notion that was 

made a moment ago about consistency and policy. I think this administration, from my perspective, has had more difficulty being 

able to demonstrate consistency on a whole host of foreign policy 

initiatives, and I think this is but one example of that. All administrations wrestle with that, but this one seems to—when you have 

foreign policy by tweet, I think it is a very difficult challenge. 

Having said that, they have engaged in a multilateral effort here. 

What would the three of you—comment quickly, because I have a 

few other questions—as to so far the policy that has been taken to 

embrace this multilateral effect, and what more do you think 

should we be doing? Dr. Chavez. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. So like I said, I applaud that we have taken this 

multilateral approach. I think we should continue to, first and foremost, I think just recognize the importance of the Lima Group, and 
59 

what it is doing, and let them take the front seat in these diplomatic—— 

Mr. COSTA. So what more could we do? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. I think we could also give the International Contact 

Group a chance. It is relatively new. 

Mr. COSTA. Do they have a timeline? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. So they started in early February, but they have already begun sort of the shuttle diplomacy effort. I think it is an 

important group also, because it is a very diverse group, with eight 

European countries, four Latin American countries. So, again, supporting that. 

Mr. COSTA. Barrister Pearlstein? You are a barrister, are you 

not? 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Pearlstein. Yes. I would just make the point 

that multilateralism in this regard, working with regional allies, 

ideally working with international allies, depending on what is 

coming down the road, may be necessary from the point of view of 

international law to make any subsequent U.S. cooperation—— 

Mr. COSTA. I think we concur with you, yes. 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN [continuing]. Lawful. 

Mr. COSTA. So what more could we do? 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. What more could we do? I think the engagement of the ICC, the engagement of the U.N. Security Council on 

some sort of resolution, whether or not, indeed, way before—— 

Mr. COSTA. For the off-ramp on Maduro, does the potential of an 

indictment help? 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. So there are a number of range—so there is a 

range of views on this peace versus security question. 

Mr. COSTA. Right. We have different options that we are discussing right now. 

Ms. PEARLSTEIN. Right. And the range of options that are available, my impression is the credible threat of indictment, should the 

facts bear that out, right, can help clarify thinking well before, 

right? The ICC process is a long one. There is an investigation and 

so forth. And allowing that process to begin does not foreclose any 

options. 

Mr. COSTA. What would you care to add to that question about 

the Administration’s—— 

Ms. NEUMANN. Thank you. The unilateral—the bipartisan acknowledgement of the Venezuelan Constitution and that Juan 

Guaido is the interim president under that Constitution. 

Mr. COSTA. And we can do that as a Congress. 

Ms. NEUMANN. Supporting a transition. 

Mr. COSTA. We can do that as a Congress? 

Ms. NEUMANN. As a Congress. There is a Congress. Support that 

transition. The calculus on multilateralism is going to change as 

the crisis deepens, so continue to develop strategies to prevent the 

spillover. And also, I believe supporting the prosecution of Maduro 

under RICO. Use RICO to support the Maduro indictment. 

Mr. COSTA. You mentioned earlier the Organization of American 

States. Do you think that as one of the efforts or multiple efforts 

that we are using to force this change that the organization of 

American States is being used effectively? Is there more that could 

be done? 
60 

Ms. NEUMANN. Let me say that I am not an expert on the OAS, 

but, obviously, I have been following it. I think what more they 

could do? No. 

Mr. COSTA. I mean, what if we were to call a meeting for all of 

them to come together and to—— 

Ms. NEUMANN. To develop a better contingency planning for the 

spectacular crisis. That if the refugee crisis was the second in the 

world before, it is going to skyrocket. We need better collaboration 

on contingency plan. 

Mr. COSTA. Dr. Chavez, you look like you are anticipating an answer. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. No, sir. I would say the OAS has really stepped up 

in a way that—— 

Mr. COSTA. Can they do more? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. I think they could do more. I think that there 

should be more outreach. I think, for example, for Congress to more 

outreach to the OAS. But Luis Almagro has—I mean, he has been 

a force of nature. 

Mr. COSTA. My time has expired, but a number of delegations are 

looking at visiting in the region here in the next couple months. I 

am with a group that may go to Colombia. What would you advise 

us to do for those that are visiting the area? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. I would say spend time, go to Cucuta. Spend time 

on the border. See the magnitude of the humanitarian—of the suffering. I think you will also be surprised by—I mentioned earlier 

the importance of having a neutral party deliver humanitarian assistance. There are a lot of small local NGO’s that are already 

there, and I think when you go to the border, you will see, whether 

it be Catholic Relief charities or local NGO’s. And also, I would recommend talking to these folks to get a better sense of what the real 

challenges are when it comes to delivery of humanitarian assistance. 

Mr. COSTA. Well, we will follow up with all of you. The three of 

you have done a very good job. Thank you. 

Ms. NEUMANN. Thank you very much for your time. Thank you. 

