Filed 10/13/23 Asi v. Hollywood Foreign Press Assn. CA2/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

HUSAM “SAM” ASI,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HOLLYWOOD FOREIGN 

PRESS ASSOCIATION,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B327002

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22STCV15728)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Michael L. Stern, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded 

with directions.

Latham & Watkins, Marvin S. Putnam, Chandler S. Howell and Robert 

J. Ellison for Defendant and Appellant.

King & Ballow, Richard S. Busch and David M. Niemierzycki for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an entertainment journalist, was publicly accused of sexual 

misconduct in the press. At the time the accusations were made, plaintiff 

was a member of the Hollywood Foreign Press Association (HFPA). In 

response to these accusations against plaintiff, HFPA issued statements to 

the press stating it would investigate the allegations and had placed plaintiff 

on probation from its organization pending the results of the investigation. 

Plaintiff then filed suit against HFPA based partly on HFPA’s statements to 

the press. In response, HFPA filed a special motion to strike under our antiSLAPP1 statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,2 arguing its 

statements to the press were protected activity. The trial court denied the 

motion in part. HFPA appeals the denial of its special motion to strike. We 

affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s order and remand the 

matter with directions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Parties

HFPA is a private membership association consisting of approximately 

100 journalists who report on entertainment news for foreign markets. 

Plaintiff and respondent Sam Asi (Asi) became an HFPA member in 2010 and 

has previously worked as a journalist for the BBC and the newspaper AlQuds Al-Arabi. 

1 “SLAPP” is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public 

participation.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 

Cal.4th 53, 57.)

2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure 

unless otherwise stated. 
3

B. TheWrap Article and HFPA Response

On February 2, 2022, the entertainment news outlet TheWrap 

published an article detailing allegations made by three women accusing Asi 

of sexual misconduct. At the time the article was published, Asi was a 

member of HFPA and TheWrap approached the HFPA for comment on these

allegations. HFPA provided a statement to TheWrap, which the parties refer 

to as a press release, and later that same day TheWrap published a second 

article that incorporated HFPA’s comment. HFPA’s comments in the first 

press release, as reported by TheWrap, were as follows: “A spokesperson for 

the HFPA—which has been under fire for much of the last year amid 

accusations of corruption, racism and self-dealing that prompted NBC to back 

out of televising the Globes last month—said that the organization sent the 

information provided by TheWrap to an outside law firm for review, citing 

the group’s ‘intolerance for any type of discrimination or harassment.’

“‘The HFPA takes any and all allegations very seriously and does not 

condone any type of inappropriate misconduct or behavior,’ the spokesperson 

said. ‘If it is found that a member has violated the Code of Conduct, 

disciplinary action will be taken, including suspension and/or expulsion from 

the organization. Upon receiving this information, we immediately sent the 

complaints to the outside law firm for review and investigation. The HFPA 

strongly encourages anyone with any complaint against any member to do 

the same.’”

On February 7, 2022, HFPA issued a second press release which was 

published by TheWrap and The Los Angeles Times. As reported by 

TheWrap, HFPA’s second press release confirmed Asi had been placed on 

probation from HFPA pending the results of its investigation pursuant to 

HFPA’s Code of Conduct. It further stated: “‘Grievance procedures were 
4

designed to govern the investigation of any alleged violations of this Code,’ an 

HFPA spokesperson said in a statement provided to TheWrap. ‘We take 

these conduct rules very seriously. As such, any member accused of alleged 

sexual assault is put on probation pending the completion of an investigation 

by an outside law firm into the allegations.’” Before HFPA completed its 

investigation, Asi filed this action against HFPA and two of its employees. 

C. Complaint

Asi’s complaint, filed May 11, 2022, asserts 14 causes of action against 

HFPA and its codefendants. The complaint asserts a wide range of 

allegations of wrongdoing by HFPA, in some instances dating back to 2013, 

including allegations of racial discrimination and sexual harassment,

retaliation, as well as mismanagement and corruption in the operation of 

HFPA itself and, more specifically, its website. These allegations include the 

claim that HFPA violated its bylaws and procedures in issuing the two press 

releases in response to TheWrap’s article. All allegations of wrongdoing are 

incorporated by reference into every cause of action pled in the complaint. 

D. Special Motion to Strike

On July 18, 2022, HFPA filed a special motion to strike under section 

425.16. HFPA’s motion sought to strike the first nine of Asi’s 14 causes of 

action to the extent they arose from HFPA’s issuance of the press releases, 

which HFPA asserted was protected activity. HFPA’s special motion to strike 

targeted Asi’s claims for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) tortious breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) tortious interference with contract, 

(5) tortious interference with prospective economic relations, (6) violation of 
5

Business and Professions Code section 17200, (7) intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, (8) negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (9) 

violation of the common law right to fair procedure. 

Asi opposed HFPA’s motion, arguing the press releases were not 

activity protected by section 425.16. He also claimed the challenged causes of 

action did not arise from the press releases but from other alleged 

misconduct. Finally, he argued that, to the extent they did arise from the

releases, he had established a probability of success on the merits of his 

claims. 

On December 9, 2022, the trial court issued its order on HFPA’s special 

motion to strike. The court found the press releases constituted protected 

activity under section 425.16. With the exception of Asi’s third cause of 

action for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing, the court held each of the nine challenged causes of action were 

based, in part, on HFPA’s issuance of the press releases. Having determined 

the third cause of action for tortious breach of the implied covenant did not 

arise from the press releases, the court denied the motion as to that cause of 

action. The court granted HFPA’s motion as to Asi’s eighth cause of action 

for negligent infliction of emotional distress, holding such a cause of action 

“only lies in direct or bystander distress situations.”