Mr. TRONE. I recognize myself for 5 minutes. I have one quick 

question, and we will head out the door. Given the myriad of problems facing Venezuela, what should we concentrate our U.S. resources on? Economic pressure? Redoubling humanitarian aid? Or 

additional resource to help the IDPs and refugees? Start on the 

left, Dr. Chavez, and we will go across the table. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. I believe that the priority must be the delivery of 

humanitarian assistance. 

Ms. NEUMANN. Yeah. Humanitarian assistance, getting it into 

the country, making sure it is not part of some illicit trade black 

market, or political repression. Humanitarian aid is No. 1. 

Mr. TRONE. Ideas on how we get it past the border? 

Ms. NEUMANN. No. I think—no. I think I want to—I want to 

defer on that if I were, you know—how we get it past the border, 

it is going to take the involvement of multilateral groups and support from some elements, either of the U.N. or, OAS. 

Unfortunately, Latin America does not have anything like the African Union. Something like that would be particularly helpful at 
61 

a time like this. So forming some form of coalition and with supervision with the ICRC is really what is needed. 

Mr. TRONE. Any other ideas? That is the key. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. One idea I think is to push the U.N. to—ask the 

U.N. to push Maduro to recognize what is going on in his country, 

and to accept aid, and for the U.N. to play a greater role in this 

particular issue. 

Mr. TRONE. OK. Thank you all. You guys have been fantastic. We 

really appreciate the briefing and look forward to keeping moving 

and trying to help Venezuela. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
62 

APPENDIX 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Eliot L. Engel (D-NY), Chairman 

March 13,2019 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You arc respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held 

in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Ollice Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

https:/ /fore igna ff airs. house.gov /): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUB.JECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, March 13,2019 

4:00p.m. 

Hearing on H.R. 1004, Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act 

Panel I 

The Honorable David Cicilline 

Member of Congress (D-R I) 

Panel II 

Rebecca Bill Chavez. Ph.D. 

Non-Resident Senior Fellow 

Inter-American Dialogue 

(Former Deputy Assistant Secret my <!f"D4ense }i>r Westem Hemisphere Affairs) 

Ms. Deborah Pearlstein 

Professor of l.aw and Co-Director 

Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy 

Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 

Yeshiva University 

Vanessa Neumann. Ph.D. 

President 

Asymmetrica 

By Direction of the Chairman 
63 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

Day Wednesday Date, __ .......:0:::31:.::'1:::31'1=9 ___ Room. __ 2_17_2_RH<_O_'B_ 

Starting Time 4:05p.m. Ending Time 6:06p.m. 

Recesses _0_ L.__to __ ) L__to ___) L__to ___) L__to ___) L__to ___) L__to ___) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman EUot L. Engel, Rep. David Cici/Une, Rep. Adriano Espalllot, Rep. David Trone 

Check aU of the following that apply: 

Open Session 0 

Executive ~sed) Session 0 Televised0 

TITLE OF BEARING: 

Electronically Record!l!!Jtaped) 0 

Stenographic Record 1.!:.1 

Hearing on H.R. 1004, Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act 

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See attached. 

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

NIA 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes EJ NoD 

(If "no", please list below ond include title. agency. department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.) 

N/A 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

;';mADJOURNED 6:06p.m. ~ B 
64 

Æ 

PIWSENI 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

t--x 

X 

X 

X 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

MEMBER 

Eliot L. Engel, NY 

~rad Sherman, ~-A 

Gregory W. Meeks. NY 

Albio Sires, N.l 

Gerald E. Connolly. VA 

Theodore E. Deutch, Fl. 

Karen Bass. C1 

Willi• ,I{, .MA 

David Cicillinc, Rl 

Ami Bera, CA 

Joaquin Castro, TX 

Dina Titus, NV 

,NY 

Ted Lieu. CA 

' Susan Wild, PA 

Dean Phillips, MN 

Ill nm IAN 

l'nlin ~llml, TX 

Andy Levin. Ml 

Abigail Span berger. VA 

Chrissy lloulahan, PA 

Tom oli• "'"'"; 

David Trone. MD 

"' (", r. 

Juan Vargas, CA 

Vicente Gonzalez, TX 

PRESEI\'T lv!EMBER 

X Michael T. McCaul, TX 

X Christopher H. Smith, NJ 

]' Steve Chabol, OH 

Joe Wilson, SC 

Scott Perry, PA 

X I Ted Yoho, f[ 

\dam Kin?ineer, !L 

X I.Ji. NY 

James Sensenbrenner, Jr., WI 

Ann Wagner, MO 

Brian J. Mast, FL 

X Francis Rooney, FL 

r-x 

X 

Brian !<~ yit_zpatric_ls__!>_~ 

John Curtis, UT 

Ken Buck, CO 

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~~--~~R~on~W~'ri~g~ht~,·~rx~~~-------­

~~X~--e~U~uLy~R=es=ch~e~m~h=al=er~.P~A~----------­

Tim Burchett, TN 

X Greg Pence, JN 

Steve Watkins, KS 

Michael Guest, MS