3 As to the remaining 

seven causes of action, the Court denied the motion, finding Asi had 

sufficiently demonstrated a probability of success on the merits of those 

claims under section 425.16. 

3 Neither party has appealed the trial court’s striking of the eighth cause 

of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and, we do not address 

it further in this appeal.
6

HFPA filed a timely notice of appeal of the order denying its special 

motion to strike. 

DISCUSSION

A. Anti-SLAPP Procedure

The “anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from

meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and

petition on matters of public concern.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.

(2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884 (Wilson).) A “cause of action against a person

arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of

petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California

Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special

motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has

established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the

claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The anti-SLAPP statute itself provides that 

its protections “shall be construed broadly.” (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)

In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, courts conduct a twostep analysis. First, the court decides whether a defendant has met its

“burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’

protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of

Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).) 

Second, if a defendant meets its burden on the threshold showing, the court

decides if the plaintiff “has established that there is a probability that the

plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

“Analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion is not confined to evaluating

whether an entire cause of action, as pleaded by the plaintiff, arises from

protected activity or has merit. Instead, courts should analyze each claim for

relief—each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may
7

be several in a single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether the acts

are protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite

degree of merit to survive the motion.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System

(2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010 (Bonni).) “[T]o the extent any acts are

unprotected, the claims based on those acts will survive.” (Id. at p. 1012.) “A 

mixed cause of action is subject to section 425.16 if at least one of the 

underlying acts is protected conduct, unless the allegations of protected 

conduct are merely incidental to the unprotected activity.” (Salma v. Capon

(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1287.)

We review the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion de

novo, applying the same two-step analysis. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v.

Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) We independently review whether a

moving party has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of

action arises from protected activity. (Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191

Cal.App.4th 977, 988.)

B. Prong One: Arising from Protected Activity

“At the first step of the analysis, the defendant must make two related 

showings. Comparing its statements and conduct against the statute, it must 

demonstrate activity qualifying for protection. (See § 425.16, subd. (e).) And 

comparing that protected activity against the complaint, it must also 

demonstrate that the activity supplies one or more elements of a plaintiff’s

claims.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887.) 

HFPA argues its press releases constitute protected activity under the 

anti-SLAPP statute, and its special motion to strike is limited to the claims 

that it alleges arise from those press releases. To the extent the challenged 

causes of action also arise from or are based on claims of discrimination,
8

sexual harassment, or other wrongdoing, those causes of action will survive. 

(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393–394; Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 1012 (Baral).) To determine whether HFPA has made the requisite 

showing under the first prong, we must decide if the press releases in 

question constitute protected activity and whether the HFPA’s issuance of 

those press releases forms the basis—either in whole or in part—of the 

challenged causes of action.

1. Protected Activity

“At this stage, the question is only whether a defendant has made out a 

prima facie case that activity underlying a plaintiff’s claims is statutorily 

protected.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 888.) Protected activity has been 

statutorily defined to include four categories of statements or conduct. 

(§ 425.16, subd. (e).) HFPA argues the press releases fall within two of these 

categories, specifically “any written or oral statement or writing made in a

place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of

public interest” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3)) and “any other conduct in furtherance

of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right

of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest” 

(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4)). To fall within this second category, there must exist a 

“functional relationship” between the speech and the public conversation 

about a matter of public interest. (Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 

Cal.App.5th 893, 904 (Bishop).)

Asi does not dispute the press releases constitute a writing made in a 

public forum under subdivision (e)(3), rather he argues that the HFPA cannot 

show the press releases were made in connection with an issue of public 

interest under either subdivision. We disagree.
9

“Like the SLAPP statute itself, the question whether something is an 

issue of public interest must be construed broadly.” (Hecimovich v. Encinal 

School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 464, 

internal quotation marks omitted.) Accordingly, an issue of public interest 

“is any issue in which the public is interested. In other words, the issue need 

not be ‘significant’ to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute—it is enough 

that it is one in which the public takes an interest.” (Nygård, Inc. v. UusiKerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042.) “‘Although matters of public 

interest include legislative and governmental activities, they may also 

include activities that involve private persons and entities, especially when a 

large, powerful organization may impact the lives of many individuals.’

[Citations.]” (Macias v. Hartwell (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 669, 674.)

The California Supreme Court has set out a two-part test to determine 

whether the public interest requirement has been satisfied. “First, we ask 

what ‘public issue or . . . issue of public interest’ the speech in question 

implicates—a question we answer by looking to the content of the speech. 

[Citation.] Second, we ask what functional relationship exists between the 

speech and the public conversation about some matter of public interest. It is 

at the latter stage that context proves useful.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. 

DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149–150 (FilmOn.com).) 

FilmOn.com’s “first step is satisfied so long as the challenged speech or 

conduct, considered in light of its context, may reasonably be understood to 

implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute.” (Geiser 

v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1253.) In determining whether the second 

step is satisfied, courts look to considerations such as whether (1) the subject 

of the speech was a person or entity in the public eye, (2) the speech could 

affect large numbers of people beyond the direct participants, (3) the speech
10

occurred in the context of an ongoing controversy, dispute, or discussion, and 

(4) the speech affected a community like that of a governmental entity. 

(FilmOn.com, at pp. 149–150.)

Bishop v. The Bishop’s School is instructive. In Bishop, a school 

terminated a teacher’s employment. The teacher sued the head of the school 

and the school itself for defamation based on (1) the termination letter the 

school sent to the teacher and (2) a statement made by the head of the school 

to the school’s student newspaper. (Bishop, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 897.) 

The Court of Appeal determined defendants did not meet their burden to 

show the termination letter arose from protected activity, which was a 

private communication between the school and the teacher “with the purpose 

of privately communicating an employment decision” and did not contribute 

toward any public debate or discourse. (Id. at p. 907.)

However, the Court found the comments made to the student 

newspaper did constitute protected activity. The comment in question was 

the statement “‘We are committed to the safety and well-being of our 

students past and present.’” (Bishop, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 907.) The 

Court determined student safety and well-being is a matter of public interest, 

and the alleged statement sufficiently contributed to public discussion of that 

issue to qualify for protection under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). (Id. at 

pp. 907–908.) In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned “Kim made the 

statement to someone interviewing him on behalf of the newspaper; he did so 

with the knowledge that his statement would likely be published in the 

newspaper to an audience of the School’s students, staff, and potentially 

parents or others in the community; and his purpose was to communicate 

defendants’ position regarding student safety and well-being. [Citations.]

Kim’s quote is therefore entitled to anti-SLAPP protection.” (Id. at p. 908.)
11

We reach the same result here. Asi primarily argues HFPA cannot 

satisfy the public interest requirement here because he is not a sufficiently 

public figure. However, Asi’s notoriety is only one way this requirement can 

be met. HFPA itself is, as Asi characterizes it in his complaint, “a 

noteworthy entity within the world of entertainment journalism.” It is 

undisputed that, before the public accusations against Asi, HFPA had faced 

widespread scrutiny and criticism over its conduct and culture. In his 

complaint, Asi alleges “the gross mismanagement that Dr. Asi and other 

HFPA members had sought to address came home to roost when 

investigative journalists exposed the HFPA’s history of corruption and 

racism.” Asi’s complaint also directly asserts HFPA’s press releases were 

issued in response to prior public criticism, alleging “the HFPA, under fire in 

the Los Angeles Times and other media for failing so miserably to keep its 

house in order, is using the false claims against Dr. Asi as an opportunity to 

make it appear as if it takes allegations seriously and is changing its

culture.” 

HFPA also acknowledges this history of public scrutiny and criticism in

its handling of allegations of member misconduct, including its passage of 

new bylaws meant to “reform” the organization. TheWrap’s article quoting 

the first HFPA release similarly mentions the prior public scrutiny faced by 

the HFPA, stating “A spokesperson for the HFPA—which has been under fire 

for much of the last year amid accusations of corruption, racism and selfdealing that prompted NBC to back out of televising the Globes last month—

said that the organization sent the information provided by TheWrap to an 

outside law firm for review, citing the group’s ‘intolerance for any type of 

discrimination or harassment.’” TheWrap made similar comments in 

reporting on the HFPA’s second press release, noting “The spokesperson 
12

added that under the group’s new code of conduct—which was established in 

the wake of accusations of corruption, racism and self-dealing—Asi will be 

unable to partake in any HFPA-related activities until an investigation by an

outside law firm has been completed.”

There was public interest in HFPA’s handling of public allegations of 

misconduct at the time TheWrap reported on the accusations against Asi. 

HFPA’s press releases must be understood in this context, as Asi himself 

alleges in his complaint. HFPA’s public comments in the releases are not 

focused on the specifics or truthfulness of the allegations made against Asi 

but instead are focused on HFPA itself and how it would respond to these 

public accusations. In its first release, HFPA does not mention Asi or discuss 

the specific allegations made against him. Instead, HFPA states in general 

terms that it takes all allegations seriously, would discipline any members 

found to violate its Code of Conduct, and had forwarded the complaints to an 

outside law firm for review and investigation. In its second press release, 

HFPA simply acknowledged Asi had been placed on probation until the 

completion of the investigation as mandated by HFPA’s new policies. 

HFPA’s press releases were statements to the press made for public 

dissemination in response to public scrutiny which were intended to show it 

had legitimately reformed in the wake of public criticism. As with Bishop,

HFPA’s purpose in issuing these releases was to communicate to the public 

that it would follow its new policies and procedures to investigate accusations 

of misconduct. Under Bishop, such statements are protected activity for antiSLAPP purposes under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) even if Asi himself is 

not a public figure. 
13

2. Activity Giving Rise to Plaintiff’s Claims

A “claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is 

the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to 

some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 

p. 1060.) To determine whether a challenged allegation or claim “arises 

from” protected activity we must determine whether protected activity was 

the alleged injury-producing act forming the basis for the claim. (Id. at pp. 

1062–1063.) “Allegations of protected activity that merely provide context, 

without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the antiSLAPP statute.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.)

We find nearly all of the causes of action challenged by HFPA’s motion 

arise, in part, from the issuance of the press releases. In paragraph 16 of his 

complaint, Asi alleges the press releases violated HFPA’s bylaws, procedures, 

and rules. Asi’s cause of action for breach of contract sets out a list of alleged 

breaches, including the claim that “Defendants breached their obligations to 

Dr. Asi by summarily, unfairly and unlawfully . . . . [¶] . . . Engaging in the 

conduct described within paragraphs 10 through 24 of this Complaint each of 

which are incorporated herein by this reference.” Asi’s cause of action for 

breach of contract is expressly based, in part, on the issuance of the press 

releases.

The same is true of Asi’s cause of action for breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In his complaint, Asi expressly 

states, “Defendants, HFPA, Goeckner, and Lee have materially breached the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by, inter alia . . . . [¶] . . . 

Engaging in the conduct described within paragraphs 10 through 24 of this

Complaint each of which are incorporated herein by this reference.” Asi’s 

third cause of action for tortious breach of this implied covenant states it is 
14

based on “the acts and omissions alleged above and by arbitrarily enforcing 

HFPA’s bylaws.” The issuance of the press releases was an act “alleged 

above” and forms the basis of Asi’s claim for tortious breach of the implied 

covenant.

Asi’s causes of action for intentional interference with contract and 

with prospective economic relations are also both based on the misconduct 

alleged in “paragraphs 10 through 24” of the complaint, which necessarily 

includes the allegation that HFPA breached its bylaws and procedures by 

issuing the press releases. The same is true of Asi’s causes of action for 

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Asi appears to 

concede the press releases form the basis of these claims, as he offers no 

argument to the contrary in his briefing before us. 

In pleading a cause of action for violation of Business and Professions 

Code section 17200, Asi specifically alleges “The conduct of HFPA . . . 

described above and in paragraphs 10 through 24 of this Complaint 

incorporated herein by this reference, as well as the additional causes of 

action within this Complaint constitute unlawful, unfair, and/or coercive and 

illegal business practices in violation of California Business and Professions 

Code Section 1700 [sic], et. seq., including, inter alia, . . . failure to adhere to

HFPA’s Bylaws and Code of Conduct.” The plain language of the Complaint 

indicates Asi is alleging that all of the conduct by the HFPA as alleged in 

paragraphs 10 through 24 are the basis for this claim, which includes the 

allegations related to the press releases in paragraph 16. Additionally, the 

language of the cause of action makes specific reference to alleged breaches of 

HFPA’s bylaws and Code of Conduct, mirroring the allegations in paragraph 

16 that the press releases violated HFPA bylaws and rules.
15

As for Asi’s ninth cause of action for violation of the common law right 

of fair procedure, it is based on HFPA’s placing of Asi on probation pending 

the outcome of its investigation and not on the issuance of the press releases. 

While this cause of action inartfully incorporates the allegations of all 

preceding paragraphs, the only harm alleged and relief requested concern 

Asi’s probation. Asi’s complaint alleges the right to fair procedure protects 

“members from suspension or probation” from certain trade organizations. 

He alleges membership in the HFPA carries significant benefits for members

and that he “is now being adversely affected in his ability to practice his 

profession by virtue of his probation from the HFPA without even a 

semblance of fair procedure.” This cause of action seeks “injunctive relief 

against defendants prohibiting them from denying him the benefits of 

membership in the HFPA based on unsubstantiated claims.” Nothing in Asi’s 

complaint indicates this cause of action is based in whole or in part on the 

issuance of the press releases. 

We find HFPA has failed to carry its burden under prong one of the 

anti-SLAPP analysis as it has not shown the ninth cause of action for 

violation of the common law right of fair procedure arises from protected 

conduct. The trial court properly denied HFPA’s motion as to the ninth cause 

of action. However, it found HFPA had carried its burden under prong one 

and Asi had established a probability of prevailing under the second prong of 

the anti-SLAPP analysis. Because we find HFPA has not carried its burden 

under prong one, we do not need to reach the question of whether Asi has 

carried his burden under prong two. We therefore affirm the trial court’s

denial of HFPA’s motion as to this ninth cause of action, though we disagree 

with the court’s reasoning for reaching that result.
16

For these reasons, we find HFPA has carried its burden under prong 

one as to each challenged cause of action except Asi’s ninth cause of action for 

violation of the common law right of fair procedure. We turn next to the 

question of whether Asi has carried his burden under prong two to establish a 

probability of prevailing on the seven remaining causes of action put at issue 

by HFPA’s special motion to strike.

C. Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits

Under the second anti-SLAPP prong, a plaintiff “need only establish

that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert 

Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “‘must 

demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a 

sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the 

evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Ibid.) Although “‘the court 

does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing 

evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s

evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish 

evidentiary support for the claim.’” (Ibid.) “In making its determination, the 

court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits 

stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16, 

subd. (b)(2).) “However, speculative inferences not supported by the evidence 

proffered need not be considered.” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 

Cal.5th 781, 795.) “The prima facie showing of merit must be made with 

evidence that is admissible at trial.” (Salma, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p.

1289.)
17

1. Contract Claims

In opposing HFPA’s motion to strike, Asi argued he could establish a 

probability of success on his first claim for breach of contract because the 

press releases violated the terms of the HFPA Whistleblower Policy, the 

HFPA Code of Professional and Ethical Conduct (Code of Conduct), and the 

HFPA Bylaws as amended and restated on August 4, 2021. He also argued 

his second cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing is based on an alleged breach of the implied terms of the HFPA 

Reporting and Grievance Policy for Members (Grievance Policy). We examine 

each of these documents to determine whether Asi has met his burden of 

demonstrating a probability of success on these alleged breaches.

a. Breach of Contract

“[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the

existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for

nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the

plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 821.) 

While the parties dispute whether the Whistleblower Policy, Bylaws, and 

Code of Conduct are enforceable contracts, we ultimately need not reach this 

issue as we find that Asi has not demonstrated the press releases breached 

any terms of these documents.

i. Whistleblower Policy

The HFPA Whistleblower Policy was established, by its express terms, 

“to protect from retaliation directors, officers, employees, active members and 

volunteers of HFPA who report suspected improper conduct (each, a ‘Covered 
18

Person’) and to provide a means for Covered Persons to raise good faith 

concerns” about actions taken by or within HFPA. 

Asi alleges HFPA’s press releases violated the confidentiality provision 

of the Whistleblower Policy, which provides “Any investigation will be 

conducted in a manner that conceals and protects the Covered Person’s

identity and the reported information (if necessary under the circumstances) 

to the greatest extent practicable given legal requirements, consistent with 

the need to conduct a fair and adequate investigation and take necessary 

corrective action.” The confidentiality provision thus protects the identity of 

“Covered Persons” and the information reported by them. In the context of 

TheWrap’s article and the HFPA’s investigation into its claims, Asi is not a 

“Covered Person” as defined by the Whistleblower Policy. Instead, the 

individuals accusing him of sexual misconduct would be Covered Persons

under the policy, and the information they reported was released publicly in 

an article published by TheWrap. The content of the press releases, HFPA’s 

investigation, and Asi’s probation were not contained in the allegations of his 

accusers.

Asi has not shown the press releases revealed any information about 

the identity of his accusers or their allegations which was not already public 

information such as to run afoul of the confidentiality provision in the 

Whistleblower Policy. The press releases stated HFPA would investigate the

claims made in the article and that Asi would be placed on probation pending 

the results of the investigation. While this information was not public 

knowledge when the press releases were issued, nothing in the Whistleblower 

Policy guarantees confidentiality to one accused of misconduct, nor does it 

provide that the existence of an investigation into misconduct would be kept 

confidential. Asi has not shown the issuance of the press releases was in any 
19

way prohibited by the Whistleblower Policy and has failed to demonstrate a 

probability of success on any claim that the press releases breached the 

Whistleblower Policy.

ii. Code of Conduct

The HFPA Code of Conduct sets forth “the values, expectations, and 

standards” of the HFPA, which its members must agree to abide by. Asi 

claims HFPA’s press releases breached the section of the Code which states 

“the HFPA will protect the reporter’s confidentiality to the fullest extent 

possible.” This section provides in pertinent part, “We encourage anyone who 

is aware of a potential violation of this Code of Conduct or any other HFPA 

policy to speak up and report any concerns. . . . Although individuals are 

encouraged to identify themselves while making reports so that any 

necessary follow-up can be undertaken, the hotline accepts anonymous 

reports. In any case, the HFPA will protect the reporter’s confidentiality to 

the fullest extent possible (although information may need to be shared to 

facilitate an investigation and response to a report).” “Reporter” in this 

context does not refer to journalists such as Asi, but rather to those who 

report violations of the Code of Conduct. As with the Whistleblower Policy, 

this section of the Code of Conduct provides confidentiality to those who 

report misconduct, not those who are accused of it. 

In the context of TheWrap’s article, Asi is not a “reporter” of 

misconduct who is guaranteed any confidentiality by the Code. Nothing in 

the Code prevents HFPA from disclosing that a member is being investigated 

or placed on probation for public accusations of sexual misconduct. Asi has 

not presented evidence demonstrating HFPA’s press releases breached any 

provision of the Code of Conduct. As a result, he has not established a 
20

probability of success on a claim for breach of contract stemming from an 

alleged breach of the Code of Conduct.

iii. Bylaws

Asi next contends the press releases violated HFPA’s Bylaws. 

Specifically, Asi points to the provision of the Bylaws which states

“[i]nformation disclosed at any meeting of the Members that is not generally 

known to the public, including Association . . . legal matters . . . shall, not be 

disclosed by Members to third parties at any time without approval of the 

Chief Executive Officer or the Board.” This language appears in section 4.16 

of Article IV of the Bylaws, which governs official meetings of HFPA’s 

members. Other sections of Article IV provide details on the scheduling and 

place of these official meetings, including sections on remote attendance, 

voting rights, and other procedural aspects of these official meetings. Section 

4.16 sets forth rules for decorum and civility at these meetings and closes 

with the language quoted by Asi regarding the confidentiality of information 

disclosed at the meetings that is not otherwise known by the general public. 

This confidentiality provision cannot support any claim for breach of 

contract in connection with the press releases. First, Asi has not offered any 

evidence showing the investigation and his probation were discussed at an 

official meeting of HFPA members pursuant to Article IV of the Bylaws. The 

confidentiality provision in question only applies to information disclosed at 

such meetings. If the investigation and his probation were not discussed at 

an official member meeting under Article IV before the press releases were

issued, the confidentiality provision in question is simply irrelevant. Second, 

by its express terms, section 4.16 only prohibits HFPA members from 

disclosing the content of meetings, it does not prohibit HFPA itself from 
21

disclosing any content discussed at these meetings. Asi has not shown this 

confidentiality provision prohibited HFPA from disclosing the information 

contained in the press releases. For these reasons, we find Asi has failed to 

establish any probability of success at showing HFPA breached the Bylaws 

by issuing the press releases.

As Asi has not put forth any evidence showing HFPA breached the 

terms of the Whistleblower Policy, Code of Conduct, or Bylaws by issuing the 

press releases, he has failed to carry his burden of establishing a probability 

of success on his claim for breach of contract in connection with the press 

releases. As Asi has failed to carry his burden under prong two, we find the 

trial court erred in denying HFPA’s motion as to this cause of action.

b. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair

Dealing

“The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every 

contract, exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly 

frustrating the other party’s right to receive the benefits of the agreement 

actually made.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349.) 

“The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing rests upon the existence 

of some specific contractual obligation.” (Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. 

Department of Parks & Recreation (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1031.) “It 

cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond 

those incorporated in the specific terms of their agreement.” (Guz, supra, 24 

Cal.4th at pp. 349–350.) “A plaintiff claiming breach must allege the 

defendant’s wrongful conduct was contrary to the contract’s purpose and the 

parties’ legitimate expectations.” (Cordoba Corp. v. City of Industry (2023) 87 

Cal.App.5th 145, 156.) “It is universally recognized the scope of conduct 
22

prohibited by the covenant of good faith is circumscribed by the purposes and 

express terms of the contract.” (Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon 

Development California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 373.)

“To prove breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 

plaintiff must show that defendants engaged in conduct which frustrated 

plaintiff’s rights to the benefits of the parties’ agreement.” (Ojjeh v. Brown

(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1037.) 

The Grievance Policy outlines certain procedures by which claims of 

misconduct are to be investigated, including whether a report will be referred

to an outside law firm, how that firm will conduct its investigation and 

prepare its report, HFPA’s obligation to maintain records relating to such 

complaints, as well as the procedure for the imposition of disciplinary 

sanctions where a report of misconduct has been substantiated. It also 

provides that members accused of sexual or physical assault will be placed on 

probation pending the outcome of an investigation. The policy does not 

contain a confidentiality provision, nor does it make any mention of 

confidentiality. As such, it does not guarantee confidentiality to the accuser 

or the accused in the context of investigations of misconduct.

Asi has not put forth any evidence or argument showing how the public 

acknowledgment that an investigation was ongoing or that he had been 

placed on probation pending the outcome of that investigation—without 

disclosing any details of the investigation itself—in any way frustrated the 

procedures or purpose of the Grievance Policy. The purpose of the Grievance 

Policy is to establish a process to investigate claims of misconduct and 

discipline members in instances where those claims are substantiated. Asi 

has not shown the press releases prevented or frustrated the procedures or 

process outlined in the Grievance Policy. Asi does not allege the press 
23

releases prevented the outside law firm from conducting an investigation 

according to the Grievance Policy, or that it jeopardized HFPA’s obligation to 

maintain records relating to reports of misconduct. He has not identified any 

provision or purpose of the policy which was frustrated by the issuance of the 

press releases.

Asi has also not offered any explanation as to how the terms of the 

Grievance Policy could give rise to a legitimate expectation that the existence 

of HFPA’s investigation and his probation would be kept confidential. We 

find no legitimate expectation of such confidentiality can be read into the 

Grievance Policy. As set forth above, the Code of Conduct and Whistleblower 

Policy make it clear that HFPA would endeavor to keep only certain aspects 

of investigations confidential; specifically, it endeavors to provide

confidentiality only to those who report misconduct, not those who are 

accused of it. In light of this limited guarantee of confidentiality, the 

Grievance Policy cannot be legitimately or reasonably read to impliedly 

guarantee confidentiality to all aspects of an investigation, including the 

existence of an investigation itself and a member’s placement on probation 

pending the results of the inquiry.

As Asi has not put forth any evidence indicating the press releases 

frustrated his rights to the benefits of the Grievance Policy, he has not 

carried his burden to establish a probability of success on the claim for breach 

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court erred in 

denying HFPA’s motion to strike this claim.
24

c. Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and

Fair Dealing

In opposing HFPA’s motion below, Asi did not offer any argument or 

evidence to establish a probability of success on his third cause of action for 

tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

Instead, he exclusively argued that the press releases did not form the basis 

of this cause of action. The same is true on appeal. HFPA argues the cause 

of action for tortious breach of the implied covenant only exists in the context 

of insurance contracts. Asi does not address this argument in his briefing.

“Because the covenant of good faith and fair dealing essentially is a 

contract term that aims to effectuate the contractual intentions of the parties, 

‘compensation for its breach has almost always been limited to contract 

rather than tort remedies.’ [Citations.] At present, this court recognizes only 

one exception to that general rule: tort remedies are available for a breach of 

the covenant in cases involving insurance policies.” (Cates Construction, Inc. 

v. Talbot Partners (1999) 21 Cal.4th 28, 43.) “[T]ort recovery is considered 

appropriate in the insurance policy setting because such contracts are 

characterized by elements of adhesion and unequal bargaining power, public 

interest and fiduciary responsibility.” (Id. at p. 52.) However, cases have 

recognized other contracts may support a claim for tortious breach of the 

implied covenant where they are “sufficiently analogous to insurance to 

support the imposition of tort liability.” (Chu v. Old Republic Home 

Protection Co., Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 346, 355 [finding home protection 

contracts are not sufficiently analogous to insurance contracts]; Cates 

Construction, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 60 [holding construction performance 

bonds are not sufficiently analogous to insurance contracts].)
25

Asi has not attempted to carry his burden to show any of the alleged 

contract documents discussed above are sufficiently analogous to insurance 

contracts to support the imposition of tort liability for breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Even if we were to assume Asi could 

validly pursue such a claim here, he has failed to carry his burden of putting 

forth evidence establishing a probability of success on the merits of such a 

claim. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in denying HFPA’s motion as 

to the third cause of action for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing.

4. Interference Claims

Asi’s fourth cause of action for intentional interference with contract 

and fifth cause of action for intentional interference with prospective 

economic relations are based on allegations that HFPA interfered with Asi’s 

relationship with the BBC and Al-Quds Al-Arabi. As the parties rely on 

similar arguments and evidence for these two claims, we will discuss them 

together.

To prevail on a cause of action for intentional interference with 

contractual relations, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of a 

valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s

knowledge of that contract; (3) the defendant’s intentional acts designed to 

induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual 

breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting 

damage. (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1148.) 

The elements of the tort of interference with prospective economic 

advantage are “(1) a relationship between the plaintiff and some third party 

with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the 
26

defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) a wrongful act, apart from the 

interference itself, by the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; 

(4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the 

plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.” (Arluk Medical 

Center Industrial Group, Inc. v. Dobler (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1340–

1341.) “The chief practical distinction between interference with contract and 

interference with prospective economic advantage is that a broader range of 

privilege to interfere is recognized when the relationship or economic 

advantage interfered with is only prospective.” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. 

Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126.)

In his complaint and briefing, Asi alleges HFPA interfered with his 

relationships with the BBC and Al-Quds Al-Arabi. In his briefing before us, 

Asi claims he was suspended by Al-Quds Al-Arabi and several unidentified 

people have declined to work with him because of the press releases. Asi’s

opposition to HFPA’s motion below did not provide evidence of any purported 

interference with his relationship with Al-Quds Al-Arabi. Asi’s declaration 

and its exhibits were the only evidence put forth by Asi in opposition to 

HFPA’s anti-SLAPP motion. Nothing in his declaration or attached exhibits 

alleges or evidences any harm to his relationship with Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 

much less any harm to that relationship stemming from the press releases. 

Asi has not established a probability of success on any claim of interference 

with his contractual or prospective relationship with Al-Quds Al-Arabi 

stemming from the press releases.4

4 The same is true with regard to Asi’s assertion that “several people” 

have refused to work with him as a result of the press releases. Nothing in 

Asi’s declaration or supporting exhibits substantiates this assertion, and it 

does not appear in Asi’s complaint. (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. 

ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 893 (Medical Marijuana, Inc.) 
27

As for the alleged interference with his relationship with the BBC, Asi 

states in his declaration that the BBC suspended him indefinitely as, “a

result of the HFPA’s statements to the media.” The only evidence offered to 

substantiate this claim is the assertion in Asi’s declaration that “My BBC 

editor informed me by telephone that the suspension was because of the 

HFPA’s announcement of the investigation and ‘sexual assault’ statements in 

the LA Times.” Asi does not identify this editor by name, nor has Asi put 

forth a declaration, affidavit, or testimony from this editor substantiating the

claim. This purported statement by Asi’s editor is unquestionably hearsay as 

it is an out of court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted: 

namely, that the BBC suspended Asi because of HFPA’s second press 

release.5 HFPA objected to this portion of Asi’s declaration as hearsay and 

was overruled by the trial court. On appeal, HFPA argues the trial court 

erred in overruling this objection. We agree.

To carry the burden under the second prong, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate the merit of the challenged claim with “‘competent admissible 

evidence.’” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co.

(2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940.) Evidence Code section 1200, subdivision (b), 

provides “hearsay evidence is inadmissible” except as otherwise provided by 

law. “[T]he hearsay rule applies” in anti-SLAPP proceedings. (Id. at p. 942.) 

[“We reiterate that the pleading itself provides the outer boundaries of the 

issues that are to be addressed in an anti-SLAPP motion”]; see also Paulus v. 

Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 672 (Paulus) [“As is true 

with summary judgment motions, the issues in an anti-SLAPP motion are 

framed by the pleadings”].)

5 Evidence Code section 1200, subdivision (a) defines hearsay as “a 

statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the 

hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.”
28

As a result, hearsay evidence “cannot be used by the plaintiff to establish a 

probability of success on the merits because it could never be introduced at 

trial.” (Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750, 776, internal quotation

marks omitted.) In ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, “declarations 

that lack foundation or personal knowledge, or that are argumentative, 

speculative, impermissible opinion, hearsay, or conclusory are to be 

disregarded.” (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 26.)

Asi does not address this issue in his briefing before us and has not 

shown an exception to the hearsay rule applies here to render this portion of 

his declaration admissible. Below, he did not dispute this section of his 

declaration was inadmissible hearsay, but claimed he would be able to 

substantiate this claim through subpoenas in discovery and thus should be 

given “leeway” to rely on hearsay evidence, citing Fashion 21 v. Coalition for 

Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1138

(Fashion 21). 

Asi’s reliance on Fashion 21 is misplaced. In Fashion 21, the Court of 

Appeal held the trial court did not commit reversible error in considering an 

unauthenticated videotape in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion to strike. (Id. 

at p. 1148.) In reaching this conclusion, the Court drew a sharp distinction 

between inadmissible hearsay and evidence that merely lacks authentication. 

“Evidence such as the videotape in this case, which is only excludable on the 

ground it lacks proper authentication, stands on a different footing in terms 

of its ability to support the plaintiffs’ cause of action. Evidence made 

inadmissible by the hearsay rule, the parol evidence rule or a privilege could 

never be introduced at trial and therefore could never support a judgment for 

the plaintiff.” (Ibid.) Fashion 21 does not permit a plaintiff to rely on 
29

inadmissible hearsay to carry its burden in opposing an anti-SLAPP motion 

to strike.

We find the trial court erred in overruling HFPA’s objection to this 

portion of Asi’s declaration. The hearsay evidence regarding the purported 

conversation between Asi and his editor at the BBC is inadmissible. The 

trial court should not have considered it in ruling on HFPA’s motion. This

hearsay statement was the sole piece of evidence put forth by Asi to establish

the press releases interfered with his relationship with the BBC. When it is 

removed from the equation, we can only conclude Asi has failed to 

demonstrate a probability of success based on alleged interference with his 

contract or relationship with the BBC.

As Asi has failed to put forth any admissible evidence showing the 

HFPA’s press releases interfered with his contract or prospective

relationships with the BBC or Al-Quds Al-Arabi, he has not carried his 

burden in establishing a probability of success on the causes of action for 

interference and the trial court erred in denying HFPA’s motion as to these 

claims.

5. Business and Professions Code section 17200

California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), codified at Business and 

Professions Code section 17200, et seq., prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or 

fraudulent business act or practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200; see Clark v. 

Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 605, 610.) A UCL plaintiff must plead and 

prove the defendant engaged in a business practice that was either unlawful 

(i.e., forbidden by law), unfair (i.e., harm to the victim outweighs any benefit),

or fraudulent (i.e., is likely to deceive members of the public). (Albillo v. 

Intermodal Container Services, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 190, 206.) “An 
30

‘unlawful’ business practice or act within the meaning of the UCL ‘is an act or 

practice, committed pursuant to business activity, that is at the same time 

forbidden by law.’” (Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America

(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 351.) 

To establish a probability of success on this claim, Asi relies on the 

assertion that HFPA breached its contracts with him by issuing the press 

releases. As we have already determined Asi has failed to establish the press 

releases breached the Whistleblower Policy, Grievance Policy, Code of 

Conduct, or Bylaws, he cannot rely on such breaches to form the predicate of 

his UCL claim. Absent such a breach, Asi has not carried his burden to 

establish the press releases were unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent. As a result, 

Asi has not established a probability of success on his UCL claim in 

connection with the press releases. The trial court thus erred in denying 

HFPA’s motion on this claim.

6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a 

plaintiff must show “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant 

with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of 

causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme 

emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional 

distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & 

Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001, internal quotation marks omitted.) To 

qualify as “outrageous,” the conduct must be so extreme as to exceed all 

bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Ibid.) Mere 

insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, or petty oppressions are not 

sufficient. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.)
31

In denying HFPA’s motion as to this claim, the trial court found Asi 

had carried his burden of showing the press releases were extreme and 

outrageous conduct because HFPA violated its procedures in issuing them. 

However, as we have determined, Asi has not shown HFPA breached any 

policy or contract in issuing the press releases. Therefore, he cannot rely on 

such claims to establish the element of extreme or outrageous conduct by 

HFPA.

6

We find Asi has failed to demonstrate HFPA’s issuance of the press 

releases was extreme or outrageous. Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 

Cal.App.4th 931 (Comstock) is instructive. The plaintiff in Comstock sued 

her employer and two coworkers for sexual assault. (Id. at pp. 934–935.) 

One of the defendant coworkers cross-complained against her, denying her 

allegations and asserting claims for defamation and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress based on the allegation that the plaintiff had falsely 

accused him of sexual assault to friends and other coworkers, as well as in 

reports made to a hospital nurse, the police, and to the company’s human 

6 On appeal, Asi argues for the first time that he can establish a 

probability of success on this claim because HFPA erroneously characterized 

the accusations against him as allegations of “sexual assault” rather than 

“sexual misconduct.” The claim does not appear in Asi’s complaint and thus 

he cannot rely on this allegation to defeat HFPA’s anti-SLAPP motion to 

strike. (Medical Marijuana, Inc., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 883 [“the act or 

acts underlying a claim for purposes of an anti-SLAPP statute is determined 

from the plaintiffs' allegations” and the court “will not ‘insert into a pleading 

claims for relief based on allegations of activities that plaintiffs simply have 

not identified’”]; Paulus, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 672.) Additionally, 

having failed to raise this argument in the trial court, Asi may not assert it 

for the first time on appeal. (In re Marriage of Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 

667, 695 [“‘“theories not raised in the trial court cannot be asserted for the 

first time on appeal”’”]; Bocanegra v. Jakubowski (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 848, 

857 [“‘“a party is not permitted to change its position on appeal and raise new 

issues not presented in the trial court”’”].) 
32

resources department. (Id. at pp. 936–937.) In response, the plaintiff 

brought an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the defendant’s cross-complaint, 

which was granted by the trial court. (Id. at p. 939.) The Court of Appeal 

affirmed, finding the defendant had not established a probability of success 

on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding “The 

complained-of conduct here—reporting a sexual assault to the Kaiser nurse 

and Kluwer’s HR department—is hardly ‘extreme and outrageous.’” (Id. at p.

954.)

HFPA’s conduct here falls well below the allegations found to be 

insufficient in Comstock. HFPA’s press releases merely confirmed HFPA was 

investigating public accusations against Asi and that Asi would be placed on 

probation pending the results of the investigation. In other words, HFPA’s 

statements acknowledged it was aware of the accusations against Asi and 

was following its internal policies in handling these allegations of 

misconduct. If accusations of sexual assault do not qualify as extreme or 

outrageous conduct, it is difficult to see how simply acknowledging an 

investigation into public claims of sexual assault or misconduct could give 

rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The press releases simply do not rise to the level of conduct which has 

been held sufficiently extreme and outrageous such as to support a claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See, e.g., Kiseskey v. Carpenters’

Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 229–230 [finding threats 

of physical harm directed at plaintiff and his family were sufficient to state a 

claim]; Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1598 [same]; Grenier 

v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471, 486–487 [finding falsely accusing 

plaintiff of being a self-confessed child molester who steals from his church 

and abuses and deals drugs, coupled with statements that plaintiffs should 
33

have their teeth knocked out and reproductive organs removed was 

sufficiently extreme and outrageous]; KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 

31 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1032 [holding that callously informing children that 

their friends had been murdered was sufficient to give rise to a claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress].)

We find Asi has failed to establish a probability of success on his claim 

for intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from HFPA’s press 

releases, and HFPA’s motion to strike this claim should have been granted.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the 

cause is remanded with directions to enter an order granting HFPA’s special 

motion to strike the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh

causes of action to the extent they are based on HFPA’s issuance of the press 

releases. HFPA is awarded its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

CURREY, P. J.

COLLINS, J.